Do you have any idea exactly how many aircraft or how many gallons of retardant were dropped on the YHF between the time we hear “Air support down there” and the time of deployment?
As we know, there was no retardant lines placed to protect Glen Isla or Yarnell in that timeframe
———————————————————————————————–
Via the Air Study Videos we have a very good record of the various drops on the fire during all of that time.
I’m writing this off the top of my head, and way past my bedtime, but I think your question is important.
Until the 4;30-ish drop that the SAIR incorrectly (imho) said Eric said ‘that’s where we want it,” the aerial fire-fighting was going on on the northeast and then east flanks of the fire. Firstly defending areas in the Model Creek Road area, and then in the Sickles Road Area.
After that, in the time framework you are speaking of, the aerial fire-fighting then turned it’s attention to the southwest part of the fire. They then managed to put in one line of retardant at around 4:30 (from, I think, about Shrine Road north-eastward), and then while they were lining up the DC-10 for a line continuing that, the Deployment happened.
After the deployment, they continued dropping retardant from the first line they put in all the way towards the northeast, to defend Yarnell.
The line Bravo 3 dropped, earlier in the day, across the bowl was basically in vain.
However, it looks to me that the lines dropped in the Model Creek Road area and across the top of Yarnell were successful, via the aerial photos in this article on this UK-based Daily Mail Website:
—————————————————————————————-
“Devastation left by ‘firestorm’ that killed 19 Arizona firefighters: Shocking aerial images show town burned to the ground by blaze”
You have to scroll down a bit to come to the actually quite interesting collection of aerial photos that show where the retardant lines stopped the fire. I’ve mapped almost all of these photos, by the way. I have absolutely no clue how they managed to obtain these photos.
PS. Given what I’ve seen in these aerial photos, it has always disturbed me that they didn’t start that line above Glen Illah. I don’t know why that was the case. I really don’t and it bothers me.
**
** EXIF METADATA SUMMARY FROM
** ALL OF THE PANEBAKER AIR STUDY VIDEOS
Below is a just a short summary of the EXIF data contained in ALL of the
Panebaker videos sitting in the online Dropbox folder.
You can see clearly below what Marti has been talking about with embedded
time stamps ( and GPS time stamps ) actually bearing no relation to the
time stamp(s) eventually used in the FILENAMES themselves.
The Nikon Coolpix seems to have been set TWO hours ahead of real time
and the filenames used for files coming from the camera were just ‘dialed back’
manually, or something.
The first SEVEN Panebaker videos show below also contain a short NOTE after
the EXIF data that tries to show how both the ‘Creation Dates’ OR the GPS
Time Stamp *may* have been used to come up with the actual time stamp
used in the video filename.
As you can see from these NOTES below… something is very strange about
where the time stamps used for the video titles actually came from. None
of them appear to be an exact match for either the ‘Creation Time’ or
the ‘GPS Time’ embedded in the movie itself.
Also note… MOST of the videos taken with the Nikon Coolpix P520 do, in fact,
have UTC based GPS timestamps… but SOME videos from the (same?)
Nikon do NOT. It is almost as if the GPS was being turned OFF on the Nikon
for only SOME of the videos shot that day.
File Name: 20130630_144226_VLAT_EP.MOV
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 16:40:52
Duration: 0:01:32
Make: NIKON COOLPIX P520
GPS Time Stamp: 21:40:46.57 UTC ( AZ 14:40:46.57 PM )
GPS Date Stamp: 2013:06:30
GPS Position: 34 deg 16′ 19.85″, 112 deg 43′ 51.89″
NOTE: GPS time stamp of 14:40:46 AZ time plus 1:32
equals 1442.18, but that is still 8 seconds shy of 1442.26.
16:40:52 plus 1:32 equals 1642.24, but subtracting two
hours manually still only gives 1442.24, which is still
two seconds shy of filename time stamp 1442.26.
File Name: 20130630_144508_EP.MOV
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 16:44:27
Duration: 0:00:40
Make: NIKON COOLPIX P520
GPS Time Stamp: 21:44:22.11 UTC ( AZ 14:44:22.11 PM )
GPS Date Stamp: 2013:06:30
GPS Position: 34 deg 16′ 19.85″, 112 deg 43′ 51.94″
NOTE: GPS time stamp of 14:44:22 AZ time plus 40 seconds
gives 1445.02, but that is still 6 seconds shy of 1445.08.
16:44:27 plus 40 seconds equals 1645.7, but subtracting two
hours manually still only gives 1445.7, which is still
ONE second shy of filename time stamp 1445.08.
File Name: 20130630_144756_SEAT_EP.MOV
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 16:45:37
Duration: 0:02:17
Make: NIKON COOLPIX P520
GPS Time Stamp: 21:45:31.97 UTC ( AZ 14:45:31.97 PM )
GPS Date Stamp: 2013:06:30
GPS Position: 34 deg 16′ 19.85″, 112 deg 43′ 51.95″
NOTE: GPS time stamp of 14:45:31 AZ time plus 2:17
gives 1447.48, but that is still 8 seconds shy of 1447.56.
16:45:37 plus 2:30 equals 1647.54, but subtracting two
hours manually still only gives 1447.54, which is still
TWO seconds shy of filename time stamp of 1447.56.
File Name: 20130630_150016_EP.MOV
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 16:59:44
Duration: 0:00:29.66
Make: NIKON COOLPIX P520
GPS Time Stamp: 21:59:39.17 UTC ( AZ 14:59:39.17 PM )
GPS Date Stamp: 2013:06:30
GPS Position: 34 deg 16′ 20.99″, 112 deg 43′ 51.82″
NOTE: GPS time stamp of 14:59:39 AZ time plus 29 seconds
gives 1500.08, but that is still 8 seconds shy of 1500.16.
16:59:44 plus 29 seconds equals 1700.13, but subtracting two
hours manually still only gives 1500.13, which is still
THREE seconds shy of filename time stamp of 1500.16.
File Name: 20130630_150530_fire_behavior_EP.MOV
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 17:05:10
Duration: 0:00:17.55
Make: NIKON COOLPIX P520
GPS Time Stamp: 22:05:05.95 UTC ( AZ 15:05:05.95 PM )
GPS Date Stamp: 2013:06:30
GPS Position: 34 deg 16′ 20.99″, 112 deg 43′ 51.82″
NOTE: GPS time stamp of 15:05:05 AZ time plus 17 seconds
gives 1505.22, but that is still 8 seconds shy of 1505.30.
17:05:10 plus 17 seconds equals 1705.27, but subtracting two
hours manually still only gives 1505.27, which is still
THREE seconds shy of filename time stamp of 1505.30.
File Name: 20130630_150822_VLAT_EP.MOV
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 17:06:28
Duration: 0:01:52
Make: NIKON COOLPIX P520
GPS Time Stamp: 22:06:23.3 UTC ( AZ 15:06:23.3 PM )
GPS Date Stamp: 2013:06:30
GPS Position: 34 deg 16′ 20.99″, 112 deg 43′ 51.82″
NOTE: GPS time stamp of 15:06:23 AZ time plus 1:52
gives 1508.15, but that is still 7 seconds shy of 1508.22.
17:06:20 plus 1:52 equals 1708.12, but subtracting two
hours manuall still only gives 1518.12, which is still
TEN seconds shy of filename time stamp of 1508.22.
File Name: 20130630_151842_fire_behavior_EP.MOV
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 17:16:50
Duration: 0:01:49
Make: NIKON COOLPIX P520
NOTE: 17:16:50 plus 1:49 equals 1718.39, but
subtracting two hours manually still only gives 1518.39,
which is still THREE seconds shy of filename time
stamp of 1518.42.
File Name: 20130630_152406_SEAT_EP.MOV
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 17:21:07
Duration: 0:02:56
Make: NIKON COOLPIX P520
GPS Time Stamp: 22:21:01.4 UTC ( AZ 15:21:01.4 PM )
GPS Date Stamp: 2013:06:30
GPS Position: 34 deg 16′ 20.18″, 112 deg 43′ 51.71″
File Name: 20130630_153014_SEAT_EP.MOV
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 17:29:02
Duration: 0:01:10
Make: NIKON COOLPIX P520
GPS Time Stamp: 22:28:57.45 UTC ( AZ 15:28:57.45 PM )
GPS Date Stamp: 2013:06:30
GPS Position: 34 deg 16′ 20.14″, 112 deg 43′ 51.73″
File Name: 20130630_153414_EP.MOV
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 17:34:01
Duration: 12.38 s
Make: NIKON COOLPIX P520
GPS Time Stamp: 22:33:56.38 UTC ( AZ 15:33:56.38 PM )
GPS Date Stamp: 2013:06:30
GPS Position: 34 deg 16′ 19.98″, 112 deg 43′ 51.79″
File Name: 20130630_153510_EP.MOV
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 17:34:42
Duration: 23.62 s
Make: NIKON COOLPIX P520
GPS Time Stamp: 22:34:37.65 UTC ( AZ 15:34:37.65 PM )
GPS Date Stamp: 2013:06:30
GPS Position: 34 deg 16′ 19.96″, 112 deg 43′ 51.79″
File Name: 20130630_153532_EP.MOV
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 17:35:13
Duration: 1.17 s
Make: NIKON COOLPIX P520
GPS Time Stamp: 22:35:07.87 UTC ( AZ 15:35:07.87 PM )
GPS Date Stamp: 2013:06:30
GPS Position: 34 deg 16′ 19.95″, 112 deg 43′ 51.80″
File Name: 20130630_153622_5KA_EP.MOV
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 17:35:38
Duration: 0:00:43
Make: NIKON COOLPIX P520
GPS Time Stamp: 22:35:33.09 UTC ( AZ 15:35:33.09 PM )
GPS Date Stamp: 2013:06:30
GPS Position: 34 deg 16′ 19.94″, 112 deg 43′ 51.80″
File Name: 20130630_154138_fire_behavior_EP.MOV
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 17:41:06
Duration: 0:00:31
Make: NIKON COOLPIX P520
GPS Time Stamp: 22:41:01.07 UTC ( AZ 15:41:01.07 PM )
GPS Date Stamp: 2013:06:30
GPS Position: 34 deg 16′ 19.84″, 112 deg 43′ 51.83″
File Name: 20130630_154940_SEAT_EP.MOV
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 17:48:21
Duration: 0:01:18
Make: NIKON COOLPIX P520
GPS Time Stamp: 22:48:15.97 UTC ( AZ 15:48:15.97 PM )
GPS Date Stamp: 2013:06:30
GPS Position: 34 deg 16′ 19.76″, 112 deg 43′ 51.84″
File Name: 20130630_161620_VLAT_split_1_EP.MOV
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 18:12:48
Duration: 0:03:31
Make: NIKON COOLPIX P520
GPS Time Stamp: 23:12:43.83 UTC ( AZ 16:12:43.83 PM )
GPS Date Stamp: 2013:06:30
GPS Position: 34 deg 16′ 19.92″, 112 deg 43′ 50.16″
File Name: 20130630_161658_EP.MOV
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 18:16:41
Duration: 15.75 s
Make: NIKON COOLPIX P520
GPS Time Stamp: 23:16:36.24 UTC ( AZ 16:16:36.24 PM )
GPS Date Stamp: 2013:06:30
GPS Position: 34 deg 16′ 19.90″, 112 deg 43′ 50.35″
File Name: 20130630_161858_VLAT_split_2_EP.MOV
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 18:17:07
Duration: 0:01:49
Make: NIKON COOLPIX P520
GPS Time Stamp: 23:17:02.62 UTC ( AZ 16:17:02.62 PM )
GPS Date Stamp: 2013:06:30
GPS Position: 34 deg 16′ 19.88″, 112 deg 43′ 50.40″
File Name: 20130630_162300_SEAT_drop_EP.MOV
Make: Canon EOS REBEL T3i
Lens Type: Canon EF-S 15-85mm f/3.5-5.6 IS USM
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 16:23:34
Internal Serial Number: ZA2261150
Serial Number: 152066061038
Lens Info: 15-85mm f/?
Lens Serial Number: 000013b95c
** WHY IS THIS TIME DIFFERENT FROM 16:23:34?
Create Date: 2013:06:30 16:23:01
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 16:23:01
Duration: 11.78 s
Create Date: 2013:06:30 16:23:34.00
Date/Time Original: 2013:06:30 16:23:34.00
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 16:23:34.00
File Name: 20130630_162508_2SEATS_EP.MOV
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 18:23:17
Duration: 0:01:50
Make: NIKON COOLPIX P520
GPS Time Stamp: 23:23:11.9 UTC ( AZ 16:23:11.9 PM )
GPS Date Stamp: 2013:06:30
GPS Position: 34 deg 16′ 19.82″, 112 deg 43′ 50.86″
Wait, what?? I’m not sure you explained that right.
Panebaker’s Nikon and Canon t3i are one hour ahead of Arizona time, because Arizona time is not Mountain Daylight Savings Time, the time Panebaker set his cameras to.
If anybody working on these files, unless they were in a serious hurry, or didn’t care whether it made sense dealing with an Arizona fire, should have known how to do this. Somebody apparently didn’t.
So first you have to set the camera’s timestamp back one hour, in order to sync to other Arizona-set cameras (like the one used on the Air2Air videos, and just about every other camera used on that fire).
Then you have to translate that to the military time — (the 24 hour clock) format they’re using on these filenames.
It seems crazy complicated, for people who don’t understand it. But it’s not really.
So, for example, a photo or video, taken by Panebaker, who lives in Montana and had set his two cameras to Mountain Daylight Savings Time, should have been re-timestamped, by whoever was preparing these files for this, back one hour. Say from 4:16:24 PM to 3:16:24 PM. Then, in order to accurately translate that into the “military 24-hour” format they chose to use to name these files for this kind of important publication, they would then “add” 12 hours to it (to count from midnight of the beginning of that day), to get to 151624. That’s how you do this. That’s what everybody does when they do this, That’s what I’ve been doing all along. For people hired/payed to do it, I would think it would been a “no-brainer.”
They could have absolutely cleanly and quickly and accurately renamed these files without confusion. I have no clue why they didn’t.
Marti… yes… this confused me as well when I finally
did an EXIF dump on ALL of Panebaker Apple Quicktime
movies and then looked at the dates coming OUT of
the movie files themselves. ( EXIF metadata ).
You ALREADY said the Nikon Coolpix P250 was set
ONE hour ahead of time… but the ‘Creation Date’ being
stamped into the movies themselves says that it was
TWO hours behind the ‘real Arizona time’ that day.
Let me take just ONE of the EXIF metadata dumps
from above and see if I can show you what I mean…
Let’s take just THIS one ( since it also has GPS data )…
_______________________________________________
File Name: 20130630_144226_VLAT_EP.MOV
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 16:40:52
Duration: 0:01:32
Make: NIKON COOLPIX P520
GPS Time Stamp: 21:40:46.57 UTC ( AZ 14:40:46.57 PM )
GPS Date Stamp: 2013:06:30
GPS Position: 34 deg 16′ 19.85″, 112 deg 43′ 51.89″
NOTE: GPS time stamp of 14:40:46 AZ time plus 1:32
equals 1442.18, but that is still 8 seconds shy of 1442.26.
16:40:52 plus 1:32 equals 1642.24, but subtracting two
hours manually still only gives 1442.24, which is still
two seconds shy of filename time stamp 1442.26.
_______________________________________________
The FILENAME ended up in the ‘1400’ timerange… but
the ‘Creation Date’ ( according to the Nikon ) was TWO
HOURS ahead of that… in the ‘1600’ hour.
Now there is this…
GPS Time Stamp: 21:40:46.57 UTC ( AZ 14:40:46.57 PM )
That is actually CORRECT.
Timestamp that went into the movie itself was in the
‘1400’ hour ALREADY… and not TWO HOURS ahead
in the ‘1600’ hour as the Nikon’s own timeclock thought.
Well… when I say CORRECT… I mean the HOUR was
correct according to UTC time. ( 1400 hour ).
As explained above, however… I don’t think this is simply
a case where they ended up just taking the GPS time
and using that for the FILENAME itself.
The GPS time stamp of 14:40:46 AZ time plus the
1:32 media duration time embedded in the movie
itself equals 1442.18, but that is still 8 seconds shy of 1442.26 ( which is what they actually NAMED it ).
So ‘eight seconds’ are ‘missing’, even if they were
just referring to the embedded GPS time for filenames…
…but my point is that the HOUR is CORRECT ( according
to the GPS stamp )… and it is TWO hours ahead of the
‘Creation date’ stamped by the Nikon’s own clock setting.
UPDATE: The ‘EXIF metadata’ dump for the Panebaker videos
posted above in this Chapter 6 has been updated and
re-posted at the bottom ( the START ) of the new Chapter 7.
The list above actually has a couple of Panebaker videos
missing. The new list over in Chapter 7 is complete and
has all 31 Panebaker videos listed.
Here is a direct link to the *new* Chapter VII ( SEVEN ) of this ongoing discussion where the *new* EXIF report is posted…
**
** USING AN ONLINE EXIF METADATA EXTRACTOR WITH AIR STUDY
** VIDEOS WITHOUT HAVING TO DOWNLOAD THE VIDEOS
The same ‘online’ tool that can be used to easily extract EXIF metatdata from
any photograph can ALSO be used to pull a ton of metadata out of Apple
Quicktime movie format ( MOV ) files… ( like the Panebaker Air Study videos
in the online DropBox )… but it’s a little trickier to do than just analyzing
a ‘photograph’ in Mr. Dougherty’s online Drobox.
To analyze any PHOTOGRAPH in the online Dropbox… all you have to do
is select the photo… let it appear… then use the ‘View Original’ option by
either right-clicking the image or from the little ‘three dot’ menu option that
is always in the lower right corner when a photo is being displayed.
When the original photo appears… you just ‘cut and paste’ the URL that is now
showing in your browser’s address bar into the ‘View Image at URL’ input
box over in the EXIF online tool page.
You have to do this ‘View Original’ thing because the online Dropbox page
that normally (first) shows a photo to you is just an HTML ‘container’ and
that URL is NOT a ‘direct link’ to the photo itself.
In order for the online EXIF extractor to work… it simply needs a URL that
represents the location of the ACTUAL image ( and not a web page URL ).
Okay… all well and good… but here come the problem with trying to do the
same thing with the online Apple Quicktime movies ( like the Panebaker Air
Study videos ) that are also sitting in the online Dropbox.
When you choose to ‘play a movie’ up there in the Dropbox… right-clicking
the movie player when it appears does NOT give you the same ‘View original’
option as when viewing a still photo. Likewise… when it’s a movie being shown
in the online Dropbox… there is no ‘View original’ menu option if you click the
little ‘three dot’ menu in the lower right corner.
So if you just ‘cut and paste’ the URL of the Dropbox movie player into the
online EXIF extractor tool… it simply comes back and says “Invalid URL. This
is a web page and not a direct link to the item.”
Not to worry. Here is how to essentially do the same ‘View original’ option
for MOVIES up at that Dropbox… even though there is no such menu option.
You have to PRETEND as if you want to DOWNLOAD the movie… but
you still don’t have to actually download it.
When the movie you want to pull the EXIF data from is showing on the screen
with the big RIGHT-ARROW ‘Play’ button already showing… just mouse down
to the bottom right of the panel and LEFT-CLICK that little ‘three dot’ menu icon.
Only one option will be on the popup menu… and it says ‘Download’.
Do NOT LEFT-CLICK that option ( that will start the download ).
Do a RIGHT-CLICK instead.
A RIGHT-CLICK will bring up a ‘System menu’ that should have the
following option on it ( among others )…
“Copy Link Location”
Left-click click that option on this second popup menu.
This will copy the ACTUAL URL of where that original movie
file is really located up there at the Dropbox into your clipboard.
Once you have done the “Copy Link Location” operation… just switch right
over to the online EXIF extractor page and then do a ‘paste’ of that Link
into the ‘Image URL’ input box at the top of the page… then just RIGHT-CLICK
the ‘View Image at URL’ option.
That’s all there is to it.
The online tool now knows exactly where to get its OWN copy of the movie from
the Drobox… and will do so ‘in the background’ at backbone speed… and will then
show you the extracted EXIF data for that MOVIE. If it’s one of the larger movie
files you WILL have to ‘wait’ just a bit while the online server obtains its own
copy of the movie to analyze… but it won’t take long.
NOTE: You may see the online EXIF tool ‘loading’ icon just keep ‘spinning’
even after the EXIF data appears because it is still trying to display frames
from the movie on the same page. Once you are done cutting/pasting the
EXIF data into some other place of your own it’s probably best to CLOSE
that copy of the EXIF tool window so your CPU doesn’t keep spinning.
** GPS TIME STAMPS IN THE PANEBAKER VIDEOS
The Nikon Coolpix P520 camera being used for most of the Panebaker
videos was, in fact, using GPS and MOST of the videos taken with that
camera also have a ‘real time’ GPS time/date stamp. SOME of the same
videos from the same camera do NOT ( almost as if GPS was being
turned OFF at various time ).
If there IS any GPS data in a movie… it WILL be displayed by the online tool
and it will look like this…
Target image: /Panebaker/Video/Video/20130630_161658_EP
Date/Time Original 2013:06:30 18:16:41
GPS Time Stamp: 23:16:36.24 UTC
GPS Date Stamp: 2013:06:30
GPS Version ID: 2.3.0.0
GPS Latitude Ref: North
GPS Latitude: 34.272193 degrees
GPS Longitude Ref: West
GPS Longitude: 112.730652 degrees
GPS Altitude Ref: Above Sea Level
GPS Altitude: 1292.1 m
GPS Img Direction Ref: Unknown ()
GPS Img Direction: undef
GPS Map Datum: WGS84
Arizona is -7 ( minus SEVEN ) hours in relation to GPS UTC time.
That means…
When UTC hour is 2100… it is 1400 ( 2:00 PM ) in Arizona
When UTC hour is 2200… it is 1500 ( 3:00 PM ) in Arizona
When UTC hour is 2300… it is 1600 ( 4:00 PM ) in Arizona.
When UTC hour is 0000… it is 1700 ( 5:00 PM ) in Arizona
etc…
>> On May 18, 2014 at 4:48 am, calvin said:
>> The Panebaker VLAT pictures labeled 1715′ish are incorrect. These pictures
>> are actually the split drop from the VLAT from 1617. I am not sure if this is
>> relevant, or if it has already been identified.
It’s VERY relevant.
One of those 1715’ish Panebaker still photos ( the one named 20130630_171528-1_EP ) is the one that is a PERFECT match for the Tom
Story photo that was (supposedly) shot at 1639 ( according to the timestamp
on Story’s Canon 1D with the 300mm zoom lens attached ).
So however *wrong* the Panebaker still photos are ( being shot with his
own Canon EOS REBEL T3i camera )… that is ALSO how ‘wrong’ the
Tom Story Canon EOS 1D photo timestamps are.
So there appear to be TWO ‘wrong offsets’ involved here now…
1) How *wrong* was Panebaker’s Canon EOS REBEL T3i that day?
2) Answer to (1) determines how *wrong* Tom Story’s Canon EOS 1D really was.
As much as there is no evidence that there was a VLAT drop at 1639 that
day ( the moment of Steed’s first MAYDAY ) as suggested by Tom Story’s
photos… there is also now actually no real evidence there was a VLAT drop at
exactly 1715, either ( as indicated by Panebaker’s still photos ).
There is no doubt they were BOTH photographing the ‘same VLAT drop’…
but there is still plenty of doubt as to exactly WHEN that was.
So regardless of how the ‘162300 video mystery’ pans out on the other
thread… this thread needs to ‘revisit’ the Panebaker 1715 series and
find out what the ‘wrong time offset’ for THAT camera really was.
More on this later.
Back to looking at video stillframes and comparing them to still photos.
**
** PROBLEM SOLVED?
**
** NEW TIME OFFSETS FOR BOTH…
**
** PANEBAKER’S CANON EOS REBEL T3i
** TOM STORY’S CANON EOS 1D ( WITH 300mm LENS )
As it turns out… thanks to the fact that the audio tracks of the
Panebaker Air Study Videos were capturing ‘shutter clicks’…
this wasn’t all that hard to figure out.
As calvin pointed out… the Panebaker 1715’ish photo series
( regardless of timestamp ) are ACTUALLY photos of the FIRST
VLAT PASS that was part of that ‘VLAT split’ sequence taken
almost an HOUR earlier than 1715.
The Panebaker Air Study video that captures the ACTUAL (correct)
VLAT drop which corresponds to BOTH the Tom Story 7093 photo
( with an incorrect timestamp of 1639.21 ) AND the Panebaker
20130630_171528-1_EP photo ( with an incorrect timestamp of
1715.28 ) is this one…
20130630_161620_VLAT_split_1_EP
This video is 3 minutes and 30 seconds long.
VIDEO 161620 STARTS AT 1612.50 ( 4:12.50 PM )
+2:27 ( 16:15.17 / 4:15.17 PM )
Shutter click that matches Panebaker still photo 20130630_171528-1_EP *and* Tom Story’s 7093 still photo.
VIDEO 161620 ENDS AT 1616.20 ( 4:16.20 PM )
So that means the TIME setting on Panebaker’s Canon EOS
REBEL T3i was actually 1 hour and 11 seconds AHEAD of the
time of the video camera that was recording the 161620 video
that day.
( 1715.28 minus 1615.17 equals 1 hour and 11 seconds ).
So… how does that now affect the ‘time offset’ for Story’s
Canon EOS 1D?
Well… since we NOW know that the actual EVENT being
photographed by Tom Story’s 7093 photo with his Canon
EOS 1D took place at exactly 1615.17 that day… and Story’s
Canon EOS 1D put a *wrong* timestamp of 1639.21 on that
photo… the ‘difference’ between those times would be…
24 minutes and 4 seconds.
( 1639.21 minus 1615.17 equals 24 minutes and 4 seconds ).
So Tom Story’s Canon EOS 1D appears to have been set
24 minutes and 4 seconds AHEAD of the ‘real’ time that day
( if we accept that the video camera on the tripod shooting Air
Study videos was, itself, set close to the ACTUAL time that day ).
SUMMARY…
** Panebaker’s Canon EOS REBEL T3i camera was timestamping
photos 1 hour and 11 second AHEAD of ‘real time’ that day.
** Tom Story’s Canon EOS 1D camera was timestamping
photos 24 minutes and 4 seconds AHEAD of ‘real time’ that day.
See what I wrote below about syncing 152406_SEAT with the 1544 Air2Air video.
Now thinking about that 162300_SEAT_drop video. I couldn’t figure out where it came from. It’s not from any of the cameras we’re seeing most of the video from. It’s totally different. I had been wondering “Where did Panebeker get that video from??”
Now that all makes sense. He was shooting stills with the t3i, with a, as you have found, camera set ahead one hour (which actually would be correct in any Mountain Time place other than Arizona — which doesn’t observe Daylight Savings Time), and he decided to shoot that drop as a video.
So whoever was file-naming Panebeker’s t3i’s photos/video didn’t know that and thus incorrectly named the files.
It really makes me wonder who was naming these files. They made so many mistakes it makes it hard to believe it was someone on “their team.” I think if it was somebody on “their team” they would have been going more for syncing accuracy and would have been more clued in.
Just my somewhat brain dead at this pont opinion.
I think here’s still a lot of timestamp wonkiness on the Nikon videos. Bit I have somewhat of a killer day in front of me, so I don’t know when I’ll be able to get back to it.
We are still putting a lot of ‘trust’ into the existing
filename time/date stamps of the Panebaker
Air Study videos… but I still think it’s OK to do
that ( given exceptions like the 162300 video ).
Example… even for the NEW ‘time offsets’ for
Panebaker’s Canon REBEL and Story’s EOS 1D,
I am obviously ‘trusting’ the fact that the following
Panebaker video is ( at least ) CLOSE to the
REAL time that day…
20130630_161620_VLAT_split_1_EP
As you just pointed out… events in these Panebaker
videos *ARE* ‘traceable’ back into the long-running
Air-To-Air channel videos… and usually ( at least )
these TWO video cameras match up pretty
well, time wise.
So what are the odds that BOTH the camera on
the tripod recording the Panebaker videos *AND*
the camera on the tripod that was recording the
long-running Air-To-Air channel traffic are *BOTH*
set incorrectly… but still within a few seconds
of each other?
I don’t know… but I would say ‘slim to none’.
The fact that the Air-To-Air traffic captures
eventually ‘line up’ ( timewise ) with the actual
MAYDAY calls and the deployment events seems
to indicate that the camera doing the Air-To-Air
channel captures that day was pretty much set to
the ‘right time’ that day… so anything from
Panebaker that ‘matches’ up with dialogue in an
Air-To-Air capture can/should also be considered
‘the right time’ that day.
At one point… I tried to match up an event in either
a Panebaker video OR the Air-To-Air videos with
something from the Blue Ridge GPS unit ( which
was using satellite real-time that day )…
…but that turned out to be pretty much like putting
a square peg into a round hole. I can’t find any
DIRECT correlation between a GPS stamped
event in the Blue Ridge data with an Air-To-Air
channel transmission and/or a Panebaker video
radio capture. Close… but still guesswork.
When I set out on THAT quest… I was hoping to
actually find a TAC channel capture in an Air
Study video that matched the moment when
Frisby told Brown to ‘get some drivers to move
vehicles’. That is still, of course, the EXACT
moment when Brown did his ‘about face’ on
his hike on the Cutover Trail… which was
captured by his GPS unit.
No such luck. None of that ‘rescuing Brendan’ and
the immediate ‘moving vehicles’ radio traffic seems
to have been captured in any Air Study video.
The only line we NOW have to the Blue Ridge GPS
unit and the Panebaker videos is this ‘indirect’ line…
1) Blue Ridge GPS event ( ATV leaving parking lot )
was used to verify that Story’s Canon 3D was
‘accurate’ that day ( within 45 to 50 seconds of
real time ).
2) Story’s photos can be used to ‘match’ events
in Panebaker videos to determine ‘accuracy’
as related to Blue Ridge GPS unit.
So any Tom Story Canon 3D photo that matches
a moment in a Panebaker video almost exactly
is a good ‘indirect’ line of proof back to the
GPS based satellite time that day.
But as we have already discovered… ANYTHING
within 60 seconds or so is going to have to be
considered ‘accurate’ for this day in Yarnell.
Even the GPS unit was only ‘updating’ every
60 seconds that day.
Interestingly, tho, the camera timestamp on the first of those three videos says 6:12:48 PM.
So now I’m thinking the the Panebaker Nikon (source of these videos) is also one hour ahead, just like the Panebaker t3i. And that would make perfect sense, all things considered. The must both be Panebaker’s cameras, and he must live outside of Arizona,with his cameras synced to Mountain Daylight Savings time.
Still, however, I’m seeing quite a few of my representative samples of this videos, in which the File Namer, both not realizing those two cameras were “off” by an hour and getting confused as to how to translate the stamps from “4:30 PM” to “1630” goes back and forth between translating them correctly and translating them incorrectly.
I think the “Air2Air” Contour +2 videocam is accurate, both in names and timestamps, essentially.
I’m looking at 20130630_1628_EP.MOV. The timestamp says 3:47:58 PM. Which would relatively accurately indicate the video was started at 3:47 PM (1547) and end at 4:28 PM (1628), and it’s a 40-minute video. So that works.
Reply to Marti Reed post on
May 19, 2014 at 12:06 pm
>> Marti said…
>> I think the “Air2Air” Contour +2
>> videocam is accurate, both in
>> names and timestamps,
>> essentially.
Totally agree… it is ‘consistent’ with
its own timestamps and filenames
*AND* it *ALSO* seems to have
been set pretty close to the ‘real
time’ ( well, as close as anything
was that day, anyway ).
That video is actually 40 minutes and 14 seconds long… but that didn’t
throw anything off as far as the file
naming went.
1547.58 plus 40 minutes and 14
seconds is 1628.12.
Still ‘right on the money’ and still means the ‘1628’ in the filename is
CORRECT.
I think *all* of the Air-To-Air channel
videos are just as ‘tickety-boo’ with
regards to start times, durations, end
times ( and resulting filename stamp ).
The Panebaker videos… well… ( as
you pointed out already )… that’s
a whole ‘nother story.
It’s like ‘follow the bouncing timestamps’ for those puppies.
More later.
PS: A number of the Nikon Panebaker videos DO, in fact, have UTC GPS time and date stamps embedded in them… and I’m currently trying to see how that factors into things here.
Something is ‘strange’ about even these UTC GPS timestamps, however, and there seems to be a ‘pattern’ there but can’t quite explain it yet. They are always about 8 to 10 seconds BEHIND the other timestamps but its not totally consistent from video to video.
OK I’m back from driving, with a swollen sprained foot, clear across town and back in heavy traffic. I had some time to think.
I DON’T think it’s OK to be “putting a lot of ‘trust’ into the filename time/date stamps” on those videos.
I didn’t have time nor drive space to download all those videos, but of the eight I did, they were ALL incorrectly labeled. The five that are kinda sorta right, like 152406 and 150530 is only right because the renamer just read 5:21:07 PM and just stuck a 1 in front of that, not knowing the camera stamp was an hour ahead. So, purely by mistake those ended up with the “right” filenames.
The other three of those eight, are misnamed, because the renamer, while getting the translation right, didn’t now the camera stamp was off by an hour. So anybody that doesn’t know that camera is off by an hour, is gonna either misinterpret or misunderstand what they’re looking at.
If I could download all those files, which I can’t, I could easily and quickly make a list of those videos with correct filenames. I think it would be well worth doing, now that we know what the problem is.
And I think they should be corrected for Arizona time, which Panebeker didn’t, so they can be synced more “trustworthily” with all the other stuff people are comparing them to.
Can you do that with your online file metadata reader?
I’ve used a lot of Jeffrey’s Lightroom Plugin. His stuff is quite good. I think I’m gonna download and try out this, and also his Exif Viewer for Lightroom.
It actually SAYS it supports MOV Quicktime… but I haven’t been able to get it to successfully analyze any of the Panebaker videos.
Problem with the online tool and using it with the YFH Dropbox is that you have to do ‘View Original’ on any photo and use THAT URL for the EXIF viewer.
If you just call up an Apple Quicktime movie via the dropbox and try to use that URL… it just says “Invalid URL… this is just a web page”.
There is no ‘View original’ option for the movies in the online Drobox, as there is with photos.
You can also try to analyze any ‘downloaded’ videos… but problem there is that the online tool then has to UPLOAD the entire frickin’ thing before it can ‘analyze’ it. Not workable with some of these Air Study videos.
So a desktop tool like exiftool v9.6 is what I’ve been using to analyze the Apple Quicktime movies.
Scratch my comment
above. I just figured out HOW to use that ‘online tool’ to analyze the Apple Quicktime MOV files that are actually sitting in the online YHF Dropbox.
You have to sort of ‘fool’ it and pretend to ‘download’ the video… without actually downloading it.
See a new parent comment up above about how to actually do this.
Ha Ha remember when we spent several days syncing Tom’s D1????
I said I thought it was 22 minutes ahead and you estimated somewhere around 30 minutes ahead?
I had reasons to not want you to be right because of how that would skew my syncing of Tom’s photo of the VLAT after Blue Ridge McCord’s “almost fiasco with the helicopter” video!!
WTKTT: I hate to ask too much of you, and I know we’re all breathlessly waiting/hoping/praying for a Chapter VII, but…
I think it would be enormously useful if you could write up a summary of this whole Panebaker exploration. I can’t do it because I don’t know what all is in your head. I’ve pretty much written/thunk out loud what’s been in mine.
I think it’s really important for folks coming here to understand this, and I don’t think they will by trying to read/comprehend these four days of complicated/convoluted threads.
Marti… I did a ‘dump’ up above of the EXIF data ( including
GPS time stamps ) from the Panebaker videos… but that
was before I read your comment above.
That ‘dump’ is NOT my idea of a ‘summary’ as to where
we reallly stand with these Panebaker videos.
I will do that additional ‘summary’ and post it as well.
It’s actually looking pretty clear.
I no longer think ( at the moment ) that 162300 video
was ‘replacing’ anything at all. It was just a ‘screw up’.
What amazes me is that these guys were getting PAID
to do this ‘Aerial Firefighting Study’ ( With taxpayer dollars
from USDA? )… but they didn’t even bother to make sure
their equipment was all ‘good to go’ with correct timestamps
and whatnot that day.
**
** UPDATE: MORE ABOUT THE 162300 AIR STUDY VIDEO
**
** MYSTERY SOLVED?
>> Marti wrote…
>> Was the Nikon’s timestamper generally off? I don’t know.
>> Periodically, a photo was taken on that camera. The photos
>> are in the Schultz folder.
>> 20130630_1616_AZ-A1S-000688_T911___7_G_RS.JPG
>> (Please dear Universe, don’t ever compel me to type that out
>> on my iPad ever again…) is of the T11 coming out of one of the
>> split drops and has a time stamp of 4:16:36 PM. Boom!
>> As in that’s pretty accurate, relatively speaking, given that we
>> don’t have any absolute time stamps on any of these files, because
>> it just doesn’t work that way in the real world, unless somebody
>> decides to make it do that.
Marti…
Couple of things.
You are right. There is no doubt that even though they DO capture the same
SINGLE SEAT drop… the 152406 video and the 162300 video were shot with
TWO different video cameras.
The 152406 video was shot with a video camera on a TRIPOD… while the
162300 video was shot with a ‘handheld’ video camera.
So which one has the *REAL* timestamp?
I believe it’s the 152406 video.
The following photo in the Swartz folder DOES, in fact, appear to be a still photo
of the EXACT SAME DROP that we see happening in BOTH the 152406 video
*and* the 162300 video.
/AerialFirefightingstudy/Swartz/Pictures/Nikon/North of Fire/Seat Drop 3/
20130630_1524_AZ-A1S-000688_T874___1_G_RS.JPG
Camera: Nikon COOLPIX P520
Lens: 107 mm (Max aperture f/3)
Exposure: Auto exposure, Program AE, 1/250 sec, f/4.9, ISO 160
Flash: Off, Did not fire
Focus: AF-S, Mid-left
Focus 2: AF Area Mode: Dynamic Area
Date: June 30, 2013 – 3:24:31 PM
Location: Latitude/longitude: 34° 16′ 19.7″ North, 112° 43′ 51.9″ West
Location decimal: ( 34.272152, -112.731085 )
Altitude: 1,375.3 m
File: 3,672 × 4,896 JPEG (18.0 megapixels)
If we are going to trust the timestamps on the Swartz photos… then this simply
CONFIRMS that the drop actually did take place in the 1524 timeframe… and
*NOT*( in the 1623 timeframe as the 162300 video seems to suggest.
Things are *still* just a ‘little wonky’ timewise, however, but ( I believe ) fully
explainable now.
The timestamp on Swartz’s photo showing the actual moment of ‘retardant
dropping’ from this single SEAT is 1524.31.
That does NOT match the actual ‘drop time’ for this single SEAT drop as
shown in the 152406 video… but it may be ‘close enough’.
Here is the actual ‘moment of the drop’ as recorded starting at the +2:05
second mark in the 152406 video…
__________________________________________________________________
+2:05 ( 1523.15 / 3:23.15 PM )
(Foreground person 1 – Panebaker?): Here he comes.
+2:19 ( 1523.29 / 3:23.29 PM )
( RETARDANT DROP STARTS FROM THE SINGLE SEAT )
+2:19 ( 1523.29 / 3:23.29 PM )
(AA – Rory Collins): Okay… Ahhhh… we’ll probly be around there
in about five. Umm… What’s your plan on the ground?
+2:20 ( 1523.30 / 3:23.30 PM )
( RETARDANT IS NOW FULLY DROPPING FROM THE SINGLE SEAT )
+2:27 ( 1523.37 / 3:23.37 PM )
(OPS1 Todd Abel): What I’d like to do… ah… is… ah… tie into ( that court here? ) where ya
see the whole ??. If we can tag onto the road up here and then just run it… ah… you know…
( transmission breaks up and cuts off ).
FOREGROUND OVERLAP…
+2:27 ( 1523.37 / 3:23.37 PM )
(Tanker 810): Eight one zero OFF… hard right.
(B33 – French): Lookin’ like you already got me in sight…
looks like your drop went in there good. Thank you.
(Tanker 810): ( Back to ?? )
__________________________________________________________________
So… according to the 152406 video… the ‘moment of the drop’ appears to have
been from a START time of +2:19 ( 1523.29 / 3:23.29 PM ) to ‘fully dropping
retardant’ ( as seen in the Swartz photo ) at +2:20 ( 1523.30 / 3:23.30 PM ).
However… the timestamp on Swartz’s photo for that same ‘fully dropping
retardant’ moment is 1524.31 ( 3:24.31 PM ).
That’s pretty much a full 61 seconds different ( ahead of the video )… but it IS
definitely *within* 61 seconds… which we might have to simply accept as
‘accurate enough to be the same moment’.
I believe this Swartz photo IS of the same exact ‘single SEAT drop’ moment
as seen in the 152406 video… but Swartz’s camera was simply *about* 61
seconds AHEAD of that camera on the tripod that day.
The other reason I believe that Swartz’s photo MUST be of the same drop being
shown in the 152406 video is that even if that SEAT was making MULTIPLE drops
at that location… the simple 61 second time difference is NOT enough time for
his photo to have been of a full ‘go around’ and/or ANOTHER drop by the same
SEAT at the same location.
Not only is there no indication of that happening in the audio or the Air-To-Air
channel traffic… 61 seconds is NOT enough time for them to have made a
complete ‘circle around’ for another pass… either BEFORE or AFTER this
drop captured in the 152606 video.
Also note…
At +2:14 in the 152406 video a white SUV passes the camera heading
west on Hays Ranch Road. The same white SUV is also seen in the
162300 video just a few hundred feet further west on Hays Ranch Road.
No big additional revelation there… just more proof that the 152406 video
and the 162300 video are ‘of the same event happening at the same time’.
So what does all this now mean?
I believe it means the following…
1) There is no doubt that the Swartz photo, the +2:18 second mark in the
152406 video, and the contents of the 162300 video are all THE SAME
SINGLE SEAT DROP being photographed/videoed with 1 digital camera
( Swartz’s ) and TWO different video cameras ( one on tripod, one handheld ).
2) The Swartz photo verifies that the drop really did take place right around
1523.30 that day… and NOT in the 1623 timeframe as the mysterious 162300
video seems to suggest. Swartz’s digitial camera was simply +61 seconds
ahead of the time set on the video camera that was on the tripod that day.
3) The 162300 video *could* just simply be a ‘renaming error’ on Panebaker’s
( or someone else’s? ) part and he really did just mean it to have a filename
of 152300 instead ( even though even that timestamp would not be totally
accurate ). It was NOT an ‘extraction’ from the actual 152406 video that was
then ‘saved to disk’ with a wrong filename… it was the 11.7 seconds from the
OTHER handheld video camera that was (somehow) saved/named with
*WRONG* timestamp about 1 hour into the future.
So… mystery solved?
There WAS no *original* 162300 video at all? ( or at least not one that got
‘replaced’ with 11.7 seconds from another video? ).
This was just some kind of RENAMING error on TWO (different) videos from
TWO different cameras that DO show the same SEAT drop event happening
circa 1523.30 that day?
>> Marti…
>> At exactly +4 seconds in the 11.7 second 162300 video… a
>> shutter click is heard. It comes right after OPS1 Todd Abel
>> says “Go ahead” and then Air Attack Rory Collins starts his
>> “Okay… uh… we’ll probly be around there in about five”
>> response.
>>
>> The ‘shutter click’ also comes at the exact moment that the
>> retardant flow was turned on during this SEAT drop captured
>> in the 162300 video.
>>
>> The SAME EXACT ‘shutter click’ is also heard at the SAME
>> EXACT moment at the +2:20 mark in the 152406 video ( an
>> hour earlier? ) and is part of the same 11 seconds from
>> 152406 ‘duplicated’ as the content of 162300.
>>
>> I can’t seem to find a match for this still photo in ANY of the
>> folders up in the ‘Aerial Firefighting Study’ folder.
>> Not even in Panebaker’s specific ‘SEAT drops’ folder. ( Which
>> is what the 162300 video is showing… a SEAT drop ). Pity.
>> Maybe THAT still camera would have had a correct setting in
>> order to verify 162300 itself.
There DOES appear to be such a ‘photo’ in the folder(s).
Apparently I just ‘missed it’ on a first pass.
I believe the Swartz photo being referenced above IS the one
that corresponds to this ‘shutter click’ heard at the same
exact moment in BOTH the 152406 and 162300 video(s),
and it DOES help verify the TIME when this single SEAT
drop *actually* took place.
That photo filename (thank you swartz for doing this consistently in your photos!!) has the name of the plane in it, It’s T874. The plane being directed in the two videos by Bravo 33 is three-one-zero. You can hear that in 162406.
Unfortunately Swartz doesn’t have any photos of 310 making this drop. That’s because, in my opinion, he’s NOT using a different camera, he’s using the same one and only Nikon Coolpix that they are using to shoot the videos.
It’s because people are using the Panebaker videos to establish when things are being said. IMHO, after today, I don’t believe the “times” being used in the filenames are accurate, for a variety of reasons.
One, because I’m finding that the timestamps on these videos don’t appear accurate and two….
Because whoever was translating them into the filenames seems to have also been confused as to how to translate them.
Reply to Marti Reed post on
May 18, 2014 at 11:36 pm
>> Marti said…
>> And I ask myself, what is the importance
>> of this?
>> It’s because people are using the
>> Panebaker videos to establish when
>> things are being said.
Yes… that’s one BIG reason… but with
regards to this one single ‘mystery’
of the 162300 video… it’s also all about
just establishing if things that are now
permanently in the public evidence record
really ARE what they SAY they are.
*OR*
…whether there is any ‘evidence’ that things
are MISSING which OUGHT to be there.
The 162300 video ‘mystery’ really did look,
at first, as if something that OUGHT to be
there ( an Air Study video capturing events
and/or radio traffic circa 1623 ) *might*
have been ‘replaced’ with something ELSE.
That is looking much less likely now… but
it is still worth verifying as much as possible.
>> Marti also said…
>> IMHO, after today, I don’t believe the
>> “times” being used in the filenames are
>> accurate, for a variety of reasons.
Your ‘points one and two’ up above are
valid… but in *general* I still think MOST
of the Panebaker video timestamps
*CAN* be trusted.
There are a LOT of ‘overlapping’ radio
transmits between these Panebaker
videos and the other ( long running )
Air-To-Air channell videos that DO
sort of prove that at least the timestamps
between those TWO video cameras were
perhaps only SECONDS apart…
…but I agree there appear to be exceptions.
SOME of the Panebaker Air Study video
timestamps ( even other than the
mysterious 162300 one ) appear to still
be a little ‘wonky’.
>> Marti said…
>>
>> Hate to say it but.
>> That photo filename (thank you swartz for doing
>> this consistently in your photos!!) has the name
>> of the plane in it, It’s T874. The plane being
>> directed in the two videos by Bravo 33 is three-
>> one-zero. You can hear that in 162406.
Actually… it is 810 ( Eight one zero ), not 310, but
you are still RIGHT. It is Tanker 810 making the
drop in BOTH videos and he says so himself as
he finishes that drop and is heard ( in BOTH of
the videos ) completing the drop by announcing…
“Eight one zero OUT… hard RIGHT”.
As far as whether or not the ‘title’ on that Swartz
photo actually matches reality… it’s hard to say.
We now have a situation where either the TIME
on Swartz’s camera was WILDLY wrong… and
could not possibly have been a mere 61 seconds
off… OR… the time on Swartz’s camera really
was ‘reasonably accurate’ ( within, say 60 seconds ),
and he is just totally mistaken about what the
number of the SEAT was that he was photographing
at 1524.
A super-enhancement of that Swartz photo SEEMS
to indicate that the actual number on the TAIL of
that plane making that drop is, in fact, 810.
It’s pretty hard to make out because of the smoke
but I would put money on 810 and not 874. The
last digit of the 3-digit tail number seems to most
definitely be a ZERO and not a FOUR.
Also… even though T874 looks VERY similar to
810 ( same type of plane )… Air Tanker 874 also
has the word FIRE ( in big black letters ) on the tail
under the 874 tail number… which I can almost say
for certain is NOT present under the 3 digit tail
number of that SEAT in Swartz’s 1524 photograph.
Tanker 874 apparently has a registration number of
N174ML.
The registration number for Air Tanker 810 is
apparently N187LA… and here is a ‘close-up’
photo of it ( matches Swartz photo exactly )…
Here’s a link to a corresponding ‘photo’ of
Tanker 874. Notice the word FIRE in big
black letters on the tail under the ‘874’
tail number.
I can say pretty much for certain that there
is NO such word FIRE under the tail number
of that SEAT in the 1524 Swartz photo.
Just the 3 digit number that DOES, in fact,
appear to at least end with ZERO.
Nothing else UNDER the tail number.
Firefighting Tankers and Support Aircraft…
Tanker 874 – Registration number N174MLK
The sequence which begins with Bravo 33 saying “eight-one-zero how we lookin?” at 00:31 in 152406_SEAT is right there at 5:18 in the 1544 Air2Air video.
Of course, we don’t know how accurate the timestamping is on the Contour +2 videocam, but I’m guessing it at least isn’t as wonky as the Nikon!
I think you’re right about the cameras, also, now. There’s no way that still and that video could have been shot on the same camera. They were both Nikon Coolpix P520’s. What threw me off was the wording in the “Panebeker Photo and Video Information” docx.
It says:
“Photos were taken primarily with a Canon EOS Rebel T3I, a couple were taken with a Nikon P520. Video in the video folder was also taken with the Nikon Coolpix P520.”
Sounds like they’re describing on camera, right?
Lightroom doesn’t show camera metadata, except the timestamp, for videos. So there is no camera name, much less Camera Serial Numbers. So I wasn’t “seeing” anything to tell me those were two different “versions” of the same camera.
So now I can quit wondering how the camera was stamping the stills “accurately” but not the videos.
The Moore folder includes some photos of that drop, too, and they sequence right in that framework, also. Starting with 20130630_Loc1_seat (20).jpg at 3:23.23 PM. Also Swartz shot the scene before the drop on his iPad at 3:20:42 PM.
**
** MORE ABOUT THE MYSTERIOUS 162300 AIR STUDY VIDEO
**
** WHAT WAS *REALLY* HAPPENING CIRCA 1623 ( 4:23 PM )?
Since we don’t know if there ever even WAS an ‘original 162300’ Air Study
Video ( of any length ) that was then ‘replaced’ with the 11.7 clip from another
video taken almost an HOUR earlier… it’s impossible to say how much ‘radio
traffic’ that original 162300 video *might* have captured ( if it existed ).
For the sake of argument… let’s assume that it DID exist and that it WAS much
more than 11.7 seconds… and that it actually ‘covered’ the time period that
stretched all the way back to the Air Study video that immediately preceded it.
All that means is that it couldn’t have been more than FOUR minutes
long, since the Air Study Video that immediately precedes the
20130630_162300_SEAT_drop_EP Air Study video was the 20130630_161858_VLAT_split_2_EP one.
( 162300 minus 161858 equals 4 minutes and 2 seconds )
It is doubtful that even if the original 162300 video was MUCH longer than 11.7
seconds that it would have been this full FOUR minutes long ( since no other
Panebaker video was that long and never really exceeded 3 minutes in length )…
…but again… just for the sake of completeness… here are the full FOUR minutes
of captured Air-To-Air channel traffic that would cover the entire time in-between
the 161858 video and the 162300 one… just to see what was *really*
happening ( on Air-To-Air, anyway ) during that timeframe.
The timeframe that actually covers the 11.7 seconds of the existing 162300
video is marked in the transcript below.
As the transcript below shows… NO ACTUAL DROPS took place during this
1618.58 and 1623.00 time period ( as the 162300 video seems to suggest )…
and B33 Thomas French was simply just still in the planning stages for the
upcoming ‘two seat’ drop with Tankers 874 and 830 ( captured in a completely
separate video from the 162300 one ).
** VIDEO 20130630_1628_EP STARTS AT 1547.46 ( 3:47.46 PM )
Length of video: 40 minutes and 14 seconds.
NOTE: The first 30 minutes and 42 seconds omitted from this posting to save
space. Only the FOUR minutes that covers the gap between the 161858 and
162300 videos is included.
+30:43 ( 1618.29 / 4:18.29 PM )
(Tanker 830): I gotcha… am I comin’ in too, Rusty?
+30:48 ( 1618.34 / 4:18.34 PM )
(Tanker 830): Is eight three zero comin’ in with eight seven four?
+30:51 ( 1618.37 / 4:18.37 PM )
(B33 – French): Afirmative. Eight seven four and eight three zero you’re
both cleared in. Two nine eight zero… come in at fifty-five.
+31:10 ( 1618.56 / 4:18.56 PM )
(5KA): Five Kilo Alpha’s out of the dip.
+31:12 ( 1618.58 / 4:18.58 PM )
(B33 – French): Kilo Alpha you’re clear to the drop.
+31:14 ( 1619.00 / 4:19.00 PM )
(5KA): Kilo Alpha
+31:23 ( 1619.09 / 4:19.09 PM )
(B33 – French): Eight seven four… set me up a coverage level 4… whole load… okay?
+31:26 ( 1619.12 / 4:19.12 PM )
(874): Okay.
( 40 SECOND PAUSE – NO RADIO TRAFFIC )
+32:06 ( 1619.52 / 4:19.52 PM )
(5KA): Five Kilo Alpha’s off the drop
+32:07 ( 1619.53 / 4:19.53 PM )
(B33 – French): Kilo Alpha Bravo 33 copy… Hey… I gotcha in sight
so I’ll be low level on this flight but I DO have you in sight… give me a call off the dip.
+32:14 ( 1620.00 / 4:20.00 PM )
(5KA): Will do.
( 42 SECOND PAUSE – NO RADIO TRAFFIC )
+32:56 ( 1620.42 / 4:20.42 PM )
(Unknown): And Bravo 33 eight ?? comin’ around on the east side…
lookin’ for ya… oh… I gotcha.
+33:00 ( 1620.46 / 4:20.46 PM )
(B33 – French): Follow me around… we’re gonna take ya right to
work… allright?
+33:04 ( 1620.50 / 4:20.50 PM )
(B33 – French): You’re clear down to five… and… uh… I’m gonna start my
turn to the left… I’m outta one sixty for one twenty.
+33:11 ( 1620.57 / 4:20.57 PM )
(Unknown): Okay.
+33:13 ( 1620.59 / 4:20.59 PM )
(B33 – French): Puttin’ on the brakes.
+33:17 ( 1621.03 / 4:21.03 PM )
(5KA): Kilo Alpha’s outta the dip.
+33:20 ( 1621.06 / 4:21.06 PM )
(B33 – French): Kilo Alpha gimme a call off the drop.
+33:22 ( 1621.08 / 4:21.08 PM )
(5KA): Will do.
+33:38 ( 1621.24 / 4:21.24 PM )
(B33 – French): Eight seven four… that’s you in the front of the line, right?
+33:42 ( 1621.28 / 4:21.28 PM )
(B33 – French): Okay… what we’re gonna do is… we’re gonna build line
backwards. I need to extend my… uh… pattern just a little bit we’re gonna
get a helicopter in and out… kind of at the… uh… north end of that flank.
Gimmee a good left turn on the exit, okay?
+34:08 ( 1621.54 / 4:21.54 PM )
(B33 – French): Okay… we ah.. we just put in a whole bunch of retardant in with the DC10 we’re gonna build line backwards… you’re gonna be starting in a light fuel patch taking it TO existing retardant… how copy?
+34:21 ( 1622.07 / 4:22.07 PM )
(B33 – French): What I’d look to do is… ah… yea… level 4… star… and I’m… I’ll pop smoke at the start… it’s even gonna be before that light… ah… fuel patch.
+34.56 ( 1622.42 / 4:22.42 PM )
(B33 – French): Allright… I’m gonna start my descent… you’re gonna see the
existing retardant put in by… ah… by nine one one so we’ll be taking retardant
TO that.
*****************************************************************************
** NOTE: 1622.49 is supposedly the START of the 11 second long
** Air Study Video 20130630_162300_SEAT_drop_EP.MOV
*****************************************************************************
+35:06 ( 16:22.52 / 4:22.52 PM )
(B33 – French): Little bit hard to see here… so basically their retardant
started in the flats. We’re gonna be kind of up in the foothill portion.
I’ll pop smoke at the start. Gimme about a wingspan left for ah… drift
Drop heading’s gonna be about zero eight five.
****************************************************************************
** NOTE: 1623.00 is supposedly the END of the 11 second long
** Air Study Video 20130630_162300_SEAT_drop_EP.MOV
****************************************************************************
VIDEO 20130630_1628_EP ENDS AT 1628.00 ( 4:28.00 PM )
Length of video: 40 minutes and 14 seconds.
The Panebaker VLAT pictures labeled 1715’ish are incorrect. These pictures are actually the split drop from the VLAT from 1617. I am not sure if this is relevant, or if it has already been identified.
Reply to calvin post on May 18, 2014 at 4:48 am said:
>> calvin said…
>> The Panebaker VLAT pictures labeled 1715′ish are
>> incorrect. These pictures are actually the split drop from
>> the VLAT from 1617. I am not sure if this is relevant,
>> or if it has already been identified.
calvin… yes… it’s very relevant for a number of reasons.
You just pointed out that we have been *assuming* that
the both the filename and EXIF timestamps on the Panakebaker STILL photos are ‘correct’.
You are right… that doesn’t really appear to be the case.
The Panebaker 20130630_171528-1_EP photo in the
‘VLAT drops’ still photos folder is also the one that is a
‘perfect match’ for Tom Story’s 7093 photo of the same
drop… which Story’s Canon 1D said took place at 1639.
So however ‘wrong’ these Panebaker STILL images are is also directly related to how ‘wrong’ Tom Story’s Canon 1D was set that day.
We were assuming a +36 minute error there, but if the Panebaker still photos ALSO have ‘bogus’ timestamps
then that is no longer correct.
So now we need to figure out just how *wrong* BOTH
Panebaker’s Canon EOS REBEL T3i *AND* Story’s Canon EOS 1D were that day.
Geez. what a mess.
Reminder to anyone getting paid to take pictures of a fire in the future… please make sure the time/date settings on the cameras you are using are CORRECT. Thanks in advance.
So……. I downloaded (and am still downloading) a representative smattering of the Panebaker et al photos and videos.
The File-naming of the videos is all over the boards, compared to the time-stamping. A bunch of the mis-file-naming appears to be typos. For example, 143844 has a time stamp of 4:38:41 PM. Ahem. And 150530 is time stamped 5:05:30 PM. Buyer Beware!
Which leads to our favorite mysterious pair. 162300 is stamped 4:23:01 PM. Accurate? Quite possibly, relatively speaking. 152406 is stamped 5:21:07 PM. Think about THEM apples! There is no way, given what’s going on, that what is happening in that video is happening at 5:21:07 PM!!! So I would be more likely to trust 162300 than 152406.
And speaking of these two videos, the short one is not an edit out of the long one. They’re two completely different videos, captured by two different cameras.
152406_SEAT, with a most likely wrong filename and timestamp, and 162300, with its possibly more accurate timestamp and filemame, were both recorded on the Nikon Coolpix P520. It was on a tripod. It can record up to 24 minutes of video at a time.
Which leads me to my theory. Panebaker et al shot the main videos (except for the ones w/air2air capture, which were recorded on a Contour +2 videocam) on the Nikon in much longer chunks than we see here. Then, probably soon after, they had to sit down and split those videos into smaller chunks. Because…that’s what you have to do. As they were splitting them, they were exporting them out, and had to give them names. Some of them they may have been naming correctly. Some of them they clearly weren’t.
And I don’t know, when you split videos like these up, in something like QuickTime, what happens to the time stamps in the course of doing that. I’ve so far never had to pay attention to that, but then, I’m just learning how to shoot video.
Was the Nikon’s timestamper generally off? I don’t know. Periodically, a photo was taken on that camera. The photos are in the Schultz folder. 20130630_1616_AZ-A1S-000688_T911___7_G_RS.JPG (Please dear Universe, don’t ever compel me to type that out on my iPad ever again…) is of the T11 coming out of one of the split drops and has a time stamp of 4:16:36 PM. Boom! As in that’s pretty accurate, relatively speaking, given that we don’t have any absolute time stamps on any of these files, because it just doesn’t work that way in the real world, unless somebody decides to make it do that.
So that’s what I’ve discovered so far. When I first started looking at those files and their metadata in Lightroom, I wrote in my notes, “Marti starts slowly backing out of THIS particular project…….”
Also. One of my first thoughts as WTKTT (thankfully) starting posting his concerns about these videos was that I have no problem imagining a four-minute lapse in recording. Sometimes, yah know, you have to change out things like batteries and memory cards. And, now that I’ve per used this thing a little bit, maybe we DON’T have a lapse at all. Maybe 162300 WAS shot at that time and so was 152406!!
At exactly +4 seconds in the 11.7 second 162300 video… a shutter click is heard. It comes right after OPS1 Todd Abel says “Go ahead” and then Air Attack Rory Collins starts his “Okay… uh… we’ll probly be around there in about five” response.
The ‘shutter click’ also comes at the exact moment that the retardant flow was turned on during this SEAT drop captured in the 162300 video.
The SAME EXACT ‘shutter click’ is also heard at the SAME EXACT moment at the +2:20 mark in the 152406 video ( an hour earlier? ) and is part of the same 11 seconds from 152406 ‘duplicated’ as the content of 162300.
I can’t seem to find a match for this still photo in ANY of the folders up in the ‘Aerial Firefighting Study’ folder. Not even in Panebaker’s specific ‘SEAT drops’ folder. ( Which is what the 162300 video is showing… a SEAT drop ). Pity. Maybe THAT still camera would have had a correct setting in order to verify 162300 itself.
So… just to be clear…
Despite what you said above… I still don’t think there is *ANY* question that the entire 162300 video is not an exact duplicate of the 11.7 seconds seen at the +2:18 mark in the 152406 video. The ‘mystery’ is why this is so…
…but I hear you up above with your ‘potential’ explanation.
Are you saying that it could just possibly be that this same SEAT drop was captured with TWO different video cameras at the same time… but the one that was running longer and captured the full 2+ minutes ( that includes this SEAT DROP ) was simply mis-named into the 152406 timerange and should have ACTUALLY been named 162406 instead?
Okay… bad typo above.
The word ‘not’ slipped in there which
changed the intent of what I was trying
to say, I think.
Should have read like this…
Despite what you said above… I still don’t think there is *ANY* question that the entire 162300 video is, in fact, an exact duplicate of the 11.7 seconds seen at the +2:18 mark in the 152406 video. The ‘mystery’ is why this is so”.
So just to be cystal clear…
I still think that 162300 video IS an EXACT DUPLICATE of the 11 seconds at the +2:18 mark in the 152606 video.
Hmmm… I think I need to scratch this
comment of my own from above…
“Are you saying that it could just possibly be that this same SEAT drop was captured with TWO different video cameras at the same time… but the one that was running longer and captured the full 2+ minutes ( that includes this SEAT DROP ) was simply mis-named into the 152406 timerange and should have ACTUALLY been named 162406 instead?”
Even this isn’t really a possible explanation.
The 1624 timeframe *IS* covered by the
Panebaker video
20130630_162508_2SEATS_EP, which is 1
minute and 49 seconds long, and ( according to THAT filename timestamp ) starts capturing events at 1623.19 ( 4:23.19 PM ) and ENDS at 1625.08 ( 4:25.08 PM ).
So even if someone ‘misnamed’ the
152406 video and really meant it to
say 162406… everything is still ‘wonky’.
The TWO SEAT drop ( 830 following 874 )
is what is really happening at 162406, and
NOT the SINGLE seat drop shown in both
the 152406 and 162300 videos.
And I’m also saying, these videos, recorded on the Nikon Coolpix are a bloody mess that I’m still trying to sort out.So it’s no surprise they tripped,you up.
Fortunately, I’m pretty sure the photos from it (in the Swartz folder — and they are actually quite astonishing) are accurately time stamped. And I have NO IDEA how that could happen.
So I’m currently downloading some more videos to see if the camera (or whatever) started out accurate, and went gonzo, or if it was that way all day (or thru what ever editor they put the videos through).
Reply to Marti Reed post
on May 18, 2014 at 7:53 pm
>> Marti said…
>> Fortunately, I’m pretty sure
>> the photos from it (in the
>> Swartz folder — and they
>> are actually quite
>> astonishing) are accurately
>> time stamped.
Well.. I hope so.
See new post above entiteld…
** MYSTERY SOLVED
I was wrong just above about
saying there didn’t seem to
be a still photo that matches
the ‘shutter click’ heard in
BOTH the 152406 and 162300
videos at the moment that
single SEAT was ‘dropping’.
There IS such a photograph.
I just missed it at first.
It’s in the Swartz folder(s).
I have NO IDEA which of these
Air Study devices actually had
the RIGHT time that day… but
if we assume ( as we have
been doing for a while now )
that the tripod-mounted video
cameras DID have the ‘correct
time’ that day… then Swartz’s
camera still falls into the
‘accurate enough’ category but
still appears to have been
about 61 seconds ahead of
the time on the tripod
mounted camera(s).
I would still call +/- 60 seconds
‘close enough for accuracy’
on a day like this.
Reply to Marti Reed post on
May 18, 2014 at 7:44 pm
>> Marti said…
>> Yes, It’s exactly what I’m saying.
>> Those are completely different
>> videos.
Yes. You are right.
They are simply TWO *different*
video cameras ( one on a tripod and
one handheld ) recording the same
exact ‘event’ ( the same SEAT drop ).
See new posting above entiteld
** MYSTERY SOLVED?
The Swartz photo I found that appears
to also be the EXACT same SEAT
drop seems to prove that ALL of
this did, in fact, happen in the 1524
timeframe and nowhere near 162300.
Somehow… that 162300 Air Study video is just the 11.7 seconds from the ‘handheld’ being used at that time was meant to be named 152300 ( even though that isn’t even totally accurate, timewise ).
So looking more at what’s coming out of that Nikon. Trying to sync to the VLAT split. The photo of it, which I referenced above, and won’t type again, has an accurate timestamp, and the timestamp is shown on the image. The video, however, is time stamped two hours “late — 6:12:48 PM, and somebody renamed the file 161620. I don’t know where and when and how the Nikon video timestamps are going wacky. And it looks like whoever is splitting out or renaming or what those videos is having a big struggle trying to do it. Maybe in a hurry?
And now I’m not sure my earlier theory — that they videos were shot in big chunks and then split — is correct. Swartz’s folder of the photos taken with the Nikon has a lot of photos in it. I’m not sure exactly what he was doing.
Marti… FWIW… that last photo in the Swartz folder…
20130630_1716_AZ
-A1S-000688___FB_1_G_RS.JPG
has an EXIF timestamp of… 5:16:58 PM and shows
them basically ‘packing up and leaving’ that location
by the helibase where they had the tripods set up
most of the afternoon.
This does appear to be accurate.
The final video taken from the tripod actually ENDS
just before we now see him with that tripod in
his hand and about to put it into the truck.
Have you looked at the Town of Yarnell Folder? YIKES!!
They drove into town. He has photos in the Ranch House Cafe parking lot from 6:38 PM til 6:44 PM. I think the last two include Brian and Trew and their UTV. he wins my gold prize today! He was also shooting on an iPad.
I’m going after 150822_VLAT_EP. It’s the first VLAT drop they shot, both photos and video, of a VLAT drop that day. I didn’t download it right, so I’m waiting. I’ll see if the Nikon was timestamping the video correctly then.
I just don’t know where the screw-up came. I really think 162300 (snot om a different camrea) is both stamped and file named correctly, and 152406, shot on the Nikon, clearly isn’t
The next thing to do would be to go into the Air2Air videos, and see if there’s a match somewhere. But I’m not gonna have time anytime soon to do it…..
Reply to Marti Reed post
on May 18, 2014 at 8:13 pm
>> Marti said…
>> Have you looked at the Town of
>> Yarnell Folder? YIKES!!
Yes. It really was a disaster.
It’s an absolute MIRACLE that more
people were not killed that day.
One of the things I can’t figure out
about that sequence of Swartz
photos is that if you look carefully…
he is approaching the Ranch House
Restaurant ( and taking pictures out
the window of his vehicle ) from the
SOUTH ( not the NORTH, where
he was taking pictures earlier ).
So, somehow Swartz worked his
way further SOUTH than the Ranch
House Restaurant following the
deployment and now we simply
see him coming back NORTH
to it… and pulling into the parking lot.
It would also be nice if someone could
identify all those fire guys in THESE
photos standing in the parking lot,
including the one who is GLARING
at Swartz as he takes photos, even
though the other guy to the right with
the red helmet is obviously freely
shooting photos or video with an
iPhone at that same time.
The guy who is GLARING at Swartz
has a BLUE Helmet… but the Blue
Ridge Hotshots had already
evacuated the Ranch House parking
lot by this time.
Could that be BR Hotshot Ball who
have been ‘left behind’ at the parking
lot that day?
When Frisby and Brown drove out
from the deployment area in the
UTV Ranger… the GPS tracker
shows them going straight up NORTH
towards the ICP command center,
so I don’t think it’s either Frisby
or Brown in that photo.
>> Marti also wrote…
>> They drove into town. He has
>> photos in the Ranch House Cafe
>> parking lot from 6:38 PM til 6:44
>> PM. I think the last two include
>> Brian and Trew and their UTV.
>> he wins my gold prize today!
>> He was also shooting on an iPad.
See above. I believe the BR GPS
tracker shows Frisby and Brown
driving straight up to the ICP after
they came out of the deployment
area… and the rest of BR evacuated
the parking lot shortly after that
in the vehicles. So the guy in the
Blue Helmet seems to have been
a BR Hotshot that was ‘left behind’.
Ball?
>> Marti also said…
>> I just don’t know where the
>> screw-up came. I really think
>> 162300 (shot on a different
>> camera) is both stamped and file
>> named correctly, and 152406,
>> shot on the Nikon, clearly isn’t.
See new post above.
I believe the Swartz photo of the
same SEAT drop puts things the
other way around. That SEAT drop
was in the 1524 timeframe and
NOT the 1623 timeframe.
>> Marti also said…
>> The next thing to do would be to
>> go into the Air2Air videos, and see
>> if there’s a match somewhere. But
>> I’m not gonna have time anytime
>> soon to do it…..
Probably no need.
See new post above with title
** MYSTERY SOLVED?
There IS a Swartz photo that IS most
likely that same exact SEAT drop
seen in BOTH the 152406 and 162300
videos ( shot with different video
cameras ).
Swartz’s digital camera was only
61 seconds ahead of whatever video
camera was sitting on the TRIPOD
that day and capturing drops.
So I believe the ‘proof’ is there that
Swartz’s photo, the 152406 video
( shot on tripod ) and the 162300
video ( handheld video camera )
are all capturing the SAME SEAT
drop… and it was in the 1524
timeframe ( not 1623 ).
Whether that means the handheld
used to shoot the 11.7 seconds was
just a full HOUR off ( timezone error? )
or it was a ‘file renaming’ error is the
only thing that still needs to be
figured out, IMHO.
What I’m kinda sorta generally seeing is that Swartz, who seems to have been in charge of the Nikon (while Panebaker was actually photographing with a Canon t3i ( which is the camera I use)) was taking photos every 10-20-30 minutes.
So I think he was shooting, say, a bit of video, then stopping and shooting some photos, and then switching back to video.
So I no longer think these videos were split out from longer ones. I think the videos were started, recorded, then stopped in camera.
So no-one was splitting them later in QuickTime or such. That means whatever mis-time-stamping was happening must have been happening in camera. Problem is, I’ve never heard of that happening, with a camera correctly stamping its photos and incorrectly stamping its videos. That’s where I’m stumped.
It’s now pretty obvious that in those 11.7 seconds that ended up being ‘named’ the 162300 video… whoever shot that was HURRYING to grab the camera and record that SEAT drop.
The first few seconds show the operator fumbling to point the camera… and then fumbling to ZOOM and catch the SEAT drop in the nick of time… with retardant dropping.
So YES… these 11.7 seconds now just look like a ‘quick opportunity’ to get ADDITIONAL video of the same SEAT drop ( circa 1523.30 ) that was already being captured by the OTHER video camera on the tripod.
How it ended up with a filename of 162300?… that’s still a mystery.
Followup to the original parent comment above that has
the ‘transcript’ in it.
What I should have made clear(er) in the original parent comment
was that the ‘2 SEAT drop’ with 830 following 874 DOES, in fact,
take place very soon after that transcript above ends…
…and that ‘2 SEAT drop’ is fully captured in the Panebaker
video 20130630_162508_2SEATS_EP, which is 1 minute and
49 seconds long, and ( according to the filename timestamp )
starts capturing events at 1623.19 ( 4:23.19 PM ) and ENDS
at 1625.08 ( 4:25.08 PM ).
French, in B33, starts ‘poppin’ smoke right at +21 seconds
( 1623.40 ) in that video ( just as he says he does in the audio )… and then 874 is seen ‘dropping’ at exactly +35 seconds
( 1623.54 ) and 830 then follows him right away dropping
retardant at exactly +57 seconds ( 1624.16 ).
The point here is that this is a TWO SEAT drop and it happens AFTER the 162300 video ENDS… whereas the 11 seconds of the 162300 video (supposedly) shows a completely different SINGLE seat drop with a completely different SEAT happening just a few seconds for the TWO seat drop…
…and BOTH drops (supposedly) being ‘guided’ by the same lead plane. Not possible.
Typo in last sentence above.
I left out the word BEFORE.
Should have read like this…
The point here is that this is a TWO SEAT drop and it happens AFTER the 162300 video ENDS… whereas the 11 seconds of the 162300 video (supposedly) shows a completely different SINGLE seat drop with a completely different SEAT happening just a few seconds BEFORE
the TWO seat drop…
…and BOTH drops (supposedly) being ‘guided’ by the same lead plane. Not possible.
I disagree. Right when whoever (of course we now agree that’s probably Cordes) says “We’ll probably be there about five,” the tanker drops in both videos.
Reply to Marti Reed post on
May 18, 2014 at 9:20 pm
>> Marti said…
>> I disagree. Right when whoever (of
>> course we now agree that’s probably
>> Cordes) says “We’ll probably be there
>> about five,”
The only way it could be SPGS1 Gary Cordes ‘responding’ to Air Attack Rory Collins there is if Cordes was ‘authorized’ to be responding to direct callouts for ‘Operations’.
Just before the ‘Go ahead’ transmit… we hear Air Attack Rory Collins specifically ASK for ‘Operations’ to talk to him over ‘Air to Ground’.
The ‘responder’ to a request for ‘Operations’
( at that point in the day ) *would* have logically been OPS1 Todd Abel… and it even SOUNDS just like Todd Abel, and not Musser or Cordes.
This is all captured in the 152406 video…
____________________________________
+2:13 ( 1523.23 / 3:23.23 PM )
(AA – Rory Collins): Operations, Air Attack, Air-To-Ground
+2:19 ( 1523.29 / 3:23.29 PM )
(AA – Rory Collins): Okay… Ahhhh… we’ll probly be around there in about five. Umm… What’s your plan on the ground?
+2:27 ( 1523.37 / 3:23.37 PM )
(OPS1 Todd Abel): What I’d like to do… ah… is… ah… tie into ( that court here? ) where ya see the whole ??. If we can tag onto the road up here and then just run it… ah… you know… ( transmission breaks up / cuts off ).
____________________________________
>> Marti also said…
>> …the tanker drops in both videos.
Yes… but I believe the proof is now there that this ‘drop’ ( and the audio capture with Air Attack Rory Collins talking to ‘Operations’ ) is definitely in the 1524 timeframe and not the 1623 timeframe.
If that really is a capture of a SINGLE SEAT
drop at 1623… some 1/4 mile off to the
east there of where they were using the
VLAT and the SEATS in most of the other videos…
…then French would have then only had about 25 seconds to completely set up the upcoming TWO SEAT drop with Tanker 874 leading and Tanker 830 following… which is captured in the next Air Study video.
Not possible.
Not enough time for French to have come off that single SEAT drop and then go through all the preparation we hear in the Air-To-Air captures for that upcoming TWO SEAT drop.
It is NOT anyone from ‘Operations’
at all that says “We’ll probably be
around there in about five.”
That is actually Air Attack Rory Collins himself talking TO ‘Operations’ after someone in Operations ( sounds just like OPS1 Todd Abel ) responded to HIS “Operations, Air Attack, Air To Ground” callout with “Go ahead”.
At this point in time ( 1524 ish )… it is Air Attack Rory Collins himself who wants to know what ‘Operations’ plans to do ‘on the ground’… and he gets a full answer from what appears to be OPS1 Todd Abel regarding what ‘roads’ they want retardant to try and ‘tie into’.
OPS1 Todd Abel is still on the NORTH end of the fire at this point and actually ‘on the ground’ back there with SPGS2 Darrell Willis in the Model Creek Road area and the ‘tying into roads’ response to Air Attack Rory Collins is still all about the NORTH side of the fire.
Here are the ‘transcripts’ from the two Air Study Videos which prove that
the 162300 Panebaker Air Study video is simply 11.7 seconds of video that
was simply ‘extracted’ from the much longer 152406 video ( taken almost an
HOUR earlier ) and was either created as a *new* 162300 video OR was
used to REPLACE the contents of the *original* 162300 video.
Whether or not this 11.7 seconds of video simply replaced a much LONGER
video capture of what was *really* transpiring circa 1623 is still not known.
Only a comparison with the actual original 162300 video ( if it ever even existed )
could prove any difference in time lengths.
Here is the transcript of the 11.7 seconds that is the content of Air Study Video
20130630_162300_SEAT_drop_EP as included in the SAIT FOIA/FOIL release…
** PANEBAKER AIR STUDY VIDEO
** 20130630_162300_SEAT_drop_EP.MOV
Transcript of both the foreground and background radio conversation captured
by Panebaker Air Study Video 20130630_162300_SEAT_drop_EP.MOV.
ECITW ( Every Caveat In The World )
This is what I ( me, personally ) believe is being said in the background of this
video. Your mileage may, of course, vary.
This video is 11 seconds long, so given the small note in the README.TXT file
that accompanies these Air Study videos which states that they all use the
VIDEO END time as the timestamp in the TITLE… then that means this
particular video STARTED at 1622.49 ( 4:22.49 PM )
+0:03 ( 1622.52 / 4:22.52 PM )
(AA – Rory Collins): Okay… Ahhhh… we’ll probly be around there
in about five. Umm… What’s your plan on the ground?
FOREGROUND
(Tanker 810): Eight one zero OFF… hard RIGHT.
BACKGROUND
+0:10 ( 1622.59 / 4:22.59 PM )
(OPS1 Todd Abel): What I’d like… ( VIDEO ENDS )
NOTE: Video ends and cuts off right after the word ‘like’.
VIDEO 162300 ENDS AT 1623.00 ( 4:23.00 PM )
*** NOW… Here is the transcript from the 11 seconds of video at the +2:18 mark
*** in the Air Study Video 201300630_152406_SEAT_EP taken an HOUR earlier…
***
*** The KEY part is the duplication of the following exact query from
*** Air Attack Rory Collins to OPS1 Todd Abel… ( which is now in BOTH
*** of these Air Study Videos… but at different TIMES and almost a
*** full HOUR apart from each other…
***
*** (AA – Rory Collins): Okay… Ahhhh… we’ll probly be around there
*** in about five. Umm… What’s your plan on the ground?
This transcript includes both the FOREGROUND radio traffic ( mostly Air-To-Air
channel captures ) and the BACKGROUND ( TAC channels ) captures.
You can see clearly that the audio at the +2:18 second mark in THIS video
is identical to the audio supposedly captured almost an HOUR later
in the 162300 video.
Also… the 11 second clip from this video being used as the content for
the 162300 video only starts with the ‘Go ahead’ response from OPS1 Todd
Abel… but this ‘Go ahead’ from Abel is a direct response from Air Attack
Rory Collins having just called out to HIM with a “Operations, Air Attack on
Air To Ground” radio call at the +2:13 mark in THIS video.
Also… the ‘What I’d like to do’ phrase that also ENDS the 11 second clip used
as the content for the 162300 video is NOT ‘cut off’ in THIS video and we can
hear OPS1 Todd Abel’s full response to Air Attack Rory Collins.
VIDEO 152406 STARTS AT 1521.10 ( 3:21.10 PM )
+1:30 ( 1522.40 / 3:22.40 PM )
(B33 – French): Okay… what we’re gonna do is… uh… it’s kinda…
like I said the farthest north house… and… pretty close to the house, okay?
This one with the red engine. There’s actually two with red engines it’s
the one furthest north. Now I’m online.
+1:44 ( 1522.54 / 3:22.54 PM )
(Tanker 810): Okay. Gotcha… and… and we’re pretty much goin’ for the heavy smoke?
+1:47 ( 1522.57 / 3:22.57 PM )
(B33 – French): Yea… it’s… it’s a bead on the heavy smoke and I’m on line now
poppin’ smoke just so ya can see me. I want your line to start and bring it right
through HERE… right turn on the exit… ya got that?
** NOTE: Here is the START of the 11.7 seconds from THIS video
** that is duplicated as the content for Air Study Video 162300
_________________________________________________________________
+2:18 ( 1523.28 / 3:23.28 PM )
(OPS1 Todd Abel): Go ahead.
+2:19 ( 1523.29 / 3:23.29 PM )
(AA – Rory Collins): Okay… Ahhhh… we’ll probly be around there
in about five. Umm… What’s your plan on the ground?
+2:27 ( 1523.37 / 3:23.37 PM )
(OPS1 Todd Abel): What I’d like to do… ah… is… ah… tie into ( that court here? ) where ya
see the whole ??. If we can tag onto the road up here and then just run it… ah… you know…
( transmission breaks up and cuts off ).
FOREGROUND OVERLAP…
+2:27 ( 1523.37 / 3:23.37 PM )
(Tanker 810): Eight one zero OFF… hard right.
(B33 – French): Lookin’ like you already got me in sight…
looks like your drop went in there good. Thank you.
(Tanker 810): ( Back to ?? )
_________________________________________________________________
** NOTE: Here is the END of the 11.7 seconds from THIS video
** that is duplicated as the content for Air Study Video 162300
** but 162300 cuts off early up above right after the phrase
** “What I’d like…” in the BACKGROUND capture and the
** phrase “Eight one zero OFF…” in the FOREGROUND capture
**
** The 152406 video simply continues for another half-minute or so
** with a response from Air Attack Rory Collins…
+2:39
(B33 – French): Load and return.
(Tanker 810): Load and return… eight one zero.
+2:43 ( 1523.53 / 3:23.53 PM )
(B33 – French): Five Kilo Alpha… you’re cleared direct to the
helibase if you’re not already headed there.
+2:43 ( 1523.53 / 3:23.53 PM )
(AA – Rory Collins?): Ah.. Okay… I’ll come around once they’re… ah…
( road? )… ahm… on… ahhh… those fire spots (under ?).
+2:53 ( 1524.03 / 3:24.03 PM )
(OPS1 Todd Abel): (Responding to last transmit from AA but words not clear).
Reply to Bob Powers post on May 12, 2014 at 2:43 pm
>> Mr. Powers wrote…
>>…If the Helicopters were dropping water in the same area trying to hold the fire
>> down, then they definitely would have commented on the tanker drop helping
>> them out at a critical location.
Mr. Powers…
In an effort here to try and figure out what is really going on with that now
known-to-be-bogus 162300 Air Study Video ( and to see if any of these ‘other’
Air Study videos are equally bogus )… I now have full transcripts of ALL of the
other USDA Air Study videos that were on fixed tripods and capturing ALL of
the Air-To-Air channel traffic which ‘overlaps’ with these Panebaker and Moore
Air Study videos.
I will post ALL of these transcripts at some point… but since this Chapter 6
is already bigger than it should be ( and failing to load already on mobile
devices )… I am going to wait a bit and see if a new Chapter 7 starts before
attempting to do that. They are not *small* transcripts.
In the meantime… I just thought I would point out that the helicopters
‘commenting’ on the ‘goodness’ of retardant drops ( if they were in a
position to see it ) appears to be *common practice* in that ‘other world’
of WFF Air Support and this is now perfectly evident in the full transcripts
of the Air-To-Air channel traffic that day.
In just ONE of the USDA Air Study videos capturing the complete Air-To-Air
traffic… EVERY TIME the pilot of Helicopter 5KA ( Five Kilo Alpha ) saw
a retardant drop… he IMMEDIATELY would add his own unsolicited comments
to the conversation like “That was spot on!” and “Right on! Perfect!” and
sometimes even lengthier ‘Attaboy!’ style comments.
And MOST of the time… these ‘confirming goodness’ transmits right after a
retardant drop would take place WITHOUT any ‘call signs’. They would just
come out of ‘nowhere’.
So YES… if ANY of the helicopters operating on the south side of the fire
circa 1633 ( we know there were at least TWO in the air there at that
time ) saw that 1633 SEAT drop that went right between the fireline and
a house… it is VERY likely one ( or both? ) of those helicopter pilots might have
been the ones offering the unsolicited. “That’s exactly what we want” and/or
“That’s exactly right” comment(s) over the radio following that drop and
Burfiend was simply mistaken to think those comments were coming
from DIVSA Eric Marsh.
Two things:
FIRST: In a post below, WTKTT suggests that EP (one of the guys conducting the “air study” on the day of the Yarnell Hill Fire) might somehow be withholding or concealing video. I suppose that it is possible that EP is deliberately participating in a scheme to withhold information, or that the AZ Forestry folks withheld some of EP’s video, or that the SAIT is withholding some of the video, but it is equally (if not more) likely that EP just made a misstep in labeling and keeping straight all of his videos, pictures, etc.
Specifically: On June 30th, three folks (EP, SM, and Sw) were on the fire to take pictures and videos regarding the use of RETARDANT (and general air support with water drops) on fire – this is the “air study” folks keep referencing. These folks set up a main, stationary camera on a tripod that was recording from a stationary position almost non-stop, with audio coming exclusively from the air-to-air frequency (such that you can hear pilots such as Tom French, Rory Collins, “Jack,” “Kevin,” etc. talking to each other on these LONGGGGG main videos). In addition to that main camera, however, there were three people on the ground – EP, SM, and Sw – taking individual video clips and photos with various small hand-held devices. My impression is that at least one of them or maybe two had MULTIPLE hand-held devices that they were using.
Here’s the KEY: My impression is that these three folks were SPECIFICALLY interested in capturing videos/photos of the air drops (water, retardant) in action, such that, before you conclude that they are HIDING a video, consider whether there was an actual DROP from a SEAT or a VLAT during the time window in question. If not, it is entirely possible that there WAS no video from a hand-held device at exactly that moment, and NOTHING is being hidden or withheld.
To wit: At roughly 4:15 and 4:17, VLAT 911 dropped its massive load of retardant (split into two drops), and then there were two SEAT drops (one right after the other – they were in a line) at about 4:24 p.m., and then tanker 413 dropped at roughly 4:33, and then VLAT 910 was lining up for a drop when the shit hit the fan with GM. Which brings me to my second point….
SECOND: For reasons not worth getting into (given that I do not have the time or ability to provide links at this point), allow me to say again that I am pretty sure that Marsh did indeed comment to B33 about where he was hoping for some air support (e.g. a VLAT line), but Marsh made the comment WELL before 16:37. Meaning, I am fairly comfortable believing based on the way that I have been tying together all of the same materials that all of you have access to at this point that the 16:37 comment alleged to have been made by Marsh was indeed made by Marsh, but (a) it was likely uttered well before 16:37 AND (b) the words might have been slightly different than what B33 recalls (although the gist was likely the same).
This, by the way, ties into my previously-articulated view that the SAIT, ADOSH, and Wildland Fire Associate timelines are all wrong. I have no “links” to anything to support this, because my support for this is the timeline that I am slowly piecing together on my laptop and in my notebooks. There is nothing – other than my brain and notes – for me to “link” to…. 🙂
Reply to Elizabeth post on May 15, 2014 at 11:16 am
Elizabeth…
First off… let me say that whatever that noise was down below
about some kind of ‘boycott’ on responding to any more of your
posts… I did not comment on it because that’s not something
I personally believe in on a PUBLIC forum.
Yes… this is a PUBLIC forum.
If a post simply meets the acceptable criteria for ‘allowable’
commentary on the part of the person hosting this PUBLIC
discussion… then whatever someone has to say is OK with me.
But… ( likewise )… since this is a PUBLIC forum… people are then
also allowed to ‘freely comment’ ( and SHOULD ) on what anyone
else has to say… even if that comment was not ‘addressed’ to them.
That’s how this works.
If people don’t like your posts… they don’t have to respond to them.
It’s that simple.
I think folks laid out pretty well down below what they find ‘annoying’ about most of your PUBLIC posts and your ‘style’ of commenting.
You are free to either take whatever ‘advice’ was posted… or
ignore it altogether. Freedom of choice, as they say.
Ok… back to business…
>> Elizabeth said…
>> FIRST: In a post below, WTKTT suggests that EP (one of
>> the guys conducting the “air study” on the day of the Yarnell
>> Hill Fire) might somehow be withholding or concealing video.
>> I suppose that it is possible that EP is deliberately participating
>> in a scheme to withhold information, or that the AZ Forestry
>> folks withheld some of EP’s video, or that the SAIT is
>> withholding some of the video…
Correction: I did NOT say that Eric Panebaker (himself) has
‘withheld’ ( or tampered with ) information/evidence. All I said
was (quote)…
“If the 20130630_162300_SEAT_drop_EP video ( as released by the SAIT in response to FOIA/FOIL requests ) does NOT contain the same content as the original… then HE would certainly know.”
That is simply a TRUE statement.
He would be in the *best* position to know whether or not that video that ended up as part of the FOIA/FOIL package coming from the SAIT actually contains the same things he *gave* them.
He probably still has the *originals*.
I ( me, personally ) do NOT KNOW what the ‘story’ is here.
All I know is that one of these Air Study videos is NOT what it is supposed to be… and that there MUST be SOME kind of *story*
that would explain it.
>> …but it is equally (if not more) likely that EP just made a
>> misstep in labeling and keeping straight all of his videos,
>> pictures, etc.
See my original post. I ( me, personally ) do *NOT* think it
is ‘more likely’ this is the case.
I would be the first to tell you that I have ‘mis-named’ files on a
computer when assembling collections of things… but that is
*NOT* the simple explanation for what is seen in THIS case.
If two of these Air Study videos ended up being just ‘duplicates’
of each other ( completely )… then YES… I would say the likelihood
was high that a copy / naming operation went sideways.
In this case, however, we are talking about a much more
complicated scenario.
Someone ( Repeat: I do NOT know WHO ) took the time to
EXTRACT 11.7 seconds of video from the +2:18 second mark
of a PREVIOUS video… and then SAVE that video back to disk
with a totally differnent TIME on it… just short of an HOUR later
than when it was actually taken.
That’s a little more complicated than just accidentally hitting
the wrong key at some point, or screwing up a drag-and-drop
with a mouse.
>> Elizabeth also said…
>> Here’s the KEY: My impression is that these three folks were
>> SPECIFICALLY interested in capturing videos/photos of the air
>> drops (water, retardant) in action,
That is a valid impression to have. That is what they were
getting PAID to do…
…however… you are WRONG to assume that that is the only
reason they ever shot any VIDEO.
SOME of the Panebaker / Moore videos have nothing to do with
any actual ‘retardant’ drops. The most noticeable of these are
the ones that simply have ‘fire-behavior’ in the video TITLE(S).
>> Elizabeth also said
>> such that, before you conclude that they are HIDING a video,
>> consider whether there was an actual DROP from a SEAT or
>> a VLAT during the time window in question.
See above. There did NOT have to be any kind of ‘drop’ in progress
for Panebaker or Moore to be shooting video that day.
The *mystery* surrounding the particular video in question is
that its title DOES seem to inidicate that it is SUPPOSED to be a
video of a SEAT drop at 1623… but that is NOT what it *REALLY*
is at all.
>> Elizabeth
>> SECOND: For reasons not worth getting into (given that I do
>> not have the time or ability to provide links at this point), allow
>> me to say again that I am pretty sure that Marsh did indeed
>> comment to B33 about where he was hoping for some air
>> support (e.g. a VLAT line), but Marsh made the comment
>> WELL before 16:37.
Please provide evidence if you are going to make these
kinds of statements ( or just re-read the comments below about
what people find most annoying about your posting here ).
I have certainly made some ‘leaps’ myself in an effort to try and
help us ALL decipher some mysteries in this ongoing disscusion
(mostly before there was really no evidence to go on but the stupid
SAIR report and the only thing to DO was ‘guess’ about things )…
but I believe if I have ever gotten even close to saying “I’m pretty
sure this is what happened”… there was ( at least ) extensive
explanation as to WHY I was making such a claim.
I could tell YOU right now that MY *extensive notes* seem to indicate that Darrell Willis left the north side of the fire, drove to Yarnell, borrowed an ATV from the Yarnell Fire Station… and then personally drove all the way out to where Steed and Marsh were and told them face-to-face… “You get your asses over there to town and do something that gets your name in the newspapers because I’ve got a City Council Budget meeting next week”…
…but I would NOT expect ANYONE to believe me unless I showed some ‘evidence’ to back it up.
Not much to add to that. I think the evidence you have gone thru the past 2 days pretty well sums up the discussion.
On another note I will be gone for a week and have a lot to catch up on here so keep on looking.
Will be at my Oak Grove Hot Shot reunion reliving the great old days. Have a good week.
Signal boost to WTKTT’s earlier request for a new chapter. My mobile device crashes whenever I try to load this page now. Thanks, Mr. Dougherty, for continuing to host this discussion!
**
** WHERE IS THE *REAL* 20130630_162300_SEAT_drop_EP
** AIR STUDY VIDEO?
After checking the Panebaker 163700 Air Study video again for ANY evidence of ANYONE saying anything like “That’s what we want” circa 1637 ( and finding no such evidence )… I started working BACKWARDS from 1637 and re-checking the other Air Study videos.
There is no Panebaker or Moore Air Study Video that actually covers the 1637 to 1639 timeframe… so if there was any chance of finding evidence of this (supposed) “That’s what we want” transmission reported ONLY by John Burfiend of Bravo 33… then I thought perhaps that even if anyone did say any such thing… he might have simply been mistaken that it came (quote) “within 5 minutes of them going into shelters” ( as he said in his SAIT interview ).
1642 ( Marsh’s final transmissions ) minus 5 minutes is 1637 and so that must have been the ‘guesstimate’ the SAIT investigators were applyiing to this ‘recollection’ on Burfiend’s part.
I STILL believe it is MUCH more likey that if ANYONE said anything to Bravo 33 like “That’s exactly what we want”… that it was SOMEONE ( but NOT Marsh ) confirming the ‘goodness’ of the 1633 SEAT drop that was ‘spot on’ ( according to Burfiend and French ) and got laid down RIGHT between a house and the fireline at exactly 1633. If anyone said “That’s exactly what we want”… it MUST have been someone who saw that actual ‘spot-on’ drop right between the house and the fireline… ( like a chopper pilot ) and NOT someone who would have just seen some plane circling around in the air on some kind of ‘line-up’ flight.
It was MOST LIKELY one of the chopper pilots known to have been in the air and also working that same exact area circa 1637. They would have seen that drop be ‘spot on’ and would have immediately been ‘confirming the goodness’ of it.
Anyway… my plan was to work BACKWARDS through the Panebaker videos again listening carefully for ANY evidence of ANYONE saying anything like “That’s what we want” or other ‘confirming goodness’ opinions on the 1633 SEAT drop at ANY time that day.
Well… here comes the new MYSTERY.
The Panebaker video that immediately precedes the 163700 one is named…
20130630_162300_SEAT_drop_EP
That (supposedly) means it ENDED at 1623 and would also mean there was no Panebaker video prior to the 163700 one that covered the time of that 1633 SEAT drop down in Yarnell…
…but what the heck… I re-checked the 162300 Air Study video, anway.
That is when I discovered that this entire 162300 Air Study video is BOGUS.
It is NOT what it says it is ( A video taken by Panebaker that ENDS at 1623 ).
The entire Panebaker video 20130630_162300_SEAT_drop_EP is simply a reproduction of 11.7 seconds from the 2:18 second mark ( near the end ) of a much EARLIER Panebaker video 201300630_152406_SEAT_EP.
Someone just LIFTED 11.7 seconds out of a previous video shot around
1524 ( 3:24 PM ) that day… and is trying to pretend that it is the contents of
an Air Study Video shot an hour later at 1623 ( 4:23 PM ).
Everything from those 11.7 seconds at the +2:18 mark in the 152406 Air
Study Video is a *PERFECT MATCH* for the entire content of the 162300 video.
So where is the *REAL* Panebaker 20130630_162300_SEAT_drop_EP video?
How long was the ORIGINAL video?… before someone just (manually) REPLACED it with an 11.7 second clip from a video taken an HOUR earlier?
There was a LOT of critical stuff going at circa 1623 that day and so the original Panebaker 162300 video may have captured some of that.
Example: It has NOT been completely verified that the YARNELL-GAMBLE video was actually shot at 1627. That APPEARS to be the time as supported by the sirens heard in the Jerry Thompson videos… but I still wouldn’t call that 100 percent verification.
If Jerry Thompson himself was just a few minutes off on the times he reported for HIS videos… then the YARNELL-GAMBLE video *MIGHT* have actually been shot a few minutes earlier… like in the 1622-1624 timeframe.
If that is the case… then that means this ‘missing’ 162300 Panebaker Air Study video had a good chance of ALSO capturing that TAC 1 channel conversation where SOMEONE in fire command *seems* to be urging Marsh to ‘hurry up and get to town’ and Eric Marsh ( totally confirmed ) then immediately reports Granite Mountain’s STATUS as… “They’re comin’ from the heel of the fire” ( as in… on the MOVE and NOT in the ‘safe black’ at all ).
So the ‘missing’ Panebaker 162300 video might have ALSO captured that
YARNELL-GAMBLE conversation on TAC 1… complete with the actual
CALL SIGN of whoever it was that was having that conversation with
Eric Marsh at that time and *seemed* to be urging him to hurry up.
Even if the YARNELL-GAMBLE conversation was NOT also captured in this
Panebaker 162300 video… there might have been *other* radio traffic relevant
to Granite Mountain that WAS captured circa 1623.
It really is not possible this was just a screw-up.
Someone seems to have purposely preserved the 20130630_162300 filename
and timestamp for this video… but then also PURPOSELY made an effort
to replace the content with something else from ANOTHER (earlier) video.
More on this later.
I’m now going back and re-checking ALL the Air Study videos to see if this
kind of ‘money business’ was going on with any OTHER Air Study videos.
The 20130630_162300_SEAT_drop_EP video that is now known
to be BOGUS is just ONE of the Panebaker Air study videos that
‘precedes’ the 163700 one. It does not IMMEDIATELY precede it.
There are actually TWO others that come in-between 162300
and 163700… and they both appear to be exactly what they
say they are.
These are the actual ( Eric ) Panebaker Air Study videos
that cover the crucial 4:00 PM to 5:00 PM timeframe that day…
20130630_161858_VLAT_split_2_EP
20130630_162300_SEAT_drop_EP **** This is the BOGUS one
20130630_162508_2SEATS_EP
20130630_163338_fire_behavior_EP
20130630_163700_fire_behavior_EP
20130630_164544_fire_behavior_EP
20130630_170634_VLAT_EP
NOTE: The 20130630_161858_VLAT_split_2_EP video that precedes the one that is now know to be BOGUS is the one that captured the 4:16 PM “Granite Mountain… what’s your status right now?” query from from someone in fire command and Eric Marsh’s response about Granite Mountain “makin’ their way out the same escape route from this morning” and Marsh’s “just checkin’ it out to see where we gonna jump out at” transmission.
ALSO NOTE: The ‘EP’ initials in these Air Study video filenames all stand for ‘Eric Panebaker’.
If the 20130630_162300_SEAT_drop_EP video ( as released by the SAIT in response to FOIA/FOIL requests ) does NOT contain the same content as the original… then HE would certainly know.
**
** PANEBAKER AIR STUDY VIDEO
** 20130630_163700_fire_behavior_EP.MOV
Reply to calvin post on May 9, 2014 at 3:04 am
>> calvin said…
>> At the 23 second mark of the 1637 Panebaker video there is a background
>> transmission that I cannot make out. This video is only 39 seconds long and
>> would put the 23 second mark near 1637. If you do not mind reviewing,
>> I would appreciate it.
calvin…
I went back and reviewed the 163700 Panebaker video again looking for ANY evidence that ANYONE said anything like “That’s exactly what we want” as reported by the SAIR as Marsh talking to Bravo 33 at that time ( circa 1637 ).
This video (supposedly) ENDS at exactly 1637 and ( as you pointed out )
only covers the 39 seconds prior to that… so if anyone did say anything
of the sort circa 1637… it must have come AFTER 1637 and there is no
Panebaker or Moore Air Study video that covers the 1637-1638 timeframe.
Anyway… after listening carefully again… there is NOTHING in the 163700
video that resembles ANYONE saying anything like “That’s what we want”
or “That’s exactly what we want”.
The mysterious background transmit in the +21 to +23 second mark that you mention APPEARS to be someone saying something about a ‘horse’ that needs to be taken care of. This would match other reports around that time of ‘horses’ being seen running down the middle of Highway 89.
Here is my full transcript of that 163700 Panebaker video…
Transcript of BOTH the foreground AND background radio conversation captured
by Panebaker Air Study Video 20130630_163700_fire_behavior_EP.MOV.
ECITW ( Every Caveat In The World )
This is what I ( me, personally ) believe is being said in both the foreground AND the background of this video. Your mileage may, of course, vary.
This video is 39 seconds long.
Since the text notes accompanying these videos states that the timestamp in the title represents the END time…that makes the actual START time for this video 1636.21
NOTE: The air-to-air conversation in this video is ALSO captured even MORE
clearly in the corresponding USDA AIR STUDY VIDEO – DISC 4 folder.
+0:05 ( 1636.26 / 4:36.26 PM )
(Unknown): Five-O-Eleven… you sure of that helibase… in that green circle here?
+0:09 ( 1636.30 / 4:36.30 PM )
(Unknown – Sounds like French in B33?): Okay, copy that… are you gonna drop your bucket and have to lift back somewhere else?
+0:13 ( 1636.34 / 4:36.34 PM )
(Unknown): Yea… I’ll have to drop ( the bucket? ) then I’ll head for Wickenburg for fuel.
+0:16 ( 1636.37 / 4:36.37 PM )
(Unkown – Sounds like French in B33?): Oh… okay… gotcha… okay… gimme a call… uh… ready to lift.
+0:21 ( 1636.42 / 4:36.42 PM )
(Unknown): Will do.
BACKGROUND
+0:22 ( 1636.43 / 4:36.43 PM )
(Unknown): I’ve got a (horse?) left (to take care of?)
+0:25 ( 1636.46 / 4:36.46 PM )
(Unknown): You’re all clued in. No need to act… just write it down on a piece a paper.
FOREGROUND
+0:34 ( 1636.55 / 4:36.55 PM )
(Unknown – Sounds like French in B33?): And I’ve got a project for you.
+0:37 ( 1636.58 / 4:36.58 PM )
(Unknown): When ya have… ???
BACKGROUND
+0:37 ( 1636.58 / 4:36.58 PM )
(Unknown): (Someone’s NAME here is FIRST word? Boleba/Boleeba? Buliba?) What’s goin’ on back there?
Update: Wherever it says ‘Unknown – Sounds like French in B33’ up above should have just said ‘Thomas French in B33’. It is confirmed.
Since this Panebaker video ‘overlaps’ with DVD DISC 4 of the USDA Air Study Videos… the Air-To-Air traffic captured in that USDA video confirms most of the FOREGROUND communications captured in this Panebaker video.
WTKTT
Discussion above—-
Helicopter Pilot talking to French’
Has a water Bucket for drops.
he is going to drop it off at the heliport and go for fuel.
I’ve got a hose lift to take care of — not horse—would have been moving hose to some location. Generally they bag it Nets and drop it at some location for use.
5011 might be the call sign of the Helicopter? Just thoughts.
Reply to Bob Powers post on May 14, 2014 at 7:06 am
>> Mr. Powers wrote…
>> Helicopter Pilot talking to French’
>> Has a water Bucket for drops.
>> he is going to drop it off at the heliport and go for fuel.
Yes. That is definitely French talking to helicopter
5KA ( Five Kilo Alpha ) at that point. 5KA is the one that needed to ‘drop his bucket’ and go refuel, at this time.
The ‘other’ USDA audio captures of Air-To-Ground with
no ‘walk overs’ on the Air-To-Air channel proves that.
5KA would always identify himself using the full
‘Five Kilo Alpha’ but whenever French was hailing him
he would simply abbreviate it as ‘Kilo Alpha’.
>> I’ve got a hose lift to take care of — not horse—
>> would have been moving hose to some location.
>> Generally they bag it Nets and drop it at some location
>> for use.
Perfectly possible. That’s a very hard section to hear
in this particular video. Could be ‘horse’ *OR* ‘hose’.
The KEY thing there was that this transmission is definitely NOT anyone saying anything like “That’s what we want” in response to any line-up flights.
>> 5011 might be the call sign of the Helicopter?
>> Just thoughts.
I listened to it again. This is definitely a capture of Burfiend in Bravo 33 talking on the Air-To-Ground channel… because in the USDA DVD there is more Air-To-Air talk right underneath this transmit from Burfiend… so the capture in THIS Panebaker video MUST have been ‘Air-To-Ground’ instead.
It still definitely sounds like ‘Five-O-Eleven’ there, but since the chopper call signs all tend to be just THREE digits/numbers ( and there is no chopper with call sign 5011 listed as having been in Yarnell ) it’s unclear who Burfiend is really talking to about the ‘Helibase’.
I could believe he really meant to say ‘Nine-Eleven’, but since they were not dropping in Yarnell now, and the DC10 VLAT 911 was still returning from a refuel and wasn’t even really back in the area yet… I’m not sure what sense that would make at this moment.
Again… the KEY takeaway there is that THIS transmission was definitely Burfiend and it was definitely on the Air-To-Ground channel… so that means this Panebaker video WAS capturing ‘Air-To-Ground’ transmissions…
…but there is still nothing in the capture with anyone ever coming onto the A2G channel and saying anything resembling “That’s exactly what we want”.
This capture ENDS exactly at 1637… so if anyone said something like that circa 1637 over A2G channel… then it must have happened AFTER 1637.
Unfortunately… there is no Panebaker or Moore Air Study video that then goes on to capture the A2G traffic in the 1637 to 1639 timeframe.
The only NEXT ‘capture’ ( in the public record, anyway ) of the A2G channel after this Panebaker video is the Helmet-Cam video itself… which starts just prior to 1639 and begins with Burfiend on A2G talking to ?? someone ?? about how it’s going to be hard for them to hit some target being discussed because of the ‘smoke’. A moment later we hear Steed’s first “We are in front of the flaming front” MAYDAY transmit.
The only reason I might be hearing a little ‘more’ than you
have is that even though this particular video didn’t need
any ‘audio forensics’ or ‘noise filtering’… I STILL found that
I needed to really BOOST THE GAIN on the audio to have
a chance at hearing some of the background.
Does whatever you are using to ‘listen’ to the videos
have that ‘GAIN BOOST’ capability?
“Audio forensics” INCLUDES boosting the gain, WTKTT. When you BOOST the gain, you distort the audio. Sorry if I was not clear on that with you earlier.
WTKTT – it absolutely CAN distort the audio! If you doubt me, the actual Audacity disclosures make this clear. If in doubt, READ the relevant info. If you have something that suggests otherwise, “post your sources.” (Tongue in cheek, obviously.)
Reply to
Elizabeth post
on May 17,
2014 at 11:59
____________
WTKTT – it absolutely CAN distort the audio!
_____________
Oh… so NOW you are backing
off your carte-blanche “When you BOOST the gain, it distorts the audio” statement and have arrived at simply the ‘possibility’ that can happen.
.
Good for you.
You’re learning.
Yes. If you boost the gain some RIDICULOUS amount and your speakers or headphones are now shaking and your eardrums are getting blown out… or if you exceed the SOFTWARE limits as to ‘maximum volume’ allowed for a track… most software ( including Audacity ) has a ‘safety catch’ where it will then start applying ‘clipping’ to the waveform in order to not destroy your equipment.
What I said above was ‘the kind of gain boost I am talking about does NOT ( in ANY way ) distort that audio.
That is simply a TRUE statement.
Incremental boosts of +3db do NOT cause any loss of the waveform and no DISTORTION is taking place… and certainly nothing that would cause anything that anyone might be SAYING to be changed in any way.
_____________
If in doubt, READ the relevant info.
_____________
I have.
I wish YOU would do the same.
_____________
If you have something that suggests otherwise, “post your sources.” (Tongue in cheek, obviously.)
_____________
Okay.
From Audacity’s own user manual…
****************
The top slider is the gain control – it affects the relative volume of the track. By default it only lets you select multiples of 3 dB, but if you hold down shift you can choose any level. Be careful not to set it too high, or you can exceed the maximum volume of a track, which results in clipping.
****************
By the way… the ‘too high’ being referred to would probably be blowing out your ear drums even before the ‘safety catch’ clipping starts to kick in.
Don’t do that.
Just use low increments and all the GAIN boost does it make it EASIER to hear what is being said.
I’ve got Audacity (such a sweet program), and can boost the gain in general and specifically boost the 200-400 Hz range. While it tends to lower interference, I still have the same issues on the brain side of the ear (alas!), and don’t seem to parse the language any better. I’ll give it another try, though.
I think you were spot on about the “Wickenberg to fuel” part. I don’t hear “no need to act” or “write it down on a piece of paper.”
It would be interesting to know if EP still has access to the original files, and how they differ from what we have.
Sitta… yes… the (free) Audacity software is amazing. I have sound software here that costs thousands and thousands of dollars… but I still use Audacity for most things.
It is even BETTER at some things than anything money can (currently) buy.
Disclaimer: I am in no way associated with ‘Audacity’ or any of its software products. I am just a ‘user’.
My only other advice to try and ‘hear’ things that are ‘hard to hear’ is to simply set yourself up a ‘loop’ on that specific phrase… and then let it play over and over and over and over.
**
** Reply to Bob Powers post on May 11, 2014 at 7:49 am
>> Mr. Powers wrote…
>> When Fires Like this in WUI start running at structures the first thing
>> is to thro Air Tankers at the Fire.
>> The problem most times they don’t do any good except make
>> everybody feel like they at least did something.
>> It looks good to the public at least some one is doing something.
There is no doubt ( and we can now hear it for ourselves ) that the Air Support in Yarnell that day knew that most of the drops they were making weren’t doing much good and that it was just like (quote) “spittin’ at it”.
Just like ‘Hotshots’ ( and any FFs building line ) know about the ‘hauling chart’ which says that if flame-lengths are more than about three and one-hal feet they are basically ‘out of it’ and ‘wasting their time’… the AIR people know full well what their own ‘limitations’ are and when THEY are also, basically ‘out of it’.
But… that being said…
If you look at the AFTERMATH photos ( mostly the aerial ones ) following Sunday, June 30, 2013… there is also no doubt that in SOME places… that line of red stuff on the ground IS what ‘stopped’ or ‘diverted’ the fireline near some pretty critical areas of the town.
So I guess it’s really like that old adage that is often attributed to someone in the advertising industry…
“Half of what we do doesn’t do a damn bit of good.
The problem is knowing WHICH half.”
>> Mr. Powers also said…
>> Helicopters – When Fixed wing plains are on a fire Helicopter pilots
>> Monitor there Freq. And stay out of the way. They fly lower and are
>> assigned to specific areas. They maintain contact Air to Air.
>> That is why I said the 1 Helicopter flying that is mentioned may have
>> had an overhead in it that could have made the comment, and could
>> have over keyed Marsh DIV A call.
Since I don’t believe we have even near fully wrapped up the ‘discussion’ about whether the 1637 “That’s what we want!” transmission ever happened at all… or that if it did… whether it really was DIVSA Eric Marsh saying it…
…then this is a very important point.
It’s pretty much a given that there WAS no YHF fire overhead ‘in the air’ at the time this (supposed) 1637 transmission took place… but it really doesn’t matter if there was any ‘fire command’ in a chopper, or not.
Any chopper pilot could have made that transmission… and we KNOW there were at least TWO in the air right there around Yarnell at both 1633, when that ‘spot-on’ SEAT drop happened… and in the 1637 to 1639 timeframe when Steed’s first MADAY appeared. We can even HEAR these 2 choppers flying overhead in the Helmet-Cam video itself.
The recent ‘sidetrack’ of proving that Tom Story’s Canon EOS 1D was 36 minutes and 7 seconds BEHIND the REAL time that day is actually related to this 1637 transmission discussion… which is why it was good to ‘sidetrack’ and take care of that. Tom Story’s 7093 photos series seemed to show a VLAT drop at exactly 1639… the moment of Steed’s first MAYDAY. It was worth it to go off and verify that for no other reason than to prove that that is NOT the case… and that we CAN trust the Air-To-Air traffic completely for figuring out what Bravo 33 was REALLY doing in the 1637-1639 timeframe.
In the course of basically re-viewing and re-listening to EVERY Panebaker Air-Study video in order to nail down that Tom Story camera time offset… I happened to HEAR some things I hadn’t really heard before regarding HELICOPTERS and RETARDANT DROPS.
If you listen to all of the Panebaker Air Study videos… it is *NOT* unusual at all to hear someone in a helicopter ‘commenting’ on a retardant drop right after it happens.
You actually DO hear a lot of ‘unsolicited’ comments ( over Air-To-Ground channel ) such as “Spot-on!” or “Right on target!” or even one lengthy response from a chopper pilot after one of the VLAT drops on the NORTH end where he jumps in on Air-To-Ground right afterwards and says something like…
“This is 5Q Alpha in the hotbird’s seat with a front row view… and that was right on the money! Nice work!.”
So YES… it is actually MORE than likely that when Burfiend thought he heard DIVSA say “That’s exactly what we want”… that really just might have been one of the chopper pilots already in the air down there jumping in on Air-To-Ground and ‘confirming’ the ‘goodness’ of that spot-on 1633 SEAT drop.
So something like “That’s exactly what we want!” probably WAS actually said on the Air-To-Ground channel ( by SOMEONE who saw the spot-on 1633 SEAT drop )… but Burfiend was simply mis-remembering ( during his SAIT interview ) who said that around that time.
No definite PROOF ( yet )… but we’re getting closer.
I’d still love to know what Clint Clauson ( the THIRD guy onboard that Bravo 33 plane that afternoon ) actually thinks he did ( or didn’t ) hear.
While it is NOT unusual at ALL to hear these chopper pilots ‘commenting’ on a retardant drop… the KEY seems to always be that these ‘unsolicited’ verifying-goodness comments ONLY come AFTER a REAL DROP.
In other words… if you listen carefully to all of these sorts of ‘unsolicted’ verifying-goodness comments from the chopper pilots in the Panebaker videos… they NEVER comment on a ‘show me’ or on a ‘line up’ drop…
…and there’s a GOOD reason for that.
These guys are flying ‘show me’ and ‘go-around’ and ‘line-up’ flights basically ALL the time… and unless you are totally GLUED to the Air-To-Air channel yourself then you really can’t ever be sure when they are actually going to DROP… or NOT.
So the ONLY thing that warrants an unsolicited “That was spot-on!” or “That’s exactly what we want!” comment is when you have actually just SEEN them drop… and you are verifying the ‘goodness’ of that location for even MORE drops.
So that, I think, is even more ‘indirect’ proof that Marsh would NOT have just jumped onto the radio and come out of nowhere with an unsolicited “That’s exactly what we want!” transmission JUST because he *might* have accidentally saw ANYONE doing a ‘show me’ or a ‘practice run’.
Those kind of ‘unsolicited’ comments over Air-To-Ground usually ONLY happen AFTER a REAL DROP… and are simply meant to encourage ‘more of the same’ at that location.
So ( perhaps? ) just one more reason why if anyone really did say “That’s exactly what we want!” over the Air-To-Ground channel in the 1634 to 1637 timeframe… it really was just a ‘confirming goodness’ comment regarding the spot-on 1633 SEAT drop right there on the outskirts of Yarnell ( which Marsh himself could NOT have seen due to the smoke cloud between him and Yarnell in that timeframe ).
WTKTT I think you are right on with the above.
Also if the Helicopters were dropping water in the same area trying to hold the fire down, then they definitely would have commented on the tanker drop helping them out at a critical location.
The reason I keep referring to the 1633 SEAT drop there right on the outskirts of Yarnell is because that, in fact, seems to be exactly what everyone who saw it seemed to think. Burfiend and French seemed to think so and said so in their SAIT interview.
The drop went ‘right between the ‘fire’ and a ‘home’… which at THAT point is time is what was *really* needed.
This ‘cut’ from Bravo 33’s SAIT interview seems to be describing that exact drop… and the fact that it was just after this 1633 drop when Burfiend then turned his attention to Kevin in the DC10 VLAT and told him to ‘come on in now’ ( circa 1636 )…
__________________________________________
We decided we were going to go here (pointed to Div Z) and go direct. Took the single SEAT. Brand new pilot (830) went right between spot and the home. We brought the DC10 in…
___________________________________________
Sidenote: They obviously had MAPS at these SAIT interviews and there are several references in the interviews where people are said to have been ‘pointing at the map’.
It SURE would have been nice if copies of that maps ( with notations of where people were pointing ) were included in the SAIT FOIA/FOIL releases…
…but they weren’t.
If these ‘Interview notated maps’ even exist… then they are just even more documents that Arizona Forestry either just neglected to include in the FOIA/FOIL requests… or they ( for some reason ) decided to specifically ‘withhold’ them.
The ADOSH investigation did the RIGHT thing.
They had fresh copies of ‘maps’ at each and every interview and they were freely letting the interviewees ‘mark them up’ during their interviews to make locations and movements more clear…
…and ADOSH did INCLUDE those ‘interviewee notated maps’ in their FOIA/FOIL release(s).
You can listen ( or read ) along with the interviewee AND see the exact notes they were making DURING the interview on real maps.
I’d still love to know exactly WHERE Burfiend was pointing when his own SAIT interview notes say he was ‘pointing at a spot in Division Z’ and said “We went HERE”.
Whoops. I left the phrase “as SPOT-ON” out of the first paragraph above, which was really intended to be the whole point of the statement.
Here is how paragraph 1 above SHOULD have read…
“The reason I keep referring to the 1633 SEAT drop there right on the outskirts of Yarnell as SPOT-ON is because that, in fact, seems to be exactly what everyone who saw it seemed to think. Burfiend and French seemed to think so and said so in their SAIT interview.”
Glad you caught that. TBH I haven’t had much of a chance to even look at the Panebakers. And I’ve definitely been wondering how the helicopters communicated and with whom.
When I read the Interagency Fire Aviation Manual, it said there was supposed to be a “Helico,” a Helitanker Coordinator, somehow in communication with both Air Attack and Incident Command.
The 20130630_162300_SEAT_drop_EP video that is now known
to be BOGUS is just ONE of the Panebaker Air study videos that
‘precedes’ the 163700 one. It does not IMMEDIATELY precede it.
There are actually TWO others that come in-between 162300
and 163700… and they both appear to be exactly what they
say they are.
These are the actual ( Eric ) Panebaker Air Study videos
that cover the crucial 4:00 PM to 5:00 PM timeframe that day…
20130630_161858_VLAT_split_2_EP
20130630_162300_SEAT_drop_EP **** This is the BOGUS one
20130630_162508_2SEATS_EP
20130630_163338_fire_behavior_EP
20130630_163700_fire_behavior_EP
20130630_164544_fire_behavior_EP
20130630_170634_VLAT_EP
NOTE: The 20130630_161858_VLAT_split_2_EP video that precedes the one that is now know to be BOGUS is the one that captured the 4:16 PM “Granite Mountain… what’s your status right now?” query from from someone in fire command and Eric Marsh’s response about Granite Mountain “makin’ their way out the same escape route from this morning” and Marsh’s “just checkin’ it out to see where we gonna jump out at” transmission.
ALSO NOTE: The ‘EP’ initials in these Air Study video filenames all stand for ‘Eric Panebaker’.
If the 20130630_162300_SEAT_drop_EP video ( as released by the SAIT in response to FOIA/FOIL requests ) does NOT contain the same content as the original… then HE would certainly know.
The Az Republic ran another piece on the Yarnell evacuations yesterday. Turns out only 1 in 8 persons received an automated call, and most of those involved no human-to-human contact, i.e. just left a message. Also the article says there was a 21 minute delay in sending out the notifications (I am assuming from the time the decision was made sometime after 3:30). May account for why people said they were notified around 4:08. Also there was no one hour notice, just “get out now”. In a disaster nothing ever works as it supposed to, but the evacuations that day seemed particularly bad. I still wonder the extent to which the flawed evacuations that day affected firefighting decisions in the time after 3:30.
I can imagine it might have had something to do with Abel, Cordes, et al, not paying enough attention to what Granite Mountain was doing until it was too late……
Maybe their attention was diverted. But I was asking more in how it might have affected tactical decisions.
One thing struck me recently. GM was aware of the evacuations situation. When the fire started running at Yarnell, I believe it was Scott Norris who texted “the fire is running right at Yarnell”. Yet I also think it was he (I’m pretty sure, maybe it was someone else) who texted “and the evacuations have just started”. Maybe it was a throwaway comment, not something they were making decisions based on. But it shows, that even for an experienced crew member, it was on their minds.
The evacuation situation should not have impacted safety considerations. But human nature being what it is, I wonder if it colored the way people looked at risk that afternoon.
Actually… it was Wade Parker’s final text message sent to his mother with a network timestamp of 4:04 PM that had those references in it.
Wade’s complete text message was…
“This thing is running straight for yarnel. jus starting to evac. you can see fire on the left town on right. DO NOT POST THIS ON FACEBOOK OR ANY OTHER SOCIAL MEDIA DEAL!!!!”
There was some discussion, early on ( even on this forum ) about what Wade really meant when he said “jus starting to evac”.
The discussion(s) were addressing the possibility that Wade’s statement could be taken one of two ways…
1) He was telling his mother that HE ( and the other Granite Mountain fellas ) were ‘just starting’ THEIR ‘evacuation’ of their position. As in… just now leaving the safe black.
2) He was telling his mother that YARNELL was only now starting to evacuate.
I believe the consensus back then was that Wade probably meant number 2… mostly because the people with WFF experience were in agreement that Parker probably wouldn’t even use the word ‘evacuation’ to describe their OWN movements or ‘relocation’ efforts.
So if it really was number 2 above… then YES… that is full proof that even the line crew up there ( and not just management like Marsh/Steed ) were fully aware that ‘get out now’ evacuations had been ordered down there in town… but they were also NOT aware that they had been ‘ordered’ by SPGS1 Gary Cordes some 24 mnutes BEFORE that… at 1540.
With regard to how this ‘knowledge’ affected their own decision making… I’m SURE it had SOMETHING to do with either of the following…
1) Management putting pressure on them to get to town as fast as they could ( Sic: Someone in management appears to actually be telling them to HURRY in the YARNELL-GAMBLE video ).
2) If there was no management pressure at all… then it still probably made them ‘rethink’ their already stated plan to remain in the safe black. They ( Steed and/or Marsh ) just didn’t want to accept the fact that they were ‘out of the game’ and weren’t going to be able to be ‘where the action was’… and this urge on their part made them totally forget that their PRIMARY responsibility was the *SAFETY* of ALL of the employees in their charge.
SIDENOTE: A lot has been discussed about what GOOD anyone might have even thought 19 guys with hand tools and no actual structural firefighting equipment could have even been able to do that day… or what their ‘assignment’ might have been even if they made it down there.
It is perfectly possible that even if management requested them to ‘come down’… that no one really had anything specific in mind for them to do at all… at least not at the time the request was made.
Management might have just ‘wanted them to be there’ and was going to figure out what to do with them AFTER they arrived.
This would actually match OPS1 Todd Abel’s thinking with regards to Type 1 Hotshots.
In his ADOSH interview… the ADOSH investigators went over the situation with the Blue Ridge Hotshots with OPS1 Todd Abel and how they just bounced around most of the morning with nothing to do and only being told to ‘stage’ at 3 different places before anyone even gave them any kind of ‘assignment’.
Todd Abel’s OWN explanation for all of that was that he was ‘busy’ that morning… but knew that he just wanted to have a Type 1 Hotshot crew in (quote) “My back pocket in case I needed them”.
Actual (full) quote from Abel about this in his ADOSH interview was…
__________________________________________
So we went down there, uh, after the briefing ran into, um, Blue Ridge out there, um, and they said hey, what would you like us to do? I said hey, why don’t you guys go stage at the school. I’m not sure exactly where I wanna put you guys yet. But I wanted that hotshot crew in my back pocket.
__________________________________________
Granted… that was ‘start of work day’, pretty much, and Abel really *was* ‘very busy’ at that point. It then took Abel almost an HOUR to get all the various engines and crews that were showing up assigned to various places.
However… I’m sure the ‘evacuation cycle’ was just as busy ( and confusing ) when it hit later on… and there might have been no other reason for asking GM to ‘come down’ ( and to HURRY ) than the same sort of “I just wanted Hotshots in my back pocket” mentality.
I would really hate to think that that is the reason why 19 good men died… just because someone wanted them ‘in their back pocket’ but would have ended up just letting them stand around in a parking lot like they did with the OTHER Type 1 Hotshot crew that was ALREADY THERE… .and totally available.
Mike, I absolutely believe that it does. Absolutely. 100%.
(I made a comment on IM long ago about this point and about the demographics of Yarnell/Glen Ilah, and, not surprisingly, I took a fair amount of pushback. It is clear from at least one ADOSH interview that leaps readily to mind that Dave Larson (or someone…) was on the same wavelength, for whatever that is worth. I’m not suggesting the GM guys SHOULD have tried to go to the BSR or wherever, but I am saying that they strike me as a bunch of men who were likely to want to try (if safely possible) help a vulnerable population. Human nature is what it is, and a lot of guys become wildfire professionals because they CARE.)
Elizabeth… I don’t think there is any question in the world that these were men who were ‘likely to try’ to help people. The pay wasn’t good enough to stick with that kind of work for any other reason…
…but ( as I think we have seen )… it is, in fact, possible to care TOO MUCH… if those urges make you forget the rules of your profession and take unnecessary risks with the very LIVES of the employees you are responsible for.
This applies to MANY professions… and not just firefighting.
Yes… they CARED.
But why did TWO of those men care SO much that they forgot the ‘rules’ of their profession *AND* what their PRIMARY responsibilities were… and it ended up
killing all 19?
This is the primary question that still remains to be answered.
The Republic, which I gather takes a fair amount of grief at times, continues to write on this story. This is at least the second significant piece they have done on the evacuations, both well after the incident. They have never tried to link the evacuations to the deaths of the GMHS, but I do think the delayed evacuation impacted some decision-making.
The Yavapai sheriff’s office basically said the evacuations were not perfect, but were good enough as no residents died or were seriously injured. I have a lot of problems with that thinking. First of all, there were near misses with residents. Second, I think some firefighters were left too long at the head of the fire west of town and there were apparently near misses there too. I think there was some reluctance to pull them out because they were trying to buy time. And finally, we may never know for sure the degree to which knowledge of the tardy evacuations impacted Granite Mountain’s actions. Maybe it played no role, but they knew of it and then they did something inexplicable. The questions about what could they have done, about what actions they thought they could do, are good ones. Maybe though they just felt the need to be “available”, to help if needed. Yes, they needed to say put, but am trying to fathom their thought process.
Anyways, those in charge of evacuations should not conclude the process was “adequate”, just because no residents were killed or injured.
>> mike said…
>> The Republic, which I gather
>> takes a fair amount of grief at
>> times, continues to write on
>> this story.
As well they should ( continue to write about this historic, tragic incident ).
>> mike also said…
>> They have never tried to link the
>> evacuations to the deaths of the
>> GMHS, but I do think the delayed
>> evacuation impacted some
>> decision-making.
Of course it did.
Suddenly… EVERYTHING was an EMERGENCY.
That affects EVERYONE involved *and* their decision making.
It ( the total chaos which created this sense of total EMERGENCY in a very short span of time ) could have been AVOIDED. No question.
The moment that thing marched right through that heavy retardant line like it wasn’t even THERE ( hundreds of yards north of even Cordes’ FIRST trigger point )… it didn’t take a genius to figure out there wasn’t much that was going to stop it. The Big Dog was going to just EAT. Get everyone OUT OF THE WAY. Like RIGHT NOW.
>> mike also said…
>> The questions about what could
>> they have done, about what
>> actions they thought they could
>> do, are good ones. Maybe though
>> they just felt the need to be
>> “available”, to help if needed.
Yes. Maybe having some Type 1 Hotshots in Yarnell in/around the time the ONLY thing to be doing was a total evacuation *might* have helped… and maybe that *was* what they were ‘thinking’…
…but just ONE quick call on the radio to discover that there were ALREADY 20 Elite Type 1 Hotshots right there ‘in the middle of the action’… with NO ONE giving them *ANY* assignment(s) whatsoever would have answered that question in their minds… toot-sweet.
That radio call never happened.
IMHO… It should have.
Even if they were half-way there… if they had discovered there wasn’t anything they were even going to be ALLOWED to do if they got all the way there ( just like Blue Ridge wasn’t being allowed to do anything at that time but *be safe* )… they could have TURNED BACK. There would still have been TIME to do that.
>> mike also said…
>> Anyways, those in charge of
>> evacuations should not conclude
>> the process was “adequate”, just
>> because no residents were killed
>> or injured.
No, they most certainly should NOT.
That’s just more ‘establishment of normalcy’ and ‘prior bad decisions with good outcomes’ crap.
Own it. Learn from it.
Find out what OTHER small Arizona towns don’t have a working siren at the fire station because the rats have chewed through the wires….
…then FIX it. ASAP.
Find out what OTHER small Arizona towns have never done a ‘reverse 911’ test to see if it is even going to work when the time comes…
…and do a TEST.
See if it IS going to work.
This is NOT rocket science.
** Regarding INJURIES…
There has ALWAYS been confusion and mis-reporting about that.
The LA Times and USA Today BOTH initially reported that in addition to the 19 fatalities… 22 other ‘firefighters and civilians’ were injured that afternoon.
Their own articles even stated that some of the ‘injured’ had to be flown to burn units because the nearby Congress hospital couldn’t handle them.
2 days later… the AP press was then reporting that there were NO serious injuries other than the 19 fatalities.
To this day, however, the Wikipedia page for the Yarnell Hill Fill is still ‘sticking to the story’ that there were MANY ‘others’ injured that day and they upped the number to 23.
The current ( active ) Wikipedia Page for the Yarnell Hill Fire is basically an absolute JOKE… but this is what their very OFFICIAL looking ‘information box’ about the Yarnell Hill Fire has said from day one and it has NEVER been ‘corrected’ by anyone…
Wikipedia
The Yarnell Hill Fire http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yarnell_Hill_Fire
______________________________
Location: Yarnell, Yavapai County, Arizona, U.S.
Coord: 34°14′54″N, 112°45′29″W
Date(s): June 28, 2013 – July 10, 2013
Burned area: 8,400 acres
Ignition source: Lightning
Land use: Mixed (residential/wildlands)
Buildings destroyed: 129
Fatalities: 19
Injuries (non-fatal): 23
______________________________
There are also (apparently) claims of ‘personal injuries’ in MANY of the 100+ claims that have been filed by property owners… but no one has done an actual ‘tally’ on that number.
Gary Cordes himself ( according to his own ADOSH interview ) was putting people into the backs of ambulances that afternoon… but there was no good followup on any of that, either.
So whether there *really* were any ‘injuries’ other than the 19 fatalities still remains a bit a mystery… but what else is new when it comes to YHF.
From the article…
________________________
Eight of the 22 firefighters injured were taken to Wickenburg Community Hospital, some were airlifted to a burn unit in Pheonix, and others were transported to Yavapai Regional Medical Center, Glover said. The 19 firefighters who perished were part of the Granite Mountain Hot Shot Crew.
_________________________
This article lists ( and has links to ) what they say are their TWO sources for the article…
Roxie Glover. Wow, have not seen that name for awhile. Fine woman. Amazing mother. Wow. I am looking at the link now: http://guardianlv.com/2013/06/arizona-19-firefighters-dead-and-22-injured-battling-the-yarnell-hill-fire/
That photo is a picture of Bob Kramer’s place off highway 89 that the only thing that survived in his burnt fridge was a case of beer. You can see Bob on my photo area-
Who was injured in that fire?
Tex and I were just skimming and Joy saw Roxie’s name and that photo of Bob’s place and we are out hiking Zion country- God’s country for a bit and away from civilization but it was nice to see the forum going strong. Tex wondered has anyone looked into the ACTUAL DATE that restricted map was made for state land restriction for that area that is currently restricted (340 acres) beyond the Helm’s spot. Anyone know how to find that out? That lady in the red cross showed us a map that matched the map we got in an email mid July 2013. It is not being looked into much but we are wondering as time went by that Tex (Sonny) awoke at 3am this morning thinking of the 19 and that map and other areas. Has anyone new come out on photos/videos locally to help? I guess I will know when I keep skimming. Short on time. Skim for 10 minutes then off I have to go- Hope all you are well.
~Joy A. Collura
From the article…
________________________
Roxie Glover, a spokeswoman for Wickenburg Community Hospital, said officials had told her to expect injured firefighters — but then she was told they weren’t coming.
“It became clear that the firefighters had been deceased,” Glover told The LA Times. “We were told that we were not getting firefighters.”
Glover said officials told her that the 19 firefighters who had perished were part of the Granite Mountain Hot Shot Crew.
At least two (other) firefighters were evacuated by helicopter to a burn center in Phoenix, she said.
Glover said homeowners had flooded into the hospital, suffering from smoke inhalation and shock after losing their homes.
________________________
From the article…
________________________
Wickenburg Community Hospital is expecting to treat about eight firefighters who were among about 22 injured battling the fast-moving, 2,000-acre Yarnell Hill Fire that has burned through have the town, officials said Sunday evening.
The spokeswoman for Wickenburg hospital, Roxie Glover, said there are reports of as many as 22 firefighters being injured. About eight from that group were headed to the Wickenberg facility, some were being air lifted to a Phoenix burn unit and others were being transported to Yavapai Regional Medical Center, Glover said.
Jim Tavary, CEO of Wickenburg hospital, said his facility was put on alert to expect several injured firefighters but did not know their conditions or the extent of their injuries.
“We are setting up an incident command,” Tavary said.
Homes have burned and hospitals have reported injuries from the blaze that had reached Yarnell.
_________________________
And the SAIT and some others still think the Type II team did a good job. When a Cluster F*** starts it just acts like a rolling snow ball it gets bigger and bigger.
Poor planning, poor Safety and poor execution total lack of situation awareness.
Also why would any one think they could through a crew at the head of a running fire and do any thing? That includes Marsh and GM. Why would they think they could do something that no other Hand Crew has ever been able to do.
For all of you who have never fought fire….Direct attack starts by flanking the fire not taking it head on and pinching the head off. The running fire that afternoon was just plain get out of the way. To much fire and no place to make a stand, or no defensible space to protect structures. Evidenced by Fire Fighters Injuries (burns).
** TOM STORY’S CANON EOS 1D CAMERA WAS
** 36 MINUTES AND 7 SECONDS BEHIND THE
** REAL TIME ON JUNE 30, 2013.
Tom Story’s ‘Canon EOS 1D Mark II N’ camera had an incorrect time setting on June 30, 2013 that was always 36 minutes and 7 seconds BEHIND the REAL time.
The proof of this comes from comparing the following two images of the same VLAT drop ( One that Tom Story took and one that Panebaker took ) which took place circa 1715.28 on the NORTH side of the fire, along Hays Ranch Road in Peeples Valley.
Tom Story’s 201303_Yarnell_Hill_7093
*and*
Panebaker’s 20130630_171528-1_EP
BOTH of these photos show the same exact VLAT drop and were taken no more than 1 second apart, so the *known* correct timestamp on the Panebaker photo can simply be applied to the Tom Story photo, and used to compute the ‘time offset’ for Story’s ‘Canon EOS 1D’ that day.
Here is a VIDEO CROSSFADE between these two photos which PROVES that they are of the same VLAT drop and taken within 1 second of each other…
YouTube About Information
_________________________________________________________________
This is a video crossfade between the following two photographs…
Tom Story’s 201303_Yarnell_Hill_7093 *and*
Panebaker’s 20130630_171528-1_EP
They are BOTH still photos of the same DC10 VLAT drop that took place circa 1715.27 ( 5:15.27 PM ) up on the NORTH side of the fire along Hays Ranch Road in Peeples Valley.
Tom Story shot his photo with a ‘Canon EOS 1D Mark II N’ camera with a 300mm f/2.8L Lens attached.
Panebaker shot his photo with a ‘Canon EOS REBEL T3i’ camera with a 15-85mm f/3.5-5.6 Lens attached.
The TIME on Tom Story’s ‘Canon EOS 1D’ was set incorrectly that day and it put an EXIF metadata timestamp on his 7093 photo of 4:39.21 PM. The actual time it was taken ( based on this comparison with the correctly-timestamped Panebaker photo ) is 5:15.28 PM.
That means that Story’s ‘Canon EOS 1D’ was always 36 minutes and 7 seconds BEHIND the REAL time on June 30, 2013.
The absolute proof that these are two photos of the same VLAT drop is really in the SMOKE cloud on the left side of both photos. It remains absolutely identical during the ‘crossfade’ between the two photos.
__________________________________________________________________
** MORE DETAIL…
Panebaker wasn’t just shooting videos that day.
Every time there was a VLAT drop… Panebaker also used his ‘Canon EOS REBEL T3i’ digital camera to shoot the drops ( these are all the ‘shutter clicks’ being heard in the Panebaker VIDEOS.
Those photos are in the online Dropbox in this folder…
Photos and Video / AerialFirefightingstudy / Panebaker / Photo / VLAT Drops
ONE of Panebaker’s photos of that 5:15.27 PM VLAT drop on the NORTH side of the fire is an almost perfect match for Tom Story’s 7093 photo.
Filename: 20130630_171528-1_EP
EXIF metadata for this Panebaker still image…
Camera: Canon EOS REBEL T3i
Lens: Canon EF-S 15-85mm f/3.5-5.6 IS USM
Lens 2: Shot at 85 mm
Exposure: Auto exposure, Program AE, 1/128 sec, f/5.6, ISO 320
Flash: Off, Did not fire
Focus: AI Servo AF, with a depth of field of from 59.7 m to 15.84 m.
Focus 2: AF Area Mode: Multi-point AF or AI AF
Date: June 30, 2013 – 5:15:27 PM
File: 3,456 × 5,184 JPEG (17.9 megapixels)
The EXIF timestamp of 5:15.27 PM ( 1715.27 ) matches the filename title of 171528 ( filename title is 1 second ahead of EXIF timestamp ).
Tom Story took 3 photos of this same moment of the same drop with his Canon EOS 1D.
All THREE have the same exact timestamp so he must have had his ‘auto-shutter’ motor on, leaned on the shutter button, and just took three photos as fast as the camera would take them.
NOTE: The 4:39.21 timestamps are according to HIS Canon EOS 1D but that is the issue. We know these timestamps are not correct. The KEY was finding out what the real ‘time offset’ was that day.
NOTE: His Canon EOS 1D was not ‘stuck’ on 4:39.21. His photos of the rest of this VLAT drop are stamped with the correct incremental seconds values like 4:39.22 and 4:39.23, etc. He really did take these 3 photos all in the same ‘second’ at 4:39.21.
The FIRST one ( 7093 ) is the best ‘exact match’ for the same photo in the Panebaker Air Study Video ‘Photos’ folder.
In-between the Panebaker and Tom Story photo, the DC10 has, in fact, advanced about 1 plane length.
That means that while both of these photos were taken at almost the same moment… the Panebaker image was actually shot FIRST.
Given the rate of movement as seen and timestamped in other photos/videos of this VLAT drop… I would say that only 1 second has elapsed between when Panebaker pressed his shutter button and then Tom Story pressed his.
So.. since the actual EXIF timestamp for this photo is 1715.27… that puts a REAL timestamp on Story’s 7093 photo of…
1715.28 ( 5:15.28 PM ).
The difference, then, between the ACTUAL time Tom Story’s 7093 photo was taken and the incorrect 4:39.21 PM that his Canon 1D ‘stamped’ it would be…
+36 minutes and 7 seconds. ( 1715.28 minus 1639.21 ).
BOTTOM LINE: This PROVES that there was NO VLAT DROP on the SOUTH side of the fire at 4:39 PM that day, which is what Tom Story’s photos seemed to suggest. That would have meant there was a DC10 VLAT drop taking place at the exact moment that Captain Jesse Steed was making his first MAYDAY call.
That is why it was IMPORTANT to figure out WHY Tom Story’s photos might have been suggesting such a drop at that time.
It didn’t happen.
He ( Tom Story ) simply had the TIME set WRONG on his Canon EOS 1D.
You sent me to the Google to do a little Canon 1D History!! Shows how much I pay attention to cameras that cost five times more than I can even contemplate affording!
That is NOT a new camera!! The 1D Mark ii n came out in 2005!! It was about $4000 then. Google shows one on ebay today for $790.
HOWEVER the 1D’s have always been considered the fastest cameras on the market. They’re the supreme sports photography cameras. It wasn’t STUCK on a second. It could shoot 8.5 frames per second. The current 1D Mark iv can shoot 10 frames per second. Tom’s 5D Mark ii’s can only shoot 4 frames per second. And the 1D is a 1.3 crop frame, a little smaller than full frame, which gives it more “reach.”
That’s why when you watch the Olympics the 1D is what most of the photographers are using. So when Tom wanted a combination of speed and reach, that’s when he went for the relatively ancient but still awesome 1D.
Actually Tom shot 21 frames of that whole drop. The first being at x:xx:18. The last being at x:xx:29. There are at least nine frames that he shot that he didn’t put into that folder.
So now that means possibly having to go back to McCord’s VLAT-helicopter-almost-fiasco video and seeing if that possibly changes its timing (and thus the rest of his coolpix images). It might and it might not. And it may not matter in the general scheme of things.
And PS. I’ve been using Canon Rebels since 2007. I currently use the t3i. It’s the most popular “non-professional” dslr on the planet. I have a three-day “how to shoot video with your dslr” class beginning today. So I may not be around too much.
Have you seen the Tom Story photos that DO actually have some GPS information in them?… but that GPS data is totally screwed up?
I find that very unusual. Usually these GPS chipsets in these devices either WORK… or they don’t.
There is always a ‘startup time’ for GPS if you have just turned the device on and sometimes you won’t be getting truly ACCURATE GPS coordinates until you have acquired at least 4 or 5 of the LEO ( Low Earth Orbit ) satellites…
…but Tom Story’s GPS capable device ( I have no idea what camera that really was ) just seems BROKEN.
It’s also VERY unusual that, in the EXIF data for these GPS stamped photos of his, there is no CAMERA or DEVICE information whatsoever.
Very unusual.
Sometimes the CAMERA or DEVICE Model number or ID is one of the ONLY things a cheap camera will add as EXIF data… but I’ve never seen a device that is adding other sophisticated EXIF data ( like GPS )… but also seems to be REFUSING to add any actual CAMERA or DEVICE information.
So it wasn’t a Canon…
and it wasn’t an iPhone or an iPad.
I have NO IDEA what camera he was using for those (incorrectly) stamped GPS photos.
It was some kind of smartphone pic that he was posting to Instagram. I’m such a bozo re smartphones.
But I’ve looked at LOTS of various smartphone pix from this fire, and the way they get tagged and time stamped is all over the boards. And we had a discussion way back when about how the geotagging etc could be easily way off. It takes awhile for that to set itself up.
I’ve seen LOTS of smartphone geotagging from this fire that is also all over the boards. I haven’t come to expect any kind of accuracy on any of this stuff at all.
**
** MORE ON THE TOM STORY CANON EOS 1D PHOTO TIMESTAMPS
** AND THE (SUPPOSED) VLAT DROP AT 1639
Reply to Marti Reed post on May 11, 2014 at 8:54 am said:
>> Marti said…
>> I had downloaded a smattering of photos from both folders, but
>> just kinda randomly. Just downloaded a bunch more,
>> more strategically. Looks like he photographed three VLAT drops.
Yes, it does.
>> Marti also said…
>> I’m starting to think he set up that camera quickly, just setting the
>> date, and not the time. Thus the stamp when first shot a frame on
>> it would have been 00:00:00. I don’t know if I have the time to figure
>> out what to synch on. But if I can pin one of those VLATs, it might
>> be possible to nail it.
>>
>> That being said, I’m currently thinking that drop might be the 1707ish
>> one. I just don’t know where he took it from. I don’t know where that
>> drop was, exactly. Do you?
I’ve been hard working on that here ( the actual LOCATION of that VLAT drop in
the Tom Story Canon EOS 1D photos ) and I can almost say with little doubt
that regardless of he 4:39 timestamp(s)… that is actually EXACTLY where
we see the Air Study people filming those earlier VLAT drops off on that
small ridge at the NORTH end of the fire… up in Peeples Valley.
So YES… regardless of device timestamp… it looks like that 4:39 series
of photos coming from Ton Story’s ‘Canon EOS 1D Mark II N’ are of the
SAME VLAT DROPS captured in the Panebaker videos… much earlier.
Exactly WHICH Panebaker video is a match?
I am on that right now… taking stillframes from Panebaker videos and
comparing them to the Tom Story photo(s).
>> Marti also wrote…
>> If it was visible from the RHR parking lot, he could have caught
>> it w/that 300mm easily.
Yes… but see above. It looks like those photos were taken all the
way up NORTH of the same VLAT drop(s) seen in the Panebaker
Air Study videos.
It even looks like Tom Story might have been standing almost exactly
where the Air Study group was and using his 300mm lens from there.
>> Marti Reed also said ( on May 11, 2014 at 9:19 am )…
>>
>> Hah! I just found what looks like a tight sequence of the same event,
>> using both a Mark D and the 1D! It’s the red and white helicopter
>> picking up a bucket at the helispot and heading into the smoke…
>> Looks good…more later….
Bingo! I agree. That looks like the ‘moment’ when he decided to
actually switch between the 5D and the 1D.
>> Marti also said…
>> OK, if this helicopter sequence shows the 1D is set about 20 minutes
>> late, that would put the problematic VLAT drop at 4:17– the split drop.
Yes. This is starting to fall into place now.
That VLAT drop (supposedly) photographed by Tom Story with his
Canon 1D at 4:39 PM ( the exact minute of Steed’s first MAYDAY )
looks more and more like simply one of the same VLAT drops that
happened much earlier and captured by one of the Panebaker videos.
Still not *EXACTLY* sure it was the 4:17 ‘split drop’ video… but I am
all over that and will have some results of my own soon about that.
Bcuz, I wrote mistakenly below that he shot the second T 911 sequence (the one Blue Ridge was capturing with the almost helicopter snafu) on on the Mark D II. He actually shot it on the D1. And the first image is stamped 2:00:23. If you pull that stamp back 22 minutes (like I think you need to with the long two-camera helicopter and the third sequence) that puts it at 1:38:23. Right when it would be flying out of that drop. I think we’ve got it. At least good enough for well, what we need. If some overpaid lawyer’s crew wants to get more exact, that’s fine with me!!!!
That Tom Story VLAT sequence which *appears* to have been taken at 4:39 PM ( according to his Canon 1D ) was definitely shot almost exactly where the Panebaker Air Study videos were being taken up on Hays Ranch Road some time earlier and looking WEST at the SEAT / VLAT drops.
** Panebaker Air Study video
** 20130630_161858_VLAT_split_2_EP
The ‘focus’ starts out fine in this video, but at about +7 seconds, when the ZOOM starts to capture the actual VLAT drop, the focus goes blurry, recovers a little, but never really returns to ‘sharp’ focus the whole time it is ZOOMED…
…EXCEPT for a brief moment at exactly +20 seconds. He recovers ‘sharp’ focus while ZOOMED for just a split second, but then loses it again.
A freeze-frame of that split-second when it is both ZOOMED and in ‘sharp focus’ proves that the terrain matches the Tom Story photos exactly… right down to the trees on the ridge in the foreground.
The ‘terrain’ in both the foreground and the background is, in fact, an ‘exact match’ for the Tom Story Canon EOS 1D photo sequence.
Now… is Tom’s photo sequence simply ‘stillframes’ of this same exact VLAT drop shown in this Panebaker video?
Not 100 percent on that yet.
There are similarities… but not seeing an ‘exact match’ yet.
Stay tuned. Tom was apparently in a slightly different spot on the side of Hays Ranch road than the Air Study fellas so the ‘perspective’ on the drop is slightly different. The ‘retardant’ in the Panebaker video seems to fall much farther ‘into the smoke’ than is shown in Tom’s photo sequence…
…but the DC10’s ‘hard left on exit’ is a MATCH in both the video and Tom’s photo sequence.
I’m still comparing stillframes from this Panebaker video to the Tom Story photo(s) to see if we can get this down to an EXACT time offset for Story’s Canon 1D.
The one thing we know for SURE now… is that Story’s Canon 1D photo is *NOT* a photograph of any VLAT drop that was happening at 1639, at the same exact time Steed’s first MAYDAY went out.
I actually accidentally downloaded the USDA 1640 Air Study video yesterday, intending to download the later one. So I sat and watched it three times, just to get familiar with the jargon, the planes, the kind of communication going on. It’s a really helpful one to watch, because there is a LOT of stuff going on right in front of the camera. The one after it with the air 2 air of the 1633 drop and the 1647 whatever is not as good, because they don’t zoom in so you can’t really see anything, like the Panebaker does with that 1633 drop.
So, yeah, I watched the VLAT split drop quite handily three times over. So when I went to recheck those photos I instantly recognized the spot. That smoke to the left is over the helicopter “horseshoe dip.”
I think he’s at a different angle from the videos, although I haven’t watched the Panebakers, they’re still……..down…..loading.
With that 300 mm lens, it’s hard to tell, but when the plane lifts, it’s right over his head. And I don’t know whether this is the first or second drop, and i’m not sure it’s possible to tell. The plane was flying the exact same path, just dropping at the “front” end (which is actually called the “tail” because its the last part dropped) and extending it.
You can really get a much better grasp on it by watching the USDA video with the air 2 air. Very detailed conversation going on.
Finding that overlapping helicopter sequence was like a HAPPY Mother’s Day Gift, believe me. Thanks Tom Story!!
It also confirmed that my re-time-stamping of McCord’s camera was not terribly off, which I wasn’t sure of. Things could be several minutes off, but it looks like I’ve got all of this basically synced.
Update: It appears that the VLAT drop captured
in the Panebaker Air Study video titled…
20130630_161858_VLAT_split_2_EP
…is NOT the VLAT drop in Tom Story’s Volume 2
photo sequence.
In Tom’s photo sequence… we see the VLAT in ‘level flight’ at the peak of retardant output.
In the Panebaker 161858 video… pretty much at NO TIME during the drop is the DC10 actually in ‘level flight’. That video basically shows him dropping in a ‘constant curve’ and already heading to his left before the ‘cutoff’ moment.
The VLAT drop Tom Story photographed makes the same kind of ‘hard left on exit’ after drop… but definitely came in straighter ( and lower ) than the drop seen in the Panebaker video.
So on to the USDA videos.
Probably a more likely ‘match’ there…
…but we are still NOT WRONG about LOCATION.
Tom Story definitely photographed a VLAT drop at that same location as these Air Study videos… onto that ridge up there off Hays Ranch Road in Peeples Valley.
Thanks. It has to be one of those drops. Because there aren’t that many VLAT drops, and ONLY drop in that location is the split drop. So it’s the other drop. It has to be.
Yeah, go watch the USDA video. And actually the entire Panebaker 3-part sequence.
Marti… just an FYI… see posts below about helicopters. In the course of watching these Air Study videos all over again I’ve found at least one more ( so far ) very *NEAR MISS* between a fixed-wing and a helicopter.
This one looked even CLOSER than the skycrane versus DC10 one earlier in the day.
It’s in Panebaker Air Study video
20130630_153414_EP at the
+11 second mark.
Lead plane is on a line-up from east to west parallel to Hays Ranch Road… but a chopper with a bucket is coming up on a south to north line on the OTHER side of the smoke cloud.
Chopper crosses RIGHT in front of the lead plane at exact same altitude with only a few seconds to spare.
Reply to Marti Reed post
on May 11, 2014 at 9:04 pm
>> Marti said…
>> It has to be one of those drops.
>> Because there aren’t that many
>> VLAT drops, and ONLY drop in
>> that location is the split drop.
>> So it’s the other drop. It has to be.
It is. ( the 5:15 VLAT drop up along Hays Ranch Road on the NORTH side of the fire ).
Totally confirmed.
See new post above including a new
VIDEO CROSSFADE on YouTube
that proves it.
Story’s Canon EOS 1D was always 36 minutes and 7 seconds BEHIND the REAL time that day.
**
** CLINT CLAUSON ( ATS TRAINEE FLYING IN BRAVO 33 )
** RECORDED THE TIME OF STEED’S FIRST MAYDAY?
As long as we are still sort of ‘focused’ on these *VERY* confusing SAIT interview notes with Bravo 33… I think it’s worth pointing out something else.
When the SAIR came out… it was astounding how *LITTLE* information they were providing with regards to ‘sources’ for the narrative timeline and other (supposedly) ‘factual’ statements they were making.
ONE of those things has always been…
How did they arrive at a time of 1639 for Steed’s first MAYDAY call?
They just published that time as FACT… and there wasn’t even a ‘footnote’ to indicate how they arrived at that (specific) time.
Sure… a LOT of people HEARD this call… but no one seemed to be SURE what TIME it really was.
The SAIT also already knew about Aaron Hulburd’s Helmet-Cam video and this is obviously where they were taking a lot of what was then SAID and ‘paraphrasing’ it in their SAIR report…. but they also knew they were NOT going to release that Helmet-Cam video to the public along with the report…
…but ( as we know now )… the TIMESTAMPS on Aaron Hulburd’s Helmet-Cam device were also a little ‘wonky’ that day and not entirely accurate.
So how did the SAIT really ‘nail down’ the 1639 time for Steed’s Mayday?
The answer might be the SECOND SENTENCE of their later-released interview with Bravo 33 in their SAIT Investigation Notes .
__________________________________________________________________
SAIT INTERVIEW WITH BRAVO 33 – July 9, 2013 – 1700
Interviewees: Bravo 33
John Burfiend – ATS Specialist ( Air Attack duties / Monitoring Air-To-Ground )
Clint Clauson – ATS Trainee
Thomas French – AT Specialist ( Pilot, Lead Plane / Monitoring Air-To-Air )
SAIT Interviewers: Dudley, Mayhew, Foley, Kurth, Rocha
We were ordered as lead air attack to relieve Bravo 3.
Clint did record a few times on air tankers departing and
when the frantic call was made.
_________________________________________________________________
This mysterious ‘Clint Clauson’ person is never “quoted” at all in the interview ( or never even asked any questions? )…. but this SECOND sentence in the interview notes DOES establish that he seemed to be ‘writing some TIMES down’ that day… INCLUDING the moment of Steed’s first (frantic) MAYDAY call.
I would also say this one sentence in the SAIT notes also pretty much
establishes all of the following…
1) Clint Clauson was onboard as an ‘ATS Trainee’. Burfiend is listed as ‘ATS’ and French is only listed as ‘AT’… so that means Clauson was most probably ‘mentoring’ with Burfiend that day and NOT French.
2) If Clauson was ‘mentoring’ with only Burfiend… then that means Clauson would probably ALSO have been listening to the same radio channel Burfiend was. That means Clauson was listening exclusively to the ‘Air-To-Ground’ channel and was hearing everything that Burfiend was (including Steed’s first MAYDAY in real time).
3) Clauson apparently WROTE DOWN the TIME they heard Steed’s first MAYDAY call ( described in SAIT notes as ‘the frantic call’ ). As in… on a piece of PAPER.
4) Even though Clauson apparently was never asked anything by the SAIT investigators and there is no record of him ever SAYING anything in the interview… the notes still imply that Clauson might have given them a ‘document’ or a ‘piece of paper’ that had these TIMES that he recorded written on it. If so… that document was NOT included in the SAIT FOIA/FOIL package and ( if it exists ) is just one more document that would seem to have been *withheld* by Arizona Forestry from legitimate ( legal ) FOIA/FOIL requests. We already KNOW that Arizona Forestry *DID* withhold any number of documents. Maybe this ‘piece of paper’ from Clauson is simply one of those ‘withheld’ documents.
So… REGARDLESS of whether there was an actual DOCUMENT ( or copy of
one ) handed by Clauson to the SAIT investigators that had ‘1639’ written down for the time they heard the first ‘frantic call’… SOMEHOW that ‘1639’ time was COMMUNICATED to the SAIT investigators ( but is also never mentioned in the interview notes ).
So THIS *might* be how the SAIT was so SURE that Steed’s first MAYDAY actually took place at 1639, despite poor recollections and a wonky timestamps on the Aaron Hulburd Helmet-Cam video.
They might have been totally trusting what this mysterious ATS Trainee Clint Clauson had actually WRITTEN DOWN ( or, perhaps, just TOLD them verbally during the interview, according to his recollection ) as the TIME for Steed’s first ‘frantic call’… and they ‘adjusted’ all the other times/events based on that.
There has always been a folder in Mr. Dougherty’s online Dropbox that says it contains ‘Pre-Fire images from Boulder Springs Ranch’, but there has also always been a ‘glitch’ in the linking that was sending clicks to another ( different ) folder.
That ‘glitch’ is GONE… and now we can see the full set of pre-fire images taken at the Boulder Springs Ranch ‘safety zone’.
There are even some ‘post-fire’ images included for a ‘before/after’ glimpse of some parts of the compound.
The following link now takes you right to the correct folder…
There are at least TWO photos there which verify what Joy Collura reported about the FENCING on the western side of the compound ( The direction Granite Mountain was approaching from ). It does, in fact, appear to simply be 3 strands
of barbed wire. Nothing substantial.
There are also TWO photos of an antique pickup truck that was parked well INSIDE the ‘safety zone’ up in the northwest part of the compound.
One photo of the antique pickup truck is pre-fire.
Another is post-fire.
You can see the ‘before/after’ for this vehicle. It got fried.
The entire back-half and wooden bed of the pickup burned
up completely, along with both back tires ( completely melted ).
This ‘antique pickup truck’ was exactly here ( INSIDE ) the ‘safety zone’…
34.219495, -112.771250
It was sitting 98 feet INSIDE the ‘safety zone’ from the fence that established the western edge of the compound and only 46 feet from the northwest corner of the Llama barn next to the house.
The last photo in the set ( with a name of vegetation-on-hills-.jpg ) actually shows how FAR inside the perimeter of the ‘safety zone’ this burned pickup truck was… and how CLOSE it was to the Llama pens and the barn.
NOTE: The actual NAME of the post-fire photo of the burned pickup truck is ‘truck Yarnall 15 June 001.JPG’ but the date indicated in this hand-modified title is INCORRECT.
The post-fire photo of the burned pickup truck was ACTUALLY taken well AFTER the fire on September 14, 2013.
The ACTUAL EXIF data embedded in the ‘after fire’ photo of the
pickup truck is as follows…
Camera: Canon PowerShot A4000 IS
Date: September 14, 2013 – 11:56:39 AM
Lens: 5 – 40 mm – Shot at 15.1 mm (shot wide open)
Exposure: Auto exposure, 1/1,002 sec, f/4, ISO 125
Flash: Auto, Did not fire
Focus: Single, Face Detect, with a depth of field of from 18.2 m to infinity.
Focus 2: AF Area Mode: Multi-point AF or AI AF
File: 3,456 × 4,608 JPEG (15.9 megapixels)
I would say the truck burned because of the straw in the back of it
possibly by direct flame but more likely by sparks that ignited the straw and burnt the truck. Sill interesting….
Reply to Bob Powers post on May 11, 2014 at 10:45 am
>> Mr. Powers said…
>> I would say the truck burned because of the straw in
>> the back of it… possibly by direct flame but more likely
>> by sparks that ignited the straw and burnt the truck.
Agree. That was a LOT of ‘straw’ piled in the back of the thing and you can even see a burned-up gasoline can there in pile in the aftermath photo.
It’s also possible that the ’embers’ ignited that small tree that was near it first… then the ‘open flame’ from the tree nailed the straw.
>> Mr. Powers wrote…
>> Still interesting….
Yes. Definite proof that even though the structures didn’t appear to suffer any damage at all… the ‘open area’ of the ‘safety zone’ was no picnic that afternoon.
It definitely wasn’t one of those ‘sit in the middle in a lawn chair and drink a beer and watch the fire go by’ kind of ‘safety zones’. More like ‘you better be inside one of the bulidings’ kind of ‘safety zone’.
Probably also a good lesson there for anyone trying to ‘fire proof’ their own compounds. These pictures prove that regardless of how far INSIDE your compound there are ‘small trees’ or other ‘combustibles’ ( like bales of hay )… they probably ARE going to IGNITE under similar circumstances… so BEWARE.
Even if you have a 600 foot wide ‘clearing’ around your house… make sure you haven’t kept ‘trees’ right next to your house and make sure all ‘combustibles’ are INSIDE or… at least… out on the PERIMETER and not near a structure.
Confession time. My urban backyard is full of dead stuff. I don’t live in the WUI, but the wind is blowing, we’re in endless drought here in N Mexico, and I’ve spent inordinate amounts of time reading about fire lately. Tomorrow morning I intend to make an appointment to get rid of the dead stuff in my backyard. Now that it’s finally possible to tell the dead stuff from the live stuff.
Every fifth post in my New Mexico Twitter Stream is about Wildfire Preparedness. We shall see……..
I’m dreading this wildfire season in New Mexico……..
I spent eight years living in the forest outside of Flagstaff. You couldn’t pay me enough to live in the forest now, or in the East Sandia Mountains, although I’d love to….
By the way… that ‘pile of crap’ on the left-hand side of the ‘post-fire’ photo with the fried pickup truck is the burned-up remnants of a wooden wagon that was also there INSIDE the ‘safety zone’.
You can see what that wagon looked like BEFORE it got fried to nothing in the ‘pre-fire’ photo of the pickup truck.
It did NOT have any ‘hay’ or ‘straw’ in it… but it burned to the ground, anyway.
If you look at the last photo on that page ( which shows the pickup truck and the wooden wagon pre-fire ) you will see that there was ALSO actually a STRUCTURE there in-between them pre-fire.
Some kind of storage shed? Looks to be wooden.
That STRUCTURE is TOTALLY GONE in the post-fire pictures and only that 50-gallon drum is left standing there.
Not too surprising. That STRUCTURE appears to have been sitting right BETWEEN the two small trees that were there INSIDE the ‘safety zone’.
When those two trees ‘lit up’… it must have been quite a BLAZE going there INSIDE the ‘safety zone’ and just 46 feet from the Llama barn.
Amazing job on the supposed 16:37 Marsh transmission. That is some impressive collective work! It’s not easy to prove the absence of a thing, yet I think you’ve pretty much wrapped that one up.
I’m still confused about how you are using VHF vs. UHF to refer to radio traffic. Here is how I understand frequencies:
All(?) radio communications on non-military incidents (including fire, Search and Rescue, police, etc.) take place over VHF. This includes air-to-air, air-to-ground, dispatch, and all ground crews.
Air-to-air tends to span from 121.x Mhz to 123.x Mhz. Fire/police/EMS in my area use frequencies in the range of 154.x – 173.x Mhz. (This may differ in areas near large bodies of water, as this overlaps with Marine VHF). Bendix King handheld and mobile (vehicle) radios used on fire generally transmit and receive in the 136 – 174 Mhz range. Dispatchers and repeater stations transmit and receive larger parts of the spectrum. Airguard and air-to-ground frequencies are in the 160s, so ground crews can monitor and transmit on them. For obvious reasons, transmissions on the airband range are more tightly controlled (non-pilot radio operators get permitted, and base stations are licensed).
In summary, all of these Yarnell radio communications are VHF, though air-to-air and air-to-tower transmissions are on a lower frequency of VHF than air-to-ground and ground-to-ground. Do I have this right?
>> Sitta said…
>> Amazing job on the supposed 16:37 Marsh transmission.
>> That is some impressive collective work!
>> It’s not easy to prove the absence of a thing,
No. It most certainly is NOT ( easy ).
>> Sitta also said…
>> yet I think you’ve pretty much wrapped that one up.
Well… perhaps not yet. Still needs another few passes.
There is some other evidence in the public record that is
relevant. Still ‘looking’ at all that. Stay tuned.
>> Sitta also said…
>> In summary, all of these Yarnell radio communications are
>> VHF, though air-to-air and air-to-tower transmissions are on
>> a lower frequency of VHF than air-to-ground and ground-
>> to-ground. Do I have this right?
Well… YES… you probably do.
Probably should have done this yesterday ( before all the VHF/UHF lingo entered the picture )… but here are the channels that were
actually ‘in use’ that weekend ( along with exact frequencies )…
From PDF page 22 of the Arizona Forestry SAIR report itself…
______________________________________________________
Radio Frequencies
The Yarnell Hill Fire was assigned Group 1 A1S PHX District
channels on June 28. On June 30 at 1022, the communications
plan was as follows:
Channel No., Channel Name, Assignment
1, AZSF1, Command
5, VFIRE21, Optional Tactical, Unassigned
6, AZSFTAC1, Tactical 1, Div A and Div Z
7, AZSFTAC2, Tactical 3, Structure Protection Group 1
8, AZSFTAC3, Tactical 2, Structure Protection Group 2
10, AZSFTAC5, Air-Ground
16, AIRGUARD, Air Guard Channel
Early in the day on June 30, there was limited use of AZSFTAC3
Tactical 3 by Granite Mountain IHC, Blue Ridge IHC, and heavy
equipment boss. Tactical 3 was assigned to Structure Protection
Group 1 at 1200 that day.
___________________________________________________
The exact frequencies assigned to Arizona’s
“Group 1 A1S PHX District Channels” are as follows…
Channel, Function, Frequency, Tone, Mode, Assignment
1, TAC 1, RX: 168.0500, TX: 168.0500, 123.0, N, OPS / DIV
2, TAC 2, RX: 168.2000, TX: 168.2000, 123.0, N, OPS / DIV
3, TAC 3, RX: 168.6000, TX: 168.6000, 123.0, N, OPS / DIV
4, TAC 4, RX: 166.7250, TX: 166.7250, 123.0, N, OPS / DIV
5, TAC 5, RX: 166.7750, TX: 166.7750, 123.0, N, OPS / DIV
6, TAC 6, RX: 168.2500, TX: 168.2500, 123.0, N, Unassigned
7, CMD C-2, RX: 168.1000, TX: 170.4500, 123.0, N, Command
8, CMD C-9, RX: 160.0125, TX: 165.2500, 123.0, N, Command
9, AZ State Fire, RX: 151.4000, TX: 159.4050, 162.2, N, AZ State Fire RPTR
10, Prescott NF Fire Net, RX: 164.3525, TX: 172.6125, 103.5, N, Forest Fire Net RPTR
11, Blank
12, MUTL AID, RX: 154.2800, TX: 154.2800, 0.0, N, Mutual Aid
13, AIR/GND, RX: 169.2000, TX: 169.2000, 0.0, N, Primary A/G
14, AIRGUARD, RX: 168.6250, TX: 168.250, 0.0, N, Air Guard
15, WEATHER, RX: 162.4000, TX: 0.0, 0.0, N, Weather Broadcast
16, AIRGUARD, RX: 168.6250, TX: 168.6250, 110.9, N, Air Guard
ALL of the frequencies assigned to this Arizona
“Group 1 A1S PHX District Channels” are in the
range from ( low/high )…
154.2800 ( Mutual Aid ) up to 170.4500 ( Command 2 )
That matches what you said is used in YOUR area…
>> Sitta said…
>> Fire/police/EMS in my area use frequencies in
>> the range of 154.x – 173.x Mhz.
The most IMPORTANT thing to notice is that there is NO
PUBLISHED ‘Air-To-Air’ channel in this frequency group.
Only an ‘Air-To-Ground’ channel.
Even if you CLONED your radio off of someone else that day… you would still have had to specifically ‘punch in’ an Air-To-Air frequency and add it manually to the bank to talk on the ‘Air-To-Air’ channel.
Good reason for that.
The Air guys will not ( and SHOULD not ) tolerate just anyone
transmitting on whatever Air-To-Air channel they are using.
That would be a nightmare ( for them ).
So you are saying that the Bendix-King radios could not be programed for Air to Air at the lower freq. of 121-123 ?
As I have tough although the newer Radios are different than the ones I used 20 years ago. So there would be a separate radio for
the air to air and special separate Freq.? would certain fire officials and others have those radios in their vehicles? I know we did back when. Like the helitack truck and dispatch both FS & BLM as well as some county and city as well as State rigs.
One of the newer ( and more expensive ) Bendix Kings
on sale (today) at Amazon.
This is what they choose to call their COMMAND VERSION
of even the more basic ( and cheaper ) BK GPH5102… and even this COMMAND version doesn’t have the 121-123 frequency range.
This puppy is $1,325 smackeroos… and it STILL won’t give you an Air-To-Air Channel if it’s down in the 120’s.
500 Channels, 25 User Groups, 20 Channels per Group
136-174 MHz Frequency Range
5/1.5 watts RF Power
MIL-STD 810
Programmable Soft Switches
1 new from $1,325.00
_______________________________________________
I can’t quote them at the moment… but I’m SURE there ARE tight regulations about who is ever ‘allowed’ to even be transmitting on ‘Air-To-Air’ channels.
Could you imagine if anyone could just walk out of a Radio Shack and immediately start transmitting on ‘Air-To-Air’ channels.
“Hey!… Delta Airlines!… I see you up there! How’s it goin’!… where ya headed!”
It has a lot of stuff about radio frequencies. I don’t really understand it because I don’t understand radio frequencies.
But somebody like you might want to peruse it. It’s more complicated than we think. I think there was more going on than we’re currently aware of. And I think you might find it quite useful for getting a finer understanding of what the possibilities/probabilities might be.
Including possible helicopter stuff. And a few other things.
Also I asked somewhere below, “What is Air Guard?” Now I know.
I just what to say to you Sitta, thanks for coming back and helping out. I’ve missed your voice.
I think what we’re doing now is an example of what we can do when we work together at solving problema, even when we disagree/see things differently, respectfully with each other, communicating back and forth, knowing none of us is exactly “right,” we’re all seeing different things at different times, from different perspectives and different knowledge bases. We all have different things/skills/perspectives to offer.
**
** Reply to calvin post on May 10, 2014 at 2:49 am
>> calvin said…
>>
>> WTKTT… The slash across the throat sign has always bothered me.
>> How could he ( John Burfiend ) be so certain that they were dead?
>> Really, how?? How did he know they were dead when he didn’t
>> even know where they were??
>> WTF
calvin…
The SAIT interview notes with Bravo 33 are an absolute MESS… but if you read them *very* carefully it would appear that John Burfiend ( who was the right-seat guy, not flying the airplane, and the one who was monitoring Air-To-Ground channel ) did his ‘slash across his throat’ gesture just AFTER Marsh’s final transmission when Marsh ‘affirmed’ that they were on the ‘SOUTH side of the fire’.
Even if they couldn’t see them… I think Burfiend could tell looking downward at that moment that anyone deploying on the SOUTH side of that exploding fireline was a goner. Hence… ‘slash across the throat’ gesture over to Thomas French.
Here is the exact ‘context’ of that testimony from Thomas French in the SAIT interview notes. It seems to confirm that Burfiend’s ‘slash across his throat’ gesture to French did, in fact, come right after Marsh’s *final* transmission…
__________________________________________________________________
We were right here (pointed at map) when Granite Mountain 7 called screaming in the radio. Ops said “are you getting this? I told Granite Mountain 7 “you need to calm down. I can’t understand you”. Immediately Division A called and said “we are starting a burn out, we are getting in our shelters. I said we got pople in trouble. Tanker called and said I got you in sight. I claimed out – the DC10 swung wide. I looked at John and he did this (slash across the throat). I told Kevin to stand by copy, taking it around. We have a crew in trouble. We are going to go look.
__________________________________________________________________
Let me also say that while I (personally) have always found this ‘slash across the throat’ gesture from Burfiend to be quite ‘uncalled for’… I do *NOT* believe for one second that this obvious assumption on his part that they were ‘goners’, even at that point in time, had *ANY* effect on him then proceeding to do his job.
I can also criticize them ( and, indeed, the WFF radio protocols themselves for apparently NOT having a good, established MAYDAY protocol ) for NOT taking the transmissions from Steed and Caldwell seriously for more than TWO MINUTES… but that still doesn’t mean I think they didn’t do all they possibly could to try and save those men that day… when they finally did realize this was a *REAL* emergency.
As soon as OPS1 Todd Abel contacted French and Burfiend and *TOLD* them to get their heads out of their asses and RESPOND to these men… they did.
And once they did ( finally stop ignoring them )… they obviously kicked into their own highly-rehearsed and professional procedures for such a situation.
I also happen to believe that if there had been *ANY* indication in those final radio exchanges of where they REALLY were ( such as… if Marsh had only taken 2 seconds to say… “we are 600 yards due WEST of Boulder Springs Ranch” )…
…I believe Thomas French in B33 and Kevin in the DC10 VLAT would have actually attempted a retardant drop ( whether they really believed it would do any good or not ) at GREAT risk to their own lives.
To have flown the jet-engine DC10 right through that thick ASH cloud would have been absolute suicide for Kevin… so I don’t think THAT would have happened… but if there was ANY way to get at their location ( if they knew where it was ) OTHER than flying blindly directly THROUGH the smoke/ash cloud…
I think they would have tried it.
For the rest of my life… I will always wonder WHY, when Marsh was directly asked by Burfiend…. “So, you’re on the south side of the fire, then?”…
…all Eric Marsh said was… “Affirm”.
Obtuse communications. Right to the end.
Even if French or Burfiend didn’t know where the heck the ‘Boulder Springs Ranch’ was… there were MANY people listening to the final MAYDAY calls who DID and they would have jumped right into the conversation and TOLD French and Burfiend *EXACTLY* where that was.
If Marsh had just added ANY amount of OTHER information… they at least *MIGHT* have been able to KNOW or GOOD-GUESS their exact location.
He didn’t… and I will ALWAYS wonder WHY he didn’t avail himself of that
one last chance to identify their exact location.
We ( in this ongoing discussion ) are not the only ones to wonder from day one WHY there was so much ‘confusion’ and ‘delay’ in realizing that the transmissions from Granite Mountain constituted a *REAL* emergency… or to wonder WHY it was that Burfiend in Bravo 33 basically IGNORED them for almost 2 minutes ( and even told them to get OFF the channel ) until OPS1 Todd Abel called him directly and *TOLD* him to stop ignoring these men.
Back in December of 2013 even… Wildfire Today published an article about this specific thing and about the new *YoLo* proposal which was a DIRECT reaction ( coming from the ground level ) to what happened in Yarnell.
Wildfire Today
Published December 23, 2013 by Bill Gabbert
Suggested protocol for firefighters when declaring an emergency
______________________________________________________
After reading about the deaths of the 19 firefighters on the Yarnell Hill Fire, Mr. Joseph Berto ( WFF Helicopter pilot ) had some thoughts about the crucial need for clear, descriptive radio communications when there is a firefighter emergency that requires immediate assistance. Below is his proposal, and following that my initial reaction and his response:
( See original article for full proposal )
______________________________________________________
There has ALSO been this ONGOING forum discussion about
this over at ‘Wildland Fire’.
Wildland Fire
Home of the Wildland Firefighter
Thread: More Yarnell Hill discussion: Mayday, Mayday, Mayday!
The first comment that ‘kicked off’ this (ongoing) discussion
over there at ‘Wildland Fire’ is as follows…
______________________________________________________
From Wildland Fire member: D Powers
Join Date: Oct 2013
Location: New Mexico
Mayday, Mayday, Mayday!
I have read the official reports about the Yarnell Hill fire, but the transcription of the radio traffic does not do justice to listening to them.
One thing that stood out to me was the lack of an emergency declaration. B-33 did not pick up on the tone of voice (possibly because he was trying to do three jobs at once), but everyone else did.
In the military, civilian aviation, and the structural fire service that is one of the first things to be drilled into new recruits: recognize when you are in trouble, and call for help. Make sure others know you are calling for help.
I am not saying GM did anything improper (I have never heard of Mayday being used in a wildland setting) but perhaps it is something to be considered for the future?
______________________________________________________
This ‘Wildland Fire’ Forum Thread is heavily commented and goes on with many ‘ideas’ such as just adopting what WFF people use in Australia ( Emergency, Emergency, Emergency ) or other ‘already used’ standards.
Since it still appears that the WFF management in the United States doesn’t intend to DO or RECOMMEND ANYTHING new in this regard… I certainly hope the ‘folks on the ground’ just go ahead and decide on something amongst themselves… ASAP… since whether their own management gives a crap about their safety, or not, it is THEIR LIVES that might depend on such an established protocol in the future.
Marti and WTKTT
A couple of thoughts one I listed below.
1. If the transmission was on air to air Marsh would not have made it.
The portable radios do not Carrie that Freq. because of the Radio Ban it is on.
2. If a OPS or the IC was in the helicopter they could have made that statement over Air to Air. If the Helicopter was in the area then it could have been re-conning the fire with 1 of the overhead.
3. A vehicle with that Radio Ban on a separate radio from the National fire Freq. Ban Radio could have also made the comment. That statement could have come without a call sign.
At this point with out verifiable radio traffic that was copied we are right now chasing shadows. If it was not copied on air to ground it could not have been Marsh. WTKTT if you have a way to check the freq. you could probably show the Problem of different Bans Low and High They should be listed some where.
Reply to Bob Powers post on May 10, 2014 at 10:58 am
>> Mr. Powers said…
>>
>> 1. If the transmission was on air to air Marsh would not
>> have made it.
Yes… and also IAOI ( If And Only If ) it went out on ‘Air-to-Air’…
then WE should be hearing it, too, captured in that video
which was CLEARLY recording the A2A traffic around that time.
It’s not there. Didn’t happen.
>> The portable radios do not Carrie that Freq. because of
>> the Radio Ban it is on.
No, they don’t. Not normally, anyway.
It’s the whole VHF ( Highband ) versus UHF ( LowBand ) thing.
Handhelds that have BOTH capability are VERY expensive.
>> 2. If a OPS or the IC was in the helicopter they could have
>> made that statement over Air to Air. If the Helicopter was in
>> the area then it could have been re-conning the fire with 1
>> of the overhead.
True… but there is certainly NO evidence that any OPS or IC
was flying in anything in Yarnell that late in the day. Everyone
was ‘on the ground’.
>> 3. A vehicle with that Radio Ban on a separate radio from the
>> National fire Freq. Ban Radio could have also made the
>> comment. That statement could have come without a call sign.
Also possible. Heck… we can even hear with our own ears in the video capture(s) that someone way back in Prescott Air Operations was ‘hearing’ all the traffic and was ALSO able to just press TRANSMIT at any moment and ‘insert’ themselves into the Air-To-Air conversations all the way down there in Yarnell.
This is all kind of ‘moot’, however, because with regards to this (supposed) “That’s exactly what we want” retardant-related transmission (supposedly) from DIVSA Marsh… it is John Burfiend ALONE who is testifying he ‘heard that’ and he is also testifying it was over the ‘Air-To-Ground’ ( UHF / LowBand ) channel.
That’s *another* reason the ‘Air-To-Ground’ channel is always one of the most popular and most-listened-to channels on ANY fire. It’s ‘where the action is’ and its accessible to the ‘cheaper’ radios because it is a UHF frequency and not a VHF one.
>> At this point with out verifiable radio traffic that was copied we
>> are right now chasing shadows.
I’m still looking at some ‘other’ things in the public evidence record and I’m not sure more still can’t be ‘figured out’ from it about this (supposed) transmission from Marsh… so I’m not ready to call it ‘shadow chasing’ just yet. Stay tuned.
>> If it was not copied on air to ground it could not have
>> been Marsh.
Agree. It really is a shame that the Air-Study folks didn’t ALSO have another video camera running that day with a direct inline feed on the A2G channel like they had one going with a direct inline feed on the A2A channel. That would have been REALLY helpful here.
>> WTKTT if you have a way to check the freq. you could probably
>> show the Problem of different Bans Low and High They should
>> be listed some where.
I’m sure they are… but I’m not sure it matters.
Air-To-Air was VHF and Air-To-Ground was UHF.
Only a VERY expensive handheld can do both and those are
NOT usually the Bendix Kings carried by WFF ground men.
We also DO have a full VHF A2A channel capture covering
the timeframe in question.
Marsh is nowhere on it.
If that transmission of his happened at all… it had to be on A2G.
I actually started this comment way earlier this morning, while doing other stuff and watching an over-my-head class on how to use InDesign, while continuing to read all the comments, and letting things sink in and re-arrange themselves. And then I wandered off to check on some facts and re-read some interviews, and then try to figure out when that VLAT drop was that Blue Ridge Hotshot McCord videod as it dangerously flew right over a helicopter so that maybe if there was any info on that (which there isn’t, but I think it happened about 1:37 PM, which means under Bravo 3’s watch), and now I’m back to finishing/editing this.
OK so now you know why it wasn’t on air 2 air. So I can delete the rest of the paragraphs that I wrote for you about that. I basically agree with all WTKTT has written about that. Including the part about maybe Marsh started to try to contact Air Attack but got overstepped by someone else saying “that’s where we want it” from down below, even the parking lot. That also makes sense, from a possibility level, since Eric Div A had been in earlier contact with Air Attack, and AA had indicated v/A2G uneasiness with where he saw that crew (that he didn’t know who they were).
At this point, who knows? Who even knows if that SAIT interview report was even accurate/truthful about anything either French or Burfiend even said. I agree w/WTK that it’s pretty evident the SAIT pretty heavily massaged that whole process to make it fit their pre-established narrative.
And note to WTKTT here, bcuz it’s easier to do this than scroll down while I’m downloading a bunch more of both sets of Air Study videos, thanks for clarifying the “show me” directions. I confess, when I wrote that question, it was a short-cut, bcuz I hadn’t had time to go try to “translate” the numbers and I was guessing you probably had. I also confess, I’m still a bit “bowl-challenged,” and thus my confusion about that. When somebody says “bowl” I have no idea what they mean. Thus, when Burfiend apparently (or not) spoke of test-flying “the bowl” “from west to east,” it definitely created a certain picture in my head, that apparently didn’t correspond to the facts. And, hey, maybe it didn’t even correspond to what he said!
And, hey, as long as we’re being left to lots of gaps and thus room for speculating, could it be that Burfiend and French didn’t take that Forest Service SAIT interview all that seriously, either? Maybe they had already figured the AFS was gonna, all things considered, bend the “facts to their narrative” based on their at-that-time recently published investigative process model. Which is in fact exactly what they did.
And to TTWARE — and Bob — and WTKTT — etal:
About the ASM thing. As I was on again off again over the past few months, trying to make sense of the Air command structure and terminology, including reading Fire Aviation, the sister site of Wildfire Today, I saw quite a bit of grumpiness about this new Module thing. And it may be one of the Lessons to be Learned from Yarnell.
And somewhat related to the above, I’ve been really thinking about my possible “overly glowing” assessment of French. It may be just that. Or it may be that I’m just translating him a little differently. I’ve been around air and balloon pilots and meteorologists and tornado-chasers a lot. They do what they do because they enjoy it, even when it gets dangerous and difficult — and, hey so do fire/wildfire fighters (who we all know are actually pyromaniacs in disguise!!), so I’m not so offended by what some of you all are upset about. And maybe that gesture across the throat was not in jest. It could have been dead serious. I could envision my dad doing that if he heard a report of a balloon hitting a power line. And he wouldn’t have meant it to be funny.
Bravo 33’s job was (as per the Air Support YouTube video) to get wet stuff on the ground without bending metal along with, when necessary and possible, adding situational awareness, but NOT managing the ground crews (as opposed to what Rory Collins was/wasn’t doing, ahem. I can’t imagine, after watching/listening to French for hours, ever doing what Collins did.). That was somebody else’s job. They were doing just that, and it wasn’t all that easy, and they had lives on their hands, too. Plane crashes on fires are not that uncommon.
So when that SEAT flew through that fire at 4:33, to make that drop that apparently took a few set-ups to get, French essentially thanked him, and the pilot, possibly with some relief, indicated he was happy too, even tho they both knew, it was quite possibly a fool’s errand, but one they were hired to do.
And now that I’ve read what you wrote, WTKTT, about what they would have done, and DID do, after they abandoned that VLAT drop, I really appreciate that. Not only that, but they were running out of fuel, and still managed a 5:07 VLAT drop in the middle of it all. And, as they said, they were just barely able to do it because it was in such heavy smoke and ash they could hardly even see.
That being said, I’m sensing something of a cognitive dissonance. Might it, again, have to do with this thing we have called “Culture”?
Could it be that “Fire Aviation” has something of a different “culture” than on-the-ground “Fire Fighting”? And is that maybe something else that’s adding to the confusion? And furthermore, I definitely see, and have read about, regional differences, especially in the complaints about Collins. As in, in the northwest forests they fight fires differently than in the southwest, and thus the big conflicts between Marsh and Collins.
OK a final thing, before I go on a last-minute quest for Mother’s Day Flowers. Regarding that 1:37ish PM VLAT drop. Once I figured out that that’s when it happened, I went back to Bravo 3’s interview. Collins had had to leave (out of fuel) so Bravo 3 was Air Attack. They say nothing about that drop in their SAIT interview. And that’s what leads me to the next thing.
Helicopters. I have absolutely NO IDEA who was mostly directing helicopters. I was wondering that as I watched the Air-to-Air 1628 video. French WAS paying careful attention to helicopters, but it was all about keeping them out of the way of the fixed wing tankers, because they were dropping really close to the helispot and the “horseshoe dip” location. Since there’s no air-to-air video earlier than 2pm-ish, there’s no record of how Bravo 3 was communicating. I don’t even know if B3 was even aware there was a helicopter right under that VLAT. So I have no clue who was directing the helicopter drops. Maybe just another little unimportant detail in the general scheme of things?
Which leads to my seriously final point. Having those Air Study videos really HAS been critical, given the jumbling of everything else. And yes, it would have been even more helpful if they had set up the same kind of video camera with the Air to Ground channel included. Without all the wind and stuff that the Panebakers have. We’d still be fifty miles behind where we are if somebody hadn’t thought, “Gee, lets go set up some video cameras up on that fire and document the Fire Aviation!!”
Great Job Marti
When Fires Like this in WUI start running at structures
The first thing is to thro Air Tankers at the Fire. The problem most times they don’t do any good except make every body feel like they at least did something. It looks good to the public at least some one is doing something.
Helicopters–When Fixed wing plains are on a fire Helicopter pilots Monitor there Freq. And stay out of the way. They fly lower and are assigned to specific areas.
They maintain contact Air to Air.
That is why I said the 1 Helicopter flying that is mentioned may have had an overhead in it that could have made the comment, and could have over keyed Marsh DIV A call.
From what I am reading there is no radio verification that DIV A broke into any Air conversation except the statement from AA. At this point we have a personnel recollection with no solid proof it actually happened.
Again good work on the info.
Marti—–Yes there are 2 different cultures good catch Ground and air, not sure where those Smoke Jumpers fit? We always liked the Helicopters when they gave us a ride.
Also we all love Fire, Fire Fighting and even starting them like Back Fires Project burns Etc.
If you didn’t you would not stick with it.
So you found us out as well.
Actually, to be honest, I “go to school” online regarding photography, media, design, business at an online “place” called CreativeLIVE, which is based in Seattle. When we have classes, we also have chatrooms.
One of my pals in the chatrooms is a female firefighter relative/supporter in southern California. She’s actually VERY interested in this fire and is probably reading this site, which I have linked her to regularly.
We chuckle a lot about how people who fight fires and people who pay attention to fires (like me) are actually fascinated by fire. I’ve always been fascinated by fire, loved/miss my 10 years of surviving via wood-stoves in Flagstaff, always have candles burning, and about every 4 years get really intensively interested in a wildfire.
I started tracking/observing wildfires online in about 1996. I was really interested in how communities used the Internet to deal with how a wildfire was impacting them and to connect to each other to deal with it.
That lead to my watching the Los Alamos Cerro Grande Fire online in 2000. Given that a bunch of geeks were affected by it, and I had family/friends ties to it, they really used the Internet to connect, respond, get the word out. I followed that carefully.
I was really interested in the interface between wildfires and the Internet. Why? Because I, too am a lover of fire.
The other big one for me was 2001, the Hayman Fire near Colorado Springs. My daughter was a competitive figure skater, and we were there when that fire was burning. I actually photographed it, and, of course, I followed all of it online.
Oh and then the 2002 Rodeo-Chedeski Fire in Arizona, a HUGE fire. We ate and inhaled the smoke from it for weeks here in Albuquerque. I followed it online. And cried. A lot. I FELT it. And was AWED by it. Because I spent ten years living in the forest in Flagstaff. I felt those trees burning.
Fire. I majored BA in Anthropology/Archaeology from Prescott College. (When we had the crew that gave birth to the Prescott Hotshots that, in turn gave birth to the Granite Mountain Hotshots. And I had a horse, and I rode that horse all over Granite Mountain). The harnessing of fire by humans is considered a benchmark in human evolution. But fire can still overpower us.
So, yes. We love fire!!! And we fear it! And we have to deal with it. And it kills. And it renews. So yeah, I found you out. Because I, and a number of others, are just like you.
There WERE helicopters already down in Yarnell and also doing whatever they could to ‘save things’ in this 4:15 to 4:45 timeframe.
We actually can HEAR at least TWO of them actually ‘fly over’ Aaron Hulburd as he was filming the ‘Helmet-Cam’ video there in the St. Joseph Shrine parking lot… and AS he was capturing those ‘final transmits’ from Steed, Caldwell and Marsh.
It actually could have been ANY helicopter pilot working the fire down there at this time that just jumped onto the Air-To-Ground channel and said…
“That’s exactly what we want”
…right after the 1633 SEAT drop there on the EAST side of the fire. That SEAT drop probably DID hit the same outlying areas that THEY ( the choppers ) were focusing on as well.
Burfiend said this call came ‘5 minutes before they went into shelter’… but given their *general* confusion about TIME throughout their recollections to the SAIT investigators… it’s pretty doubtful they could have been *THAT* sure that *EXACTLY* 5 minutes had transpired between ANY two events that afternoon.
If the “That’s what we want” confirmation ( from someone in/near or ‘flying over’ Yarnell… but not Marsh ) was a direct response to the spot-on 1633 SEAT drop… then it’s possible that Burfiend was simply 4 minutes off on his recollection… and it was really about 9 minutes between when he heard that and when it all started hitting the fan.
Mistaking a 9 minute elapsed time period for 5 minutes would have been perfectly understandable that afternoon… coming from ANYONE.
I still think the most important point about all of this is that the SAIT investigators obviously did *NOT* even lift a finger to try and *VERIFY* the TIME and the SOURCE of this “That’s what we want” recollection on Burfiend’s part.
They just trusted what (only) Burfiend was recalling, didn’t care that no one else seemed to have heard it, called it an ‘absolutely verified communication from Eric Marsh’… and used it was the defacto END of their own self-imposed ‘verifiable communications’ blackout period.
Even Eric’s voice in the YARNELL-GAMBLE video TEN MINUTES earlier ( at 1627 ) is much more ‘verifiable’ than this ‘recollection’ on Burfiend’s part… yet they (apparently) chose to ignore what they were hearing in the YARNELL-GAMBLE video altogether.
Perhaps the SAIT understood that if they were going to pretend there was a ‘blackout’ ( with no verifiable communications )… then they couldn’t END that blackout ‘too early’.
In other words…. it was OK to take a dubious transmission/recollection that happened just 2 minutes before the MAYDAY… because 2 minutes wasn’t enough time for management to be accused of neglecting to do something…
…but TEN MINUTES was too much… hence… they had to IGNORE Eric’s obvious reporting of GM’s ‘status’ ( to someone in command ) at 1627.
Once they decided to officially report that there was a ‘verifiable communications’ BLACKOUT… and that that is why management didn’t know where they were… they could not END it too early before the deployment… so the 1637 ‘recollection’ from Burfiend simply looked like a good place to do that.
The VLAT/helicopter incident I’m describing is not about the in-question call we’re talking about. It happened about 12:35 PM. There was a VLAT drop just northish of where the Blue Ridge hotshots were waiting with their buggies for an asignment. There was one test flight then the VLAT made it’s drop. The BR guys were photographing and video-ing it.
When the VLAT was coming down to make the drop, there was a helicopter right underneath it. Bravo 3 was in charge, as Rory Collins was off getting re-fueled. Unfortunately we don’t have the air 2 air so I don’t know what kind of communication was going on.
Interestingly enough, as I’ve been working on jockeying Tom Story’s photos into submission, it looks like his first VLAT set, which he took on the relatively accurate Mark D II, is of that T 911 coming out of that drop. With, I think, Bravo 3 just ahead of him.
I confess, I’m still a little mystified re helicopter communications. They were on air-to-air, but during the air-to-air video I watched yesterday, from a bit before 4:00 pm to about 4:20, French was just keeping them out of the way of the tankers. That’s all.
I would think the helicopters must have been in communication with some kind of overhead. I haven’t had time to “go there” but I’m sure there must have been some kind of crew organizing them?????? It definitely wasn’t Bravo 33. And I don’t know if Bravo 3 was doing it either. It just seems weird.
Also, that leads me to ask, “What is Air Guard? What is that channel used for?”
Reply to Marti Reed post on
May 11, 2014 at 5:10 pm
>> Marti said…
>> I confess, I’m still a little mystified re
>> helicopter communications. They were
>> on air-to-air, but during the air-to-air
>> video I watched yesterday, from a bit
>> before 4:00 pm to about 4:20, French
>> was just keeping them out of the way
>> of the tankers. That’s all.
Correct. There are never any ‘instructions’ to them from Bravo 33 ( acting as both Lead Plane and Air Attack ) about what they should actually be DOING ( drop-wise ).
The ONLY thing French was concerned about was them staying out of HIS way.
Only conversations are about who is heading to helibase… or who is leaving the fire… and what direction they should take to do that.
This also confuses me from the ‘Air Attack’ standpoint. It is French ( performing Lead Plane duties ) we hear ‘directing’ this Air Traffic around him… even though the SAIT notes say it was French who turned to Burfiend and said “You’re Air Attack!”.
____________________________________
From SAIT interview with Bravo 33…
Paragraph 4…
I knew there was 2 structural groups.
I wrote down 2.
Tom said “hey dude, you are the air attack”.
____________________________________
So it really is very, very confusing.
I’m not even sure the Air people fully understand it all… much less the ground folks.
Anyone on the ground in a command position could obviously ASK the choppers to do things without going through Air Attack… which is what makes it all the more confusing.
In one of the Air Study videos… right after the spot-overs were happening up on Model Creek road… SPGS2 Darrell Willis just tells his subordinate, Gary Moser, to ‘get one of those choopers to take care of that spillover’.
So even line personnel could just make requests of the choppers any time they wanted to?
It’s a wonder there weren’t MORE near-fatal
crashes that day other than the incredible near-miss out over that middle bowl earlier that day.
Another near Fixed-Wing / Chopper
near miss I hadn’t seen before…
In Panebaker Air study video
20130630_153414_EP, at +11 seconds, there is another *NEAR MISS* between a helicopter and the lead plane flying a line-up flight in that same location where the VLATS were dumping up there off Hays Ranch Road.
The lead plane is flying the line-up flight from west to east, parallel to Hays Ranch Road… but a chopper is coming up on a south to north line over in the same location but on the ‘blind’ side of the smoke cloud… and the lead plane seems to have NO IDEA he is there.
Hard to tell how close it was because the ZOOM is active on the camera… but it looks WAAAY too close for comfort as the chopper crosses right in front of the lead plane at what looks like the same altitude.
Looks like a few seconds in time made all the difference here.
Somebody has to be directing the helicopters, and it’s not really Air Attack/Bravo. That’s just not their responsibility from what i’ve read. Like it’s not also their responsibility to direct the ground crews, basically.
Their responsibility, it seems to me, in general and on this fire, is more about directing the fixed wing tankers and clearing the space around them.
I’m getting pretty brain-dead at this point, but tomorrow I’ll go look.
I do find myself wondering about the cost-effectiveness of the whole Fire Aviation thing. I’m hoping maybe the fact that those video cameras were set down that afternoon to do Air Study means something.
There is actually, I think, a TON of stuff to be learned from this fire, including the effectiveness of Fire Aviation. Where, and under what conditions, did it really help, and where did it not, and at what cost.
The problem is, as I have sensed all along, and even more so when I spent some hours today reading the Interagency Aerial Supervision Guide, they said over and over again how Aerial Support has to be integrated with overall Incident Command Strategy and Tactics.
And, as we know, since there was no actual “as-required” thought-out and written-out Plan for this day, there was nothing, strategically speaking, for Fire Aviation to tie into, other than various ad-hoc ongoing “let’s try this” tactics.
How do you effectively evaluate Aerial Fire-fighting on a fire in which there was no coherent over-all strategy/tactics in play in the first place?
So I’m not willing to dump the possible value of intelligent Fire Aviation, all things considered, but I do believe it’s time for a serious analysis of it, all things considered.
First, kudos to WTKTT and Marti, for digging into and getting the “that’s where we want it” conversation as analyzed as can possibly be done without some additional ‘outside’ input. I’m in agreement with Bob that, with all the chaos in the sky and on the ground that day, it would have been easy to mix-up that ‘recollection’ attributed to Marsh with another parties transmission.
The troubling part of the whole deal is that MANY people heard A/G radio traffic during the time in question, but we don’t have any of those ‘other’ recollections.
As has been stated before, A/G is one of the most listened-to channels on the fireground, as the most up-to-date reports on fire activity and other significant events usually comes across that channel in a prompt fashion. While earlier in the day people might have been only paying a cursory listen, later in the afternoon, with the fire getting ready to burn up an entire town, you can bet many, many people were glued to it (as evidenced by the background traffic videos).
On another note regarding possible takeaways, in my opinion two glaring ones seemingly related to BUDGET concerns are:
1) The states calling out a Type II Short Team (which was never even able to assemble all of it’s critical team members) for a fire that was already deemed a threat to a community.
2) The feds determination that they could save money by having less aircraft and personnel on fires by jamming two critical and busy functions inside of one aircraft (ASM). There may be times on slower, less active fires when that could be appropriate, but NEVER on Type I or Type II fires, and NEVER on Type III fires that are deemed to have a strong potential to rapidly escalate and threaten communties. Personally, I think the ASM ‘experiment’ should be ended and the duties returned to the Air Attack and Lead planes, but hey, that’s just me.
>> TTWARE said…
>> First, kudos to WTKTT and Marti, for digging into and getting
>> the “that’s where we want it” conversation as analyzed as can
>> possibly be done without some additional ‘outside’ input.
Two quick things here…
1) calvin is the one that has been focused like a laser-beam on this 1637 transmission from day one. It has deserved more focus and attention for quite some time… and deserves even MORE. It is ( and will remain ) IMPORTANT to know whether this ‘fact’ being reported by Arizona Forestry ever actually happened at all… and if it did… what the FULL story is on it.
2) I’m looking at some other things in the public evidence record that might shed a little more light on this… so I wouldn’t say that nothing more can be learned *without* some new interviews.
It is, in fact, still perfectly possible there is *GOING* to be ANOTHER official Yarnell Hill Investigation sometime soon.
At this point ( and with everything even WE have proved is totally WRONG with the original SAIT work )… I would think the right thing for Arizona Forestry to do at this point is just admit their mistakes and do it all over again… but THIS time try to get it RIGHT.
The families deserve nothing less ( and have, indeed, been ASKING for a better investigation since day one ).
Indeed… a ‘proper investigation’ is even one of the ‘stipulated’ action items in most of the wrongful death claims… which means that even if ALL the parties involved try to ‘settle out of court’…. the settlement(s) themselves might still REQUIRE a new ( proper ) investigation be done.
>> TTWARE also said…
>> I’m in agreement with Bob that, with all the chaos in the
>> sky and on the ground that day, it would have been easy to
>> mix-up that ‘recollection’ attributed to Marsh with another
>> parties transmission.
It actually could have been a COMPLETE walk-over.
Bravo 33 has already testified that because of the piss-poor handoff from Rory Collins… they basically had NO IDEA who was even ‘working the fire’ down there underneath them… and they also freely admit they had NO IDEA what anyone’s VOICES sounded like as they got all this dumped onto them. They didn’t even know what Field OPS1 Todd Abel’s voice sounded like as they suddenly started doing this Lead Plane / Air Attack double-duty.
So it is ACTUALLY possible that Marsh might have hit ‘transmit’ on the A2G channel… and only got the words “Bravo 33, Division A” out before SOMEONE ELSE totally walked all over him and then said something like “That’s exactly what we want”.
Maybe Marsh WAS trying to ‘say something’ to Bravo 33 at that point… but got totally ‘walked on’ and Burfiend just thought all that was coming from the same person ( since they admit they had
no idea who anyone was down there or what their voices
sounded like ).
Don’t forget that we NOW know that by the time Steed made his FIRST MAYDAY call… that call is NOT ‘filled with over-modulation’
as the SAIR reported. Steed is ACTUALLY YELLING into his microphone at the top of his voice and its because there are ACTUALLY at least two chainsaws running right next to him already. He was YELLING as much to hear himself as to make sure Bravo 33 could hear him over the saw noise right next to him.
That means that they DID realize the trouble they were in some span of time BEFORE Steed’s first MAYDAY. They had ALREADY decided to deploy BEFORE Steed’s first MAYDAY… and had (apparently) ALREADY found the deployment site, pulled the ropes on the saws, and gotten to work.
It could very well be that whatever Marsh was trying to say to Bravo 33 when he then got ‘walked on’ was either related to them suddenly realizing the trouble they were in ( as early as 1637? )… OR it was simply Marsh getting walked on at 1637 but not having the time to RETRY because it was suddenly time to help find the deployment site or just simply ‘run forward’ to catch the men.
All guesswork… but it’s possible.
My feeling is that there were no CALL SIGNS involved here at
all regarding what Burfiend was ‘recalling’.
I believe that Burfiend is just simply MISTAKEN about it being
DIVSA Marsh saying anything ( at any time ) about “That’s exactly what we want”. It was probably someone else who had a VHF radio with them there in Yarnell and they were ‘confirming’ the ‘goodness’ of the 1633 SEAT drop that had just taken place within sight of the Ranch House Restaurant.
>> TTWARE also said…
>> The troubling part of the whole deal is that MANY people heard
>> A/G radio traffic during the time in question, but we don’t have
>> any of those ‘other’ recollections.
Correct. Even the SAIT should have realized this alone was reason to re-interview Burfiend and try to CONFIRM what he reported.
Not only did the SAIT *NOT* do that…. they took as ‘gospel’ Burfiend’s recollection(s)… and even totally trusted his ‘guess’
that it was ‘5 minutes later when they deployed’… so they just
subtracted 5 minutes from 1642 and put a timestamp of 1637
on Burfiend’s “That’s what we want” recollection…
…and they went ‘out the door’ with it
The SAIT just published it as FACT, and even called this
non-verified reported transmission the ‘official’ end of their own
self-imposed ‘non-verifiable communications’ blackout.
Go figure.
>> TTWARE also said…
>>
>> As has been stated before, A/G is one of the most listened-to
>> channels on the fireground, as the most up-to-date reports on
>> fire activity and other significant events usually comes across
>> that channel in a prompt fashion. While earlier in the day people
>> might have been only paying a cursory listen, later in the
>> afternoon, with the fire getting ready to burn up an entire town,
>> you can bet many, many people were glued to it (as evidenced
>> by the background traffic videos).
Totally agree. If there was EVER a time for anyone with a cheap
UHF handheld ( capable of listening to Air-To-Ground UHF ) to be
monitoring that channel for transmissions… it was circa 4 to 5 PM in Yarnell.
Everybody WAS… but only ONE guy up in an airplane who admits he had no idea who was even on the ground or what they sounded like is the one reporting a ‘crucial’ transmission?
It doesn’t ‘add up’.
>> TTWARE also said…
>>
>> On another note regarding possible takeaways, in my opinion
>> two glaring ones seemingly related to BUDGET concerns are:
>>
>> 1) The states calling out a Type II Short Team (which was
>> never even able to assemble all of it’s critical team members)
>> for a fire that was already deemed a threat to a community.
>>
>> 2) The feds determination that they could save money by
>> having less aircraft and personnel on fires by jamming two
>> critical and busy functions inside of one aircraft (ASM). There
>> may be times on slower, less active fires when that could be
>> appropriate, but NEVER on Type I or Type II fires, and NEVER
>> on Type III fires that are deemed to have a strong potential to
>> rapidly escalate and threaten communties. Personally, I think
>> the ASM ‘experiment’ should be ended and the duties returned
>> to the Air Attack and Lead planes, but hey, that’s just me.
Not sure myself about necessary/needed changes to the whole Air Support thing… but with regards to BUDGET…
If ICT4 Russ Shumate had only just spent the money on Saturday for day-long chopper support and bucket drops… that thing would have been dead-as-a-doornail before 4:00 PM on Saturday.
If ‘Arizona Forestry’ just adds up what the cost for that chopper support on Saturday would have been and THEN compares it to
the *other* costs that resulted by NOT spending that money
on Saturday…
…well… you don’t need a whole lot of batteries in your calculator to realize what a ‘budget buster’ that mistake was.
If the whole Yarnell Incident ( and the loss of 19 good men ) isn’t enough to teach Arizona Forestry ( and SWCC ) that using the ‘IA with overwhelming force’ approach isn’t ( ultimately ) the most cost-effective way to fight wildland fires in that region…
The (supposed) “That’s what we want” transmission came over the UHF Air-To-Ground channel and NOT the VHF Air-To-Air channel.
Nobody needed an expensive VHF piece of kit to have been the one making that call to Burfiend in B33 on A2G.
It could have been ANYONE on the ground in Yarnell who saw that 1633 SEAT drop and might have been trying to confirm the ‘goodness’ of it.
So that one paragraph above SHOULD have read…
“It was probably someone else who had a UHF radio with them there in Yarnell and they were just ‘confirming’ ( over the A2G channel ) the ‘goodness’ of the 1633 SEAT drop that had just taken place within sight of the Ranch House Restaurant.”
So……I’ve been watching and listening to the Air Study 30130630_1628_EP.MOV video three times through. Since I mistakenly downloaded it, instead of the next one that I’m now downloading. I figured I might as well, since it would help me see and hear what was going on. Quite interesting.
This one includes the impressive 4:16-4:18 two-minute VLAT 911 split-drop. Quite interesting and quite educational to watch/hear. Most of it features Tom French as Bravo 33 Lead Plane , leading, instructing the other pilots of both air tankers and helicopters, checking things out, communicating with media planes, really polite, respectful, supportive, calm and cool. Totally impressive all things considered. This video spans from about 1558 til 1628. Forty minutes. I highly recommend watching it. I don’t have the link for it at the moment, unfortunately. But you can find it. Just go to WTKTT’s link for the Air Study video he posts above, and download/watch the 1628 video instead!
What really strikes me is the truly calm, professional, supportive, positive, specific, clear communications happening all around. No sign of stress, pressure, conflict, frustration, anything negative at all. You really get a sense that everybody actually enjoys what they’re doing.
This also includes the communication between Rory Collins, as Air Attack, as he leaves the fire to head to Deer Valley, because his pilot has run out of fly-time, and his, I would say, disappointment that he still hasn’t been able to secure his relif pilot, who is grounded at Stafford because, I would guess, of the same weather that was grounding other planes all around.
I hate to say this, because I have a beef with Rory Collins, but over the course of about fifteen minutes during this, on again off again, he did have something of a leisurely conversation with Tom French. And, as Tom French says towards the end of it, (re Burfiend who would become Air Attack) “my right-seater’s been copying everything.”
Collins told him quite a bit of stuff, about the weather, about IC, about go ahead and finish what you’re doing and then get over to the other side of the fire with the DC 10’s, about Div A being the ground contact ( I guess not forecasting that Div A was about to head out to the bleak unknown, which, to be fair, he didn’t know at that time). He asked for questions, concerns, and French back-and-forthed with him, and didn’t sound the least like this was weird or strange or hectic or insufficient in any way. He sounded confident that they were completely ready to assume the responsibility they were being handed.
And then he kept on doing what he was doing. Being Bravo33 (which is pronounced Bravo Three Three) Lead Plane. Calm and confident and positive in the midst of what we perceive as being chaos.
Marti
I am confident after every thing I have been reading that you guys have found, that the statement.
That’s where we want it,– is from OPS or a ground person
with the structure protection group in the area of the drop, and has absolutely nothing to do with March.
It has never made science that Marsh would have popped out of no where with that statement.
Based on experience call it a educated guess it was not Marsh. People near the drop site would be much more plausible. They were trying to save structures at that point and that is what they were focused on.
Yes, I’m thinking more and more in line with you (see my comment below in response to yours). I’m still wondering how it could have been that this call from someone (who decreasingly looks like it would have been Marsh) (and I’m trusting Burfiend who says he heard it) wouldn’t have been heard on the AirToGround channel that A WHOLE LOT OF PEOPLE heard at the time, including the crew doing that “Last MInutes” video. That’s what stumps me.
Is there possibly some other channel that Air Attack Burfiend could have been interacting with that could have signaled to him, at 4:37-4:39-ish, as they were circle-ing then flying a test flight “west to east over the bowl” that “that’s exactly what we want”?
Marti… not only am I not sure we can really
trust either Burfiend’s or French’s statements
in the SAIT investigations notes about the
“that’s what we want” statement… I think
their recollection in *general* is kinda wonky.
For example…
Here is the exact ‘infamous’ paragraph from
their SAIT interview that has that one and
only reference in the *entire* evidence
record in it about “that’s what we want”…
…but look at the REST of the paragraph
that precedes that ‘recollection’.
It’s all pretty ‘skewed’ unto itself regarding
what ELSE they ‘think’ they heard from
Marsh… and WHEN…
TIME NOW = 1630
:: We needed to go back to the right flank
:: ( 1630 AZ time ).
:: Made 3 practice runs. Painted 2.
:: We came around.
TIME NOW = However long it take to make
‘3 practices runs’ and then ‘come around’.
Let’s call that FIVE minutes, at least.
TIME NOW = 1635
:: Got a call from Division A stating they
:: were going down their escape
:: route to the safety zone.
WTF? At 1635? Not a chance.
:: Didn’t know Division A was the
:: superintendent of the Granite Mountain
:: hot shots. Asked him “is everything OK?”
:: He replied “everything is ok, just heading
:: to the safety zone”.
Again… WTF?? Not possible ( at 1635 ).
There ARE video captures that cover this
timeframe AND were capturing the A2G
radio channel and there are no such
transmissions recorded.
:: We came around,
:: made a practice run through the bowl,
:: west to east.
TIME NOW = ??
We really have no idea. Their testimony
above about hearing from Marsh at ‘this
time’ already proves the SAIT notes are
out in left field already… so there is no
telling WHEN this ‘practice run’ they are
now referring to happened… if it even
happened at all.
:: I was talking to Tom
:: about the rising terrain on exit.
:: Division A clad and said “that is what
:: we are looking for, that is exactly right”.
:: Within 5 minutes of that, they went in
:: shelter.
So this LAST STATEMENT about them ‘going into shelter’ within 5 minutes of the “that is what we are looking for” transmission
( according to their recollection ) MUST be
what the SAIT used to actually come up with the 1637 timestamp for Marsh’s (supposed)
transmission.
French and Burfiend had no frickin’ idea what
time it *really* might have been… but
somehow they also seemed to be SURE
that ‘within 5 minutes’ is when Eric
announced they were ‘deploying’.
So the SAIT just took their ‘recollection’ about
the previous transmission from Marsh being
‘within 5 minutes’… and then they just
counted BACKWARDS from 1642… when
the Helmet Cam captured Marsh’s final
statement(s).
1642 minus 5 minutes = 1637
Voila!… The SAIT was now SURE that 1637
is when Marsh MUST have said “That is what
we are looking for”… and they frickin’ PUBLISHED that in the SAIR as if it was fact.
They were taking these ‘unverified’ random recollections of French / Burfiend as ‘gospel truth’… even though ( as shown above ) they were completely mis-remembering Marsh’s OTHER statements ( on A2G channel ) about
‘going down their escape route’.
So the SAIT didn’t question the FIRST half of
even that one section ( paragraph ) of their
interview ( which is obviously an inaccurate
recollection ) but then the SAIT took the
SECOND half as ‘gospel truth’… and
PUBLISHED the ‘statements’ as FACT…
even though NO ONE ELSE was reporting
that transmission from Marsh on the *VERY*
popular A2G radio channel.
Go figure.
As I have said before… something about
Marsh ‘asking’ for retardant must have
seemed *really* attractive to THEIR ‘version
of events’ and fit nicely with THEIR ‘agenda’
in order for them to not have either
questioned this one statement from them
*OR* made sure it fit the criteria of ‘verified
transmission’ which they seemed to be so picky about for the previous 30+ ‘blackout’
minutes.
Bob:
Do you think this is important, all things considered?
To be honest, I’m less and less thinking it is, all things considered. To be honest, I’m kind of hanging onto it because the SAIT made a big deal of it, using Burfiend, who I really respect, and his narrative of it to further their own narrative, in what I agree with WTKTT to be a really irresponsible manner.
Do you think it’s really all that important, in the general scheme of things on this totally mismanaged fire, that Burfiend says he heard, while they were flying a “show me,” someone tell him (and possibly mistakenly thinking it was Div A Eric Marsh) that ‘this is exactly where we want that” ?
Or is it time for all of us to just admit we can’t figure this out, all things considered, and move on?
I really respect your hard-won experience-based sense of what is truly important in wildland fire-fighting.
I would say with out other identified radio traffic its a guess as to who made the statement. Maybe an assumption after the fact by Burfiend that he recollects something
during a show me run. What is very strange is there was no prior conversation asking for a drop by March. It would be un conceivable for Marsh to think his discussion with OPS about we’ll get a drop down there would have any thing to do with a 30 min. later statement. Where is location and discussion of need?
The only thing this adds to is some how thinking Marsh asked for a drop to save the crew and no one was listening. Which I think is BS. It could have been any one with an Air to Air Freq. on the ground. Thought they said DIV. A. It dose not make science that Marsh would have jumped in and said that with all the smoke at that time he could not have seen air craft and gave no other direction prior.
With out verifiable evidence it will just hang hot there as something to talk about– Had the air tanker dropped where DIV A ask they would have been saved,–Wishful thinking. Where they were dropping had no connection to where Marsh was. I am still of the belief it was not Marsh, I am still betting on the Structure Group. Air to Air would have a very limited number of people on it. That same statement could have been used several times during the day by ?????
Also if it was air to air Marsh would not have had that on his hand held radio. Only air to ground.
Any air to air radios would have been in Vehicles like City or county Engines or Supervisors trucks. If I am not mistaken Air is on a totally different Ban than the Fire freq. Bans. High Ban and Low Ban you cannot run them both on the same radio. Air to ground is in the same ban area as crewnet, and the other fire freq. Another little added info on air attack. 2 different radios in air craft to talk to air and ground.
A air tanker would have Air to air, if they IA a fire some one on the ground would have air to air to talk to them till Air Attack arrived. Clear as mud again ….
Reply to Marti Reed post on May 9, 2014 at 5:20 pm
>> Marti wrote…
>> What really strikes me is the truly calm, professional,
>> supportive, positive, specific, clear communications
>> happening all around. No sign of stress, pressure, conflict,
>> frustration, anything negative at all.
Yes. Right down to Burfiend doing the ‘slash across his throat’
gesture as soon as he knew 19 good men were deploying.
Very positive. Very professional.
>> You really get a sense that everybody actually enjoys
>> what they’re doing.
Yes. Flying airplanes is FUN!
>> This also includes the communication between Rory Collins,
>> as Air Attack. He asked for questions, concerns, and French
>> back-and-forthed with him, and didn’t sound the least like this
>> was weird or strange or hectic or insufficient in any way. He
>> sounded confident that they were completely ready to assume
>> the responsibility they were being handed.
Yes. It all sounds very ‘nicey-nicey’ and polite, doesn’t it?
You would hardly be able to tell that just a few hours earlier,
Collins was dumping retardant all over a Division Supervisor’s
plan of action and not giving a shit whether he liked it or not…
…or that while he was ‘Air Attack’… a helicopter almost crashed
straight into a DC10 and the resulting explosion would have lit
that middle bowl up like a Christmas tree long before wind
change…
…or that while he was ‘Air Attack’… numerous people on the
fire commented how ‘disorganized’ the helicopters were that
day and seemed ‘totally unsupervised’ and ‘doing whatever the
hell they wanted’… to the point where Blue Ridge Hotshots would
later say that the ‘split’ in the fireline was actually caused by
this ‘unsupervised’ helicopter activity that day.
…or that he only gave them 10 minutes notice about having
to leave the fire… and then left Bravo 33 with a laundry list of
‘cluelessness’ that they would then recount to SAIT investigators…
…or that this same guy, following the incident, would refuse to
return phone calls and make it almost impossible for anyone
to interview him.
Sorry, Marti.
Yes… I agree that these guys know how to talk on the radio and
‘get a job done’… but I’m not ready to give any of them the glowing
‘points’ you are granting.
In MANY ways… ( from Friday night through Sunday )… the AIR
operations at Yarnell left a LOT to be desired.
I actually, truly hope the overall ‘picture’ that has emerged
from the Yarnell Hill Fire regarding this ‘Air Support’ stuff ( and the
interaction with ground forces ) is not NORMAL or ‘business as
usual’.
WTKTT… The slash across the throat sign has always bothered me. How could he be so certain that they were dead? Really, how?? How did he know they were dead when he didn’t even know where they were??
calvin… the SAIT interview notes with Bravo 33 are an absolute MESS… but if you read them *very* carefully it would appear that John Burfiend ( who was the right-seat guy, not flying the airplane, and the one who was monitoring Air-To-Ground channel ) did his ‘slash across his throat’ gesture just AFTER Marsh’s final transmission when Marsh ‘affirmed’ that they were on the ‘SOUTH side of the fire’.
Even if they couldn’t see them… I think Burfiend could tell looking downward at that moment that anyone deploying on the SOUTH side of that exploding fireline was a goner. Hence… ‘slash across the throat’ gesture over to Thomas French.
Here is the exact ‘context’ of that testimony from
Thomas French in the SAIT interview notes.
It seems to confirm that Burfiend’s ‘slash across
his throat’ gesture to French did, in fact, come
right after Marsh’s *final* transmission…
_________________________________________
We were right here (pointed at map) when Granite Mountain 7 called screaming in the radio. Ops said “are you getting this? I told Granite Mountain 7 “you need to calm down. I can’t understand you”. Immediately Division A called and said “we are starting a burn out, we are getting in our shelters. I said we got pople in trouble. Tanker called and said I got you in sight. I claimed out – the DC10 swung wide. I looked at John and he did this (slash across the throat). I told Kevin to stand by copy, taking it around. We have a crew in trouble. We are going to go look.
__________________________________________
Let me also say that while I have always found this ‘slash across the throat’ gesture from Burfiend to be quite ‘uncalled for’… I do *NOT* believe for one second that this obvious assumption on his part that they were ‘goners’, even at that point in time, had *ANY* effect on him then proceeding to do his job.
I can also criticize them ( and, indeed, the WFF radio protocols themselves for apparently NOT having a good, established MAYDAY protocol ) for NOT taking the transmissions from Steed and Caldwell seriously for more than TWO MINUTES… but that still doesn’t mean I think they didn’t do all they possibly could to try and save those men that day… when they finally did realize this was a REAL emergency.
As soon as OPS1 Todd Abel contacted French and Burfiend and *TOLD* them to get their heads out of their asses and RESPOND to these men… they did.
And once they did ( finally stop ignoring them )… they obviously kicked into their own highly-rehearsed and professional procedures for such a situation.
I also happen to believe that if there had been *ANY* indication in the next few moments of where they REALLY were ( such as… if Marsh had only taken
2 seconds to tell them… “we are 600 yards due WEST of Boulder Springs Ranch” )…
…I believe Thomas French in B33 and Kevin in the DC10 VLAT would have actually attempted a retardant drop… at GREAT risk to their own lives.
To have flown the jet-engine DC10 through that thick smoke-ass cloud would have been absolute suicide for Kevin… so I don’t think THAT would have happened… but if there was ANY way to get at their location ( if they knew where it was ) OTHER than flying blindly directly THROUGH the smoke/ash cloud…
I think they would have tried it.
For the rest of my life… I will always wonder WHY, when Marsh was directly asked by Burfiend…. “So, you’re on the south side of the fire, then?”…
…all Eric Marsh said was… “Affirm”.
Obtuse communications. Right to the end.
If he had just added ANY amount of OTHER information… they at least *MIGHT* have been able to KNOW or GOOD-GUESS their exact location.
He didn’t… and I will ALWAYS wonder WHY he
didn’t take that one last chance to identify their
exact location.
**
** DID DIVSA ERIC MARSH REALLY CALL BRAVO 33
** AT 1637 ABOUT ‘RETARDANT’?
Reply to calvin post on May 8, 2014 at 2:34 am
>> calvin said…
>> I am not sure exactly where Marsh was when he called Bravo33 and said
>> that is exactly where we want the retardant.
calvin… see below. I am personally ( and honestly ) still not convinced this
1637 radio ‘callout’ from Marsh actually took place… or ( if it did ) that it really
was Eric Marsh that said anything of the sort.
>> But if he was walking downslope toward the canyon floor, I do not think he
>> would have been able to see the flight path.
Assuming this transmission DID take place just as the SAIR reported…
It’s really not possible. He might have been able to HEAR some planes flying
over there on the other side of that smoke column… but it’s really not
credible that he could have SEEN them, at that point. It was almost
‘dark as night’ at that point, as well ( as the Glen Ilah resident video proves ).
>> Because of the short period of time between that call out and the call
>> announcing the entrapment, we know he HAD to be close.
Yes. If it happened at all… and at the TIME it supposedly happened… then
Marsh had to be VERY close to the rest of the men. No question.
>> There is a small mound between the entrapment/ deployment site and BSR
>> that is just north of the dozered road (created to remove GM’s bodies).
>> I think it is possible he was on that mound where he would have had
>> more visibility.
Perhaps… and I know exactly the ‘mound’ you are referring to… but that would create the UNBELIEVABLE scenario that Marsh could see exactly what was happening with the fire out ahead of the men still over in the canyon… and he still let them walk right into a deathtrap, anyway.
There are a LOT of ‘unbelievable’ moments that happened that weekend… ( too many ) but I really can’t get my head around THIS possibility ( that Marsh really might have been ‘out ahead of them’ and in a good ‘forward lookout’ position up on that mound… but he let them all die anyway rather than ‘abort the mission’ ).
>> calvin also wrote…
>> I do not believe the GMH were only counting on their speed to outrun
>> the fire. I do believe they were expecting retardant to be dropped on the
>> south side of the fire. But as far as I can tell (from post burn pictures),
>> that never happened.
I hear ya… but ‘as far as I can tell’… there is still the distinct possibility that this “That’s where we want retardant” transmission from DIVSA Eric Marsh never really happened at all… or that it wasn’t actually Eric that said it.
Stick with me for a moment while I try to ‘document my confusion’ about
this (supposed) callout from Marsh to Bravo 33.
This Air Study video actually covers the 1637 timerame…
This video is only recording the Air-To-Air channel but it does provide a CLEAR accounting of *EXACTLY* what Air Attack was doing from 1630 and right up through the deployment ( and beyond ).
There really is nothing in these captured Air Attack conversations that even remotely backs up what the SAIR says was happening at 1637… much less
Marsh making any “that’s where we want retardant” call(s).
Hence my ‘confusion’.
Air Attack ( Bravo 33 ) had the VLAT DC10 910 ( Pilot Kevin ) in a HOLDING
pattern a full SEVEN MILES OUT from the fire and didn’t even ASK Kevin
to start to ‘come into the area’ until 14 seconds before 1637. It took almost
another 2 minutes for the VLAT to even get close to the fire and only then
BEGIN talking to Air Attack about a ‘show me’ run on the EAST side of
the fire… and even this initial conversation about a possible ‘show me’ run
with Air Attack didn’t start until just 24 seconds prior to Steeds first MAYDAY.
The FULL 12 minute and 22 second transcript of this video has already
been posted down below in this ‘Chapter 6’. The following is just a
SUMMARY of that full transcript describing (generally) what Air Attack
was actually DOING during this timeframe…
** USDA AIR STUDY – DISC 4 VIDEO STARTS AT 1630.48 ( 4:30.48 PM )
NOTE: When the video STARTS… we hear Air Attack (B33) actively lining up
a REAL drop ( not a practice run ) with a SEAT from NORTH to SOUTH on
the EAST side of the fire… down near Yarnell. At this point… Air Attack has
the DC10 VLAT 910 ( Pilot Kevin ) in a ‘holding pattern’ SEVEN MILES OUT
and away from the fire… and isn’t even STARTING to deal with him yet.
( 1631.36 4:31.36 PM ) – AA tells SEAT to follow him for DROP.
( 1633.20 4:33.20 PM ) – SEAT drop takes place.
( 1633.24 4:33.24 PM ) – SEAT says “Off the drop now”.
( 1633.26 4:33.26 PM ) – AA tells SEAT to ‘load and return’.
( 1634.11 4:34.11 PM ) – AA tells 910 to set level 4 drop but to still HOLD.
( 1634.12 4:34.12 PM ) – AA tells 910 he’ll get back to him.
( 1634.40 4:34.40 PM ) – AA tells SEAT Wickenburg is out of retardant.
( 1634.42 4:34.42 PM ) – SEAT tells AA he’ll try ‘private club’ for retardant.
( 1635.37 4:35.37 PM ) – Chopper 5Q Alpha reports needing to refuel.
( 1636.10 4:36.10 PM ) – DOZER AND TRANSPORT go by camera.
( 1636.25 4:36.25 PM ) – Chopper 5QA reports landing at Helibase.
( 1636.27 4:36.27 PM ) – AA tells 5QA to let him know when he’s back.
( 1636.46 4:36.46 PM ) – AA only now tells VLAT 910 to ‘come on in’ to the area.
( 1637.05 4:37.05 PM ) – AA tells VLAT 910 target will be flames on EAST side.
( 1638.12 4:38.12 PM ) – Chopper 5QA departs to Wickenburg.
( 1638.15 4:38.15 PM ) – AA asks 5QA to depart on WEST side of fire.
( 1638.42 4:38.42 PM ) – VLAT 910 only now reports ‘approaching area’.
( 1639.03 4:39.03 PM ) – AA only now starts talking to 910 about ‘show me’
( 1639.27 4:39.27 PM ) – Captain Jesse Steed’s first MAYDAY.
( 1639.47 4:39.47 PM ) – Prescott Air Operations (PAO) heard MAYDAY.
( 1639.48 4:39.48 PM ) – PAO tells AA ‘get with OPS… something wrong’.
( 1639.53 4:39.53 PM ) – AA ignores OPS. Sticks with 901 ‘show me’ talk.
( 1641.18 4:41.18 PM ) – AA only now realizes something is happening.
( 1641.20 4:41.20 PM ) – AA tells VLAT 910 ‘folks in trouble… just standby’.
( 1641.25 4:41.25 PM ) – VLAT 910 copies… tells AA he’ll stage out northeast.
( 1641.31 4:41.31 PM ) – AA tells VLAT 910 looks like ‘deployment in progress’.
( 1641.33 4:41.33 PM ) – AA asks VLAT 910 for coverage lvl 6 and to ‘standby’.
( 1641.39 4:41.39 PM ) – VLAT 910 copies… says he’ll watch AA and standby.
( 1643.33 4:43.33 PM ) – USDA AIR STUDY – DISC 4 VIDEO ENDS
So ( from what I can tell ?? )… there is NOTHING there that supports what the
SAIR has reported about Marsh ‘seeing a VLAT drop lineup’ fly OVER him
at 1637 and making ANY kind of radio call like “That’s where we want retardant”.
Unless it’s the SEAT drop at 1633 that the SAIR was talking about ( which DID
actually take place and so the time of 1637 is totally wrong )… but even that was
a SOUTH to NORTH lineup on the EAST side of the fire and never ‘flew over
Marsh’ at all.
The most IMPORTANT thing to remember here is that this one single ‘transmission’ from Marsh is based on just ONE SINGLE person’s recollection,
was NOT captured in any background recordings, and it has not been ‘verified’
by ANYONE else ( even though it supposedly happened on the *very* popular
and well-listened-to Air-To-Ground channel ).
From page 15 of the SAIT Yarnell Investigation Notes ( YIN )…
**************************************************************************************
INTERVIEW WITH BRAVO 33
Interviewees: Bravo 33
John Burfiend-ATS Specialist
Clint Clauson – ATS Trainee
Thomas French – AT Specialist
Interviewers: Mike Dudley, Brad Mayhew, Tim Foley, Jay Kurth, Jimmy Rocha
We needed to go back to the right flank ( 1630 AZ time ).
Made 3 practice runs. Painted 2. We came around.
Got a call from Division A stating they were going down their escape
route to the safety zone. Didn’t know Division A was the superintendent
of the Granite Mountain hot shots. Asked him “is everything OK?” He
replied “everything is ok, just heading to the safety zone”. We came around,
made a practice run through the bowl, west to east. I was talking to Tom
about the rising terrain on exit. Division A clad and said “that is what we are
looking for, that is exactly right”. Within 5 minutes of that, they went in shelter.
************************************************************************************
So there it is.
That is the ONLY reference to this (supposed) transmission by (supposedly)
DIVSA Eric Marsh in the ENTIRE evidence record… and there isn’t even any
specific TIME reported for it at all.
Here are the things to ‘consider’ about this ‘testimony’.
1) This is the ONLY place this transmission from (supposedly) DIVSA
Eric Marsh is EVER mentioned… even though it (supposedly) took place
on the well-listened-to Air-To-Ground channel. TWO completely separate
investigations interviewing MANY people who were constantly monitoring
that Air-To-Ground channel all day… and this quick blurb in the SAIT
investigator’s notes recounting just ONE person’s recollection is still the
ONLY mention of this (supposed) transmission.
2) There is NOTHING (recorded in the SAIT notes) about this (supposed)
transmission taking place at 1637, as published in the SAIR. Zero. Zip. Nada.
It is still a complete mystery how the SAIT actually ‘assigned’ a time of 1637
to this (supposed) transmission from Eric Marsh to B33 on the Air-To-Ground
channel. Bravo 33 was even not really ‘sure’ about any of the actual times…
so how did the SAIT come up with 1637 for this (supposed) transmission?
3) The interview notes DO say that Bravo 33 reports this as ‘Division A called’…
but they also do NOT specifically say whether Bravo 33 ALSO said there were
actual CALL SIGNS involved with this transmission such as “Bravo 33, Division
Alpha’. Other notes from the Bravo 33 interview establish that they were not only
‘unfamiliar’ with who was even working the fire ( because of the piss-poor handoff
from ATGS / ASM1 / Rory Collins )… they were also not familiar with anyone’s
VOICES yet. Bravo 33 specifically says they had no idea what OPS1 Todd Abel
sounded like yet… so UNLESS there were specific CALL SIGNS involved on this
transmission from Marsh it is doubtful they would have been able to tell it was
DIVSA Marsh just from the voice. It is still POSSIBLE that this transmission came
from ‘someone else’ at that time and Bravo 33 is simply mistaken that it was
actually ‘Division A’ ( Marsh ).
4) This one single ‘supposed’ transmission from Marsh played a critical
role in the published SAIR document since they are using this one single
transmission as the defacto END of the (supposed) ‘blackout period’ where
they say they had ‘no direct verifiable transmissions’ from either Marsh
or Granite Mountain… yet it (actually) remains one of the most ‘unverified’
transmissions on record that day.
It is ONLY being ‘recalled’ by one single source ( ONE person ) and even
though others SHOULD have heard this transmission over the well-listened-to
Air-To-Ground channel… NO ONE ELSE in ANY interview or testimony spanning
TWO separate investigations recalls hearing it at all.
I still think it is ‘suspicious’ that the SAIT gave absolute ‘verified transmission’
status to this one (supposed) unrecorded radio callout from Marsh with only
ONE person seeming to ‘recall’ it ( when many others SHOULD have also
heard it… but apparently did NOT ).
There are still MANY other ‘transmissions’ that were actually captured in videos
and in audio tracks that the SAIT chose to call ‘not verifiable’, yet they chose
THIS (unrecorded) moment as so ‘verifiable’ that it ‘officially’ represents the
END of the (supposed) ‘blackout’.
It still almost seems like they were going to great lengths to make sure
this one (supposed) statement about a ‘retardant drop’ made it into the
‘official narrative’ and the ‘official public report’.. regardless of how thin
its ‘verifiableness’ really was.
We can OBVIOUSLY hear ( with our own ears in the Air Study video ) that ‘Air
Attack’ himself NEVER got this transmission at all.
So the ONLY possibility is that the other guy in the plane who was listening to
any ‘Air to Ground’ traffic was the ONLY one who actually heard this.
I am not saying he is WRONG or ‘imagining things’… but our ability to actually
VERIFY this ( as to caller ID and TIME, and what was actually said ) is seriously
non-existent.
I just wish there was an equivalent ADOSH interview transcript with Bravo 33
( French and Burfiend ) to ‘compare’ the SAIT (YIN) notes to and be SURE that
this ONE person’s recollection isn’t flawed, or that he simply was mistaken
about WHO was ‘calling that in’ to him.
There isn’t ( an equivalent ADOSH or other ‘independent’ interview with B33
French/Burfiend ).
At the 23 second mark of the 1637 Panebaker video there is a background transmission that I cannot make out. This video is only 39 seconds long and would put the 23 second mark near 1637. If you do not mind reviewing, I would appreciate it.
Otherwise, I hear you. I also want to know how the SAIT came up with this “quote.”
How does the 4490 red video that was taken around deployment time fit into all of this?
I know the +23 transmission in the 163700 Panebaker video that you speak of. I checked my Air Study notes and what I have for that is someone simply saying something about a “horse in the road” that they need to “take care of”.
I will re-listen to this 39 second video and get back.
As for the 4490red video… I don’t know.
Makes about as much sense ( time-wise ) as the Tom Story photo showing a full VLAT DC10 dump at exactly the moment of Steed’s first MAYDAY ( which is also not supported by any other evidence for being at that time ).
It could be that the 1633 SEAT DROP ( which definitely happened and is captured in that video ) is what Marsh MAY have seen and was reacting to THAT.
The ‘recollection’ might simply be wrong about what they were doing when they heard the transmission. Maybe Marsh had seen the actualy 1633 drop and THAT is what he meant by “That’s where we want retardant”… and it wasn’t a response to any ‘line up’ flight at all.
I decided to walk away from that, because the pain of picking my way thru it was greater than desperation to figure it out….
However, now that I found your posting of the list of the drops, I’ve been thinking hmmmmm is it possible he’s photographing the 1706 T910 drop? Of course the problem with that is that at about the same time (I think?) he was photographing the Blue Ridge UTV leaving the Ranch House Parking Lot…..
I don’t have Lightroom open, so I’m not looking at the photos, just doing this off the top of my head…….
One with id 552301203 with a 70-200 mm f/2.8 L lens (major everybody’s favorite workhorse zoom lens), and another with id 720306928 with a 16-34 mm f/2.8 L lens for wide angle shots.
They both seem to be accurately time-stamped.
On the 1D Mark II id 401063, his most state-of-the-art camera, with which he shot the VLAT drop that I may be getting closer to time-stamping (he was so far off that I think maybe he hadn’t bothered to set the time, just the date–perhaps it was brand new??), he was using a 300 mm f/2.8 L lens. That’s a pretty big honkin’ lens. And heavy.
Marti… in folder ONE of Tom Story’s online photos ( the folder that does NOT have any Ranch House Restaurant photos )… he shot a LOT of ‘retardant drop’ sequences and they appear to have ALL been shot with this same ‘Canon EOS-1D Mark II N’ camera that was then later used for the (supposed) 1639 VLAT drop.
I suppose if we can just match ANY of these ‘drops’ that he photographed with THAT camera we will know if the that 1639 VLAT drop photo has an accurate timestamp or not.
I’m looking at it from this end as well. There is NO EVIDENCE that ANY VLAT drop took place ANYWHERE on that fire at 1639… when Tom Story’s photo seems to say it did.
I was hoping for just a 1 hour (incorrect) time zone setting… but that doesn’t seem to be the case.
I had downloaded a smattering of photos from both folders, but just kinda randomly. Just downloaded a bunch more, more strategically. Looks like he photographed three VLAT drops. Will look at them much more closely after Mothers Day Lunch!
I’m starting to think he set up that camera quickly, just setting the date, and not the time. Thus the stamp when first shot a frame on it would have been 00:00:00. I don’t know if I have the time to figure out what to synch on. But if I can pin one of those VLATs, it might be possible to nail it.
That being said, I’m currently thinking that drop might be the 1707ish one. I just don’t know where he took it from. I don’t know where that drop was, exactly. Do you? If it was visible from the RHR parking lot, he could have caught it w/that 300mm easily.
Plus, I’m not sure that folder just has the 1Ds. But I’ll examine them later today for sure!
Hah! I just found what looks like a tight sequence of the same event, using both a Mark D and the 1D! It’s the red and white helicopter picking up a bucket at the helispot and heading into the smoke…
The voice in the video is that of French, who is in the role of Lead Plane, not Air Attack. That’s why he is on Air-to-Air. He’s not listening to Air-to-Ground.
When you hear the voice/callout of Air Attack, on Air-to-Ground, that is Burfiend. He’s not listening to Air-to-Air.
The only way each one knows what’s going on on the other’s channel is via their communication with each other.
So the person telling the story of their recollection of the communication with Div A would have been Burfiend.
Other than that, yep, copy. So now that I’ve downloaded that video, I’ll go watch it.
They were obviously able to just ‘talk’ to each other in
the plane but each one was ONLY listening to the one
frequency, apparently.
Don’t forget that the 163338 Panebaker video actually
SHOWS the ‘real time’ SEAT drop that actually happens
in the other video detailed above.
They come in from the SOUTH ( lined up on that radio tower as the conversation says ) and they drop on the EAST side of the fire.
There is no ‘West to East’ flyover as described in the SAIR and there was no chance of it flying OVER Marsh… but that doesn’t mean he might not have ‘seen it’… and THIS 1633 SEAT drop is what he might have actually been referring to with his “That’s where we want retardant” message.
A public copy of this Air Study video is in Mr. Dougherty’s online Dropbox at…
LOL I’m still downloading the 20130630_1628_ER.MOV file that I’ve been downloading for the past hour and a half, having slowed it down exponentially by trying to watch a bunch of other videos at the same time…..
But as soon as it finally finishes, I’ll take a look at that one. I still haven’t actually been able to play anythng in any manner that lets me actually SEE what’s going on……
Also WTKTT and Marti
Bothe of the drops on the Video were to far out in front of the fire to do any good. The did not fly into the smoke to hit the flames.
Again it is hard to use air tankers at the front of a running fire. Smoke wind and no visibility reduce accuracy of drops. If GM was under the smoke they would not have seen them to make an accurate drop. Only in the movies. OLD SAYING— Never expect an air drop to save your ass, if they can’t see you they can’t hit you…
Looking back over the transcript of Bravo Lead Pilot talking to the VLAT 910 while they’re setting up for the drop.
I can’t tell if Bravo is actually flying a “show me” or they’re just circling. It kinda reads like Bravo is actually flying the show me, which would mean he would have been flying over the bowl.
What do you think?
And also I’m asking this of Bob Powers, who seems to be the one of us with the most experience of this stuff……
Yes very likely the fir was not that big to circle and make runs and keep all the plains apart would cover a lot of air space. circling the fire at different altitudes or even locations. as I said earlier the plains could have flown over Marsh and crew at any time
in a 8 mile square area. Setting up to make a run takes a lot of maneuvering. Dose that help?
“If you need more altitude let me know… you should be okay at sixty five, only other aircraft I’ve seen is a media ship at this time (at) niner-thousand five hundred.”
Right after the 1633 SEAT drop… it was ‘load and return’ time for that SEAT. French didn’t get back to Kevin ( DC10 ) right away because he had to take a moment to inform the now departing SEAT that Wickenburg was ‘out of retardant’. Departing SEAT says he will try a ‘private club’ in Wickenburg. French gives him permission to do that… and only then begins to turn his attention to Kevin… SEVEN miles out and ‘holding’.
As Kevin is ‘coming in’… French tells him “we’re pretty much alone on the fire now”.
So YES… the space was cleared out. The other DC10 was ‘on approach’ to Yarnell but still quite a ways out.
Except for the choppers, that is. They ( apparently ) just continued to do pretty much whatever they wanted to… just as they had been doing all day.
Marti… yes. Probably so. See my other post about the ‘plan’ apparently being to just try to get ‘in position’ to be in FRONT of Kevin ( DC10 910 ) as he came into the area from the SOUTH and be ready to just ‘angle in front of him’ for a quick ‘show me’ as soon as he entered the area.
This ‘jockeying for position’ while waiting for Kevin to arrive on the fire and ‘acquire a visual’ on them might be the ‘practice runs’ mentioned in the B33 YIN notes.
I think, now, after going over the transcripts, they did fly the show me, but it was exactly when Jesse made the mayday, bcuz the call from Prescott (who heard Jesse’s mayday) came right while Bravo was flying over the bowl west to east.
Chilling.
So, to get out of stun mode and back to analytical mode, if Eric made any call on air to ground about “that’s where we want it,” it had to have been about an earlier flight. So that would mean the actual SEAT drop.
It’s possible Eric is watching the Bravo Lead Plane and VLAT 910 circling around the bowl, which is what they were doing, before the show me, at 3:47, and that’s when he Air2Grounds “that’s it that’s where we want it.” And that’s what Burfiend would have heard.
Is that impossible?
I’m thinking out loud so thanks for your patience, every one…..
Marti… the way I read that transcript in the 1630 to 1643 timeframe… my take is that when French ( Lead Plane Duty ) finally turned his attention to Kevin ( VLAT DC10 910 ) circa 1636.46 ( just 14 seconds before 1637 )… and told him to ‘come on in’ from his ‘holding pattern’ SEVEN MILES away… and said “Have I got a project for you!”… what he wanted to have happen at that point was to be ‘in position’ to do a ‘show me’ for Kevin as soon as he ‘entered the area’.
So YES… there must have been a lot of ‘circling’ going on at that moment as he waited for Kevin to ‘come on in’ and get a VISUAL on him.
We can even hear the two of them struggling to ‘acquire’ that visual as Kevin brought the DC10 in. It isn’t until Kevin says “Okay… I see your beacon” that he actually DID ‘acquire that visual’.
But now we are just seconds BEFORE Steed’s first MAYDAY.
So I guess it is ‘possible’ that as French was ‘circling around’ in anticipation of getting in FRONT of Kevin as he came in from the SOUTH… French could have been
literally ‘all over the place’ down there.
Maybe he did circle WAAAY out over that middle bowl doing some kind of ‘practice run’ to get in front of Kevin as he came in from the SOUTH… and Marsh simply just ‘saw’ French ‘jockeying for position’ as Kevin approached…
…but that still doesn’t warrant Marsh’s (unsolicited) “That’s exactly what we want!” radio call.
That ‘circling around’ to get into position to lead Kevin on a SOUTH to NORTH ‘show me’ on the far EAST side of the fire as Kevin ‘arrived’ in the area would have had nothing to do with where they actually planned to drop any retardant.
So we’re supposed to believe Marsh just saw some small plane wildly circling around up in the air down there and somehow thought that was an indication of where retardant was going to be dropped?
Fer cryin’ out loud.
If Marsh really was all that concerned about ‘helping’ get retardant dropped somewhere… then why isn’t there MORE radio traffic to that effect where we at least hear Marsh trying to CONFIRM where they planned on dropping ANYTHING?
Do I still confused about all this?
You damn betcha.
Marti… I am on a ‘learning curve’ here with all this information myself… but that is simply what it SOUNDS like is happening from the transcript(s) of the audio conversations.
Yes… something about ‘west to east’ practice is runs is mentioned in SAIT interview notes… but I am focused more at the moment on what the AUDIO captures ACTUALLY tell us about what they were REALLY doing.
Even though the ‘show me’ is long past 1637 and just moments before Steed’s first MAYDAY… French has obviously started the ‘show me’ and is explaining what he wants to Kevin in the DC10… and he uses compass headings.
French says “…and my heading starting out was three six zero and ended up about three three five’.
Flying a ‘heading’ of ‘three six zero’ means you are flying DUE NORTH.
There is no ZERO compass heading in aviation. True north is always referred to by pilots as ‘three six zero’.
So flying a heading of ‘three six zero’ for the start of the drop and ending up with a heading of ‘three three five’ means flying a due SOUTH TO NORTH flight path and then banking a little to your LEFT and ending up with a heading of 335 degrees ( sorta north/northwest ).
There are OTHER clues in that transcript such as French specifically asking the chopper that is leaving the area to fly down the WEST side of the fire to stay ‘out of the way’.
Why would he be ASKING the chopper to exit the area to the WEST if that’s where he was planning on flying with Kevin?
I posted this video a few weeks ago. I don’t know if anybody watched it. It’s REALLY REALLY helpful, about the most helpful thing I’ve come across regarding how Air Attack actually works.
I think there’s a TON of CONFUSION in our discussion about Air Attack. And that’s NOT helping us figure things out or communicate accurately to whomever may be reading this.
In this really well made BLM National Incident Fire Center video, called “Firefighting Airspace (2012 Refresher),” Steve Price, Aerial Supervisor, BLM Boise District, clearly describes and illustrates how Air Attack works. Then, at 6:16, he clearly describes how the Aerial Supervision Module, i.e. BRAVO, works, and, then, how the communications system is organized.
The pilot of the plane (i.e. for Bravo 33 at Yarnell being FRENCH, not Burfiend) functions as a lead plane pilot, and communicates primarily over Air-to-Air with the other pilots. That is his job. That’s why I’m saying to you, WTKTT, that you are incorrect in ascribing that voice/role to Burfiend.
The not-pilot of the plane (i.e. for Bravo 33 at Yarnell being BURFIEND, not French) functions as Air Attack, and communicates primarily over Air-to-Ground with the crews and overhead and whoever else on the ground. Again, WTKTT, when you say that, in the interview, it’s French speaking, that, also, is not accurate.
When one needs to let the other know something, they tell each other. French, as overheard in the Air Study videos, was functioning as lead plane, and being heard in the videos, communicating over air-to-air. He didn’t hear the Steed Mayday. He was trying to line up the VLAT T910 drop, a challenging job in itself, all things considered. How that Prescott notification got picked up in that video I have no idea. I don’t think French probably even heard it.
Burfiend is the one speaking in the interview. He’s the one who would have been busy doing other things when Steed did his Air to Ground “MayDay.” He’s the one who would have been in communication with Div A. I’m guessing he would have heard the Prescott call. Probly about the same time OPS got his attention, also. He’s the one who would have told French, we’ve got a problem on the ground, at which point French notified T910 of the problem and told him to go on standby.
In order to even begin to accurately understand what we are seeing/hearing in these videos, and what we are reading in these reports, interviews, etc., we really need to clear up our confusion about this stuff.
Also, since I’ve spent the morning reading all your Air Study posts, WTKTT, yes that 4:16/4:18 T-911 pair of videos was a split-drop in which, as the list indicates, the first drop was “at” 1615 and the second was “at” 1617. So, as unbelievable as it may sound, those two drops came two minutes apart.
And thanks for all the heavy lifting you did getting those videos transcribed and analyzed. It wasn’t until I stumbled across that Firefighting Airspace video, that my own confusion started lifting enough for me to even begin to comprehend what we are encountering. Because it really is……..CONFUSING!
And now that I just wrote all that, it also means that whether or not that 4:37 Marsh communication with BURFIEND happened, it WOULDN’T have shown up on the Air Study video, because it wasn’t Air-to-Air. And it wasn’t with FRENCH, who wasn’t AIR ATTACK.
So the only way it will emerge is if it’s via a video that has Air to Ground at that time overheard, or if someone who was listening, as you have said WTKTT, that VERY MUCH listened to Air to Ground frequency overheard it and would like to speak up about that somewhere sometime somehow.
Burfiend’s a pretty awesome guy. I don’t think he would be making something up. I think both of them were doing a SPECTACULAR job, all things considered. Including the fact that they were left clueless about what was happening in the midst of total chaos and had to figure out a whole lot of things on the fly.
Marti as you explained above you rang a bell.
The that’s exactly were we want it came fro the Air attack boss telling the lead plane he was right on.
some times no one answers as he was expecting to hear that or hear he was not in the right place.
Happens all the time between lead and air.
I am saying it never was Marsh.
If it was not Air Attack
It would have been some one close to the drop zone talking on air to ground. have to figure this out. Maybe one of the OPS.
I am still betting it was not Marsh.
If there was to much smoke he may have heard the Plains but never would have seen them. I am in agreement with WTKTT that the smoke was to thick to see the plains at that time. Marsh would have wanted a drop on his head and the crews at that point not dropping on the flames would not even slow that fire down.
I think I’m agreeing with you here. I kind of put this idea out, trying to wrestle the timeline together, this being the last straw.
Watching the Air Study Video of the VLAT split drop some 20 minutes earlier, I could see Bravo33 flying and leading the VLAT 911, but only just barely. And that’s when they were both coming down much lower to actually do the drops.
I think if Eric was watching when Bravo 33 did the practice run from west to east over the bowl, he might have been able to see it, if the smoke wasn’t too thick, or maybe hear it. But, unfortunately, that didn’t happen until 4:39 while Steed was making his mayday call and, alas, it was too late for any meaningful signal from Eric saying “yes that’s where we want it.”
So since I don’t think Burfiend made that up, and he’s saying it happened while they were flying “show me” from west to east over the bowl, in the midst of all that smoke and whatever (which they WERE IN FACT DOING over on the other side of the fire before they came to this side), the only thing I can think of is that somebody else must have said that. It’s really a stumper.
And if Eric, or anybody else, had said it over AirToGround, at 4:39, while Bravo 33 was flying (I think, but I could be wrong) a “show me” from west to east over the bowl, everybody that was listening to Air to Ground then, which included a WHOLE LOT OF PEOPLE (including us watching/listening to the “Last Minutes” video, would have heard it, also
So at this point, I, personally admit I can’t figure this one out, based on the data we currently have, and am willing to admit defeat, given that I’m not all that sure what difference it ultimately makes in the general scheme of things, anyway.
At this time, “Air Attack” was Burfiend, sitting in Bravo 33 with French, who was flying as Lead Plane. It was fully functioning as an Air Support Module, with both Lead Plane and Air Attack bundled into one vehicle. So what you are saying here doesn’t work.
Reply to Marti Reed post on May 9, 2014 at 11:50 am
>> Marti said…
>> Because it really is……..CONFUSING!
Yes… it is… and the SAIT interview notes with Bravo 33 are
really such a MESS that it just compounds things.
For example…
>> Marti also said…
>> Burfiend is the one speaking in the interview.
No… not exclusively. There are ‘quotes’ in these interview
notes from BOTH of them… but since it is all written as
‘first person perspective’ it is NEVER clear in those SAIT
interview notes ( at any particular moment ) WHO is really
being ‘quoted’ ( Burfiend or French ).
The SAIT interview notes with Bravo 33 contain specific
references for BOTH Burfiend AND French being the ones
‘quoted’… but it keeps CHANGING.
Examples from the YIN interview notes…
( See if you can ‘follow the bouncing ball’ here as to
who is suddenly ‘speaking’ to the SAIT interviewers )…
________________________________________________
Paragraph 4…
I knew there was 2 structural groups. I wrote down 2.
Tom said “hey dude, you are the air attack”.
Paragraph 13…
I was talking to Tom about the rising terrain on exit.
Paragraph 17…
I told Tom “lets fly something further down”.
Same Paragraph (17)… but only 8 sentences later…
I looked at John and he did this (slash across the throat).
I told Kevin to stand by copy, taking it around.
Same Paragraph (17)… just 4 sentences later…
At first KA wanted to get the bucket but John said “no,
we need to find these guys”.
Last paragraph…
Because of the attitude, I was working hard trying to
stay 3 drops in front of Tom.
_______________________________________________
So not only is the TIME all distorted in this ‘interview’ with
them jumping back and forth all over the place…
…one moment it is (apparently) Burfiend speaking in the
‘first person’… then suddenly it’s French speaking in the
‘first person’… then it’s (apparently) back to Burfiend again.
I could almost understand them ‘splitting’ the interview notes into ‘top-half’ and ‘bottom-half’ with one or the other being
French or Burfiend then speaking from the first-person…
…but there’s no indication that’s what they were doing, either. It’s all just a jumbled MESS.
By the way…
There were THREE people in that airplane.
SAIT INTERVIEW WITH BRAVO 33 – July 9, 2013 – 1700
Interviewees: Bravo 33
John Burfiend-ATS Specialist
Clint Clauson – ATS Trainee
Thomas French – AT Specialist
What RADIO CHANNEL does anyone think the 3rd guy
in the plane ( Clauson ) was ‘listening to’ that day?
Since he is listed as an ATS Trainee… and French is
only listed as an ‘AT’… does that automatically mean
this mysterious Clauson guy was only interested in
what Burfiend ( ATS Specialist ) was doing… and so
was only listening to ‘Air-To-Ground’ like Burfiend?
If that is the case… then that means this Clauson guy
would have heard EVERYTHING Burfiend did… including
this (supposed) “That’s what we want” transmission from
DIVSA Eric Marsh.
But ( apparently ) even though the SAIT had this Clauson
guy sitting right there in the interview… they never asked
him anything and he is (apparently?) not quoted anywhere
in that interview. Very strange.
Also… now that I have re-read the SAIT Bravo 33 notes
to grab the ‘follow the bouncing ball’ quotes… I just realized
that this Bravo 33 interview ALSO proves without a
shadow of a doubt that OPS1 Todd Abel was ‘fully engaged’
with Bravo 33 throughout the entire ‘swtich to the south
side of the fire’ Air Operations shift… and right on up
through the deployment.
There are quotes in the B33 YIN interview which indicate
OPS1 Todd Abel was VERY ‘focused’ on the Air-To-Ground
channel and conversing directly with Burfiend right up
to Steed’s first MAYDAY call ( and beyond ).
So that means if Eric Marsh really did suddenly come
onto the Air-To-Ground channel at 1637 with his
( unsolicited ) “That’s what we want” transmission…
…that OPS Todd Abel MUST have heard it right along
with Burfiend ( and the Clauson guy )… along with ALL
the other people who were no-doubt listening to that
‘popular’ Air-To-Ground channel.
But NOWHERE in ANY of his interviews with two separate
investigations does Todd Abel say he ever heard any
such transmission.
It really is important to figure this out.
Not only because the SAIT chose to label this one single
‘transmission’ as ‘totally verified’ and THEN use it as the
defacto ‘end’ of the (supposed) ‘verifiable communications’
blackout period…
…but also because it’s simply important to KNOW if
DIVSA Eric Marsh ever really did say any such thing.
So….. I’ve spent the day downloading and watching and trying to learn from the videos. And trying to be unbiased about it. And still struggling with that Marsh call that Burfiend (who I really respect) notes. And being seriously impressed by French’s behavior, even tho you diss him for the chuckles. I see him as doing a really good job of a really complicated task and the chuckles are to support the pilots, and I think they’re doing a better and more professional job than a whole bunch of other people on that clusterf*ck fiasco of a fire.
But reading what you are writing here, and yeah. The SAIT was a joke. Not an investigation. This is totally unprofessional. But I don’t blame Burfiend and French for it.
I sit here thinking maybe sometime I should head down to Silver City to have a conversation. If I can find the time. Which I maybe can’t. All things considered. Hopefully whoever is in charge of the lawsuits will.
>> calvin said…
>>
>> Div A tells Rory Collins the other crew is in the black and they were
>> headed back to the rigs.
>>
>> Questions.
>> 1. What other crew? Is he referring to a squad of GMH? No?
>> 2. Who is the “They”, that were headed back to the rigs??
>> 3. Does this indicate that Marsh was not in the black circa 1530?
calvin… I knew you were going to ‘catch’ that.
This statement from Air Attack Rory Collins has always been there ( in his SAIT interview notes ) and has always been sort of just laying there like a turd on the table.
It’s never really been fully discussed.
The elusive Mr. Collins was (apparently) NEVER interviewed by ADOSH but it was not for lack of them trying to.
Once again… here is that ‘cut’ from the SAIT investigators’ NOTES from their ( apparent ) interview with Air Attack Rory Collins…
_________________________________________________________________
** SAIT interview with Rory Collins…
Air Attack – LDF – Roseburg
Interview took place at 11:00 a.m. 7/13/2013
Interviewers: Rocha, Kurth, Mike Dudley, Jim Karels.
15:30 Experienced wind shift and the flank turned and became the
head going SOUTH to Yarnell. I let B(?) know prior to the shift to
move to that side and start drops.
15:30 – 15:45 The fire was headed for Yarnell moving FAST to the SOUTH.
They were getting retardant drops. Contacted Division A to tell them of fire
condition and that they needed to move their rigs to a better location.
Q: Did he say he was in good black?
A: NO, he said the other crew was in a good location in the black and
they were headed back to the rigs.
__________________________________________________________________
As for your questions…
>> 1. What other crew? Is he referring to a squad of GMH? No?
It’s hard to tell… but the way I have always read that confusing note from the SAIT investigator(s) is that Marsh might have been referring to ‘Blue Ridge’ as the ‘other crew’ ( or specifically Frisby and Brendan in the UTV ) and that ‘they’ were ‘headed back to the rigs’ ( Even though the ‘in the black’ part of that statement would then make no sense at all ).
>> 2. Who is the “They”, that were headed back to the rigs??
See above. My mind wants to say it was a reference to Blue Ridge ( or just Frisby and Brendan ) since they really were ‘headed back to the rigs’ at that time… but is it possible that at that moment Marsh talked to Collins Marsh really did think there was time for Granite Mountain to ‘head back to the rigs’?
Is it possible that was the ‘plan’ that Marsh actually was referring to in other documented conversations around this time?
>> 3. Does this indicate that Marsh was not in the black circa 1530?
If Marsh was actually on the VERY top of the ‘Weaver Mountains’… then yes… I don’t think it can be said that he was technically ‘in the black’ at that point. Even now… with Google Maps defaulting to post-fire imagery, there are places up there where Marsh could have been that never really burned at all.
These aren’t the *only* notes from the SAIT’s (supposed) interview with Rory Collins that are totally mystifying and unexplained.
That entire SAIT Investigation Notes page for Collins’ interview is basically a joke.
ADOSH tried and tried to interview the elusive Mr. Collins… but (apparently) never succeeded since there is NOTHING in the ADOSH FOIA/FOIL documentation package that represents either an in-person or a telephone interview with ATGS / ASM1 / Rory Collins.
Strangely enough, however… the ADOSH contracted WFAR report makes DIRECT references to ‘our interview with ATGS / ASM1 / Rory Collins’…
Example 1… page 37 of WFAR.
NOTE: This is where the WFAR is using the known incident of Rory Collins dropping retardant on Marsh’s (planned) burnouts as an example of the MANY ‘mis-communications’ that were happening on that fire pretty much all day long. The WFAR specifically says that it interviewed ATGS / ASM1 / Rory Collins about this and it is QUOTING him…
_________________________________________________________________
A good example of the lack of communication from the briefing that occurred on June 30 was the test fire that GMIHC was igniting. During the morning at the top of the ridge, GMIHC was planning to burnout a small section of line to create the fire perimeter down to a two-track road. While they were igniting the test fire, two SEAT retardant drops extinguished their test fire between 1130 and 1145. The Air Tactical Group Supervisor (ATGS) did not know the purpose of the burning and dropped retardant on it, forcing GMIHC to go to direct attack on the fires perimeter. Planning OSC failed to inform ATGS of the tactics for the fire. During our interview with the ATGS on ASM1, he stated that they did not have a firm understanding of where the division breaks were. He stated that they could see the dozer, but did not understand its mission. The dozer was constructing a contingency line from west to east, which when complete, would allow a firing operation to be conducted when conditions were favorable. If ATGS had known this, they could have reinforced the dozer line with retardant instead of picking a location just to the north.
__________________________________________________________________
Again… there is NO DOCUMENTATION in the ADOSH FOIA/FOIL package that supports these statements in the WFAR report, or establishes ( for sure and certain ) that ADOSH ( or anyone associated with WFA ) was able to ever interview Rory Collins.
There are specific memos in the ADOSH ’emails and correspondence’ part of the FOIA/FOIL release that show ADOSH reminding the Wildland Firefighting Associates contractors that NO INTERVIEWS could take place WITHOUT an ADOSH representative present, so it is unlikely that WFA ever interviewed Collins on their own and that might be why the transcript of such and interview never made it into the ADOSH FOIA/FOIL release.
It’s still a BIG MYSTERY.
ATGS / ASM1 / Rory Collins was/is a KEY PLAYER in what was happening on the Yarnell Hill Fire on BOTH Saturday AND Sunday…
…but he still really doesn’t seem to have been properly interviewed
by any competent investigator(s).
This whole air support organization/terminology thing has been some of the most mind-boggling and confusing stuff I’ve been struggling to understand this whole time. Apparently the SAIT didn’t understand it either!
The only two small plains should have been.
Air Attack Boss– Ground to air coordination.
Lead Plane—-Takes orders from Air Attack and leads the Air tankers thru the drops. also may make first run to set up drop and show where to drop.
Some times Air Attack can also serve as Lead plane as needed.
Normally the lead plane is a 1 person contract or employee Pilot, who is dispatched with the Air Tankers. Clear as mud right.
Also the call numbers B33 would have been the numbers on the Plane unless they were assigned call numbers. ASM1 is there working ID. but not use normally as a call sign.
Exactly. (See my post above with the video that explains this stuff).
I think a big part of the confusion is the shifting relationships with Rory Collins being Air Attack when he’s there and Bravo 3 or 33 being Lead Plane, and Bravo 3 or 33 being both Air Attack and Lead Plane when he isn’t.
We-who-are-not-familiar-with-this-stuff are getting really confused by the way we’re encountering it. And it doesn’t help that both SAIT and ADOSH inaccurately communicate it, also. It just gets bewildering.
But I think I’m getting a WHOLE lot clearer about it.
And to make matters worse ( but still
something that is totally relevant to
figuring out what happened THAT
DAY in Yarnell )…
What is the damn ‘procedure’ for ‘notifying OPS and/or ground forces’ when these guys are playing “musical AA, ATGS, LP” all day up above them?
Is there no ‘procedure’ at ALL for this?
One minute you are pressing your microphone button on Channel 10 and/or 16 and you are talking to one guy… and seconds later you can press the microphone button again and you are now talking to a completely different guy who MAY or MAY NOT now even know who the hell YOU are? ( Depending on whether the changeover was piss-poor Collins style or not? )
When ( and HOW? ) were even OPS people like Abel or Musser even being ‘officially notified’ that these guys were changing jobs like tag-team wrestlers up above them that day?
I am not hearing ANYTHING that resembles ‘notifications’ about any of this in ANY of the captured radio traffic from that day.
Elizabeth has been chastised a few times in the past for multiple accusations against several different people who have posted here, that they were all actually one person, using different names. Myself, WTKTT, RTS, RS, Fire20+, and probably some others are included in that group. Despite the chastizing, she has continued to accuse others of this, without a shread of evidence
There is a recent on-going discussion down below, where she once again accused SEVERAL posters of being one person. She was called-out by several people, who said she owed RTS an apology.
She out-snarked everyone with her ridiculous response, stating she would apologize, ‘if only it weren’t true’.
I then called her out again, myself, and since the only person I actually know here IS myself, and I’M NOT WTKTT as she has alleged, I told her that at the very least she owed WTKTT and myself an apology, and if she didn’t, I was done with her, period.
FINALLY, she has revealed what stellar investigative skills she used to expose us all to the light of day.
Elizabeth on May 8, 2014 at 1:48 pm said:
TTWARE, as you might recall, it was “Observer” and I who both noticed the same thing a while ago. Specifically, when a question was asked of YOU, it was WTKTT who replies. Presumably that means that you and he are the same person or are speaking for each other? Or am I missing something?
Sorry Elizabeth, but it was ‘Observer’ who ran with the BULLSHIT that you had previously put out there, quite some time prior. The same WORTHLESS SHIT you have also been repeating about others. AND NOW, in your comment above, we are able to see your stellar investigative skills in action, ALONG WITH YOUR SOUND EVIDENCE.
What’s even more amazing is your obsession with this SHIT, and the fact that you continually put it out there like it’s VERY IMPORTANT, apparently to somehow denegrate the targets.
What you haven’t been able to grasp due to your obsession, is that it doesn’t matter one whit in the grand scheme of things, if someone WERE posting with a hundred different names. IT’S JUST INFORMATION, TO ALWAYS TAKE WITH A GRAIN OF SALT!
In case you haven’t noticed during your obsession, WTKTT POSTS TO EVERYTHING, no matter who the post was directed to. THERE’S NOTHING WRONG WITH THAT, AND I AM NOT HIM!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
As I said in my comment down below, which I posted above your comment copied above, since you choose not to apologize to WTKTT and myself, I am done with you, PERMANENTLY. I hope others on here follow-suit, as well!
I’ve been trying to take Elizabeth seriously about the weather. But I’m feeling used. And I just don’t have the time or energy. She hasn’t returned the favor. She hasn’t added anything. That doesn’t bother me personally, because I was genuinely interested in the weather at this point, anyway.
There are a number of people here who, I believe, have genuinely given of their time and energy to pick apart the evidence we can find in our own various ways, and share what we find, and question each other, in a relatively respectful way, in order to drill down into this whole mess, in order to discern the truth. I include you in that. And WTK, whose intense work has been so helpful so often, even when I’ve sometimes thought, OK you may be pushing too far….. And Calvin, who just keeps asking hard and challenging questions that I hadn’t even thought of…….. And Bob Powers, with so much hard-learned experience……. And Mike in his honesty…. And SR who sometimes aggravates people but I also think knows way more than he sometimes lets onto…
I hate to say this, Elizabeth, but I don’t trust you. I wish I could. Sometimes it seems like you are really trying to figure things out, and sometimes it seems like you are baiting and switching and using us all. And I don’t know why. We are not here……for your purposes.
And this whole current deal about who is who that you are pushing relentlessly, is pretty much the last straw with me. I refuse to play those kind of games. And I refuse to play with people who do.
Than You Marti what else can I say. Bring us back on subject. I have no problem with those that wish to stay anonymous. I have no reason to and I guess that just me I have always owned every thing I have said win lose or draw.
I’m like you. I’m pretty much “out there” on the Internet. My Facebook says who I am. My Twitter says who I am. My Flickr says who I am. If I ever finally get my website back up, it will, again, say who I am.
On the other hand, there are things I don’t say on the Internet. Because I’m “out there.”
I was once under investigation by the FBI. Not because of what I did, but because of what I knew. It was the most terrifying experience of my life. I had to rethink everybody in my life, as to exactly who they were, and exactly how much I trusted their judgement. I had to re-think TRUST.
And that is why I don’t expect anybody to ipso facto say who they are on the Internet. I am totally fine with Internet anonymity. it’s everybody’s right. I’m totally fine with it.
And I have had absolutely no problem distinguishing people in this forum. I have been perfectly capable of distinguishing the various voices here. I can’t even fathom anybody conflating TTWARE with WTKTT. Or RTS with SR.
This whole thing has been a huge waste of time and energy, IMHO.
Not long ago someone perused that Elizabeth is writing a book about this and using this forum to gather data. At the time I thought that was very far-fetched. Since then, considering how her posts have been worded, it certainly sounds like she might be gathering data for a book and using all of us to do the investigative leg-work.
OK I’m going to bare my soul here, after what I just wrote in response to Bob Powers.
Because I think this is a great time to just get real. As I just told my 94-year-old mom over the telephone, we’re ten months into this fiasco and we can still not figure out why they did what they did.
At one time, I thought I admired Elizabeth. I thought she was really concerned about and trying to gather information needed by the families in their quest to know the truth.
This was about the time I decided I was trying “to work” for Amanda Marsh, whether she ever knew it or not, because, at that time I was so seriously seeing how the Prescott Fire Department (as I wrote, “Here’s looking at you Daryll Willis”) was with-holding evidence, about a) the options conversation and what possible pressure was possibly being applied onto the crew, and b) the cellphones and gps units that have never surfaced. To be honest, I’m still asking those questions. That’s my “tin-foil hat conspiracy theory” and today I’ll proudly continue to stand by it. I still don’t know if “overhead” managed to screw over Eric Marsh (with all his foibles and strengths) and his crew or not.
However, as things progressed, even as I announced my retirement, but still kept reading this every day, and thinking every day, I found myself thinking, “Ya know, if I was looking to hire an investigative lawyer to drill down to the bottom of this whole affair, the last one I would hire would be Elizabeth, because of her lack of open-mindedness and, thus, her obtuseness.” Kind of the opposite of Sherlock Holmes.
And now I have to say, in response to your post, the last person I would hire to write a book about this is Elizabeth, because of her lack of respect for her sources. The best writers respect their sources. Which, in this case, Elizabeth hasn’t done. Not to mention her complete inability to communicate herself out of a paper bag. As we have, exasperatingly, all experienced.
Honestly, I have no idea why she is continuing to be here.
Elizabeth, exactly and honestly, why is it that you continue to invest yourself in being here, again?? I truly and honestly would like to know.
Marti. I totally disagree with you regarding Elizabeth.
Elizabeth has been in this conversation starting September 2013.She has put herself out there. She has secured a lot of the information we have to review. I realize fireman20 (or whom ever) says anyone can request records through the FOIA/FOIL (and that may be true) BUT, no one else has done this (and then shared the records publicly) except ELIZABETH, DOUGHERTY, and GABBERT.
Marti. I am not asking you to agree with everything Elizabeth does or says. But I am asking you to weigh the positive effects Elizabeth has brought to IM and the Yarnell incident before making personal attacks against her.
We all have different backgrounds which makes this discussion interesting and (IMHO) helps explore different angles that may have been overlooked.
I really value and appreciate what you are saying here. And that’s because I really respect and trust your voice here.
In general I mostly avoid making negative comments about other people. I really do. And I’ve mostly done that here. Because I agree with you that various voices, even when I disagree with something they say, are REALLY REALLY valuable.
My beef has to do with two things.
1. I feel that in a number of instances, from recently to back aways, she has been perfectly comfortable interrogating us without expressing any genuine respect for us, or responding to our questions of her. I’ve personally experienced that, and I’ve seen her do that to others.
2. Trashing/distorting other peoples’ identities. This whole thing has been really disturbing to me, and genuinely hurtful to others. I can’t fathom any need to do that and it damages her credibility and I have no idea why she has continued to do it.
I appreciate the many things she has positively offered, but I am no longer willing to just sit back and be OK with the damage she has done.
>> SR said…
>> I hadn’t known about the McDonough statements as regards what Marsh,
>> Steed and he knew and discussed about the weather. I think it’s glaringly
>> clear that they did know that a full 180 windshift, complete with 50 mph
>> gusts, was coming.
Of course it is.
It was ALREADY HAPPENING even by the time Byron Kimball got around
to forwarding the official NWS and SWCC spot forecast over the radio
at 1530. Just moments later… it was so OBVIOUSLY happening that that
is what threatened Brendan McDonough’s safety and was forcing him to
abandon his lookout position circa 1536 or 1537 ( and to have all of those
radio conversations with Steed/Marsh about why he had to leave ).
In the course of just 5 minutes… Marsh thought it was ‘safe’ to ask Brian Frisby to schlep all the way out to the ridge just to have some kind of ‘secret’ conversation that Marsh (somehow) didn’t feel comfortable having over open radio… then moments later ( while Frisby is only halfway out there ) the fireline up right near them has REVERSED DIRECTION and is now threatening Brendan’s life.
So even if Marsh didn’t realize the predicted 180 FULL WIND REVERSAL was just about to happen when he called Frisby out to meet with him… he certainly realized it just minutes later when his own 20th man’s life is now in danger and Frisby himself realized it was ‘too dangerous’ to even still try to fulfill the request for the face-to-face with Marsh… and CALLED OFF THE MEETING for that very reason.
There is actually plenty of ‘other’ evidence that Marsh and Steed were FULLY aware of ( and EXPECTING ) the FULL 180 degreee wind shift such as other statements Brendan ( and others ) have made in public interviews and press
conferences following the incident.
Here’s just another ‘sampling’ of those statements…
__________________________________________________________________
** From the Kyle Dickman ( former Hotshot ) article entitled…
** “19: The True Story of the Yarnell Hill Fire” published September 17, 2013,
** and completely based on face-to-face interviews with Brendan McDonough…
NOTE: This matches Brendan’s ADOSH testimony where Brendan says it was
Steed himself who now reporting the predicted 180 degree wind shift and 50-60
mile per hour wind gusts to HIM, over the radio…
Donut was less than a minute into slinging his 4 P.M. weather when Steed
came back over the radio.
“Donut, you up?”
“Go, Steed.”
“They’re calling for a 180-degree wind shift and gusts of up to 60 miles per hour out of the northeast.”
“Copy that.”
He looked up at the approaching wall of flames and blinked. For the first time that afternoon, the wind was blowing at his face instead of his back. The flank that had been slowly backing down the valley had suddenly jumped to life. Two-foot flames had grown to twelve, and within moments the fire was running up a ridge on the east side of the valley and then south, directly at Donut.
“Steed, Donut. It hit my trigger point.” The fire had crossed the drainage on the valley floor only a quarter of a mile away. “I’m bumping back to the dozer push.”
“Alright, let me know when you get there. We’ve got eyes on you.”
Donut tossed on his pack and grabbed his gear as he started wading down
through the brush field and boulders toward the safety of the clearing the
bulldozer had created that morning
__________________________________________________________________
** From Brendan McDonough’s exclusive ABC news interview with
** Brian Ross, August 7, 2013
“Everything seemed normal, not threatening. Just — a typical day, going direct
on a fire,” he ( Brendan McDonough ) told ABC News.
Around 4:00 in the afternoon, however, everything changed. The winds that had
been driving the fire away from the Hotshots began to turn 180 degrees, propelled
by what some fire officials call a “perfect storm” of gusts up to 50 miles per hour.
Instead of moving NORTH, it started moving SOUTH as the flame front leapt
from 25 to 50 feet high.
McDonough says the team could now see what was happening — contradicting
some accounts that they were unaware the fire was heading toward them.
“From where they were, they could see it picking up. So they kind of relayed to
me, ‘Hey, Donut, we got eyes on it,'” McDonough remembers his captain telling
him. “They said, ‘If you need to get out of there, go ahead and get out of there…
we want you to be safe too,’ you know?”
__________________________________________________________________
** From Darrell Willis’ press conference at the deployment site, July 23, 2013…
( Question From A Reporter ) : Is there a confirmation that they did receive…
uh… information concerning the outflows from the thunderstorms?
( Darell Willis ): Yes. There is confirmation of that.
There’s no question about it.
They saw that the… uh… fire activity was picking up. There was a line of fire
from the ridge top… beyond where they where down lower into the valley
probly a mile or two… mile and a half line of.. uh.. fire… and it’s chaparral
that started to move to the SOUTH.
__________________________________________________________________
>> SR also wrote…
>>
>> It is convenient for those claiming that everything at YHF was perfectly
>> reasonable that, hey, the wind shifted, and no one could see further shifts
>> coming. Crazy outflow boundary, something you couldn’t see and that no
>> one had heard of. Almost as if GM got hit by an asteroid — tragic, but
>> nothing anyone could have done anything to prevent. Of course, that is
>> all completely nonfactual.
Some people never let the FACTS get in the way. It’s just annoying to them.
Something that needs to be remembered here is what any lawyer knows, and
that is what the real ‘legal’ *definition* of NEGLIGENCE is… and how lawyers
go about either proving it… or DEFENDING AGAINST IT, in open court.
Here is the ACTUAL (legal) definition of NEGLIGENCE…
_________________________________________________________________
1) Failure to exercise the care that a reasonably prudent person would
exercise in like circumstances.
2) Lack of normal care or attention
_________________________________________________________________
Two IMPORTANT things to notice about the ‘definition(s)’…
“reasonably prudent person” AND “normal care or attention”.
What lawyers will ALWAYS do to DEFEND against accusations of NEGLIGENCE
is to FIRST simply try to establish that ‘anybody else’ ( Sic: reasonably prudent
person ) would have probably ‘done the same thing’ AND/OR that nothing
regarding the circumstances surrounding the decision making was really
‘out of the normal’ at all.
Sounds close to some recent posts here, doesn’t it?
Don’t forget that Elizabeth is also the one who has now stated at least FOUR
or FIVE times on this public discussion thread that there was ‘nothing out of
the ordinary’ with regards to the piss-poor handoff that Air Attack Rory Collins
had with Bravo 33 before he abruptly left the fire at 1558… EVEN THOUGH
there is signed testimony from Bravo 33 themselves about what a ‘strange
handoff’ Collins performed that day and their own testimony about how
absolutely CLUELESS they were following that piss-poor handoff.
She continues to maintain that it was ‘nothing out of the ordinary’ and that
the next handoff later on was ‘just as quick’. ( I.E. – establish ‘normalcy’ ).
What a lawyer often hopes to establish when trying to defend against
NEGLIGENCE is this exact ‘establishment of normalcy’ and/or ‘establishment
of a pattern of decision making or behavior’ that doesn’t lead to ‘bad outcomes’
which can then be construed as ‘reasonably prudent behavior’… hence…
NO NEGLIGENCE.
So…… I’ve just spent 45 minutes trying to get to the weather documents via both Dougherty’s live links and the ones you have to copy and paste and EVERYTHING is landing on a page with a message that says: “Disabled link
Access to this link has been disabled. Please ask the owner of the shared link to send a new link to access the file or the folder.”
Could somebody else please try this and tell me if they’re getting it, too, or am I doing something wrong>
You could still pull the historic Stanton RAWS data from somewhere, for sure.
But as great that it is that you are looking to do this, since all the data, radar, forecasts, etc. seem to align with contemporaneous accounts, I don’t think there’s any legit question as regards the weather.
Yes. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qwIB9RQY3zE There are all sorts of other sources, such as this blending of Flagstaff Doppler images. I can’t access from where I am, but for a weather-lite view, people can even go to something like Weather Underground and check the Alamanac for Flagstaff for 6/30/13 just to see that it more or less corresponds to other accounts.
The real story here is that a couple posters are simply floating the proposition that Marsh relied on some unique and personal definition of weather and of the weather forecast he had just heard, and reasonably so, and/or that weather associated with thunderstorms is unheard of in AZ and couldn’t have been expected…even if the forecasts of that weather had been received and were correct.
Amidst all this sound and fury it seems the GM overhead misread something – weather, fire etc. Even if there was an order (which at the present time appears to be the triumph of hope over facts), Marsh must have misread something in order to comply with it. Otherwise, if he complied knowing how dangerous it was, well I certainly hope that was not the case. He not only had a right, but a responsibility, to turn down an unsafe order. He was responsible for his crew. And if he knew it was unsafe, but relied on the promise of a retardant drop, many WFF have already indicated that would have been firefighting malpractice.
It seems too much effort is going into making sense of Marsh’s decision, when in the end I believe it will not make sense.
Hah! That video is a true brain-challenger!!! I like the sound of the wind and the birds chirping!
But yes.
It definitely shows what a thunderstorm bearing down on a fire that’s burning in high-risk fuels can do. Is it unique? No. Is it radical? Depends on one’s definition. Is it why Chuck Maxwell, the SWCC Meteorologist, was agonizing in Albuquerque about whether to get more pro-active about strategy? You betcha!
Well, I was finally able to access the files, by turning on my Dropbox account and downloading them to there. Spent the day reading and re-reading the weather stuff, and then had turned to the Google for more, then a storm hit and blew out my power. But yay Safari remembers….
So now I know what was reported by whom and when. And now I know what the radar images and the satellite images look like. And I can see how easy it would be for someone like Elizabeth, who doesn’t know how to interpret this stuff, to get bogged down.
And there was an article in USA Today on October 13 (am looking at it on my computer but can’t provide the link cuz I’m typing on my iPad cuz of the storm), that speculated that Granite Mtn may have misinterpreted what they were seeing, thinking that the wind-shift the forecast predicted had peaked when Brendan had to be evacuated, and that they could hence proceed. Thus missing the fact that it hadn’t and the worst was yet to come.
It goes on to say, “But the stronger winds — the outflow boundary from the thunderstorm — moved across the area about 40 minutes later. By then, the crew was in a position it could not escape.”
I actually don’t believe it. What I see in what I’ve seen is more along the lines of what Bob Powers described a few miles down below. The meta-weather cell was slowly turning in a clockwise direction and the lower winds were, also, just in a more erratic terrain-related manner. Maybe GM was fooled by that… and maybe they weren’t. I happen to think they shouldn’t have been.
The other thing Elizabeth keeps saying that I don’t get is that that line of thunderstorms was just sitting there for hours some 60 miles from the fire going nowhere and doing nothing. I haven’t seen ANYTHING that indicates that. If she is looking at the same “above the clouds” images I am (I.e.the gifs which are in fact the satellite images), they show that thunderstorm line bearing right down over the fire and engulfing it, until the pyro-cumulus column forces it’s way up above it. At least, that’s what I see.
And I’d highly recommend reading Chuck Maxwell’s report in the FireBehaviorAndWeather PDF. He was in Albuquerque, watching that whole thing unfold on radar/satellite monitors, very much in touch w/IncidentCommand, and agonizing about whether he should/should not take a more pro-active stance in terms of getting everybody off that fire NOW. Kinda like my dad (who he probably knew) praying when Overhead didn’t listen to him.
And sitting here after reading all this, and your comments, and thinking. The reason I don’t believe this theory is because they were still up above it all, seeing it all happening until 4:20-ish. And it hadn’t quit happening. And it was increasingly heading right where they were increasingly going.
I increasingly agree with WTK, when he wrote a couple of miles below, that the REALLY critical decision was the one to enter the bowl, not the one to leave the black. I think they didn’t know where the two-track actually went, or trust it, and saw the ranch right below them, and maybe were cardinally-directionally-disoriented or something? (That can actually happen even to the best of us) They must have thought they were flanking the fire and not heading right into where it was going. They absolutely should have kept a lookout above them.
WEATHER:
My view (with all due respect) is that the SAIT and Wildland Fire Associates reports do not always most accurately describe or emphasize the relevant facts as they existed between roughly 3:40-ish and 4:22-ish p.m. on June 30th in terms of what GM was likely seeing or perceiving (or mis-perceiving) or relying upon that would make GM believe that it made sense to move when they did down to the Boulder Springs Ranch. With respect to the WEATHER, this is certainly my view.
TTWARE referenced either the radar or satellite images (I cannot remember which parlance he used), and I am pretty sure that I have 30 or more of those images, which, in my view, seem to confirm my understanding of the weather as GM was seeing it or perceiving it or understanding it that day. The SAIT either did not review these images or they did not publish/release them to the media/Dougherty.
Marti seems to suggest below that she views the radar/satellite images as irrelevant to this discussion, which suggests to me that perhaps she is instead focusing on the weather materials in the 147 pages released by the SAIT. (Hopefully everyone who is opining on the weather who does not have the WFF background that folks like Bob Powers or xxfullsailxx seem to have has at least given the 147 pages a read, to get up to speed on some of the raw materials rather than what the SAIR and other reports are saying about the raw materials. The overachievers among you have probably already pulled the *raw* NWS or other data for the past few years to confirm that not a whole lot of WFF work would get done in AZ between mid-June and the end of July if everyone stopped working and stood down in a safety zone the moment a static thunder cell appeared in the sky, even if it was 80 miles away and totally static for hours.) Either way, my tentative conclusions previously suggested remain.
I would be curious to know what those of you who disagree are pinpointing in the 147 pages or with the radar/satellite images (referenced by TTWARE) as the basis for disagreement. It is entirely possible that I am wrong about the weather and what GM was perceiving (or mis-perceiving), and, if so, it would be useful for me to understand what – other than the SAIT’s conclusions – form the basis for disagreement, so that I can do more research and hopefully come to a more accurate conclusion, assuming mine is inaccurate.
Uhh…as WTKTT very helpful laid out, Steed and Marsh heard the forecast and discussed it among themselves, including the fact that S/SW winds would shift 180 to N/NE. They could see the storm front. The forecast weather appeared. Marsh noted squirelly winds.
SR, if you honestly fail to see the confusion, then perhaps you underestimate the complexity of weather as it pertains to (a) fire behavior and (b) fire behavior in topography of the sort that existed near Yarnell/Glen Ilah. To respond to some of your points:
1. My understanding is that there was conversation AFTER the 3:26/3:30 p.m. forecast about whether any predicted weather changes had actually already occurred or were in the process of occurring. WTKTT seems to be ignoring this fact. If the NWS or FBAN or whatever weather-specific person indicates that the weather change predicted is either already here or has already impacted the fire, why would Marsh and Steed IGNORE this input?
2. When you say “they could see the storm front,” what storm front are you talking about? As I understand it, there had been one particular cell (or more) that had been around for multiple hours and was going NOWHERE. Marti gives a very good explanation below about how the weather in AZ this time of year can often be predicted in one way and play out in entirely another. Bob Powers himself notes that men who are experienced with wildfires and who pay attention can often see things in front of them or feel things or see things manifest in fire behavior that people who are arm-chair quarterbacking or sitting in an NWS office or on another side of the fire do not perceive.
3. “The forecast weather” (whatever that means) seems to have appeared either AFTER the men were dead or fatally compromised. The forecast weather did not CAUSE the shift in the fire that killed the men, as I understand it. So you are saying that the men got trapped and killed by “the forecast weather” (whatever you mean by that) that occurred AFTER they were trapped and likely already dead? Really? REALLY??
4. “Squirrelly winds” – Did *you* hear Marsh say such a thing? Me neither. It was either you or RTS or whomever who pointed out (correctly) that there are multiple things alleged in the SAIR/SAIT materials to have been said that people who are still living seem to indicate were NEVER said. So, it is *not* an established fact that Marsh commented on “squirrelly winds” no more than it is an established fact (as you or RTS or whomever like to allege) that Marsh had a pattern of reckless or needlessly risky/dishonest/covert/whatever behavior. That said, even if Marsh said “squirelly winds,” so what? Squirrelly winds does not equate with “a huge wind gust is about to occur and impact the fire behavior in a way that will trap and then kill you,” at least according to Bob Powers. Bob tells us – correctly, as I understand it – that FLAT air (e.g. no wind) can often be the warning sign of an impending major wind event. Then again, FLAT air (e.g. no wind) can sometimes indicate… no wind and no prospect of wind and there will be no wind for a while such that it is safe to move.
You are quick to criticize me, SR, for my alleged deficiencies in understanding weather as it pertains to fire, but, with all due respect, it appears that perhaps you also have some gaps in your knowledge. I suggest you and I work together to constructively figure out the relevant weather (as opposed to what folks have been alleging about the relevant weather).
I really don’t understand what you are saying here.
On the one hand, you say:
“1. My understanding is that there was conversation AFTER the 3:26/3:30 p.m. forecast about whether any predicted weather changes had actually already occurred or were in the process of occurring. WTKTT seems to be ignoring this fact. If the NWS or FBAN or whatever weather-specific person indicates that the weather change predicted is either already here or has already impacted the fire, why would Marsh and Steed IGNORE this input? …”
What CONVERSATION are you, AGAIN, referring to and among whom? And are you saying you are aware of NWS/FBAN/whatever indicating the predicted change (which was a half-hour prediction, but that doesn’t mean it predicted that weather event would END in a half hour, it was just the start) had already happened and was done at 4 PM??
And on the other hand, you say:
“3. “The forecast weather” (whatever that means) seems to have appeared either AFTER the men were dead or fatally compromised. The forecast weather did not CAUSE the shift in the fire that killed the men, as I understand it. So you are saying that the men got trapped and killed by “the forecast weather” (whatever you mean by that) that occurred AFTER they were trapped and likely already dead? Really? REALLY??”
What in the world are you talking about? How can you say here that the forecast weather happened after the burnover? The weather forecast was for the half an hour after 3:30. (and it was actually a spot forecast, and I’ll bet there were other forecasts/reports put out as the fire blew up, but I don’t feel like going to look for them ATM).
That doesn’t mean it ENDED a half an hour after the forecast. He was forecasting a major weather shift that was beginning at 3:30 and signified the major shift in the “winds aloft” so to speak, and wouldn’t be over until it was over, and the forecast didn’t say when it would be over. And there’s nothing I can see anywhere where anyone said ever that the forecast weather began after the crew was dead.
Do you understand what a forecast is?
Reminder: This is the forecast we are discussing:
WantsToKnowTheTruth
on May 6, 2014 at 9:36 pm said:
“Byron Kimball: Within the half-hour, (pause) EAST winds. (pause) Possibility of as high as 50 miles an hour or likely 25 (pause) definitely 25, 35 gusting 40 (pause) east / northeast within the half hour. Um… the outpoint to outflow line also ( will be ) located…”
These forecasts come from the national or state agency fire centers (Dispatch) offices relayed directly to the Fire. They are not some off the wall forecast.
Also I believe the squarely wind statement by Marsh was recorded on a video phone while taking a video of the fire. Refer back to one of WTKTT info.
Marti, you said the following: “I have not seen the 30 photographs you are referring to, but I can imagine that if they were taken from above the cloud cover, they probably aren’t particularly meaningful as to what is going on below that cloud cover.”
I took your words, Marti, to mean that you did not think the photos were, uhm, “particularly meaningful.” 🙂
Having looked at what I think you are talking about. The images I think you are talking about, if they’re the gifs that are the satellite images. It depends on what you are asking of them.
In re to what I was saying, they’re still not that meaningful, in terms of what was going on on the ground. They’re not going to tell you any more than what GM was photographing, or people were saying, on the ground, in real time.
They are, however, meaningful, in terms of meta. The big system. They show that line of thunderstorms moving southwest and dynamically interacting with the fire. Which is why I can’t understand why you keep saying that that thunderstorm/system was sitting statically 60 miles away doing nothing and going nowhere. Maybe I now take those images more seriously than you do?
Elizabeth
Your throwing a can of worms again…..
I do not know where you are getting the stand down theory?
Fire Fighters do not stand down from Weather forecasts.
They adjust to the forecast and continue working.
making sure they are safe and following all the safety procedures.
Including LCES. The Weather Forecast that afternoon was what the people on the Fire were going by and based on our hind site it is what happened. The forecast is right there in front of you word for word. Standard Firefighting Orders #1 and #3, I do not think any body here knows exactly what GM was thinking when they moved. we do know they had NO LCES in place, No identified or scouted escape route and no personal knowledge of the BSR SZ. What worm would you like us to pick up. Your not in a court room quit acting like an Attorney trying to get a statement out of a defendant.
As a Law Enforcement Officer I was trained on Court trials and have been in the chair a lot for testimony and how questions are ask, enough said.
Elizabeth on May 8, 2014 at 6:18 am said:
“Marti seems to suggest below that she views the radar/satellite images as irrelevant to this discussion, which suggests to me that perhaps she is instead focusing on the weather materials in the 147 pages released by the SAIT.”
There is nothing I wrote that suggested that I view radar/satellite images as irrelevant. Just because I wasn’t referring to them, doesn’t mean I dismiss them.
And it was not based on the weather pages in any of the reports.
I was describing what you, in fact were asking for, i.e. what the crew was experiencing, based on the accurate forecast they had received, the photos they were taking, and what everybody else was saying, as WTKTT laid out so clearly down below, oh and also what we’ve been slowly conversing about for months.
The crew was not looking at radar/satellite images, most likely.
My father (RIP) forecasted/tracked the weather for the Albuquerque International Balloon Fiesta for 16 years. I assisted him for the last ten of them. The lives of thousands of crew depended on his expertise. They loved having him fly with them, because “he could see the winds,” as they said.
At 3:00 every morning, we packed my daughter into the back seat of the car, and headed to the National Weather Service in Albuquerque, and looked at the most current satellite, radar, and wind maps for about an hour. So we knew what, in general, was happening and was going to happen and why. But that’s not the most important thing we did.
We then drove out to the field and started flying and tracking weather balloons. Up until the 6 AM pilot briefing and then until the launch. And then my dad would keep watching what was going on through the whole launch of as many as 1000 balloons, and throughout the hours until they were all safely landed. And he kept communicating to the pilots through “the overhead” the entire time. Situational Awareness, in other words.
And if the winds aloft “in real time” based on our weather balloon observations started running over 15 mph, my dad would warn the “Overhead” that they should shut the whole thing down, because it was too dangerous. And that decision could cost the Balloon Fiesta millions of dollars. So they didn’t like hearing that. And there was absolutely nothing he could do if they decided to launch against his recommendations. Except pray nobody got killed, which sometimes they did.
There’s a dynamic relationship between radar/satellite/weather maps and “in real time” observations. What I was describing was what people “in real time” were observing, and that those observations corresponded to the forecast, which was based on radar/satellite/imagery mapped onto a weather map, and sent out as a forecast at 3:30 PM.
calvin on May 6, 2014 at 3:32 am said:
“It does appear (to me) that after Marsh tells Bravo 33, that is exactly where we want the retardant (1637?), and it wasn’t dropped,; then Marsh didn’t transmit again until he was with the crew. However, I am not convinced he was behind the crew. If so, there is no way (in my opinion) he could have saw Bravo 33 flying through the middle bowl west to east.”
I am really curious, and a bit confused, about what you are saying here. Where do you think Marsh was? And could you clarify, in more detail, why?
Marti. I am not sure exactly where Marsh was when he called Bravo33 and said that is exactly where we want the retardant. But if he was walking downslope toward the canyon floor, I do not think he would have been able to see the flight path.
Because of the short period of time between that call out and the call announcing the entrapment, we know he HAD to be close. There is a small mound between the entrapment/ deployment site and BSR that is just north of the dozered road (created to remove GM’s bodies). I think it is possible he was on that mound where he would have had more visibility.
I do not believe the GMH were only counting on their speed to outrun the fire. I do believe they were expecting retardant to be dropped on the south side of the fire. But as far as I can tell (from post burn pictures), that never happened.
Calvin hopefully to clear up some confusion.
The Lead plain B33 would have been 500 ft. or more above the terrain which would have given the people on the ground in the canyon the ability to see the plain for some distance barring any smoke. I was not there but that is my assumption. The higher the plain was the longer it would have been in view if that helps.
Calvin.
When you say “the middle bowl” are you referring to the bowl GM walked down into, or the big bowl that most of the days activities were taking place in?
I.e. I’m still not sure exactly where the drop path flight happened. And I currently have in my head WTKTT’s analysis of that flight (and I haven’t looked at the video and maybe I should), in which he was saying it shows it happening more on the east side of the smoke column, and thus questions whether Eric could have seen it.
I still think this is a pretty muddy part of the story.
calvin… I am with you. That 1637 transmission from Marsh is still quite a mystery.
See a longer post I just made up above about this and it is
really just an attempt for me to try and ‘document my continuing confusion’ about this ‘transmission’.
The *new* post above is mostly just based on that recent transcript of the USDA Air Study video that DOES, in fact, cover the time period from 1630 to 1643… and gives a CLEAR picture of *exactly* what Air Attack ( B33 ) was *actually* doing during this time… and especially what they were ( or, more importantly, were NOT ) doing at 1637.
I am not seeing the ‘proof’ there, in that Air Study transcript, that this ‘line up flight’ ever took place at all around the time that the SAIR says Marsh ‘saw it’… and ‘responded’ to it.
Something is still ‘wonky’ with this whole 1637 event.
Maybe it’s just the TIME is wrong, or something.
WEATHER: TTWARE, you made a point below about “the timed-stamped radar images of the weather-event progression.” Would you mind explaining more about what you are driving at with your comment?
Specifically, I have copies of all 30 or so relevant images from *above* the cloud cover (not sure what the parlance is), and I am not understanding how your comment ties in with them. My understanding of those images is that they are consistent with the point that xxfullsailxx and I are making, no?
Thank you in advance. (I, personally, think the weather-related take-away from the Yarnell Hill Fire is still grossly under-discussed.)
The time-stamped radar images I am referring to, are the same ones I referenced from the SAIR report in response to one of your earlier comments about the weather down below a ways.
Specifically, they show that the storm system originated in the Flagstaff area, proceeded to the Yarnell area, and then, became responsible for the outflow boundary.
Nothing more, nothing less.
I think you’re getting too hung-up with the weather aspect. The predictions (long and short term) predicted the weather could go ape-shit (my term), and it actually came to pass. One wind shift does not equate to ‘well, ape-shit’s all over now, we shouldn’t expect any other significant changes.’
Elizabeth on April 20, 2014 at 3:55 pm said:
…”I think I am just seeing the weather differently, in part because there was a CONVERSATION that followed the 3:30 p.m. weather reading, and it seems that folks thought that the winds warned about were already THERE at 3:30 p.m., such that they were well OVER by 4:04 p.m. or later. I hear you, though, Bob. I do.”
I understand that you are trying to get a bead on, not what we know now, but what whoever was making GM’s decisions was seeing and thinking then.
To be honest, as someone born and raised in New Mexico, the daughter of a meteorologist raised in New Mexico (for whom intense conversations about southwest weather were everyday dinner conversations the whole time i was growing up), and a Girl Scout Leader, Camp Counselor, and later as a Group Guide in the Grand Canyon for ten years, I’m in deep agreement with those who say that any kind of thinking on the part of Granite Mountain that the wind change had stabilized by 3:50-ish (which is what I read you and xxfullsailxx saying) would have been insane.
However I also agree with you that IT SEEMS (via the consequences) that that may have exactly been what they decided/thought. Even after the 3:30 severe weather warning which said basically a seriously different thing. And even though, as they gathered there observing that fire and that weather, they were seeing that fire pick up steam and do exactly what that forecast said it was going to do. Why did they hear that, and then see that, and then decide that it had stabilized when it so seriously hadn’t?? Anybody that is from here, that has spent time HUNKERING DOWN during thunderstorms, which is VERY common, knows it ain’t over til it’s OVER.
As a lowly Girl Scout Leader, as a lowly Camp Counselor, as a lowly Grand Canyon Guide, as the lowly daughter of a southwestern meteorologist, I just have to say I would NEVER have done what they did. I am painfully mystified. I really struggle with this one.
Maybe, even in spite of that clear and accurate and severe 3:30 forecast, and in spite of what they must have HAD to have known from years and years of actual experience, something cut across all of that. And the only thing I possibly can think of is Rory Collins telling them at 3:50ish (iirc) that the fire would hit Yarnell in one to two hours.
But I still don’t know. Which is why I am bringing your comment from way below to here. What CONVERSATION are you truly aware of that took place after the 3:30 forecast that was about the weather?? And how is it that you are aware of it? Because, I truly have no idea what you are referring to, and I would really like to know.
And PS. I have not seen the 30 photographs you are referring to, but I can imagine that if they were taken from above the cloud cover, they probably aren’t particularly meaningful as to what is going on below that cloud cover.
Right on Marti. It’s dangerous for individuals to claim they know something about YHF without being able to back it up. I asked this question regarding the 1526 Wx and GM’s SA of it to EN a while back as well with no response…I would really like to know.
It’s not just dangerous, not to minimize that at all, it gets to be very disrespectful of the issues involved. Part of the game seems to be make whimsical statements, and then continually ask for more and more information (and therefore more time and energy) from people like Marti and WTKTT and TWARE who have just painstakingly laid out why your (EN’s or FullSail’s in this case) inane claims don’t hold water.
I mean, I personally still think GM saw prairie dogs and was concerned about exposure to plague if they remained in the black. I am relying on my notes for that statement. Anyone who disagrees with me, please state with specificity the sources you are relying on to show that there were no prairie dogs in the black and that GM wasn’t concerned about the plague. Have you exhaustively researched the NIH and CDC plague data in reaching your conclusions? I am always open to discussing this further…
Put differently, if EN has any evidence at all that suggests that all the weather forecasts, radar images, contemporaneous accounts, and fire behavior — which all seem quite consistent with on another — are wrong, and that the storm coming out of the N/NE was really expected by Marsh and Steed to be a steady wind straight from CA, then she should do the work and state with specificity what on earth makes her think that. Simply making that type of claim, in the fact of overwhelming evidence to the contrary, without putting forward any proof oneself, only creates confusion.
I don’t know shite about reading smoke. Sometimes I wish you would all get into some kind of conversation about what you are seeing in the smoke, so I could learn more about it. But, that being said, I thus don’t say anything about smoke.
What I do know about is camera angles, handling cameras, fixing time-stamps on images, how photographers do stuff, and also weather in the southwest (except smoke).
So I try to use what I do know to fill in gaps and ask questions of others in order to further all of our understanding. That’s what I am here for, and think others are, too. I have no other agenda.
Reply to Elizabeth post on May 7, 2014 at 10:35 am
>> Elizabeth said…
>> My understanding of those images is that they are consistent
>> with the point that xxfullsailxx and I are making, no?
Elizabeth… I am going to echo TTWARE’s comment above and say I, also ( respectfully and truthfully ) have no idea what the ‘point’ is that you ( together with xxfullsailxx? ) think you have somehow *already* (recently) made…
…but let me take a guess at a ‘summary’.
You ( and xxfullsailxx? ) are trying to resurrect the theory that Marsh and Steed were NEVER fully ‘expecting’ or ‘anticipating’ a full 180 degree wind shift ( despite what any carded/qualified FBAN predicted or anything they were told over the radio )… and that they somehow convinced themselves ( without bothering to consult with anyone else ) that the ‘expected wind shift(s)’ were OVER by the time they left the safe black and that they would *always* be traveling on ‘their new mission’ in a direction that was simply ‘parallel’ to the fire.
Well… if that’s the case… let’s ‘break it down’…
1) Marsh and Steed were never really ‘expecting’ or ‘anticipating’ a full 180 degree wind shift.
Horse manure.
See Brendan McDonough’s interview transcript with ADOSH reprinted below.
In short… Brendan CONFIRMS to ADOSH ( multiple times ) that just after Byron Kimball’s 1530 weather broadcast… EVERY conversation he had with GM Captain Jesse Steed contained FULL acknowledgement between them that the winds were GOING to shift a FULL 180 degrees ( Not 45, not 90… a FULL 180 ) and that this TOTAL REVERSAL of wind direction was going to be backed by 40 to 50 mile per hour winds gusts. Brendan said both he and Steed knew that was going to be (quote) “a phenomenal change”. Brendan ALSO confirms that Marsh was also ‘copying’ these conversations about the upcoming FULL 180 degree wind shift.
2) Steed and Marsh somehow convinced themselves ( without bothering to consult with anyone else ) that the ‘expected wind shift(s)’ were OVER by the time they left the safe black and that they would *always* be traveling on ‘their new mission’ in a direction that was simply ‘parallel’ to the fire.
Well… Brendan still won’t talk about anything he might have heard AFTER he left his lookout position… so there is no direct evidence to fully negate such a claim/belief… but based on (1) above and what they BOTH KNEW was coming they would have both had to pretty much have suffered a sudden case of ‘ridge blindness’ and/or both hit their heads on rocks to forget what they knew just moments before and could still *see* happening with their own eyes out there in front of them.
Look carefully at all the photos taken while they were doing nothing but ‘watching the fire’ ( and the recent crossfades between them ).
Forget about the smoke. Look at the FIRE… especially where it was CLOSER to them and mattered the MOST as far as their own decision making.
At NO TIME is the FIRELINE doing anything but continuing to head SOUTH and TOWARDS the mouth of that box canyon just some 4,000 feet away from the fire BEFORE they even started their ‘new mission’.
Also… ( again ) see Brendan’s testimony to ADOSH (reprinted below) where even circa 4:00 PM when the GM vehicles were being moved ( and supposedly before GM even left the safe black ) the FIRE was heading in a direct SOUTHERLY direction and ( according to Brendan ) was ALSO making those ‘easterly’ pushes simply because of a trick of geography with the terrain on the east side.
>> Elizabeth also wrote…
>> Specifically, I have copies of all 30 or so relevant images from
>> *above* the cloud cover (not sure what the parlance is), and I
>> am not understanding how your comment ties in with them.
>> My understanding of those images is that they are consistent
>> with the point that xxfullsailxx and I are making, no?
I really don’t see how you can think that some photos taken from way ABOVE the ‘cloud cover’ are going to tell you what was happening at ground level around that time, under such ‘squirrely’ conditions.
Even in the photos we can see with our own eyes… the winds were doing ‘strange things’ at GROUND LEVEL ( and at various heights ) and just because a wisp of smoke/cloud is suddenly blowing one way as it rose out of the middle bowl and was being hit by ‘crosswinds’ doesn’t automatically mean that’s the way the fire down on the GROUND was actually headed.
Smoke/clouds didn’t kill them. The FIRELINE did.
Again… LOOK AT THE FIRELINE in all the known photos/videos and in the ‘crossfades’ between them.
The FIRELINE was (consistently and steadily ) headed SOUTH
and TOWARDS the mouth of that box canyon from the time Brendan left his lookout post until the time that they all died.
The only thing that really changed during that entire time period is that it just kept picking up SPEED and INTENSITY as it headed to the SOUTH and filled that entire ‘explosive’ area.
>> Elizabeth also said…
>> I, personally, think the weather-related take-away from the
>> Yarnell Hill Fire is still grossly under-discussed.
So do I, actually… but probably for reasons that are as much the polar opposite of yours as that full (predicted) 180 degree wind shift was that day.
Now that we have the ‘video crossfades’ between pretty much ALL of the ‘photos’ taken from up on that ridge that afternoon and we can truly ‘see exactly what they saw’ during that time they were doing nothing BUT ‘watching the fire behavior’…
…it is even more inconceivable than it has ever been that men who were *supposed* to be ‘fire experts’ would have STILL decided to do what they did that afternoon.
As Brendan himself said to the ADOSH investigators regarding
his own impressions circa 4:00 PM that day…
“You knew that it was coming… ‘cause that wind…
a 180 degree wind shift… that’s a phenomenal change.
I’d never seen anything like it.”
** THE LONG STORY
For the sake of completeness… the following has all been posted before ( at least once )… but here is exactly what Brendan McDonough had to say to the ADOSH investigators about all this.
Several times during his ADOSH interview… Brendan confirms that BOTH he and Jesse Steed FULLY understood that the expected wind shift was going to be a FULL 180 degress. ( Not 45 degrees, not 90… a FULL 180 degress )… and was going to be backed with 40-50 mph wind gusts.
Brendan also states that this ‘expected’ 180 degree wind shift BEGAN just moments after Byron Kimball’s 1530 weather update.
Brendan also explains carefully to the ADOSH investigators that by the time they were moving the GM and Blue Ridge vehicles ( circa 3:59 PM and (supposedly) BEFORE Granite Mountain even left the safe black )… the FIRE was ALREADY moving through that middle bowl (quote) “straight up and down as NORTH / SOUTH”.
Brendan also carefully explains that at that point… the winds were definitely (quote) “out of the north, northeast”… but the fire was ALSO moving some to the EAST not as its ‘primary direction’… but simply due to a trick in the geography there and (quote) “primarily due to the terrain of that ridge”.
ADOSH INTERVIEW (1 of 2) WITH BRENDAN MCDONOUGH
August 20, 2013 – 1:00 PM
______________________________________________________
Q = Bruce Hanna
Q1 = Barry Hicks
Q2 = Dave Larsen ( Rest in Peace )
A = Brendan McDonough
A1 = Brendan’s Attorney Emily Dolan
______________________________________________________
Q1: Yeah. Okay. Were you noticing any – did you notice any change in the winds as the day progressed, ah, either direction or strength, um, or?
A: I’d say we had winds between five and ten. Consistently out of south, southwest and they didn’t shift until moments after the weather came over the radio.
…
Q1: So, ah, at the, ah, ah, when you – when your trigger point was reached, did you make that decision or did someone else make that decision?
A: Me and Steed had come to the conclusion.
Q1: Steve?
A: Steed. Jesse Steed.
Q1: Oh Jesse Steed.
A: It was time for me to…
Q1: Gotcha.
A: …to evaluate where I was.
Q1: Okay.
A: ‘Cause they could see – they could see me. They could see.
Q1: They could see you. And they could see that. Okay.
A: They could see the fire and what was going on after we had heard the – the weather transmission.
Q1: Right.
A: Of the storm coming in where — 50 to 60 mile per hour gusts and 180 degree wind shift.
Q1: Right. So you knew things weren’t gonna be good at that point.
A: Mm-hm.
…
Q2: Would you – would you take a minute and tell me about what you heard on the r- radio about the weather? As much of that as you can remember. How – who said it?
…
A: Steed called me and said there’s a radio – weather coming over. Cause’ this was at that time that I needed to spin my – and he said, “Spin your weather. Listen to crew so I can tell you what’s going’ on. I’ll listen to it.” So I did not directly hear…
Q2: Did not hear the – the – the weather transmission?
A: The weather transmission — not directly.
Q2: Okay.
A: That was relayed from my captain to me.
Q2: Okay.
A: That there was a thunderstorm coming in, expect gusts up to 50 to 60 miles per hour.
Q2: That’s what he’s told you while (unintelligible).
A: Yes, sir.
Q2: Could you…
A: No this is right after it came across.
…
Q2: At that time you got a wind shift. The wind is definitely shifted, were you picked up?
A: Yeah the wind has shifted. The wind has shifted but it didn’t make a tremendous push. You knew that it was coming up. Just ‘cause that wind – a 180 degree wind shift…
Q1: Right.
A: …that’s a phenomenal change.
…
Q1: And so you guys moved if I understand right, all four of y’all’s vehicles.
A: Yes, sir.
Q1: Okay. And, ah…
Q2: And can you remember what time that was?
A: No.
Q2: Four? Okay.
A: At this point, the fire is moving straight up and down as north South. It’s moving – it’s starting to come out of the north but it’s really moving east so that my way out is getting cut off sooner than theirs. They had more concern at that point for me and my safety.
Q1: Right.
A: Just because of the direction of the fire.
Q2: Right
A: So it was – the winds were out of the north, northeast but primarily due to the terrain of that ridge, it’s moving to the east.
…
Q1: So the weather was – and the fire activity was changing dramatically?
A: Oh yeah. Very rapid, um, like nothing I’ve ever seen before.
_____________________________________________________
Followup… just a few other ‘quotes’ about the ‘wind shift(s)’
from various other places in the evidence record…
________________________________________________
** From SPGS2 Darrell Willis himself… during his ADOSH interview and also reprinted as a SIDEBAR on page 14 of the official WFAR report…
“…it wasn’t like an outflow. It was pushing the fire in this (southerly) direction. It wasn’t a ten-minute bust and things got back to normal. It was two solid hours…”
________________________________________________
** From Rob Berry ( in his SAIT interview )…
4. Robb said that the fire did a U-turn on that day.
5. He said that the wind turn northerly (outflows) but didn’t know exact time although compared favorably with the Stanton RAWS when he later looked at the data. He said he could feel higher humidity with the outflow wind and actually felt a couple of drops of rain.
6. Robb said that the wind was “ripping” when it hit and remained very constant for awhile. It just didn’t stop. He said the duration of the stronger wind was also consistent with what the RAWS showed.
________________________________________________
** From SAIT interview with Blue Ridge Hotshots Frisby, Trueheart (Trew) Brown, Fueller and Ball…
NOTE: Documents all kinds of ‘crazy’ wind shifts going on at GROUND LEVEL after the 1530 weather update and Captain Brown reports soon after being able to feel the fire itself already PULLING IN THE WINDS ( and apparently already starting to create its OWN ‘weather’ )…
…there’s a wx update. Trew hears T-storms developing over the fire outflow winds up to 50mph. Brian hears NNE outflow winds up to 50mph, Travis hears outflow winds N NW up to 50mph all happening within 30min. Trew calls the 3 guys with the wx update. There’s a shift out of the west fire is going east and the column is starting to develop and then lays over. When the shift out of the west the column collapsed after the wx update only minutes later. When there’s a wind shift from the west, it then goes SW for 10 minutes and the smoke drifts off to the sth, Travis can feel the column PULLING IN THE WINDS. During this time Travis is on the dozer line. That’s when Travis tells Trew, I don’t think this plan is going to work, this is the 3rd wind shift.
Column starts to lay down, smoky, the split the helicopter did earlier, is now evident. Extreme fire behavior spot fire to the NW of them. Winds are howling, embers falling, instant spot fires 10 x 10 in seconds, homes going up, fire leap frogging.
________________________________________________
** SAIT interview with Rory Collins…
Air Attack – LDF – Roseburg
Interview took place at 11:00 a.m. 7/13/2013
Interviewers: Rocha, Kurth, Mike Dudley, Jim Karels.
15:30 Experienced wind shift and the flank turned and became the head going SOUTH to Yarnell. I let B(?) know prior to the shift to move to that side and start drops.
15:30 – 15:45 The fire was headed for Yarnell moving FAST to the SOUTH. They were getting retardant drops. Contacted Division A to tell them of fire condition and that they needed to move their rigs to a better location.
Q: Did he say he was in good black?
A: NO, he said the other crew was in a good location in the black and they were headed back to the rigs.
________________________________________________
** From SAIT interview with SPGS1 Gary Cordes…
1530 ( 3:30 PM )
– Wind event – collapse of column – fire shifted from flanking fire and turned to a head fire going SOUTH.
– Place evacuation order
– Heard of storm to the north
1540 ( 3:40 PM )
– Trigger point was 1 mile north of town. It was 5-7 minutes before the fire the next trigger point to get my people out.
– Spot 1/2 mile.
– Covered a mile in 15 minutes.
– Building a column in front of us.
1600 ( 4:00 PM )
– I watched the wind change directions 5 times.
_______________________________________________
** From SAIT interview with
** SWCC Meteorologist Chuck Maxwell
“I informed them that this was going to be mainly an outflow WIND REVERSAL issue on the Yarnell fire and not a rainfall issue. I pulled up the updated radar images and showed the gust front and explained its implications. Dugger checked in again with the Incident Commander Roy Hall who said they could SEE IT COMING.”
_______________________________________________
** From SAIT interview with Daniel Kight, DPS officer
NOTE: Daniel Kight was the Yavapai County DPS officer that was assigned to Yarnell with the YCSO Emergency Mobile Trailer Unit.
…wind shifted wall of flames headed to Yarnell.
PREDICTED winds, pant legs were Whipping.
1550 call to supt Yarnell was going to burn…
all hell is breaking lose.
Div A tells Rory Collins the other crew is in the black and they were headed back to the rigs.
Questions.
1. What other crew? Is he referring to a squad of GMH? No?
2. Who is the “They”, that were headed back to the rigs??
3. Does this indicate that Marsh was not in the black circa 1530?
Thanks very much for taking the time to find and assemble all of this. I hadn’t known about the McDonough statements as regards what Marsh, Steed and he knew and discussed about the weather. I think it’s glaringly clear that they did know that a full 180 windshift, complete with 50 mph gusts, was coming.
I also think some of your excerpts help underscore as well that an outflow boundary is not only not a rare or freaky thing that no one could see coming, but that it is also specifically mentioned (referred to both as an outflow and as a gust front).
It is convenient for those claiming that everything at YHF was perfectly reasonable that, hey, the wind shifted, and no one could see further shifts coming. Crazy outflow boundary, something you couldn’t see and that no one had heard of. Almost as if GM got hit by an asteroid — tragic, but nothing anyone could have done anything to prevent. Of course, that is all completely nonfactual.
Reply to Bob Powers post on May 6, 2014 at 4:47 pm said:
>> Mr. Powers said…
>>
>> As a division boss I reported to the OPSC
>> If things started going to hell I talked to OPS and they talked to me.
>> As a Type 2 OPS or IC I kept track of my resources and made sure they
>> were not in harms way.
>> If the fire started going nuts that is your main responsibility
>> with the plan for the day.
>> The line OPS should have checked with each one of his divisions and
>> discussed options. That did not happen
>> Marsh evidently was OPS only Division Boss.
>> WTF?
No. There really WERE ‘two paid Division Supervisors’ on active payroll
for the SOUTH end of the fire and reporting to Field OPS1 Todd Abel that day.
Rance Marquez was *hired* and *assigned* as ‘Division Z’ that day early
in the morning but simply didn’t arrive on the fire until late in the morning.
He was not sent down to Yarnell to ASK Eric Marsh if he COULD
( pretty please? ) be DIVSZ. He had already ‘checked in’ up at the ICP
and already WAS DIVSZ ( and was now on the clock and getting paid for it ).
DIVSA Eric Marsh got into an *argument* with him right off the bat.
Marquez was having radio problems when he first arrived down there
in Yarnell and so ( according to his own testimony ) he did the only thing
he could at the moment… he called up to AA Rory Collins just to try and
get an ‘update’ on what was happening down there on the south end of
the fire where he was supposed to now be DIVSZ.
Marsh heard this ‘conversation’ between Marquez and Rory Collins and got
pissed off. Marsh thought Marquez and Collins were just trying to ‘take away
real estate’ from him without consulting with him.
So when Marquez finally got through to Marsh ( following that ‘update me’ call
with Rory Collins )… Marsh had already mis-understood what he heard and
what was really going on and was already pre-pissed-off.
Everyone heard these exchanges.
Everyone used various adjectives to describe what they heard like ‘mad’, or
‘angry’, or ‘argument’ but regardless of adjectives… it was obvious that this
‘first meeting’ between DIVSA and DIVSZ did not go well that day.
Things calmed down once Marsh realized Marquez was not ‘dictating terms’
to him or anything of the sort… and all Marquez wanted to know is where the
western end of his (already assigned) ‘Division Z’ was going to be.
They decided on the ‘old-grader’ as the dividing line between Division A and
Division Z… and then Marsh actually calmly ( and constructively ) told Marquez
that it would be good if he could find *another* way to get to the fireline in that
maze of dirt roads and two-tracks down there.
So that is what Marquez did. He left the Sesame area to ‘scout that out’.
Marsh then called OPS1 Todd Abel with ( one of his two? ) cellphones that
Marsh had with him that day… and reported both the ‘argument’ and the
‘results’ to Abel. All OPS1 Todd Abel wanted to know ( according to his own
ADOSH testimony ) is if the issue had been ‘resolved’… and he was told
( by Marsh ) that it HAD.
So now we have OPS1 Todd Abel (supposedly) understanding that he had
TWO active (paid) Division Supervisors working ‘together’ down there on
that south end of the fire… with defined ( and agreed upon ) Division boundaries.
But then DIVSZ Rance Marquez basically DISAPPEARED.
At NO TIME during all of this consternation was DIVSZ Marquez either
RELIEVED of his job OR assigned another one.
Marquez remained ‘on the payroll’ for the rest of the day as the OTHER
official ‘Division Z Supervisor’ under OPS1 Todd Abel… and supposedly
responsible for the entire Yarnell / Glen Ilah side of the south end of
the fire ( with SPGS1 Cordes as a primary DIVSZ resource ).
Problem was… no one knew where he went, or what he was doing, or even
really made any attempts to FIND OUT.
After that (private) cellphone conversation with DIVSA Marsh… OPS1 Abel
didn’t even make any attempt to FIND OUT where his (paid) ‘DIVSZ’
Supervisor was. OPS1 Todd Abel just continued to treat SPGS1 Gary
Cordes as his ‘Division Z Supervisor’ for the rest of the day and really couldn’t
have cared less where his actual (paid) DIVSZ was.
In his ADOSH interview… OPS1 Todd Abel said he never knew where his
DIVSZ Marquez hire was the entire rest of the day until he ran into him
face-to-face at the Ranch House Restaurant… AFTER the deployment.
So OPS1 Todd Abel DID have ‘more than one line DIVS’ under him that
day and actively ‘on the payroll’ all day… but he didn’t seem to care.
OPS1 Todd Abel also didn’t even seem to be the least bit concerned about the
confusion that might be causing down there on the south end of the fire.
Even when the evacuations started… Neither OPS1 Abel or OPS2 Musser
made any attempt to ( as Mr. Powers describes above SHOULD have been
done ) ‘find DIVSZ and make sure all his resources were getting off the fire’.
This is ALL fully documented in the ADOSH reports, including the detail
pages for ‘infractions/fines imposed’ against the employer(s).
This absolute MESS when it came to whether or not there really WERE two
‘defined Divisions’ and two ‘assigned (paid) Division Supervisors’ for the SOUTH
end of the fire that day was a BIG DEAL, according to ADOSH ( from a
workplace management *and* safety control standpoint ) and they said so.
As I said only 1 DIV. Boss The other was not active and it seemed that Frisby was covering that though not assigned.
They had contact both radio and phone Responsibility runs both ways….Right.
And I agree the organization was a total mess.
also without a Safety Officer the job fell to Both of the OPS to cover. Some blame belongs to Overhead in this mess and they should be held accountable in this mess.
Bob, I am thinking that your pal RTS/SR/Fire20+/Robert-the-2nd/whatever-he-is-calling-himself-here-nowadays can vouch for the fact that, with wildfires being dealt with in the WUI these days, it is *not* abnormal or unheard of for a WFF crew to go out to start their assignment WITHOUT a Safety Officer already “clocked-in,” on scene, and fully up-to-speed on the relevant fire and allocation of resources. Obviously, that is not the IDEAL way (or maybe even not the “right way”) to do things, but it seems to happen often enough. Is your position that nobody should be out in the field on a fire UNTIL the Safety Officer is on scene and FULLY up-to-speed on the relevant fire and resource assignments? (I am asking for your honest opinion – not trying to argue with you….)
I think everyone here can see that I am neither RTS nor Fire20+. You have a tendency to accuse posters whose views you find inconvenient of being other people, having accused TWARE and WTKTT of being one and the same, for instance. Pretty lame, but a good way to disrupt accurate dialog.
What’s with your obsession regarding this RTS thing?
ONCE AGAIN, you are negating the value of your commentary by putting forth non-factual, incorrect suppositions about people.
For you to start-off what presumably, is supposed to be serious commentary with this absolute BS, makes a lot of people not want to pay attention to the portion of the commentary that was the purpose of your post.
I presume myself and WTKTT will be getting another turn on your ‘hot-seat’ very soon, as well.
Elizabeth
You ask me about Safety Officers.
Safety officers are assigned to type II Short teams.
WUI has nothing to do with weather a SO is assigned to the fire. Teams are assigned according to complexity and number of resources from short teams to Type I full teams.
If the Type II team is a on call fully organized they come with a SO.
Type I teams also have a SO as part of the team.
Initial Attack fires do not have a SO also unless ordered Type III teams do not normally have a SO.
A SO is for the whole fire and not for an individual crew.
The problem with the Yarnell Hill Fire, the State slapped together a Type II team that was short several members. The entire team should have been fully functional at 0600. They should have had Maps and a written plan. Division Bosses and Safety Officer, Plans, Service and Finance.
The State cut to many corners I assume to save costs.
Again you can fight Fires with out a Safety Officer but the responsibility falls to the IC and to his OPS. SO is a position under direct command of the IC.
If a Type I or Type II fully implemented Team is on duty. They will have a SO. The SO will provide safety to plans for each shift and identify problems during each shift to the IC, and work hand in hand with OPS.
Dose that explain what you asked?
Also RTS’s fire season is in full swing so you probably will not hear mush from him for awhile and he is none of the other above mentioned people. Robert is Robert and I won’t divulge his last name as he requested.
He actually went to Robert The Second because when I first started I signed in as……
Robert (Bob) Powers which I changed about the same time RTS came on. He worked for me I know him and we communicate on E-Mail
He goes by no other name on here and he is busy hiring ,training and getting ready for this fire season in R3, He may not be on for awhile and I am sure we will miss his solid input. If someone wants him to jump in for input let me know…….
Ms. Marti (or Miss Marti 🙂 ):
What am I supposed to be apologizing to you for? I am happy to give you an apology, but I am unclear about what I need to apologize to you for…. Please advise.
While I can’t speak for Marti, I believe she is refering to this whole RTS fiasco discussed above. If that’s indeed the case, the apology should be going to RTS.
You are right and because I know him I am getting emails accusing me of a cover up of his true name. she will not apologize its not her nature.
Have you ever known a Lawyer to apologize?
After the attacks 2 months ago I gave up on Elizabeth.
I’m waiting for an apology to those whom you, for some reason, decided to publicly (and irresponsibly, and wrongfully, and thus unprofessionally as bespeaks a lawyer) accuse of being deceitful in their identities here.
Ohhhhh, Ms. Marti, if I were wrong, I would absolutely apologize to RTS! 🙂
In unrelated news, I am so glad that you are out of your “retirement” from IM, Marti. When you announced in February that you were leaving, because you could not afford to give up any more lucrative work to instead spent your time here, I was surprised. It is good that your retirement did not stick! 🙂
While you have ALMOST NEVER provided any of the proof and documentation that others have repeatedly, over time, asked you for, I’m sure you have the goods on RTS, but as per usual, you won’t be providing any proof!!
I’M ISSUING A CHALLENGE TO YOU RIGHT NOW TO PUBLICLY STATE ONCE MORE, THAT YOU KNOW THAT WTKTT AND MYSELF ARE THE SAME PERSON, AS YOU HAVE DONE BEFORE, WHILE CONTINUALLY BAD-MOUTHING RTS .
Since you aren’t willing to give RTS his well-deserved apology, you can instead give one to WTKTT and myself. If you don’t, I’m done with you, PERMANENTLY!
TTWARE, as you might recall, it was “Observer” and I who both noticed the same thing a while ago. Specifically, when a question was asked of YOU, it was WTKTT who replies. Presumably that means that you and he are the same person or are speaking for each other? Or am I missing something?
Based on what I read from TTWARE and WTKTT they are defiantly 2 different people
TTWARE Is a wild land Fire Fighter or a retired one totally based on his knowledge and statements here. WTKTT is
not a Fire fighter and has learned from us and his research If you have been here awhile you can tell the difference in their stiles.
since any discussion of weather found down below detracts from mike’s original points i felt the need to start a new comment… i am by no means any sort of weather expert. but like all wff’s worth their salt, weather plays an important part in what we do and it is important to be a “student” of wildfire, and therefore, the weather… and i recently spoke to a couple of NOAA guys about this very thing…
there was a distinct weather event that occurred called an “outflow boundary.” here is a link that describes it pretty well:
the nearest t-cells that day were miles away, and there is a distinction between t-cell “downdrafts” and an “outflow boundary” which can occur miles away from any t-cells and can effect a much greater area than a t-storm downdraft. in fact, a outflow boundary can be picked up by radar (as it was in the case of Yarnell Hill Fire) not unlike a cold front…
there is also a distinction between fire behavior associated with an unstable atmosphere, which is what i feel like Bob Powers is talking about down below. downdrafts, fire whirls, pyro-cumulus, etc. are all very localized events and certainly occurred that day. but what caught GM was the outflow boundary turning the fire 90 degrees from east to south with 40+ mph winds that they didn’t anticipate. and quite possibly, as the SAIR points out, they interpreted the previous windshift that changed fire spread from NE (which they had been watching all day) to due East as the predicted wind shift and then mistakenly thought that it was safe to flank the fire to BSR…
Since FullSail completely got wrong the SZ requirements, doesn’t seem to understand local conditions and vegetation even though he claims to be from AZ, has blown multiple other issues, and now seems to not know that outflow boundaries are not unusual byproducts of thunderstorms…well I have to wonder.
You get thunderstorms during that time of year in the southwest, and winds are likely to shift and be erratic. It is typical. For purposes of thinking about fire behavior, the key is that winds are likely to shift and strong gusts should be anticipated. All of that was known at the time Marsh noted squirrely winds.
As fullsail said fire fighters become students of fire and weather its in your sole. You cant always predict the wind or local changes in the weather by looking at the sky. But if you pay attention to the fire it will tell you a lot. When a fire becomes active and exhibits different flame activity its telling you that weather forces heat, humidity, and wind are changing the normal to increased activity. If the fire starts laying down then it reverses activity. cooling, higher, humidity’s some times less wind or a change in direction. You learn to observe those changes and adjust accordingly. If you are observant you don’t need a weather forecast to let you know what you are already seeing. Its something we learn from many, many days of wild land fire fighting. As fullsail has learned. The little indicators are there we just need to use them in decision making.
Reply to xxfullsailxx post on May 6, 2014 at 8:04 pm
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>>…what caught GM was the outflow boundary turning the fire
>> 90 degrees from east to south with 40+ mph winds that they
>> didn’t anticipate.
Wrong.
They had EVERY REASON to ‘anticipate’ what was GOING to happen and were specifically TOLD that this is what was GOING to happen when Byron Kimball made his 1530 PM ‘weather announcement’. ( See below ).
>> xxfullsailxx also said…
>> and quite possibly, as the SAIR points out, they interpreted the
>> previous windshift that changed fire spread from NE (which
>> they had been watching all day) to due East as the predicted
>> wind shift
Wrong again.
Your description does NOT match the ‘predicted wind shift’ that
actually went from FBAN Byron Kimball on the radio that afternoon.
( See below ).
For whatever amount of time the fire ‘appeared’ to just be heading ‘due east’ was simply the period of time when it was still just ‘rotating around’ due to the wind shifts actually announced by FBAN Byron Kimball circa 1530. ( Again… see below ).
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>> and then mistakenly thought that it was safe to flank
>> the fire to BSR…
Yes… that part of what you are saying seems to be true. They most certainly DID (inexplicably?) think if was ‘safe’ ( or at least acceptable risk ) to go on a cross-country hike through unburned ‘gasoline on a stick’ within 4,600 feet of an actively ROTATING flame front… but that decision cannot be construed to have been based on ‘incorrect weather information’.
The fire/weather did pretty much EXACTLY what FBAN Byron Kimball SAID it would do… in pretty much the EXACT timeframe he said it would happen… and they ( Marsh/Steed ) DID hear this (accurate) weather forecast on the radio circa 1530 ( 3:30 PM ).
Here is a a full reprint from a previously posted message that contains what Fire Behavior Analyst (FBAN) Byron Kimball *actually* announced over the TAC 1 channel that day at exactly 1529.52 ( 3:29.52 PM )…
**
** FULL TRANSCRIPT OF BACKGROUND RADIO TRAFFIC
** IN AIR STUDY VIDEO 20130630_153014_SEAT_EP.MOV
**
** CONTAINS BYRON KIMBALL’S 1529.52 WEATHER REPORT
** GOING OUT ( LOUD AND CLEAR ) ON TAC 1
This Air Study video is 1 minute and 10 seconds long.
Since the text notes that accompanied these Air Study videos say that the timestamps in the filenames actually represents the END times for the videos ( 1530.14 ) then that means this particular video STARTS at…
1529.04 ( 3:29.04 PM )
Since the VIDEO starts at exactly 1529 plus 4 seconds, and Byron’s weather report is at exactly +0:48 seconds into the video… that makes the EXACT time his crucial weather report actually began over the radio…
1529.52 ( 3:29.52 PM )
Here is the actual FULL transcript of the background radio conversation in this AIR STUDY video that captured Byron Kimball’s detailed weather report going out ( loud and clear ) over TAC 1 at 3:29.52 PM.
NOTE: There is no need for any ‘audio forensics’ here. The background conversation in this AIR STUDY video is CLEARLY heard by anyone with even normal hearing… and Byron Kimball himself is speaking especially LOUDLY and CLEARLY as he gives his weather report over the TAC 1 radio channel.
ALSO NOTE: This probably goes without saying… but when someone ( anyone ) says ‘EAST winds’ ( like Byron did )… that always means what direction the winds will be COMING FROM. This is industry standard practice when referring to ‘wind direction’.
Also notice in the transcript below that when Byron was giving his weather report and was CLEARLY warning everyone of the wind change and HIGH wind speeds to be expected… he was ALSO giving detailed information about the expected outpoint to outflow location(s). The video cuts off before we hear the rest of his detailed weather report… but anyone who was hearing it DID hear those specific ‘outpoint to outflow’ details from Byron.
AIR STUDY VIDEO – 20130630_153014_SEAT_EP.MOV
NOTE: This AIR STUDY video has been made public and is still
available in either Mr. Dougherty’s online Dropbox OR at the following YouTube link…
+0.02 ( 1529.06 / 3:29.06 PM )
(Unknown): (?) is gonna be with me (?) has to do and get
(torches?) out.
+0:14 ( 1529.18 / 3:29.18 PM )
(Unknown): Copy
+0:30 ( 1529.34 / 3:29.34 PM )
(Unknown): Task Force (common?) to Task Force Six.
+0:37 ( 1529.41 / 3:29.41 PM )
Byron Kimball: Operations Abel, Fire Behavior, on TAC 1.
NOTE: The responder to this callout sounds more like
OPS2 Paul Musser than OPS1 Todd Abel.
+0:43 ( 1529.47 / 3:29.47 PM )
( OPS1 Todd Abel or OPS2 Paul Musser ): Go ahead, Byron
+0:48 ( 1529.52 / 3:29.52 PM )
Byron Kimball: Within the half-hour, (pause) EAST winds. (pause)
Possibility of as high as 50 miles an hour or likely 25 (pause)
definitely 25, 35 gusting 40 (pause) east / northeast within the half
hour. Um… the outpoint to outflow line also ( will be ) located…
( At this point… both a Helicopter and a fixed-wing make a loud
flyover and the background conversation in the last few seconds
of the video cannot be heard. )
umm, i wasn’t saying that GM wasn’t informed of the weather event… nor was i saying that GM was erroneously MIS-informed of the weather event.
the point is, that there were no direct thunder-cells that influenced the fire behavior with down-drafts that day. nor was it a pyro-cumulus collapse that influenced the fire behavior. what influenced the fire behavior, was an “outflow boundary” which is very different than a t-cell downdraft.
nice ad-lib and speculation based on an incomplete conversation though… nothing you say above really negates my point. just because they “had every reason to anticipate” something, doesn’t mean they actually did anticipate (or interpret it) correctly. my description does not match the predicted wind shift? so… you seem to be indicating that you think weather forecasters are 100% accurate in their predictions? i would rather base my opinions on the resultant fire behavior (as shown on fire progression maps) as to what the winds actually did that day, rather than the “prediction.”
Reply to xxfullsailxx post on May 6, 2014 at 10:10 pm
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>> just because they “had every reason to anticipate”
>> something, doesn’t mean they actually did
>> anticipate (or interpret it) correctly.
Fair enough. You may be right.
Their behavior that afternoon seems to be far
enough ‘off the reservation’ that it appears it really
doesn’t seem to have mattered what ANYONE
thought or what ‘intel’ they received.
They ( Marsh and Steed only ) made up THEIR
minds about what THEY wanted to do… and to hell
with what anyone else might have been telling them.
I just thought I would balance out YOUR ‘ad-libbing’
up above by reminding anyone reading of what was
ACTUALLY said that day by FBAN Bryon Kimball.
He WAS right. Things pretty much happened just
the way he said they would over the open TAC
channels that day.
It’s important to recognize that a couple posters continually try to normalize every aspect of the decision to go through that bowl. Whether claiming they were going to be making good time on switchbacks and game trails, or implying that it’s reasonable to think one shift in wind is THE sole shift in weather with a thunderstorm blowing in.
In the real world, as regards storms, it’s not only not the WFFs think, it’s not the experience of normal people, or the way normal everyday people think. I believe everyone here has been in or near a thunderstorm and not been amazed when winds gusted and changed direction. I actually believe many people here have had storms blow through in places like AZ and experienced wind events more severe than those that occurred during a storm that was expected that day. Whether looking after the safety of your crew, or planning a picnic, betting on one single change of wind direction (even if that change had occurred as FullSail claimed it to have) would be a very unusual thing for people normal exposure those storms.
Likewise, attempts to divert focus onto the specific source of the specific winds encountered at that time can be very misleading. This was not a day with winds forecast for 2-3 mph and gust as high as 6 or 6, that got real breezy through some unanticipated, highly unusual weather event that no one expected or would have reasonably been asked to expect. There was a forecast that more or less showed up as expected. Marsh himself knew and said that the winds were getting “squirrely” up top. He didn’t say “the wind shift seems to have come, and it looks like it is now stable and to the east.”
3 or 4 posts on the web to implying that GM was relying on THE wind shift that already occurred (and implying that this was normal, and that subsequent winds were freaks of nature) can create a false idea that supports the nothing-to-see-here mantra of some. But, not what happened, and if people reflect on what to expect with that type of front coming through, they should ask how surprising it is that winds shifted in that kind of weather.
Hey – xxFullsailxx – thanks. I’ve been beating the weather drum here for a while, but I don’t know nearly enough (while you and Bob Powers obviously know tons). So, thank you – your explanation was incredibly helpful. (In return, here’s some help for you: Don’t rely with 100% confidence on the SAIT fire progression maps (or the SAIT/Wildland-Fire-Associates/ADOSH timeline or other random details (including the SAIT interview notes)). They are just not 100% accurate. I meant to mention this earlier to Bob Powers, but I forgot…. 🙂 )
EN, beating the weather drum doesn’t add anything but confusion if the weather drum you are beating has no basis in fact. The reality is, shifting winds given the forecast weather, that did materialize, are a normal thing.
What would be highly unusual and not founded on either experience or even the ability of short-range forecasts to predict specifics is taking the view that a singular wind shift was expected, and had already occurred, and that no further wind shifts were going to happen. Typing the idea, that GM reasonably relied on A wind shift being the SOLE wind shift, multiple times doesn’t make that idea hold water.
While some of the details in the various investigative reports certainly are questionable, the one thing that is not in question, are the timed-stamped radar images of the weather-event progression.
Yes. The SAIT contains a pretty good weather summary in this regard, starting roughly on p. 70 if I recall, and the ADOSH report does as well.
I also note that both discuss the outflow boundary pretty matter-of-factly, as is appropriate as it was not a rare component of the expected weather for that day. Likewise there is a discussion of plume dynamics and the terrain channeling that Bob mentioned. Thunder cell development was visible from the area of YHF. Other indicators are noted after 1600.
In terms of whether this anticipated weather was a rare event, it’s relevant that on the 28th, two days earlier, there was a thunderstorm that passed through with similar wind speeds. There’s just no “rare” there.
TTWARE, thanks for your reply – I made a new post for this discussion up above. If you don’t yet have all 30 images of the clouds, I can e-mail them to you. In my view, they are misleading if you watch them in a GIF (which is exactly the same with another progression video related to the YHF – it is hard to get a good sense of the relevant progression when you are dealing with a GIF, in my experience).
Whatever the reason behind this directed, purposeful effort, I would encourage anyone with questions about the weather caused by this discussion to do two things. 1) Read the weather discussion in the SAIT and ADSOH reports. 2) Think about the times they watched a front of thunderstorms approach from one direction, and ask whether they would assume a partial wind shift as a front approaches would be the ONLY wind shift, given what their experience has been with past fronts blowing in.
Actually, I should have added a 3) ask themselves, if they’d been told 30 minutes before that N/NE front arrived that the front would bring E/NE winds, would they assume that a partial shift to W winds was going to be the final change in wind brought by that storm front that was itself blow in from N/NE?
During his ADOSH interview
and also reprinted as a
SIDEBAR on page 14 of
the official WFAR report…
“…it wasn’t like an outflow. It was pushing the fire in this (southerly) direction. It wasn’t a ten-minute bust and things got back to normal. It was two solid hours…”
Moved this up here as I can’t type 1 letter to a line.
Bob,
I agree with the delayed evacuations being part of the story and that they could have been handled better. I really wonder how different the Yarnell evacuations were from the usual case, reading about other fires leaves the impression that late evacuations are not rare. Others could probably add input on this. I do think it was part of the general theme, they underestimated the fire and played catch-up all day. However, their underestimating the fire still should not have resulted in the GMHS getting killed. The firefighters most in danger from this were the ones on the edge of Glen Ilah, at the head of the fire that afternoon. GM was out in left field – in the black – and walked into the path of the fire. Yes they could have pulled out GM earlier, feeling that their work was futile, but was there any urgency to do so? In the black, they should have been safe.
SR –
My questions are not meant to be either tricky or even argumentative. You have been looking at this fire for months. Catch phrases from the report such as lack of risk management or operational oversight really do not add understanding. In your own words, what did the fire command do that they should not have done or what did they not do that they should have done? If you believe their decisions were a major factor in the deaths of the GMHS (as ADOSH does) you should be able to answer those questions. I do believe there has been a tendency to say fire command should have made sure that the GMHS were safe. But who was better able to assess the safety implications of any actions on the part of the crew – the GM overhead or the fire command?
what some people in this commentary don’t seem to understand (and especially those with no first hand experience of wildland fire operations over the last ten years in and around WUI) is that the Yarnell Fire was the perfect shit-storm of complicating factors…
-extremely dry fuel conditions with heavy fuel loading…
-a lightning start fire within close proximity to three communities…
-three communities who hadn’t prepared for the inevitable…
-a weather event that occurred (as was expected) in the middle of the burn period…
-an incoming IMT trying to transition…
…all happening within a 12 hour period. i am not saying that this event was unprecedented, but it is a situation that is nearly impossible to manage well. and easy, in hindsight, to hyper-analyze what could have been done better.
what is ironic about the ADOSH fines (and i think this is what mike is saying) is that the very people it says were actually put in harms way will in no way be “compensated” (nor do i think they should be. they were just doing their jobs and had the same choice GM did to refuse risk, i am just explaining one example of why the ADOSH report is out of touch with reality)… GM was in the safest position of anyone that day. as mike said, they made the conscious decision to leave their assignment and try to walk out. i think the ADOSH fines are simply an attempt to “right the wrong” for the City of Prescott, who failed to properly cover their employees with appropriate death benefits.
xxFullsailxx – one small point: You make reference above to “a weather event that occurred (as was expected) in the middle of the burn period…”
My understanding is that the weather event that was “expected… in the middle of the burn period” did not actually occur “as was expected.” My current-and-still-grossly-incomplete impression (based on the research I am currently doing) is that GM got screwed by fire induced weather far more than any predicted outflow from the thunder cells (that, according to the IMET, fell apart). This weather business is difficult for me to research, so anyone who knows anything about fire-induced-weather is welcome to e-mail me at [email protected]. That said, I have done enough research to date to feel comfortable sharing my above comment.
(In case WTKTT or whomever wants “links” or sources, allow me to state up-front that my sources are my pages and pages and pages of notes, largely hand-written.)
EN, you again would do well to get competent sources instead of the ones you seem to be relying on. Unless there is something I don’t full understand. GM themselves noted squirelly winds. Wind shifts and gust during forecast thunderstorms are a fact of life. 50 mph gusts in the southwest that time of year aren’t particularly newsworthy.
On top of that the fire had fire swirls or wind devils which are directly related to down draft winds and heat. It takes a good sized area of fire to create its own weather. Around 10,000 acres plus igniting rapidly to create fire induced weather or wind. It may have happened in the canyon the crew was in based on the way the fire hit it and spread rapidly with extreme heat like a blow torch.
There was a natural chimney, heavy fuels, a large fire head pushed by wind, with a upslope condition. Any fire above the crew would be sucked down to the fire at the mouth of the canyon causing area combustion. A large combination of factors fell into place where they were. At that point similar to the Loope Fire in 1966 in California. The Chimney effect can be devastating. It also is predictable if you pay attention.
Bob, I am with you. Are you saying, Bob, that if the fire ran up the two-track to the saddle and reached the “descent point” on the ridge, that *THAT* fire could then PULL a spot up through the valley, essentially like a funnel or chimney? (I am sure I am articulating this poorly, but hopefully you can envision what I am saying.)
Not sure what you meant by valley. The canyon the crew was caught in if the fire actually was above them as the fire spread map showed it would have been affected by the fire at the mouth of the canyon that the crew was faced with. Thus creating its own force pulling the fire from both directions. It is a possible scenario based on the way the fire burned. The map showed fire above the crew before the fire below them exploded into the canyon it did not run around them and up to the saddle first
if that was what you were asking. Take a look at the progression charts if they can be believed or are accurate the fire was also burning above them near the heal of the fire while the fire covered the mouth of the canyon. It is like a backfire being pulled to the main fire. Make science?
I have to agree with you on the above, My only concern was the lack of direction by the OPS in not talking to Marsh About the situation and make a clearer decision on staying in the black. I do think the Overhead had some blame in supervision how much is debatable. The Fire had 2 OPS that seemed to cause some confusion as to who was working for who. When the fire broke loose and compromised GM line at around 1530 the crew should have been pulled from there assignment by the OPS or IC. Some one should have been talking to them, They were safe in the Black no dought about that. So simply tell them to stay until we can get you off the mountain. We being the fire command. No less responsible were the crew leaders, and communication with the overhead before moving off the fire.
As in the past and for years the problem with compensation for seasonal’s is terrible. $25,000 is not going to sustain a wife and 4 kids, so you will see lawsuits in this day and age.
Bob- the reason why IHC’s are ordered for a situation like Yarnell Hill Fire is because they are expected to make smart decisions, independently, without having to be “looked upon” when shit goes wonky.
the OSC’s had their bases covered by assigning Marsh as Div. Sup. OSC’s don’t provide for LCES, the line overhead does… in this case, Div Sup Marsh. the whole point of the ICS system is that Command positions don’t have to account for every single resource on the fire… because that would be unreasonable.
I totally agree with you except OSC and Division Boss’s should always be in direct contact with those under them to discuss changes and set up new plans if the original plan is failing. Superintendents like to work closely with good Div. Boss’s and OPS always likes to keep updated with their Divisions. At least it worked that way in my time, It never hurt to double check on safety when things started going south, you made sure your guys were good and aware.
xxfullsalexx
The OSC position under Incident Command System Is in fact the old Line boss position he is in fact responsible for and part of the line overhead and is as responsible for LCES as any one on the line and without a SO he is directly responsible for safety to the IC or Old Fire Boss There job descriptions have never changed just there names. IHC’s still answer to there supervisors, Division and OPS’s if there is 1 or 3 crews on a Division they answer to their line overhead.
Chain of command dose not go away because you are a Hot Shot Crew.
Risk management is not a catch-phrase. If you have read the report accompanying the ADOSH findings, you have already seen a detailed discussion of risk management. Basically, if it’s clear all day that the tactics you started the day with will not be successful given fire behavior, and you never reevaluate those tactics and continue to expose people to risk, it’s a problem. With poor risk management, you leave everyone more susceptible to stupid things happening.
Part of management is understanding that everyone underneath you will not always make perfect decisions. It is almost a given that if managers don’t stay mindful of what their resources are up to, or worse commit them in ways bound to not work, and then don’t pay much attention after that, that sooner or later bad things will happen. GM’s lookout is a good example of this that happened before the burnover, though fortunately with a happy ending.
I’d suggest you go back and re-read the report and state with specificity which part of the risk management discussion and discussions of operational oversight and communications you feel are in error. For instance, I note for communications that management has the ability to cause communication to happen. The fact that GM may have had a history of being close-mouthed as to crew movements and did not specifically reach out to disclose what they were doing clearly was an issue, but operations could have stepped in and asked for communication. If you get only partial communication, as a manager you’re fully able to ask for full communication.
This actually is a good example of what Putnam talks about in saying the 10 are used to put all blame on crews. Yes, GM could have communicated better. And should have. But, it’s a two-way street.
Managers get fired in business all the time for mistakes made by employees that the manager didn’t know about, if the manager didn’t show sufficient oversight.
In regards to your comment ot SR above, one management specific I can point to is the (State budget influenced?) call for a Type II Short Team after the fire had already been deemed a threat to Yarnell.
The negative effects of that decision were immediately compounded by the Short Team’s inability to bring to the table the necessary critical components of a ‘Short Team’, which included no Safety Officer or Planning Chief (who were both scheduled to arrived long after the fire had gone Type I).
It can certainly be argued as to whether or not having these key indivduals on-scene might have changed the outcome of the tragedy. One thing is certain though, having a full team there in a timely manner, would have produced a more positive impact on the firefight that day.
One further example along these lines is taking the time — about 30 seconds — to discuss with each crew whether they have LCES in place. Saying “we’ll escape by bushwhacking down the unscouted bowl to the BSR” likely wouldn’t have been viewed as acceptable. But that conversation never happened, either earlier when it should have, or when people heard that GM was moving and some became concerned that where they were made no sense.
Likewise, TWARE accurately pointed out that the BSR was a fail as an SZ. It seems no one, throughout the day, had a conversation with GM where they formally discussed the black qualifying as a SZ. It did, and they should have stayed committed to it. Failure to have that conversation earlier may not have been a central cause of what happened next. But, when a crew says it’s abandoning its SZ and proceeding down its escape route to another SZ, that would have been a logical moment for 15 seconds of mindful conversation as to the what and why and where implied by that statement. As in, Why did the black become unsafe? Why are you moving? Where is your escape route? Which SZ are you moving to, and do you know it’s a good SZ?
Again the crew is responsible for there safety.
If they are ask to do something that is unsafe they have the right to refuse. When Crew fail to use the 10 SO then they don’t follow the rules so yes as Putnam says the crews are blamed which they should be.
We go back and back again the crews safety is the responsibility of ????? “their crew supervisors.”
Let’s suppose there HAD been a clear statement by GM that they were going to bushwhack down to the BSR, for instance.
Should ops be off the hook in that case, because, well, GM is responsible for their safety, so people are free to sit back and let them do something they clearly shouldn’t be doing? To be clear, this is a hypothetical. What happened seems on evidence more to be a failure to supervise include a failure to force communication that wasn’t really sought by GM. But, it is part of management and a failure that management can and should be accountable for.
Again this is the perspective of a non-WFF. Much of what is suggested above could have been done in theory, but just does not sound real world to me. With the fire blowing up and fire command worrying about citizens in Yarnell, moving resources. coordinating firefighting efforts (including air) and worrying about getting additional resources to Yarnell, the idea that fire command would be asking any group of hotshots if they have a lookout or any escape route seems to be a little hard to expect. Maybe this would have been the role of a safety officer (my lack of knowledge) and if so would argue that the Type 2 short crew was an issue. But I have to believe it is generally assumed that hotshot crews take care of those matters. They are highly trained and Granite Mountain’s overhead was not green (at least Marsh and Steed). I do not think that fire command really sees its role as a mother hen.
Yes managers do get fired AT TIMES for the actions of their employees. But the fire command – hotshot crew relationship is not a typical employer-employee relationship. They are thrown together for a few hours or days on a fire, each with specific, defined roles. The fire command is not responsible for the crew’s training, providing their equipment etc – all the things that exist in a normal manager-employee relationship. Most importantly, hotshot crews are taught and expected to accept that their safety is THEIR responsibility. They choose their SZ’s, they choose their escape routes, they can turn down risk etc. Fire command does not have the “eyes” to make those decisions for a hotshot crew, which is why safety is a crew responsibility. So while it may seem that “blaming the crew” is what fire managers do to escape responsibility, it really just flows from the nature of the job. It sucks, but it is what it is.
The responsibility rests solely with the crew line is just that, a line. Not the way it works. FWIW many people can and do require crews to report on LCES, which is a helpful and reasonable thing to do. And, not a meaningful time intrusion. It does force mindfulness of LCES.
Let’s look at part of the hidden aspect of “blame the crew.” Lowly paid seasonal employees are a dime a dozen — they may be integral parts of their communities, and great people, but it’s easy to hire more. And, they tend to not be that influential. Kind of like ski patrollers in the winter. If an accident happens to one of them, to take the view the responsibility must stay at the crew level, and not go up the line the way it always does in quality organizations, is very convenient. More-senior people do have decent salaries, other perks, and a good number of social and professional chits that they’ve accumulated. Are they really supposed to enjoy all those perks, and then if they don’t perform well in a management role, bear none of the responsibility for accidents that result? That seems to be what people are asserting.
Steed and Marsh were not seasonal -they were full time. Management should be held accountable if they are at fault, not because they get “perks”. Management clearly could have done things better on this fire, that is why you go back and review what you did. But the case to blame fire command as the primary cause for the deaths of the GMHS I think is really quite weak. They did not pull them out (could have, but not necessary for safety). They did not tell them to stay put (actually Abel did it appears). No safety officer (yes they serve a role, but should the GMHS have needed a safety officer to tell them not to go into the canyon).
Simple fact is the GMHS made a mistake. If they had announced to the world their plan, including the route, yes fire command should have aborted it. But it appears that even if fire command was aware of their movement (and this remains very uncertain), they were not aware of the route. I suspect they never dreamed they would go through the canyon. So really were they obligated to tell them not to do so?
13 of the GM dead were seasonal. 6 in total were full-time. It is a tad convenient to say all responsibility stops at the crew level. Many of the crew were not even in a position, necessarily, to know that some things weren’t in place safety-wise that needed to be. You have a medical background it seems, would you put it solely on a junior nurse to stand up to a surgeon who was doing something unsafe, or would you ask hospital administrators to also have a few check and balances in place? Including bearing some responsibility if a major case of malpractice happens?
Lax management creates an environment that allows safety violations. Again, had someone asked Marsh in the morning what his escape route and SZ were, the whole bushwhack and burnover may have been avoided. Lax management was not a sufficient cause for the burnover, for sure, but that simple conversation could have nipped it in the bud.
As a division boss I reported to the OPSC if things started going to hell I talked to OPS and they talked to me As a Type 2 OPS or IC I kept track of my resources and made sure they were not in harms way if the fire started going nuts that is your main responsibility with the plan for the day. the line OPS should have checked with each one of his divisions and discussed options. That did not happen
Marsh evidently was OPS only Division Boss. WTF
Not going to make light of communication, it is usually a good thing. But the leap about having a conversation about a SZ and escape route in the morning and preventing the burnover in the afternoon is mighty large. The walk through the canyon apparently was adlibbed, so how in the heck would the morning talk changed that. Even ADOSH does not suggest fire command knew anything about the walk through the canyon, we have no idea if Marsh had even thought about that route in the morning.
Marsh said he was going down his escape route. It’s possible he had id’d it earlier, and yes it is possible he was ad-libbing. Whichever the answer, if he’d committed to another escape route in the morning, he would have been less likely to identify another route as an escape route, as it would’ve then been an outright dishonest statement to do so. If he truly thought that a bushwhack of that nature was a legit escape route (which he may well have thought) ops could either have cosigned on that, or, more likely, suggested to Marsh another escape route.
None of the mistakes here are something like sexual harassment where someone may from the get-go have known they were doing something wrong and taken intentional steps to be deceptive. It is troubling to here that Marsh was big on crew secrecy, so he may have been aware that his tactics were often at best unorthodox, but that doesn’t mean he would have actively distorted information if a conversation were to have been pressed. That’s one good reason for people to manage by asking questions until they feel they are reasonably getting straight answers back.
For instance, if someone says they are abandoning an SZ, in essence, and going down an escape route to another SZ, a reasonable set of questions is 1) why abandon the first SZ at a time of escalating fire behavior, and 2) what’s your escape route, and 3) what’s your next SZ, and why is it preferable? None of those questions seem to have been asked. Not malice, but not reasonable care of a concerned manager, either.
While ‘everybody is responsible for their own safety’ is a true statement, enough is known about human nature to require having Safety Officers on IMT fires.
Safety Officers certainly can, and do, perform a certain amount of mother-henning when it comes to 10/18, LCES, and other proper safety practices.
If you ask, most fire managers would admit that they’re among the most important people out there.
Checks and balances help minimize the effects of human error.
mike- your perspective is a worthy one. i am sorry you’ve fallen into this futile argument with the yappy-dog.
the ADOSH report and associated fines are out of touch with reality. had the IMT evacuated all the personnel off of YHF at 1530 as it suggests, and allowed the fire to roll through Glen Illah, or whichever community it was pointed toward, with all the folks there who had refused to evacuate, there would be ten times as many lawsuits.
the only reason more homes weren’t lost, and civilian causalities didn’t transpire, is because of the efforts of the wff’s. again, as far as GM goes, they had the safest assignment of nearly any other resource on the fire that day. anchor, flank and pinch from the black.
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>> as far as GM goes, they had the safest
>> assignment of nearly any other resource
>> on the fire that day.
Until they didn’t.
The anchor point ‘assignment’ isn’t what killed them.
It was the ‘next assignment’.
Whether that was a *totally* self-imposed ‘new assignment’ or a response to the requests/urgings/directives of management is what remains to be fully discovered and documented.
Well, we know that there was a request for GM to come down, so TOTALLY self-imposed seems an unlikely scenario. There’s no sign yet that there was an order or veiled order for them to come down. Regardless, at multiple points during the day but certainly around the time GM made the decision to move and for a few minutes after, 30 seconds of communication that didn’t happen could have resulted in GM ultimately making different decisions. There are obviously large vested interests (financial but also professional) that are strongly committed to saying that all responsibility rests on people who aren’t here anymore. But, if the transition from IA and thereafter had been handled better — in line with what standards would suggest — there is a reasonable likelihood that the bushwhack never would have happened.
I still think critical evidence is being with-held. It could be that that evidence is not so critical. It could be that Granite Mountain made the decision completely internally, wanting to push their odds on their own, as they sometimes had done in the past. But there are chunks of that that still don’t make sense to me.
But if that were the case, if there is “nothing to hide,” if it is just them making a truly stupid and dangerous decision on their own, why was a camera that contained a critical conversation hidden from the chain of evidence, why are cellphones still missing, why are gps units still missing, and why are the critical conversations GM had over their crew radio frequency–obviously listened to by Brendan, and likely listened to by various Blue Ridge Hotshots, and maybe listened to by Daryll Willis, still missing?
WTKTT
Just reread your post on the 3rd.
the extra 9 or 10 min. could be attributed to the crew waiting for Marsh to drop off the top and catching up with the crew. Just another possibility. No evidence for proof but very plausible.
Reply to Bob Powers post on May 5, 2014 at 5:39 pm
>> Mr. Powers wrote…
>> WTKTT… Just reread your post on the 3rd.
>> The extra 9 or 10 min. could be attributed to the crew waiting for
>> Marsh to drop off the top and catching up with the crew. Just
>> another possibility. No evidence for proof but very plausible.
Yes. Still perfectly possible.
It’s GOOD to have an accurate timeline now for all the photographic evidence from up on that ridge that afternoon… but it DOES throw some new mysteries into the works.
When everyone ( SAIT included ) just thought that Wade Parker’s photo that he texted to his mother was *actually* taken from that ‘Rest Location’ at 4:04 PM ( and that that could be assumed to be the LAST photo taken at that location ) it seemed to nail down a time when they MUST have left that location to head SOUTH ( SAIR ended up saying 4:05 PM ).
The SAIT must have just done some kind of ‘test walk’ from that ‘Rest Location’ to the ‘Descent Point’ ( they never said HOW they arrived at ANY of their time estimates ) and it came out around 15 minutes, so 4:20 PM then just became their logical ‘guesstimate’ as to when Steed/Crew (plus Marsh?) made it to the ‘Descent Point’… and that is the time they ‘published’ in the SAIR.
Now that the ONLY *actual* proof as to the what TIME they were STILL at that ‘Rest Location’ and taking all those photos/videos is Christopher’s final cellphone image ( IMG_2738 taken at exactly 3:55.31 PM )… there are now 9 to 10 minutes ‘unaccounted for’ and we really have no proof WHAT was happening during that time.
Personally?… I think if they HAD just sat there at that ‘Rest Location’ for 9 or 10 more minutes just waiting for Marsh to ‘arrive’ there BEFORE heading SOUTH…
…I simply think we would be seeing MORE PHOTOS with timestamps in the 3:55 to 4:04 PM timeframe.
They would have had nothing else to do for those extra 9 or 10 minutes ( waiting for Marsh ) than to just keep doing exactly what they had been doing ( taking lots of pictures of the fire ).
Somehow… I believe the fact that all the ‘picture taking’ abruptly ENDS with Christopher’s IMG_2738 at exactly 3:55.31 PM means something.
I believe it *means* ( at the very least ) that 3:56 PM is then about the time Steed ‘announced’ something like “gaggle up, boys… we’re leaving”… and they did, in fact, leave that ‘Rest Location’ then.
Now… whether they just moved those few hundred feet to the
southwest to the ‘two-track’ and began ‘assembling’ there on the two-track ( but still ended up waiting THERE for Marsh to catch up from behind )… we simply don’t know.
But the ‘picture taking’ DID abruptly ended at 3:55.31 PM, and I think that means something.
I still think Marsh was at the ‘end of the line’ of 19 men, even if they did wait for him… and that still has to be the ultimate explanation for Steed being the one to come on the radio FIRST with the initial MAYDAY… and only 3 minutes later do we then hear Marsh ( out of breath from running ) come on the radio saying “This is DIVSA… and I’m here NOW with Granite Mountain”…
…but when they actually left to head SOUTH ( and at what point Marsh really was finally ‘with them’ ) we still don’t know.
WTKTT… I agree with the point that it appears GM left the location where all the pictures and videos were taken circa 1556. And it appears that the SAIT was basing their timeline on the text sent by Parker and the incorrect timestamp (thanks ASAIT) on the power shot camera.
Could it be that the SAIT used the GPS information from Caldwell to determine not only the times, but also the route GM chose?
It does appear (to me) that after Marsh tells Bravo 33, that is exactly where we want the retardant (1637?), and it wasn’t dropped,; then Marsh didn’t transmit again until he was with the crew. However, I am not convinced he was behind the crew. If so, there is no way (in my opinion) he could have saw Bravo 33 flying through the middle bowl west to east.
BTW… Blue Ridge YIN says the first radio traffic they heard regarding GM in trouble came on Tac1, not A/G (tac 5)
YIN P 44 David Morgan Pilot 215KA….. he heard GM trying to contact AA prior to deployment.
Regarding the link to the Facebook comment. I hope the person that actually made the comment will speak up and share the information.
Calvin, I don’t know a lot about Hotshots, but I would bet my LEFT arm based on what I have learned over the past many months that Wade Parker was *NOT* texting and moving at the same time. Therefore, regardless of the time that he TOOK his picture, we can assume with some relative level of certainty that he SENT it at 4:04 p.m., such that the GM guys were NOT on the move at 4:04 p.m. They left AFTER 4:04 p.m. No?
Elizabeth. I agree, most people do not text while hiking on uneven terrain. And I agree, with a fair amount of certainty that Wade Parker did send the text at 1604
You know what doesn’t make sense? To accept as fact that GMH took a minimum of 10 photos and 3 videos between 1549 and 1556 and suddenly turned off their cameras while continuing to sit for another 8 or nine minutes and then suddenly Wade Parker pulls up a picture that is approaching 20 minutes old and texts it, when he could have easily snapped a current photo and sent it.
I think it is much more likely that Wade Parker actually sent the photo after leaving the spot where the picture was taken.
Regarding the facebook comment I have referenced (and the one YOU liked). It *seems* that there was a pause by GM (before descending) and a photo was taken. Wade Parker could have texted his picture at this point. No?
Elizabeth, follow up. It hasn’t been discussed (yet), but I would put the Parker Photo as happening before any Mackenzie picture. And also before the CALDWELL video.
In the very bottom right corner of the Parker picture, you can see a small portion of black helmet. I believe this is the helmet of Robert Caldwell, and he is moving down to the location where he takes his video.
>> calvin said…
>> It hasn’t been discussed
>> (yet), but I would put the
>> Parker Photo as happening
>> before any Mackenzie
>> picture. And also before
>> the CALDWELL video.
calvin… it HAS been discussed, even recently, and there is a video that pretty much PROVES that Parker actually *took* his ‘texted photo’ just BEFORE Caldwell shot his video.
That ‘video crossfade’ between Parker’s photo and a stillframe from the start of Caldwell’s video is here…
The only thing that has NOT been resolved about the TIME on the Parker photo ( texted out some 14 minutes AFTER he took it ) is exactly HOW MUCH sooner he took it before Caldwell started shooting his video there.
It’s hard to venture a guess just from looking at the ‘crossfade’… but I would say it had to be no sooner than about 60 seconds before the video… but not anything less than 15 or 20 seconds.
Do you see any better way to nail that down other than ‘guessing’ about the fire progression seen in the ‘crossfade’?
Reply to Elizabeth post on
May 6, 2014 at 10:56 am said:
>> Elizabeth said…
>> I would bet my LEFT arm based on what
>> I have learned over the past many months
>> that Wade Parker was *NOT* texting and
>> moving at the same time.
Elizabeth… I don’t know if the loss of any extremities depends on it… but that is a
fair assumption to make.
You are RIGHT to point out that the 4:04 PM
network timestamp on Wade Parker’s ‘transmission’ DOES exist… and will always need to be ‘factored in’.
I agree with you.
It is NOT LIKELY that Wade Parker was ‘sneaking in a text transmit’ while he was
ACTUALLY ‘hiking’ in-line with the rest of the men. It was not the ‘policy’ of this Granite Mountain organization for ANYONE to be using their electronic devices WHILE they were hiking.
Indeed… except for the odd ‘opportunistic’ shot like a retardant drop happening ( everyone gets their cameras out for those ) the ‘policy’ seems to have been ‘no picture taking, texting, or phone calls unless on a break’.
So is the 4:04 PM network timestamp on the text message enough PROOF that they didn’t actually DEPART that ‘Rest Location’ and head SOUTH until 4:04 PM?
Maybe. Maybe not.
As I said above… it is GOOD to (finally) have an accurate timeline for ALL of that photographic evidence from out on that ridge that afternoon… but the new *accuracy* calls into question previous *assumptions* like when they actually did LEAVE that area.
It is perfectly possible they DID *leave* that photo-taking location right at 1556 ( when the picture taking stops )… but it was not possible to ‘form a line’ in those ROCKS.
Their next ‘move’ would have been over to the two-track to start ‘assembling’ into a single file line… and I’m sure that’s what they did next.
It’s possible they THEN just waited THERE on the two-track for another 8-9 minutes for Marsh to ‘catch up’ to where they were.
Whether he ( Marsh ) did or not… or whether they got tired of waiting for him and took off SOUTH without him is still unknown…
…but it is possible that if that is what they were doing ( waiting for Marsh while lined up on the two-track ) that they would have still been in ‘break mode’ and it would have been OK for Parker to still be fooling with his smartphone and sending his text message at 4:04 PM… BEFORE starting the ‘hike’ SOUTH.
I’m afraid it is going to remain debatable, however.
Parker COULD have ‘snuck in a text transmit’ as they were hiking south… even if he wasn’t supposed to.
Regarding the time issue, the more I think about it as I try to put myself in their shoes, I think there must have been a brief period at the top of the bowl (1-5 minutes) where they were contemplating the “Now what?” moment.
As they trudged along the 2-track, they had no idea what the direct route to the ranch was going to look like from the top of the bowl. All of a sudden, they were facing a transition from an open path, to a brush-choked bowl. There had to have been some ‘oh shit, now what?’ thoughts and comments as they contemplated their next move.
My speculation is that they discussed it, and thought about it for a brief period of time as noted above, before actually committing themselves, which may account for some of the ‘travel minutes’.
>> TTWARE said…
>> Regarding the time issue, the more I think about it as
>> I try to put myself in their shoes, I think there must have
>> been a brief period at the top of the bowl (1-5 minutes)
>> where they were contemplating the “Now what?”
>> moment.
Yes. It’s hard to picture that ‘decision’ happening any other way. There have been times when it seems like Steed might have just put his ‘left blinker on’ and down they went… but given the circumstances that afternoon that would almost surely represent some kind of ‘heat stroke’ moment.
I’m sure, when Steed humped over that final rise in the two-track and the Ranch actually came into view ( and the rest of the two-track heading SOUTH essentially ‘disappeared from view’ )… he was probably shocked.
>> TTWARE also said…
>> As they trudged along the 2-track, they had no idea
>> what the direct route to the ranch was going to look like
>> from the top of the bowl. All of a sudden, they were
>> facing a transition from an open path, to a brush-choked
>> bowl. There had to have been some ‘oh shit, now what?’
>> thoughts and comments as they contemplated their
>> next move.
Most likely. I would even say the “oh shit, now what?” moment was (briefly) preceded by a few seconds of
“Are you f**king KIDDING ME?”.
Whether or not Steed actually got right on the radio and expressed either of those sentiments to his boss ( Eric Marsh )… we do not know.
>> TTWARE also said…
>> My speculation is that they discussed it, and thought
>> about it for a brief period of time as noted above, before
>> actually committing themselves, which may account for
>> some of the ‘travel minutes.
Your ‘they’ and ‘themselves’ obviously just refers to Steed and Marsh. The other 17 were just ‘along for the ride’ at that point.
If Marsh was not physically with Steed at this point… then ANY conversations about this ‘decision’ pretty much MUST have taken place on the intra-crew channel… and anyone who was listening to that channel at that time ( like Brendan McDonough, Darrell Willis, and perhaps up to 3 Blue Ridge Hot Shots sitting in the other 3 GM vehicles ) probably heard some/all of this ‘decision making’.
There is still one background radio capture right around this exact time that APPEARS to be Marsh telling someone ( like Steed? ) to ‘not be upset’ and Marsh then seems to say he’s ‘coming off the slope’ in an effort to get ‘catch up’ quicker…
…but that background capture has NOT been verified yet.
Even if that background capture ends up being verified it is obvious it was taking place on one of the open TAC channels, which itself would then be another mystery.
If Steed really was ‘upset’ about the decision that now lay in front of him and was expressing that to Eric Marsh… WHY would he be doing that on an open TAC 1 or 2 channel and NOT on the GM intra-crew?
Reply to Elizabeth post on April 30, 2014 at 7:53 pm
>> Elizabeth said…
>> There absolutely 100% *are* text messages and photos
>> ( from GM Hotshots ) that the SAIT was never given. The
>> SAIT never ASKED for them (to this day).
>>
>> WantsToKnowTheTruth on April 30, 2014 at 8:40 pm said:
>> I honestly hadn’t heard that.
>> My turn to ask…
>> What are YOU basing THAT statement on?
>>
>> calvin on May 1, 2014 at 3:17 am said:
>> Elizabeth. How many? Did the ADOSH investigators ask for
>> other pictures and texts that were sent?
>> ScottNorrisPhotoAndText.pdf says……(in an email from Randy
>> Okon to Richa Wilson)on August 8 2013……..
>> I believe we have received all text and photos from the families that
>> we are going to see.
>>
>> Marti Reed on May 1, 2014 at 8:43 pm said:
>> So….. evidence? Links? How do you KNOW that??
Elizabeth…
We are ALL still waiting for an answer here.
Did you just ‘make that up’… or do you *actually* have evidence to support your statement that there are other texts and/or emails from the Granite Mountain Hotshots on Sunday, June 30, 2013 that have never seen the light of day?
calvin… what makes YOU think she is correct? I honestly hadn’t heard anything about this so just wondering what makes you think she even *might* be correct?
Did someone say something in a media article?
Rumors?
…OR… just ( perhaps ) a *feeling* and/or *assuming* that
some family members *might* have had things they didn’t
want to share with investigators?
I don’t actually have that *feeling* or *assumption* myself.
I would find it very hard to believe that any family member
might have been *refusing* to cooperate with investigators,
which is why I’m simply wondering what this *claim* is
really based on.
Reply to Elizabeth post on May 5, 2014 at 10:35 am
NOTE: This is a ‘continuation’ of a discussion that was taking place down below
regarding Rory Collins ‘abruptly’ leaving the fire at 1558… but the ‘reply’ comment
space got filled up to the right-side. New parent comment started to make
room for more comment.
>> Elizabeth asked…
>> What makes you think the briefing Rory gave (as compared to the one
>> Bravo3 gave, for example) was NOT a proper briefing?
I can’t believe we are going over this one again.
You, yourself, have already asked for ‘opinions’ about this a number of times
before and below is simply a ‘reprint’ of ONE of the answers from March 12…
>> WantsToKnowTheTruth on March 12, 2014 at 6:52 pm said:
>> Reply to Elizabeth post on March 12, 2014 at 4:29 pm
>>
>> Elizabeth said…
>> Rory left the fire at 3:59 p.m. because the PILOT who was
>> FLYING the plane for him RAN out of time and had to return
>> to Deer Creek (or Deer Valley or whatever it was). That pilot
>> could NO longer be in the air, according to the relevant
>> regulations/rules.
>>
>> WTKTT responded…
Correct. ( Deer Valley is where the airstrip was ).
I also agree with your opinion that the ‘official’ reports ( the SAIR in particular ) did Rory Collins a huge disservice by not making it clear that it was not HIS decision to ‘abrupty leave the fire’ at 1558 ( timestamp according to SAIR report ).
That being said… there is STILL the following documented testimony from Bravo 33 regarding the ‘briefing’ ( or lack thereof ) from Mr. Collins that day.
Does THIS sound like Mr. Rory Collins gave them any kind of “proper briefing”?
SAIT Interview Notes ( page 15 )…
_____________________________________________________
INTERVIEW WITH BRAVO 33
July 9, 2013 – 1700
Interviewees:
John Burfiend-ATS Specialist
Clint Clauson – ATS Trainee
Thomas French – AT Specialist
Interviewers:
Mike Dudley, Brad Mayhew, Tim Foley, Jay Kurth, Jimmy Rocha
__________________________________________________________________
We had been there about 1 ½ hours when air attack on the scene told us he had
to leave. (1700 NM time). It was a strange change out. He just said “you have the
fire, I’m leaving”. Not sure if I was talking to structure group 1 or 2. I remember
looking up. Talking to ops structural group 1, 2 and ops.
I knew there was 2 structural groups. I wrote down 2. Tom said “hey dude, you
are the air attack”.
Didn’t know Division A was the superintendent of the Granite Mountain hot shots.
Air attack didn’t tell me there were resources in the area.
I never got divisions from the briefing. Didn’t know there were divisions. Thought it
was a Type 3 incident. I didn’t recognize Todd’s voice. I didn’t know anybody was
taking any action on the fire.
I didn’t know that Blue Ridge was there until we were home watching the news.
__________________________________________________________________
So, given these statements from Bravo 33, how can ANYONE say that
Rory Collins did a ‘proper transition briefing’ with these guys before just
bailing off the fire? Even B33 testified it was (quote) “a strange changeout”.
Bravo 33 ended up essentially CLUELESS.
If that is actually ‘standard practice’… then guess what (else) needs to
CHANGE (toot-sweet) in the WFF business.
fire20+
I hear what you were saying and you picked up on mine.
My problem with Putnam is that he did not spend time explaining his theory.
In other words many Fire Fighters not talking to him directly have formed the opinion that the 10 Standard Orders are old and not current for todays fires.
Like his question which one of the Orders is the most important or number one?
As I have said and trained for years no one by its self stands out they are all interactive and have a place at different times on a Fire.
Fight Fire aggressively but provide for safety first—The other 9 are the Safety Rules. That seems to have got lost somewhere with Putnam, at least that’s my take. LCES is good but it is only 3 of the 10 you should always be aware and use the other 7. I hope that makes science. Because of human nature I dought we will ever eliminate Fire Fatalities. Most Fire Fighters will learn and use the rules and that is a good thing.
Reference WTKTT’s 4/30/14 comment regarding Google Earth images, all previous satelite images are still available on Google Earth simply by clicking on the ‘historic images’ (1997) button under the picture. Any placemarks you had imprinted previously, will show up on each of the ‘historic’ images there as well, beginning in 1997.
Followup… ONLY ‘Google Earth’ ( the desktop application ) has the
ability to use ‘previous satellite image sets’. ‘Google Maps’ will still
just ‘default’ to using the ‘latest’ production set of satellite images
which are now ‘post-fire’ ( Dated January 4, 2014 ).
‘Google Earth’ is FREE!
There IS a ‘professional’ ( paid ) version available that has more
capability than the FREE version… but ALL versions of ‘Google
Earth’ can, in fact, show ‘previous satellite images set’ if that’s
what you need to see.
If you still need the pre-fire images… just download/install
the FREE version of ‘Google Earth’.
Just returned from 10 days in Arizona (mainly for a medical conference). Was able to spend a couple of days in Prescott and drive up from Phoenix to Yarnell one afternoon. Also did some hiking in a # of spots.
Couple of observations from Yarnell. First, any suggestion that the men could have dropped packs and “run like hell” is completely nuts. You do not “run” up those steep rock formations. A hike up Camelback Mountain in Phoenix will give you a good idea what climbing up a steep pile of rocks is like. There was no outrunning that fire. Second, driving up to Yarnell, even at the base of the hill, the vegetation did not seem particularly dense. But when you got near the town, it was much denser, even on the Congress side of the ridge. Finally, it has been mentioned that running off to the Congress side was an option. It clearly was, but the rock walls lining Rte 89 were so steep, it did not seem you could have gotten to the highway without going all the way to the bottom of the hill, which is 5 miles down the road (not as the crow flies). Maybe 89 could have been reached higher up in places, maybe Joy or Sonny can shed light on this. Still preferable to dying, but maybe that was why they did not want to fall off to the Congress side.
Yarnell just seemed grim and sad (made worse by the weather, it was cloudy and in the 40s). I did not spend much time there. There really needs to be a proper memorial there (the state is working on this).
Agreed on escape all the way back uphill. GM quickly crossed a line where this became a non-option, as going back uphill would have been even slower than their painfully slow pace down through the bowl. Steep slope, difficult soil, and brush were all issues. This is part of why I’ve urged some posters not familiar with local conditions to get that familiarity.
As regards options once entrapment and burnover seemed imminent, GM still had the choice to drop packs and try to escape to at least a better place to hunker down and deploy, among other possibilities. Unfortunately, burning out, which is the option they chose, would have required light fuels which they didn’t have. It should be stressed that none of the options in front of them at that point were good options. But, in terms of making good decisions, Putnam among others has looked at fatality fires and concluded that many would have been survivable had better decisions, and earlier decisions, been made. Given the terrain trap, GM may not have been one of those cases, but given their lookout’s seeming acceptance of deployment earlier, maybe GM had undue emphasis on deployment ingrained. The next crew in a position similar to theirs, where there is not a survivable deployment site, hopefully will be thinking about other options and seeking them.
>> SR said…
>> It should be stressed that none of the options in front
>> of them at that point were good options.
No, they weren’t. The only *real* cure was prevention ( to not have gotten themselves into that situation at all ).
That being said…
>> SR also said…
>> As regards options once entrapment and burnover
>> seemed imminent, GM still had the choice to drop
>> packs and try to escape to at least a better place to
>> hunker down and deploy, among other possibilities.
In general… it should be noted that to this day… NONE of the actual ‘fire progression’ charts produced by any investigative body ( SAIT or ADOSH ) actually shows that even a full minute after Steed’s first MAYDAY ( circa 1640 )… that their path FORWARD had actually been fully ‘cut off’ when Steed’s first MAYDAY went out at 1639.
To the contrary. All the ‘official’ fireline progression charts show that while the fireline was certainly advancing rapidly at 1640… it had *not yet* actually ‘cut them off’ from making more forward progress in an ‘eastward’ direction either in a mad attempt to reach the ranch OR try to cut more to the south across the floor of the canyon and make it into that draw south of the Ranch which exits out towards the Candy Cane Lane.
We also know now that at 1639… some time had ALREADY transpired between the time when they first realized the trouble they were in… then took the time to find a deployment site… and only THEN did Steed make his first MAYDAY call at 1639.
We know now that isn’t ‘over-modulation’ on Steed’s first 1639 MAYDAY call. Steed is actually YELLING into the microphone because there are ( at least ) TWO chainsaws fully running right there near him and he was ‘yellling’ as much to be able to hear himself talking as to make sure Bravo 33 could hear him over the saws.
So that really does mean a certain amount of time ( several minutes, even? ) had ALREADY passed between making all the decisions to deploy, find a good place, and pull ropes on saws to improve the site BEFORE there was any attempt to contact Bravo 33.
The electricity didn’t go off at the Boulder Springs Ranch until 1653 ( Page 70 of SAIR ) and that timeframe for the fireline actually ‘reaching’ the Boulder Springs Ranch is now supported by the Security Camera Videos.
Steed only said ( at 1639 ) “We are in front of the flaming front”… but even at 1640 none of the ‘official’ fireline progression charts show that to actually have been the case.
It would Marsh who would then say ( almost 3 minutes later circa 1642 ) that their “escape route has been cut-off”.
Again… even at 1642… no officially published fire progression chart shows that to *actually* be fully the case.
It was now (probably) DARK AS NIGHT at that location… and the smoke would have been reducing visibility in ANY direction to almost ZERO… so I’m not saying they could actually ‘see’ that they might have had other ‘chances’ at that point… but it’s still curious to note that the officially published fireline progressions do not fully support their own (recorded) perceptions of the situation circa 1639 / 1640.
>> SR also wrote…
>> given their lookout’s seeming acceptance of deployment
>> earlier, maybe GM had undue emphasis on deployment
>> ingrained.
If Frisby had not ‘accidentally’ come across Brendan when he did… OR whoever he had called on the radio to come get him blew two tires halfway there… then YES… it appears that Brendan is saying he would have ‘deployed’ as a ‘first choice’.
If he had then died… we would simply be here now scratching out heads about ‘situational awareness’ again but this time it would be about why Brendan didn’t really ‘consider his other options’. Just 1 or 2 hundred yards east on that trail was an ‘intersection’ with a Jeep trail that heads directly SOUTH to the Boulder Springs Ranch itself. Brendan could have easily ‘dropped packs and run’ to that intersection and then headed SOUTH and AWAY from the fire…
…but ( even according to his own interviews ) Brendan was totally unaware of that ‘option’. He had NO MAP… and no full ‘situational awareness’ of even his own location that day.
When your own ‘Wildland Division Chief’ ( Darrell Willis ) stands in front of cameras at the same deployment site where he just lost (almost) ALL of his men and says he has no idea what the ‘upper limit’ is for a fire shelter… you DO have to wonder if ANYONE in this organization really had a full understanding of the capabilities of their own equipment or ( worse yet ) were actually ‘teaching’ people to rely on it under totally inappropriate circumstances.
>> SR also said…
>> The next crew in a position similar to theirs, where
>> there is not a survivable deployment site, hopefully
>> will be thinking about other options and seeking them.
It is still worth discussing ( what the other options *might* have been ) and the ‘training’ should focus on that.
SR, your reference to Dr. Putnam is spot on. Fighting fire is easy, its the human factors that can get you in trouble. Better decisions & earlier decisions–BY HUMANS–should/could/would save lives. Unfortunately fatality investigations look at the ‘science’ (sorry FBA’s), 10&18 (essentially blame FF’s themselves), and continue to downplay managements role (go pick an entrapment lessons learned & read for yourselves) more intently than the human side of things. If you haven’t read Dr. Putnam’s essay ‘Up In Smoke’ from 2000–do!
Fire 20+
While I understand what Putnam is trying to put forth he is causing havoc in the Safety rules.
First there are the 10 standard orders. They are to give directions for safety. If you do not follow them then evidently you will asses fault according to each one that was not used that caused fatalities.
It is like any Industry accident there are safety rules trained and posted. If you put your body or extremities where they don’t belong and Die then the finding will be that you violated one or more of the rules. So the 10 Standard FFO keep you safe they also show what went wrong. To list the orders that weren’t followed will make fire fighters aware of the need to follow the Orders. Wild Fire burn over fatalities are not that common, that’s because Fire Fighters follow and use the rules. Accidents happen because humans cut corners and forget or ignore the rules. Train– Situation Awareness and use the 10 and 18 and you will stay safe like thousands who are and have gone before you.
If you read Putnam’s piece on the 10 orders, including his listing of the “Real,” i.e. unspoken, fire orders, together with his “Up in Smoke,” I think what he is getting at makes sense. Basically, recognizing that there needs to be some priority, and actual accountability. Certainly many symptoms of the “real orders” seemed to be on display at the YHF.
Key to me is Putnam really does want accountability. Some of his points are used by some people to argue for no accountability. Bob I think in part is saying he want there to be accountability as well. Some of the “nothing-to-see-here” comments in this forum reflect the no-accountability (and above all no financial liability) viewpoint, both as regards the obvious problems with GM but also issues like SZs.
Bob (and wtktt below),
I understand what you are saying about the 10 SFFO (which if they aren’t met–NO engagement) and not EVER getting into a situation where a shelter is needed/used, please know this, including researching and learning from other’s mistakes.
What I grabbed ahold of in your post was your Putnam reference and ‘survivable with better decisions’ — decisions being a human factor…Putnam’s essay’s are applicable from 2000 to now, no? And your reply ‘Accidents happen because humans cut corners and forget or ignore the rules.’…HUMANS..that’s all I’m saying, and again, the 10 SFFO, when followed, saves lives.
Also look at Putnam’s reference to Management when questioned regarding the 10 SFFO…when do we break them and when do we bend them? Could it be there is a possible disconnect between Management and real, attainable goals accomplished by FF’s in the current fire environment, particularly T1 FF’s? Absolutely, and/but please prove me wrong. Accountability is where it’s at, and Management doesn’t care for that word, trust me.
The 10 SFFO, are mentally checked by the Supt/Asst Supt, mitigated, followed, and the 18 are different, more flexible. Perhaps a flaw w/i the 10 SFFO are people’s (w/ different experience levels) perceptions of what they mean at extremely different situations/circumstances?
It’s a scary time…yes, like you said SA, train, talk, and don’t be afraid to speak up.
If you don’t mind, please expand on Putnam causing havoc in safety rules? All I have read isn’t current…and have you been on an IHC that has practiced mindfulness?
—-Reference to WTKTT reply—-
I’m sorry, I have read all YHF evidence…what I was speaking of was historical entrapment lessons learned, not YHF. You are right, Management’s failings ARE scathing, if only they’d of told the truth from the beginning…
I do think there were problems with the management of this fire, especially as related to failure to evacuate citizens, as well as the firefighters in close to town in a timely matter, coming from not appreciating how fast this fire was moving. There may also have been some mixed messages. But, specifically as relates to the GMHS ON THAT DAY (not discussing Willis’ relationship with Marsh or their feelings about structure protection), tell me what was fire management’s great sin? Fire management obviously cannot know exactly what is happening with the fire everywhere at all times. So was asking for possible assistance a real sin? If it is judged to be so, worthy of a giant fine, how will fire commands operate in the future? Will they be afraid to make requests, if they can be punished for doing so? Whereas the SAIT was unwilling to explicitly point out errors, I think ADOSH was an overreaction. I think they went in with the idea of hanging the fire command, no matter what the facts were. They criticized and fined fire command for not pulling the GMHS out. But they were safe were they were, so why was not pulling them out worthy of condemnation? But ADOSH took the view that 19 men died, so someone was going to take the hit and it was not going to be the crew. As I have said, ADOSH did contribute by helping to understand the timeline better, but I do not think their conclusions were any more supported by the facts than those of the SAIT.
Did you read the actual ADOSH report? They lay out the multiple balls that got dropped pretty clearly. Not all of those dropped balls even related to GM.
Given what happened that day, the fine wasn’t that big, btw. $25k per death, for instance, doesn’t pay for much these days.
I read the report. I also acknowledged above the problems not related directly to the GMHS. The main finding of the report as relates to the GMHS was they were not pulled out. As I asked above, given that the GMHS were safe in place, why is this criticism valid? Yes, the fire command failed to appreciate the speed of the fire that afternoon and they were lucky people did not die in Yarnell. But that should not have killed the GMHS. The critical failing there was that the crew did not ensure its own safety. Don’t refer back to the report. In your own words, tell me what was the “sin” of the fire command as relates to the GMHS that day – i.e. don’t say the IA was inadequate – that is said about every big fire.
I think it was Musser who once asked in an interview – given the situation that afternoon with people still in Yarnell, what were they supposed to do? Were they supposed to pull out and leave people to whatever fate befell them? We probably could argue a long time about that, but that was the dilemma fire command was facing late that day.
Mike a good team in place can make good decisions.
1. OPS could have been more aggressive with GM, Realized they were hung out to dry and pulled them out early. As there line supervisor specificly told them to pull back into the old black and Waite until it was clear to move that is his job.
2. Also a evack plan should have been in place and implemented earlier working with local Sheriff’s office Overhead cut that way to close or not at all a real plan.
I have said before this was a overhead nightmare that never got better. The type 2 team was never organized or really in control.
Failure to pull GM out early is far from the only issue in the report relating to GM. Serious shortcomings in risk management, and serious problems with operational oversight, are some of the standout issues.
>> FIRE20+ wrote…
>> Unfortunately fatality investigations look at the
>> ‘science’ (sorry FBA’s), 10&18 (essentially
>> blame FF’s themselves), and continue to
>> downplay managements role
Only if you (apparently) let ‘Forestry’ people do it.
The ADOSH investigation *VERY* much found that ‘management’ was ‘at fault’ here. No question.
The ‘summaries’ state that… but if you actually read the full ADOSH release and the ‘detail pages’ behind each and every ‘assigned infraction’… the opinions about management’s ‘failings’ are scathing… all the way through Friday night, Saturday, and all day Sunday.
It was not ADOSH’s job to ‘name names’. From their perspective… it was a ‘workplace environment’ that was SUPPOSED to be run ‘according to the rules’ by the EMPLOYER(S)… to provide ( and ENSURE ) *safety* for the EMPLOYEES in that workplace… but ADOSH found that was simply ‘way off the charts’.
mike- i continue to appreciate the fact that you try to gain more perspective, both by remaining open minded and relatively non-judgmental and not to mention the fact that you traveled to the site to gain first hand insights…
that’s worth ten-fold more than all the pages of judgmental speculation from the non-experts on this commentary. and much more meaningful and respectful to the deceased and their loved ones.
Sonny: From where we dropped off, yes, you could have continued to highway 89 without much difficulty. We could have reached hwy 89 as quickly or sooner than we reached Foothill Dr. where my car was parked. We did a hike right off the plateau that has a rocky and steep drop off for about appx. 200 yards so that could have been an option for sure.
Joy: Shed light. Hmmm. I am the one that wanted to go to remain on the 2 track ridge road towards the cattle pond near the Helm’s spot that was nearer to the car’s location so I never really gave the Congress side much thought until Sonny came back for me and stated this was a situation we had to get the hell outta—In knowing Sonny as my hiking partner and I am the desert walker—one true lesson in this is the value in his expertise and raw knowledge in knowing the terrain even if he had not hiked it or lived that area as long as I did. That man has a rare quality that you either get by “living” it all your life that you never learn in any school. I wonder what they have as part of the training for wildland firefighters because I am always going to be bewildered as to WHY 19 men stuck together to die while we SURVIVED that fire and WHY they went down the very area Sonny/I disagreed early that morning on the hike up. The area they died is the same gps coordinates to where we argued because I was not going up that steep terrain when it was still dark out knowing that tight maze like manzanita terrain in snake country and I was not going to crawl at dark time under it so he appeased me and went my way that morning scaling boulders around the base to the old grader road but it saddens me that there is no reason 19 men should have perished. I had the sheriff dept find me with their great gps program yet 19 men died and it is labeled due to heavy smoke and not able to fly in the area or we heard it was a chaotic afternoon and a bad thing happened. Sure did. A very bad thing! I hope clarity is reached in this mystery—that is all. As far as shedding light on the topic—what Sonny says is GOLD! enough said.
WTKTT….Can you take a look at image p0260 and help me find the Rest spot #2?
We do know that the group of GMH in image 0885,0886 and 0887 made it to the rest spot #2, however, at this point it doesn’t make sense to me that they are walking away from the Black, walking away from rest spot #2. It also doesn’t make sense that they would have stopped only a couple minutes away from rest spot #2 if that was the destination, at that point. And, if they didn’t access the two track to achieve the move to rest spot #2, they would have been moving through brush, right?
And I think it should be noted again, that all 19 GMH are not accounted for in any of the images taken from the rest spot #2. But I think it is now certain that Neil and Maclean got it wrong when they say a group of sawyers left the black at 1553 (referencing 0885,0886,0887), we now know Ashcraft, Norris and another hotshot/ sawyer (seen in movie 0888 holding a chainsaw) are at rest are #2 circa 1555.
>> calvin said…
>> WTKTT….Can you take a look at image p0260 and help
>> me find the Rest spot #2?
Yes. I will do so. Actually… I’m working on a VIDEO that explains
all this complete with maps and crossfades of relevant photos.
Stay tuned.
In the meantime…
>> calvin also said…
>> We do know that the group of GMH in image 0885,0886 and
>> 0887 made it to the rest spot #2,
Yes. Confirmed.
>> calvin also said…
>> however, at this point it doesn’t make sense to me that they
>> are walking away from the Black, walking away from rest
>> spot #2.
They are not walking AWAY from ‘rest spot #2’. That’s where
they are GOING. It was a steep slope… and there were other
rock formations to their LEFT that would have been blocking
a direct walk directly UP the slope to where the others were
gathering. It makes perfect sense that they just walked to
RIGHT at first and exited the camera frame to the RIGHT.
They were simply circling AROUND the point where
MacKenzie was standing there shooting pictures.
Pre-fire Google images show there was a ‘better’ walking
path UP the slope there BEHIND that point where Christopher
was standing.
>> calvin also wrote…
>> It also doesn’t make sense that they would have stopped
>> only a couple minutes away from rest spot #2 if that was
>> the destination, at that point.
You make it sound like you think they were somewhere
else when the ‘tools up’ order came just minutes before
that ( when Brendan left his lookout post ).
I believe that place where we see them in the MacKenzine
0085, 0086 photos IS the place where they were ‘working’
when that ‘tools up’ order came… but they were told to
‘standby’ because Marsh/Steed were busy with conversations
with Frisby about the vehicles… so it just became a “smoke ’em
if ya got ’em” moment… which these translates to “Photo time!”.
As soon as Marsh finished talking to OPS2 Paul Musser circa
1542 to 1543… that’s when ‘breaktime’ was over and then
Steed told them to ‘come up the slope now’ and join the others.
Steed didn’t even need a radio to do that at that point since
there were so close by.
If Steed was already right above them there at ‘Rest Spot 2’
he could have just waved his arm and called them up the slope
or he could have just shouted down to then, sans radio.
>> calvin also asked
>> And, if they didn’t access the two track to achieve the move
>> to rest spot #2, they would have been moving through
>> brush, right?
Yes. Probably… but the BLACK was right there and it extended
straight UP the slope and encompassed ‘Rest Spot 2’ itself.
It appears they just basically ‘walked the retardant line’ up
the slope a ways and ( in this case, almost literally ) had
‘one foot in the black’.
>> calvin also said…
>> And I think it should be noted again, that all 19 GMH are not
>> accounted for in any of the images taken from the rest spot #2.
Correct. There are a LOT of fella missing from all of these
photos ( and they always have been ).
Now that we know that Christopher’s last cellphone image
IMG_2738.JPG ( taken at 3:55.31 PM ) is the LAST photo taken
by any Hotshot that day from that ‘Rest spot 2’… we still have
to answer these questions…
1) Why did the picture taking STOP at 3:55? Is that when Steed
turned to them all and suddenly said something like ‘gaggle up,
boys, we’re leaving’?
2) If the picture taking session just STOPPED of its own accord,
and they DID, in fact, just stay there until 4:04 or 4:05 before
heading SOUTH… then why did they even wait those 9 minutes
before leaving? Could it be they were simply waiting for the
OTHER fellas ( not seen in any photos ) to arrive there from
wherever THEY has been working ( 1 or even 2 squads
from other ‘work spots’, or something? ).
3) Did Steed and the fellas we CAN see at the ‘Rest Spot 2’
actually take off SOUTH at 3:55 or 3:56 ( and that really is
why the photo taking session ends abruptly at 3:55 )… and
the OTHER ‘squads’ that weren’t even there yet were told
to simply ‘catch up’… and it really didn’t become a full line
of 19 men headed SOUTH until they actually did ‘catch them’?
>> calvin also said…
>> But I think it is now certain that Neil and Maclean got it
>> wrong when they say a group of sawyers left the black at
>> 1553 (referencing 0885,0886,0887), we now know Ashcraft,
>> Norris and another hotshot/ sawyer (seen in movie 0888
>> holding a chainsaw) are at rest are #2 circa 1555.
If Maclean is actually writing a book about all this… I certainly
hope he does his homework better in the long run than he
did regarding THAT “Marsh was at the ranch!” fiasco.
**
** THE ‘CUTOUT’ ROCK IN MACKENZIE IMAGES
** IMG_0085, IMG_0086 and IMG_0087 IS ONLY
** 80 FEET IN FRONT OF ‘REST LOCATION 2’
For all intents and purposes… what has long been referred to as ‘Rest Location 1’ and ‘Rest Location 2’ with regards to the MacKenzie Canon Powershot images are, essentially, the same place.
** THE SHORT STORY
The basic ‘center’ of that ‘Rest Location 2’ area where MacKenzie shot his two 9 seconds videos ( and his other photos ) has been confirmed to be here…
34.227515, -112.789960
The ‘confirmation’ of that comes from the absolute on-site verification of where Wade Parker took his photo and the fact that the ‘same cactus’ seen in all the photos is right there where it should be. That ‘cactus’ actually survived the firestorm that afternoon and can STILL be seen in even the current post-fire Google Maps imagery. MacKenzie was only standing a few feet to the right of this ‘Wade Parker Photo’ GPS coordinate when he shot his videos. Not even enough to cause a ‘bump’ in these GPS coordinates.
That ‘cutout’ rock seen in the MacKenzie 0885, 0886 and 0887 images ( taken in the 3:44-3:45 PM timeframe ) seems to be right here…
34.227698, -112.789829
That is just 80 feet ‘down the slope’ from the ‘Rest Location 2’ spot where Christopher MacKenzie shot his Canon VIDEOS.
So the Hotshots seen in the 0885, 0886 and 0887 images really did just have a ‘short walk up the hill’ when they left that ‘Rest Location 1’ to simply join the others a little farther up the slope at ‘Rest Location 2’.
Apparently… the only reason we see them exiting the camera to the RIGHT ( and seeming to head DOWN the slope and AWAY from ‘Rest Location 2’ ) is that was the way to go back UP because of the steep slope there and some other rock formations that are out-of-frame to Christopher’s LEFT.
They basically just exited to Christopher’s RIGHT… but then just ‘circled around’ where he was standing and headed to Christopher’s LEFT the few hundred feet it took to go UP the slope, around those rocks, and join the others at the ‘Rest 2′ location’.
** THE LONG STORY
Calvin… you are right about ALL of the photos you have cited already that contain images of this ‘cutout rock’ seen in the MacKenzie Canon 0885, 0886 and 0887 images.
There are also many others like 8 or 9 in Joy Collura’s Folder… the Dean Fernandez aerial photos, etc. etc. Many other Folders.
You are ALSO right that that ‘cutout’ rock is the same one seen in the ‘dead center’ of MacKenzie’s 8090 images taken from the ‘Rest 2’ location.
The following ADOSH photo proves that.
NOTE: It is NOT in the ADOSH GPS stamped folder… it’s in the OTHER one.
The ‘cutout rock’ is seen in this photo face-on at the top-center of the photograph… along with those 2 other ‘unique’ (large) rocks to the LEFT of it.
There is NO QUESTION that those are the same 3 rocks in BOTH the P9180060 photo *AND* Christopher’s IMG_0890 photo.
In the P9180060 photo… look at the top left side of the ‘chunked rock’ that is facing the camera. There is what almost looks like a man-made ‘chisled out’ indentation about 2 inches deep that when viewed in P9180060 almost looks like the little ’round balloon coming to a point’ that you see in Google Maps. The inside of this ‘balloon coming to a point’ shape also has a different COLOR than the rest of the surface of that ‘chunked rock’.
Now look at that ‘pointy rock’ in the exact center of MacKenzie’s IMG_0890 ( the one you mentioned ).
It’s the same rock.
We can’t actually SEE the ‘chunkout’ in the IMG_0890 image of it because of the new angle on it. The side of that rock with the ‘chunkout’ is now facing AWAY from the camera… BUT!… that same ‘balloon coming to a point’ chiseled out indentation is also clearly visibile on the side of that ‘pointy rock’ that we CAN still see in IMG_0890.
It’s also obvious in IMG_0890 that the side that is now facing away from the camera ( that has the chunkout ) is perfectly flat-faced… and this matches all other images of that rock perfectly.
* THE OTHER TWO TALL ROCKS THERE…
Now also look at P9180060 again and notice the OTHER two ‘tall rocks’ to the LEFT of the ‘chunked rock’.
The one just to the left of it has its own ‘notch’ on end facing the camera. That ‘cutout’ makes the east facing side of the rock sort of look like a ‘dog’s head’ in profile ( a dog with a flat snout facing the camera, anyway )… and that ‘crack’ that runs in that rock from top left to bottom right ALSO makes that top half of the EAST rock face look lke a ‘dog’s ear’…
…so I’ve been calling THIS rock ‘Dog’s Head Rock’.
In IMG_0890 the other two ‘pointy rocks’ to the left of the one in the center are those SAME ‘other two tall rocks’ seen in P9180060, just viewed from that different angle farther up the hill where they were taking their photos.
In IMG_0890… the other ‘pointy’ rock just to the left of the ‘cutout’ rock with the ‘ballon shaped indentation’ is simply another angle on ‘Dog’s Head Rock’… and the one to the left of THAT is simply the more ‘dome’ shaped rock ( also with a distinct crack ) that is also seen to the left of ‘Dog’s Head Rock’ in the P9180060 photo.
Those THREE rocks seen in P9180060 are just close enough in front of that ‘rest area 2’ location… and just TALL ENOUGH… that that is why they are seen ‘peeking up’ in the foreground in MOST of the photos and videos taken from that ‘Rest Area 2’ location ( including IMG_0890 ).
>> calvin asked…
>> Many thanks. Are the group of GMH (seen in
>> 0885,0886,0887) returning to the two track to
>> move to rest area 2?
They COULD have… but they didn’t have to.
All they were doing was ‘coming up the slope’ to reach
that ‘Rest Location 2’.
Look at the satellite photos ( or the Dean Fernandez
aerial shots ).
They MAY have just circled around behind Christopher
after exiting the camera to his RIGHT… and then just
walked up the slope directly AT the ‘Rest 2 Location’
and entered it that way…
…or they may have gone straight up the slope, caught
the two-track NORTH for only about 100 feet, and
then cut over to the ‘Rest Location 2’ area and entered
it from the BACK.
My guess would be the former. they just came up the
slope a little… cut over to where the others were
already gathering… and never set foot on the two-track
at all.
The interesting part of all of this is not really that they
were all still very close together circa 1543… it’s that
they were already ‘at rest’ and taking photos… and
the sawyers already had their SHEATHS on their
saws… as if they ALREADY knew ( at 1543 ) that the
work was over there.
That means the ‘tools up’ moment for ALL of them
probably came circa 1536 or 1537… when Brendan
left his lookout position.
The same ‘advancing fireline’ that drove Brendan off
his lookout mound and caused Steed to tell Brendan…
“Yeah… I know Brendan… I can see what’s happening
down there” appears to be the same moment Steed
knew to tell his OWN crew ‘tools up’ and that there
was no point in continuing that ‘anchor point’ work.
Followup… I’m still ‘checking it out’ and trying to verify… but I believe that particular ADOSH photo linked above might actually show the ‘orange rock’ that MacKenzie shows Ashcraft actually SITTING on in his 0085, 0086 photos.
If it’s not one of those ‘retardant covered’ rocks in the ADOSH photo… then it’s probably one just out-of-frame to the LEFT.
Actually… it’s pretty much verified ( for MacKenzie image 0086, anyway ).
Most of the ‘retardant covered rocks’ in the
fore-to-middle ground of MacKenzie’s 0086
Canon Powershot image are, in fact, sitting
right there in the same fore-middle ground
in the ADOSH photo.
Actually… whoever took that ADOSH photo
was pretty much just about 20 feet to the
right ( and a little farther down the slope ) of where MacKenzie took his 0086 Canon photo.
**
** GOOGLE EARTH AND GOOGLE MAPS NOW USING
** JANUARY 1, 2014 SATELLITE IMAGERY FOR YARNELL
This is just a ‘heads up’. It was bound to happen sooner or later… and a few
days ago Google switched to now using ‘post-fire’ satellite imagery for the
entire Yarnell area. The ‘pre-fire’ ground images are no longer available and
all you see now is the post-fire ‘moonscape’ with just some vegetation returning.
If you have any ‘Google Earth’ tours recorded… they will still show the same
waypoints and whatnot but the 3D imagery is now ‘post-fire’.
Actually… if you have a paid/professional Google Earth account there IS a
way to ‘dial back’ to previous sets of images… but it is complicated and
requires communicating with Google.
So if anyone has any sets of pre-fire screen snapshots from Google Maps
in ‘satellite view’ or any Google Earth tours recorded as movies using pre-fire
imagery… you should hang on to those for posterity’s sake since they are now
pretty valuable.
The DOWN side is that it is now basically impossible to ‘match up’ any
pre-fire ( or weekend of ) photos with satellite images based on anything
involving the vegetation.
The UP side is that it is also *now* easier to actually match up *some*
images based on the ‘rocks’ that might be showing. The rock formations
are now clearly visible in both Google Maps and Google Earth… whereas
some of them were being ‘hidden’ from the satellite views because of
the vegetation in the pre-fire aerial imagery.
The new January 1, 2014 set of satellite images also show something
very interesting. They were taken very LATE in the afternoon on a sunny
day ( almost near sundown? ) and this means the SHADOWS on the
ground are VERY prominent and can easily be used to tell the HEIGHT of
certain objects on the ground.
Example: There are some ROCK formations that can now be easily identified
because of these SHADOWS. If a rock was standing about 6-10 feet tall then
the new imagery shows a shadow on the ground of up to 20 feet out from
that object. So just by looking at the SHADOWS near some of these rock
formations it is easier to tell if they match the ‘height’ and ‘shape’ of a lot
of things seen in the photo collections(s) from Yarnell.
In Google Earth ( in 3D mode ) these new ‘shadows’ also supply a dramatic
effect showing just how DEEP those ‘blind canyons’ really were down there
to the SOUTH towards the Boulder Springs ranch.
There are actually THREE ‘canyons’ down there.
The one they died in, another one just SOUTH of that ( which appears to ALSO
have had its own sort of ‘hiking trail’ down inside it )… and then the final
one that actually contains the now-famous ‘alternate escape route’.
The TRAILS ( two-track / one-track / hiking path, etc. ) are also now actually
much more clearly visible than they were in the pre-fire imagery.
It is now EASY to see that the ‘alternate escape’ route WAS clearly ‘contiguous’
and visible at ground level all the way EAST to where it then actually turned
SOUTH towards the Candy-Cany Lane area.
There was a WAY to then turn NORTH and get to the Boulder Springs Ranch
through that ‘draw’ at the end of the EASTWARD leg of the alternate escape
route… but it is NOT ( nor ever was? ) nearly as clearly defined as the other
trail that simply headed SOUTH towards Candy Cane Lane after that
EASTWARD leg of the alternate escape route met that large clearing.
**
** UPDATE
** ONLY GOOGLE HAS SWITCHED TO POST-FIRE
** SATELLITE IMAGERY OF YARNELL
Forgot to mention this up above. As of today… ONLY Google has
switched to using post-fire satellite imagery for Yarnell.
Other popular ‘maps’ services with optional ‘satellite’ views
are STILL using the pre-fire satellite imagery sets for Yarnell.
Those would include…
Microsoft Virtual Earth ( Just go to bing.com and click Maps ).
Yahoo Maps ( Same deal. Go to yahoo.com and click Maps ).
So if anyone was working on anything that really could use more
of the pre-fire imagery from Yarnell complete with vegetation…
I would be sure to take your own ‘screen shots’ that you need
before these other services roll over to the latest satellite
imagery.
All of these NAVSAT satellite images for public use basically
come from the same company… so sooner or later all these
online services ‘get around’ to updating their production-level
data sets with the latest data…
…so the clock is ticking. Google has done their ‘roll over’ first
but the other online services probably will as well in short order.
As is the case with ‘Google Earth’… if you are using Microsoft’s
Virtual Earth and you have created any files that use ‘waypoints’…
unless you do the option of ‘playing the waypoints’ and recording
the whole thing as an actual ‘video’… then you won’t lose your
valid waypoints but you WILL lose the pre-fire background(s)
unless you SAVE everything as an actual VIDEO sometime soon.
The Google Earth view also now illustrates a bit more starkly why staying high also would have preserved several other options. Claims that staying on the 2-track would have inevitably led to the same result in the end are big reaches at best.
Yes. You can also see even *more* clearly now that if they had simply kept heading SOUTH after reaching that point where it would have been time to decide whether or not to take the EASTBOUND leg of the ‘alternate escape route’… there IS, in fact, a ‘hiking trail’ coming down off the other (Congress) side of the ridge that then ‘cuts over’ to the EAST where you would then eventually pick up the ‘continuation’ of the ‘alternate escape route’ trail as it heads over to the Candy Cane Lane area.
This is exactly the way the hikers Joy Collura and Tex (Sonny) Gilligan got out of there safely that afternoon.
Situational awareness.
It’s important.
Sometimes… it’s the difference between life or death.
WTKTT—
If some of you have learned nothing else that is the one thing that always stands out on every fire where lives are lost—-Situation awareness
Its the main ingredient of the 18 STSWO…..
It also illustrates more clearly that the idea that there were switchbacks and game trails that GM was going to be making good time on is patently false. As anyone familiar with local conditions would know already. GM’s decision to drop down into that bowl would have involved, for anyone reasonably familiar with conditions at the time GM made the decision, assuming they were in for a slow slog through that bowl.
Agree. We also know now that Christopher MacKenzie’s last cellphone photo IMG_2738 ( which he took at exactly 3:55.31 PM ) is the LAST KNOWN solid proof of when they were still at the ‘Rest Location 2’ point prior to embarking on ‘the mission’.
It can no longer be assumed that they ‘left’ that location at 4:05 PM, as the SAIR ‘suggested’ they did.
Unless the SAIT knows something that has never been made public, or unless Brendan McDonough ( or anyone else listening to the intra-crew around that time ) knows something different… we have to now assume they *might* have left on ‘the mission’ as early as 3:56 PM or so.
So if they really did leave that area circa 3:55.50 or 3:56.xx ( which is why the photo taking abruptly ends )… then that simply ADDS 9 to 10 minutes to the ‘assumed’ travel time and DECREASES their overall ‘rate of travel’ significantly.
The SAIT has never said how in the heck they came up with those 4:05 ( departure time ) and the 4:20 ‘estimated’ time for reaching the ‘Descent Point’ and then dropping into the fuel-filled box canyon.
We have to ‘assume’ two things, I guess.
1) They really did think that Wade Parker actually took his ‘photo’ that he texted to his mother at 4:04 PM… and/or that there was no possibility he HAD taken it ‘earlier’ and simply ‘texted’ it out to her while they were ALREADY hiking south.
2) They must have done some kind of ‘timed walk’ themselves from where they THOUGHT they left from to that ‘Descent Point’… and THEIR ‘guesstimate’ came out to be 15 minutes ( hence, the 4:20 PM arrival time at the ‘Descent Point’ ). If they ‘timed’ that walk from the other known ‘lunch spot’… then even that ‘test walk’ was totally WRONG.
Maybe they did ‘get that part right’.
Maybe they did a good ‘test walk’ from the right departure point to the right ‘Descent Point’.
If that is the case… then the ‘extra 9 to 10’ minutes that now *might* need to be added to the overall ‘travel time’ all had to be wasted either pausing at the ‘Descent Point’ and taking a long time to decide what to do… OR just add those 9-10 minutes to the ‘Descent Time’ itself.
If we add those 9 or 10 minutes to the ‘Descent Time’… then not only were they ‘bogged down’… they were literally ‘crawling’ their way down to the bottom of that canyon… excruciatingly slowly.
Maybe someone actually got HURT on the way down… and they had to STOP, or something. Very few people have ever seen the actual autopsy reports. I wonder if there was, in fact, any evidence that one ( or more? ) of the men had sprained, twisted, or even (perhaps) broken an ankle during that ‘descent’.
I think that has been ‘discussed’ before and IIRC the ‘consensus’ was something like…
1) Not likely. Good boots. Trained hikers.
2) If it was a serious injury ( enought to STOP them )… there would (should?) probably have been some radio traffic about it.
3) Even if autopsy reports showed such an injury… the SAIT would/should have know about it ( since they had access to the autopsy reports ) and why would they be hesitant, in ANY way, to publish that information, or include it in their report narrative? They didn’t… so I guess we can *assume* there is no evidence there was any hiking injury during that descent.
So even adding 9 or 10 minutes to the ‘travel time’ and trying to account for it just comes down to either ‘more hesitation’ and/or even a SLOWER rate of descent and ‘bog down’ than was previously thought.
This is the last in the recent series of ‘crossfades’ for ALL of Christopher MacKenzie’s cellphone pictures plus his 4 Canon photos and videos that were taken in-between cellphone images 2737 and 2737.
This final MacKenzie cellphone photo ( IMG_2738 ) is now the LAST KNOWN photograph from anyone up on that ridge that afternoon.
The Wade Parker photo that he texted to his mother has never actually been the ‘last GM photo’. It has a network timestamp of 4:04 PM for when he finally got around to ‘texting’ that photo… but it has ALWAYS been the case that he actually took that photo long before that… even BEFORE Robert Caldwell shot his 3:50 PM video.
As for this last crossfade in this particular series…
Cellphone IMG_2737 was taken in ‘Portrait’ mode.
Cellphone IMG_2738 was taken in ‘Landscape’ mode.
11 seconds after Christopher took his IMG_2377 he turned to his RIGHT and faced more EAST than in any prior cellphone photo, so IMG_2738 doesn’t show much of the close-to-them fireline like all the other cellphone photos… but it DOES show what the rest of the smoke column looked like at that point. The full ‘panorama’ shot from their location with both images ‘blended’ together is striking. The small (apparent) ‘spot ahead’ of the fireline seen in IMG_2737 also remains visible in about the center of the fade.
YouTube About Information
__________________________________________________________________
This is the last in the series of terrain-aligned crossfades covering ALL of
Christopher MacKenzie’s cellphone photos AND the four Canon Powershot
items ( 1 video, then 2 still shots, then his second video ) that he took during the
3 minute and 22 second time ‘window’ in-between cellphone photos 2736 and
2737. This last crossfade in this particular series is between his final two
cellphone photos IMG_2737 ( taken at 3:55.20 PM ) and IMG_2738 ( taken 11
seconds later 3:55.31 PM ).
Christopher turned to his RIGHT after taking IMG_2737 so this final IMG_2738
is more of a ‘panorama’ when terrain-aligned with the previous image 2737 from
11 seconds earlier… but there is still ‘some’ terrain overlap between the images
as seen in the ‘crossfade’. The (apparent) ‘spot ahead’ flame seen in the previous
IMG_2737 also remains visible during the crossfade.
IMG_2738 represents the last known photograph taken by any of the Hotshots at
this location before they left the safe black and headed south on the two-track
road. The Wade Parker photo was NOT taken at 4:04 PM, as the initial
investigation(s) seemed to believe. That was only the network timestamp for
when it was ‘texted’ by Wade Parker. The actual Wade Parker photo was taken
much earlier than 4:04 PM and either right before or right around the time that
Robert Caldwell was shooting his second ( of only two ) videos that day circa
3:50 PM.
__________________________________________________________________
So that’s it for this “You can see what they saw” series of crossfades, and sinc we now know that Christopher’s Canon Powershot was at least 9 minutes AHEAD of the real time that day… we are left with some NEW mysteries.
This final cellphone photo of Christpher’s, taken at exactly 3:55.31 PM, now represents the LAST KNOWN photo from this last ‘rest’ location before they left the safe black and started heading SOUTH on the two track.
There appears to be some ‘movement’ in the final IMG_2738 photo as compared to 11 seconds earlier in the IMG_2737 photo… but that could have just been the men ‘moving around’ at that location as we see them doing throughout this series of photographs and videos.
IMG_2738 does NOT offer any real proof that 3:55 or 3:56 PM would be the time they actually did ‘gaggle up’ from that resting location and leave the safe black.
The SAIT investigators put the ‘departure’ time at 4:05 PM… but that seemed to be solely based on the network timestamp for Wade Parker’s 4:04 PM ‘textout’ to his mother, with picture attached. We know now that the picture he ‘texted’ was NOT actually taken at 4:04 PM and he also could have easily sent that text message AFTER they had left that location and were already walking SOUTH.
So… unless the SAIT investigators had some OTHER reason or evidence to put the departure time at 4:05 PM… such as testimony from Brendan McDonough,
or someone else who was listening to the Crew intra-net frequency… there is no reason to believe anymore that Steed and the Crew actually DID wait until 4:05 PM to leave that location.
They could have left any time after Christopher’s final cellphone photo IMG_2738, taken at exactly 3:55.31 PM.
Maybe they spent 9 to 10 *more* minutes at that location ‘making up their minds’ before finally ‘gaggling up’ and leaving circa 4:05 PM… but maybe NOT.
If the ‘deicison to leave’ had, in fact, already been made by 3:55 or 3:56 PM, and the men left the safe black just shortly after Christopher took his final IMG_2738 cellphone photo… then that does NOT bode well for their ‘travel time estimates’.
It adds another 9 ( or even 10 minutes ) to their ‘hiking’ time and SLOWS DOWN their estimated ‘rate of travel’ that afternoon considerably.
If they did leave that much earlier… but still maintained the same ‘brisk’ hiking pace from this last photo location to the ‘Descent Point’ in about the same amount of time the SAIT investigators ‘calculated’… then now there is a 9 to 10 minute ‘gap’ to account for at the ‘Descent Point’ itself before they finally decided to drop into that fuel-filled box canyon.
It means Steed and the Crew might have reached that second critical ‘Descent Point’ 9 or 10 minutes earlier than 4:20 PM ( as the SAIT investigators seemed to think )… and then they just ‘stood there’ wondering what to do next for as much as 9 or 10 minutes… or making ‘consultation’ calls with someone ( presumably DIVSA Eric Marsh? ) about what they should do at that point.
Christopher MacKenzie took his 48 second contiguous sequence of Canon Powershot videos and still photos in-between cellphone images IMG_2736 and IMG_2737.
The first paragraph above should have read…
This is the last in the recent series of ‘crossfades’ for ALL of Christopher MacKenzie’s cellphone pictures plus his 4 Canon photos and videos that were taken in-between cellphone images 2736 and 2737.
Thanks for all the follow up and it appears we finally have an accurate timeline for all the Mackenzie photos/ videos, as well as the Parker picture and the Caldwell video.
In the period of time between 1550 and 1555 there are up to 9 photos and 3 videos (and possibly more?) that were captured by the GMIHC. It would seem that if they were still in the same location, there would be more pictures after 2738 on Mackenzie’s cell phone. Right?
So now we know. 1. The GMIHC moved out of the Discussing options sometime soon/ possibly immediately after the promise of air support “down there”, and, 2.It appears that Rory Collins abruptly/unexpectedly leaves the fire about the same time GM started moving from their last known location that can be confirmed from photos. Someone (not Elizabeth) called Collin’s actions COWARDLY and the same person described the retardant drop that Collins used to extinguish the GM burnout as SOP from Collins. The comment was something to the effect of Collins and his fellow state foresters do not use indirect line building and prefer direct attack.
So, IF, GMIHC and DIV A were, in fact, repositioning to try to create another indirect line, burnout operation in the timeframe of 1555ish. Maybe Rory Collins showed his disapproval by leaving the fire.
BTW, I think it is getting harder and harder to deny the theory that the air support ASAP comment is pertinent to the discussion when trying to understand what made GMIHC think they were safe in their attempt to reposition.
WTKTT… Can you assign a time to images 0885, 0886 and 0887?
I believe that I have properly described these images as showing this group of GMIHC actually leaving the black prior to returning to the black for the final pictures/videos currently being discussed.
Mr Powers. I agree based on what I have read. I am just applying the comments from a commenter and trying to figure out why he/she (not Elizabeth) would have called Collins actions cowardly?
I believe that ‘moment’ happened ( people applying adjectives to Collins’ decision to abruptly leave the fire ) just BEFORE any evidence was discovered that it was his PILOT who was supposedly ‘needing to leave’ because he was hitting some ‘hours’ limit.
Before there was any evidence to the effect… it was a total mystery why Collins just ‘disappeared’ from the fire at a very critical time.
That being said… there are still ‘mysteries’ regarding this Mr. Collins.
The WFAR report contracted by ADOSH has a footnote in it that says something in the report was ‘based on ADOSH interview with Rory Collins’.
There is NO SUCH INTERVIEW in any of the FOIA/FOIL documents released by ADOSH… so either WFAR/ ADOSH never really did interview Rory Collins… or the DID… but then did NOT include any kind of transcript of telephone interview notes with him in their FOIA/FOIL release.
A LOT of people heard the ‘arguments’ between Marsh and Collins over the morning retardant drops over the TAC channels… and have testified as such.
What we still don’t know is what OTHER ‘interactions’ either Marsh/Steed had with Rory Collins that day ( if any )… or whether there were even MORE ‘arguments’ that afternoon after the morning retardant drop
snafu.
Pilots aren’t notified at the last minute that they’ve just timed-out, “gotta go, see ya!!”
The aircraft crew knew throughout the entire day how much time they had left. Knowing that detail, gives them PLENTY of time to interact and brief their replacements properly. That radio briefing could (and should) have occurred, continuing on for as long as necessary while Collins and pilot flew back to their base.
THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO EXCUSE for what happened at the transition that day!
TTWARE – I have said this before and I will say it again: The transition between Air Attack (as run by Rory Collins) and Bravo33 was consistent with the way that the transitions were being conducted throughout that day (e.g. when Bravo3 left, when Bravo33 left, when Air Attack left earlier in the day). Rory *DID* give Bravo33 the heads-up in advance that he was leaving. The SAIR misrepresented it, and the Wildland Fire Associates report then “cut-and-pasted” from the SAIR, rather than doing their own research.
If you are going to criticize Collins, then you need to criticize Bravo3 and Bravo33 as well, because they ALL did their exits the same way on June 30th. The reality is that all three leadership teams in the air (Collins/AA, Bravo3, and Bravo33) had their hands full for every single minute that they were in the sky, such that leisurely briefings and exits were going to be a pipe dream that day. Poor Rory Collins. I have to believe that this is part of the reason why he never returned phone calls from ADOSH…. I am not blaming you, Mike, but my view is that we need to be cautious about criticizing folks who were on the YHF without first researching in FULL (rather than relying on the SAIT, ADOSH, Holly Neill, John Maclean, or the Wildland Fire Associates) what the relevant facts actually show….
Whoops – meant “TTWARE,” not “Mike.” Sorry. And, FYI, it was Robert-the-Second (RTS), who is now posting here under multiple other anonymous names, who called Rory Collins a “coward” or “cowardly” or some such nonsense.
Elizabeth,
“leisurely briefings”, huh? Get a clue. It’s called doing your job.
Wildland firefighters get paid to perform under difficult and stressful conditions. The higher up the food chain one gets, the higher the expectations of performance.
If they can’t perform their jobs properly under those conditions, then they should get new jobs. This wasn’t their first rodeo, and it certainly wasn’t the first one that had gone to crap.
You allude that they were just ‘too busy’ to attempt a proper briefing with the incoming forces. So I guess what you’re saying is that since they gave the incoming forces a ‘heads-up, we’re leaving’, that excuses them from leaving the incoming forces with the critical information on who, was where, on the fire, and what the aerial and ground forces current tactics and strategies were, along with not supplying current fire and weather conditions.
Come to think of it, all of that information could have easily been passed-on as they flew off to their base, but it sounds as you are expounding the theory that if someone gets a bad briefing, they are then justified in doing the same to others.
Do unto others as they have done unto you! I’m not buying into that one!
Certainly, since you have cautioned me, infering that I don’t have all the facts here, you will be able to provide me with specific references to the ‘relevant facts’ you say I am lacking. I’m anxiously awaiting that info. Thank you.
WOW, TTWARE, I did not intend for my post to be so provocative. Sorry.
What makes you think the briefing Rory gave (as compared to the one Bravo3 gave, for example) was NOT a proper briefing? You are mis-reading me – they DID more than just leave the fire. Rory gave notice as soon as he knew his relief pilot had bailed!!
OK, I’ll stop and take a breath here and admit, not for the first time, that I haven’t got the time to dig as deep as some others here. Having said that, the things I can recall right now off of the top of my head from some of the interviews are, “didn’t know where the division breaks were or who was working where,” “didn’t get critical weather updates,”AND, “poor briefing”. The reason I asked for references for the relevant facts is that I would rather know the truth and admit I was wrong than not. So, if you have info that the air hand-offs were proper, then please put it out there so I can refer to it and shut my trap. Thank you.
WantsToKnowTheTruthsays
See
NEW
parent
comment
above
that
extends
this
thread.
Bravo 33
did NOT
receive
a proper
briefing
from
Rory
Collins.
SRsays
“BTW, I think it is getting harder and harder to deny the theory that the air support ASAP comment is pertinent to the discussion when trying to understand what made GMIHC think they were safe in their attempt to reposition.”
I doubt this very much, simply because of the great limitations here. It isn’t like infantry close air support, and for that matter hand crews don’t have the capabilities relative to fire that our infantry has relative to enemy soldiers. Namely, even if air support could have gotten that fire to stand still (it couldn’t) GM wouldn’t have been able to do anything with the fire. GM relying on air to do something that given conditions wasn’t possible would have been unconventional in the extreme.
Regarding Air Attack/Air Support:
I found two youtube videos this weekend that I wish I had found a lot sooner. They’re on the Bureau of Land Management Incident Fire Center channel.
The most useful one is called “Firefighting Airspace (2012 Refresher). “An Air Attack describes how the aircraft above your fire are organized. How they can help you, and how you can help them, with effective communication for a smooth operation.
(HD update, 8/6/2013).”
It really helped me understand better how this all works. Interestingly, the Air Attack guy in the video, Steve Price from BLM Boise District, says, “I’m not dictating tactics at all, and I don’t like to do that unless they ask…It’s not my job to run the fire…It’s my job to put red stuff and wet stuff on the ground and give them situational awareness.” http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9fjF2KQ75TY&feature=share&list=PLTErVrHH6uJja-ljtn7z9Q5Sz9WtCPGw1&index=142
Also these two videos very helpfully describe the relationships between the whole Air Attack, Lead Plane, and ASM Aerial Supervision Module, i.e. Bravo, which is a combination of Air Attack and Lead Plane.
Also, another related item I found is “The DC-10 Air Tanker.”
“The DC-10 Air Tanker is an American wide-body jet air tanker, which has been in service as an aerial firefighting unit since 2006. The aircraft, operated by the joint technical venture 10 Tanker Air Carrier, is a converted McDonnell Douglas DC-10 airliner, and is primarily used to fight wildfires, typically in rural areas. The turbofan-powered aircraft carries up to 12,000 US gallons (45,000 liters) of water or fire retardant in an exterior belly-mounted tank, the contents of which can be released in eight seconds. Two air tankers are currently in operation, with the call-signs Tanker 910 and Tanker 911.”
And now those two DC-10s are stationed in Albuquerque, so…… http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WG06xAbBf3Q&list=PLTErVrHH6uJja-ljtn7z9Q5Sz9WtCPGw1&feature=share&index=130
>> calvin said…
>> Thanks for all the follow up and appears we finally
>> have an accurate timeline for all the Mackenzie
>> photos/ videos, as well as the Parker picture and the
>> Caldwell video.
Yes. I think so.
One of the reasons I just did that whole ‘crossfade’ series
was to try to see if these ‘crossfades’ would indicate
clearly exactly WHEN ( inside that 3 minute and 22 second
gap between 2736 and 2737 ) Christopher began his 48
second ‘session’ with the Canon Powershot.
Alas… while very revealing and informative ( the fire was
ALWAYS progressing SOUTH during and in-between
all of these photos/videos )… I don’t see any definitive
proof that MacKenzie’s 48 second Canon Powershot
session in-between 2736 and 2737 was ‘leaning’ more
towards 2736 or 2737… or vice-versa.
Indeed… the ‘crossfades’ prove that the 48 second session
with the Canon probably *WAS* about right in the middle
of the 3 minute and 22 second ‘window’.
I also have been factoring in your (important) observations
about the gloves… but I don’t see that helping to narrow
down the exact time either ( unless you are seeing
something else that I haven’t seen there ).
So if we just accept that Christopher *probably* did take
the same amount of time to switch from using the cellphone
to the Canon as he then did to switch BACK from using
the canon to the cellphone… we still have this…
1 minute 17 seconds – Switch from cellphone to Canon.
48 seconds – The 4 item session with the Canon.
1 minute 17 seconds – Switch from Canon to cellphone.
Total time = Exactly 3 minutes and 22 seconds.
That’s the exact ‘gap’ between IMG_2736 and IMG_2737.
So that means we have a ‘workable/accurate’ OFFSET
for ALL of MacKenzie’s Canon Powershot images.
Even if there is more evidence to prove that 48 second
‘session’ can be ‘left’ or ‘right’ shifted away from that
center point and more towards either the 2736 or 2737
cellphone images… then that just means the ‘center
point’ assumption is still only off by however many
seconds you ‘left’ or ‘right’ shift it. I still don’t think he
could have ‘switched’ from one device to another in
less than 30 seconds or so… so the ‘center point’
assumption still remains accurate to within +/- 30 sec.
+/- 30 seconds for ANY timestamp for ANY event on
a day like this can be considered ‘pretty damn accurate’.
So, using the ‘center point’ assumption… just take ONE of
Christopher’s Canon images, like IMG_0889…
His Canon Powershot put this timestamp on it…
1601:52 ( 4:01.53 PM )
But it now seems to have been taken at ( exactly? )…
1553.36 ( 3:53.36 PM )
That is a TIME DIFFERENCE of 8 minutes 13 seconds.
The TIME on Christopher’s Canon Powershot was
8 minutes and 13 seconds AHEAD of ‘real time’ that day.
>> calvin also said…
>> WTKTT… Can you assign a time to images
>> 0885, 0886 and 0887?
Yep.
Since Christopher’s Canon Powershot was 8 minutes
and 13 seconds AHEAD of the ‘real time’ that day…
* IMG_0885
Canon says…
EXIF File Number: 110-0885
EXIF Date: June 30, 2013, 1552.07 ( 3:52:07 PM )
EXIF Camera: Canon PowerShot SD1400 IS
EXIF Screen Capture Type: Landscape
EXIF Camera Temperature: 34 C ( 93 F )
Actual time taken = 1543.54 ( 3:43.54 PM )
* IMG_0886
Canon says…
EXIF File Number: 110-0886
EXIF Date: June 30, 2013, 1552.18 ( 3:52:18 PM )
EXIF Camera: Canon PowerShot SD1400 IS
EXIF Camera Orientation: Portrait
EXIF Camera Temperature: 35 C ( 95 F )
Actual time taken = 1544.05 ( 3:44.05 PM )
* IMG_0887
Canon says…
EXIF File Number: 110-0887
EXIF Date: June 30, 2013, 1552.24 ( 3:52:24 PM )
EXIF Camera: Canon PowerShot SD1400 IS
EXIF Camera Orientation: Portrait
EXIF Camera Temperature: 35 C ( 95 F )
Actual time taken = 1544.11 ( 3:44.11 PM )
>> calvin also said…
>> I believe that I have properly described these images
>> as showing this group of GMIHC actually leaving
>> the black prior to returning to the black for the final
>> pictures/videos currently being discussed.
I’m not sure that ‘small move’ from the one ‘resting’
spot to the next can/should be described as ‘leaving
the black’… but the photos definitely show them
entering ‘unburned fuel’ to get to that next rest stop.
What is interesting to note is that since the *NEW*
( real ) times for 0885, 0886 and 0887 seem to be…
That means this ‘move out’ moment from that previous
location came just moments AFTER Marsh had his
1542 – 1543 conversation with OPS2 Paul Musser.
Musser ‘called’ Marsh at 1542… but as we can hear in
the radio capture… Marsh did not respond to him right
away. We have already determined the reason Marsh
did not answer Musser ‘right away’ is because Marsh
was still ‘finishing’ his conversation(s) with Brian Frisby
over the GM intra-crew frequency at that time.
So circa 1542 to 1543…. Marsh finishes his documented
conversations about moving the vehicles with Firsby,
then Marsh must have ‘answered’ OPS2 Musser and
they had the ‘availability check’ conversation…
…and IMMEDIATELY after that conversation ended
with Musser ( circa 1543 )… they MOVED OUT ( from
this first location to the next one ).
WTKTT said….I’m not sure that ‘small move’ from the one ‘resting’
spot to the next can/should be described as ‘leaving
the black’… but the photos definitely show them
entering ‘unburned fuel’ to get to that next rest stop.
1. Where is the one “resting” spot?
2. I do not think they were en route to the Second resting spot in image 0885, 0886, 0887. It appears to me that they are leaving the black and crossing the retardant line (as they left the black) that was dropped on GM bournout operation from earlier in the day that was also photographed by Mackenzie. There is a odd shaped rock that looks like it is missing a chunk (in image 0880 0881 0882 005 0886 0887) that seems to assign the location for 0885, 0886, and 0887 that is south/east of Discussing options spot. This same rock and area can be seen in ADOSH post burn photos. So it appears (to me) that after 0885- 0887 were taken, these men (Ashcraft, Parker, Norris) actually changed course, and returned to a safe location in the black before leaving.
Regarding Air Attack/Air Support: I found two youtube videos this weekend that I wish I had found a lot sooner. They’re on the Bureau of Land Management Incident Fire Center channel.
The most useful one is called “Firefighting Airspace (2012 Refresher). “An Air Attack describes how the aircraft above your fire are organized. How they can help you, and how you can help them, with effective communication for a smooth operation. (HD update, 8/6/2013).”
It really helped me understand better how this all works. Interestingly, the Air Attack guy in the video, Steve Price from BLM Boise District, says, “I’m not dictating tactics at all, and I don’t like to do that unless they ask…It’s not my job to run the fire…It’s my job to put red stuff and wet stuff on the ground and give them situational awareness.”
The second video is called “Communication With Aviattion Resources.” It really illustrates how complicated the communications can get for Air Attack over an active fire.
Also these two videos very helpfully describe the relationships between the whole Air Attack, Lead Plane, and ASM Aerial Supervision Module, i.e. Bravo, which is a combination of Air Attack and Lead Plane.
Also, another related item I found is “The DC-10 Air Tanker.”
“The DC-10 Air Tanker is an American wide-body jet air tanker, which has been in service as an aerial firefighting unit since 2006. The aircraft, operated by the joint technical venture 10 Tanker Air Carrier, is a converted McDonnell Douglas DC-10 airliner, and is primarily used to fight wildfires, typically in rural areas. The turbofan-powered aircraft carries up to 12,000 US gallons (45,000 liters) of water or fire retardant in an exterior belly-mounted tank, the contents of which can be released in eight seconds. Two air tankers are currently in operation, with the call-signs Tanker 910 and Tanker 911.” And now those two DC-10s are stationed in Albuquerque, so……
This is a crossfade between that stillframe from the very end of Christopher’s
MacKenzie’s SECOND video that he took with his Canon Powershot and the
next photo he would take ( approximately 1 minute and 17 seconds later )
with his cellphone… which is IMG_2737 with a KNOWN timestamp of 3:55.20 PM.
The ‘smoke curtain’ right along the fireline has increased ( and thickened )
dramatically and there appears to be a distinct ‘spot ahead’ appearing in about
the right-center of the crossfade where the two-track trail leads away from
the old-grader location.
YouTube About Information
__________________________________________________________________
This is a crossfade between a stillframe from Christopher MacKenzie’s second
video that he took with his Canon Powershot ( MVI_0891 circa 3:54.03 ) and the
next image he took approximately 1 minute and 17 seconds later, at 3:55.20.
After Christopher finished shooting his second video with the Canon he switched
back to using his cellphone and then he took the next sequential image on that
device ( IMG_2737 at exactly 3:55.20 PM ). As the crossfade shows… the ‘smoke
curtain’ right at the fireline has increased ( and thickened ) dramatically during the
estimated 1 minute and 17 seconds between these two images and there also
appears to be a distinct ‘spotting event’ taking place about right-center in the fade
at the point where the two-track road leading away from the old-grader location
approaches the fireline.
__________________________________________________________________
10 seconds after Christopher MacKenzie took his second ( of only two ) still
photos in-between videos… he shot his second video. That second video
was only 9 seconds long, just like his first video.
This is a crossfade between that second Canon still image and a captured frame
from the END of his second movie ( with Canon filename MVI_0891 )… so that
makes the time between images in this crossfade 19 seconds.
The reason a stillframe from the END of the second MVI_0891 movie is used for
comparison here is because that is the point in the 9 second video that provides
the best ‘terrain match’ with the previous still photo… AND using an image from
the END of the second movie also provides the best comparison for the next
(upcoming) cellphone image comparison after the second movie was shot with
the Canon Powershot.
IMG_0890 from the Canon was taken in ‘Portrait’ mode by Christopher so that
he could ( apparently ) be sure to capture that enormous smoke column
building up into the sky prior to shooting his second video. The MV_0891 video
was shot in ‘Landscape’ mode.
Once again ( even though only 19 seconds have elapsed between images )
even MORE visible progression of the fireline to the SOUTH can be observed
in the crossfade.
This frame taken from movie MVI_0891 is also the exact moment when Captain
Jesse Steed had just finished telling Eric Marsh… “I copy… and it’s almost made
it to that two-track road we walked in on.”
YouTube About Information
__________________________________________________________________
This is a crossfade between the second still image that Christopher MacKenzie
took with his Canon Powershot in-between his two movie clips ( IMG_0890 circa
3:53.44 PM ) and a stillframe from the next thing he would shoot just 10 seconds
later… which was his second VIDEO from that location ( MVI_0891 circa 3:53.54
PM ). The stillframe from the VIDEO was taken from the very END of that second
video so that means there are 19 seconds expiring in this crossfade. Even with
just these 19 seconds of time expiring in the crossfade there still seem to be
clear indications of the fireline pushing more to the SOUTH with each passing
moment.
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As I have pondered, various times, why Chris did what he did here, capturing more stills than video, when we all would wish he would have kept doing the video because of the conversations captured with it, I have sensed that he was more interested in capturing the fire behavior than anything else.
I keep struggling to intuit/reason why he was switching back and forth so much between his cellphone and his Powershot. I still haven’t gotten there. Maybe he was having some kind of trouble with his cellphone for capturing video. So he switched to the Powershot. But the quick switch from video to stills to video hints to me that what he was really trying to capture was not so much the conversations we hear from the radios as the visuals of the fire progression.
Reply to Marti Reed post on April 28, 2014 at 10:25 pm
>> Marti said…
>> As I have pondered, various times, why Chris did what
>> he did here, capturing more stills than video, when we
>> all would wish he would have kept doing the video
>> because of the conversations captured with it, I have
>> sensed that he was more interested in capturing the
>> fire behavior than anything else.
Yes. Probably so. I just now noticed myself the times
when he ( quickly ) took BOTH a ‘Landscape’ shot and
then quickly ( in no more time than it takes to turn the
camera ) took another shot in ‘Portrait’ mode… and also
tilted the camera UP for the ‘Portrait’ shot.
He did this with BOTH his cellphone and his Powershot.
He was trying to make sure he captured the enormous
( and dramatic ) smoke column that was building overhead.
He just wanted to be SURE he ‘caught all that’… from
ground up into the sky.
It truly was DRAMATIC… and worth capturing (fully).
>> Marti also said…
>> I keep struggling to intuit/reason why he was switching
>> back and forth so much between his cellphone and his
>> Powershot. I still haven’t gotten there.
Have you considered ‘battery levels’?
Maybe one ( or both ) devices were ‘flashing’ at him that
they were BOTH low on battery so it was time to
switch between the two just to make sure he was
capturing all of the dramatic scene that was unfolding
down there in front of him. He didn’t want to miss
any of it.
>> Marti also said…
>> Maybe he was having some kind of trouble with his
>> cellphone for capturing video. So he switched to the
>> Powershot.
See above. He might have made a move to just start
shooting video with the cellphone, noticed that his
battery indicator was about out… and knew that nothing
kills a smartphone battery like shooting video.
So he went for the Canon… only to discover ( after 2
videos and 2 still shots )… that now his Canon was
bitching at him about battery level(s) as well… so he
went BACK to the cellphone for 2 more quick shots
( which, as my last crossfade shows, seem to have
purposely been a final ‘panorama’ of the entire scene
out there in front of him ).
>> Marti also said…
>> But the quick switch from video to stills to video hints
>> to me that what he was really trying to capture was not
>> so much the conversations we hear from the radios
>> as the visuals of the fire progression.
I agree. There was a time when it almost *seemed* like
Christopher was ‘trying to tell us something’ because of
the exact time he suddenly decided to start shooting
video ( with AUDIO )… but I don’t believe that anymore.
It was all just ‘management chit-chat’ at that point.
The scene unfolding BEFORE him down in that valley
was so dramatic… as a photographer he just wanted
to be SURE he got enough good pictures of it ( and
a little motion video, too, to show that dramatic smoke
development ).
I think it was a complete accident that he happened to
capture Marsh and Steed talking about ‘comfort levels’
and ‘discussing their options’ and other management
chit-chat.
That’s also why I don’t believe the actual DECISION to
leave the safe black came until AFTER Christopher
finished shooting his Canon videos.
I don’t think Christopher had a CLUE ( at that point ) that
within a minute or two… Steed was going to say
‘gaggle up boys… we’re leaving’.
I don’t think ANY of them knew that was going to happen,
when you really look at them in ALL of these photos.
It just suddenly happened.
One moment they’re resting… taking photos.
The next moment… Steed says ‘gaggle up’… and
they were leaving. Simple as that.
I’m not even sure any of them had ANY frickin’ idea
WHERE the hell they were going ( or even WHY )
when Steed suddenly told them to ‘gaggle up’.
Steed said ‘jump’… and they all said ‘How HIGH!!’.
Calvin, do you, personally, think that somebody told Steed/Marsh to “jump” as opposed to Steed/GM simply wanting to get to the east-ish side of the fire to re-engage and misjudging how quickly they could get there as compared to how quickly the fire was moving? If so, why is that your view? (I am not suggesting that you are WRONG – I just want to understand your thinking, because I have not yet found any evidence that would suggest that that is why they moved, but it is certainly an option….)
Elizabeth. Yes, I personally believe that.
Mankenzie pictures 0885, 0886, and 0887 show Ashcraft, Norris and Parker (and others) leaving the black and heading away from the discussing options location (and toward Helms Ranch) and into the green. SOMETHING HAPPENED, they returned to the black before moving out a second time. This delay in leave time could account for Cordes saying, BS they had plenty of time (following his hearing of the deployment)
Cordes was deploying resources in and around Glen Isla and Helms Ranch after 1630.
Justin Hernandez and his bulldozer were somewhere around Glen Isla and Cory Ball was somewhere (in Glen Isla) looking for a place to build indirect line at Cordes request.
I think if Granite Mountain were intending to go very far beyond Helms Ranch, they would have had transportation lined up.
I have seen no evidence that any retardant was placed between the Fireline shown in Mackenzie, Norris, and Ashcraft photos and the community of Glen Isla. Have you?
Calvin~
Do you have a google map/earth geotag for that place they were in? I put them in a different place, but that had to do with what I thought was going on and the inaccurate timestamps I was using. I think you have located it more carefully. I’d really appreciate it if I could correct it in my Google Earth. Thanks!
Marti, I cannot. I would appreciate it if you or WTK could.
I think a couple other pictures that help are the ADOSH 7/18 photos with gps p0250, p0253, p0257, p0260, and p0262. (they all show the rock I mentioned before, and you can see the remnants of the retardant line)
I also believe the rock is visible in Mackenzie image 0890. Dead center of the picture, below the group.
>> Marti asked…
>> Calvin… Do
>> you have a
>> google
>> map/earth
>> geotag for
>> that place
>> they were
>> in?
>>
>> Calving said
>> Marti, I
>> cannot. I
>> would
>> appreciate it
>> if you or
>> WTK could.
Standy-by.
Coming tonight.
I’ve been on this since yesterday and since the new Google satellite images came online which make it much easier to ‘find that rock’ there on that slope.
Calvin… YES… this ROCK is in MANY photos including 8 or 9 taken by hiker Joy Collura that morning.
It was NOT very
far away from
the ‘second’
rest spot at all
where all the
other photos
and videos
were shot 10
minutes later.
Appears to have been just a few hundred yards DOWN the slope ( and due EAST ) from that ‘second’ rest spot.
All they did after leaving that spot was come UP the slope to join the others at the HIGHER location.
Calvin, my impression was the the sawyers (e.g. Ashcraft et al) were coming OFF of the line that they were building, and THAT is why we see them moving in those pictures with their saws. No?
Remember, Steed told Blue Ridge somewhere in this time frame (I don’t have my notes in front of me) that GM had at least another HOUR of cutting/line work left. However, shortly thereafter, it became clear that they were going to lose the retardant line, which was part of their tying-in plan, such that it no longer made sense to keep the sawyers trying to build line. Hence, Steed presumably instructed them to stop, and we see them coming OFF the line they were building. No? Otherwise, why would Steed have told Blue Ridge that GM had at least another hour of work left (with their SAWS)?
By the way, I do NOT have my notes in front of me, so WTKTT should NOT parse every single word that I am typing. If you want exact words, go back to the raw sources (e.g. unit logs, audio-recorded interviews).
Calvin… see a report coming later this evening on EXACTLY where that ‘cut rock’ was located. I’ve been on this since yesterday when the new Google post-fire satellite imagery came online.
It is now much easier to find that ‘cut rock’ there on that slope.
That location appears to have simply been DOWN the slope and due EAST of the ‘second rest spot’ where all the other photos were taken.
It may APPEAR they were headed ‘away’ from the others since they are exiting the camera to the right… but the reality appears to be that all they were doing was making their way due WEST and UP the slope to join the others at the ‘second rest spot’ where all the other photos/videos would be taken.
I’m thinking you may be right on the limitations Chris may have been sensing regarding battery levels. Maybe. OTOH he hadn’t taken all that many photos on his Powershot that day. I keep a pretty good eye on my batteries and have always carried a spare. But maybe he didn’t and found himself running out of steam. So he switched back to his cellphone. Which may have been running low, too.
Or maybe, as soon as he finished this sequence, he was told it was time to hustle and go.
Texting or e-mailing pictures – if you intend to text or e-mail your pictures FROM the fire, you are likely to take them WITH your smartphone. However, if you want better-quality shots, and you don’t care about texting or e-mailing them right that minute, you take them with your CAMERA (and not your smartphone), and you download them to your computer (and then e-mail them to whereever you want or print them or upload them to Facebook or whatever) when you get home.
I’m assuming that that is the obvious explanation for why Chris was working with both his smartphone and his camera, no? What am I missing, Marti?
Elizabeth… sometimes assumptions *CAN* be made not because of the existence of evidence…
…but because of the LACK of it.
There is NO EVIDENCE ( that ANYONE seems to be aware of ) that Christopher ever sent ANY text messages with attached photos to ANYONE on June 30, 2013.
The only ‘assumption’ that can be made, then, is that that is because he didn’t actually DO it.
Christopher’s Canon Powershot was
simply a *better* camera. It was the ‘professional’ piece of kit he had with him versus the ‘amateur’ iPhone 4s.
His iPhone 4s only had an 8 megapixel maximum resolution.
The Canon Powershot went all the way up to 14.1 megapixels ( almost TWICE the resolution ) with MUCH better ZOOM and focal length options.
Even on the Doce fire… Christopher was ‘switching back and forth’ and the common denominator seems to be that he would do that when he sensed ( as a photographer ) that something very DRAMATIC was happening.
On the Doce fire… it was VLAT Air Drops ( when they happened ). At Yarnell… same interest in VLATS and I’m sure he realized ( as a photographer ) what a DRAMATIC scene was unfolding before him there circa 3:55 PM. He just wanted to be sure he got some ultra-highres shots with the Canon as well as the cellphone.
It might have had nothing to do with ‘battery levels’ at all, really. That is just one possibility.
I now think it just had more to do with Christopher’s sense ( as a photographer ) of when something IMPORTANT was happening… like that dramatic fire behavior and smoke cloud developing right in front of his eyes circa 3:55 PM on June 30, 2013.
He wanted to be SURE he ‘captured it all’… which also explains the multiple switching from ‘Landscape’ to ‘Portrait’ mode. That smoke column was getting HUGE ( even before their decision to leave the safe black ) and he also wanted to be sure he captured that as well.
That was my point, friend.
Also, there absolutely 100% *are* text messages and photos that the SAIT was never given. The SAIT never ASKED for them (to this day).
Elizabeth. How many? Did the ADOSH investigators ask for other pictures and texts that were sent?
ScottNorrisPhotoAndText.pdf says……(in an email from Randy Okon to Richa Wilson)on August 8 2013……..
I believe we have received all text and photos from the families that we are going to see.
Another related question. Immediately following the Yarnell incident, Wade Ward, from PFD said something to the effect of. Marsh reported they were in a tight spot and everyone knew this was going to be a bitch, were deploying.
I have always wondered where this statement came from? Did Eric Marsh say something to that effect to someone? Or did Wade Ward make that up?
This is a crossfade between the two ‘still photos’ that Christopher Mackenzie
shot with his Canon Powershot in-between his two 9 second videos.
IMG_0889 was taken in ‘Landscape’ mode.
IMG_0890 was taken 8 seconds later in ‘Portrait’ mode and shows more of the
immense smoke column building in the sky. It would appear the reason Christopher quickly switched to ‘Portrait’ mode at this point was to be SURE
he captured that moment and more of that HUGE ‘smoke cloud building’ than
he did in his previous ‘Landscape’ photo, 8 seconds earlier.
There are places where ( even in just 8 seconds ) the fireline itself seems to
have made some quick ‘pushouts’ to the SOUTH as compared to the photo
taken just 8 seconds earlier.
YouTube About Information…
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This is a crossfade between the two ‘still’ images that Christopher MacKenzie
took circa 3:53 PM with his Canon Powershot. BOTH of these ‘still’ images were
taken in-between his two 9 second videos that day. IMG_0889 was taken circa
3:53.36 PM and IMG_0890 was taken just 8 seconds later circa 3:53.44.
IMG_0889 was taken in ‘Landscape’ mode and then Christopher apparently
just flipped the camera to ‘Portrait’ mode in order to capture MORE of the
DRAMATIC smoke column buildup than he did in the ‘Landscape’ shot just 8
seconds before that. Even though only 8 seconds transpire between these two
photos the FIRELINE seems to show places where it has sudden ‘pushouts’ to
the SOUTH, especially around the area where Brendan’s lookout mound can
be seen in the distance.
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Continuing on with this ‘see what they say’ crossfade series…
This is a crossfade between the stillframe from +4 seconds into Christopher
MacKenzie’s first 9 second video ( MVI_0888 ) and the NEXT (still) image he
took with his Canon Powershot 17 seconds later.
Canon Powershot image IMG_0889 was taken just 12 seconds after the END of
the 9 second long Canon Movie MVI_0888. Since the still frame used for the MVI_0888 image above was from the +4 second mark into that video… then we
add 5 seconds to get an ‘elapsed’ time between these two images of 17 seconds
and an approximate ‘real’ time for IMG_0889 of 3:53.36 PM.
After these 17 seconds… the FIRELINE can now be seen becoming clearly
visible again after that big ‘smoke push’ to the SOUTH that was seen in the
previous crossfade between cellphone image 2736 and the stillframe from
the 0888 movie.
YouTube About Information
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This is a crossfade between a stillframe from +4 seconds into Christopher
MacKenzie’s first Canon Powershot movie MVI_0888 ( circa 3:53.19 PM ) and
a still photo he took 17 seconds after that with the same Canon Powershot
camera ( Image IMG_0889 circa 3:53.36 PM ). The fireline has now become
visible again after the significant smoke ‘push’ SOUTH that was seen between
cellphone IMG_2736 and the stillframe from MVI_0888.
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As a reminder… here are the original Canon Powershot timestamps ( which are
NOW known to be WRONG and at least 9 minutes AHEAD of the ‘real time’
that day ) showing the 4 items that Christopher shot with his Canon for a total
of a 48 second ‘session’ with that camera which we NOW know took place
in-between his cellphone image(s) IMG_2736 and IMG_2735…
1601:31 – 110-0888 – First VIDEO – Duration: 9.24 sec.
1601:52 – 110-0889 – First still photo 12 seconds after video
1602:00 – 110-0890 – Second still photo 8 seconds later.
1602:10 – 110-0891 – Second VIDEO, 10 seconds later – Duration: 9.14 sec
THIS crossfade is between those first TWO items above.
The next ‘photographic’ evidence in this 3:49 to 4:00 PM sequence after
MacKenzie’s cellphone image IMG_2736 at 3:51.58 would be the first frame(s)
of MacKenzie’s first VIDEO… MVI_0888.
We still do NOT know exactly how long it took MacKenzie to switch from using his
cellphone to take IMG_2736 to when he first started recording his first MVI_0888
movie with the Canon Powershot… but the best estimate at this time seems
to be approximately 1 minute and 17 seconds, based on a 3 minute and 22
second ‘window’, with a 48 second Canon Powershot sequence, and the
assumption that it took him just as long to switch from the cellphone to the
Canon as it then did for him to switch BACK from the Canon to using the
cellphone again ( 1 minute 17 seconds… both times ).
NOTE: One of the reasons for this particular ‘crossfade’ is to simply establish
with a ‘visual’ how much time MIGHT have transpired… based on fireline
and smoke cloud movements during the time MacKenzie was switching from
his cellphone to his Canon Powershot.
The still frame from MVI_0888 used for this ‘crossfade’ was taken from the 4
second mark into that first movie because anything earlier would have created
too much distortion for a crossfade due to ‘camera angle’… so if we add those 4
seconds to the estimated 1 minute and 17 seconds then this crossfade comes 1
minute and 21 seconds after IMG_2736 was taken.
IMG_2736 was taken in ‘Landscape’ mode with the cellphone.
MVI_0888 was also taken in ‘Landscape ‘ mode and the still frame from +4
seconds had to be rotated a few degrees clockwise in order for the terrain to
match as the images crossfade.
YouTube About Information
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This is a crossfade between Christopher MacKenzie’s cellphone image
IMG_2736 ( taken at 3:51.58 PM ) and a stillframe from the very next
photographic moment that MacKenzie performed after that… which was
to shoot his first 9 second video at that location using his Canon Powershot.
This first movie was only 9 seconds long and had a Canon filename
of MVI_0888. It is still not known exactly how long it took Christopher
to switch from using his cellphone to the Canon… but the best estimate
at this time is that this first VIDEO was shot approximately 1 minute
and 17 seconds after cellphone image IMG_2736. This crossfade
shows that during that time delay following IMG_2736, while he switched
from his cellphone to the Canon Powershot, the SMOKE has moved
dramatically SOUTH and towards their location to the extent that it is
now ‘blocking’ their view of the fireline itself.
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NOTE: If a better way is found to establish the exact time offset between
cellphone image IMG_2736 and the start of MVI_0888 then the timestamps
used above will obviously change.
Looking at the progression of the SMOKE cloud, however, I would say there
had to be at *least* 60 seconds between IMG_2736 and the start of MVI_0888.
A full 1 minute and 39 seconds transpire between these two MacKenzie
cell phone images.
IMG_2735 was taken in ‘Landscape’ mode.
IMG_2736 was also taken in ‘Landscape ‘ mode and had to be rotated 1 degree
counter-clockwise in order for the terrain to match as the images crossfade.
YouTube About Information
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This is a crossfade between Christopher MacKenzie’s cellphone photo IMG_2735
( taken at 3:50.19 PM ) and the very next photo he took with his cellphone 1 minute
and 39 seconds later ( IMG_2736 at 3:51.58 PM ). The crossfade shows a pretty
significant advancement of the fireline to the SOUTH during those 99 seconds and
a dramatic change in the smoke cloud(s).
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NOTE: Right after Christopher took this IMG_2736 with his cellphone is when he
then switched to using his Canon Powershot. Somewhere during the next 3
minutes and 22 seconds is when he used the Canon to shoot his first 9 second
video, then he took 2 still pictures with the Canon… and then he finished this 4
item sequence with the Canon by shooting the second 9 second video.
After shooting these 4 items with the Canon ( in a 48 second contiguous
timespan somewhere in the 3 minute and 22 second window )… Christopher
then switched back to his cellphone to take his next IMG_2737 cellphone image
at 3:55.20.
It has yet to be determined EXACTLY when, in this 3 minute and 22 second
‘window’ between cellphone images 2736 and 2737 Christopher actually
began his 48 second ‘session’ with the Canon Powershot, but if he took the
same amount of time to switch from using his cellphone to using the Canon
as he did to then switch BACK from the Canon to the cellphone… then it
would appear that the first Canon Powershot video ( and the first item in
the 48 second Canon session ) came 1 minute and 17 seconds after
he took cellphone image IMG_2736.
That would put the ‘start’ time for MacKenzie’s FIRST video at 3:51.36 PM.
This represents an approximate 11 minute time difference between what his
Canon Powershot device *thought* the time was that day versus what it
really was. His Canon Powershot was ( apparently ) set about 11 minutes
AHEAD of what the real time was that day.
I added the 1 minute and 17 seconds to the time for IMG_2735
instead of IMG_2736.
That last part of the original post above *SHOULD* have read
like this…
That would put the ‘start’ time for MacKenzie’s FIRST video
at 3:53.15 PM.
This represents an approximate 9 (NINE) minute time difference
between what his Canon Powershot device *thought* the time
was that day versus what it really was. His Canon Powershot
was ( apparently ) set about 9 (NINE) minutes AHEAD of what
the real time was that day.
Only 13 seconds elapse between these two MacKenzie cell phone images.
IMG_2734 was taken in ‘Portrait’ mode and shows more of the sky and
smoke cloud.
IMG_2735 was taken in ‘Landscape’ mode had to be rotated a few degrees
clockwise in order for the terrain to match as the images crossfade.
NOTE: In-between these two images is when Christopher changed his position
and moved from standing directly behind Captain Jesse Steed to a point a little
further back on the rocks and to the LEFT of where Steed was sitting. Steed’s
knee can still be seen on the right side of IMG_2735.
YouTube About Information…
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This is a crossfade between Christopher MacKenzie’s cellphone image
IMG_2734 ( taken at 3:50.06 ) and the very next one that he took 13 seconds
later ( IMG_2735 at 3:50.19 ) AFTER changing positions from standing directly
behind Captain Jesse Steed ( with the red helmet on ) to a position further to the
left and back up on the rocks slightly.
Even though only 13 seconds elapse between the images… the crossfade still
shows a slight increase in the fireline to the SOUTH… and a significant change
in the smoke cloud(s).
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Only 7 seconds transpire between these two MacKenzie cell phone images
but the crossfade still shows some noticeable fireline advancement to the
SOUTH… AND ( considering only 7 seconds elapse ) there is a DRAMATIC
difference in the SMOKE cloud(s).
IMG_2733 was taken in ‘Landscape’ mode.
IMG_2734 was taken in ‘Portrait’ mode and shows more of the sky and the
smoke column. It had to be rotated a few degrees counter-clockwise in order
for the terrain to match as the images crossfade.
YouTube About Information…
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This is a terrain-aligned crossfade between Christopher MacKenzie’s cellphone
image IMG_2733 ( taken at 3:49.59 PM ) and the very next image he took with
his cellphone just 7 seconds later… IMG_2734 ( taken at 3:50.06 PM ).
Even though only 7 seconds have transpired between the two images the
crossfade still shows there has been some advancement of the fireline to the
SOUTH… and the difference between the SMOKE cloud(s) is DRAMATIC.
__________________________________________________________________
ALSO NOTE: At the time Christopher MacKenzie was taking these two
cellphone images… Brendan McDonough had already been dropped off
by Brian Frisby where the GM Superintendent and GM Chase truck(s) were
located… and Brendan was, at this same moment, taking his own cellphone
photos of the fire/smoke whirl he was seeing down where the trucks were parked.
Also… IMG_2734 ( taken at 3:50.06 ) also appears to be the photo that captures
Robert Caldwell shooting his second of (only) two videos that day which captured
the following background radio conversation going on at this exact moment…
__________________________________________________________________
Eric Marsh (DIVS A): Yea… I’m tryin’ to work my way off the top.
Todd Abel ( OPS1 ): Okay… I copy… ah… just keep me updated…
ah… ya know… you guys hunker and be safe and then… ah…
we’ll get some air support down there ASAP.
_________________________________________________________________
WTKTT and xxFullsailxx: Regarding your recent exchange about where Todd Abel was located at the time of the deployment and burn-over…. Presumably, if Todd Abel had made it over to the east side of the fire by the time of the 4:27 “Yarnell Gamble” video (which I doubt that he had), we would see him in the Tom Story photos where some of the guys are congregating around the white pick-up trucks in the Ranch Restaurant parking lot immediately after hearing that GM was in trouble. WTKTT, do you see Abel there?
There appear to be two Central Yavapai trucks in several of the Tom Story photos. Able and Cordes? One truck actually heads into the adjacent street and is also seen coming back toward the ranch house. Cordes, right?
ultimately it doesn’t really matter where Abel was… the fact is, that there is no substantive evidence that it is Abel’s voice…AND, there is no substantive evidence that the conversation is addressing Marsh.
what IS substantive, is that WTKTT continues to peddle the nefarious mystery person ordering-GM-off-the-hill (oh, and hurry up doing it) conspiracy theory. what else is substantive, is that WTKTT continues to ad-lib conversations, and then call it “evidence” from which to speculate further.
noone had reason to “order” GM anywhere, let alone tell them to “hurry up.”
as WTKTT has already acknowledged… there was an IHC within arms reach of that end of the fire already… so if there was a specific task for an IHC then Blue Ridge could have just as well been utilized.
xxfullsailxx
I will have to agree with you that I have not seen substantial evidence to indicate GM was ordered or told to hurry up that has not been tied together in my assessment.
Something you said down below dose bother me.
As a Lookout and I was talking a highly qualified lookout.
A Foreman on a crew. I ask you would that person concerned about there crew not have got in the Superintendents truck. Driven to any location necessary to get eyes on their crew and the fire and continue to inform them of the fire activity, even if the crew could see the Fire?
We still do not fully know if McDonough actually knew what the crew was doing or where they were going.
Absent that a qualified Foreman (lookout) would have been in contact and asking for the information on the crew and giving their advice on fire spread. Do you not agree with that? I think on this fire there were places for a while that person could have been useful. I do not think that is BS. McDonough was seeing fire activity as he drove out and took pictures that he could have relayed to the crew if he had been more qualified. That was what I was trying to get across, maybe you misread my intent.
bob, while i completely agree with you about the competencies and experience level of a lookout in general, i do not agree that McDonough had any obligation or reason to go try to post up else where, unless Steed or Marsh asked him to…
a. i don’t think there was any where else to get a vantage on the crew and their relation to fire behavior…
b. Marsh & Steed both had the best vantage point point of EVERYTHING going on with the fire… if anything (and again, this is total hindsight bias) what they should have done, was post a new lookout at that exact spot where they were before they hike toward BSR…
the lookout qualification thing is something that we seem to have to revisit every fire years or so. it’s been addressed in multiple fire refreshers. i think that in general, and especially with IHC’s, that the lookout position is taken seriously… and even if you’re sending a squad boss trainee up to be lookout, you should also be sending up a qualified individual to train them up on the importance of the task.
but again, i don’t believe that ANYONE knew or understood the route that GM was taking… if they knew that GM was travelling around the fire to the south, through the green, SOMEONE (probably ops. Musser or Blue Ridge overhead) would have told them about the second wind shift that ultimately got them entrapped.
I completely agree re the lookout not just cranking up the AC and effectively quitting work. But, the same is true about not putting your lookout where they put him, and not simply letting him hang out and nearly get burned over. Both to me are symptomatic of broader issues. Everything from an undue tolerance for risk, to an undue tolerance of no real communication.
There is a catch-22 involved, though. If you don’t want people to know where you are going, it’s tough to ask McDonough to keep working as a lookout in a way that’s likely to be useful.
I believe looking at pictures that some one could have gone out of town on the highway and been able to look back up the ridge to the heal of the fire where the crew was. If they had binoculars they may have been able to see them start down the ridge before the smoke layed over and covered the area. Again a well qualified lookout attached to the crew would have at least tried to maintain contact. after the trucks were safe they had there crew freq. to talk on all they wanted with out interference from other traffic. It is a within 2 to 4 mile line of site personal radio channel.
Yes actually not that different from glassing deer in some ways. But you’ve got to know to try to do it, and/or have someone direct you to do it. One of many opportunities where both the intended route could have been disclosed, and they could have gotten better information on fire and weather in turn. I strongly suspect that most people would have been asking their lookout to do this, but that again gets back to disclosing their route.
Reply to Bob Powers post
on April 27, 2014 at 3:14 pm
>> Mr. Powers said…
>> I believe looking at pictures that
>> some one could have gone out of
>> town on the highway and been
>> able to look back up the ridge to
>> the heal of the fire where the crew
>> was.
You didn’t need to go ‘out of town’
at all. There were any number of
places where that ‘anchor spot’
could be clearly seen from in
town itself. The Yarnell Fire Station
was up on its own ‘hill’ and had an
absolute CLEAR ( and direct )
view of that area. That’s where
OPS1 Todd Abel and Eric Marsh
first had their ‘chat’ that morning,
with a CLEAR view of that anchor
point location… and both agreed to
send GM up there in the first place.
>> Mr. Powers also wrote…
>> If they had binoculars they may
>> have been able to see them start
>> down the ridge before the smoke
>> layed over and covered the area.
Yes…. and there was (apparently)
no shortage of binocluars that day.
In his ADOSH interview…
SPGS1 Gary Cordes said he ‘glassed
them up ‘ any number of times that
day ( from various locations in town )
and was able to see exactly what they
were doing up on the ridge.
Page 45 of Cordes’ ADOSH interview
Q = Bruce Hanna
A = SPGS1 Gary Cordes
______________________________
Q: Okay.
A: …and I did glass them up throughout the day and they were up on the switchback right in here. They had…
Q: Mm-hmm.
A: …a squad uh, just staged out over here and then they had been, they had some doing some work in here.
( Points to map ).
______________________________
Also… in his first ADOSH interview…
Brendan McDonough was asked if
HE had his own binoculars that day
while serving as lookout… and
he said YES…
Page 27…
Q1 = Barry Hicks
A = Brendan McDonough
______________________________
Q1: Did you have any binoculars
with you?
A: Yeah.
Q1: You did?
A: Mm-hm.
______________________________
Seems reasonable with the right person trained in fuels, weather, and responsibilities as a lookout. Could have made a huge difference. One of those learning things that need discussed.
Reply to Elizabeth post on April 27, 2014 at 8:31 am said:
>> Elizabeth wrote
>> WTKTT and xxFullsailxx: Regarding your recent exchange
>> about where Todd Abel was located at the time of the
>> deployment and burn-over…. Presumably, if Todd Abel had
>> made it over to the east side of the fire by the time of the 4:27
>> “Yarnell Gamble” video (which I doubt that he had), we would
>> see him in the Tom Story photos where some of the guys are
>> congregating around the white pick-up trucks in the Ranch
>> Restaurant parking lot immediately after hearing that GM
>> was in trouble. WTKTT, do you see Abel there?
The first Tom Story photo available in the public folder that
shows anything from the Ranch House Restaurant parking
lot ( his image number 1677 ) has a timestamp of 5:06.10 PM.
It was taken with his Canon EOS, which has already been
determined to be ‘accurate’ with timestamping that day to
within 45 to 50 seconds of ‘true’ time.
His ‘previous’ sequential image ( 1676 ) was taken up near the
helibase on Hays Ranch Road ( with the same Canon EOS )
and has a timestamp of 3:18.48 PM.
So, apparently, Tom Story himself was ‘moving around’ a lot
that day and didn’t take any picutures with his Canon EOS
at all between 3:18 and 5:06 PM ( Almost a 2 hour gap ).
So even the Tom Story photos from the RHR were not taken
( as you suggested ) “immediately after hearing GM was
in trouble”. His first photo from that location seems to be
almost a half-hour AFTER the ‘deployment’ message(s).
We KNOW that Todd Abel WAS at the Ranch House
Restaurant sometime after the deployment… because Paul
Musser says ( in his ADOSH interview ) that that is where
he suggested to Abel ( face to face ) that Abel become the
IC for the ‘Incident within an Incident’ and that Musser would
continue on as ‘Field OPS’ for the fire itself.
But I’m glad you brought this up… because even as xxfullsailxx
and I were having that exchange I remembered that there really
has never seemed to be any definite proof of WHEN Field OPS1
Todd Abel really worked his way down to Yarnell that day.
So, again… we KNOW that pretty much ‘everyone’ ended up
at the Ranch House Restaurant, at some point ( Musser, Cordes,
Willis, Abel, etc. )… but EXACTLY when they all arrived there
has never been fully researched or documented, AFAIK.
Musser says ( in his ADOSH interview ) that after he dropped
the ‘Planning OPS’ duties and jumped in as the second fully
functional ‘Field OPS’ on the fire that afternoon… he pulled
some resources to himself and then first tackled the problem
that had developed in the Sickles Road area. After he dealt
with that… he worked his way down towards Yarnell.
Apparently… he FIRST met up with SPGS1 Gary Cordes at
that ‘other’ staging area up by the Shrine Road ( I believe
it was referred to as ‘the gas station’ ). Whether he made his
1542 ‘availability check’ out to DIVSA Marsh just BEFORE
he arrived there or not has still not been definitely determined,
but that ‘near the Shrine road’ staging point IS where he
first met Cordes face-to-face and got ‘briefed’ on the situation
as Cordes knew it at that time. ( Evacuations already in progress ).
So we know when Musser got to Yarnell… and where he first
‘staged’ ( up near Shrine road and 89 )… but we still don’t know
when either he or Cordes went down to the RHR.
Likewise… we can (*apparently) hear Field OPS1 Todd Abel telling
SOMEONE in an Air Study video circa 4:10 or so that he thought he
was going to ‘be down there’ ( in Yarnell ) in (quote) “About FIVE”
( minutes )… but I also realized in that recent exchange that there
doesn’t seem to be any real proof that he actually did that ( made it
down there in 5 minutes ).
So I went digging.
I agree with xxfullsailxx that it “doesn’t really matter where
Abel was” with regards to radio transmissions that day… but
I was just curious myself whether there really is any documented
evidence of WHERE Field OPS1 Todd Abel actually WAS when
we hear him breaking into Steed’s MAYDAY sequence and
telling Air Attack “Granite Mountain is trying to get a hold of you,
let’s see what we’ve got goin’ on.”
Wherever he was at the time of the MAYDAYS… it is obvious
he was hearing that MAYDAY traffic in real time and HE was
the one trying to get Bravo 33 to ‘wake up and pay attention’
and RESPOND to these men… ( recorded in the Helmet-Cam
video ) which they (eventually) did.
I’ve checked all the Tom Story photos and the Michelle Lee
photos and the Blue Ridge photos from the Ranch House
Restaurant. I really don’t see either Musser OR Abel there in
pretty much ANY timeframe ( even though we know they were ).
I don’t see Darrell Willis in any of the photos either.. and we ALSO
know fer sure he was there at some point ( unless that
is him just sitting in that white pickup truck listening to radio ),
so I guess it’s possible ANY of these guys could have been there
at just about any time but just never got caught in a photo.
So I went back to Todd Abel’s own ADOSH interview.
Sure enough… there DOES seem to be a quick moment there
in that interview when they are looking at maps and Abel is
pointing to where he was out workinig on the NORTH end
of the fire.
As he was doing that… he happened to mention something.
On page 50 of his ADOSH interview… OPS1 Todd Abel
actually DOES describe how it was he got down to Yarnell,
and WHEN he did that.
It starts with them trying to work through the ‘unit log’ that Abel
supplied to the SAIT investigators… with him (Abel) pointing at the
map they were working with during the interview and him pointing
at the spot where he was working up on the north end. Then he
starts ‘pointing’ at ‘other spots’ and adding some explanation…
Q1 = Dave Larsen ( Rest in Peace )
A = Field OPS1 Todd Abel
______________________________________________________
Q1: Um, do you remember the timeframe? Do you remember
when you heard the word deploy?
A: I remember looking at my watching and thinking it was probably
around, uh, 1645ish.
Q1: Okay that seems to be – okay. All right. Uh, structures are
burning in Yarnell, heavy smoke, fire crosses 89, propane tanks
exploding, all-out search began for Granite Mountain, that’s the
next entry ( in Abel’s log ).
A: All right. Uh, I’m gonna – let me, uh – I’ll – let me back up a little
bit with you guys just to make sure we got the full picture here.
Q1: Please.
A: So I’m still upon this north end when all this happens down
here. Um, we had the wind – the wind had shifted, structures
weren’t threatened anymore. Um, I – about the time this happens,
Darrell Willis calls me and – just to update me on how they were
doing over there. I say are you copying this on air on to ground?
And he says no. I said Granite Mountain just deployed. And he’s
like well okay. You know and we hung up the phone – uh, it was
either phone or radio, I can’t remember, ‘cause I had talked to him
a couple of times on the phone. But, um, I called – Todd Foster
said hold up any burning, we didn’t need to do it anymore because
the wind had shifted. I moved myself back around to the – to Yarnell.
All right? Um, and – and I know Darrell did too and I know he made
arrangements to leave his chunk with the task force leader there.
So I come back around here to the – there’s a restaurant that sits,
uh – it’s gotta be right in here somewhere. A restaurant sits right in
there. Um, I came back around there. In transit over here I called
our alarm room here, started ordering Medevac helicopters and
ambulances, ‘cause I didn’t know what we were dealing with.
…
Q1: Okay.
A: So I come down to here. Paul Musser comes up to me and
says I’m gonna – we need to make you the IC of the incident within
the incident. I said I copy that. He goes I’m gonna keep on – I’m
gonna hold on to tactical – I’ll take tactical ops for the fire, so we
can still try to save some of this stuff in Yarnell.
______________________________________________________
So ( according to Abel himself ) he did NOT ‘make it down
there in FIVE minutes’ as he seemed to say he was going to
do in an Air Study video circa 4:10. According to Abel’s testimony
to ADOSH… he was still up on the north end even when the
MAYDAY calls first appeared on the radio at 1639… and he
jumped on the Air-to-ground channel to tell Bravo 33 to stop ignoring them from UP THERE… which is also where he
then had that cellphone call with Darrell Willis. Willis has always
said he got that cellphone call FROM Todd Abel to notify Willis
about the deployment ( and that it WAS, in fact, a phone call
and not a radio transmission ) but now Abel says it was the
other way around ( that Willis called HIM right after deployment).
So we still don’t have an exact TIME for when OPS1 Todd Abel
made it down to Yarnell… but it does SOUND like he only
headed down there because of the deployment situation and
that he DID go straight to the Ranch House Restaurant…
…and whenever he DID finally get there… that is when Musser
asked him to be IC for the ‘Incident within an Incident’.
Reply to xxfullsailxx on April 27, 2014 at 3:26 pm
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>> hmm, so even less credibility to the voice in the
>> “Yarnell Gamble” video being attributed to Abel…
>> interesting.
How so?
>> xxfullsailxx also said…
>> ultimately it doesn’t really matter where Abel was
I agree. IAOI ( If And Only If ) that really is him
speaking to Marsh in the YARNELL-GAMBLE
video and IAOI Marsh is actually responding
directly to whoever that is saying ‘appreciate if
you could get to town a little faster’…
…then YOU are right. It truly doesn’t matter where
Field OPS1 Todd Abel was. Radios are an
amazing tool.
You can maintain all you want that Marsh is
NOT ‘finishing’ an ongoing conversation with
speaker 1 in the YARNELL-GAMBLE video…
…but it is not possible to maintain that Eric Marsh
was NOT reporting Granite Mountain’s ‘status’
and/or ‘progress’ to SOMEONE at exactly that
moment in time… just 15 minutes before
deployment.
So WHO do YOU think Marsh was ‘reporting’ to,
at that moment, if not speaker 1 in the video?
It’s a finite (short) list of names, don’t you think?
Go re-read the interviews and the alleged interview notes/unit logs. Make a chart of who says they heard from or spoke with GM, regarding *what.* Presumably that chart will answer your questions (or at least point you in the right direction), no?
Elizabeth… it sounds like you might
have already done that yourself.
So same question goes out to YOU.
Regardless of the apparent ‘context’
of the YARNELL-GAMBLE video… and
the *apparent* response of Marsh to
what speaker 1 says… just take the
4:27 PM ‘report’ by Marsh all by itself.
WHO do YOU think he was ‘reporting
Granite Mountain’s status/progress
to at that moment… just 15 minutes
before deployment?
Do YOU, in fact, have some idea of WHO Marsh was obviously ‘reporting’ Granite Mountain’s status/progress to at 4:27 PM?
I have already stated a number of times what I believe is actually happening in the YARNELL-GAMBLE video and WHO Marsh
*seems* to be answering/reporting to.
I am seeking other opinions.
He was ‘reporting’ to SOMEONE ( with only 15 minutes to go before deployment ) and it’s a ‘short list’ of names.
>> Reply to Marti Reed post on April 25, 2014 at 6:52 pm
>>
>> Marti said…
>> I still haven’t managed to ever figure out Brendan’s trail.
>> I find it still REALLY confusing.
It’s not you, Marti. It really is quite confusing what ACTUALLY
happened there with that CONVOY circa 1600 ( 4:00 PM ).
>> WTKTT on April 26, 2014 at 12:22 am replied…
>>
>> Since the additional unit logs surfaced in February… it’s pretty clear that
>> Brendan DID just ‘convoy’ out with the Blue Ridge guys and they all drove
>> south through the Sesame area, then through Glen Ilah, then turned north
>> on Highway 89 at 4:02 PM ( when Brendan shot those pics out the window
>> of the Sup truck )… and then they all headed over to the Youth Camp at end
>> of Shrine road.
>>
>> So even if the new TIME for the ‘discussing their options’ conversations
>> moves BACK to the 3:53 PM timeframe… Brendan was ( supposedly ) still in
>> the GM Supervisor truck with ( in his own testimony ) the intra-crew radio
>> volume ‘cranked up’
>>
>> Marti Reed on April 26, 2014 at 7:07 am replied…
>>
>> But what does that do to the photos he took from Hiway 89 in
>> Yarnell at 4:05ish?
Nothing, really. The new TIME for the MacKenzie videos doesn’t change
that event. It just means that he had heard them ‘discussing their options’
BEFORE those photos were taken… and not (perhaps) DURING, as
was previously thought might be the case when it *seemed* that the
MacKenzie videos were also being shot at that same (4:02) moment.
If the time on Brendan’s own device was ‘right’ ( and it seemed to be
a network-connected smartphone so we ARE assuming that )… the
exact TIME for his 4 photos was 4:02 PM. He took all four of them
out the driver window just 2 seconds apart from each other.
>> Did he drive down Sesame to 89 and then up Shrine to where Blue Ridge
>> was and then help “bump” the rest of the trucks, which is what it looks like
>> to me?
I don’t believe Brendan did anything but sit in the GM Supervisor Truck from
the time he got in it after Frisby dropped him off until it finally reached the
Ranch House Restaurant circa 1639. That was now his only ‘job’.
The Blue Ridge guys had been told where all the ‘keys’ were in the trucks
long before they even tried to move them and back during the time when
Frisby was evacuating Brendan… so they did not NEED Brendan to help
them ‘bump’ anything.
Brendan’s JOB was simple… at that point…
Drive that GM Supervisor truck… keep track of ALL the GM vehicles…
and listen closely to that intra-crew frequency for instructions that
could come at ANY moment.
After 1549 and all the way to 1639, when all the vehicles were finally
arriving at the Ranch House Restaurant… I actually don’t think Brendan
even exited the GM Supervisor Truck at all…. not even once… unless
he had to take a piss, or something.
>> Marti also said…
>> When I read the Unit Logs, I find them very confusing as to who went
>> where and when.
It’s not you, Marti. It IS, in fact, very confusing.
When reading some of the unit logs… it even seems like some of the people who
were actually DRIVING the vehicles aren’t even sure exactly which way they
went that day.
The generally accepted theory is that ALL of the vehicles that were leaving
that Sesame Area that day ( GM Sup Truck, GM Chase, GM Crew Carriers,
1 or more Blue Ridge support vehicles, etc. ) ALL exited the Sesame area
the way they all came in that morning.
South through the Sesame area, onto the pavement where Lakewood and
Manazanita end in west Glen Ilah… EAST on Lakewood to Highway 89,
then NORTH on Highway 89 to Shrine Road, then WEST / NORTHWEST
on Shrine Road to where the pavement ends at the parking lot of the
St. Joseph Shrine itself ( where Aarron Hulburd shot the Helmet Cam
video along with Jason Clawson and KC (Bucky) Yowell later on )…
then WEST on Shrine road some more to that Youth Camp clearing.
I really don’t think that any ‘vehicle’ other than the BR ATV ever ‘cut across’
that ‘cutover trail’ between the Sesame area and the Youth Camp, even after
the dozer was done improving it. It was still a nasty, winding sandy-soft-dirt
road with a downhill descent through that rock pile just before reaching the
Youth Camp area.
I think all the ‘real vehicles’ just stayed with legit ROADS that day and
‘going all the way around’ through Yarnell was the safe bet… so that’s
what they all did.
It was NOT the time to get any expensive vehicle STUCK out there on one of
those dirt roads. That would have been a BIG problem, at that time.
One of the things to remember is that Brendan McDonough, himself, had
NO IDEA where this ‘Shrine Road’ was, much less that obscure Youth Camp
off by itself after the pavement of Shrine Road ends.
GM never went down Shrine Road that morning… or anywhere near it.
Cordes took GM out to the Sesame area that morning via that known
Lakewood Drive access route… and Brendan wasn’t even driving that
morning.
So Brendan, himself, MUST have ‘followed’ someone from the Blue Ridge Crew
out of that area to even know how to get out of there, much less all the way over
to this ‘Youth Camp’ at that time.
If Brendan had turned his camera just a little farther north for one of those
four photos he took looking west from Highway 89 at 4:02 PM, I am sure we
would have seen one of the Blue Ridge vehicles in front of him ‘showing him
where to go’.
>> Marti also wrote…
>> Whatever whenever, I think it may have been quite difficult for him to
>> have been paying complete attention to what was coming over the
>> radio, given all that was going on.
I’m going to disagree there, Marti.
On the contrary… it was now ( more than ever that day ) Brendan’s
‘prime directive’ to be ‘listening to the intra-crew radio’.
He had already TOLD his Captain ( Steed ) as he left his assigned lookout
position and was being ‘picked up’ by another Hotshot supervisor ( Frisby )
that that is EXACTLY what he would be doing while he was absent from them.
Brendan was now the one who was responsible for ALL of the GM vehicles
and, at some point, seeing to it that they were re-united with the rest of
HIS team.
At any moment… he could be receiving instructions… and he BETTER
be listening to the intra-crew and not MISS those instructions… and
he knew that.
If Brendan had MISSED a callout from Steed or Marsh ( at any moment )
with ‘instructions’ about where to try and rotate the GM vehicles… there
would have been hell to pay… and I think Brendan knew THAT, too.
Brendan has said in his ADOSH interviews that his own handheld had
the GM intra-crew set as his PRIORITY channel all day that day… which
means that even if you are in general *scan* mode… any transmissions
that begin to take place on that pre-set PRIORITY channel will ‘break through’
to the top and now be the active conversation coming over the radio so
that no important conversations on the PRIORITY channel are ‘missed’.
The onboard radios in the GM Superintendent and GM Chase truck
probably also had this PRIORITY channel preference set to GM’s own
intra-crew frequency.
So… because of the circumstances… it was IMPERATIVE that Brendan
be listening closely to the intra-crew while he was separated from the
others… and I believe that is exactly what he was doing.
Besides… despite any consternation about all of this… the FACT remains
that ALL of the ‘official’ reports about this incident all state (unequivocally)
that Brendan McDonough DID hear them ‘discussing their options’,
whenever that actually took place.
Brendan has never denied ( or even qualified ) these statements.
The only thing we do NOT know is WHAT he might have heard.
THAT is what he has always ( and still ) refuses to talk about.
Yeah, now I think you’re right. Thanks for helping clear this up.
The other thing this scenario implies, is that as soon as someone from Blue Ridge was driving Jesse Steed’s chase truck, they could have listened in on that channel, also. At least if, in fact, it had an on-board radio, and if it was set to that channel as Priority.
Reply to Marti Reed post on April 28, 2014 at 8:55 am
>> Marti said…
>> The other thing this scenario implies, is that as
>> soon as someone from Blue Ridge was driving
>> Jesse Steed’s chase truck, they could have listened
>> in on that channel, also. At least if, in fact, it had an
>> on-board radio, and if it was set to that channel
>> as Priority.
Exactly.
That has actually *always* been a possibility even when
we thought the MacKenzie videos were shot at 4:02 PM.
There is even *some* evidence in those (redacted)
unit logs that one ( or more? ) of the THREE Blue
Ridge personnel who ended up driving those THREE
other GM vehicles actually USED the onboard radio(s)
to speak with Marsh and/or Steed WHILE they were
driving the GM vehicles ( reporting progress and
whatnot ).
So there might actually be THREE Blue Ridge Hotshots
who had a good chance of hearing Marsh and Steed
talking to each other at any time after 3:49 or 3:50 PM.
It all depends when everyone actually got into those
trucks… and when all of these ‘comfort level’ and
‘discussing their options’ conversations actually took
place.
ADOSH was never able to interview ANY of the
Blue Ridge Hotshots. Zero. Zip. Nada.
>> calvin said…
>>
>> Mcdonough 154944 image.
>> How does this image align with the Mackenzie, Parker photos?
>> Where is the anchor point on the ridge?
>> Where is the Mackenzie, Parker, Norris photo spot?
>>
>> It appears that the ridge is clearly visible on the south side of the fire.
>> Possibly photographing the area GM were taking pictures from at
>> the same time?
Close… but no cigar.
The actual point where all these photos were being taken up on that ridge appears
to be *just* ‘out of frame’ on the left side of McDonough’s 1549 image(s).
That small ‘knob’ seen up on the ridge at the very left edge of 154944 appears
to be the north part of the actual ‘helispot’… where the entire DOC Lewis crew
was ‘airlifted’ out of that location just hours earlier that day…
…but even that ‘helispot’ was some hundreds of yards NORTH of where those
late-day ‘resting spots’ and the spot where the MacKenzie cellphone and Canon
photos/videos were taken.
However… looking back in the OTHER direction…
* IMG_2736.JPG – 3:51.58 PM
This MacKenzie cellphone image ( taken just 2 minutes and 14 seconds AFTER McDonough’s 154844 image ) has a clear view back from the ridge to the ‘Sesame area’… but the view to that EXACT spot where BOTH the GM Supervisor Truck AND the CM Chase truck had been parked that day is blocked by a ‘ridge’ in the distance.
That spot where they were ACTUALLY parked was a few hundred yards west of the point where that east/west two-track actually meets the more open ‘Sesame area’.
HOWEVER… in this photo… you CAN see that exact ‘intersection’ of the east/west two-track leading out to the ridge and where it meets the Sesame area… and there DO appear to be a group of vehicles captured there in this 3:51.58 PM photo.
I count at least TWO vehicles there.
They appear as small WHITE dots against the tan background of the
clearing at that point.
This is, in fact, known to be point where Blue Ridge had left at least ONE of their vehicles that day… which also needed to be evacuated along with the GM vehicles around this time.
So it looks like it is POSSIBLE that this cellphone photo of MacKenzie’s ( at 3:51.58 ) has captured the moment when that ‘evacuation’ convoy was assembling and actually heading out of the Sesame area.
It could very well be that moments after Brendan shot his 1549 photos… the ‘extra driver’ for the GM Chase Truck arrived at his location and then they both drove these WHITE vehicles the few hundred yards east to the Sesame area… and now Christopher’s 3:51.58 cellphone photo is capturing them ‘pausing’ at that intersection to pick up the other Blue Ridge vehicle that also needed to be evacuated.
* IMG_2738.JPG – 3:55.31 PM
3 minutes and 33 seconds later… those WHITE DOTS are GONE from that intersection where the east/west two-track meets the Sesame area… but NOW we see what appears to be an even LARGER group of vehicles in the distance at the exact point where the two GM Crew Carriers had been parked all day.
The 2 GM Crew Carriers had actually been visible there as 2 ‘white dots’ in various other photos taken throughout the day, but NOW ( at 3:55.31 PM ) there appear to be MORE than just the 2 Crew Carriers assembled at that location.
So THIS MacKenzie cellphone photo could now be showing the actual ‘progression’ of the evacuation convoy as it stopped where the GM Crew Carriers were to ‘fire them up’ and add them to the convoy…
…which was then going to keep heading SOUTH in the Sesame area and exit out to Highway 89 via Lakewood Drive in Glen Ilah ( the way they all came in that day in the first place ).
That ‘convoy’ would, of course, then head all the way around on Highway 89 and Shrine road to ‘re-stage’ out at the Youth Camp at the west end of Shrine road.
The timing pretty much matches here.
Christopher’s cellphone photos might actually have been capturing the ‘progess’ of this vehicle evacuation down there in the Sesame Area clearings.
** THE MACKENZIE VIDEOS AND ‘THE CONVOY’…
The only chance of seeing this same ‘activity’ in the distance in the MacKenzie videos comes after the 4 or 5 second mark in Chrisopher’s FIRST video… when he pans the camera to the right and we first see Jesse Steed sitting there.
In the distance… over Steed’s red helmet… you CAN see the same ‘clearing’ where the GM Crew Carriers were parked.
However… at this moment in the first MacKenzie video… there does NOT appear to be the same large ‘group of vehicles’ at that spot as can be seen in the (upcoming) 2738 cellphone photo. You can still ( apparently ) only see the two GM Crew Carriers there.
Since we NOW know that these MacKenzie videos HAD to have been taken
in-between MacKenzie cellphone photos 2736 and 2737… this would still make sense.
That means the ‘convoy’ may have still been working its way down south from the northern end of the Sesame area at that moment in the first video… but is still hidden behind that ridge in the distance.
It would only be a few minutes later ( when MacKenzie would return to shooting photos with his cellphone ( with image 2738 at 3:55.31 ) that we NOW see the convoy ‘arriving’ where the GM Crew Carriers are.
Followup… cellphone photo 2737 is the FIRST one that MacKenzie
took AFTER using his Canon Powershot to shoot the videos…
but that 2737 photo is of the fireline and is NOT pointed EAST
where we could see any ‘convoy’ activity.
It is only 11 seconds AFTER 2737 when Christopher then
turned more to the EAST and took his next 2738 photo which
DOES show the Sesame area in the distance.
WTKTT. So you are saying the Discussing options spot is more to the south or left of the 154944 image? Do I understand you correctly that the helispot/ anchor point is visible in this photo? Meaning that if Marsh was north of the discussing options spot, he would have had a clear line of sight to where Mcdonough was in this picture?
>> calvin said…
>> WTKTT. So you are saying the Discussing options
>> spot is more to the south or left of the 154944 image?
Yes. That is what Google Earth ‘ground level’ lookbacks
from Brendan’s location seem to indicate. If Brendan
has just pointed the camera a *little* more to HIS
left before taking that picture… it would have PROBABLY
captured that spot where the men were at 1549 up
in the ridge at the very left edge of his photo.
Now… whether we could have ACTUALLY ‘seen’ them
up there on the ridge or not is still debatable. The
resolution on Brendan’s camera was not so hot.
>> calvin also said…
>> Do I understand you correctly that the helispot/ anchor
>> point is visible in this photo?
Yes. It seems to be. That ‘knob’ on the ridge at the
extreme left of the photo seems to be the NORTHERN
edge of that area where the helispot was… and the spot
where the entire Lewis DOC Crew had been evacuated
from that same ‘anchor point’ location via helicopter
just hours earlier that day.
>> calvin also wrote…
>> Meaning that if Marsh was north of the discussing
>> options spot,
There is no ‘if’ about it. He was ‘north’ of that spot,
at that point. Probably still almost all the way on the
top of Weaver Mountain itself and ( as he had just
told OPS1 Todd Abel )… “Workin’ my way off the top.”
>> calvin also wrote…
>> he (Marsh) would have had a clear line of sight to
>> where Mcdonough was in this picture?
Well… I don’t know about a CLEAR line of sigth… but
YES… Marsh probably could have seen this area where
the GM Supervisor AND the GM Chase Trucks were
parked from where he was at that time.
It all depends on the ‘smoke curtain’… and what it looked
like from the ‘other side’. I still ascribe to your theory that
the reason Steed felt the need to tell Marsh ( in the
second MacKenzie video ) that the fire had “Almost made
it to that two-track road we walked in on” is because
Steed KNEW Marsh was pretty far NORTH of where
they were… and would now have been looking BACK
‘through’ the south-headed ‘smoke curtain’… and Steed
was just telling Marsh what HE was seeing in case
Marsh couldn’t really see through that ‘smoke curtain’
too well at that point.
There are also various other reported ‘comments’ from
Eric Marsh in this timeframe about him saying he could
‘see’ certain things… but those reports are spotty ( and
not even verified? ) so it’s really hard to say what Marsh
could ACTUALLY see from up there on the Weaver
Mountain, in this general timeframe ( after wind shift ).
**
** TOM STORY CANON EOS 5D MARK II CAMERA
** WAS 1 TO 2 MINUTES OFF THE CORRECT TIME THAT DAY?
This is the Tom Story photograph that show the Blue Ridge ATV actually
LEAVING the Ranch House Restaurant parking lot…
Tom Story photo: 201303_Yarnell_Hill_1682
It is ‘leaving’ the lot via the southern driveway opening and its hard to see… but if
you zoom in over the open driver-side door of the white pickup with the red stripe
on the LEFT SIDE of the photo… you can see the Blue Ridge ATV there ‘pausing’
at the driveway just before pulling out onto Highway 89.
And here is the EXIF metadata for this particular Tom Story photo…
_________________________________________________________________
Caption: A thunderstorm to the north of Peeples (cq) Valley during the
Yarnell Hill Fire caused the blaze to reverse directions and burn through the
town of Yarnell.
Artist: TOM STORY
Address: Post Office Box 7936, Tempe, AZ, 85281, USA
Copyright: Copyright Tom Story – All Rights Reserved
Camera: Canon EOS 5D Mark II
Lens: Canon EF 16-35mm f/2.8L – Shot at 35 mm
Exposure: Auto exposure, Shutter priority AE, 1/166 sec, f/4.5, ISO 800, Compensation: -1
Flash: Off, Did not fire
Focus: One-shot AF, with a depth of field of from inf to 2.14 m.
Focus 2: AF Area Mode: Multi-point AF or AI AF
Keywords: Airtankers, VLAT, SEATS, Type II helicopters, Type 1 Helicopters. Structures lost.
Date: June 30, 2013 – 5:08:18 PM
Location: Peeples Valley, AZ, USA
File: 2,720 × 4,080 JPEG (11.1 megapixels)
__________________________________________________________________
So, according to the timestamp on Tom Story’s Canon EOS 5D Mark II camera,
the Blue Ridge ATV was leaving the Ranch House Restaurant parking lot at
exactly 1708.18 ( 5:08.18 PM ).
This does NOT match the Blue Ridge GPS tracking data, which was taking
the TIME value directly from information contained in packets coming from
the satellites themselves.
At about +6:05 in the Blue Ridge GPS tracking video itself is the 1707 to 1710
GPS tracking data… which looks like this…
__________________________________________________________________
1707 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary at the Ranch House Restaurant
1708 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1709 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary ( slight movement south in the Ranch House Restaurant parking lot )
1710 – 34.216118, -112.758758 – 1839.480 – 20.90 – Heading northwest through Glen Ilah on Lakewood Drive
1711 – 34.218611, -112.760239 – 1000.710 – 11.37 – At intersection of Westward/Lakewood and Manzanita Drive
__________________________________________________________________
At 1709 ( 48 seconds AFTER Tom Story’s photo 1708.18 timestamp ),
the Blue Ridge GPS tracker shows that it has, in fact, moved just slightly
SOUTH in the parking lot ( which would match the move shown in the Tom
Story photo towards the southern driveway entrance/exit ) but it STILL has
NOT actually LEFT the Ranch House Restaurant parking lot yet.
60 seconds LATER… at 1710… the GPS tracking DOES show the ATV having
left the parking lot and is now heading west on Lakwood Drive in the
Glen Ilah sub-division.
It has ( by 1710 ) traveled 1,839 feet which represents a speed of 20.90 mph
in relation to its previous 1709 location, still back in the RHR parking lot.
Since the GPS unit was ONLY updating every 60 seconds… it is not telling us
the EXACT MOMENT when the Ranger did leave the parking lot… but it IS
telling us that at 1709… it had not YET left the lot.
So Tom Story’s Canon EOS could NOT have been more than about 2 minutes
off the ‘actual’ clock time that day… but it DOES look it MIGHT have been
anywhere from a minimum of 48 seconds up to 1 minute off.
** BLUE RIDGE TRACKING DATA FOR THIS TIMEFRAME
Here is the actual Blue Ridge GPS tracking data that covers the time period from
the tracker ( in Captain Brown’s possession ) actually evacuating the Shrine
Road Youth Camp.. through the time at the Ranch House Restaurant and then
the start of the ‘ground rescue mission’.
It also shows their exact movements on that ‘rescue mission’ as they first scouted
various roads in Glen Ilah, then moved north to the Shrine road where they would
then ‘break through’ and head west out to the ridge…
1635 – 34.228414, -112.754134 – 0644.378 – 07.32 – Heading EAST out the driveway of the Youth Camp (YC)
1636 – 34.227183, -112.752758 – 0624.010 – 07.09 – At the St. Joseph Shrine (SJS) parking lot now
1637 – 34.227183, -112.752758 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary at SJS parking lot
1638 – 34.227183, -112.752758 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary at SJS parking lot
1639 – 34.224803, -112.749746 – 1342.030 – 15.25 – Suddenly all the way EAST on Shrine Rd, almost to Highway 89
1640 – 34.222603, -112.746935 – 1188.170 – 13.50 – At the intersection of Shrine road and Highway 89 now
1641 – 34.217985, -112.750025 – 1966.140 – 22.34 – Heading SOUTH on Highway 89 to the Ranch House Restaurant
1642 – 34.213532, -112.755497 – 2468.580 – 28.05 – Heading SOUTH on Highway 89 to the Ranch House Restaurant
1643 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0167.099 – 01.90 – Arrival at the Ranch House Restaurant
NOTE: 1643 is one of the estimated times of the burnover in the box canyon.
1644 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary in parking lot
1645 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1646 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1647 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary ( slight movement west )
1648 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1649 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1650 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1651 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1652 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1653 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1654 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary ( slight movement east )
1655 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary ( slight movement west )
1656 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1657 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary ( slight movement east )
1658 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1659 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1700 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1701 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary ( slight movement west )
1702 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1703 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1704 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1705 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1706 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1707 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1708 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1709 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary ( slight movement south in the parking lot )
1710 – 34.216118, -112.758758 – 1839.480 – 20.90 – Heading northwest through Glen Ilah on Lakewood Drive
1711 – 34.218611, -112.760239 – 1000.710 – 11.37 – At intersection of Westward/Lakewood and Manzanita Drive
1712 – 34.215772, -112.758640 – 1183.450 – 13.45 – Back east on Lakewood Drive
1713 – 34.218611, -112.760239 – 1183.550 – 13.45 – Back west again to same 1711 spot. Intersection of Westward/Lakewood and Manzanita
1714 – 34.215471, -112.758082 – 1352.120 – 15.36 – Back east on Lakewood again. To intersection of Lakewood and Mountainaire Drive
1715 – 34.215471, -112.758082 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1716 – 34.215471, -112.758082 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1717 – 34.215304, -112.759219 – 0405.336 – 04.61 – Southwest on Mountainaire, then west on Foothill Drive
1718 – 34.216544, -112.762223 – 1043.210 – 11.85 – Heading west on Foothill Drive
1719 – 34.215746, -112.760561 – 0612.670 – 06.96 – Heading back east on Foothill Drive to Mountainaire Drive
1720 – 34.212534, -112.760646 – 1646.220 – 18.71 – South on Mountainaire Drive
1721 – 34.210502, -112.762266 – 1149.650 – 13.06 – South on Mountainaire, west on Las Tiendas Dr., then south on Candy Cane Ln.
1722 – 34.215346, -112.758458 – 2457.170 – 27.82 – All the way back north (fast) to intersection of Mountainaire and Lakewood
1723 – 34.215967, -112.754134 – 2607.150 – 29.63 – Exited Glen Ilah via Lakewood east, now heading north on Highway 89 (fast)
1724 – 34.222581, -112.746828 – 3413.380 – 38.79 – North (fast) on Highway 89, now at intersection of 89 and Shrine Road
1725 – 34.223610, -112.748051 – 0542.768 – 06.17 – West on Shrine Road. Now at intersection of Shrine Road and Willow Lane
1726 – 34.228307, -112.753844 – 2538.890 – 28.85 – West on Shrine Road all the way to Youth Camp entrance
1727 – 34.227225, -112.752782 – 0544.510 – 06.19 – Back east on Shrine Road to St. Joseph Shrine parking lot
1728 – 34.228502, -112.754166 – 0650.764 – 07.39 – Back west to near Youth Camp entrance again
1729 – 34.228502, -112.754166 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1730 – 34.228502, -112.754166 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
A few moments later… they would ( according to the Blue Ridge notes )
decide to (quote) “F**k it… let’s go for it”… and break through the Shrine
area and then head west out to the ridge where GM had been working.
Awesome catch, thanks! I was disappointed Tom didn’t catch the UTV after it “disappeared” from it’s spot, but thanks to your keen eye seeing that, he apparently did!
So that would mean, given that this camera was, if not EXACTLY correct (which is understandable), quite realistically reliably time-stamped, either the Canon EOS-1D Mark II N (the best, most state-of-the-art and expensive camera he had that day, with the most expensive telephohoto lens, with which he shot the “4:39” VLAT drop was seriously not synced to it (which becomes, to me, harder to imagine, all things considered, but then who knows for sure), or……….
As a photographer, I’m sitting here having a really hard time conceiving of going out to a shoot with three cameras (one of them being the current state-of-the-art), a bunch of top quality glass, I.e. thousands of dollars worth of equipment, to professionally shoot a major event, with one lesser camera being basically accurately set time-wise and the best one not even remotely.
But then, I’m also still not really grasping why Chris did what he did.
I’m partly tempted to write to Tom Story, whose PO Box is in his metadata. But I retired from this at the beginning of February………
Reply to Marti Reed post on April 26, 2014 at 7:31 pm
>> Marti said…
>> So that would mean, given that this camera was, if not
>> EXACTLY correct (which is understandable), quite
>> realistically reliably time-stamped,
Yes. I goofed with the math above and ADDED 3
seconds instead of subtracting… so instead of his
Caonon EOS timestamp of 1708.18 ( 5:08.18 PM ).
being 48 seconds ‘away’ from the 1709… it was
really only 42 seconds ‘off’.
In order for them to have traveled 1,839 west by the time
the 1710 GPS update recorded… then that really does
mean they HAD to have ‘launched’ away from the Ranch
House Restaurant just a few seconds after the 1709
update showed them still sitting there.
So just add those few seconds to the 43 seconds and
it really means Story’s Canon EOS was off by only
45 to 50 seconds ( under a minute off ).
On a day like this… when it seems that NO ONE knew
what frickin’ time it was all day… and people’s devices
all wildly inaccurate… I’d say we have to call this
( now proven ) ‘less than a minute’ offset pretty darn
accurate.
So at least that takes care of ONE of Story’s cameras.
It can be said that ANY picture coming from his
Canon EOS was never more than 45 or 50 seconds
away from an atomic timestamp that was coming
from orbiting satellites that day. Not too shabby.
Just to be clear, though… what I believe we
just proved is that while *accurate*… any
Tom Story photo taken with his Canon EOS
must be considered to be 45 to 50 seconds
BEHIND the *real* atomic time ( and not
AHEAD of it ).
If a Tom Story Canon EOS photo has a
timestamp of, say, 1508.10… then the
REAL (atomic) clock time is about 50
seconds AHEAD of that and it might
already actually be 1509.00.
For anybody that doesn’t know what the relevance of this conversation might be, it shows that Tom Story’s photos from one of his cameras, capturing images from the Ranch House Restaurant after news of the deployment had been reported to everybody but, seemingly him, are basically accurate time wise, but his images of a VLAT drop, from another camera, at the time of Jesse Steed’s Mayday radio call, are problematic, because we have no other evidence that drop happened when his state-of-the-art camera seems to have recorded it. So we are wondering “what happened here and when??”
**
** TOM STORY CANON EOS 5D MARK II CAMERA
** WAS 1 TO 2 MINUTES OFF THE CORRECT TIME THAT DAY?
This is the Tom Story photograph that show the Blue Ridge ATV actually
LEAVING the Ranch House Restaurant parking lot…
Tom Story photo: 201303_Yarnell_Hill_1682
It is ‘leaving’ the lot via the southern driveway opening and its hard to see… but if
you zoom in over the open driver-side door of the white pickup with the red stripe
on the LEFT SIDE of the photo… you can see the Blue Ridge ATV there ‘pausing’
at the driveway just before pulling out onto Highway 89.
And here is the EXIF metadata for this particular Tom Story photo…
_________________________________________________________________
Caption: A thunderstorm to the north of Peeples (cq) Valley during the
Yarnell Hill Fire caused the blaze to reverse directions and burn through the
town of Yarnell.
Artist: TOM STORY
Address: Post Office Box 7936, Tempe, AZ, 85281, USA
Contact: [email protected][email protected], 480 966 6134 602 549 4094, tomstory.com
Copyright: Copyright Tom Story – All Rights Reserved
Camera: Canon EOS 5D Mark II
Lens: Canon EF 16-35mm f/2.8L – Shot at 35 mm
Exposure: Auto exposure, Shutter priority AE, 1/166 sec, f/4.5, ISO 800, Compensation: -1
Flash: Off, Did not fire
Focus: One-shot AF, with a depth of field of from inf to 2.14 m.
Focus 2: AF Area Mode: Multi-point AF or AI AF
Keywords: Airtankers, VLAT, SEATS, Type II helicopters, Type 1 Helicopters. Structures lost.
Date: June 30, 2013 – 5:08:18 PM
Location: Peeples Valley, AZ, USA
File: 2,720 × 4,080 JPEG (11.1 megapixels)
__________________________________________________________________
So, according to the timestamp on Tom Story’s Canon EOS 5D Mark II camera,
the Blue Ridge ATV was leaving the Ranch House Restaurant parking lot at
exactly 1708.18 ( 5:08.18 PM ).
This does NOT match the Blue Ridge GPS tracking data, which was taking
the TIME value directly from information contained in packets coming from
the satellites themselves.
At about +6:05 in the Blue Ridge GPS tracking video itself is the 1707 to 1710
GPS tracking data… which looks like this…
__________________________________________________________________
1707 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary at the Ranch House Restaurant
1708 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1709 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary ( slight movement south in the Ranch House Restaurant parking lot )
1710 – 34.216118, -112.758758 – 1839.480 – 20.90 – Heading northwest through Glen Ilah on Lakewood Drive
1711 – 34.218611, -112.760239 – 1000.710 – 11.37 – At intersection of Westward/Lakewood and Manzanita Drive
__________________________________________________________________
At 1709 ( 48 seconds AFTER Tom Story’s photo 1708.18 timestamp ),
the Blue Ridge GPS tracker shows that it has, in fact, moved just slightly
SOUTH in the parking lot ( which would match the move shown in the Tom
Story photo towards the southern driveway entrance/exit ) but it STILL has
NOT actually LEFT the Ranch House Restaurant parking lot yet.
60 seconds LATER… at 1710… the GPS tracking DOES show the ATV having
left the parking lot and is now heading west on Lakwood Drive in the
Glen Ilah sub-division.
It has ( by 1710 ) traveled 1,839 feet which represents a speed of 20.90 mph
in relation to its previous 1709 location, still back in the RHR parking lot.
Since the GPS unit was ONLY updating every 60 seconds… it is not telling us
the EXACT MOMENT when the Ranger did leave the parking lot… but it IS
telling us that at 1709… it had not YET left the lot.
So Tom Story’s Canon EOS could NOT have been more than about 2 minutes
off the ‘actual’ clock time that day… but it DOES look it MIGHT have been
anywhere from a minimum of 48 seconds up to 1 minute off.
** BLUE RIDGE TRACKING DATA FOR THIS TIMEFRAME
Here is the actual Blue Ridge GPS tracking data that covers the time period from
the tracker ( in Captain Brown’s possession ) actually evacuating the Shrine
Road Youth Camp.. through the time at the Ranch House Restaurant and then
the start of the ‘ground rescue mission’.
It also shows their exact movements on that ‘rescue mission’ as they first scouted
various roads in Glen Ilah, then moved north to the Shrine road where they would
then ‘break through’ and head west out to the ridge…
1635 – 34.228414, -112.754134 – 0644.378 – 07.32 – Heading EAST out the driveway of the Youth Camp (YC)
1636 – 34.227183, -112.752758 – 0624.010 – 07.09 – At the St. Joseph Shrine (SJS) parking lot now
1637 – 34.227183, -112.752758 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary at SJS parking lot
1638 – 34.227183, -112.752758 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary at SJS parking lot
1639 – 34.224803, -112.749746 – 1342.030 – 15.25 – Suddenly all the way EAST on Shrine Rd, almost to Highway 89
1640 – 34.222603, -112.746935 – 1188.170 – 13.50 – At the intersection of Shrine road and Highway 89 now
1641 – 34.217985, -112.750025 – 1966.140 – 22.34 – Heading SOUTH on Highway 89 to the Ranch House Restaurant
1642 – 34.213532, -112.755497 – 2468.580 – 28.05 – Heading SOUTH on Highway 89 to the Ranch House Restaurant
1643 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0167.099 – 01.90 – Arrival at the Ranch House Restaurant
NOTE: 1643 is one of the estimated times of the burnover in the box canyon.
1644 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary in parking lot
1645 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1646 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1647 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary ( slight movement west )
1648 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1649 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1650 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1651 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1652 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1653 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1654 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary ( slight movement east )
1655 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary ( slight movement west )
1656 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1657 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary ( slight movement east )
1658 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1659 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1700 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1701 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary ( slight movement west )
1702 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1703 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1704 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1705 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1706 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1707 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1708 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1709 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary ( slight movement south in the parking lot )
1710 – 34.216118, -112.758758 – 1839.480 – 20.90 – Heading northwest through Glen Ilah on Lakewood Drive
1711 – 34.218611, -112.760239 – 1000.710 – 11.37 – At intersection of Westward/Lakewood and Manzanita Drive
1712 – 34.215772, -112.758640 – 1183.450 – 13.45 – Back east on Lakewood Drive
1713 – 34.218611, -112.760239 – 1183.550 – 13.45 – Back west again to same 1711 spot. Intersection of Westward/Lakewood and Manzanita
1714 – 34.215471, -112.758082 – 1352.120 – 15.36 – Back east on Lakewood again. To intersection of Lakewood and Mountainaire Drive
1715 – 34.215471, -112.758082 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1716 – 34.215471, -112.758082 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1717 – 34.215304, -112.759219 – 0405.336 – 04.61 – Southwest on Mountainaire, then west on Foothill Drive
1718 – 34.216544, -112.762223 – 1043.210 – 11.85 – Heading west on Foothill Drive
1719 – 34.215746, -112.760561 – 0612.670 – 06.96 – Heading back east on Foothill Drive to Mountainaire Drive
1720 – 34.212534, -112.760646 – 1646.220 – 18.71 – South on Mountainaire Drive
1721 – 34.210502, -112.762266 – 1149.650 – 13.06 – South on Mountainaire, west on Las Tiendas Dr., then south on Candy Cane Ln.
1722 – 34.215346, -112.758458 – 2457.170 – 27.82 – All the way back north (fast) to intersection of Mountainaire and Lakewood
1723 – 34.215967, -112.754134 – 2607.150 – 29.63 – Exited Glen Ilah via Lakewood east, now heading north on Highway 89 (fast)
1724 – 34.222581, -112.746828 – 3413.380 – 38.79 – North (fast) on Highway 89, now at intersection of 89 and Shrine Road
1725 – 34.223610, -112.748051 – 0542.768 – 06.17 – West on Shrine Road. Now at intersection of Shrine Road and Willow Lane
1726 – 34.228307, -112.753844 – 2538.890 – 28.85 – West on Shrine Road all the way to Youth Camp entrance
1727 – 34.227225, -112.752782 – 0544.510 – 06.19 – Back east on Shrine Road to St. Joseph Shrine parking lot
1728 – 34.228502, -112.754166 – 0650.764 – 07.39 – Back west to near Youth Camp entrance again
1729 – 34.228502, -112.754166 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1730 – 34.228502, -112.754166 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
A few moments later… they would ( according to the Blue Ridge notes )
decide to (quote) “F**k it… let’s go for it”… and break through the Shrine
area and then head west out to the ridge where GM had been working.
Reply to Marti Reed post on April 24, 2014 at 12:45 pm
>> Marti said…
>>
>> Well. I just picked my way thru Tom’s photos. At first I wrote, up above,
>> that I never trust camera time stamps becuz most ppl don’t need to pay
>> attention to them.
>>
>> But Tom was using three cameras that day, switching back and forth
>> depending on which lens he needed.
Yes.. he was… and he was *most probably* using that beast with the large
telephoto lens when he was shooting the distant DC10 VLAT drops.
>> Marti also wrote…
>> So that would lead me to think he probably must have had to sync them,
>> thus at least vaguely getting them accurate.
>> So the 3:49 photos are mystifying.
Yes, they are… but see above. Maybe *ONLY* that beast with the telephoto
lens had an ‘inaccurate’ time stamp and seemed to be showing that VLAT
drop at 4:39… exactly when Captain Jesse Steed was actually MAKING
his first MAYDAY call.
>> Marti also said…
>> I think his photos at the Ranch House Parking Lot seem about right, though.
Yes, they do. Some of them even seem to match exactly with the
Michelle Lee photos from the parking lot… but SOME of them still seem
a little ‘wonky’ as to timestamp(s).
>> They would definitely have been later than McCord’s.
>> I think McCord jumped out of the Blue Ridge Buggy and started shooting
>> relatively immediately.
Agree. Despite some of the unit log notes… it would definitely seem that
that they were aware of the MAYDAY tracking either just BEFORE or
AS they were pulling into the RHR parking lot itself.
>> Tom’s photos start with the Blue Ridge ATV near the trucks, and then
>> the ATV vanishes, and I think that happening around 5 seems reasonable.
In one of Tom’s photos… he captures the moment when the BR ATV was
actually *leaving* the lot. It’s hidden behind one of the white pickups… but
you can see it there just pulling OUT of the RHR and onto Highway 89 for
that first trip that would take them down Lakewood Drive and to the west
end of the Glen Ilah subdivision.
>> And, yes, the fire has gotten much closer by then as the parking lot,
>> itself would eventually no longer be considered a “safe zone.”
>> So I’m stumped. It would be helpful if there was a timed list of the
>> VLAT drops, for sure.
There is still no captured “Air-to-Air” traffic in the USDA Air Study videos
that would support *any* DC10 VLAT actually ‘dropping’ at 1639 itself.
Yes… Air Attack can be heard ‘discussing’ a drop with VLAT pilot ‘Kevin
at that exact time… but that drop they are discussing was still in the
planning stage and they hadn’t even done the ‘show me’ run yet.
Almost more than 40 minutes earlier… SPGS1 Gary Cordes had directly
requested that the Air resources start ‘dropping at will’ and to try and
‘save whatever town they could’… but I don’t think for one minute that
actually meant the airplanes started doing whatever the hell they wanted.
It still all had to go through ‘Air Attack’… or there would have just been
complete and utter chaos ( and perhaps more fatal incidents that day ).
I wanted to go back a minuet to the April 25 @4:43 posting of Marti Reed.
Scott Noris Photo
This picture alone says a thousand words to a knowledgeable Fire Fighter.
Fuels and weather before GM left the black.
Note the flame lengths from that location 20 to 40 Ft. based on est. 10 to 15 FT. Brush.
There are at least 3 or maybe 4 fire swirls (wind educed).
This is an extreme indicator of unpredictable fire behavior.
GM was looking right at that, What or who could have possibly convinced them to move out of the black and into the unburned and head to BSR?
That was one of the biggest indicators, they were looking right at it and taking pictures of the flame front. They ignored it and moved down into unburned fuel.
Its hard for me to believe. But then I just read over on WFToday a fire fighter saying they do not train in the 10 and 18 or use it on fires a statement on redoing the 10 & 18. WTF I would like to have used the entire F-word.
Mir. Powers… yes… that’s really quite a frightening picture… given
that ‘green carpet’ of ‘gasoline on a stick’ sitting right in front of
it ( and continuing for over 4,000 yards… right to the mouth of
that box canyon they decided to drop into.
Ditto for the MacKenzie Canon high-res photos. Huge wind-bent
flame lengths clearly seen.
Something to keep in mind, however, is what Calvin astutely
observed in the evidence some time ago… and that is what
Jesse Steed is captured saying back to Marsh in the second
MacKenzie video.
Steed reports… ( back to Marsh )… “I copy… and it’s almost
made it to the two-track road we walked in on.”
As Calvin originally asked… you have to wonder WHY Steed
felt the need to report that ‘visual’ back to Marsh.
It is VERY possible that Eric Marsh was so far north on that
two-track road and all the way up on the top of Weaver
Mountain that he was now BEHIND the smoke curtain and
unable to see what was actually happening in FRONT of it.
So Steed was reporting to Marsh what HE ( and now WE ) can
see in the videos… but the actual reality of the flame front
( size, speed, direction(s) ) was now hidden from view from
Marsh because of his distance north, and the now southern
direction of the flame front.
So it very well could be that ( for whatever reasons… radio call,
cell phone call, his own DIVSA initiative ) Marsh just WANTED
to try ‘the mission’… but was now relying solely on Steed to
tell him his ‘comfort level’ since Marsh couldn’t really see
the south-headed flamefront at the time he wanted them to
start ‘the mission’.
So maybe it really was just Captain Jesse Steed reporting back
to Marsh something like…
“Yea… what the hell… I think we can make it… but if there’s
any chance we need to leave RIGHT NOW.”
Mcdonough 154944 image. How does this image align with the Mackenzie, Parker photos? Where is the anchor point on the ridge? Where is the Mackenzie, Parker, Norris photo spot?
It appears that the ridge is clearly visible on the south side of the fire. Possibly photographing the area GM were taking pictures from at the same time?
calvin… see a new ‘parent’ comment about this
just above. It looks like the exact spot where the
‘men’ were up on the ridge is *just* out-of-frame
to the left in McDonough’s 1549 image(s)…
…However… it also now appears that MacKenzie
cellphone photos and his Canon videos ( now known
to ALL be in the 3:50 to 3:55 timerange ) appear
to show the ‘progress’ of the possible vehicle
convoy off in the distance as the GM and Blue
Ridge trucks were being ‘driven out’.
>> Reply to Marti Reed post on April 25, 2014 at 4:43 pm
>>
>> Marti said…
>> Another important visual for this sequence (that I had forgotten about until
>> going back to redo it) is Scott Norris’. That’s Scott standing up on that rock
>> taking his photo in most of these Caldwell photos and videos.
Yes. It most certainly IS… and you are RIGHT. That photo texted at 3:54 PM by Scott Norris ( along with Calvin’s observations concerning the gloves ) could help nail down the exact TIME where that 48 second time block for the 4 MacKenzie Canon items fits into that 3 minute and 22 second ‘window’ where we now know it belongs.
>> Marti also wrote…
>> PS I think you can see Scott shooting that photo 1 second into Chris’
>> second video, MVI_0891
Yes. It’s possible. I did a preliminary SUPER enhancement on the fireline at that
point in the 0891 video and compared it with the Scott Norris photo and I’m not
really seeing a match at this point… but more work needs to be done there.
There MIGHT be a better ‘fireline/smoke’ match somewhere else in that
video or even in the FIRST video. More about that later.
>> Marti also wrote…
>> And, by the way, looking at my ancient notes regarding the whereabouts of the
>> cellphones, I have no indication of Scott’s cellphone ever entering into the
>> chain of evidence.
It would, of course, be nice to have a copy of that original photo Norris took, complete with EXIF metadata and timestamp… but alas… I think you are right.
The reason that Scott Norris photo that was supplied to the SAIT investigators has basically NO EXIF information at all is because that’s what usually happens these days when you elect to ‘attach’ a photo to a TEXT message on one of these Smartphones.
The Smartphone doesn’t even send the ‘original’ ( which could be up to 8 megapixels on an iPhone 4 ). It makes a ‘cropped’ sort of ‘square’ copy of the photo you want to TEXT out and also reduces the resolution. It does NOT preserve the original metadata when it does this. Likewise for the RECEIVER. Depending on what software RECEIVES it… sometimes it is reformatted on reception even AGAIN and whatever metadata was in it can then be even FURTHER lost.
So the REAL question is ( as you said )…
Whatever happened to Scott Norris’ Smartphone?
Well… I think I just FOUND it.
**************************************************************************************
WARNING – GRAPHIC CONTENT AHEAD
**************************************************************************************
The REST of this message has descriptions and LINKS to some of the original YCSO Police reports and photographs of the personal items and the clothing of some of the Granite Mountain firefighters. If you do not wish to read about such things or accidentally view the (graphic) photos… do NOT continue reading this message. END OF WARNING.
**************************************************************************************
From the YCSO Yarnell Hill Case Report…
Document Name: 13 021744 Yarnell Hill Case Rpt
By YCSO Detective J. McDormett.
Page 7…
——————————————————————————————————
The following day, 7/02/13, I, along with ET ( Evidence Technician ) Waldock,
went to the medical examiner’s office in Phoenix, arriving at about 0800.
Lt. Boelts was there when we arrived. Honor guards were also in place.
Honor guards had also been in place throughout the night. All the firefighters
were identified on this day largely through either dental records by forensic
odontologist Dr. John Piakis or through distinguishing tattoos or other identifiers
that left no doubt as to the individual identity of each man. Photographs were
taken by the ME staff. I was advised that a disk of the photos would not be
ready for a few days. I was later advised that the cause of death was accidental
and that the manner of death was a combination of thermal injuries and smoke
and carbon monoxide inhalation. As of the writing of this report I have not
received the autopsy reports.
Personal property and shelters were separated into a corresponding body bag
and were transported to the YCSO evidence unit.
What follows is an accounting of the numbers assigned to the decedents while
on the hill, the Maricopa Medical Examiner number, and the name of the
firefighter associated with each:
1 / 13-04442 / Wade Parker
2 / 13-04425 / Sean Misner
3 / 13-04443 / Travis Turbyfill
4 / 13-04428 / Kevin Justin Woyjeck
5 / 13-04427 / Clayton Whitted
6 / 13-04426 / Christopher MacKenzie
7 / 13-04431 / Dustin DeFord
8 / 13-04430 / William Warneke
9 / 13-04435 / Eric Marsh
10 / 13-04429 / John Percin Jr
11 / 13-04434 / Andrew Ashcraft
12 / 13-04433 / Travis Carter
13 / 13-04438 / Anthony Rose
14 / 13-04432 / Joe Thurston
15 / 13-04436 / Jesse Steed
16 / 13-04437 / Grant McKee
17 / 13-04441 / Scott Norris
18 / 13-04440 / Garret Zuppiger
19 / 13-04439 / Robert Caldwell
—————————————————————————————————-
From the YCOS report above…
“Personal property and shelters were separated into a corresponding body bag and were transported to the YCSO evidence unit.”
What that also means is that any clothing that was removed by the Medical Examiner was ALSO added back to the orange ‘transport’ bags, along with personal effects, and then these bags were transported to the YCSO evidence unit for safekeeping and further examination.
The YCSO took pictures of the contents of these bags once they got them over to their own YCSO evidence unit ( clothing included ).
As they examined the contents of each ( ORANGE ) bag… they left the bag in the top of the photo(s) so the NUMBERS on the bag ( as per the YCSO list above ) could still be seen in the photo(s) in order to associate the contents with certain firefighters.
In the FIRST FOUR photos in that folder… the number on the bag whose contents are being photographed was written with a black Sharpie and it says 17.
Bag 17 corresponds to Scott Norris ( according to YCSO list above ).
The Microsoft Word Doc file that is also present in this folder indicates which photos belong to which firefighter. This is the actual document that the SAIR used when they inserted their own report about the ‘damage’ to shelters in the their own SAIR report.
The following ‘cut’ from that document concerning these first FOUR images
in the folder also confirms that they are of the personal effects ( and clothing )
of Scott Norris…
——————————————————————————————————–
Bag 17 – Medical Examiner Number 13-4441 ( FF Scott Norris )
DSCN0002 – Fire shelter exterior – 98 percent of Aluminum foil burned away.
DSCN0003 – Fire shelter interior – 75 percent of fiberglass burned away.
DSCN0004 – PPE – shirt (front) and pants.
DSCN0005 – Pants (back)
———————————————————————————————————
The BLACK writing on the ORANGE bag in these photos also says the following and the Medical Examiner number 13-4441 also matches the number in the list above that the ME assigned to firefighter Scott Norris…
13-4441 ( Large black magic marker )
17 ( Smaller black sharpie )
NOTE:
They
PI ON MON
Still Accurate
And Working
( With Personal Affects )
The first two images in the folder are of the mostly intact fire shelter that came out of bag 17. Photo 1 is topside. Photo 2 is bottom side.
The SECOND two photos are of the CLOTHING that was also in that bag 17.
The shirt and pants were laid out and photographed first lying face up… and then flipped over and the backs of the shirt and pants were photographed.
The name of that FOURTH photo in the folder showing the BACK of the pants that came out of bag 17 ( Scott Norris ) is DSCN0005.
This photo seems to CLEARLY show that there is STILL an ELECTRONIC DEVICE in the bottom of the right-pants side pocket. It has the CLEAR shape of an iPhone or one of the Android smartphones that also has ’rounded corners’… or any smartphone that has one of the durable rubber ’rounded corner’ casings on it.
NOTE: When I say CLEARLY… I really mean it. You can’t miss it sitting there pressed against the material of the side pants pocket.
In this BACK view of the pants… the RIGHT pants leg is at the TOP of the photo and the ELECTRONIC DEVICE ( in the right side pocket ) can be seen in the top-center of the photograph.
This SAME DEVICE also appears to be seen almost as clearly in that right-side pants pocket in the FRONT photo of the pants which is the THIRD photo in the first row named DSCN0004.
In BOTH of these photos… the DEVICE itself seems to be totally undamaged. The pants pocket is burned ABOVE the DEVICE, but not around the bottom of the side pocket where the device is located.
I would say the SIZE of that ELECTRONIC DEVICE appears to be just a little bit large for an iPhone… unless it has one of those large rubber protective cases on it.
It is also actually possible that this could be a handheld GPS unit.
It also has the right ‘size’ for some of the newer, smaller Garmin GPS portable units ( which also have rounded corners ).
So… obviously the MYSTERY is…
WHAT HAPPENED to whatever it is that seems to be sitting there in
Scott Norris’ side pants pocket?
Was it ever REMOVED from the pants and entered into evidence?…
or was it just ‘left in the pants’ and just became another ‘personal
effect’ that never entered the ‘evidence chain’ at all and just ended up
being returned to the family?
To be honest, when those photos came out, I was so sick of all things related to the deployment site (which I had spent the entire Christmas-New Year Holidays examining), that I just skimmed through them.
I also don’t remember what you came up with awhile back regarding whether the time-stamp of a video gets attached to the beginning or the end of it, and couldn’t find that info via the Google Tool yesterday.
Tom Story’s two cellphone images that he also Instagrammed don’t have any metadata left in them except the originals are geo-coded. It really gets quite random!
Come to think of it (I’m just waking up), since Scott’s mother generously sent that photo to the investigative team, I’m thinking if she had access to the cellphone, she might have sent more images in, along with a different note than the one she did send,
Reply to Marti Reed post on April 26, 2014 at 6:52 am
>> Marti said…
>> To be honest, when those photos came out, I was so
>> sick of all things related to the deployment site (which I
>> had spent the entire Christmas-New Year Holidays
>> examining), that I just skimmed through them.
I hear ya. Ditto on this end. I DO remember looking at ALL
of those photos… but I still missed seeing that (possible)
electronic device in Norris’ side pants pocket, at first.
I also started re-examining every other photo, to see if
there are similar ‘shapes’ showing in other pairs of
pants ( like Eric Marsh’s )… but only got about halfway
through the ‘extreme closeup’ phase of that last night.
They are really, really tough to look at.
Some of the burn marks and patterns are, well, quite
disturbing to view and/or contemplate.
>> Marti also said…
>> I also don’t remember what you came up with awhile
>> back regarding whether the time-stamp of a video gets
>> attached to the beginning or the end of it, and couldn’t
>> find that info via the Google Tool yesterday.
Marti… keep in mind…
The Panebaker Air Study videos are *unique* in that
the titles that someone chose for them include the
ENDING time of the video and not the START time.
That is *NOT* normal and I still really don’t understand
why they chose to actually NAME the videos that way.
For any of these digital devices using either a FAT or
an HPFS file system ( those really are the only two
choices these days )… the actual recorded filename
date/timestamp will ALWAYS be the ‘creation date’
( the START ) of that digital recording… whether its
a photo or a movie. If you have access to the original
HPFS or FAT file system… you can see these stamps
clearing just doing a directory listing on the files.
As far was what actually gets *embedded* in the images
themselves… the whole EXIF metadata standard really
only applies to JPEG images. There actually are no real
‘standards’, even now, for metadata getting *embedded*
into either MP4 or Apple Quicktime MOV movie files.
The only ‘standard’ that has evolved there ( for smartphones ) is that in both the MP4 and the MOV cases… a THUMBNAIL
image will be created using the FIRST FRAME of the
movie… and it will be saved to the file system with the
same name as the MOVIE itself but with a .THM file
extension. ( THM = THUMBNAIL image ).
That THM image of the first frame of the movie is what
shows up on your device when you are looking at the
folder that contains your photos / movies.
This THM thumbnail has, in fact, been somewhat
standardized and is actually just a JPEG image and,
therefore, can contain all the same standard EXIF
JPEG metadata already standardized for JPEGS.
NOTE: A THM thumbnail image is, in fact, just a JPEG
image with THM as a file extension insted of JPG. If
you RENAME any THM file and give it a filename extension
of JPG instead… then Voila!… you can ‘view’ that JPEG
thumbnail in ANY standard JPEG image viewer.
So that THM thumbnail image of the first frame of the
movie is what ACTUALLY contains all the IMPORTANT
metadata about that movie such as creation date/time,
modification date/time ( if any ), GPS data ( if any ),
frames per second, total frames in movie, etc. etc.
This is why we STILL do NOT know the exact TIME for
the YARNELL-GAMBLE video shot by Blue Ridge
Hotshot McCord. McCord EDITED his original movie
and renamed whatever the original filename from the
device was to YARNELL-GAMBLE.MOV… and then he
gave that edited copy of the movie to the SAIT investigators,
but he did NOT give them the corresponding THM thumbnail
file from his device that had all the metadata for that
YARNELL-GAMBLE movie… and the SAIT investigators
never bothered to follow up with him and obtain it.
McCord might still actually have that ORIGINAL (unedited)
Apple Quicktime MOV file AND the corresponding THM
thumbnail ( JPEG) from whatever he was using that
day to shoot that YARNELL-GAMBLE video. It was
probably an iPhone… but we are still also not sure
about that, either.
>> Marti also wrote…
>> Tom Story’s two cellphone images that he also
>> Instagrammed don’t have any metadata left in them
>> except the originals are geo-coded. It really gets quite
>> random!
Yes, it is. Android based Google phones will usually
ALWAYS try to keep GPS data in photos because
Google uses that information ( unbeknownst to you and
*without* your permission ) to update its own ‘Street View’
databases. Flickr, Facebook, Twitter and others…
same deal. It’s pretty much SOP these days so beware.
>> Marti also said…
>> Come to think of it (I’m just waking up), since Scott’s
>> mother generously sent that photo to the investigative
>> team, I’m thinking if she had access to the cellphone,
>> she might have sent more images in, along with a
>> different note than the one she did send,
Possible. I would also believe that even if Scott’s mother
DID receive a fully functioning device back… that
she would have no idea how to even check and see
if there WAS anything else ‘on it’.
Unless you actually USE one of these puppies these
days… it’s like voodoo and people have no idea how
to look at the actual ‘file system’ and/or walk through
all the FOLDERS on the device.
The reason we DO have the exact TIME/DATE
stamps (according to the Canon device, anyway)
and frame length count and frames per second
values… etc… for Christopher MacKenzie’s
two Canon Powershot VIDEOS is because
we DO also have the corresponding THM
(JPEG) thumbnail images for those two Apple
Quicktime format MOV movie files.
Those two THM files WERE included on the
CD that mysteriously made its way to the SAIT
investigators and they ARE sitting in Mr.
Dougherty’s public online Dropbox along with
Christopher’s movie files.
I just wish the SAIT investigators had had the
brain cells to get the same THM thumbnails
from Blue Ridge Hotshot McCord ( and everyone
else who was handing them ‘movies’ ).
**
** VIDEO FADE BETWEEN…
** MACKENZIE 3:51.58 PM CELLPHONE PHOTO IMG_2836.JPG AND
** MACKENZIE VIDEO MVI_0888.MOV AT +6 SECONDS
Well… here is the ‘other piece of the puzzle’ as far as confirming that the
MacKenzie MVI_0888.MOV video MUST have been taken during that 3 minute
and 22 second ‘time gap’ between MacKenzie cellphone photos IMG_2836
( taken at 3:51.58 ) and IMG_2837 ( taken at 3:55.20 ).
It’s another ‘video-fade’ that uses the exact same ‘stillframe’ from +6 seconds into the MVI_0888 video… but this time it compares it to the ‘earlier’ IMG_2836 cellphone photo.
Just as there is really no doubt that the MVI_0888 video had to have been shot
BEFORE cellphone photos IMG_2837 and IMG_2838… THIS ‘crossfade’ proves
that it ALSO had to have been shot AFTER cellphone photo IMG_2836.
In other words… somewhere in that known 3 minute and 22 second ‘time gap’ between cellphone photos IMG_2636 and IMG_2637.
YouTube About Information for this video…
__________________________________________________________________
This video is a ‘comparison’ between MacKenzie cellphone photo IMG_2736.JPG, taken at 3:51.58 PM… and a still frame from +6 seconds into MacKenzie’s first Canon Powershot video MVI_0888.MOV shot at the same location as the cellphone photo.
As the images ‘fade in/out’… it is clear that the MVI_0888.MOV video was shot AFTER the IMG_2736.JPG ( 3:51.58 PM ) cellphone photo. There is a significant ‘forward push’ of the smoke cloud in a due SOUTH direction into the ‘middle bowl’ which is not seen in the cellphone photo.
So this is the ‘other half’ to the proof that MacKenzie’s first 9 second long MVI_0888.MOV video was shot sometime between MacKenzie cellphone photos IMG_2736 ( taken at 3:51.58 PM ) and IMG_2737 ( taken at 3:55.20 PM ).
__________________________________________________________________
OTHER NOTES ABOUT THIS ‘VIDEO FADE’…
This time… instead of ‘clockwise’ as with IMG_2738, this IMG_2736 cellphone image had to be rotated a few degrees COUNTER-CLOCKWISE in order for the terrain to match up exactly as the images fade in and out of each other.
Notice the old-grader location in the distance in about the center of the ‘collage’.
It remains stationary as the images fade in and out.
Also.. as with the other IMG_0888 ‘video fade’ comparison with IMG_2738, this ‘panorama’ also has the rock outcrop on the RIGHT side of the frame which is where the northern ridge of the fuel-filled box canyon actually meets the floor of the middle bowl.
You can see clearly how CLOSE that advancing fireline really was ( even at 3:51 PM ), to the mouth of that box canyon. The fireline is only about 4600 feet away with nothing but explosive (manzanita, etc.) fuel in-between it and the mouth of the box canyon.
** THE ‘WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY’ FOR CANON VIDEOS / PHOTOS
So we have now nailed down a 3 minute and 22 second ‘window of opportunity’ between 3:51.58 and 3:55.20 in which MacKenzie must have put his iPhone away for a moment… and then shot the following FOUR things with his Canon…
__________________________________________________________________
MVI_0888.MOV – The first 9 second video which contains…
(Eric Marsh): Ah… I jus… I was just sayin’ I knew this was comin’ when I called ya
and asked how… what your comfort level was. I could just feel it… ya know.
(FF (Misner?) standing next to Ashcraft): We’ve been feelin’ it all day.
( Ashcraft laughs in response and then FF (Misner?) spits on the ground ).
IMG_0889 – First of two still photos taken in-between the 2 videos
IMG_0890 – Second of two still photos taken between the 2 videos
MVI_0891 – The second 9 second video which contains…
(Eric Marsh): …strange, ya know.
(Unknown 3rd person OR Marsh finishing his previous statement): You bet.
(Jesse Steed): I copy… and it’s almost made it to that two-track road we
walked in on.
__________________________________________________________________
To get the ‘total time’ it took to take these 4 items all we have to do is look at the original Canon timestamps for these items and ( even though we know the time offset is wrong ) we still get the ‘duration’ for all four items…
1601:31 – 110-0888 – First VIDEO – Duration: 9.24 sec.
1601:52 – 110-0889 – First still photo 12 seconds after video
1602:00 – 110-0890 – Second still photo 8 seconds later.
1602:10 – 110-0891 – Second VIDEO, 10 seconds later – Duration: 9.14 sec.
SIDENOTE: The ‘numbers’ just above still also mean for certain that the TOTAL time ( and possible maximum total missing conversation length ) BETWEEN the two videos is exactly 30 seconds… since the first video ended at 1601:40 and the second one actually started at 16:02:10 ( according to the Canon Powershot’s own timestamps ). That means that whatever ‘conversation’ MacKenzie FAILED to catch… it wasn’t much. It took Marsh and Steed a total of 18 seconds to say just the few things they did… so there was only time for less than twice as much similar ‘conversation’ in-between the two videos. No more than a few quick sentences can be ‘missing’ in-between the two videos.
So… based on the Canon’s own timestamps shown above… the TOTAL time it took for these four shots to have happened ( start to finish ) equals…
48 seconds. ( 1602:19 minus 1601:31 ).
Take 48 seconds ‘away’ from our ‘known’ 3 minute and 22 second ‘window of opportunity’ and that leaves…
2 minutes and 34 seconds.
Divide that right in half and we get the following…
1 minute and 17 seconds for MacKenzie to switch from using his iPhone to
take cellphone photo IMG_2736 to the start of the first Canon Powershot VIDEO.
Then 48 seconds to take all FOUR Canon Powershot items in a row.
Then another 1 minute and 17 seconds for MacKenzie to switch BACK from
using his Canon to his iPhone again to take cellphone photo IMG_2737.
Perfectly possible.
So the only thing left to determine is to which END of this 3 minute and 22 second ‘sliding window’ those 48 seconds of Canon activity belong… and we have the exact TIME OFFSET for ALL of the Canon powershot images that day.
I think that can be accomplished with just a few more COMPARISONS of
stillframes from the absolute START of video 1 and the absolute END of
video 2… and see whether this 48 second contiguous sequence is closer to
the 3:51.58 window START time… or has to be more towards
the 3:55.20 window END time.
Maybe I am just a crazy old fire fighter—-But
with out all the fading that is what I saw way back when we started this and my brain went click.
Why would they move out of the black and walk down in front of that?
The Fire its self should be telling them that’s a really bad idea.
My education of brush fires tells me that fire front is getting ready to romp and eat up the landscape.
The laying down of the column on to the brush is actually sucking the fire to it as the winds lay the smoke over it is like a giant vacuum pulling oxygen in to the burning process. That kind of burning can get so radical as to sound like a jet flying low over the fire.
The only conclusion I have is they felt they could beat the fire to the BSR. Calculated risk? They wanted off the mountain before they got stuck up there until the fire laid down. Again my thoughts with out proof.
Reply to Bob Powers post on April 25, 2014 at 7:39 am
Mr. Powers…
Yes. I believe THIS one ( the dramatic difference
between the two photos ) is EASY to see… even
without all the digital gymnastics… but I did the
‘crossfade’ video anyway just to show how
DRAMATIC the difference really is in just that
short passage of time.
Tex (Sonny) Gilligan had never taken a WFF course
in his life… and even HE knew it was time to
‘get the hell out of there’ more than an HOUR
before these moments.
That ‘green carpet’ spread out in front of that
thing is mostly bone-dry manzanita.
‘Gasoline on a stick’… as some call it.
As we know now… there was about to be a
very large EXPLOSION.
It really is inconceivable that Marsh and Steed
would *NOT* have anticipated what was about
to happen down there… or that any of the other
(supposedly) trained men wouldn’t have said…
What I wrote below, but wanted to repeat it in response to your comment, Bob:
The biggest reason, ala Bob Powers and his student RTS, for making sure there is a recognized and supported “what if” person on every crew!!
“What if” someone on this crew had said, looking at the fire behavior and the wind and knowing how wacky this can all get underneath a typical southwestern thunderstorm cell, and seeing how close this fire was moving toward that bowl-canyon’s entrance, “I don’t think we should go there. What if that fire turns and starts burning up that bowl?”
I learned that from you two, and I think it’s really Importent.
Mr. Powers – I am thankful that you are an OLD fire fighter. BUT GMIHS did not leave the black because they were ignorant of what was around them. They were ordered off the ridge -period. What needs to be discussed is who would have the power to insist they leave the black. Who would call them and require this movement? What are the human factors that these men worked under (City of Prescott & Forest Service)? They knew the last time they turned a directive down they were punished. They had eyes on the fire (Eric). They were told by someone that they had enough time to get to the ranch. Who possibly started a back burn that whipped up the canyon? Who is not talking that knows the truth? Who is being haunted by the memories of knowing a mistake was made? Who will finally step up and talk – standing up for the Granite Mountain Hotshots – finally stopping those voices that say it was them being cowboys? These men may have been young wildland firefighters but they knew the rules, they knew fire, they knew the fuels, they had their eyes on the fire, they would not take risks with their lives. I think a lot of good conversations are happening here – but – pressure needs to be placed on the so called leaders who do not accept the responsibility of leadership: “honesty”, “strength”,”courage”.
Only as an Old WFF and my past will I go here and it is not to assign Blame as much as responsibility.
The safety of the crew was Steed and Marsh’s they had that responsibility as all of us in the past have had.
Safety out weighs orders. One Foreman on that crew could have voiced a concern none evidently did but we don’t know that.
The real problem is simple–
No evaluation of the 10 Standard Orders…..
No LCES when they moved……
No scouted escape route…..
Those are the basics no matter who orders you to move……..
Some would say the entire crew is also responsible for their safety…..
Or each individual. I believed that my whole carrier SAFETY IS EVERYBODYS RESPONSIBILITY.
I agree with both of you. And thank you so much, Deborah, for contributing to this quest for the truth.
Where to begin.
I first joined this in December because, as a photographer, I saw Chris’ camera sitting in the middle of the deployment site, when no-one else did. I wanted to know what happened to it.
After a great deal of analysis, research, and connecting-the-dots, I discovered that it, and a bunch of cellphones had been with-held by the Prescott Fire Department from the “chain of evidence.” I discovered that that didn’t “matter” because, once the Yavapai County Sheriff signed off on a piece of paper that “no foul play” was involved, there would be no legally accountable investigation. I discovered that Darryl Willis was twisting his story into all kinds of pretzels to make sure nobody knew what actually happened to Chris’ camera. “Why would he do that?” I wondered.
I believe things are being withheld. I believe that is for a reason. Otherwise, why would that still be the case, now, nine months later. Somebody is being “protected,” I believe, and I still have no clue who that somebody is.
My brother, when he was a 15-year old Eagle Scout, got himself killed and almost got some other people killed, when he was ordered to get his patrol down off a ridge as quickly as possible. He was only fifteen. I always wondered why he did what he did. I could never figure it out, except that he was responding to that voice of authority. All I could do was decide to never do what he did. No matter what. No matter what pressure I felt was on me to do it.
This “incident” has not been seriously investigated. All we have done is try to pick away at what we are being ALLOWED to see. That’s not good enough.
I wish my very very best to you, Deborah. What happened to your son, and all these fine young men, has broken my heart over and over again. I’m a graduate of Prescott College, by the way. With all that that entails.
Based on the way things are being don now the only answers will come from a court hearing which may or may not happen, based on settlements. No body else will identify mistakes, decisions or orders made. Its a new world out there and has nothing to do with preventing the next one. Say a prayer and be safe….
SFFO # 10 should be #1……..
Mr. Powers… if you read ALL of the ‘wrongful death’ claims that have been filed so far… it is perfectly clear that as far at the families are concerned… ANY possible ‘settlement’ must ALSO include what are called ‘action items’ that have NOTHING to do with MONEY.
The families WANT the TRUTH to come out… and they WANT to know that the WFF industry is taking steps to make sure ( as MUCH as they possible can ) that something like this can be prevented from happening again ).
So even a ‘settlement’ might *REQUIRE* another investigation be held… and/or public admissions about what they ALREADY might know… but are refusing to release publicly.
Civil lawsuits CAN require that the defendant(s) take certain ACTIONS as part of any ‘settlement offer’… and these claims do just that.
WTKTT. The two firefighters you referenced above (from video0888), Ashcraft and possibly Misner is not correct. Ashcraft is sitting between Parker and Deford. I think the FF standing beside Mackenzie in 0888 (the one who spits) could possibly be Joe Thurston. This appears to be the same FF in image 0878, 0879, 0883, 0884. The same person is in Ashcraft’s photo.
At the 7-8 second mark of the 0888 video (Thurston’s?) red chainsaw chaps come into view.
The other FF standing to the right of (Thurston?), I believe, could be Anthony Rose, but not very certain about that.
Andrew Ashcraft is sitting – his shirt has a circle stain on the (R) shoulder. Yes he is between Wade Parker and Dustin DeFord. I had the opportunity to sit on the that same rock (thank you to the one who took me there). The view was panoramic – plus aggravating. They worked hard all morning to have it all for not because of a retardant drop – nice work put out the back burn. This is why they re-positioned.
Again, thanks for doing this, WTK and Calvin. I think it’s really important to have tightened this image sequence up in order to see what they were seeing, and when.
Another important visual for this sequence (that I had forgotten about until going back to redo it) is Scott Norris’. That’s Scott standing up on that rock taking his photo in most of these Caldwell photos and videos. The link is: https://www.dropbox.com/sh/p78do502dflii7b/fhrel76c3A#/ .
According to the ReadMe that accompanies the photo:
“Karen Norris, Scott Norris’s mother, provided this photo to Randy Okon, a member of the accident investigation team. In her email, she wrote “The following text, along with this photo was sent from Granite Mtn Hot shot, Scott Norris to me, his mother, on June 30 at 3:54 pm : ‘This fire is running at Yarnell!!!’ This was the last text I received from him. Thank you, Karen Norris.”
PS I think you can see Scott shooting that photo 1 second into Chris’ second video, MVI_0891.MOV.
In IMG_2735, while Caldwell is shooting his video, Scott has what looks like his cellphone to his ear. In 2736 he seems to be looking down onto it. In MVI_0888, he is still holding it, in IMG_IMG_0889 he is holding it and looking out over the fire, and in MVI_0891 you see him shoot it, then lower it, and then then look down onto it! By IMG_2737, he is sitting down on that rock he was standing on.
So. depending on how accurate that 3:54 stamp on that message he sent to his mother is, this would pin that second video pretty closely to 3:54 PM, and also underpin this re-ordering of the whole sequence.
Since I’m still the last photographer on the planet without a smartphone, I’m not sure how all these details I just described translate.
And, by the way, looking at my ancient notes regarding The whereabouts of the cellphones, I have no indication of Scott’s cellphone ever entering into the chain of evidence.
See below (I think–I can never quite tell where comments in threads land before I post them) for why/how I have (based on Scott Norris’ photo) currently placed the beginning of Chris’ second vide at 3:54 PM.
The MacKenzie IMG_2837.JPG photo had to be ‘rotated’ clockwise a few degrees
in order for the terrain to match as it ‘overlays’ the MVI_0888.MOV video stillframe.
I used the +6 second mark for the ‘still frame’ from the MacKenzie video instead of
the +7 second mark just because that retains just a ‘bit’ of the fireline in the bottom
left corner of the photo ( similar to the Wade Parker texted photo ).
If we are going to now ASSUME that Christopher MacKenzie’s iPhone photo
timestamps are true and accurate ( and there really is no reason to NOT believe
that, at this point )… then I believe this ‘video fade’ between these two photos
PROVES that the first MacKenzie MVI_0888.MOV video was shot BEFORE the
3:55.31 PM IMG_2837.JPG cell phone photo was taken.
If you look at the CENTER of the video as these images fade in and out of each
other you will see that there is MUCH more SMOKE in the 3:55.31 PM cell phone
photo than can be seen in the 0888 video… AND the smoke has traveled much
farther SOUTH in the cell phone photo than is seen in the video stillframe.
You can clearly see that the smoke column ( and the fireline ) was still in the
process of ‘rotating around’ to the SOUTH at this point in time… and ( as we now
know ) would continue to do so for the next 30 to 40 minutes
Other interesting things to notice in this ‘video fade’…
1) Obviously Jesse Steed ‘disappears’ from where he was captured sitting
on that rock in the MacKenzie video and by 3:55.31, when the cell phone
photo was taken. ( Well… at least his red-helmet disappears but I believe if he
had still been sitting there it would ALSO be in the cell phone photo. )
2) Look to the RIGHT SIDE of BOTH of the photographs. That little ‘rock
outcrop’ that appears in the lower right is, in fact, the northern ridge of
the fuel-filled box canyon as it meets the floor of the middle bowl.
So you can see ( from left to right ) in this photos how SHORT the
distance really was from the fireline to the mouth of the box canyon
before they even left the safe black. The fireline was only about 4,600
feet from the mouth of the box canyon at the time the 3:55.31 PM
cell phone photo was taken.
2735 Second of Chris’s cellphone pix of Robert Caldwell shooting his video down below where Chris is. 3:50:19
2736 Chris shoots the fire on his cellphone with Caldwell right in front of him. 3:51:58. Pretty much just barely time enuff for Caldwell to get there.
2737 Chris shoots the fire on his cellphone: 3:55:20. About 3 1/2 minutes after shooting 2736.
2738 Chris shoots the fire on his cellphone again. 3:55:31. 11 seconds after shooting 2737. This is the photo WTK is comparing to the look of the fire in the 0888 video, saying that in the 2737 photo the the fire looks more intense and more turning to the south, and thus later than the 0888 video.
If the 0888 video was shot before the 2738 cellphone photo, it would have had to be taken between the 2736 and 2737 photos, in order for there to have been time to do that, and definitely not before 2736.
And even then there would have just been barely time for him to have done that.
I’m now remembering this was where we began to get hung up when we last tried to sequence this. It was hard to imagine then, and still hard to imagine now, Chris switching back and forth so quickly between all of this in this short frame of time. Unless he passed off either his camera or his cellphone to somebody else. Which is not impossible.
If indeed the fire progression seems to you and Calvin to indicate that the video + two photos + video quick sequence happened before IMG_2738, which was taken on Chris’s cellphone at 3:55:31 (and most likely at least a vaguely accurate timestamp), it had to have happened during that 3 1/2 minute gap between 2736 and 2737.
The more I think about this, the more I don’t find it reasonable unless someone other than Chris was shooting either with his canon powershot camera or his cellphone. As a photographer, switching back and forth like this doesn’t make physical or mental sense.
On the other hand, if there were two people doing this, it would, but they would have to have been very close together given the angles seen in the images.
Marti. You are exactly right. The 088 (and probably the 0891) video was taken between images 2736 and 2737
As I stated before. The proof is in the pair of safety glasses Dustin Deford has in his hand in image 2735 and appear inside his work gloves in image 2737. I believe that Dustin Deford can be seen in video 0888 tucking the safety glasses inside his work glove.
Yes, I remember that conversation between us.
And it makes sense.
But, dang, it’s hard to fathom Chris switching back and forth so quickly between the powershot and the cellphone unless he had a reason (maybe I’m just too lazy as a photographer to feel my way into this?) .
So apparently he took several photos with the powershot of the sawyers shooting a photo and then heading up to the “convo” site, then shot several photos via his cellphone of Caldwell capturing his video–which also captured Abel saying “hunker down and be safe”– then shot Caldwell after he landed in front of him with his cellphone, then switched to his canon powershot to capture the first video of the “discussing the options” video, then switched to capturing two photos, then switched to capturing his second video of that conversation, and then switched to his cellphone to shoot two more photos of the fire advancing rapidly toward the fuel-filled bowl they were about to descend into.
This is all making about as much highly refined sense to me as a photographer as Tom Story’s 4:39 photos of a VLAT drop over the fire.
And a massively whole-hearted thank you to Chris MacKenzie for working his butt off as both a fire-fighter and a photographer/videographer for capturing all of this so we can, after his death (RIP) try to figure out what the Granite Mountain Hotshots were seeing and, thus, trying to figure out what to do. Love to you Chris and your powershot which I saw on that deployment site when nobody else did!
And now that we have refined all of this (even tho, as a photographer,
Chris’s choice of ways to get his images don’t totally make sense to me), I am wondering. Can anybody tell me what difference/significance all of this makes?
Reply to Marti Reed post on April 24, 2014 at 6:28 pm
>> Marti said…
>> If indeed the fire progression seems to you and
>> Calvin to indicate that the video + two photos + video
>> quick sequence happened before IMG_2738, which was
>> taken on Chris’s cellphone at 3:55:31 (and most likely at
>> least a vaguely accurate timestamp), it had to have
>> happened during that 3 1/2 minute gap between 2736
>> and 2737.
>>
>> Does that seem reasonable?
Certainly does, Marti. Thank you.
See a new ‘crossfade’ video link post above that pretty
much supplies the ‘other piece’ to this puzzle and
PROVES that the MVI_0888 video HAD to have been
taken inside this 3 minute and 22 second ‘window’
you have identified.
And yes, I see that very short distance. At 3:55 PM. And I want to say to those awesome beautiful firefighters, whose memorial videos I have had to watch in order to identify them in all those photos and videos, please don’t go there.
The biggest reason, ala Bob Powers and his student RTS, for making sure there is a recognized and supported “what if” person on every crew!!
“What if” someone on this crew had said, looking at the fire behavior and the wind and knowing how wacky this can all get underneath a typical southwestern thunderstorm cell, and seeing how close this fire was moving toward that bowl-canyon’s entrance, “I don’t think we should go there. What if that fire turns and starts burning up that bowl?”
Maybe Brendan McDonough just reflected
the view of ALL of those 17 men with
regards to why no one said anything.
In his mainstream media ABC interview,
filmed with him sitting in a chair inside
Granite Mountain Station 7 and in front of
the team’s tool bench… Brendan said
was describing his moments of decision
to leave his lookout and summarized
those decisions saying…
“I knew fer sure it was time to get out of there”.
The interviewer then deftly asked…
“And what about them? Couldn’t they see
what you were seeing? Should THEY have
been ‘getting out of there’ at that same
moment?”
Brendan was caught off guard… leaned
back and put his hands behind his head
and obviously thinking carefully about
what to say next. All he finally said was…
“I’d never questioned any of their decisions
before… so why should I question them now?”
I might be paraphrasing some above… but
that was the ‘gist’ of the ABC interview at
that point. Brendan says he NEVER
questioned ANY of ‘their’ decisions
( Marsh and Steed ).
That probably generally applied to the rest of
that crew as well.
There were 17 other men up there
(supposedly) experts in fire behavior… and
not one of them seemed to say… “This
is NOT a good idea.”
WTKTT
I doubt that I would say all 17 were supposedly experts in fire behavior. 2, 3, 4 and maybe even 5 year WFF are not experts in fire behavior.
that is why most Superintendents and Asst. have 10 to 15 years experience in wild land fire. However they were or should have been trained every year with refreshers in the 10 and 18, fire weather, and fuels. It takes a lot of fires and a lot of different fires to understand fire behavior. The other foreman below Steed should have had some grasp of FB.
Way back I said a crewmen with 21/2 years was not the person to put as a lookout. Before I left California SAFTY FIRST had been signed off on which required a minimum Sector Boss or now Strike Team Leader for look out. It is very important to understand FB, Fuels and weather to give accurate reports to the crew. The safety of the entire crew depends on the Lookout. The ability to stay ahead of any threats and the complete trust of his supervisor.
A good lookout never stops McDonough could have and should have continued to notify the crew of the fire changes and what was happening after he got in the truck. He should have found a vantage point and continued to look out for the crew. A foreman or higher would have done just that until they could not be of service.
“McDonough could have and should have continued to notify the crew of the fire changes and what was happening after he got in the truck. He should have found a vantage point and continued to look out for the crew. A foreman or higher would have done just that until they could not be of service.”
I never would have known enough to have thought of that. Thank you.
It seems that McDonough was there be cause he was sick and all he did was take weather. Another lack of training and what a true Lookout dose? He was just hanging out taking weather not advising of the increased fire activity. So lackadaisical that the fire almost got him.
Sorry but that has always bothered me.
i’m calling BS about McDonough continuing to be lookout for GM…
there was no better vantage point than what GM had. there was no where else he could have gone to be an effective lookout.
besides the fact, he was assisting in the movement of vehicles…
i think the fact that neither BR nor McDonough seemingly felt the need to report the windshift to GM lends credibility to the fact that NONE of them thought GM was moving through the green. they all thought GM was “picking their way through the black” down the two track they had been trying to tie together and that they had originally walked up.
Thanks WTKTT. It appears that the 0888 video was taken between the 2736 and 2737 video (to me). If this is the case, this would mean the discussing options conversation heard in the 0888 video comes only moments after the promise of air support, down there, ASAP by Todd Able. BTW, I do not think for a minute that the IMT were planning to use an expensive load of retardant to facilitate a safe passage of GMIHC. It would , however, seem realistic that retardant would be placed on the south side of the active fire front, hopefully delaying the fires advance into Yarnell and Glen Isla. And could have influenced the decision to move toward Yarnell. And if the combination of fire retardant, increasing RH, decreasing temperature at the end of the burn period slowed the fire progression. Maybe, just maybe, GM (and others) could have worked with the dozer to create a line to burn out from before the next burn period.
>> calvin said…
>> Thanks WTKTT. It appears that the 0888 video was
>> taken between the 2736 and 2737 video (to me).
There is no ‘appears’ about it (anymore), calvin.
It’s a fact.
See the new ‘crossfade’ video between IMG_2736
and the stillframe from MVI_0888 ( posted as a new
parent comment above ) and there is no doubt about it.
>> calvin also wrote…
>> If this is the case, this would mean the discussing
>> options conversation heard in the 0888 video comes
>> only moments after the promise of air support, down
>> there, ASAP by Todd Able.
That is exactly what it means… and it means a number
of other things, too… such as…
1) This ‘discussing their options’ and/or ‘comfort level’
discussion took place up to 5 minutes BEFORE ASM2
Rory Collins left the fire at 1558.
2) Something made them WAIT at least 10 minutes
AFTER this video-captured ‘comfort level’ discussion
before actually ‘leaving’ at 4:04 ( unless it can be
established that the carrier network timestamp on
Parker’s text message is now also WRONG… OR
that Parker somehow texted that message out
WHILE they were already walking south. )
3) It puts Brendan McDonough in a completely different
place in time when he might have been ‘overhearing’
these conversations other than the moment he was
taking his own 4:02 photos over on Highway 89.
Etc… etc. A LOT of things need to be ‘re-evaluated’.
Since the additional unit logs surfaced in
February… it’s pretty clear that Brendan
DID just ‘convoy’ out with the Blue Ridge
guys and they all drove south through
the Sesame area, then through Glen Ilah,
then turned north on Highway 89 at
4:02 PM ( when Brendan shot those pics
out the window of the Sup truck )… and
then they all headed over to the Youth
Camp at end of Shrine road.
So even if the TIME for the ‘discussing their options’ conversations moves BACK to the
3:53 PM timeframe… Brendan was
( supposedly ) still in the GM Supervisor
truck with ( in his own testimony ) the
intra-crew radio volume ‘cranked up’.
But what does that do to the photos he took from Hiway 89 in Yarnell at 4:05ish? Did he drive down Sesame to 89 and then up Shrine to where Blue Ridge was and then help “bump” the rest of the trucks, which is what it looks like to me?
When I read the Unit Logs, I find them very confusing as to who went where and when.
Whatever whenever, I think it may have been quite difficult for him to have been paying complete attention to what was coming over the radio, given all that was going on.
Sorry, I misread what you wrote. What I’m finding confusing is exactly that “bumping” route. Some make it sound like they just drove across that newly scraped dozer line directly from Sesame to Shrine Road (which makes sense time-wise) and others sound like they went all the way down Sesame and back up Shrine just to get to the Youth Camp which, to me, doesn’t seem to make sense. But maybe that’s what they had to do. But I find the notes and logs are kind of jumbled about this.
Sorry folks to take away from YHF information sharing, but I posted this last night, reconsidered and reposted.
EN wrote:
“Fire20+ who leapt on ME for things that *I* did not say (and do not believe) while he simultaneously IGNORED the fact that it was BOB and WTKTT who said the things that Fire20+ is accusing ME of saying. This utter BULLSHIT has gone on for MONTHS, and it continues…”
—OK, so you were quoting somebody else, why not just quote them then? Folks would then understand the idiotic words you (you statements are appropriate here) DID put in that list weren’t yours, which raises another question. Why would you put things on a blog entry that appears to be coming out of your mouth then when your ‘jumped on’ you just can’t handle it and blame other people?—
“I had to WASTE my time defending myself on that, rather than doing the things that are far more valuable and unique, such as getting public records to guys like Gabbert or JD, who can then post them. Why am I not surprised that now Fire20+ has done the SAME fucking thing, in terms of accusing me of stuff that I NEVER said…”
—Don’t waste your time on my account, stop writing what you didn’t say or know about then you wouldn’t have to defend yourself Elizabeth and work yourself into a tissy. As far as what you say about ‘getting public records to guys…’ well, there you go again. ANYBODY can get public records by doing a records request, it is not special or generous or important, it is something ANYONE can do. You behave as if your “role” is exclusive and proprietary, your generous public service efforts, your selfless generosity to “give” this information to JD and Gabbert. They could have clearly gotten it themselves or gotten it from any other number of people who have the records also. I sure hope nobody has pointed this out to you before me, I’d hate to upset you.—
Oh, one more thing, I’m curious how the families like seeing F-bombs all over the place accompanied by victimized, crazy talk? Do you care about that at all? I cuss like a logger, but not here.
I’d encourage people to also scroll down maybe 70 or so comments to see Fire20+ original comments. All he did is substantively engage a post by EN — no curse words, no personal invective beyond noting that on a substantive level EN clearly doesn’t understand very basic WFF issues. Trying to marginalize substantive responses by using emotional language including curse words, “conspiracy theorist” and the like can be effective for people not following the substantive dialogue, but is actually very harmful to advancing substantive understanding.
On a substantive level, unless and until EN first grasps some basics relating to wildland fire, and also some basics of local conditions, and begins making comments based on those facts of life, pointing out when she is speaking without support is a classic and useful function of this type of comment forum. A while back, we had a similar exchange involving another poster who, though claiming to be a WFF, was talking rot about SZ guidelines in a very misleading way. We were able to show with specificity what those guidelines actually are, and the underlying reasons for them, and for people who care to read the full exchange who didn’t have that info before, this is useful. Interestingly, the guy who was making the very odd SZ statements is one EN now seems to rely on as a supporter. It is helpful to clear up some of these misstatements.
I have no problem with either people not having a background in something, or simply making either misstatement or differences in opinion. People claiming that others voicing their informed views represents an attack or trolling or stalking should be a big red flag, though.
I’ve disagreed with most people here, including you, WTKTT, just this morning, yet you aren’t dropping F-bombs and blaming me for wasting your time. I’m going to respectfully disagree with you on GPS and air, for instance, which for fire behavior like that the afternoon of the YHF is extremely limited in what it can do. That’s all good. Differing points of view are good, and frankly truly “smart” delivery might in future be able to make what’s pretty ineffective now work better.
>> SR said…
>> I have no problem with either people not
>> having a background in something, or
>> simply making either misstatement or
>> differences in opinion. People claiming
>> that others voicing their informed views
>> represents an attack or trolling or stalking
>> should be a big red flag, though.
Yes. Agreed. I wasn’t trying to soften your
original message/intent. Civil (public)
discussion pretty much *requires* tolerance
for disagreement and not automatically
assuming someone is ‘attacking’ or all
the other adverbs you quoted.
Totally agree.
>> SR also wrote…
>> I’ve disagreed with most people here,
>> including you, WTKTT, just this morning,
>> yet you aren’t dropping F-bombs and
>> blaming me for wasting your time.
Nope. Not my style.
I am someone who WELCOMES debate.
It’s always the chance to learn something.
>> SR also wrote…
>> I’m going to respectfully disagree with
>> you on GPS and air, for instance,
And I respectfully *accept* your opinion.
It’s a ‘touchy’ ( and complicated ) subject.
>> which for fire behavior like that the
>> afternoon of the YHF is extremely limited
>> in what it can do.
Yes. Most likely. Marsh could have had a
Navy-Seal style laser-location receptor
on his helmet and Air Attack could have
had the corresponding equipment onboard…
…that still doesn’t mean they would have
ACTUALLY been able to fly to that spot
to dump any retardant. It could still have
been a suicide mission for the Air Resources
and they would have been hauling pieces of
airplanes out of the canyon as well as well
as bodies.
>> SR also wrote…
>> That’s all good. Differing points of view
>> are good, and frankly truly “smart” delivery
>> might in future be able to make what’s
>> pretty ineffective now work better.
Yes. There is a LOT that technology can
contribute to the WFF effort in the future.
Someday… Hotshots themselves will
probably just be replaced with robots for
just pure ‘line building’… but certainly not
in OUR lifetime(s).
wait, what? SR, you’re going to try to drag me into this BS?
SR, you’re like one of those little yappy ankle-biter dogs (like a chihuahua or miniature doberman pincer…) you just yap-yap-yap and don’t really have a clue what you’re yapping at but you just can’t seem to control yourself.
but let’s go ahead and have another talk, because you seem to like to portray yourself as some sort of expert about wff’ing, but i’ll bet you have little to *0* actual on the ground experience… did you want to qualify your experience level? no, i didn’t think so.
regarding your continually ridiculous assertion that distance and time traveled should be measured on a straight line, or, as the crow flies, or, as your “back to the future” hover-board seems to work for you:
so, when you’re at a TSA turn-style security check, do you measure the time you spend walking around the maze in terms of the 50 foot straight line distance from the security inspector?
when you’re walking down a switchback trail, and the actual “as the crow flies distance” down the hill is less than a mile, but you have three miles worth of switch backs, do you time yourself based on the mile?
why don’t you walk down to your local fire department, and tell them that from now on, you’re going to measure their response time in terms of straight lines on google earth instead of the actual roads system they have to travel.
more related yet, you seem to put a lot of value in the speculation about the two track that GM could have utilized all the way to the ranch… but by your math, if you measure a straight line from lunch spot (or descent point) to the BSR… then their rate of travel would still be something closer to your previous ill-conceived logic after they walked around the very indirect two-track route.
regarding SZ’s: i don’t think you’ve ever even dealt with having to size up a safety zone, let alone take account for the safety of a squad or crew. so i would suggest you stop trying to make yourself sound like the expert you’re not.
I.e., FullSail is trying to shout to distract attention from the fact that he was speaking in complete ignorance of what SZ guidelines actually are. This is very relevant in assessing his overall credibility, and likewise relevant when EN uses references to FullSail to try to buttress her own (often quite fanciful) assertions.
FWIW, while I wasn’t following the comments actively at the time, apparently FullSail had some real doozies that were perhaps even worse earlier on. If he is a real person in the vocation he claims to have, I would strongly advise him to recognize that, since he doesn’t seem to know what he is talking about when it comes to nuts and bolts, he should go back starting at basics and re-train himself.
As regards rate of travel, yes, absolute time in terms of exposure to risk is the key variable. Just as with SZ guidelines, this is real basic stuff. There is no “A” for effort. You can have a crew running 6 minute miles and, if the course they are running is a loop in the middle of dense, dry, unburned brush, and they get burned over, there is no extra credit for the fact that as regard the loop they were making good speed, though not good time as regards forward progress.
Basically, FullSail often seems, well, not quite up to speed. The SZ guidelines are a good example, but only one of many. Since technically he is so consistently wrong, readers should bear this in mind as regards any of his posts. What technical details is he blowing? should be the main question.
how much practical experience do you have applying the 10 & 18?
how much practical experience do you have assessing safety zones?
simple questions really. and very applicable, since you seem so prepared to judge my technical expertise.
me? i’ve worked for both the FS and NPS for the last 13 years. i’ve worked on IHC’s, Helitack Rappel crews, Engines, Fuels Crew… i’ve worked in Region 3, Region 2, Region 4…
so please, continue trying to talk yourself up by attempting to belittle others. i’ll just roll your little yappy ass over and scratch your belly till your hind leg starts twitching.
You are killing me here. You’ve worked here, there, and everywhere…but still don’t know what a SZ is, still don’t know local conditions, still don’t know basically anything else in terms of the actual nuts and bolts of the realities of wildland fire? And, seem to be trying to distract attention from those awkward, to you, facts.
In my case? Well, I was the first person to call you directly on the SZ bs you were stating (to be fair, another poster initially raised the general issue, and gave fuller and more comprehensive responses that were far better than mine), the first poster to call you as to local conditions…basically, none of that is that meaningful insofar as this is real basic stuff to most people. But, it’s real basic stuff that you’ve been persistently been getting wrong. It is what it is. If you are what you claim to be, get more educated. In the practical sense.
**
** THE WADE PARKER PHOTO WAS NOT TAKEN AT 1604 ( 4:04 PM )
Reply to calvin post on April 22, 2014 at 4:49 pm
>> calvin said…
>>
>> I suggest everyone compare (for themselves) the smoke progression from
>> the Wade Parker Picture with image 2738 from Mackenzie’s cell and decide
>> for yourself which is taken first.
There is now a VIDEO sitting up at YouTube that pretty much proves that the
Wade Parker photo ( the one he texted out ) was NOT taken at 4:04 PM that day.
That is simply the time when he actually TEXTED the photo, and NOT when the
photo was actually taken.
The Wade Parker photo that was given to the SAIT investigators had ALL of the
EXIF metadata removed and was simply a copy of the cropped version of the
original photo that accompanied the ‘text’ message from Parker’s iPhone
at 4:04 PM.
There is still little doubt that 4:04 PM is the moment when Wade Parker actually
DID accomplish the ‘text’ sendout ( give or take some seconds of latency on the
CARRIER network ). That still appears to be the actual CARRIER network
timestamp applied to the text message, and so that still means the men were
not quite ‘gaggled up’ and heading south on the first leg of their ‘mission’ yet circa
4:04 PM… but it’s still important to note that 4:04 PM is NOT the time for the
texted photo itself. It was taken much earlier than that.
So EXACTLY when WAS the Wade Parker photo taken?
It’s still hard to say… but, as Calvin says, it CAN be compared to other photos
to see if it was taken BEFORE or AFTER something else.
This new VIDEO is, in fact, a COMPARISON between that Wade Parker photo
and a ‘still frame’ from +6 seconds into the Robert Caldwell video.
There has only ever been a small amount of ‘flame’ visible at the extreme left
edge of the Wade Parker photo… but it’s just enough to COMPARE with other
photos or ( as in this case ) ‘still frames’ from one of the videos.
At +6 seconds into the Robert Caldwell video… the view and perspective into the
distance is ( at that moment ) almost identical to the Wade Parker photo so a
‘still frame’ from the Caldwell video at that point makes a good comparison view
for the Parker photo.
It is pretty clear, when comparing THESE two photos, that the Wade Parker photo
MUST have been taken some minutes BEFORE Robert Caldwell shot his video.
In the ‘still frame’ from the Caldwell video… the FLAMES can clearly see to have
ADVANCED to the SOUTH versus where they are seen in the Wade Parker photo.
I would say the flames have advanced at least 20+ feet (south) from where they
are seen in the Parker photo to where they are then seen at +6 seconds into
Robert Caldwell’s video. One part of the flamefront seems to have advanced
much further SOUTH than the other parts, at that point. It is not an ‘even’
advance of the flames… but a *general* advancement is clearly seen.
YouTube ABOUT text for this video…
________________________________________________________________
This video FADES between the Wade Parker texted photo and a
still frame from +6 seconds into the Robert Caldwell video. Notice
the FLAMES on the left hand side of the video as it fades between
the two photos. The FLAMES ADVANCE in the Caldwell video
photo and would appear to prove that the Wade Parker photo was
taken BEFORE Robert Caldwell shot his video.
__________________________________________________________________
More about all this later.
Calvin is right… there is STILL an unresolved problem with the Christopher
MacKenzie Canon Powershot timestamps ( ALL of them ). People cannot be
in two places at the same time and it is VERY unlikely that the timestamps on
Christopher’s iPhone photos are NOT accurate. It would be MUCH more likely
the time on his Canon Powershot ( used to take the two 9 second videos ) was
simply set WRONG that day.
How wrong? Still unknown.
I still believe that the timestamp on the Wade Parker ‘textout’ at 4:04 is valid
proof ( because it is an external CARRIER network timestamp ) that the men did
NOT leave that rest area and head south until circa 4:05 ( as even the SAIR
originally suggested ), but ALL of the other ‘accepted’ times for things like the
Christopher MacKenzie videos are still very much in doubt.
Calvin… I can easily do another ‘fade video’ for these
two things just like I did above with the Parker photo and
the +6 second mark in the Caldwell video…
…but just to be clear ( since you have typos above )…
You are talking about…
MacKenzie cell phone photo IMG_2738.JPG
and…
+7/8 second mark in MacKenzie video MVI_0888.MOV
Correct?
Are you SURE you want to use cell phone image
IMG_2738.JPG?
The ‘fireline’ is NOT visible on the left edge of that
photo as it is with the Wade Parker photo. IMG_2738
has no fireline visible at all. It is being BLOCKED
by a firefighter’s pack in the bottom left corner.
Sitting here remembering the four days Calvin and I spent working on that timeline at the end of January. I kept saying the only people (including professionals) who bother checking the time settings on their cameras are mostly wedding photographers who often have to sync images from multiple cameras all the time.
Chris’s powershot was not only +/- 20 minutes off, it was a full MONTH off. That’s why I struggled to find a cellphone image or video to sync his powershot stuff with. We wrestled this timeline down enough to prove that what was being written about Chris’s pix of the sawyers “leaving” after the conversation was incorrect and those images were taken before the conversation.
We were still having some questions about fine-tuning this sequence, and Calvin was looking more at the fire-behavior than I was, and then, because it was approaching my “retirement” date, I didn’t do any more with them.
I was looking at those images last night again. Here are the timestamps I ended up with in January:
I don’t remember, at this point in time exactly what I synched Chris’s powershot videos/photos with, but I’m thinking I synched them to a combination of his cellphone images and Caldwell’s video. We were also conversing at the time that even cellphone timestamps and gps data can be off a bit under those circumstances.
So……a reminder, I would NEVER expect a not-connected-to-the-internet-or-a-network camera’s timestamps to even remotely be accurate. People just don’t pay attention to them unless they have a serious reason to.
So, now I’ll go look at Tom Story’s images and see if I can figure out what’s going on with them. I again have no reason to believe even he paid that much attention to the camera timestamps. But I’ll see what I can find.
I do think trying to get a more refined timeline of these images is important at this point in order to see what GM was seeing in the fire progression. So thank you!
I may have to eat my words regarding Tom Story paying attention to his time stamps. He was shooting with three cameras and a cellphone, so…..he probably was paying attention.
I was in the act of pointing that out to you just
as you were seeing that photo he took of his
own ‘pieces of kit’ lying on the ground.
I still would find it hard to believe he wouldn’t have
those puppies SYNCED so he could make sure
and get chronological order later… but maybe
he just knows himself what the ‘offsets/difference’
are and can do it that way if he ever needs to.
Reply to Marti Reed post on April 24, 2014 at 9:50 am said:
>> Marti said…
>> We were still having some questions about fine-tuning
>> this sequence, and Calvin was looking more at the
>> fire-behavior than I was, and then, because it was
>> approaching my “retirement” date, I didn’t do any more
>> with them.
It was quite some time before the MacKenzie cell phone
photos finally emerged on a public link… and at the same
time a TON of other information came online… so the
discovery about MacKenzie’s cell phone photos proving
his Canon Powershot time was wonky sort of got lost
in the noise. I remember, myself, just letting you and
Calvin hash that out because my ears were falling off
just listening to the hours of video/audio that also
came online at the same time.
So yes… this issue has been ‘laying on the table’ since
the MacKenzie cell phone photos were finally available.
>> Marti also said…
>> Chris’s powershot was not only +/- 20 minutes off,
>> it was a full MONTH off.
Yes, it’s possible. I would believe +20 minutes easily.
If you look at ALL of the Christopher MacKenzie photos
( both Canon Powershot and iPhone ) you will see that
he had the same ‘timestamp’ problem(s) even on
Doce fire just a week or so before on June 19, 2013.
He was doing the same thing on the Doce fire.
He would take some pictures with his iPhone, and
then take some pictures with his Canon Powershot.
In one sequence from the Doce fire… he takes pictures
of a Non-VLAT retardant drop with his iPhone, and then
( according to the Canon Powershot timestamps ) he
is taking ANOTHER sequence of photos of a full DC10
VLAT Air Drop in the EXACT same location… and
according to the Canon timestamps this SECOND
DC10 VLAT drop was only 1 minutes 45 seconds
after the drop he captured with his iPhone.
Not possible. Look at the SMOKE filling the entire valley
in the background of both photos. It is NOT POSSIBLE
there could have only been 1 minute 45 seconds between
those 2 retardant drops. It really does look ( just from
the dramatic smoke difference at Doce ) that there had
to be a LEAST 20 minutes of separation… perhaps
much more.
The most ‘dramatic’ shift in understanding about what
these men did when that afternoon is going to come from
the change in the actual TIMES for the 2 MacKenzie
videos.
It could turn out that this particular ‘discussing their options’
conversation ( one of several? ) captured in the MacKenzie
videos actually took place MUCH earlier than everyone
( the SAIT and ADOSH investigators included )
has been assuming.
It actually doesn’t bode well for their ( Marsh’s and Steed’s )
‘decision making’, either.
If the ‘fire progression’ captured in the MacKenzie
photos videos actually represents the situation up
to 20+ minutes PRIOR to them actually leaving on
their ‘mission’ circa 4:05 PM… then that means the fire
HAD to have progressed much farther than seen in those
photos before they ACTUALLY left the safe black… but
they STILL decided to leave, anyway.
>> Marti also said…
>> So, now I’ll go look at Tom Story’s images and see if
>> I can figure out what’s going on with them. I again have
>> no reason to believe even he paid that much attention
>> to the camera timestamps. But I’ll see what I can find.
Thanks, Marti!
One of the Tom Story photographs shows him
photographing his OWN cameras that he had with
him that day. There are THREE serious pieces of
kit on the ground at his feet ( which means he had
at least FOUR cameras ) with him that day.
As you said… if you are using MULTIPLE cameras
to document and event ( like a wedding ), it only stands
to reason you would make SURE that ALL the times
are correct on all the devices or you might have a
helluva time later ‘organizing’ all the photos into exact
chronological order…
…but then again… (as you said)… never ASSUME anything.
Maybe even professional photographer/reporter
Tom Story wasn’t even bothering to do that.
If ANY of the Tom Story cameras had incorrect time
settings… I don’t think they were very far off. His sequence
of photos at the Ranch House Restaurant before, during,
and after the deployment look pretty *close*… it’s just
that SOME of them don’t seem to be ‘jiving’ with other
known photos ( as calvin said ) like Blue Ridge
photos, the Russ Reason video, etc.
Is there a time given anywhere for Caldwell’s video? It’s showing, in Lightroom, a stamp of 8/13/13 at 11:05:46. Do you know of anything more accurate?
I think I vaguely remember wishing I could sync Chris’s photos to that video, but I couldn’t. I think.
Also, what I’m noticing looking at this stuff is that, in some of Chris’s pix (the ones taken with his cellphone), Caldwell is down below the rest of the group when he is taking the video. Then, in the rest of the pix and the video that Chris took on the canon powershot, Caldwell is up with the group, just right in front of Chris. So I’m not sure when Caldwell was in which position.
I currently have Chris’s two cellphone pics of Caldwell taking the video at 2734 – 3:50:06 and 2735 – 3:50:19. But I don’t know whether Caldwell took that video either before or after Chris’s powershot sequence which shows Caldwell up withe group instead of just below it. I know this is just another nagging detail, but it might help get these images in a better sequence to help see the fire movement etc.
I’m getting closer. Caldwell was down a bit below the group when he took the video and Chris took pics of him doing that. Then, about a minute and a half after he finished, he was in front of Chris when Chris took one more pic with his cellphone, and then started his two videos with the two photos in between them on the powershot. I’m gonna resequence these, tying them to Chris’s cellphone pix a bit better than I did before.
Marti… I haven’t uploaded it yet… but I’ve done a
‘video fade’ of the two items Calvin seemed to
be requesting be ‘compared’ up above…
MacKenzie cell phone photo IMG_2738
and a still frame from +7 seconds in the
9 second long MacKenzie video MVI_0888.MOV.
The time stamp on that IMG_2738 iPhone image
is 3:55.31 PM… and it now *definitely* looks like
that first MacKenzie MVI_0888.MOV video was
taken BEFORE that 3:55.31 IMG_2738. Looks
like it might have been even 3-4 minutes BEFORE.
There is MUCH more ‘smoke’ evident in the
3:55.31 PM cell phone photo than in the
MVI_0888 video… and the smoke is definitely
farther SOUTH and still ‘coming around’ as the
storm was still ‘rotating’ to the SOUTH at
that point.
>> Marti… I haven’t uploaded it yet…
>> but I’ve done a ‘video fade’ of the two
>> items Calvin seemed to be requesting
>> be ‘compared’ up above…
>>
>> MacKenzie cell phone photo IMG_2738
>> and a still frame from +7 seconds in the
>> 9 second long MacKenzie video
>> MVI_0888.MOV.
Seems to be PROOF that the first
MacKenzie video HAD to have been
shot BEFORE the 3:55.31 PM cell phone
photo IMG_2837.JPG.
How much time ‘before’?
Still hard to say. If we can’t trust the times
in the original MacKenzine Canon Powershot
items ( until we find the absolute real
‘offset’ and can apply that to all the items ),
then a lot of this is going to come down to
‘smoke/fireline analysis’…
Whoops… the link in the comment
just above didn’t survive the
cut-and-paste and seems to be
broken. See the full ‘posting’ above
or try this link instead…
Sorry to put this “down in the weeds” but if I put this at the top somewhere, I’d have to scroll miles on my iPad. I’m looking Chris’s first video. Wade Parker is scrolling on his cellphone at the very start. I now think this first video is around 3:52. This is after Caldwell comes up to join the group after shooting his video. I was thinking there was something capturing Wade shooting that photo, but I guess not. But it would make sense that he could have shot it (and maybe a couple of others) before this and was now looking to see what he wanted to send out.
Reply to Marti Reed post on April 25, 2014 at 7:22 pm
>> Marti said…
>> I’m looking Chris’s first video. Wade Parker is scrolling
>> on his cellphone at the very start.
Yes. All of these ‘child comments’ right here are actually
attached to the ‘parent’ comment I posted which pretty
much proves that even though Parker apparently didn’t
get around to actually ‘texting’ that photo to his mother
until 4:04 PM… that photo he actually sent out HAD to
have been taken BEFORE Robert Caldwell shot his
video in the 3:50-ish timeframe.
It would only make sense that he shot himself some
photos, then sat down and was NOT using this ‘break’
time to select the one he was going to text to his mother.
>> I now think this first video is around 3:52.
Very well could be. We KNOW it was shot right
AFTER his 2736 cellphone image at 3:51.58
( 2 seconds before 3:52 PM )… so depending on how
FAST Christopher was able to stow the iPhone and
start shooting with the Canon… the first video COULD
be starting within 1 minute of IMG_2736 and in the
3:52 timeframe.
>> Marti also wrote…
>> This is after Caldwell comes up to join the group after
>> shooting his video.
Yes. Caldwell’s video ( and his capture of OP1 Todd
Abel telliing Marsh to ‘hunker and be safe’ ) was ‘in the can’
at this point.
>> I was thinking there was something capturing Wade
>> shooting that photo, but I guess not.
Apparently not. Parker shot the photo he would eventually
text out to his mother at 4:04 BEFORE Caldwell shot
his video. MacKenzie captured Caldwell shooting that
video ( with his cellphone ) but apparently didn’t shoot
Parker taking HIS photo just before that.
>> But it would make sense that he could have shot it
>> (and maybe a couple of others) before this and was
>> now looking to see what he wanted to send out.
Yes. Makes perfect sense.
What is still a little ‘mysterious’ is the actual 4:04 PM
‘sendout’ time for Parker’s text + photo.
Either they all sat there for another 10 minutes or so
WITHOUT really taking any other pictures… and Parker
hit ‘send’ on his final ‘assembled’ text message + photo
at 4:04 just as they WERE about to leave…
…or they really did ‘gaggle up’ and leave BEFORE
4:04 and Parker accomplished the text sendout
WHILE they were already hiking south.
By the way… here is that link to that video again that
compares the Parker photo with the Caldwell video…
so you don’t even have to ‘scroll up’ to find it…
Video ‘crossfade’ comparison between Parker photo
and a stillframe from Caldwell’s movie…
“It would only make sense that he shot himself
some photos, then sat down and was NOW using
this ‘break’ time to select the one he was going to
text to his mother.”
As it turns out… the IMG_1134 VIDEO in the ‘Jerry Thompson’ Dropbox folder
does, in fact, contain the same exact SIREN ‘cutoff’ that is heard coming from
one of Tyson Esquibel’s engines in the YARNELL-GAMBLE video.
Jerry Thompson was assigned to a brush truck working under SPGS1
Gary Cordes and they were working just several hundred yards to the
due south of the Shrine area… so when Tyson Esquibel started using
one of the engine sirens to ‘recall’ his men from Harper Canyon area
back to the Shrine Youth Camp so they could evacuate… Jerry Thompson’s
video captured those same sirens heard in the YARNELL-GAMBLE video.
There are actually TWO sirens going at the start of the YARNELL-GAMBLE
video and the ‘cutoff’ sequence for both is unique and identifiable.
The Jerry Thompson video starts at exactly 4:27 PM ( according to
documentation supplied by Thompson to the SAIT investigators when
he gave them his photos and videos ).
In the Thompson video… this first ‘siren’ heard coming from the Youth Camp
‘cuts off’ abruptly at exactly +30 seconds. The SECOND siren then simply
‘trails off’ on a 6 second countdown right after that before it, too, goes silent.
This same exact siren 1 ‘cutoff’ and siren 2 ‘6 second trailoff’ happens
in the YARNELL-GAMBLE video at exactly +4 seconds.
So ( assuming Jerry Thompson’s timestamp is correct for his video )…
here are the actual timestamps for the YARNELL-GAMBLE video and the transmission(s) captured inside of it…
_________________________________________________________________
YARNELL-GAMBLE VIDEO STARTS AT 1627.26 ( 4:27.26 PM )
+0:01 ( 1627.27 / 4:27.27 PM )
(OPS1 Todd Abel?): Copy… uh… uh… come down and appreciate if ya could
come a little faster but (you’ll) figure it out.
+0:12 ( 1627.38 / 4:27.38 PM )
(Eric Marsh): Ah… they’re comin’ from the heel of the fire.
+0:15 ( 1627.41 / 4:27.41 PM )
(Brian Frisby): Structue Group core, Blue Ridge Hotshots, on TAC 1.
YARNELL-GAMBLE VIDEO ENDS AT 1627.44 ( 4:27.44 PM )
_________________________________________________________________
It was once assumed that the YARNELL-GAMBLE video was actually shot circa
4:19 or 4:20 ( which would have been the exact moment the SAIR says that GM
was ‘deciding’ to drop down into the fuel-filled box canyon ) but if the information
above is correct then the person ( OPS1 Todd Abel? ) telling Eric Marsh he would
‘appreciate it if he could get to town a little faster’ didn’t make that request until
4:27, when ( supposedly ) Steed and the crew had ALREADY decided to drop
into the canyon and, indeed, were already +7 minutes into their descent.
So it no longer appears as if this ‘request’ for them to ‘hurry up’ actually
influenced their decision to take the shortcut through the fuel-filled box canyon.
Steed/Crew had already decided to do that before this ‘can you hurry?’
request from someone in fire command (OPS1 Todd Abel? ) even took place.
Reply to Deborah Pfingston post
on April 23, 2014 at 7:27 am
>> Deborah said…
>>
>> Could someone please let me know who was at this
>> GPS location: 13.579′ W 11245.839′.
>> Thank you for your help.
Deborah…
Not quite sure about the first ‘Latitude’ component there.
You seem to be missing the ‘Degrees WEST’ part at
the front… but since pretty much ALL of Yarnell is at
the 34 degree latitude… when I interpret those
coordinates as…
34 degrees, 13 minutes, 5.79 seconds NORTH Latitude
112 degrees, 45 minutes, 8.39 seconds WEST Longitude
…I get the following DECIMAL Lat/Long location…
34.218275, -112.752331
That point is EXACTLY the area just WEST of Highway 89
where Jerry Thompson’s BRUSH truck was working that
day to ‘prep’ those outlying homes back in there, due
south of the St. Joseph Shrine area.
To check this for yourself…
1) Call up Google Maps in your Browser
2) Then just ‘cut-and-paste’ the following line ( comma
included ) into the ‘search bar’ of Google Maps…
34.218275, -112.752331
3) Now just hit ENTER and Google Maps will display
a map of Yarnell with a large GREEN ARROW pointing
at that exact location, just WEST of Highway 89 and
NORTHWEST of the Ranch House Restaurant.
Does this point match your expectations?
By the way… this ‘Jerry Thompson’ location is the same
exact one referenced above in the ‘YARNELL-GAMBLE’
video timestamp update. Mr. Thompson’s full folder of
pictures and videos he took while working at this location
is online publicly at the following link… so maybe these
photos/videos might help you match what you are
looking for?
Reply to Deborah Pfingston post
on April 24, 2014 at 10:35 am
>> Deborah said…
>> Thank you for your help. Do you know if
>> there were any other trucks or crew along
>> this line/road?
Deborah…
Didn’t want you to think this was missed.
Offhand… no… I haven’t seen that
information since there was no IAP
( Incident Action Plan ) ever recorded
for June 30, 2013… but I am looking into it.
At one point in one of the Jerry Thompson
videos he calls out to a co-worker whose
first name is ‘Matt’. I’m trying to identify
HIM and see if he was running another
brush truck or was part of Thompson’s.
It matches Thompson’s own description of
where they were working that accompanies
his photos/videos… and a Google Earth
comparison of his photos/videos and the
location coordinates above seems to confirm.
They were doing ‘prep’ work on those houses
that you can see back there to the west
of Highway 89 and northwest of the
Ranch House Restaurant.
WTKTT, don’t his pictures match the OTHER side of 89 (the side closer to the fire when it hits the Shrine area) better? Why are you thinking that he was not on the OTHER side of 89, helping clear over there?
Thanks.
I am not following you. I DO believe Thompson and others were working that area WEST of 89 and the coordinates are pretty accurate… so what are you talking about?
Are you sure you are not mistaking the Google Maps red balloon for the GPS point? It’s not. It’s the GREEN ARROW.
If you are talking about the references to OPS1 Todd
Abel most likely being the one who is ‘urging’ them
to ‘come to town faster’… please notice the question
mark by all the references.
It has NOT been *absolutely* confirmed that it is him…
but at the same time… it pretty much HAS been
absolutely confirmed who it is NOT.
It is NOT Darrell Willis urging GM to ‘hurry up’.
It is NOT OPS2 Paul Musser.
It is NOT SPGS1 Gary Cordes.
It is NOT Tony Sciacca ( Safety officer who arrived late )
So who does that leave that would be talking to Marsh
on the TAC 1 frequency that day, at that exact time, in
such an authoritative/supervisory way?
I will bet money that the one who is ‘urging’ them to
‘come to town a little’ faster is, in fact, OPS1 Todd Abel.
It really does sound just like his voice.
BTW: Both of the other voices in this video HAVE been
absolutely confirmed to be Eric Marsh and Brian
Frisby, by people who KNOW them ( RTS, etc. ).
#1. no one is saying, “appreciate if you could come a little faster…”
they’re saying, “come down and help us get this {whatever} a little faster…”
#2. there is no reason to think that person is talking to E. Marsh… obviously shit is hitting the fan and radio traffic is chaos… (hence BR walking on [presumably] GM’s traffic)
#3. you have no frame of reference for what “help” is being asked for or for what or who it is or the full context of the sentence, etc. etc. etc.
#4. it’s not “Structure Group *core*” it’s Structure Group *Cordes* who BR is asking for…
Reply to xxfullsailxx post
on April 24, 2014 at 4:32 pm
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>> #1. no one is saying, “appreciate if you
>> could come a little faster…”
>>
>> they’re saying, “come down and help us
>> get this {whatever} a little faster…”
Disagree. ( See my transcript up above ).
Either way… even your own ‘interpretation’
doesn’t change the meaning or the intent
of the transmission. Someone ( I believe
it is OPS1 Todd Abel ) was urging
Marsh and Granite Mountain to ‘hurry’.
>> xxfullsailxx also said…
>> #2. there is no reason to think that
>> person is talking to E. Marsh…
>> obviously shit is hitting the fan and
>> radio traffic is chaos… (hence BR
>> walking on [presumably] GM’s traffic)
It’s possible… but I really, really, really
doubt it. Not in this case, at this time.
Again… even YOUR interpretation ( even it
happens to be true ) doesn’t change what is
*actually* happening. Marsh is responding to
SOMEONE who just asked him either where
Granite Mountain *really* is at 4:27 PM ( just
15 minutes before deployment ) *OR*
someone who just asked for some kind of
explanation why it’s taking them so long
to ‘get to town’.
The most important part of this still remains
WHO that SOMEONE is… how much ‘else’
did they know about this ‘mission’ GM was
on… and why the SAIR said there were no
‘verified direct communications with Marsh
or GM’ in this time period.
>> xxfullsailxx also said…
>> #3. you have no frame of reference for
>> what “help” is being asked for or for what
>> or who it is or the full context of the
>> sentence, etc. etc. etc.
See above. Even if it was a ‘walkover’
Marsh is telling SOMEONE what GM’s
status is… and providing an explanation
for someone who didn’t seem to understand
how far they had to travel and/or why they
haven’t arrived somewhere yet. There is no
other explanation for Marsh’s response to
WHOEVER he was talking to.
>> xxfullsailxx also said…
>> #4. it’s not “Structure Group *core*” it’s
>> Structure Group *Cordes* who BR is
>> asking for…
>> really? you can’t even get that right?
Listen to the video again ( or get someone
with better ears to help you out ).
Frisby himself does appear to simply say
‘core’ instead of ‘corDES’.
I am sure that he meant ‘Cordes’… but
for accuracy I only included in my
transcript what seems to ACTUALLY
be in the captured recording.
WantsToKnowTheTruth
on April 24, 2014 at 5:51 pm said:
“See above. Even if it was a ‘walkover’
Marsh is telling SOMEONE what GM’s
status is… and providing an explanation for someone who didn’t seem to understand how far they had to travel and/or why they haven’t arrived somewhere yet. There is no other explanation for Marsh’s response to WHOEVER he was talking to.”
THAT’S your bullshit ad-libbing… again, there is no reason to think those two pieces of conversation are related. there were a hundred resources working in and around the fire on a few different tac channels. you have no evidence to substantiate any connection and MORE reason to doubt there was one…
as most of us recognize, even once GM had made it to BSR it would have taken a long time for BR to bump GM’s rigs around to them at BSR. no one was expecting them to “hurry up” anywhere. and they weren’t going to walk to Yarnell.
also, Todd Abel wasn’t even down at that end of the fire, right? Musser was dealing with things down there because Abel was busy on the north end… why would Abel be asking GM to “hurry up” to get to an area he had no idea what was going on in?
the fact is, your ad-libbing always seems to point in the same direction… in support of some nefarious, unidentifiable person who is ordering GM off the hill. i think this fact is more telling about you than the Yarnell Hill tragedy.
Reply to xxfullsailxx post
on April 26, 2014 at 8:40 am
“See above. Even if it was a ‘walkover’
Marsh is telling SOMEONE what GM’s
status is… and providing an explanation for someone who didn’t seem to understand how far they had to travel and/or why they haven’t arrived somewhere yet. There is no other explanation for Marsh’s response to WHOEVER he was talking to.”
>> xxfullsailxx wrote…
>>
>> WTKTT said…
>> Marsh is telling SOMEONE
>> what GM’s status is…
>>
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>> THAT’S your bullshit
>> ad-libbing… again.
You are deluding yourself.
It *is* Marsh speaking (verified).
He is telling SOMEONE ( who obviously wanted to know ) what is happening with Granite Mountain circa 4:27 PM, just 15 minutes before deployment.
It is a RESPONSE to SOMEONE and a continuation/end of an existing ‘conversation’ with SOMEONE.
Who do YOU think that
SOMEONE was?
>> xxfullsailxx also said…
>> there is no reason to think
>> those two pieces of
>> conversation are related.
Again… more self delusion
on your part. There is EVERY
*reason* in the world to think
that they ARE… give the time,
the context, and the circumstances.
It is POSSIBLE that Marsh’s
response is not directly
related to the person talking
at the start of the capture… but
the chances are very, very,
slim, in this case.
>> xxfullsailxx also said…
>> you have no evidence to
>> substantiate connection
Yes. I (we) do.
It’s an actual captured
recording… and the LOGICAL
explanation is that caller 2
was finishing his conversation
with caller 1.
YOU are the one who is
‘groping’ for reasons to
NOT believe it.
>> and MORE reason to
>> doubt there was one…
No, I don’t ( have MORE
reasons to doubt the 2
captures are related than
to accept that they ARE ).
See above.
YOU are the one peddling
‘doubt’… because… well…
that’s what YOU do because
you don’t even want any of
this examination of the
evidence to even be taking
place.
>> xxfullsailxx said
>> no one was expecting them
>> to “hurry up” anywhere.
Disagree.
I ( me, personally ) think the
YARNELL-GAMBLE video is
just one piece of positive
proof that someone WAS
doing EXACTLY THAT.
Your mileage may vary.
>> xxfullsailxx also said…
>> also, Todd Abel wasn’t
>> even down at that end of
>> the fire, right?
At 4:27… YES… he most
probably WAS… and this would
be further explanation why
he WAS making that radio
call we hear in the video.
It is perfectly possible that
Able HAD just actually
‘arrived’ in Yarnell… now seeing
the situation for himself… and
THAT is EXACTLY why he was
on the radio urging GM to
‘hurry’.
Todd Able WAS ‘busy on the
north end’ circa 1542 ( almost an hour earlier ) when Musser
made his ‘availability check’ radio call ( on Abel’s behalf? ),
but even by 4:10 PM things were ‘under control’ on the north end because of the complete wind reversal and
Able was then ‘free’ to get
down to Yarnell.
See the Air Study video
capture circa 4:10 PM when
Todd Abel is clearly heard
saying he will be ‘down there’
in about 5 minutes ( 4:15 ).
>> Musser was dealing with
>> things down there because
>> Abel was busy on the north
>> end.
See above. You are wrong.
You are thinking of a time
circa 1542… at least 45
minutes BEFORE the
YARNELL-GAMBLE video.
>> xxfullsailxx said
>> why would Abel be asking
>> GM to “hurry up” to get to
>> an area he had no idea
>> what was going on in?
See above.
Because it is *MORE* than
likely he *WAS* now ‘in that
area’ and *DID* have an
exact picture of what was
*going on*.
If that is the case… then it is
even *MORE* reason to
believe that *IS* Todd Abel
on the radio telling Marsh he
would ‘appreciate it if you
could get to town a little faster’.
So what are we doing looking for the why GM-Marsh-Steed violated the 10 and 18? We can identify those that they did violate+ or – some, not the why unless some one heard something or advised something we currently have no proof of
As with this fire no survivors causes a lot of guessing. The $100.00 question is dose any one know what and why the decisions were made. I will tell you that as a Hot Shot we would always protect our crew as I believe McDonough will always do no matter what he knows no one else will ever here it from him…
Just my thoughts if they were my brothers, my crew and I am the only one that knows what ever. IT IS WHAT IT IS….
Reply to Bob Powers post on April 22, 2014 at 4:31 pm
>> Mr. Powers wrote…
>> The $100.00 question is does any one know what and why the
>> decisions were made.
Remains to be seen. All the evidence is (still) actually pointing to
the good chance that there are *more* than just a few people still
alive who know a LOT more about those very questions and
what the answers might be ( and I’m not talking about just
people who were actually in Yarnell that weekend ).
>> Mr. Powers also wrote…
>> I will tell you that as a Hot Shot we would always protect our
>> crew as I believe McDonough will always do no matter what
>> he knows no one else will ever hear it from him.
Even if it means some of his ‘other’ fire brothers could be
at risk ( even THIS fire season ) of dying?
So how far does this ‘fire brother’ thing go?
It is only your OWN crew that you are supposed to worry about
or be ‘loyal’ to? The hell with everyone else?
Is it REALLY that ‘tribal’?
We DO NOT KNOW if McDonough knows anything at all other
than what he has already talked about either in interviews or in
public.
For all we know… Brendan might have ‘missed’ one of the
first ‘discussing their options’ conversations while he was
standing on the gunwale of the GM Supervisor Truck at
1549 and was taking those pictures across the roof… or
even missed the ‘second’ or ‘third’ ( or however many iterations
there were on the same topic ) because of similar distractions.
Regardless… what hasn’t seem to fully sunk in to Mr. McDonough
himself is that ALL of the ‘official reports SAY ( unequivocally )
that he DID ‘hear them discussing their options’.
It’s a PUBLISHED fact.
So either it is TRUE… or it’s not.
Mr. McDonough has had every opportunity to DENY that claim
that appears in (all) the official reports… and to say that they are
‘mistaken’… but ( AFAIK ) he has declined every opportunity
to do that.
So if Mr. McDonough himself is willing to let ‘official’ reports
claim he knows things he’s not talking about… and is willing
to let THOSE statements stand… then he’s got a hard road
ahead of him.
Forget (for a moment) about the adults who have suffered great
loss and really do want to know all they can about ‘what happened’…
There are (many) CHILDREN of these dead men who are going
to grow up and STILL want to know what he knows ( if anything )
and they will be ASKING him every chance they get… for the
rest of HIS life.
Mr. Powers… you learned a lot about what really happened to
YOUR father from a well-written book… but what if that book
never had (complete) answers BUT you also knew ( from official
reports ) that someone who was THERE that day freely admitted
to ‘knowing more’ but simply ‘didn’t want to talk about it’?
How would you feel about that?
Would YOU still have wanted to know what he knows
and ‘fill in some truths’ about why YOUR father died?
I sure would.
Bottom line: If Mr. McDonough really doesn’t know anything or
didn’t HEAR anything other than what he has already told
investigators… and they were badly MISTAKEN to publish the
(unequivocal) statement that he DID ‘hear them discussing their
options with regards to leaving the safe black’…
…then I wish ( for his own’s sake ) he would issue a press
release to that effect, and just get it over with.
If he CANNOT issue a ‘press release’ to that effect because he
thinks that would be lying ( because he knows the statements in
ALL the official reports IS actually TRUE )… then I also wish he
would just find a way (somehow) to tell what he knows and be
‘done with it’ that (alternative) way.
I really worry about this ‘haunting’ him for the rest of his life…
unless he exercises one of the two options mentioned above.
There’s no need for it ( to haunt him ).
But perhaps he really is still just too young to realize that.
First there was no cover-up of the Rattle Snake fire because there were 9 survivors all pickup fire fighters.
only a brotherhood in the science they were from the same church camp. The fire that caught them was a back fire that got caught in a down canyon wind which was local and actually blows every night during the summer. Not hard to figure out what happened. 9 survived 15 died, In 1953 no portable radios, no fire shelters, no 10 &13, The only escape route was back up the trail they cut to the spot fire, which was the way the head of the fire was coming. Easy to figure what happened.
A Hot Shot Crew is a brother hood not just a crew. Would what McDonough says make any difference? Only in their discussion the decisions that violated Rules are easy to see. They were the responsible party any outside influence should never have dictated there safety. I dought that McDonough actually knows why they made the decision they did or if it was safe or not. His Bosses made the decision he believes they were right, in his mind he will never say they were wrong or make them look bad at least not for along time. I can say with out dought this years training will discuss the facts the 10 and 18 and move on. All the training facts are there the rest is a curiosity to know WHY. Am I wrong?
For McDonough himself, given what he’s been through he shouldn’t be expected to be able to say a whole lot, anyway. Not just a traumatic event, but then all sorts of inevitable social pressure afterwards. And, then the new job that I am sure may in some ways be viewed as a good thing now, but quickly can become isolating and lock him in to an identity with this one event as opposed to getting him back in the saddle, or in another vocation altogether. Basically I don’t think the PC response of creating an identity around these things serves anyone well.
>> SR
>>
>> For McDonough himself, given what he’s
>> been through he shouldn’t be expected to
>> be able to say a whole lot, anyway.
Something tells me you haven’t read the
transcript for McDonough’s SECOND
interview with the ADOSH investigators.
They basically ‘recalled’ him for some
specific ‘followup’ questions… and they
actually played the MacKenzie video(s)
in his presence and asked him to ‘identify’
the voices. ( Oddly enough, though, even
in that second interview, they still NEVER
asked what ‘else’ he might have heard ).
McDonough’s ‘attitude’ during this second
ADOSH interview was COMPLETELY
different than his first ADOSH interview.
All of a sudden… he’s a motor-mouth.
He actually launches into his OWN
(usolicited) ‘evaluations’ of what happened
that day but places the emphasis on
‘change for the future’ towards tech stuff
like ‘linking GPS units’ together and having
fire command be able to SEE where
people are at all times, and whatnot.
That’s when McDonough goes into great
detail about Granite Mountain having at
least FOUR handheld GPS units with
them that day… but complaining that
while you could exchange coordinates
with ‘each other’… that somehow fire
command still doesn’t know where
anyone is in real time.
NOTE: Not even the Garmin Oregon 450
GPS that we can see on Caldwell’s pack
strap, and (possibly) lying face-down
right there in the dirt in the YCSO site
photos was ever actually ‘found’ or
entered the official evidence chain…
much less the other THREE that
McDonough says were ‘onboard’ that day.
Even Eric Marsh had a ‘GPS rating’ and
had taken special ‘GPS classes’… according
to his personnel file… so it seems highly
likely that even Eric Marsh had one of the
FOUR GPS unit that McDonough is now
talking about with HIM that day.
I digress…
You really should read that SECOND
ADOSH interview with Brendan McDonough.
He even talks about what a ‘good place’
he was in and didn’t seem reluctant to talk
about any aspect of the incident for that
SECOND interview. He even said to
the investigators… “Someone needs to
hear this stuff”.
Problem is… even with his willingness to
talk for the SECOND interview… no one
even ASKED him any important/lingering
questions.
I think the point is, whatever his memories and recollections are now, they may well be very different from what they were the day after the event. We are all susceptible to this, even for events that aren’t highly stressful and emotional. Even beliefs that he may hold very strongly, like GPS somehow being important, may not hold up at all when looked at. (Re: GPS, leaving to one side the shortcomings and strengths of GPS vs. telemetry, simply use of the radio by Marsh and Steed could have let people know exactly their route and exactly their intentions, had there been a desire to keep people in the loop — and within the crew, they all knew where each other were — so why even mention GPS? A: Because someone else got his ear and told him it was important — perfectly natural, anyone in his situation would experience much the same.) So, by this point, he shouldn’t be expected to say much and, to the extent he does add more info, you have to assume that it may have been hugely influenced by events and pressures that occurred after the day of the fire.
I am not going to ‘discount’ Brendan’s comments in his second interview about the WFF industry thinking harder about coming into the ’21st century’. I think everything Brendan was suggesting be ‘done’ are valid points.
But if you actually LISTEN to the audio of that entire interview, I think it’s possible that what Brendan was really trying to say there was that regardless of whether Marsh and Steed were practicing some kind of ‘planned obtuseness’ with their BK radio communications… Brendan seems to be holding onto the thought that if fire command had simply been able to AUTOMATICALLY know exactly where they were… then maybe the Air resources COULD have dumped on them in time to save them.
He actually might not be wrong about that.
It MIGHT have been possible… if the following two things had been true…
1) They didn’t waste 2 minutes and 20 seconds even realzing the first radio call from Steed was an actual MAYDAY call and an actual EMERGENCY.
2) Air Attack had known EXACTLY where they were ( or could glance at a screen on-demand and know instantly ) and then Kevin in the VLAT could have just followed him right to that exact spot.
Maybe someday in the future… something like the scenario(s) Brendan is talking about in his interview WILL be possible.
The technology to do exactly what Brendan was ‘imagineering’ inn his ADOSH interview already exists, and can be accomplished RIGHT NOW even with FREE public domain software.
The only thing preventing it is cooperation and the establishment of the correct standards and adoption of the correct protocols.
Mr. Powers. Thanks for the thoughtful reply.
You are right… your own situation/experience with
this sort of thing ( while different circumstances )
seems to indicate that even if the ‘example’ I was
making was true ( 1 survivor who didn’t want to
talk about it )… the actual ‘factual’ evidence pretty
much explained what happened, once known.
Yarnell is pretty much the same.
We DO ‘know what happened’.
We really do.
Just look at all the evidence that has emerged
and it really is pretty clear what happened.
So to answer your question about ‘would anything
McDonough still knows make any difference?’…
I think we all know the answer there.
Probably not. It would (most likely) only CONFIRM
what is already known. They *decided* to disregard
the rules of engagement in favor of ‘the mission’,
and as far as ‘training takeways’ goes… well…
what else needs to be said?
The rules are there for a reason.
Break the rules… and you can (easily) DIE.
>> Mr. Powers also wrote…
>> I doubt that McDonough actually knows why
>> they made the decision they did
You might be exactly right.
For all we know… even though ALL the officially
published reports seem to CONFIRM that he
did overhear them ‘discussing their options’… the
actual conversation on the RADIO ( which is all
McDonough had any chance of hearing ) might
have been just as ‘obtuse’ as pretty much all
the other radio conversations we can now hear.
McDonough might have ONLY heard scant ‘pieces’
of the ‘why’ part or the actual ‘decision making’.
We simply don’t know ( what he did or didn’t hear ).
What bothers me ( and the point I was simply
trying to make above ) is that Mr. McDonough
seems content to let those statements in
ALL the published report about him DEFINITELY
hearing them ‘discussing their options’ stand, with
no rebuttal ( if the statements are wrong ) or
clarification ( if the statements are correct ).
That just leaves a significant ‘mystery’ hanging
out there that might follow him around for the
rest of his life… with a lot of people still/always
wanting to ‘know what he knows’…
My only real thought here is simple if you think about it.
He dose not want to say something that might hurt one of his (Brothers) family members by assigning some kind of guilt to one of his Bosses. If that makes him happy and content with that choice then he will stay in that realm so to speak. Dose that make science?
Another thought on brotherhood protection.
My Steap dad was on the fire that my dad died on he was on an Engine. He never told me or any one else that my dad had made a mistake by not putting a lookout at the top of the trail to let the crew know if the fire started there way. My dad was his friend and they worked together. It is hard to admit that a friend made a mistake or even tell your friends son that happened after he became my father and even after I went to work for the Forest Service. McDonough will only talk if he choses to, I think he is OK with were he is at.
>> Mr. Powers wrote…
>> McDonough will only talk
>> if he choses to.
OR… if he is called to testify.
He can’t take the 5th on this.
I think he should just ‘chose’
to say what he knows… OR
( at the very least ) issue a
press statement that rebuts
what all the official PUBLIC
reports are saying about him.
That he ‘knows more than he
will say’. If that really isn’t
true then it was totally
irresponsible ( and unfair to
Brendan ) for the Arizona
Forestry department to EVER
make those statements they
did about him ‘hearing them
discussing their options’.
If Brendan simply has ‘more
of the story’ from that day,
I think he should just
CHOOSE to talk about it…
and I don’t just mean about
the ‘their decision to leave the
black’, either.
For all we know… if Brian
Frisby hadn’t either suggested
( or demanded ) there be
a ‘lookout’ in place up there
that day… Brendan would
have simply DIED right along
with the rest of them.
That’s a ‘part of the story’
that hasn’t been told yet, either.
Is that what happened?
Did Brian Frisby himself
pretty much save Brendan’s
life TWICE that day?
Yes… it makes sense in the context
of the immediate aftermath of such
a horrific event ( and the grieving
process that follows )…
…but even at the press conference
when the SAIR was first released it
was perfectly obvious that a LOT of
‘family members’ just want to know
the TRUTH ( ALL of it ).
They had had a chance to read
the SAIR report BEFORE the press
conference.
A lot of them were ANGRY that
it was such a namby-pamby report
about the incident that took their
loved ones away from them…
and said so. LOUDLY.
In the ‘wrongful death’ lawsuits… it
is CLEAR that what is MOST
IMPORTANT to these family members
is knowing as much as possible
about what happened that day so at
least they can be sure the WFF
industry is RESPONDING to this
historic event and at least TRYING
to make sure it doesn’t happen
again… as much as possible.
So for Brendan to still believe that he
is ‘protecting the families’ ( if that’s
what he thinks he’s doing ) just
means he really, really hasn’t
been paying attention.
The families have spoken.
They WANT to know as much as
possible about what happened that
day ( and still intend to FIND OUT ).
Brendan has maintained ( at all times )
that it was just an ‘accident’… that
‘no one did anything wrong’… yet
he has also maintained ( at all times )
that there are some things about
what happened that day that he will
not talk about.
He simply doesn’t realize that those
two ‘stances’ are incompatible, and
just further the sense of ‘mystery’
surrounding this incident.
If he really, truly believes it was just
an ‘accident’… then there should be
NOTHING that he is ‘reluctant’ to
talk about.
That’s what
makes the
families
of those
men who
were lost
too soon
want to
KNOW.
SRsays
Subjective motivation is always hard to assess accurately, anyway. Even self-reported motivations can be very unreliable, for obvious reasons in some cases, but also because we’re not good at perceiving things. We know that, at YHF, there was a pattern even that day of being a bit fast and loose with the 10 and 18. This was on display before GM ever dropped off the 2-track.
Particularly for emotionally highly charged events, even discussing subjective motivations can be problematic. But, whatever the motivations, we do know that persistently being in situations where the 10 aren’t taken seriously and lots of Watch Outs are present is not a good practice. You can look at the 10 and 18 applied to the lookout, and stop the clock there, and say, whatever the motivation or even simple lack of attention, not best practice.
Likewise for a culture of secrecy about something like crew movements. Whatever the motivations for not wanting someone to discuss those, it is not a healthy thing.
TTWARE – thanks for your comment about the weather (and thanks also to Bob Powers for explaining in more detail what he was thinking regarding the weather). I will respond to both of you hopefully later today, after I finish a project with a deadline of today. Sorry for the delay – I just want you to know that I am not ignoring you, after you took the time to respond to me.
(Yet again, rather than using my LIMITED free time to respond productively to both of you this morning, and thereby advancing this discussion (hopefully), I ended up yet again wasting TWO HOURS drafting a reply to Fire20+ who leapt on ME for things that *I* did not say (and do not believe) while he simultaneously IGNORED the fact that it was BOB and WTKTT who said the things that Fire20+ is accusing ME of saying. This utter BULLSHIT has gone on for MONTHS, and it continues to make me want to throw up my hands and walk away from these efforts, despite people like Gabbert and JD making clear my important role in these discussions. For example, does anyone ELSE remember folks accusing ME of calling Rory Collins a coward when it was actually FRED who did it? I had to WASTE my time defending myself on that, rather than doing the things that are far more valuable and unique, such as getting public records to guys like Gabbert or JD, who can then post them. Why am I not surprised that now Fire20+ has done the SAME fucking thing, in terms of accusing me of stuff that I NEVER said, such that I have to WASTE my limited time defending myself? Huge fucking pain in the ass, but the worse option, in my mind, is my leaving IM and letting conspiracy theorist WTKTT and SR and whomever remain here unchecked, such that people actually BELIEVE all of the things that WTKTT says and states (incorrectly) as fact. I suppose that now that xxfullsailxx is back, there will be less unchecked, inaccurate rambling, but, at some point, xxfullsailxx has to leave IM and go start…fighting fires. He, unlike Fire20+ and Bob Powers and Fred and others, is presumably STILL working forty-plus-hour weeks on the fire front lines (presumably like WFF, who also seems to now be on here less and less, presumably in anticipation of the start of fire season in a week or so).)
Looks like Fire20+, with his reasonable and informed post, got someone riled up. He didn’t feel the need to drop F-bombs or to play the victim, though.
EN wrote:
“Fire20+ who leapt on ME for things that *I* did not say (and do not believe) while he simultaneously IGNORED the fact that it was BOB and WTKTT who said the things that Fire20+ is accusing ME of saying. This utter BULLSHIT has gone on for MONTHS, and it continues…”
—OK, so you were quoting somebody else, why not just quote them then? Folks would then understand the idiotic words you (you statements are appropriate here) DID put in that list weren’t yours, which raises another question. Why would you put things on a blog entry that appears to be coming out of your mouth then when your ‘jumped on’ you just can’t handle it and blame other people?—
“I had to WASTE my time defending myself on that, rather than doing the things that are far more valuable and unique, such as getting public records to guys like Gabbert or JD, who can then post them. Why am I not surprised that now Fire20+ has done the SAME fucking thing, in terms of accusing me of stuff that I NEVER said…”
—Don’t waste your time on my account, stop writing what you didn’t say or know about then you wouldn’t have to defend yourself Elizabeth and work yourself into a tissy. As far as what you say about ‘getting public records to guys…’ well, there you go again. ANYBODY can get public records by doing a records request, it is not special or generous or important, it is something ANYONE can do. You behave as if your “role” is exclusive and proprietary, your generous public service efforts, your selfless generosity to “give” this information to JD and Gabbert. They could have clearly gotten it themselves or gotten it from any other number of people who have the records also. I sure hope nobody has pointed this out to you before me, I’d hate to upset you.—
Oh, one more thing, I’m curious how the families like seeing F-bombs all over the place accompanied by victimized, crazy talk? Do you care about that at all? I cuss like a logger, but not here.
They were all taken by Jerry Thompson, who was working with a Structure
Protection Group under SPGS1 Gary Cordes on Sunday, June 30, 2013.
That ‘crew’ was working right there in Yarnell, about 1/2 to 3/4 mile due
south of the Shrine Youth Camp, to the west of Yarnell where some ‘outlying’
homes were. As one of the videos proves… they were close enough to
the Shrine Youth Camp to actually capture the siren going off on Tyson
Esquibel’s lead engine that was parked there as he was using it to ‘recall’
the fellas working in Harper Canyon.
This is the SAME SIREN heard in the YARNELL-GAMBLE video.
There are actually FOUR videos in this folder… and some of them have
some pretty interesting ‘background radio’ traffic.
Those Jerry Thompson photos/videos are publicly available HERE…
A pretty interesting ‘background radio’ exchange captured in this
one right at the start. There is little doubt that this is OPS1 Todd Abel
talking to OPS2 Paul Musser at exactly 1524 ( 3:24 PM ).
(OPS1 Todd Abel): I think they’ll probly be a mess in or out.
(OPS2 Paul Musser): What can I tell ’em, then?
NOTE: I have no idea what that exchange means. Any guesses?
* IMG_1134 – 1630 – 4:30 PM
This is the one that captures the siren going off on Tyson Esquibel’s
lead engine as he was using it to ‘recall’ his crew from down in the
Harper Canyon west of the Shrine Youth Camp.
Jerry Thompson’s crew was close enough to they Shrine area to
capture this siren clearly. It is a ‘steady’ tone with no Doppler effect
so that means it was, in fact, a siren being sounded on a stationary
vehicle over at the Shrine Youth Camp.
It is the SAME SIREN being heard in the background of Blue Ridge
Hotshot McCord’s YARNELL-GAMBLE video which contains the
background capture of someone in fire command ( Musser?,
Abel?, Cordes? ) speaking directly to Eric Marsh and saying
they would ‘appreciate it if they could get to town a little faster’
and Eric Marsh responding “They’re comin’ from the heel of the fire”.
This might help narrow down ( even further ) the exact time of that
YARNELL-GAMBLE video since that still hasn’t been exactly determined.
We already KNOW it was no earlier than about 4:20 and no later than 4:32 PM.
* IMG_1136 – Also 1530 4:30 ( plus 45 seconds ).
Taken right after the previous one… but the siren has STOPPED, which
helps to even further narrow down the time for the YARNELL-GAMBLE video.
This one has another interesting radio capture that also appears to
be OPS1 Todd Able ( with little doubt ).
(OPS1 Todd Abel): Ah… down in Yarnell… ah… it should be pushin’ hard
right now into Yarnell… and south of Yarnell.
It is not known who OPS1 Todd Abel is talking to at that point.
This video ends with a firefighter in the foreground saying pretty excitedly…
“We got a LOTTA ASH!… It’s comin’ RIGHT AT US!… We gotta…”
The video cuts off his last few words.
Even MORE firefighters that almost waited too long that day to evacuate
and almost got ‘caught’?
Any, of course. But definitely the ones from the Ranch House. And his statement that he had left the Ranch House before he heard of deployment. I had always assumed that he was aware of the circumstances when he took the photos. I remember Tom Story commented over at Wildfire Today many months ago.
I haven’t compared them against the Russ Reason video yet. But it appears (to me) that the McCord photo 106 was taken before the Tom Story 1677. photo. Also, The McCord photo 106 seems to show some clear sky in the southern (or left) part of the pic. I mention that as it could relate to the mysterious quote by Marsh saying “that is exactly where we want the retardant”. Meaning, the sky looks more clear in this photo than in ones taken later by Tom Story.
If you were asking for my *general* opinion
of the Tom Story photos I would say that
I actually *do* have some similar concerns
about the TIMESTAMPS.
It is almost inconceivable that a professional
reporter/photographer might not have the
TIME set exactly correctly on his cameras
and/or devices… but I am still scratching
my head about the TIMESTAMPS on
some of his photos.
Example: He has a full sequence of pictures
of an extensive DC10 VLAT drop right there
down around Yarnell. ALL of the these photos
seem to have a timestamp of 1639.
Yet… NOWHERE in any of the Air Study
videos ( especially the USDA folder ones
that ONLY capture the actual Air to Air
conversations ) is there ANY radio traffic
that would support that this VLAT drop was
taking place at THAT exact time ( 1639 ).
1639 is the minute Steed’s first MAYDAY
supposedly took place as well… and here
is this DC10 VLAT (supposedly) dropping
TONS of retardant right near Yarnell at
the same moment Steed is sending his
MAYDAY.
Something just isn’t quite right about all
that… and I have to suspect that however
improbable it might seem… this professional
photographer did NOT have the TIME
set correctly on one ( or more ) of his
digital cameras.
Well. I just picked my way thru Tom’s photos. At first I wrote, up above, that I never trust camera time stamps becuz most ppl don’t need to pay attention to them.
But Tom was using three cameras that day, switching back and forth depending on which lens he needed. So that would lead me to think he probably must have had to sync them, thus at least vaguely getting them accurate. So the 3:49 photos are mystifying.
I think his photos at the Ranch House Parking Lot seem about right, though. They would definitely have been later than McCord’s. I think McCord jumped out of the Blue Ridge Buggy and started shooting relatively immediately. Tom’s photos start with the Blue Ridge ATV near the trucks, and then the ATV vanishes, and I think that happening around 5 seems reasonable. And, yes, the fire has gotten much closer by then as the parking lot, itself would eventually no longer be considered a “safe zone.”
So I’m stumped. It would be helpful if there was a timed list of the VLAT drops, for sure.
**
** DID OPS1 TODD ABEL REALLY SAY “HUNKER AND BE SAFE”?
>> On April 18, 2014 at 4:47 pm, Elizabeth said:
>>
>> 6. Just because the SAIT claims that somebody said
>> something does NOT actually mean that the things at issue
>> were actually said. For example, do I believe that the Blue Ridge
>> guys said exactly some of the things that the SAIT claims they
>> said? Nope. Abel did not recall saying “hunker,” presumably b/c
>> he never SAID “hunker,” even though the SAIT said he said “hunker.”
>> Do I think Marsh said the winds were “squirrely”? Well, I wouldn’t
>> bet my first child on it.
This is just another response to one more ‘point’ from Elizabeth’s recent
bullet-list of what she chose to call ‘clarifications’.
Since she keeps obsessing about the Todd Abel ‘hunker’ quote and seems to
keep asking us all not to believe our OWN EARS…
…I thought I’d do just (hopefully) one more ’round up’ on this.
Every time she brings this up… I have asked Elizabeth to please supply an
‘alternative word’ ( other than the word ‘hunker’ ) for that sentence clearly heard
in the Caldwell video… but there’s never an answer.
* The Robert Caldwell VIDEO…
First and foremost… here is the radio traffic that is CLEARLY heard in the
Robert Caldwell video…
__________________________________________________________________
Eric Marsh (DIVS A): Yea… I’m tryin’ to work my way off the top.
Todd Abel ( OPS1 ): Okay… I copy… ah… just keep me updated…
ah… ya know… you guys hunker and be safe and then… ah…
we’ll get some air support down there ASAP.
_________________________________________________________________
And ( once again ) here is the ’roundup’ on how that clear conversation went through the investigation process and ended up in PUBLISHED report(s)…
* The Arizona Forestry SAIT investigators heard ‘hunker’ and
* were sure enough about it to PUBLISH it in their official report…
From the OFFICIAL SAIR Document – Page 22
OPS1 is listening on the radio to make sure everyone received the most recent
weather announcement. At about 1550, he radios DIVS A directly to ask if he got
the weather update and if he is “in a good spot.” DIVS A affirms that he received
the update, and he tells OPS1 the winds are starting to get “squirrely” up on the
ridge. He says he is working his way off the top and OPS1 closes by advising
DIVS A to hunker and be safe.
* Lead SAIT investigator Jim Karels is sure he heard ‘hunker’…
Page 1 of the SAIT Yarnell Investigation Notes (YIN)
Interview with OPS1 Todd Abel by Jim Karels (alone) on 8/14/13
NOTE: OPS1 Todd Abel told the SAIT investigator Jim Karels that he doesn’t
recall this ENTIRE conversation with Marsh… much less any particular words
or sentences he might have used like ‘hunker and be safe’. That is really still
hard to believe… but Jim Karels had already heard the Caldwell video prior to
the interview and he was SURE that he had heard Abel tell Marsh to “hunker”.
Karels made a note to himself to be sure and ask Abel about it during the
interview… and he did. We see both Karels’ ‘note to himself’ AND a note
about Abel’s response in the investigation document(s)…
– (Ask Abel about) the ~1555 radio conversation that we have on the
(Caldwell) video, (which includes the phrase okay, you hunker down in
the black) – Abel did not recal having this conversation with marsh.
* OPS1 Todd Able uses the same ‘hunkered’ word in his ADOSH interview…
Oddly enough… even though OPS1 Todd Abel told Lead SAIT investigator Jim
Karels that he ‘doesn’t recall’ any/all of his conversation with Marsh captured by
the Caldwell video… all of a sudden he ( Abel ) seems to be recalling it pretty
well in his ADOSH interview. He gets the TIME right… recalls Eric’s ‘squirrely
winds’ statement… and while the ADOSH investigators do not specifically even
ask Abel about the Caldwell video ( even though they knew it existed )… Abel
even uses the same word ‘hunkered’ while talking to THEM and describing that
conversation with Marsh…
Page 43 of OPS1 Todd Abel’s ADOSH interview…
Q1 = Dave Larsen ( Rest in Peace )
A = OPS1 Todd Abel
__________________________________________________________________
Q1: 3:45. This all was about in the same timeframe of wind shifts, the
conversation with Eric. He was the first one to feel those squirrely winds
start, right?
A: Yeah.
Q1: And he’s talking to you about he’s got wind issues?
A: Mm-hm.
Q1: Let me ask you this, you say you’re nervous, um, because of this…
A: This cell building over here.
Q1: …this cell – what does that mean to you?
A: That means outflows, possible lightning strikes, all that stuff.
Q1: Okay.
A: So that’s why I wanted to make sure that he had eyes on it to make sure he
watches that thing and make sure that if it’s getting too – if he gets to really
start feeling those winds changing and everything that they can get hunkered
in that black – that 250 acres of safety zone there.
Q1: Mm-hm.
A: And – and stay out of harm’s way. You know they could even drop down off
the ridge for lightning purposes if they had to.
Q1: Sure.
A: Was my thought process.
_________________________________________________________________
So Abel proves ( all on his own during the interview ) that he is someone who
DOES use the words ‘hunker’ and ‘hunkered’ as part of his usual/regular
vocabulary.
So for anyone to really doubt that OPS1 Todd Abel was NOT captured saying
“hunker and be safe” to Eric Marsh in the Caldwell video… the only real
question would be…
What OTHER word is being said?
Just because you might think he didn’t actually use the word ‘hunker’ to start
that one sentence doesn’t mean the sentence itself doesn’t exist.
So for anyone who does NOT think the first word of that sentence is ‘hunker’
( from a man known to use that word freely )…then please ‘fill in the blank’ below.
What OTHER word could possibly be used that would match the full CONTEXT
of this conversation and would start a sentence/statement that is KNOWN
to be this…
“_______ and be safe.”
Remember… it has to at least SOUND like ‘hunker’… because this entire
statement ( and context ) IS, in fact, captured in the video.
Amen WTKTT. I hope EN answers you because I am curious. She hasn’t answered me either about her doubts of the use ‘hunker’ in WFF. I can tell you WTKTT, we use this word on the regular to describe taking shelter, getting down off a ridge, literally sitting on your butts and watching Wx, fire behavior, etc. from a safe spot.
WTKTT, you think maybe Able read the SAIT report before his interview with ADOSH and just filled in the blanks in his ‘memory’? I do. The thing is, when your fighting fire they weren’t thinking ‘oh, maybe I’m being recorded’…It was perhaps after the audio/video recordings came out when some OH started worrying about statements they had previously made.
Also, just a point, Dave Larsen (RIP) uses the word squirrely and he was a T1IC, and it didn’t throw him off. Squirrely is as common a description for Wx as unstable is for FF’s on the ground.
WTKTT– You also have statements here of 2 very clear things.
1. there was a forecast on winds and a concern that they were going to get worse and the statement of squarely winds.
2. the discussion of a cell at around 1545. the fact that they had 250 plus acres of black SZ and they could hunker there and incase of lighting drop off the ridge in to safe areas.
No mention by Todd Able of going down to the bomb proof SZ.
so every thing we have been discussing is simply stated here, with or with out any pictures of support which we also Identified yesterday and which I am sure there are more.
Why is there a question about the cell and winds? Before 1600 Ops Able was concerned about the cells affect on the winds.
Why was marsh then not concerned about the same thing?
Did Marsh see something that no one else saw?
Did Marsh decide to do something that no one else thought he would do?
Your above Able interview says a lot the fire was in fact being influenced buy a cell with winds and OPS was concerned about the 1 crew on the mountain. Marsh ignored that warning sign and move the entire crew into a brush field in front of a volatile situation and did not heed the warning signs.
I could say more but I do not wish to hurt or be insensitive to any one the decisions made were not founded on Safety.
Bob, am I correct that it is not RARE to have thunder cells in the area of an Arizona wildfire between mid-June and the end of July, and that the mere presence of these cells does not suggest that everything should stop and everyone should sit in the black until every possible thunder cell (regardless of its distance away) is gone?
I am NOT trying to defend anyone or make things up or whatever nonsense you often accuse me of. I am trying to figure out if you HONESTLY take the position that the fact that someone can see a thunder cell (even as far away as Prescott with respect to the Yarnell Hill Fire) means that everyone needs to retreat to the black immediately.
Thunder cells are common through out the west.
there are safe places to work on a fire. If Lighting moves over you then you find a safe place till it passes. Depending on the location on the fire and the wind you may continue to work or back off and sit it out. It is hard to make a general statement here. If your line is containing the fire then it might be safe to continue work. If the fire has escaped containment then a lot depends on where you are on the fire. Quitting work has a great deal to do with your safety and location, every cell that passes over a fire dose not Carry the same threats for each different fire. Complicated YES.
The Yarnell Hill Fire had escaped containment or it was not fully contained because of open line. The cell created that. Where GM was they had no place to build line because all of there line was compromised due to the fire below and to the left of their break site. so they could not continue to build line back to the fire as it would move under them and burn back up to there line. Becoming unsafe and unproductive.
To state the obvious: Elizabeth is pushing yet another “false dichotomy.” There is not necessarily a binary choice between 1) quit at the first sign of a thunderstorm, and 2) take a long, slow bushwhack with the fire getting blown towards you. It does not normalize GM’s decision to say, well, depending on conditions you may or may not keep working. There is a huge range of possibility that falls under “keeping working,” and virtually none of those possible actions have killing your whole crew as a likely outcome if the timing is just a bit off.
You really don’t get it. Elizabeth is not approving of or trying to justify GMs decisions, she is trying to come up with what they might have been thinking that leads them to make the critical errors that they did.
Stop spending all your effort trying to discredit her and try and really read what she is saying.
No, I do get it. She’s starting with the premise that GM acted reasonably. And floating various theories that she thinks explain why the decisions made were reasonable. Her theories may contradict each other — GM could have been scared down by lightning, or, alternatively, could have reasonably concluded in EN’s view that bushwhacking through dense fuel down into a terrain trap with the fire being blown towards you in the midst of a thunderstorm was a reasonable thing to do — because, hey, if you stop fighting fire every time there’s a thunderstorm on the horizon, you’ll stop work a lot. There is basically zero support for any of these theories, many of which show no regard for the realities of either the southwest, or wildland fire.
We have heard from RTS that, not only were others aware that GM was using unconventional tactics and sticking their necks out while doing it, but they had spoken to GM about it. And, that there had been a culture of secrecy over crew movements. So, EN is making a few logical errors when she supposes that GM had to think that what they were doing was reasonable and safe from a conventional perspective.
Maybe they did. But, maybe a crew that doesn’t want others to know where they are and what they are doing realizes that some of their tactics may be viewed as unconventional, even risky. Maybe they were well aware that they were taking a risk. The reality is that when insular groups deviate from accepted safety norms, there often is an escalating pattern of risk-taking. And often at least some of the group is aware of that fact.
EN’s approach, which takes the fact that GM thought that their actions were reasonable and prudent at the time as a given, simply assumes away many possible realities. And so is a lousy way to conduct an inquiry, unless you decided from the get-go that the answer to that inquiry will always be that all safety norms were followed, this was a reasonable and ordinary day with simply a fluke outcome.
I’m pretty sure EN never said GM acted reasonably, if I’m wrong, show me. Same could be said for “bushwhacking into a terrain trap”.
Why is it a “logical error” to suppose that GM thought what they were doing was reasonable and safe? Why the hell would they have done it? Do you think they wanted to die?
People take outsized risks all the time. There is a difference between a suicide attempt and assuming risks that carry a high likelihood over time of resulting in death. People climb rock cliffs unroped, go boating without life jackets, fill gas cans without lifting them out of truck beds, and do all sorts of things that they may be aware aren’t great ideas. When looking at an accident, it’s a real bad idea to prejudge it as “safe people, just one of those things.”
In this case, given what we have heard in terms of the possibility of prior risk-taking, it is all the less wise to start with the assumption that there was no awareness of risk.
BTW, EN did say she thought it looked reasonable to GM when they started their bushwhack. So, yeah, she’s saying she thought based on information in front of them that they acted reasonably, without seeing undue risk. Or, alternatively, that a reasonable person would have seen undue risk, but GM didn’t and simply not competent to see those risks. But, somehow I don’t think that 2d idea is the one EN is trying to plant the seeds of when she say they thought it was reasonable to drop down.
So you say that GM stood there ready to drop into the bowl and said” this is not reasonable but lets go”
I disagree, I think they said” their is some risk, but I think its reasonable lets go”.
I think EN agrees with me and she is trying to put together what info they had that lead them to decide this way.
Bob Powerssays
You both are some what right.
when answering Elisabeth’s questions I try to tie all the lose ends as the general questions have several answers. I hope I was clear enough its not always black and white on larger fires some areas are safe some are not.
I agree Jeff. I for one think Elizabeth has as much or more than anyone to add to this conversation. And she is the one who has procured much of the material we have available to review. Thank you Elizabeth
I would ask Jeff to review the 18 situations and especialy 11, 12, 15, and 17. Also 10 Standard orders 2,3,4,5,7,and always 10. I keep banging on this is any body out there referring to these when making statements about decisions made.
You can not understand fire safety if you do not use the rules and understand them. There are fire fighters here who know what I am saying.
I made every Hot shot that worked for me memorize the 10 and 13-(18) my crew bosses reviewed them at the start of every shift. I was a hard ass and trained RTS who took it with him. They are safety tools not just some thing to read and forget. They are not there to find guilt when someone dies they are there to keep you from dyeing or severely injuring you or your crew. I’ll get off my soap box.
It is a needed message, thank you for focusing attention back to it. The number of violations/Watch Outs present out of the 10 and 18 wasn’t reasonable. Serious accidents generally will have multiple violation present, and there certainly were here.
Likewise, a culture of secrecy as to crew movements in general and at best coyness as to the specific actions at YHF suggests awareness of risk.
Also, nearly getting your lookout burned over earlier in the afternoon shows that risks were being taken at multiple points throughout the day.
With all of that, simply assuming away the chance that there was awareness of risk — e.g., Although we might get entrapped if we run out of time, I think we can pull off getting to town ahead of the front — well, it makes no sense not to consider that there may have been conscious assumption of risk.
SR & Bob, you are both correct above, GM made a conscious assumption to ignore/minimize the 10 &18. the question is why, and this is what EN is trying to get to.
Nobody here has ever said that they complied with the 10&18, Why they didn’t is the answer to this fatal puzzle.
calvinsays
I agree, the word has got to be hunker. What I think is highly important is that Chris Mackenzie’s cell phone captures Robert Caldwell taking his video which verifies the correct timestamp for the series of pictures taken from the Discussing options spot on Mackenzies cell phone which in return makes it impossible for Andrew Ashcraft to be in two places at one time. Or, in short, the timestamp on the Mackenzie Camera circa 1600 is WRONG!
And by the way, I would bet that is why none of the pictures from the camera were used in the SAIR and no timestamps were used with the Mackenzie Camera photos in the WAFR. And I suggest everyone compare (for themselves) the smoke progression from the Wade Parker Picture with image 2738 from Mackenzies cell and decide for yourself which is taken first. It also seems to me that the first Mackenzie video is taken at nearly the same time (as both pictures above) based the smoke movement to the south.
Calvin, yet again, you are the man with the answers (or at least the right questions). The smoke issue is something a friend raised recently to me. My tentative view has always been that the wind DID push the smoke back (but I admittedly have always needed to do more research on this), but HIS view was that the time is wrong. What’s your view?
Elizabeth. Andrew Ashcraft can be seen sitting at the discussing options location in images 2535, 2536, and 2537. Only his boots are visible in two of the pics.
At almost the exact same time (per timestamp) Andrew Ashcraft can be seen leaving the black with Parker, Norris and a couple other GMH in photos 0885, 0886,and 0887 from the Mackenzie camera.
BTW..photos 0885, 0886 and 0887 are taken from the same general location as photo 0882 from earlier in the day. 0882 is the picture that shows Rory Collins dropping retardant on GM burnout operation. This drop established the southern perimeter of the burnout that can be seen in image 0885, 0886 and 0887. So I am asserting that images 0885,0886 and 0887 indeed show GM leaving the black BEFORE they returned to the discussing options location.
Elizabeth. Image p0262 from ADOSH 7/18 phto with GPS shows this same location from a different perspective. The retardant line is still visible (barely) and so is the rock that is in photo 0882, 0885, 0886, and 0887. I also think the discussing options location is in this picture, or if not it is in the previous picture p0261, that is taken from the same location, just higher up the hill. The rock I mentioned above is not in photo p0261.
Reply to Elizabeth post on April 21, 2014 at 7:15 am said:
>> Elizabeth wrote…
>> WTKTT, I take it that you do NOT think that it is Gary Cordes’s voice
>> IMMEDIATELY before and AFTER Musser’s on the “Division Alpha,
>> Operation Musser” video (see the link below)? Why is that?
Why is that?… because I ( me, personally ) simply don’t believe it.
I listened (again) to this video clip you posted ( your link below where it
originally was in your comment ).
In the first place… you are definitely WRONG to assume that the voice(s)
BEFORE and AFTER Musser’s callout are the ‘same person’.
I would say that is definitely NOT the case.
Whoever that is speaking when the video starts… the “Thank you” that
comes after Musser’s callout to DIVSA is simply in response to that
‘report’ that was being given as the video starts.
I already posted a ‘transcript’ for the CLEARLY heard background
transmissions in this video ( in this very Chapter 6 of this ongoing public
discussion ) but it is reprinted below so you don’t have to go searching for it.
See my transcript below. I believe ( me, personally ) that “Thank you”
is more than a likely match for Darrell Willis. Sounds JUST like his voice.
Someone is also saying “Uh… You’re Welcome” in the very last second
of the video but that also doesn’t sound like speaker 1 or 2. That
“You’re welcome” definitely sounds like OPS2 Paul Musser.
As for the statements heard at the START of this 24 second video… I still believe
that the conversation being captured there at the start can be interpreted in
a number of ways. Here is what is actually said… ( clearly heard )…
VIDEO STARTS
+0:00 ( 1542.08 – 3:42.08 PM )
(Eric Marsh? Gary Cordes?): …towards the structures… uh… (pause)
southern… uh… (pause) into Yarnell.
So here are what I believe are the ‘possibilities’ there…
1) It is Eric Marsh giving someone ( Darrell Willis says ‘Thank You’? ) a
report on the FIRE BEHAVIOR he is now seeing from the ridge.
2) It is Eric Marsh giving someone ( Darrell Willis says ‘Thank You’? ) a
report on what the plans are for Granite Mountain. ( To move into the
southern part of Yarnell towards the structures ). It’s a little early (1542)
for that to be the fully formed plan for GM so if that really is Eric I would
say he is simply reporting about the FIRE BEHAVIOR he is seeing.
3) It is SPGS1 Gary Cordes giving someone ( Darrell Willis says ‘Thank You’? )
a report on what is happening ( and expected to happen ) with the fire
down on the Yarnell end.
So yes… it COULD be Gary Cordes in those opening statements just
giving a ‘report’ to someone. I could easily believe SPGS2 Darrell Willis
had just ‘called’ SPGS1 Gary Cordes and asked for an ‘update’ on the
fire behavior ‘down there’… but there is nothing specific in there about
‘needing any help’ and certainly nothing there to tie what he is saying
into some kind of ‘request for Granite Mountain’. He’s just telling someone
what the fire is doing on the south side at that moment, and then that
someone says “Thank You”.
However… I still do NOT believe that initial voice is Gary Cordes. Doesn’t quite
match other recordings of his voice. I believe it is a *MUCH* closer match to
Eric Marsh’s voice.
So ( see transcript below ) that is what I think.
I believe this video captures a moment when Eric Marsh is actually talking
directly to Darrell Willis and Marsh is updating Willis on the fire behavior he
is witnessing from out on the ridge in the 1542 timeframe… and Willis then
says “Thank You” to Marsh.
In-between Marsh’s fire behavior report and Willis’ “Thank You”… we
suddenly hear OPS2 Paul Musser trying to contact Marsh. There is no
response from Marsh to OPS2 Musser’s callout before the video ends.
BTW: If that really is Darrell Willis saying “Thank you” to Marsh ( and not
Cordes ), then this goes directly against Willis’ other statements that he
‘never talked to Marsh’ that day after the 0600 AM phone call when Willis
told Marsh “We’ve got to get an anchor on this thing”.
>> Elizabeth also wrote…
>> One would think that it makes SENSE that that voice is Cordes’s – having
>> ASKED Musser to reach out to Division Alpha (since Cordes’s radio is being
>> wonky, not transmitting well but obviously allowing him to HEAR things),
There you go again.
What PROOF do you have for this statement that SPGS1 Gary Cordes
SPECIFICALLY *ASKED* OPS2 Paul Musser to ‘reach out to Division Alpha’
on his ( Cordes’ ) behalf.
Gary Cordes says nothing of the kind in his own ADOSH interview and
( likewise ) neither does OPS2 Paul Musser in HIS ADOSH interview.
There is NO DOUBT that Gary Cordes expressed his ‘needs’ to OPS2 Paul
Musser that he needed more STRUCTURE PROTECTION equipment/resources
if there was any chance of him ‘saving some town’. That conversation IS
detailed in the ADOSH interviews… but there is still NO direct proof that Cordes
made any specific request to ANYONE concerning needing some guys with just
Pulaski tools and chainsaws who were two miles away and ‘out of the game’ at
that point.
Cordes knew how FAR away they were, and that they had no way to get
out of there but suffer a long 2+ mile hike. Cordes KNEW that GM was
‘out of the game’ at that point. The only thing that would NOT make SENSE
is if Cordes really did think they were still ‘in the game’ or that they could
make any significant dent in his IMMEDIATE needs at that point, or for
the next 2 hours.
>> Elizabeth also wrote…
>> and then Cordes says “thank you” immediately after Musser reaches
>> out to Division Alpha
Nope. That’s not what I am hearing. Whoever says “Thank You” is definitely
not the person that was speaking first in this video… and ( see below ) my
best guess at who says “Thank You” would SPGS2 Darrell Willis. It sounds
just like him.
>> Elizabeth also said…
>>
>> …but I take it that you are not going with the that interpretation of the
>> conversations in the below-linked video?
>>
>> http://youtu.be/y07WjZGdJQ4
You ‘take’ it correctly.
>> Elizabeth also wrote…
>>
>> Why not?
Because I think you are wrong.
Here is still MY ( me, personally, caveat, caveat, caveat ) original
transcription of that Panebaker 154232 Air Study video, complete with
notes about who I ( me, personally ) think *could* be speaking.
** On March 23, 2014 at 10:13 pm, WantsToKnowTheTruth posted…
**
** FULL TRANSCRIPT OF BACKGROUND RADIO CONVERSATIONS
** CAPTURED IN AIR STUDY VIDEO 20130630_154232_fire_behavior_EP
This is the AIR STUDY video that has always been reported to have the ‘callout’
from OPS2 Paul Musser to DIVSA Eric Marsh in it, but a public copy of that video
has not been available until today ( March 23, 2014 ).
We also now discover ( as the ADOSH investigation notes suggested ) that the
video BEGINS with what appears to be Eric Marsh ‘finishing’ a conversation with
some other (unknown) person.
AIR STUDY VIDEO…
20130630_154232_fire_behavior_EP.MOV
Length: This video is only 24 seconds long.
The video has a filename/timestamp of 154232 but this is now assumed to be
the END time for the video, so the actual START time for this video would be
154208 ( 3:42 PM plus 8 seconds ).
FULL TRANSCRIPT OF BACKGROUND RADIO CONVERSATIONS…
NOTE: No ‘audio forensics’ required here. All the background radio conversation
captured in this AIR STUDY video can be clearly heard by anyone with normal
hearing. Regardless… usual ‘caveats’ apply. This transcript is what
I ( me personally ) am hearing in this video. Your mileage may vary.
ALSO NOTE: This video BEGINS at 1542.08 ( 3:42 PM plus 8 seconds ).
That is about 2 minutes and 8 seconds AFTER Gary Cordes had officially
requested the full evacuation of Yarnell and Glen Ilah at 1540.00.
ALSO NOTE: When the video starts… someone is already answering
someone else’s previous radio call in the background and the voice that
is heard responding *seems* to be either SPGS1 Gary Cordes OR
DIVSA Eric Marsh. I ( me, personally ) believe the voice is a much closer
match to Eric Marsh than Gary Cordes. The ADOSH investigators
themselves took NOTES on this video and their own notes seem to
indicate they believe it is Eric Marsh we first hear speaking.
VIDEO STARTS
+0:00 ( 1542.08 – 3:42.08 PM )
(Eric Marsh?): …towards the structures… uh… (pause) southern… uh…
(pause) into Yarnell.
NOTE: As soon as (Marsh?) finished answering whoever he
was talking to… OPS2 Paul Musser calls him directly…
NOTE: Silence for a moment, then someone comes on and simply says “Thank
you” to (Marsh?) for his previous response which included the phrase “towards
the structures”. It’s hard to say… but this “Thank You” definitely sounds like
Darrell Willis.
+0:13 ( 1542.21 – 3:42.21 PM )
(Unknown – but definitely SOUNDS like Darrell Willis’ voice): Thank you.
NOTE: Other than someone saying “Uh… You’re Welcome” in the
last second of the video… There is no other background traffic in the
remaining 11 seconds. DIVSA Marsh does not respond to OPS2 Musser
by the time the video ends at 1542.32
+0:23 ( 1542.31 – 3:42.31 PM )
( Unknown – Sounds like OPS2 Paul Musser? ): Uh… You’re welcome.
+0:24
VIDEO ENDS
So the exact ‘clock’ time for this clear attempt on OPS2 Musser’s part to
engage in conversation directly with DIVSA Eric Marsh is now known to be…
1542.14 ( 3:42 PM plus 14 seconds ).
That is about TWO minutes after the moment when SPGS1 Gary Cordes
officially called for full the full evacuation of Yarnell, and more than 1 minute
after Brian Frisby had already ‘called off’ the face-to-face meeting with
Marsh, picked up Brendan, told Brown to get all the vehicles the hell out
of the Sesame area and to start ‘evacuating’ because the fire is now coming
in towards town like a freight train. All of that happened circa 1541.
Is it possible that the “thank you” came from Brian Frisby? Frisby calls Marsh to tell him the Face to Face is not going to happen (after picking up Mcdonough). Marsh informs Frisby of the plan….…towards the structures… uh… (pause) southern… uh…
(pause) into Yarnell. Musser breaks in with DIV Alpha. And Frisby replies with a thank you.
But here would be my own ‘probably not’ explanation…
1) I simply think the “Uh… You’re Welcome” at the VERY
end of the video SOUNDS just like Musser. Paul Musser
has a very distinct voice placement. It’s pretty high
pitched and ‘nasally’. Brian Frisby’s voice is also pretty
unique. It’s more ‘baritone’ and he whenever Frisby
presses that micophone button he speaks forcefully,
clearly, and loudly ( everyone should learn from Frisby ).
2) I really don’t believe Eric Marsh or Jesse Steed had
a frickin’ CLUE what their plans were even GOING
to be at 1542. I think that’s just way too early for them
to have already ‘discussed their options’ and have
ALREADY decided they were going to do ‘the mission’.
1542 was simply the moment when it was still dawning
on them that everything is now fully SIDEWAYS and
their all-day work assignment was now USELESS.
The ‘comfort level’ conversations were still at least
10 minutes away. ( From 1550 through 1602 ).
3) At 1542… Frisby would have been actually driving
the ATV on that dirt two-track to drop Brendan off
at the vehicles. I actually don’t think he was having
any radio conversations WHILE he was ‘driving’.
Frisby tended to *only* talk on the radio when he
was stationary and *not* actually driving the Ranger.
4) The actual conversation that Frisby had with Marsh
in this timeframe ( after picking up Brendan ) is known
to have taken place on the ‘private’ GM intra-crew
frequency. Brendan had handed his own radio to Frisby
when Frisby picked him up for that exact purpose.
So we wouldn’t be hearing Frisby talking to Marsh at
all on this TAC 1 channel in this particular timeframe.
Okay… ALL that being said… you are still absolutely
CORRECT that ‘all of this was happening at the same
time’ and there could have been OVERLAP.
Example: I also truly believe that the reason DIVSA
doesn’t even ANSWER OPS2 Musser for at least
the duration of this video is that he *MAY* have been
‘finishing’ that conversation with Frisby over on the
GM Intra-crew frequency… and only when THAT
( known ) conversation was over did Marsh jump
back to TAC 1 and respond to OPS2 Musser.
A LOT of things began to happen at once in this
1541 to 1555 timeframe. LOTS of documented radio
exchanges and conversations and a LOT of ‘overlap’.
WTKTT: Where did you establish an “exemplar” for Frisby’s voice? Where do you claim to be hearing him, such that you know for sure what he sounds like? (I am not trying to be a wise-ass. I never knew that there was a documented example of his voice…. )
The best capture of Frisby’s voice over
the radio is at the end of the
YARNELL-GAMBLE video and the verification
on that happened way back in January
in this ongoing (public) discussion.
It is Brian Frisby heard at the END of the
video calling SPGS1 Gary Cordes…
“Structure group, Cordes, Blue Ridge Hotshots, on TAC 1”
Robert the Second (RTS) knows Brian
Frisby, and absolutely verified his voice there.
From Chapter 3 of this ongoing discussion…
____________________________________
WTKTT on Jan 16, 2014 at 9:19 pm said:
RTS… thank you.
Just to be clear, though… are you saying
you absolutely recognize that voice on the
last transmission as Frisby ( since I think
you know, him, right? )…
…or are you just assuming it’s Frisby.
If that really is him… that would be the first
known capture of his voice that we have
heard so far and that would be good to know.
Robert the Second replied on
January 17, 2014 at 10:28 am…
WTKTT,
Since you posted this, I listened to the
(YARNELL-GAMBLE) video clip several
more times.
In my mind, it’s ABSOLUTELY Marsh talking
about the “heel of the fire” and ABSOLUTELY
Frisby talking about “BRHS on Tac 1.”
____________________________________
Calvin, I do not have my notes in front of me, but I THINK I would peg the time slightly later than 3:41 – maybe 3:44? As I recall, Brendan took a picture at the sup/chase trucks at 3:49, which suggests that maybe he arrived at the trucks at 3:48. I think it took roughly three or four minutes to drive the UTV from the grader to the sup/chase trucks, which means Frisby and Brendan left the grader at 3:44-ish, maybe…..
Thanks Elizabeth. If Frisby arrived at the Grader at 1541 then it could have been a couple or three minutes before they drove away. I think Mcdonough said something about they were not in a big hurry once Frisby picked him up. Thanks for answering.
Remember… the 1541
time is absolutely the
moment when Captain
Trueheart Brown did his
‘about face’ on his hike
back east on the cutover trail. This was
recorded on the GPS
unit… which takes its
time directly from
orbiting satellites and
that time information is
included in the data
packets coming from
the satellite.
So, since the REASON
Brown did his ‘about
face’ is because that is the moment Frisby told
him to round up drivers
to evac vehicles…
…it is IMPOSSIBLE
for Frisby to NOT have
come across Brendan,
and had that initial
conversation with
Marsh about moving
the vehicles any
LATER than 1541.
There is only a 60
second ‘window’ there
for ‘fudge’ since the
GPS unit was only
updating every 60
seconds… but since
Brown had already
advanced 265 linear
feet back west between
the 1541 and 1542
satellite update… that
really does put the
‘turnaround’ moment
back to within a few
seconds after 1541,
or exactly at 1541.
Also… in McDonough’s
SECOND ADOSH
interview they actually
revisited this moment
and asked Brendan
specifically how long
it had taken him to
‘come down’ from his
lookout location and
arrive at the old-grader.
Brendan first corrects
them and then says
he did NOT ’emerge’
at the old-grader. He
actually ’emerged’
right there at the ‘T’
section of the roads
east of the grader and
that is where he met
Frisby coming down
the two-track.
Brendan puts his travel
time down from the top
of the mound to that
‘T’ section at exactly
3 minutes.
So if it only took Frisby
1 minute after finding
Brendan to call Brown
at 1541 and request
the drivers… and
Brendan was only
waiting at the ‘T’
section for 1 minute
before Frisby arrived
that puts the events
as follows…
1536 – Brendan starts
his 3 minute walk
down from lookout spot.
1539 – Brendan finishes
his walk down and
emerges at ‘T’ section.
1539.30 – Brendan
considers deployment
options and then gets
ready to call Frisby
1540 – Frisby
accidentally comes
across Brendan at
the ‘T’ section.
1540.30 – Frisby
talks with Marsh over
intra-crew using radio
Brendan handed him.
1541 – Frisby calls
Brown and tells him
to get drivers to move
vehicles.
1549 – Brendan has
already been dropped
off at vehicles, got in
SUP truck, fired up
air-conditioner and
turned up the onboard
intra-crew radio. Only
now he gets OUT of
the SUP truck to take
pictures of what
appears to be a
fire/smoke devil/whirl
right there to the north
on the fast-advancing
fireline.
You were talking about the “Thank you” and I referenced
the “Your Welcome” transmission capture instead.
Most of the comments above stand, however, about whether
that could be Frisby speaking at either place in that video.
He was actively driving Brendan east in the UTV at that
moment AND he had been talking over the GM intra-crew
frequency since Brendan handed him his radio to do that.
As for the “Thank You”…
I still ( personally, only me, caveat, caveat ) believe it is
Darrell Willis’ voice saying “Thank you”.
Sounds just like him.
The critical question on that video is whether it is, in
fact Eric Marsh giving that ‘report’ when the video
starts ( the ADOSH investigators seemed to think so
in their notes about this video )…
I do think it is Marsh at the beginning. I do agree that the delayed in the response, to Musser, is possibly related to the prior (unfinished) conversation.
If that really is Willis saying “Thank You” to
Marsh… then everything Willis has ever said
about never talking to Marsh that day after
the 0600 AM cell phone conversation is
pure bullshit.
WTKTT…. I cannot take a guess at the thank you. But after listening to the (sounds like) “your welcome”, more. It sounds like the your welcome was being transmitted from inside an aircraft (helicopter maybe). The background high pitched sound coming through the radio during the “your welcome”. But I could be totally off.
WTKTT: Thanks for sharing your thoughts. Forgive me for clarifying one point, however: You have accidentally attributed to me views/opinions/statements that I have never articulated, that I do not hold (or did not make), or that are flatly not mine. Specifically, your response above to me was offered in response to my asking you QUESTIONS about why you did not think that the voice immediately before and after the one that said “Division Alpha, Operations Musser” was the voice of Gary Cordes. I was asking you QUESTIONS – not making statements or trying to indirectly offer opinions/conclusions/whatever. Your response makes it sound as though I stated that MY conclusion or opinion is that the voice is Gary Cordes’s. Particularly given the dicey state of audio forensics when dealing with a background voice, I would hate for there to be confusion on this point. Remember the George Zimmerman trial, in which a “who’s-who” of audio forensic experts were pulled in. Despite that, and despite the fact that BOTH Zimmerman’s own family *and* Trayvon Martin’s own family testified about their polar opposite views of the identity of the lone voice, there STILL, to this day, is no clarity about whose voice (Martin or Zimmerman, Latino adult or black juvenile) was the background voice in the recorded communications presented at trial. Several of the world’s top experts opined in that context that it was a fool’s errand for other experts to even TRY to opine about the identity of the background voice (which did not “self-identify” by stating, for example, “HELP, this is Trayvon Martin”).
Thank you, though, WTKTT, for sharing YOUR views. I am grateful for your response.
Reply to Elizabeth post on April 25, 2014 at 8:42 am
>> Elizabeth wrote…
>> WTKTT: Thanks for sharing your thoughts. Forgive me
>> for clarifying one point, however: You have accidentally
>> attributed to me views/opinions/statements that I have
>> never articulated, that I do not hold (or did not make), or
>> that are flatly not mine. Specifically, your response
>> above to me was offered in response to my asking you
>> QUESTIONS about why you did not think that the voice
>> immediately before and after the one that said “Division
>> Alpha, Operations Musser” was the voice of Gary
>> Cordes. I was asking you QUESTIONS – not making
>> statements or trying to indirectly offer opinions /
>> conclusions / whatever.
>>
>> Your response makes it sound as though I stated that
>> MY conclusion or opinion is that the voice is Gary
>> Cordes’s.
Yes. That is exactly what I thought YOU were trying
to establish… and the fault for making such an assumption
is NOT mine. The WAY you ‘wrote’ your comment… it
was the logical conclusion to make.
C’mon… counselor… here is EXACTLY what you said…
>> Elizabeth wrote…
>> WTKTT, I take it that you do NOT think that it is Gary
>> Cordes’s voice IMMEDIATELY before and AFTER
>> Musser’s on the “Division Alpha, Operation Musser”
>> video (see the link below)? Why is that?
If you did NOT mean to establish that you ( yourself )
DID think those voices belonged to Gary Cordes and
you wanted to know why I did NOT… then you worded
your ‘simple questions’ very, very badly.
I had already published *MY* transcript of who I thought
was speaking… and you come back with “Why don’t
you think both voices are Gary Cordes?”. The only thing
to conclude with a comeback like what you wrote is
that you DID think that was the case and wanted to
debate that point.
So let me reword the response…
If you were, somehow, only asking me *IF* I thought
BOTH the before and after voices belong to Gary Cordes,
( when I had already told you who I thought they DID
belong to ) then the answer is ( again ) NO, I ( me,
personally, only me, caveat, caveat, caveat )
do NOT think BOTH those voices belong to even the
same person… much less the same Cordes person.
Question asked. Question answered.
If you ask a similar question in the future… please either
say what you really DO believe, yourself, and that you
are looking for ‘opinions’… or at least make it clear that
you don’t think anything one way or the other and you
are just ( actually ) ‘asking simple questions’.
If you ask a question again in the same way you did
above… I probably AM going to (naturally) assume you
are stating what YOU think and you are now asking why
I don’t think your assumption(s) are correct.
>> Elizabeth also said…
>> Particularly given the dicey state of audio forensics
>> when dealing with a background voice, I would hate
>> for there to be confusion on this point. Remember
>> the George Zimmerman trial…
Please… not again.
That’s about the fourth time you’ve tried to play the
‘George Zimmeran’ card and it has as little to do with
some of what’s happening here as it did the first time.
The voice(s) being analyzed in the Zimmerman case
were SCREAMING… and of very, very POOR quality
and captured from quite a distance from the microphone.
In this case… not only are people speaking clearly and
calmly in their NORMAL voice and pitch and cadence…
MANY of the background captures are HIGH (enough)
quality that other than just simply identifying the speaker’s
voice via someone who is familiar with it… there are NO
OTHER BARRIERS to ‘identification’ from an ‘audio
forensics’ standpoint.
Example: The YARNELL-GAMBLE video.
There is NO QUESTION that those voices CAN be
positively identified. 2 of them already have been.
I ( me, personally, only me, caveat, caveat ) believe the
one asking GM to ‘hurry’ ( circa 4:27 PM ) is OPS1 Todd
Abel. It sounds JUST like him, based on the plethora of
other absolutely verified captures of his voice over the
radio.
This can ALL be absolutely VERIFIED without much
trouble at all ( along with many other ‘captures’ ).
The REALITY is that the SAIT investigators simply
REFUSED to do so… when THEY had the chance.
>> Thank you, though, WTKTT, for sharing YOUR views.
>> I am grateful for your response.
BOB Powers: Regarding the weather, you said (on April 20, 2014 at 3:45 pm ) “I know what I saw in one picture .” What picture are you referencing, Bob?
I am working diligently at understanding the weather, so, if you, as an expert, have one particular picture that you favor over all of the others or that you feel is particularly telling, could you please tell us which one it is? Maybe then I can figure out where the disconnect between you and me is coming from. Part of the timeline that I am trying to put together (which is different than ADOSH’s, the SAIT’s, the WFA’s, Maclean’s, etc.) includes pictures that have verified time-stamps showing how the fire behavior existed and evolved in the hour leading up to the guys moving, and, while I do not know how to post that series here, I can hopefully find the picture to which you are referring in the series. Or maybe I have pictures in the series that you have not yet considered, and, if so, I can post them or point you to them in JD’s materials (or e-mail them to JD, as I have with other materials, for him to post).
I know very little about weather as it relates to fire, and I know that fire can create its own weather, which obviously complicates the weather discussion even further. I can assure you that I am trying to learn as best I can, and I hope you exercise patience as I try to align your disagreement with me with what I think I am seeing in my picture series, to try to see where there is a disconnect.
P.S. For MIKE: I have said repeatedly that my goal is in part to figure out what the GM guys were SEEING and perceiving before heading off to the Boulder Springs Ranch some time after roughly 4:05 p.m. that could have convinced THEM that heading to the BSR was not a death march.
It has been stated many times by myself and others, that the 4:05pm movement, in and of itself, was NOT a ‘death march’, as you put it.
As they proceeded south, they could see the fire, see the weather, and had fairly quick access to down and out escape off of the backside. It seems the only main thing they DIDN’T have covered at that point, was succinct communication with their superiors and adjoining forces.
More importantly, having not previously ever been able to visualize the lay of the land from the top of the bowl, they had no idea when they started their journey, how the last portion would actually present itself on the ground. Once they stood there observing it, AT THAT POINT there had to have been some sort of brief decision making process, before heading down.
I think that moment is more critical than any other as far as decision making goes. Unfortunately, there is no record, or portion of conversation, or anything else, that will give us additional insight into that moment, at that place.
I was responding to your comment to Mike at the end of your post, where you said:
“I have said repeatedly that my goal is in part to figure out what the GM guys were SEEING and perceiving before heading off to the Boulder Springs Ranch some time after roughly 4:05 p.m. that could have convinced THEM that heading to the BSR was not a death march.”
I think we can all get a pretty good sense of what they were seeing and perceiving at 4:05pm, based on the published pictures and radio traffic.
My comment was simply alluding to the fact that, while we practically all agree the best option was to stay in the black, that decision point wasn’t nearly as dangerous and critical as the one that occurred at the top of the bowl.
I know you are focusing on the weather during that time period, but all WFF will tell you that as long as storm cells are active in the area, expect wind shifts, to include velocity and direction, until the system abates itself. So, the thought that GM might have perceived that the ‘major wind event’ had already happened, did not excuse them from expecting further weather effects, as the weather system was still dominating the fire.
TTWARE: You reference “the weather system” that was “still dominating the fire.”
What weather system exactly are you referencing? Or what do you mean by “the weather system” in your comment to me?
The weather system that had caused ALL of the changes in wind direction and speed that afternoon, to include the ‘outflow boundary’ push, which continued on until the southward (or SE) push of the fire abated post deployment.
TTWARE, where are you getting that from? There was no one “weather system,” as best I can tell. I am looking at the materials in the weather portion of the SAIT materials (Section “G”, I think). What are you looking at? Thanks.
SAIT page 69, Figure 6, was the system (line of thunderstorms) that moved SW from the Flagstaff area into Yarnell. In Figure 7, the actual line of storms has broken up a bit, but the severe weather is showing just ENE of Prescott, and continues tracking toward Yarnell. Figure 8, lightning activity up until 1530, as the storms continue tracking WSW. From 1500 to 1530, FAA radar detects an outflow boundary “from the thunderstorms to the northeast” of the fire. Figures 9 & 10, the outflow boundary pushes out ahead of the storm.
i think you give too much aspiration to the two-track.
first of all, it’s completely speculation on your part… all of it. there is no telling what would have happened had they continued down it.
secondly, fire progression maps (both SAIR and WFAR) showed that the fire would have been upon them with the exact same ferocity and speed… just a few minutes later.
thirdly, you have no idea what their vantage to the main fire would have been. they still had the ridgeline in between them and they would have eventually ended up behind a second ridge line.
so, by continuing along the two track, MIGHT they have been better off? maybe. but they still would have been scrambling to find a deployment site.
Yes and that is similar to what I said awhile back.
They would have had some additional options but you are right they would have been scrambling to deploy and may not have survived any way.
Hence my use of the word “death march.” It does not appear that they would have been any better off there, unless TTWARE knows something about the timing of when the guys realized there was a problem than we do. Maybe TTWARE does…
My comment above was specifically referring to the ‘time and movement’ between their 4:05pm departure, and the decision point at the top of the bowl where they began their decent. Nothing more.
During THAT period, with the fire and weather vantage point they had, and the easily accessible down and out escape, THAT PORTION was anything but, a ‘death march’. When they began at 4:05, they did not know what they were going to be faced with when they reached the top of the bowl. The “Now What??????” thought, that must have run through quite a few minds.
It seems like much more was ascribed to my comment than was actually there. I am in agreement, that once they turned east, whether into the bowl, or further down on the single-track, the out-come would have not likely have been much different. But, they didn’t HAVE TO make either of those left turns.
Well, staying in the black was clearly the best option. TWARE highlights well why staying on the two-track for at the least a while longer was better then what GM chose.
I would note that, given fire progression, it is possible GM could have beat the fire if they had moved quickly on the two-track. Even though it becomes a trail, not a two-track, it would have allowed a much better rate of travel than what they chose. That’s leaving out other important variables such as deployment options.
The point is, based on the information in front of them at the time they chose to drop down, they chose the worst possible option. And in my view it was bad enough — they had to know they were in for a long, slow slog through that brush — that it’s not a close decision relative to staying on the two-track.
Post-fire pictures show VERY LITTLE fire progression in the sparse fuels on the west side of the ridgeline. As long as they were on the the portion of the two-track that paralleled the ridgeline, they could have walked down the backside and hiked out without having to deploy.
Yes they had other options that may have made a difference depending on there location when the fire would have made its run to far into the second canyon may have had the same out come, Had there primary objective been to drop off the back side at the saddle we would not be here today.
Elizabeth
The picture I was speaking of was about fire activity. the crew sitting at the rest spot at1550 and looking at the 2 mile flaming front. That is fire activity that flaming front is the one that chased McDonough off the lookout spot. it was moving at a steady pace when it did that. The crew was sending text about the fire being pushed into Yarnell. At that time you could start to see heavy smoke column black from some of the pictures in Yarnell as you watch you can see the smoke column start changing directions and laying over towards BSR that is the affect of a storm moving thru the fire area. Some of the Pictures McDonough took as he left the Parking spot with the truck. Based on the weather forecast and those videos and pictures it gives a perty good example of the affect of thunder storm clouds moving over a fire area. How do I say it ? it is like a small microsystem of a front moving thru that is wind driven. The wind is blowing out from the front as the front moves over you the wind starts changing directions and as it passes the wind is blowing in the opposite direction than it started. Wen they said down draft winds that takes the winds aloft and pushes them to the ground. Very erratic (Squarely) and will blow an active fire all to hell and in all directions with spotting. It had an open fuel area to run in late in the day with extreme burning conditions. Those are the conditions that also produce fire whirls or wind devils which spread fire rapidly. When you can see a 2 mile fire front that could spread at any time across the land scape that you plan to walk thru and in highly flammable brush with no break between you and the fire. GM was not planning far enough ahead. That one picture of the crew looking at that fire front with the crewman with the red beard, that first impression by me was stay where you are in the black. Evidently that image did not register with them. Nor did several of the watchouts which a simply there to tell you something is wrong pay attention and adjust you safety needs. Evaluate your situation. worst part of the day, the fire is active and running winds predicted don’t assume they are done.
look at the fuel you are in and remember what the potential is you have seen it before ( Marsh and Steed had a good background and they were in there back yard). Although there back yard had not burned in some time maybe they were complacent? There were enough of the situations that shout watch out to have stopped them. If they had only paid attention. The new one to me is #17 its a good one but it was common since back in my day.
Reply to Bob Powers on April 21, 2014 at 9:11 am said:
>> Mr. Powers said…
>> Those are the conditions that also produce fire whirls or
>> wind devils which spread fire rapidly.
Indeed. If you look closely at the very Brendan McDonough
photos you reference above… you will see exactly that.
That appears to be WHY Brendan came OUT of the
GM Supervisor truck ( where he had, by his own
statements, already turned on the air-conditioner and
cranked up the radio ), stood on the gunwale of the
truck… and was taking those pictures across the
roof of the truck.
There is a ‘fire whirl/devil’ right there in the photos and
that appears to be what he was trying to get a picture of.
So conditions were ALREADY right for that to be
happening at 1549… even before GM had finished
their ‘tools down’ operation and assembled at the
first rest spot at 1550.
In addition… in Brendan’s SECOND interview with
ADOSH they focused on ‘weather’ and ‘conditions’.
In that SECOND interview… Brendan swears that by
THAT time ( 1549 )… the fire had almost totally finished
‘rotating around 180 degrees’ and was NOW heading
pretty much due north/south. Brendan himself says
the only reason it still LOOKED like it was heading
‘east’ at some points is because of the topography
and the way it was ‘skirting around’ the ridges and
mounds over towards the Shrine area.
Yes… there are times ( in some of the photos taken in
the 1530 to 1404 timeframe ) that the fire LOOKS like
it is heading east/southeast…
…but what was REALLY happening is that it was still
simply in the act of ‘rotating around’ and it wasn’t
finished yet. Even Air Attack knew this is what was
really happening at that time.
Fires don’t ‘turn on a dime’. They ‘rotate around’ when
changing direction like that.
At NO time should anyone ASSUME it is finished
‘rotating’… until it HAS ( finished ).
I’m still not sure they were evaluating the ‘current and
expected behavior’ of the fire at all much as they made
their first decision to go on ‘a mission’.
I still believe it’s possible they were just trusting what
ASM2 Rory Collins had told them just before he left
the fire at 1558.
The guy up in the airplane ( who supposedly can see
what the fire is doing better than anyone ) had just told
them it was at least 1 hour from ‘town’ ( Yarnell, not
Glen Ilah )… and perhaps as much as 2 hours.
He was wrong.
At the moment they made their decision to go on their
‘mission’… the fireline was only 4,694 feet ( about 8/10
of a mile ) from where it is seen in the MacKenzie photos
to the mouth of the box canyon… where it would then
curl around and kill them.
And they only had 34 minutes before that was
going to happen to them ( 1604 to 1639 ).
That’s only HALF the time they THOUGHT the guy in the
airplane was telling them they had.
That is why you always trust your own eyes.
Also less than a mile run across the brush field. I just don’t believe they were thinking situation awareness. They ran out of luck with bad decisions with good outcomes. Thanks for the info on what I was referring to.
See my other post from today about
remembering we might be totally
‘over-complicating’ the entire decision
making process ( as even the SAIR
suggested might be the case here ).
There are all kinds of things they
SHOULD have been thinking and
SHOULD have been doing and
SHOULD have taken into account…
…but they truth may be that they
really just didn’t give a shit.
They were hot, they were tired,
they were *generally* exhausted
from their recent work schedule.
It was their day off. Everything
they had done all day was useless.
They saw a way back to town.
They took it.
They trusted other people’s intel.
They didn’t give a shit about the rules.
By ‘they’… I mean the two employees
of the City of Prescott ( AND the
State of Arizona at that moment )
who led the other 17 to their deaths.
I don’t think there were any
‘consultations’ involved here.
Two men made all the critical
decisions that day… regardless
of any secret phone calls or
job security concerns or Hero
complexes. The other 17 were just
‘along for the ride’.
Reply to Elizabeth post on April 18, 2014 at 4:47 pm
>> Elizabeth said…
>> I would like to clarify some of the relevant facts regarding the conditions
>> under which GM decided to leave the 4:04 p.m. photo spot (near the black)
>> and head toward the Boulder Springs Ranch. It appears that not everyone
>> is reviewing every single piece of data in SAIT and ADOSH packages:
I believe you just might need to include *yourself* in that ‘group’.
Read on.
>> Elizabeth also wrote…
>> 1. Hotshots increasingly have been called upon to work within the WUI. This
>> means that, when the overhead checked at roughly 15:42 to see if DivsA had
>> resources available to bump over to the east side of the fire,
You keep using that phrase as if that is actually what someone ever said.
“resources available to bump over to the east side of the fire”.
Now that we can all see what your ‘secret sources’ were that you kept
(inexplicably) refusing to discuss for so long (The ADOSH FOIA/FOIL material)…
I am assuming you are basing you entire theory that ‘Musser and Cordes’ were
acting ‘together’ to request ‘resources’ from GM on the following paragraph
from Gary Cordes’ ADOSH interview.
Let’s see what Mr. Gary Cordes ACTUALLY said ( and then break it down )…
Page 31 of Gary Cordes’ ADOSH interview…
Q2 = Dave Larsen ( Rest in Peace )
A = Gary Cordes
_________________________________________________________________
Q2: Okay. Uh, did you um, I wanted to go back to 1545, Ops Musser and you
discussed options. Uh, what were the options?
A: Basically we just discussed where we thought this was going and how, how
we needed to play it and I told him I didn’t have the resources, we were gonna
need to start you know, pulsing some resources over to us to support this.
Um, also I was gonna need some, obviously need some uh, air support to start,
start working that. Uh, we knew once it hit that ridge line that we’re gonna be
in trouble, ‘cause there was a lot of homes that were speckled all around in
that, in that area. So it was basically, you know, uh, assist with the evacuation
uh, try to get this thing painted up a little bit with some air, air support and uh,
start pulsing us some, some resources down.
_________________________________________________________________
So let’s ‘break this down’…
>> Gary Cordes said…
>> Basically we just discussed where we thought this was going and how,
>> how we needed to play it and I told him I didn’t have the resources, we were
>> gonna need to start you know, pulsing some resources over to us to
>> support this.
There is absolutely *NO* mention of what Gary Cordes himself *meant* by
‘resources’. He is SPGS1 and he is looking at a fire charging into the TOWN
that he has been charged with ‘defending’ and THAT is what his concern is,
at this moment in time. There is *NO* mention ( on his part ) of needing any
Type 1 Wildland Hotshot Crews to do ANYTHING for him. Zero. Zip. Nada.
If we have to *guess* ( and we do, since he doesn’t say )… it is *MUCH*
more likely the ‘resources’ that Gary Cordes is talking about ‘lacking’ in order to
defend the STRUCTURES he has been charged with defending ( as SPGS1 )
are Engines with Hose Crews, Water tenders, Sprinkler systems, yada, yada, yada.
You know… serious STRUCTURE defense equipment.
Not a bunch of guys with just some Pulaski tools.
It is also *MORE* than likely that whenever SPGS1 Gary Cordes used the
word ‘pulsing resources OVER to us’… he didn’t mean guys on foot that
are TWO miles away who weren’t going to be able to be much good to
him even if they were THERE already… He meant ‘moving real, no-shit
STRUCTURE DEFENSE equipment and ‘resources’ DOWN from the
NORTH side of the fire into Yarnell… like RIGHT NOW.
Also see below… a few seconds later… instead of saying ‘OVER’, Cordes
actually does use the word ‘DOWN’ instead… meaning ‘DOWN from
up north in the Model Creek / Peeples Valley area’ where the resources
he was *REALLY* interested in having were currently becoming ‘free’
since the fire had changed direction some time earlier.
>> Gary Cordes also said…
>> Um, also I was gonna need some, obviously need some uh, air support
>> to start, start working that.
Goes without saying… and he ( Cordes ) GOT that… just minutes later.
The USDA Air Study videos show Air Attack ‘shifting focus’ to the SOUTH
side of the fire almost exactly the same time Todd Abel told Eric Marsh
( at 1550 ) “1) Keep ME informed 2) Hunker and be safe ( in the black )
3) We’lll get some Air Support down there ASAP.
There is no actual audio captured of the ‘focus shift’ coming from fire
command to Air Attack… but it’s perfectly obvious now from the USDA
Air Study traffic that *WAS* captured that pretty much the minute OPS1
Todd Abel got off the radio with Marsh… he also ‘requested’ the ‘focus shift’
with Air Attack… and he responded.
Also… Cordes ( in his own unit logs AND in his ADOSH interview ) verifies
that he, himself is the one who issued the ‘request’ to the Air Tankers to
just start ‘dropping at will’. He didn’t need Musser for that, apparently.
From page 39 of Cordes’ ADOSH interview…
Q1 = Barry Hicks
A = Gary Cordes
__________________________________________________________________
Q1: Okay. Um, so there was no, there was no question in your mind though that
when, when Eric indicated he was going to the safety zone, he wasn’t talking
about the black, he was talking about the, the Helm Ranch?
A: Yes, that would, that was my interpretation, yes.
Q1: Alright. Okay, um, and um, you know, um, you know uh, I had heard a while
back that you had um, requested um, to the air tankers to drop at will, was,
was any of that uh, happening in and right around Yarnell as all of this um, is
going on that you just described to us?
A: Um, it was prior to my entry in doing the rescues, it was before it actually, it
was as it was, it was marching very fast at town.
__________________________________________________________________
>> Gary Cordes also said…
>> Uh, we knew once it hit that ridge line that we’re gonna be in trouble, ‘cause
>> there was a lot of homes that were speckled all around in that, in that area.
Again… pure STRUCTURE PROTECTION thoughts in Gary Cordes’ mind.
He was SPGS1. That was what he was SUPPOSED to be thinking about.
The fire had ALREADY ‘hit the ridge’ before Cordes is having this ‘conversation’
with Musser. He ( they ) were ALREADY ‘in trouble’ ( DEEP trouble ).
His concerns ( and NEEDS ) were now IMMEDIATE… and not in the
‘1 HOUR from now’ timeframe.
>> Gary Cordes also said…
>> So it was basically, you know, uh, assist with the evacuation uh, try to get
>> this thing painted up a little bit with some air, air support and uh, start pulsing
>> us some, some resources down.
So there is the ‘E’ word ( evacuations ), but what Cordes meant was that
whatever assistance he could use with that he needed RIGHT NOW… not
an HOUR from now, or however long it might take 19 guys to hike 2 miles.
YCSO police already had FULL CHARGE of the ‘evacuation’ of Yarnell and Glen
Ilah, but at 1542 Cordes just seemed to unsure of even how many people YCSO
had to do that… or was unaware of the ‘jeep squads’ that had ALREADY
been forming to help with that.
He also uses his ‘pulsing’ phrase again… but this time says DOWN instead
of OVER. See above. In BOTH cases I believe it CLEAR that he meant
‘DOWN from the north side of the fire’ and his PRIMARY request to Musser
was for SERIOUS STRUCTURE PROTECTION EQUIPMENT… RIGHT NOW.
So back to what Elizabeth was saying again…
>> Elizabeth also wrote…
>> it goes without saying that the overhead had tasks in mind that would
>> be appropriate.
It most certainly does *NOT* ( go without saying ).
‘Appropriate’ for what?
REAL Structure Protection Equipment / Resources?
or 19 guys with just Pulaski tools and no real equipment?
Remember ( please? )… even BEFORE Cordes is having this ‘conversation’
with Musser is when Frisby is calling off his face-to-face with Marsh, picking
up Brendan because the fire is charging his position, and making radio
calls to his Captain Brown to get all the vehicles ( theirs and GM’s ) the
hell out of where they are because the fire is comin’ in like a freight train.
Frisby ALREADY knows the ‘dozer line’ thing is now a total waste of time.
That all happened right at 1541… BEFORE Musser even made the radio call.
Moments after this conversation with Musser… Gary Cordes is ALSO
made aware of that fact ( that the dozer line burnout is never going to happen ).
So now there is an ENTIRE 20-man elite Type 1 Hotshot Crew becoming
‘totally available’ for a ‘new assignment’ just a few blocks away from Cordes
was having this conversation with Musser.
Blue Ridge was given no new ‘assignment’ whatsoever.
By either Cordes OR Musser.
Their ONLY *new* assignment was to keep evacuating down to
the Ranch House Restaurant… and then just STAY THERE and BE SAFE.
Gary Cordes recalls the ‘3 point plan’ he gave Musser as…
1) Could use assistance with evacuations (RIGHT NOW… not 1 HR from now).
2) Paint it up with Air Support. ( RIGHT NOW… not 1 HR from now ).
3) Pulse some ( REAL STRUCTURE PROTECTION ) resources DOWN
from the NORTH end of the fire. ( RIGHT NOW… not 1 HR from now ).
So if ( as you said )… ” it goes without saying that the overhead had tasks
in mind that would be appropriate.”…
…then where were the ‘appropriate tasks’ that ‘overhead had in mind’ for
a Type 1 Hotshot crew, at that point, if they ( both Cordes and Musser )
didn’t even bother to assign any ‘tasks’ to the Type 1 Hotshot crew
that was right there with them and becoming a ‘totally free resource’?
The reason they didn’t give Blue Ridge anything to do at that point is
because they did *NOT* have any real tasks in mind for Wildland Hotshots
at that point. That was *NOT* the kind ‘help’ that Cordes was expressing
he needed to Musser at THAT time… with fire ALREADY coming into TOWN.
>> Elizabeth also said…
>> Nobody was asking GM to magically morph into a structure crew,
Nope… and they weren’t asking Blue Ridge to do so, either… even though
THEY were basically right there ALREADY in town and ( within minutes )
would have ‘no current assignment(s)’.
Why?… because ‘Hotshot’ time and ‘line building’ was now OVER that day.
It was NOW time for SERIOUS STRUCTURE PROTECTION with
some REAL EQUIPMENT.
THAT is most likely the ‘help’ and the ‘resources’ Cordes was asking for.
>> Elizabeth also said…
>> but, as folks here who are currently Hotshots have said, there is work a
>> Hotshot crew could have done, which is why the overhead made the query.
I forget what the ‘list’ is you are referring to… but whatever is on it… HOW
do you explain the same ‘work a Hotshot crew could have done’ not ALSO
being assigned to Blue Ridge?
THEY ( Blue Ridge ) were ALREADY THERE… and about to have absolutely
nothing to do. No one ASKED them to do ANY of these things you seem
to say ‘overhead’ was hot-to-trot to use some guys with Pulaskis to do.
>> Elizabeth also wrote…
>> (By the way, WTKTT seems to think that Musser and ABEL were working
>> together to call the shots in terms of details on this. Not true – it was Musser
>> and CORDES. Yet another example of WTKTT stating things as fact that
>> are not actually fact.)
See above. It is *YOU* who seem to be basing *YOUR* theory on just one
paragraph of Cordes’ ADOSH interview… without closely examining the
‘other’ evidence that is applicable.
Yes… Cordes expressed HIS ‘needs’ to Musser. ( Try and save some TOWN ).
At *NO TIME* does he specifically ask for ‘Type 1 Hotshots’ OR did he
seem to make *ANY* request that Musser ‘call Granite Mountain on his behalf’.
To the contrary…
Musser himself ( in HIS AODSH ) interview, seems to suggest that HE
made that specific call out to Granite Mountain either completely on his
own initiative ( BEFORE talking with Cordes at all ) or on Todd Abel’s
behalf because Abel was too busy to make that call himself.
Once again… here is exactly how OPS2 Paul Musser himself describes
this ‘availability check’ he made to DIVSA ( while still mistakenly believing
that BOTH GM and Blue Ridge were all the way out ‘on the ridge’ )…
From Paul Musser’s ADOSH interview…
__________________________________________________________________
A: Uh, got on the 89 to a vantage point and met with Gary Cordes. Face to face with Gary. As far as – oh at that point, I’d also called Granite on their radio. Because Todd was still tied up with Model Creek. I called Granite on the radio and asked if them and Blue Ridge were still committed on the ridge? They said that they were committed on the ridge. But Blue Ridge was on the bottom and may, may be available. I talked with Gary, he said no their committed to, uh, hold – to prepping and hold the dozer line.
__________________________________________________________________
A few things about this first statement in Musser’s ADOSH interview…
1) A few moments later, they would refine this statement and Musser would
admit that he mis-spoke about WHO he called. He says he is sure he called
DIVSA and NOT ‘Granite Mountain’. He says he would NOT have called them
( Granite Mountain ) directly.
2) It is NOT clear what Musser means when he refers to Todd Abel being ‘busy’.
Musser seems to ‘imply’ that he was making that ‘availability check’ either
completely on his own initiative ( before even talking to Cordes ) or on
Todd Abel’s behalf…because Abel was busy at that moment on the north
end of the fire at that point.
3) It would seem that even though Musser had just met up with Cordes there on
Highway 89, he made this radio call BEFORE he had a chance to really talk with
him. Musser uses the past tense ‘called’ before he starts referring to any
conversation with Cordes. Musser was also ‘confused’ when he made the call
and still thought that Blue Ridge was ALSO way out on the ridge along with
Granite Mountain. Blue Ridge was actually only a few blocks away from him,
at the time he made the radio call. The fact that Musser didn’t even know
where they (BR) were, or that Cordes simply *thought* they were still going to
have a chance to try and burn that dozer line ( not true at this point, but
Cordes seems to have been ‘behind the ball’ here ) tends to indicate that
Musser did, in fact, make this radio callout to DIVSA BEFORE talking at
any length with SPGS1 Gary Cordes. If he had… he probably would not
have exhibited the confusion he did on that radio call.
4) Now that we know the real time of this radio call ( 1542 )… Gary Cordes
himself was mistaken ( at that point ) believing that Blue Ridge was still
‘committed’ to the dozer line. They were NOT. Brian Frisby had just picked up
Brendan and knew that the fire was coming in FAST and there was now going
to be NO TIME to attempt any kind of ‘burnout’ along that dozer line. There was
nothing left to do ( for Blue Ridge ) but evacuate… which is what they began to do.
Musser goes off on another topic in his interview for a moment, but then
Q2 ( Barry Hicks ) returns to Musser’s ‘availability check’ radio call…
__________________________________________________________________
Q2: Okay. When you, uh – let me back up to when you made contact with Granite Mountain, who – who did you talk to – Eric?
A: I think so.
Q2: But you can’t remember for sure if that
was Eric or…
A: I – I – ‘cause I – I think I called division Alpha, not
Granite, no.
Q2: Oh, okay.
A: That’s who I would have called.
Q2: Uh, so it would have…
A: Yeah, I wouldn’t have called Granite direct.
Q2: Okay.
A: I would have called – gone through their supervisor.
Q2: Okay.
A: Which at that point was division Alpha.
Q2: Okay. And, uh, so, uh, that conversation was
you’re in the black and you need to stay in the black?
A: No, no that conversation was are you still committed on top of the ridge. And they said yes we
are committed on top of the ridge.
Q2: Okay. And so you’re assumption was they were
in the black?
A: If – if they were committed on top of the ridge,
they would have one foot in the black.
Q2: Okay.
A: Because that was their assignment, yes.
__________________________________________________________________
So nowhere in there is there the actual request ‘can you spare resources?’
or ‘we need to bump resources’ or ANY actual statement in response that they
were ‘committed to the BLACK’. The ACTUAL response ( according to Musser )
was ‘committed to the RIDGE’.
A subtle ( but perhaps important ) difference.
Musser himself even curiously adds the (unsolicited) opinion….
“because that was their (WORK) assignment”.
A response like “We are committed to the RIDGE” could be construed as
meaning “We are still committed to the WORK we’ve been doing and we
haven’t been told ( or realized ) yet that it’s all just a useless exercise now.”
If Marsh had ACTUALLY said “We are committed to the BLACK”…. that would
be more of an indication that they had, in fact, ALREADY realized the work
was now USELESS and had ALREADY decided they were just going to
have to ‘wait out’ the approaching firestorm in the ‘safe black’.
It is possible that the 1542 ‘availability check’ from OPS2 Paul Musser simply
caught Marsh at that confusing moment when Frisby had just cancelled Marsh’s
requested face-to-face about 60 seconds before Musser’s call… and Marsh
simply hadn’t quite realized yet that ( together with Brendan’s evacuation )
it all meant that everything had already gone sideways and this
‘anchor point’ thing they had been working on all day was now totally USELESS.
Remember.. it would still be 8-9 minutes AFTER Musser’s ‘availability check’
radio call at 1542 that we would see the first set of ‘at rest’ pictures from the
GM crew ( circa 1550 ). That means that when Marsh talked to Musser…
Marsh might have still actually been thinking that they were supposed to
‘stick to their assignment’ and that’s what he really meant when he
said they were still “committed to the RIDGE”.
It might have only been right after Musser’s call that the realization came
that their work day was now OVER… and Steed gave the ‘Tools Up’ order
and the men (only) then began to assemble in that first 1550 ‘rest’ area and
started taking photos/videos.
More about some of Elizabeth’s other recent ‘clarifications’ ( like her bizarre
repeated insistence that OPS1 Todd Abel never said ‘hunker and be safe’ )
in another post.
WTKTT, I take it that you do NOT think that it is Gary Cordes’s voice IMMEDIATELY before and AFTER Musser’s on the “Division Alpha, Operation Musser” video (see the link below)? Why is that? One would think that it makes SENSE that that voice is Cordes’s – having ASKED Musser to reach out to Division Alpha (since Cordes’s radio is being wonky, not transmitting well but obviously allowing him to HEAR things), and then Cordes says “thank you” immediately after Musser reaches out to Division Alpha, but I take it that you are not going with the that interpretation of the conversations in the below-linked video? Why not? http://youtu.be/y07WjZGdJQ4
You are the one who has been carrying the ‘state of audio
forensics’ banner around like a flag and disagreeing with
EVERYTHING I believe I have found in background audio…
…and now YOU are asking ME why I don’t think something
you seem to hear isn’t true?
Let me stop and pick my jaw up off the floor.
There. Jaw replaced.
As to your question… it’s my turn to say “No… I am not
SURE that is Cordes’ voice”. I AM sure it is him just
shortly after that saying “The intel I’m getting from Blue
Ridge is that they have lost that dozer line”…
…but I am NOT sure about the ones you reference.
Elizabeth… the crux of our disagreement on this is, I
believe, going to remain simple. YOU believe that
Gary Cordes SPECIFICALLY asked OPS2 Paul Musser
to call and ask for Granite Mountain’s ‘help’.
I do not.
Yes… Gary Cordes was telling Paul Musser what he
thought he needed to even have a chance of ‘saving
some town’… but I see no direct evidence that he had
any real plans for any Type 1 Hotshots with some
Pulaskis. He needed REAL EQUIPMENT like the stuff
that was currently on the NORTH end of the fire and
THAT is what he was asking Musser to ‘pulse DOWN
to him’ around that time.
I also believe ( based on the evidence I’m seeing ) that
Musser made this 1542 ‘callout’ to DIVSA Marsh
BEFORE he actually had that extended discussion
with Cordes about ‘what he might need’. If Musser
really had spoken at length to Cordes about the
‘situation down there’ before he made that radio call,
then why would he not have ALREADY known ( before
making the call ) that Blue Ridge was NOT ‘out there
on the ridge’ with GM and that Cordes still ( mistakenly )
believed that Blue Ridge had time to finish the
dozer line or that there was any chance in hell they
had time to ‘burn that out’.
Musser used the ‘past tense’ “called” GM in his testimony
before he begins to describe what Cordes told him.
That indicates he made that radio call BEFORE actually
having a good ‘update’ talk with Cordes.
I believe it is still a mystery why ANYONE would have
thought that 19 guys 2 miles away were still even
‘in the game’ at that point.
I believe Musser made that ‘availability check’ either
under his own initiative ( and general confusion about
exactly where people really where since he had only
been PLANNING OPS all day )… OR he actually made
that ‘availability check’ on OPS1 Todd Abel’s behalf,
which is what he seems to suggest in his interview.
Yes… Cordes was either NEAR him at that time or
even standing right next to him… but I still have no
reason to believe that SPGS1 Gary Cordes
SPECIFICALLY asked anyone to try and get
Granite Mountain to pull off a 2 mile hike for HIM.
I think Gary Cordes knew very well ( better than anyone? )
exactly where Granite Mountain was ( he says in his
own interview he had watched them with binoculars
from time to time that day )… and how FAR away that
was… and Gary Cordes himself KNEW that they
were ‘out of the game’ at that point in time.
Here is a ‘cut’ from SPGS1 Gary Cordes’ ADOSH
interview where he confirms that not only did
HE know EXACTLY where they were ( in relation
to Yarnell ) and EXACTLY how FAR away that
anchor point was… that Cordes had been
‘watching’ them working with binoculars from
time to time that day.
So no one in town circa 1542 that day ( except for
Frisby and Brown who had actually been up there )
knew better than Cordes how FAR away GM was
as that fire started charging into town… and no one
knew better that GM was ‘out of the game’ at that
point in time.
From page 45 of Cordes’ ADOSH interview…
They are now actively looking at, and pointing
to, the MAPS they had at the interview and
discussing how FAR away they really were…
_________________________________________
A: No, I put, I put a ring around, I put a ring around
uh, Eric and Jessie’s truck. I – ‘cause they were on
the other side now, but that was obviously the north
side was gonna be our, our, you know, this was our
control line and that the north side was gonna be in
the, in the burn. I rang their trucks…
Q: Oh, okay.
A: …in case they didn’t get down in time, if you know,
they pushed in. Obviously the dozer line wasn’t
stopping what was happening with this event.
Q: So did they walk up this jeep trail and up…
A: Yes.
Q: Oh, okay. That’s how…
A: Yep. Yep.
Q: …they – how long of a walk is that you think?
A: Uh, it was about a mile and a half is what I figured.
Q: Mile and a half, okay.
A: Yeah, mile and a half to two miles. Um…
Q: Okay.
A: …and I did glass them up throughout the day and
they were up on the switchback right in here.
They had…
Q: Mm-hmm.
A: …a squad uh, just staged out over here and then
they had been, they had some doing some work
in here. ( Points to map ).
Q: Okay.
__________________________________________
Also note up above that Gary Cordes admits
he just ‘put a ring around their trucks’ with
the actual thought that that might serve
as a ‘safety zone’ in case they decided
to head back to down but ‘didn’t get down
in time’.
So in the same interview… we hear from
Cordes that the Boulder Springs Ranch
was a 20-30 acre safety zone ( when it
was EIGHT to TWELVE times SMALLER
than that )… and now we hear Gary Cordes
himself thinking that a one-blade wide dozer
‘ring’ around two vehicles sitting on a
two-track road might ALSO have come in
handy as a ‘safety zone’ if GM had decided
to ‘push in’ towards town but ‘didn’t get down
in time’ that day.
Is there an actual WFF class that covers
safety zones, specifically? What ‘rating’
does one need to have to be sure they
have actually ‘taken that course’?
this is a really hilarious exchange… it’s the blind leading the blind. it’s wheelchair jousting… it’s two monkeys throwing poop at each other… it’s a county fair demolition derby! love it.
actually, as Musser surely knows… the last hope for any indefensible structures in immediate threat from wildfire is an IHC squad with a savvy firing boss. firing around structures ahead of an oncoming fire front is about the only thing you can do as a last ditch effort.
they weren’t going to park an engine in front of any of those structures because there wasn’t enough water in all of Yarnell to protect them with an engine, structure or otherwise.
and before you ask Cpt. Hindsight… the reason he didn’t ask BR to go burn is probably because he asked about their “status” BEFORE he sized up the situation and saw how dire it really was.
Reply to xxfullsailxx post on April 21, 2014 at 6:59 pm
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>> …the reason he didn’t ask BR to go burn is probably
>> because he asked about their “status” BEFORE
>> he sized up the situation and saw how dire it really was.
Thanks for reinforcing one of the exact points I WAS making.
Yes… I believe that is EXACTLY what happened.
Musser had just come off his own ‘structure protection’
gig over on Sickles Road and was headed to Yarnell.
He really had NO IDEA what the situation was down
there in Yarnell. He hadn’t been there since the 0700
briefing at the Yarnell Fire Station… which is where
he turned to Todd Abel and said… “Why don’t YOU
be Field OPS today and I’ll stick with the Planning
stuff since that’s what I’m already doing, anyway.”
All he wanted to ‘figure out’ first was who was where,
doing what, and who might be ‘available’… since he
was pretty clueless about that circa 1530 when he
was up on Sickles Road.
So ( from his own ADOSH interview ) it SOUNDS like
he was just making shotgun-blast ‘availability’ queries
BEFORE he ever really ‘briefed’ with Cordes there
on the side of the road… right near the point where
Shrine Road meets Highway 89.
And then ( as you say )… things got ‘sized up’.
The actual reality of how ‘dire’ things already were sank in.
Cordes ‘completed the picture’ for him as they finally
‘briefed’ there on the side of the road.
Musser did NOT call ‘Granite Mountain’ BACK and say
anything like “forget the request… there’s no time”…
because he did not NEED to. DIVSA Marsh had
ALREADY told him they were, in fact, ‘committed to
the RIDGE’ and that was the end of that.
Question was asked. Question was answered.
End of story.
The conundrum is that ( as we now know )… that was
NOT the ‘end of the story’.
It SHOULD have been. They should have just stayed
where they were and where fire command thought
they were… but they didn’t.
So how we get from “We are committed to the RIDGE”
at 1542 to them ‘gaggling up’ and leaving the black at
1605 is still the ‘story’ that has not yet been fully told.
my main point is that YOU ARE WRONG to think that what musser wanted was a bunch of structure engines sitting in front of homes… but you are too obstinate to understand that.
“So how we get from “We are committed to the RIDGE” at 1542 to them ‘gaggling up’ and leaving the black at 1605 is still the ‘story’ that has not yet been fully told.”
i suggest you reference what Darrell Willis had to say about this… i think the story has been told.
Reply to xxfullsailxx post
on April 22, 2014 at 6:11 am
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>> huh, i didn’t think it was a contest…
It’s not. Never has been.
>> my main point is that YOU ARE WRONG
>> to think that what musser wanted was a
>> bunch of structure engines sitting in front
>> of homes… but you are too obstinate to
>> understand that.
YOU seem to be missing the entire point of
this particular exchange. See parent
comment AND child comments.
It is not about what what OPS2 Musser
*wanted* at all. Elizabeth is trying to
maintain that Musser was just acting as
‘relay’ at 1542 and was, somehow, just
passing on a SPECIFIC request from
SPGS1 Gary Cordes. She is trying to
say that whatever request Musser made
was because Cordes ASKED him to.
I don’t believe it.
There is *NO EVIDENCE* to support that,
nor is there any evidence that if Musser
made that call BEFORE even talking
to Cordes… that Musser himself had
any idea what ‘assignments’ to give out (yet).
Musser was just doing ‘availability’ checks
at 1542. He didn’t know WHAT was or
wasn’t needed ( or even possible ) yet.
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>> “So how we get from “We are committed
>> to the RIDGE” at 1542 to them ‘gaggling
>> up’ and leaving the black at 1605 is still
>> the ‘story’ that has not yet been fully told.”
>>
>> i suggest you reference what Darrell
>> Willis had to say about this… i think
>> the story has been told.
Reply to Elizabeth post on April 20, 2014 at 5:59 pm
>> Elizabeth said ( replying to Mr. Bob Powers )…
>>
>> Bob, one of my thoughts had always been that MARSH was acting as the
>> lookout, staying up behind on the ridge (which would explain why his was
>> not the first voice on the helmet camera), but I have never articulated that
>> thought here, for obvious reasons (e.g. the trolls would leap on me, accuse
>> me of trying to defend the overhead, make legal references to my
>> career, etc.).
Elizabeth… the *idea* that (perhaps) Eric Marsh *was* trying to fulfill some
kind of ‘lookout’ duty for Steed and the crew as he made his way up from
behind that day is not *new*. It has been discussed (calmly) any number
of times in this ongoing (public) discussion thread.
I believe the first time it was proposed was by Mr. Powers himself, who
you just replied to.
It was back in January of this year… the night after the YARNELL-GAMBLE
video was first reported ( on this forum ) to contain the voice of Eric Marsh
saying “They’re comin’ from the heel of the fire” in response to someone
( Abel? Musser? Cordes? ) saying he would “appreciate it” if he/they
could “get to town a little faster” in the 1620-1625 ( 4:20 – 4:25 PM ) timeframe.
Mr. Powers pointed out right away that this *new* YARNELL-GAMBLE video/audio
evidence established with even more certainly that Marsh must have been some
distance BEHIND Steed and the Crew as they made their way south on the
two-track ( and hadn’t even caught up to them yet by the time this
YARNELL-GAMBLE radio capture took place circa 4:20 PM ) but he also pointed
out the following…
>> Bob Powers on January 16, 2014 at 11:17 am said:
>>
>> 1. The lookout discussion. ( from last night’s YARNELL-GAMBLE discussion )
>> After every thing we have learned something jumped out at me.
>> First I do not believe they wanted to leave a lookout separated from them
>> as they left the Black area they were headed out.
>> However the comfort level discussion in a new scenario.
>> Could Marsh have asked Steed About his comfort level of going down into the
>> unburned paralleling the fire if he Marsh held back acted as Lookout and kept
>> an eye on the fire as they dropped to the ranch. If they determined they were
>> taking a risk to get off the mountain ASAP. This would make sense and why
>> Marsh came down behind them. Not a good LO option but plausible. At some
>> point he lost tract of the fire when he followed them into the bowl. And again I >> say they were in contact on inter-crew freq. the whole time.
The general consensus was that it is perfectly possible this might have
been part of what happened that afternoon.
If Eric Marsh really was ‘far behind’ Steed and the crew and was struggling
to ‘catch up’ to them… it would only make ( as Mr. Powers said ) SENSE that
Marsh was also looking out into the middle bowl and ‘watching the fire’ as he,
also, moved south.
If he was NOT ( doing that simple thing )… then add just one more
ASTOUNDING / UNBELIEVABLE action / non-action event to this story.
But one thing is certain…
Even if Marsh *WAS* trying to fulfill some kind of ‘lookout’ duty as he made
his way up from behind… he (most certainly) failed miserably.
Even if he (somehow?) failed to see the fast-developing danger before even HE
‘lost sight of the fire’ and they were all back to “no eyes on the fire at all”…
…the moment he lost his own ‘eyes on the fire’ is when the situation (again)
returned to…
L = Seriously non-existent.
C = Seriously bad.
E = Fatal.
S = Questionable.
WTKTT I really believe that when they dropped into the canyon Marsh was at the back of the crew the 19th man. He could not have been far behind them when they started the deployment site. when they went into the canyon there rate of progress slowed and he would have been on there tails by then, following them down. A moving lookout that loses site of the fire is not really a lookout.
Copy that. He *MAY* not have actually been with them
the moment that crucial ‘take the shortcut’ decision
was made at 4:20… but I think you are right… he MUST
have been ‘tail man’ shortly after that as they totally
bogged down on the descent.
Marsh had a little less than 120 seconds between Steed’s
first MAYDAY to suddenly appear on the radio with his…
“Bravo 33… This is DIVSA and I’m here now with
Granite Mountain” transmission.
Marsh was ‘out of breath’ on that transmission… but
given the ‘maze’ they were in at that point he could
not have been very far away at all to cover the final
distance from the BACK to the FRONT in just
120 seconds.
As I believe even the SAIR suggested at some point…
we may be totally ‘over-complicating’ the entire decision
making process here. The things we might even think
they *SHOULD* have cared about or paying attention
to that day… they really didn’t give a crap.
Yes… Marsh *might* have been ‘looking out into the bowl’
himself as he ‘came up from behind’ ( who wouldn’t? )…
but that still doesn’t mean GM had a ‘lookout in place’.
It probably was never even discussed or mentioned in
any way as they decided to undertake ‘the mission’.
Which brings up another point.
We still do NOT know… with regards to ‘prior bad
decisions with good outcomes’… how seriously Marsh
or Steed EVER really took the whole ‘lookout’ thing.
I’ve seen no real evidence that there were actually in
the habit of setting proper ‘lookouts’ at all no matter
where they went or what they were doing.
Unfortunately… that’s one of the IMPORTANT questions
that no set of investigators ( SAIT or ADOSH ) even
bothered to ask Brendan McDonough.
Was GM really in the habit of ALWAYS setting ‘lookouts’,
or did they really just give Brendan that ( fairly useless
given his chosen location ) assignment that day because
he still wasn’t feeling all that well?
How often had this particular outfit just ‘blown off the
whole lookout thing’ before… but nothing bad happened?
Yes. Interesting question. For all we know…
When Frisby and Brown finally arrived up
there around NOON… one of the first
conversations may have been…
Frisby: Where’s your lookout?
Steed? Marsh?: We don’t have one.
Frisby: You’re supposed to have one.
Steed? Marsh?: Ok, whatever. We’ve got
a guy who’s not feeling too well so why don’t
we just use him.
There is still VERY little known about that
entire 30 minute conversation that took
place up on that ridge that day other than
everyone agreeing that the briefings
were for shit ( or even totally non-existent,
in Blue Ridge’s case ) that morning.
Other than some simple lightning strike stuff,
the Doce fire was the one GM worked most
recently before Yarnell. I wonder if there is
any documentation about them EVER using
any ‘lookouts’ at all during that engagement?
Again… not much is said about
that entire 30 minute ‘visit’ by Frisby
and Brown up at that anchor
point… but here are at least 3
entries that confirm one of the topics
of conversation was everyone
agreeing that the morning briefings
were either non-existent or BAD…
We tie in the (xxxxxxxxxxxxxx). I notice
that they have about 100 yard of line
secured. We talk to them about the
situation and comments are made
about how neither crew received a
briefing. We also discuss the issue about the radios. We give them all the
extra water and Gatorade that we had
in the Ranger and told them what we
saw from below and we all noticed
that the activity to the north was
picking up.
B & T ( Brian Frisby and Trueheart
Brown ) went on the razor to meet up
with Eric (Marsh) and Jesse (Steed)
in the saddle at 1045. They mentioned
they too had a bad briefing, bad radios.
Eric asked for cubies, Gatorade and
BR says ok and gives it to them.
** ADOSH Inspection Narrative
** Page 17
AT approximately 1150 hours, Frisby
( BRIHC Superintendent ) drives a
utility vehicle up to the ridge and met
with Marsh ( Division A Supervisor )…
Frisby reported to Marsh that he
attended a poor morning briefing and
that radio communications
problems were experienced by the
dozer operator, the Operations
Section Chief Todd Abel, and aviation
resources.
Wondering if GM ever set lookouts just isn’t called for. Maybe they made a mistake, maybe they did push the envelope at times. They were still serious men who took their job seriously. The above “conversation” makes them look like clowns, and is frankly insulting. Their decisions that day can be criticized without resorting to this.
mike… with all due respect…
I think you are over-reacting.
The greatest ‘insult’ happened
circa 1643 on Sunday, June 30,
2013… when 19 fine men
perished.
One of the REASONS that
happened is because the
2 employees of the City of
Prescott ( and the State of
Arizona at that time ) didn’t
consider the safety of the
other 17 men in their charge
important enough to follow
the rules of engagement.
Whether that kind of ‘disregard’
for ‘following the rules’ was
a one-off mistake… or the
result of a ‘pattern’ of
disregard is very much
relevant to understanding
how and why this tragic event
took place…
…AND for (perhaps) taking
steps to make SURE it never
happens again.
It remains a ‘simple’ question.
Was the leadership of this
organization in the (good)
habit of following LCES and
*usually* setting lookouts?…
I would like to clarify some of the relevant facts regarding the conditions under which GM decided to leave the 4:04 p.m. photo spot (near the black) and head toward the Boulder Springs Ranch. It appears that not everyone is reviewing every single piece of data in SAIT and ADOSH packages:
1. Hotshots increasingly have been called upon to work within the WUI. This means that, when the overhead checked at roughly 15:42 to see if DivsA had resources available to bump over to the east side of the fire, it goes without saying that the overhead had tasks in mind that would be appropriate. Nobody was asking GM to magically morph into a structure crew, but, as folks here who are currently Hotshots have said, there is work a Hotshot crew could have done, which is why the overhead made the query. (By the way, WTKTT seems to think that Musser and ABEL were working together to call the shots in terms of details on this. Not true – it was Musser and CORDES. Yet another example of WTKTT stating things as fact that are not actually fact.)
2. GM had observed and tracked the fire behavior prior to leaving the area where they were sitting at 4:04 p.m. They checked and discussed the weather, and it is clear that Jesse Steed – then the acting leader of the GM Hotshots (given that Marsh was off scouting as DivsA) – was actually sitting on the hill carefully WATCHING the fire behavior and weather in the minutes leading up to the decision to leave that spot and head down to the Boulder Springs Ranch. At its worst at this point, the fire was moving less than ½ mile per hour, and it was moving far more to the EAST than to the southeast at that point.
3. Before moving, the GM crew discussed it amongst themselves, and they alerted others to their plans. Everyone seems to agree to having heard GM stating that they were moving. The ONLY reason GM could not be found lickety-split when they deployed is because there was an INPENETRABLE cloud of smoke in the valley. The notion that nobody knew where they were is not, uhm, particularly likely or accurate. Go back and re-read Eric Tarr’s and his colleague’s recitations of how they found GM. It is because Tarr had HEARD GM/DIVSA advising over the radio of where they were going. There was communication. Not everyone hears everything on a radio, by the way. And it is well-documented that there were radio transmission problems on the Yarnell Hill Fire that day, PARTICULARLY in the area where GM died. (Remember, Tarr was having trouble communicating, BR was having trouble communicating, etc?) We KNOW that GM/DivsA communicated where they were headed because folks ADMIT hearing it. Why Neill, Maclean, and others keep missing this point is beyond me – it is documented in multiple unrelated INTERVIEWS, unit logs, notes, etc.
4. According to available living sources, it seems that GM reasonably thought that any expected wind shifts had ALREADY occurred prior to their leaving their spot (some time after 4:04 p.m.), and it appears that the weather expert on the fire at that point (there was no IMET) believed the same. Therefore, when GM tracked the ROS and calculated that they could easily beat the fire to the ranch, they were calculating such based on what they believed to be the worst ROS of the day – the ROS that occurred when the predicted winds passed through the prior hour.
5. When dealing with fires in mid-June through late July in Arizona (particularly on or near the Mogollon Rim), it is not ABNORMAL to see lingering or looming thunder cells or thunderstorms in the sky that ULTIMATELY produce nothing of import that unexpectedly, materially impacts fire behavior. If every Hotshot working a fire in mid-June through late July in Arizona sat down and “hunkered” in appropriately-sized black whenever a thunder cell or a looming storm was spotted, not a whole lot of Hotshot work would get done in those many weeks. Phrased differently: There are TONS of thunder cells or thunderstorms looming that amount to diddley-squat for those fighting big fires in Arizona. Go back and re-read every single page of the SAIT/ADOSH documents, and perhaps you will see that the weather expert does NOT think that the weather event that killed GM was actually the cell to the north or the east that Bob Powers and others seem to be considering. There WAS no pyrocumulous cloud visible when GM left the 4:04 p.m. photo spot. There WERE no looming, extraordinary weather events predicted at that point.
6. Just because the SAIT claims that somebody said something does NOT actually mean that the things at issue were actually said. For example, do I believe that the Blue Ridge guys said exactly some of the things that the SAIT claims they said? Nope. Abel did not recall saying “hunker,” presumably b/c he never SAID “hunker,” even though the SAIT said he said “hunker.” Do I think Marsh said the winds were “squirrely”? Well, I wouldn’t bet my first child on it. I spoke with two lawyers today. If you asked me to tell you EXACTLY which words they used in our conversations, I’d be hard-pressed. And such details become even more fuzzy when a conversation is under or following stress/stressors. I would urge folks like Bob Powers (and everyone!) to be very careful about ascribing direct quotes to GM or DivsA unless more than one person corroborates the direct quote (and even then it might still be inaccurate).
(FYI, my sources for the above comments are the documents and materials in the SAIT and ADOSH packages. In order to keep them all straight, I have taken roughly 100 pages (likely more) of notes. You can feel free to e-mail me at [email protected] if you want to compare notes or grill me on mine.)
People might write pages and pages on how reasonable it was for GM to move, but that will not change 1 simple fact – they moved and they died. Now you might want to chalk it up to a one in a million act of God, but I think you are fooling yourself. What happened with the weather that day might have been unusual, but in no way shape or form was it unheard of. WFF have to be prepared for the unusual, otherwise there would be a lot more of these events. When they moved, it was NOT in accord with the principles of good wildland firefighting. And they paid the price for their mistake. They banked on things staying as they were, did not prepare to deal with a changing situation and got caught.
Agreed. I’d add that the weather that day was not, in fact, in any way unusual.
I am struck by a disconnect again. Elizabeth, just a week or two ago, was saying that GM may have decided to abandon the black because they were afraid of lightning from a violent thunderstorm. Now we hear that it’s perfectly reasonable to bet an entire crew on the winds not altering during a typical thunderstorm with winds that rotate and, well, alter in the normal course.
BTW, Elizabeth, Tarr didn’t hear GM say where they were. He heard them saying they were headed towards a ranch they had in sight. Big difference between saying that, and saying that “we’re about to drop into the unburned bowl to try to bushwhack directly to the BSR.”
As far as Elizabeth’s assertion that “it goes without saying that that the overhead had tasks in mind that would be appropriate.” No, this is not logical. It does not go without saying that overheard was thinking through what GM was going to do if they did make it to Yarnell. That entire day, decisions were made without taking into account fuel type, fire behavior and the limitations of available resources.
Saying that “it goes without saying” is a way of saying “of course, overhead made no mistakes of any sort.” It is the type of thing a defense attorney might say. But, defense attorneys are tasked with defending clients who pay them money, not drilling down to the truth of whether GM would have been able to do anything if they did make it to town. Elizabeth had, a couple days ago, suggested that GM would have been able to proactively protect structures that did not have sufficient defensible space, and of course given fire behavior this is false. We need to keep this grounded in fact.
Mike and SR you pretty well covered it.
I can only say that Elizabeth opens a can of worms and throws it on the ground to see which one we will pick up to fish with. I don’t think any body is fishing any more.
Elizabeth you have totally shown with the above statements that you do not understand Wild Land Fire Fighting. Weather Fuels Topography or what and why the 10 and 18 exist. It all comes together in staying one step ahead of a bad outcome. It takes years to learn Fire behavior on the ground and in school. It is a hazardous occupation and is unforgiving if you don’t follow the rules of engagement.
What bugs me about Elizabeth’s point #3, her claim that GM did alert people to their plans, is that, not only is it not what happened, but what would normally happen if someone did attempt something as unusual as what GM did do is so different.
I really can’t think of a good scenario when you might want to undertake the bushwhack that GM did given those conditions. It’s sort of like getting into a fistfight by yourself against three guys. But, if there were to have been, in their minds, justification for it, then they had the means to ask for help and didn’t use those means.
Unfortunately, it’s not a lack of understanding Wild Land Fire Fighting that accounts for this … what we’ve been seeing for some time here is a remarkably diligent effort directed towards the goal of creating an illusion of legitimacy for certain decisions and actions that ultimately did lead to the deaths of 19 people.
That these diligent efforts are most often not grounded in fact … it’s not an accident, it’s not a bug, it’s a feature. One that, sorry to say, will no doubt continue from this point on.
Burying the truth and replacing it with falsehoods (by means of every trick in the book) is exactly what the legal team assisting the City of Prescott and the PFD intends to do in regards to the matter of the Yarnell Hill Fire.
The tactics we’ve seen from a certain attorney from New York provide a preview of what’s to come on the part of Prescott’s legal team in the event the YHF matter does reach a courtroom.
SR, I sincerely hope that you and your fellow WFF’s do not tire of pushing back against what you know to be false. What’s happening here is too important. And the people determined to bury the truth are NOT going to get tired — there’s too much at stake for them.
You are the SME’s that can call them out every time the truth is taking a beating by them.
There is not much else available for a reader like me except to hope that you do.
SHAME on you, J.Stout. You sound just like FRED, with your nonsense. (You remember Fred, my prior stalker on this website, right?) Your post does not even make sense. WTF is the Prescott Legal Team (whomever the FUCK you are intending to reference)? And who are they suing?? And for WHAT?
I am sorry you do not have an ability to understand my comments to SR.
mikesays
Elizabeth –
If you are saying that was their thought process (the fire was not going to affect them), I agree – that must have been their thinking. I will even concede that it was probable that they would get away with it – more times than not they would have reached the BSR. What was NOT REASONABLE (and what I thought you were implying – sorry if I was wrong) was assuming that the fire would keep on as is and thinking they could safely enter that box canyon as a result. By not following the rules, they lost any ability to identify and respond to changes in fire behavior. They assumed what they thought was probable and did not account for the less probable. Given the time constraints, there was no way to follow the rules when they entered that box canyon. Thus, they absolutely should not have done it.
What they should have done is crystal clear – they should have stayed in the black. That should not be controversial. I know you (and many others) want to understand why they did what they did – i.e. what were they thinking. Sadly I think that will remain mostly speculative. I think we could learn everything that Brendan as well as the fire overhead heard and knew, and I think we will still have unanswered questions about “why?”. It is what it is.
Mike, thanks for the response – I actually think that you and I are largely on the same page, although it seems that I remain slightly more optimistic than you are that we (I? someone?) might be able to come up with at least a minimally more detailed or accurate accurate picture of what GM knew and saw that informed their belief that they could move safely than we have been able to get thus far from the SAIR, the ADOSH report, the Wildland Fire Associates report, etc. I could ultimately be proven totally wrong on that, of course, but hope springs eternal, and I’ll keep researching for now. Anyway, thanks for your above response.
I know what I saw in one picture . I know what I read in the Weather report read over the radio to the entire fire. I know the watchouts 11, 12, 15 and yes 17–terrain and fuels make escape to safety zones difficult.
Putting all of that aside would be foolish but they did. A total failure to follow the 10 Standard Orders, and moved without LCES.
THERE BELEAFE THAT THEY COULD MOVE SAFLEY WAS FOUNDED ON WHAT?
As you said earlier in your 6 statements they felt they had time to beat the fire to the BSR.
Elisabeth that’s not moving under any safe rules I ever professed, trained or used. They ignored all the evidence staring them in the face, ignored all the safety rules, and with no LCES headed off the mountain. I see no plan, no safety and a total lack of situational awareness.
I hear you, Bob. I promise that I do. I think I am just seeing the weather differently, in part because there was a CONVERSATION that followed the 3:30 p.m. weather reading, and it seems that folks thought that the winds warned about were already THERE at 3:30 p.m., such that they were well OVER by 4:04 p.m. or later. I hear you, though, Bob. I do.
Maybe we have been misreading Elizabeth (easy to do as her writing can be a bit obtuse). I do not think she is actually saying that GM was correct in its thinking (at least I hope not), but just trying to flesh out exactly what they were thinking prior to moving. Bob – yours is the million dollar question. What made them believe they could do that??? Maybe there was a deliberative process carried out on the crew radio and Brendan McDonough heard it. Maybe it was nothing more than Marsh asking Steed his comfort level, not getting any pushback, and then just going. If the latter, we will never really understand it. I suspect a lot of what Marsh was thinking was never verbalized.
The thing I do not see is the winds subsiding they are pushing the fire all over Yarnell squarely winds and some times a lull before the change direction a eye of the storm so to speak seen it many times as thunder cells even high thunder cells pass over a fire. weather forecasts are not always perfect but you should always plan accordingly and not get caught with you pants down so to speak. Again a good lookout would have made a huge difference. When ever you have watchouts plan to mitigate them with the rules LOOKOUTS are primary as I have said over and over. GM had alternatives that they just did not use. Again we are back to why? Bad decisions with good outcomes it just may be that simple.
I always said in training you forget the 10 standard orders and you have a good chance of dying.
Bob, one of my thoughts had always been that MARSH was acting as the lookout, staying up behind on the ridge (which would explain why his was not the first voice on the helmet camera), but I have never articulated that thought here, for obvious reasons (e.g. the trolls would leap on me, accuse me of trying to defend the overhead, make legal references to my career, etc.). I hear your point on the weather, loud and clear, and I am doing more weather research to this day. Over Easter brunch today, actually, I discussed actually hiring a weather consultant. To that end, Happy EASTER!
Now that we can ALL see ( thanks to Mr. John Dougherty ) the
same ‘evidence’ that Elizabeth was ‘secretly’ referring to for
so long for a lot of the same claims she is still making above…
…a better conversation/debate can be had.
There is actually SOOOO much that seems just plain ‘wrong’
about the things Elizabeth is trying to ‘clarify’ up above that
I don’t really know where to start…
…but I’m workin’ on it.
Stay tuned for a more detailed response (soon).
Unlike Elizabeth… if I am going to ‘debate’ any of her claims
I will ( as usual ) supply specific references to specific things
in the evidence record.
It won’t be some kind of ‘everything I’m claiming is based on
the totality of the documents in the public record’.
You finally drew me in EN.
“EN wrote:”
“1. Hotshots increasingly have been called upon to work within the WUI. This means that, when the overhead checked at roughly 15:42 to see if DivsA had resources available to bump over to the east side of the fire, it goes without saying that the overhead had tasks in mind that would be appropriate. Nobody was asking GM to magically morph into a structure crew,…”
—-‘It goes without saying’ that all wild land firefighting resources are increasingly called to the WUI, not jut IHC, and have been for some time. Hotshots also increasingly are the only crews there to engage, know how to burn and do it around structures with fire typically coming at them, and have Command presence.
“Morphing into a structure crew”, I just don’t like your tone. Had GM reached to where OPS requested them, they would’ve been doing the same tactics as the other resources engaged on the YHF: triage, construct small chunks of handling if needed, peel out with their truck tires for instant line, meanwhile looking to burn out and doing so. Look at Page 12 of the IRPG and check out S-215.—
“3. Before moving, the GM crew discussed it amongst themselves, and they alerted others to their plans. Everyone seems to agree to having heard GM stating that they were moving. The ONLY reason GM could not be found lickety-split when they deployed is because there was an INPENETRABLE cloud of smoke in the valley. The notion that nobody knew where they were is not, uhm, particularly likely or accurate. Go back and re-read Eric Tarr’s and his colleague’s recitations..
Not everyone hears everything on a radio, by the way. And it is well-documented that there were radio transmission problems on the Yarnell Hill Fire that day, PARTICULARLY in the area where GM died. (Remember, Tarr was having trouble communicating, BR was having trouble communicating, etc?) We KNOW that GM/DivsA communicated where they were headed because folks ADMIT hearing it. Why Neill, Maclean, and others keep missing this point is beyond me – it is documented in multiple unrelated INTERVIEWS, unit logs, notes, etc.”
—Not sure where to begin. Contradictory statement you make “Everyone seems to agree to having heard GM stating that they were moving” to “Why Neill, Maclean, and others keep missing this point is beyond me..”. Do you remember a time ago when Maclean/Neill were some of the first individuals to share with the rest of us on hearing GM in recorded audio during the supposed 33 minute commo gap? During EM’s descent, thus him reporting to SOMEONE on movement? How the hell can you say they keep missing this point? Nobodies missing this point. And why make it personal? Aren’t we all here to try and figure this out together without innuendo, ignorance and contradictions?
As far as your radio comments, well I find it hard to believe that a lawyer would even feel comfortable commenting, with or without sources. Wildland firefighters well know that radio issues are a normal occurrence, including tone issues, repeater issues, bleed over, bad clones, the list goes on and on.—
“4. According to available living sources,…”
—I’ll stop right there. Who’s talking to you about presuming what GM knew or didn’t know about Wx?—
“5. When dealing with fires in mid-June through late July in Arizona (particularly on or near the Mogollon Rim), it is not ABNORMAL to see lingering or looming thunder cells or thunderstorms in the sky that ULTIMATELY produce nothing of import that unexpectedly, materially impacts fire behavior. If every Hotshot working a fire in mid-June through late July in Arizona sat down and “hunkered” in appropriately-sized black whenever a thunder cell or a looming storm was spotted, not a whole lot of Hotshot work would get done in those many we…
—Again a lawyer speaking of firefighting Wx knowledge… What’s your angle? Have you been to S-290? It actually is common to hunker and wait out a cell to pass. Sometimes that’s all a firefighter can do.—
“6. Just because the SAIT claims that somebody said something does NOT actually mean that the things at issue were actually said.
Abel did not recall saying “hunker,” presumably b/c he never SAID “hunker,” even though the SAIT said he said “hunker.” Do I think Marsh said the winds were “squirrely”? Well, I wouldn’t bet my first child on it. I would urge folks like Bob Powers (and everyone!) to be very careful about ascribing direct quotes to GM or DivsA unless more than one person corroborates the direct quote (and even then it might still be inaccurate). (FYI, my sources for the above comments are the documents and materials in the SAIT and ADOSH packages.”
—Doozy…is this a word? How about WTF? Not only do you contradict yourself AGAIN here, the glare of not understanding basic firefighting is blinding me. Hunker… have you heard Caldwell’s audio? Sure sounds like Able saying the word “hunker” to me. Squirrely…hmm extremely common description for a wind with no true direction. Not a scientific description by any means but if I had a first born I would bet on that he used this word. Back to your contradictions. Throughout your list you quote the SAIT/ADOSH, then at the end your warn your followers to not trust what it says but then follow up with again using sources in the SAIT/ADOSH. Huh?
Fire20+, thanks for joining. The more straight talk we can get on here, the better. Particularly since some people seem intent on burying the truth, and leaving false and dangerous politically correct lessons for the living.
I would like to put a few things into perspective about when GM decided to leave the black. That some have said was safe at that time.
INDICATORS
1. The Lookout had to abandon his spot because the Fire front over ran it.
2. The same Fire Front could be seen from a picture the crew took .
3. The Flaming front was moving at 1600 both east and south the south movement was at the crew although not fast it was in a continuous brush field and an almost 2 mile flaming front.
4. Marsh stated at the top of the ridge he was experiencing squirrely winds.
5. The Fire weather forecast was for high winds with the thunderstorm in the area. Critical Fire Weather Conditions.
With all those indicators GM chose to leave the black. When they were on the move Frizby called and asked “your in the black right?” Marsh were making our way thru the black. With out trying to tell Marsh what to do I think Frizby was saying don’t leave the black. Was Frizby concerned Marsh would leave the black? I think so based on previous experiences with Marsh?
All the above says Marsh and GM should have stayed in the black. Yet they did not head all those warning signs. Had they waited to make the decision for just 30 more minuets they would have never moved. 30 minuets of doing nothing sitting in the black or moving to reengage, 19 Men alive or gone over a 30 minuet decision. The indicators were there to take pause and wait and see what the Fire would do. No body needed them that bad no body would have blamed them for siting it out. They could justify staying right there to any one based on the 10 and 18 and the current and expected fire behavior.
I think simply applying the 10 and 18, you can look at what they had in the black, versus any other option, and then also see that unfortunately they chose the worst, or at least second-worst, possible option.
I had asked Elizabeth two days ago to state who or what she was relying on to state that it was reasonable for GM to take the route they did, when they did. Likewise, for sources (in general terms, not names) of people saying that GM’s bushwhack was a better option than staying on the 2-track. I think it’s important to distinguish between what IS, based on facts, and what might sound good or feel good.
In this case, not only were the choices made the least-good options, but there was no offsetting “good” to come if the chance they were taking had not resulted in an entrapment. Simply, given fuels and fire behavior, it GM had made it to town, they would have been 19 more people needing to get out of the way of the fire — unless they were going to take on even more risk. What they would not have been able to do is successfully “re-engage” that fire at that time.
**
** On April 9, 2014 at 2:23 pm, Deborah Pfingston wrote…
>> 1) Do you know if Andrew’s cellphone/smartphone was ever returned to
>> anyone in his family when the Arizona Forestry SAIT and Arizona ADOSH
>> investigations ended?
>>
>> Deborah said…
>> Yes Juliann did get Andrew’s cell phone back.
>> But no report that they were able to receive anything off it.
>> Some families did receive a report. This in itself is unsettling.
>> 2) If it was NOT… was any explanation given as to WHY?
>>
>> Deborah said…
>> They explain nothing to the families. The only time they
>> talk is when we insist on it.
>> 3) Related to the above… do you know if ALL of the families received the
>> cellphones/smartphones back? Particularly Amanda Marsh? Eric Marsh’s
>> cellphone seems to have ‘disappeared’ from the deployment site and doesn’t
>> seem to have ever been entered into evidence as were ALL the other
>> cellphones/smartphones found at the deployment site. I am just wondering if,
>> even despite that lack of any official documentation regarding Eric’s
>> cellphone… if it ever actually made it back to HIS family… or if it is still simply
>> ‘missing’. Do YOU ( or anyone in this ’12 families’ group you mention )
>> know anything about it?
>>
>> Deborah said…
>> I will let Amanda Marsh answer this question.
>> Eric always carried two phones.
>> I do think this is an important vein of investigation that needs
>> to be insisted upon.
Keyphrase: ‘Eric always carried TWO phones.’
Deborah…
I don’t believe ANY of the investigators ( SAIT or ADOSH ) were actually aware of this possibility that Eric Marsh might have had TWO cell/smartphones with him that day. They certainly knew he had at least ONE… and that he was freely using it that day to talk ‘off the radio’ with fire command personnel such as OPS1 Todd Abel ( and others? ).
We DO know now that while Darrell Willis’ cell/smartphone was, in fact, OWNED ( and fully paid for ) by the City of Prescott… Eric was simply receiving a $25 a month ‘stipend’ from the City of Prescott to help offset the costs for using ONE of his own personal cell/smartphones for City related business purposes. We also know that ONE of Eric’s phones ( the cell number Eric himself has posted publicly on the National Interagency Hotshot Crew contact page ) was a Nextel account registered locally in Prescott.
The ADOSH investigators were ‘assuming’ that both Willis’ and Marsh’s phones were OWNED by the City of Prescott and so they made a direct request to the City of Prescott for the actual ‘call records’ for BOTH of those phones.
The assumption about Willis’ phone was correct, and ADOSH DID receive a FULL copy of ALL of Willis’ call records for that day ( and the entire month of June ) from the Prescott Legal department… but the response they got concerning Eric’s phone was simply an admission that the City of Prescott was paying Eric $25 a month for ONE of them… but ( according to Prescott Legal department ) that meant they were not obligated to supply his call records as there were with Willis’ cell/smartphone.
This is actually a very debatable legal point.
Legally speaking… if the City of Prescott was *paying* for the ( business related ) use of that personal cell/smarphone, then they DO, in fact, have some ‘ownership’ rights with regards to requesting/accessing call records for that phone. There are MANY documented cases out there where this has proved to be the case…
…but if the City of Prescott did not have a specific contract in place with Eric Marsh regarding this ‘stipend’ for the ‘job related’ use of his cell/smartphone… then pursuing those legal employer rights to the phone’s call records could, in fact, be problematic. So maybe that’s why they didn’t even try to fulfill that part of request from ADOSH.
A copy of Eric Marsh’s complete personnel file was requested by ADOSH and was (supposedly) supplied. It is in this folder in the the online copies of the ADOSH documents. I have looked through the whole thing.
I don’t see ANY copy of any ‘contract’ or ‘agreement’ in Marsh’s personnel file with regards to this ’employee benefit’ of a monthly ‘stipend’ to (help) pay for his personal cell/smartphone. Other ’employee benefit’ documents are present in the personnel file… but there is nothing about this $25 month ‘stipend’ for his cell/smartphone.
Likewise…there is no standard CUPS ( Cellphone Usage Policy Statement ) in his personnel file detailing the rights of the employer to any/all business related usage of the cellphone for which the stipend is being paid.
When an employer simply OWNS the cell/smartphone itself and it is simply ‘on loan’ to an employee… the employer retains all rights to obtain any/all of the call records for that phone at ANY time from the carrier. This is/was the case with Darrell Willis’ City supplied cell/smartphone.
When a simple ‘stipend’ is being paid to the employee for ‘business related’ use of their own personal cellphone… the employers rights are USUALLY the same as if they ‘owned’ the phone when it comes to requesting call records to/from that phone ( business related )… but it’s a bit more complicated, legally speaking, than if they were the ‘owner of record’ for the phone with the CARRIER itself.
The exact ‘terms’ of the agreement, and the employer’s rights to request/access phone records for that phone at any time, are usually clearly spelled out in a signed CUPS contract ( or some other legal agreement ) with the employee… but I see no such document anywhere in Eric Marsh’s personnel file.
ALL of those ’emails’ between ADOSH and the City of Prescott legal department are included in the recent released ADOSH investigation document(s)… EXCEPT for the ’email’ attachment which actually contained Willis’ call records. That ’email’ attachment was withheld from the FOIA/FOIL request(s). No (documented) reason was given. They didn’t even bother to cite any of the permissible ‘privacy’ exceptions. The document was ( and is ) simply MISSING from the FOIA/FOIL release.
The actual NAME of the file that was ‘attached’ to the email from the City of Prescott and contained ALL of Darrell Willis’ cell phone call records was…
‘Darrell’s Cell Phone Records June 2-30’ ( An Adobe PDF file ).
It should be noted ( in the emails reprinted below ) that EVERY OTHER email ‘attachment’ shown coming from the City of Prescott DOES appear in the ADOSH FOIA/FOIL package EXCEPT for this one specific email attachment. It is simply ‘missing’ from that FOIA/FOIL release package from ADOSH, and no explanation is given as to why ONLY that email attachment was excluded from the release.
It should also be noted that while there are MANY *entries* in the ADOSH investigator’s own ‘notes’ about obtaining these cell phone records… and being sure they *pursued* this to a conclusion… once that email arrived from the City of Prescott with Willis’ full call records attached… there is then not one single *note* or any further mention of this anywhere in the ADOSH investigator’s own *note* files or email records. There is no evidence that, once they finally received Willis’ call records, the content of that file was ever examined or discussed in any way.
There is also absolutely no evidence that, once being told by the City of Prescott that they were, in fact, paying Eric Marsh a ‘stipend’ for his cell/smartphone… but that ADOSH would have to make call history requests directly to his widow… that ADOSH ever made any attempt to do that.
Those ADOSH / City of Prescott emails were posted here in this ongoing discussion about a month ago and have been sort of ‘lost in the noise’.
Here is a reprint of that that original posting from March 28 ( including the relevant ADOSH / City of Prescott emails ) so you don’t have to go ‘searching’ for it…
** ADOSH OBTAINED ALL OF DARRELL WILLIS’ CELL PHONE RECORDS
** AND
** ERIC MARSH’S CELL PHONE WAS PAID FOR BY CITY OF PRESCOTT
Circa September 4, 2013, ADOSH investigators already knew for sure that
both Darrell Willis and Eric Marsh had cell phones on June 30… but they
weren’t quite sure yet if BOTH of them were supplied/owned by the City of
Prescott or not.
So they requested that the City of Prescott supply all cell phone records
for BOTH Willis and Marsh to see what would happen.
Turns out Willis’ cell phone is/was ( owned by the City of Prescott ), but Eric
Marsh was using his own personal cell phone ( but was receiving a stipend to
pay for it from the City of Prescott ).
The City of Prescott was then obligated to obtain/turnover Willis’ cell phone
records… but because they were only paying Marsh a ‘stipend’ for his phone…
they said that ADOSH would have to make that request through his widow…
Amanda Marsh. ( Marsh’s cell phone is already known via public reverse lookup
on his published number to have been a ‘Nextel’ account in Prescott ).
The City of Prescott DID supply ALL of Willis’ cell phone records to ADOSH,
but there is no evidence in the recently released ADOSH information package
that indicates they ever followed up with a similar request to Amanda Marsh.
ALSO NOTE: ADOSH investigators had already learned by September 4
that Brendan’s original Weather reports had already been ‘discarded’
by the City of Prescott. Marsha Collier of Prescott Fire had already said in
a separate email that Brendan said that he had cleaned out his car and now
couldn’t any of the original documents )… but ADOSH still made another
attempt on September 4 to obtain Brendan’s original weather reports.
There are THREE emails reprinted below…
The FIRST one is the ADOSH request for both Willis’ and Marsh’s
cell phone records to Lori Burkeen of Prescott Legal Department.
The SECOND one is her reply ( 13 days later ) with ‘inline’ comments
about all the documents ADOSH requested.
The THIRD was sent by Lori Burkeen just 4 hours after the second one and
had an attached file containing ALL of Darrell Willis’ cell phone records for
the month of June, 2013
That attached file was named…
“Darrell’s Cell Phone Records June 2-30.pdf”
EVERY document being requested below is present in the recently released
ADOSH investigation materials folder… EXCEPT for the file containing Willis’
cell phone records. It was not released.
Not too surprising. I’m sure this entire document is being withheld
from FOIA/FOIL requests due to privacy laws and the ‘exceptions’ allowed
under FOIA/FOIL… but it’s still interesting to FINALLY learn that at least
SOMEONE obtained ( and HAS ) Willis’ cell phone records from June 30, 2013.
** THE EMAILS
** From page(s) 16-20 of ADOSH document: “Emails L3419 12-30-13.pdf”
This is the first email that ADOSH sent requesting the cell phone records
( and other documents like Brendan’s original weather reports / field logs,
and any documentation about the Wesley fire GM was ‘sent home from’ )…
________________________________________________________________
From: Hanna, Bruce – OSHA State (AZ-SP)
Sent: Wednesday, September 04, 2013 1:20 PM
To: Burkeen, Lori ( Risk Management Technician, Prescott Legal Department )
Subject: Additional documentation requested.
Good afternoon, Lori,
Our consultants two of which you have met have requested the following
documentation from the City of Prescott Human Resources Department
and the City of Prescott Fire Department:
– Brendan McDonough’s Field Notes from Yarnell Hill Fire (Copies previously
provided to SAIT).
– Darrell Willis – City supplied cell phone call history for June 29 and 30, 2013
and cell phone number, service provider, and account number.
– Eric Marsh – City supplied cell phone call history for June 29 and 30, 2013
and cell phone number, service provider, and account number.
– Eric Marsh personnel and medical file provided for review by ADOSH at
City of Prescott
– Eric Marsh payroll records for 2013
– Jesse Steed payroll records for 2013
– Granite Mountain IHC assigned work schedule for 2013
– Granite Mountain IHC “Standards for Interagency Hotshot Crew Operations
Annual IHC Preparedness Review for 2013, 2012 and 2011 (Appendix B).
– Granite Mountain IHC “Standards for Interagency Hotshot Crew Operations
Annual IHC Mobilization Checklist for 2013, 2012 and 2011 (Appendix C).
Chief Willis mentioned in his interview that Granite Mountain refused two
assignments and got unfavorable reviews. The Chief stated that he may
have copies of those particular incidences. We would like those reports if
they are available.
Again, thank you for your cooperation and assistance in this difficult time.
Bruce B. Hanna
State Industrial Hygiensit II
Arizona Division of Occupational Safety and Health
800 W Washington St
Phoenix, AZ 85007
__________________________________________________________________
It took 13 days for Lori Burkeen to REPLY to ADOSH… but when she did
she provided a full ‘status’ report on all the documents requested with
‘inline comments’ inserted into the original request…
__________________________________________________________________
From: Burkeen, Lori
Sent: Tuesday, September 17, 2013 11:07 AM
To: Hanna, Bruce – OSHA State (AZ-SP)
Subject: FW: Additional documentation request.
Attachments: OSAH-ERIC MARSH 2013 hours (3).docx;
OSHA-JESSE STEED 2013 hours.docx
Mr. Hanna:
I apologize for the delay. I was hoping to gather ALL documents before replying to
you. However, I am delayed on a few items. Here is the status of the documents
thus far:
– Brendan McDonough’s Field Notes from Yarnell Hill Fire (Copies previously provided to SAIT)
Lori: Per Marsha Collier at Fire, Brendan McDonough has advised her that he
no longer has these documents. They will need to be requested from SAIT. If
you wish to speak with Mr. McDonough to question why he no longer has them
available, please let me know if we can assist you in speaking with Mr. McDonough.
– Darrell Willis – City supplied cell phone call history for June 29 and 30, 2013
and cell phone number, service provider, and account number.
Lori: Darrell Willis does have a City supplied Cell phone Verizon provider
( cell phone number redacted ). I’m still working on getting the call history.
– Eric Marsh – City supplied cell phone call history for June 29 and 30, 2013
and cell phone number, service provider, and account number.
Lori: Eric Marsh did NOT have a City supplied cell phone. He received $25/month
stipend for his personal cell phone. You would need to request that information
from his widow, Amanda Marsh.
– Eric Marsh personnel and medical file provided for review by ADOSH
at City of Prescott
Lori: Personnel file is available. I have it copied and is available for release. It is
too large to scan. Please let me know if you wish to pick it up or would like
me to mail it to you. Per our City Attorney, we cannot release Marsh’s medical
documents without a subpeona or written release from his widow.
– Eric Marsh payroll records for 2013
Lori: Attached
– Jesse Steed payroll records for 2013
Lori: Attached
– Granite Mountain IHC assigned work schedule for 2013
Lori: Granite Mountain IHC assigned work schedule for 2013 was 01/01/2013
Mon-Thur 0700-1730 10 hrs per day four days a week with a 1/2 hr lunch break.
04/09/2013 Tues-Sat 0800-1630 8 hrs per day 8 days a week with 1/2 hr lunch
break. Their work schedule would have remained Tues-Sat until the end of fire
season, in past years they would switch back to 4 10′s sometime in October.
– Granite Mountain IHC “Standards for Interagency Hotshot Crew Operations
Annual IHC Preparedness Review for 2013, 2012 and 2011 (Appendix B).
Lori: Will send via separate email ( documents too big for one email )
– Granite Mountain IHC “Standards for Interagency Hotshot Crew Operations
Annual IHC Mobilization Checklist for 2013, 2012 and 2011 (Appendix C).
Lori: Will send via separate email ( documents too big for one email )
Chief Willis mentioned in his interview that Granite Mountain refused two
assignments and got unfavorable reviews. The Chief stated that he may have
copies of those particular incidences. We would like those reports if they are
available.
Lori: I have one log from Eric Marsh. I will send via separate email.
Document too big for one email.
Lori Burkeen
Risk Management Technician
City of Prescott Legal Department – Risk Mgt Division
( Phone number redacted )
__________________________________________________________________
About 4 hours later ( same day ), Lori Burkeen sends ADOSH another email
with Darrell Willis’ complete cell phone records as a file attachment…
__________________________________________________________________
From: Burkeen, Lori
Sent: Tuesday, September 17, 2013 2:51 PM
To: Hanna, Bruce – OSHA State (AZ-SP)
Cc: Ripley, Linda
Subject: RE: Marsh personnel and medical file/Tom Cooley
Attachments: Darrell’s Cell Phone Records June 2-30.pdf
Yes, Mr. Cooley works for the Prescott Fire Department – Fire Suppression
Division.
Also, I have received the cell phone records for Darrell Willis. They are attached.
I believe we have made available or have produced everything to date that
you have requested. Please let me know if we are still missing anything.
As always, please let me know if we can be of additional help.
Lori Burkeen
Risk Management Technician
City of Prescott Legal Department – Risk Mgt Division
( Phone number redacted )
__________________________________________________________________
Followup… I forgot to include the link to Marsh’s personnel file.
As stated above… I can find no copy of any document related
to the City of Prescott paying Eric a ‘stipend’ for his phone, or
any copy of any kind of CUPS ( Cellphone Usage Policy Statement )
in his personnel file…
…but here is the link to the PUBLIC folder where that document
resides, anyway…
Elizabeth
Let me first say that I do not know where you got the Idea that Hot Shots fight Structure Fires, they are not trained or outfitted to do that.
Granit Mountain was a Hot Shot Crew some of there members may have served as Structure firemen. But again they were not outfitted to engage in structure fires.
Point protection- he fire blew up there was no point protection.
Assist in evacuation- The Sheriff and Police departments were responsible for evacuation not fire crews.
Blue Ridge and the other crews left the fire and were at the restaurant the overhead all knew that the crews were there and could have gotten them at any time.
Winds- when a Thunder storm passes over an area the winds rotate around the directions E,S,W,N with high velocities and return back to the original direction. Fire weather 101. There should never be an unexpected wind gusts if you have thunder storms over your fire always expect them.
Radio traffic- Base on all the traffic due to the Fire going nuts GM should have been pre-warned by that. The Fire was totally out of control and you are headed into a brush field with out a lookout. Get back in the black and HUNKER DOWN.
I do not know how much plainer I can say it. They could not help any body they could only take care of them selves.
If this is the case, then why were they asked to provide assistance, resources etc at 15:42. I find this frustrating. Here we are wondering what GM was trying to do, when there are people alive who apparently asked them to move, but have never, clearly and unequivocally, said why. Clearly GM should have not moved and stayed in the black. The mystery that likely died with them is why they thought they could help, why they thought they could make it. But what they were attempting to do should not be a mystery – that appeared to come from a request from fire command. If it was so obvious that there was nothing that GM could do in Yarnell, then why were they asked for help? I just wish someone from that day would answer this question.
Absolutely–But Mike they said they could not help.
So why did they move has haunted us science we started. They told no one they were moving to redeploy.
They told no one they were moving or why.
There is a lot of guessing but there is no solid fact as to why they left the black and why they chose the route they took.
>> mike said…
>> If this is the case, then why were they asked to provide
>> assistance, resources etc at 15:42.
Well ( as Elizabeth herself likes to say )… it’s important
to remember what PROOF exists for statements like
the above before it starts to become ‘established fact’.
The ONLY thing being reported in the ADOSH material
about this moment when OPS2 Paul Musser says he
called DIVSA ( and not GM ) is that Musser was making
the call on OPS1 Todd Abel’s ‘behalf’ ( because Abel
was quite busy on the north end at that moment )…
…and the ONLY thing OPS2 Paul Musser was calling DIVSA
to find out was if BOTH the ‘Granite Mountain’ AND the
‘Blue Ridge’ Hotshot crews were still (quote) “committed
to the ridge”. He (mistakenly) thought that BOTH Hotshot
crews were ‘together’ all the way out there and that they
BOTH ‘belonged’ to DIVSA… so that’s why he called DIVSA.
There is NO evidence that Musser ever used the exact
phrase “can you spare resources to help down here?”
as reported in final ADOSH ‘Inspection Narrative’. They
were simply ‘paraphrasing’ what Musser said he said.
At the time he made that call… OPS2 Paul Musser
*mistakenly* believed that BOTH Granite Mountain
AND Blue Ridge Hotshots were somewhere ‘out on
that ridge’. Musser had no idea, when he made that
radio call, that the Blue Ridge Hotshots were only a
few blocks away from him at the end of the Shrine
Road ( and actively evacuating that area ) and already
had become a ‘free resource’ that he could easily use for
whatever he had in mind for a group of Type 1 Hotshots
at that time.
Even AFTER that radio call… when Musser became aware
he was mistaken and that he had a full type 1 Hotshot
crew already ‘free’ and just blocks away… there is no
evidence he ( or anyone else ) asked THEM do do anything
at all. He (Musser) just let that Type 1 Hotshot crew pass right
by him on Highway 89 as they exited from the Shrine road
area and go on down to the Ranch House Restaurant with no
‘assignment’ at all other than to ‘be safe’ down at that
‘safety zone’.
>> mike also said…
>> I find this frustrating. Here we are wondering what GM
>> was trying to do, when there are people alive who
>> apparently asked them to move, but have never, clearly
>> and unequivocally, said why.
I hear ya. It’s still a bona-fide mystery.
Even though *some* of those background radio captures
during the (supposed) ’30 minute blackout’ where someone
is urging Marsh/GM to ‘hurry to town’ ( YARNELL-GAMBLE
video ) and some of the Panebaker Air Study videos that
capture the ‘Granite Mountain… what’s your’s status’
exchange APPEAR to contain the voice of OPS1
Todd Abel…
Todd Abel absolutely denies ( in his ADOSH interview )
ever having spoken to them after we hear him telling them
to 1) Keep ME informed and 2) Hunker and be safe in the
1550 Caldwell video.
Those ‘voices’ in the YARNELL GAMBLE video also do
NOT sound like either OPS2 Paul Musser OR SPGS1
Gary Cordes.
So it that really isn’t Abel, Musser OR Cordes urging Marsh
to ‘get to town a little quicker’ circa 1620… and it’s not
any of them asking GM what their ‘status’ is around 1616
in the Panebaker video(s)…
…then who the hell ARE those people having those
(apparent) conversations with Eric Marsh AND Jesse
Steed… during this (supposed) ‘blackout’ period?
Either Abel ( or Musser, or Cordes ) are just plain LYING
about ‘having no conversations with Marsh’ in that timeframe,
or there is some ‘other’ mysterious person ( or persons )
involved that had a vested interest in knowing what
GM’s progress was and if they could ‘please hurry up’
that day.
>> mike also said…
>> Clearly GM should have not moved and stayed in the
>> black.
All too clearly… yes.
>> The mystery that likely died with them is why they
>> thought they could help, why they thought they could make
>> it. But what they were attempting to do should not be a
>> mystery – that appeared to come from a request from fire
>> command.
Yes. Regardless of what he ACTUALLY said… without
the call from Musser asking if they were ‘committed to
the ridge’… everything might have been different. That is
the radio call that put the (perhaps) all-important
*expectations of management* component into the decision
making process up there that afternoon…
…and the people who can fully explain that (apparent)
*management expectation* that day are all still very much
alive and well.
>> mike also said…
>> If it was so obvious that there was nothing that GM could
>> do in Yarnell, then why were they asked for help?
Again… there is no actual evidence the words ‘we need
your help’ or ‘can you spare resources?’ were EVER
used by anyone… but there is no doubt that Musser’s
‘availability check’ took place on the radio.
That itself was enough to set up the *management
expectation* in Marsh and/or Steed’s mind(s) and,
as such, still needs to be further documented and
explained.
>> I just wish someone from that day would answer
>> this question.
I think ( even if Brendan McDonugh ever talks about
what else he might have heard that day ) the answer to
“What did they even expect them to do?” is going to
turn out to be “They had no frickin’ idea”.
Again… remember that moments after Musser even did
his ‘availability’ check radio call… he only then discovered
he had a full Type 1 Hotshot crew totally ‘free’ and available
for him to use just blocks away from where he made that
radio call on Highway 89 right by the point where Shrine
road meets 89…
…but even then… he had no ‘assignment’ for them.
He just let them ‘evacuate’ down to the Ranch House
Restaurant where they all stood taking pictures of the
fire and doing nothing at all. After the deployment
situation was fully known… it was Brian Frisby himself
who went around to them and told them all to STOP
playing ‘tourist’ and STOP taking pictures ( from the
Blue Ridge redacted unit logs ).
Frisby, Brown, Ball and some other BR Hotshots got
directly involved in the ‘ground rescue mission’ at that
point… but the other 16 or 17 Blue Ridge Hotshots STILL
ended up doing ‘nothing at all’ and just ‘standing around
in that parking lot’ even as the fire was burning into town
and people were still being evacuated.
Even at THAT point… if anyone thought there was anything
some Hotshots with Pulaskis could have been doing to
help… no one ASKED them to.
Followup… here (again) is EXACTLY how OPS2
Paul Musser described that ‘availability check’
with DIVSA Eric Marsh in his 1542 ( 3:42 PM )
radio call…
From Paul Musser’s ADOSH interview…
___________________________________________
A: Uh, got on the 89 to a vantage point and met with Gary Cordes. Face to face with Gary. As far as – oh at that point, I’d also called Granite on their radio. Because Todd was still tied up with Model Creek. I called Granite on the radio and asked if them and Blue Ridge were still committed on the ridge? They said that they were committed on the ridge. But Blue Ridge was on the bottom and may, may be available. I talked with Gary, he said no their committed to, uh, hold – to prepping and hold the dozer line.
__________________________________________
A few things about this first statement…
1) A few moments later, they would refine this
statement and Musser would admit that he
mis-spoke about WHO he called. He says he
is sure he called DIVSA and NOT ‘Granite Mountain’. He says he would NOT have called them directly.
2) It is NOT clear what Musser means when he
refers to Todd Abel being ‘busy’. Musser seems
to ‘imply’ that he was making that ‘availability
check’ on Abel’s behalf… ( because Abel was
busy at that moment on the north end of the fire )… but Musser does not specifically say that was really the case.
3) It would seem that even though Musser had
just met up with Cordes there on Highway 89,
he made this radio call BEFORE he had a chance to
really talk with him. Musser uses the past tense ‘called’ before he starts referring to any conversation with Cordes. Musser was also ‘confused’ when he made the call and still thought that Blue Ridge was ALSO way out on the ridge along with Granite Mountain. Blue Ridge was actually only a few blocks away from him, at the time he made the radio call.
4) Now that we know the real time of this radio
call ( 1542 )… Gary Cordes himself was mistaken
( at that point ) believing that Blue Ridge was
still ‘committed’ to the dozer line. They were NOT.
Brian Frisby had just picked up Brendan and
knew that the fire was coming in FAST and there
was now NO TIME to attempt any kind of ‘burnout’
along that dozer line. There was nothing left to do
but evacuate… which is what they began to do.
Musser goes off on another topic in his interview
for a moment, but then Q2 ( Barry Hicks ) returns
to Musser’s ‘availability check’ radio call…
__________________________________________
Q2: Okay. When you, uh – let me back up to when you made contact with Granite Mountain, who – who did you talk to – Eric?
A: I think so.
Q2: But you can’t remember for sure if that
was Eric or…
A: I – I – ‘cause I – I think I called division Alpha, not
Granite, no.
Q2: Oh, okay.
A: That’s who I would have called.
Q2: Uh, so it would have…
A: Yeah, I wouldn’t have called Granite direct.
Q2: Okay.
A: I would have called – gone through their supervisor.
Q2: Okay.
A: Which at that point was division Alpha.
Q2: Okay. And, uh, so, uh, that conversation was
you’re in the black and you need to stay in the black?
A: No, no that conversation was are you still committed on top of the ridge. And they said yes we
are committed on top of the ridge.
Q2: Okay. And so you’re assumption was they were
in the black?
A: If – if they were committed on top of the ridge,
they would have one foot in the black.
Q2: Okay.
A: Because that was their assignment, yes.
__________________________________________
So nowhere in there is there the actual request
‘can you spare resources?’ or any actual
statement in response that they were ‘committed
to the black’. The ACTUAL response ( according
to Musser ) was ‘committed to the RIDGE’.
Reply to Bob Powers post on April 17, 2014 at 2:06 pm said:
>> Mr. Powers said…
>> Let me first say that I do not know where you got the Idea that
>> Hot Shots fight Structure Fires, they are not trained or outfitted
>> to do that.
They certainly are NOT. They don’t even carry ‘quick breathers’
for quick structure entry/exit.
>> Mr. Powers also wrote…
>> Granite Mountain was a Hot Shot Crew some of there members
>> may have served as Structure firemen. But again they were not
>> outfitted to engage in structure fires.
TWO points ( also posted below but directly relevant here, as well )
** GARY CORDES DID *NOT* HAVE A STRUCTURE GROUP
** SPECIALIST RATING, EVEN THOUGH HE WAS ASSIGNED
** ‘SPGS1’ DUTIES THAT WEEKEND.
Gary Cordes was NOT a ‘structure group specialist’.
He didn’t even have that ‘rating’… even though they made him
SPGS1 that weekend and directly responsible for the entire
protection of both Yarnell and Glen Ilah.
From the very start of Gary Cordes’ ADOSH interview… when they
were going over his ‘qualifications’…
Q2 = Dave Larsen ( Rest in Peace )
_____________________________________________________
Q2: Hey Gary, I was just wondering you – I’m gonna presume that you have a structure uh, group specialist or however you got that on your red track?
A: No, I’m not a structure group specialist.
However, most of the division work I do is as a structured group, um, doing structure protection. But I’m not a specialist.
_____________________________________________________
** FIELD OPS1 TODD ABEL SAYS THAT EVEN IF GM
** HAD MADE IT TO TOWN THEY WOULD HAVE SIMPLY
** JUST BECOME ‘PART OF THE PROBLEM’ THAT DAY.
The actual FIELD OPS1 Todd Abel on the fire that day ( and the man
actually directly responsible for running the extended attack for most
of the day ) agreed with ADOSH in his own interview with them that
there wouldn’t have been much good GM could have done in town that
day, even if they had made it there, and that they would, in fact, have
just become ‘part of the problem’.
This is the point near the end of OPS1 Tod Abel’s interview where
they are simply trying to fathom, themselves, what good Marsh/Steed
might have possibly thought they could do even if they had made it to
town.
OPS1 Todd Abel AGREES with Dave Larsen (Rest in Peace) that some guys with nothing more than a (quote) “shiny little hard hat and a Pulaski” weren’t going to be able to do much good at all.
Page 67 of ADOSH interview with Field OPS1 Todd Abel…
Q1: = Dave Larsen ( Rest in Peace )
A: = OPS1 Todd Abel
____________________________________________________
A: Well yeah, you’re – you’re right. You know our priorities are life safety, property conservation, and – and incident stabilization that’s what we – we reach for. But, if I know I can’t get down there or get my crew down there safely, what good am I gonna do? I ain’t gonna do no good. I’m gonna add to the problem.
Q1: Do you know the hauling chart?
A: Mm-hm.
Q1: Familiar with it?
A: Yes.
Q1: People with – we’re talking about hand crews being relatively ineffective if – if the flame lengths are higher than three and a half feet, you’re kind of out of it?
A: Yeah.
Q1: You’ve heard that?
A: I have heard that.
Q1: That’s common knowledge?
A: Yes.
Q1: That we, uh…
A: Yes, the hauling chart, yeah.
Q1: So we, uh – what are you thinking we’re gonna do with your shiny little hardhat and a
Pulaski?
A: Yeah.
_____________________________________________________
Todd Abel is saying that after the fact, when everything is known. However, there has been recent suggestion that Abel knew of the request to help, so in real time, he might not have thought that way. But it is possible he wants people to think that was what he was thinking at the time.
I know not knowing what happened in that famous “14 minutes” is very frustrating. That time period has been subject to great speculation. Some of that speculation might seem to make a lot of sense on the face of it, yet be totally wrong. However, some of the other, later communications do suggest there were people in Yarnell expecting them. This would be consistent with the idea they were moving to help.
>> mike said…
>> There has been recent suggestion that Abel knew
>> of the request to help
Actually… the ‘mystery’ is even deeper than that.
According to OPS2 Paul Musser… the only reason
HE was making that ‘availability check’ radio call
at 1542 was because Todd Abel ASKED him
to… because he was so busy up on the north end
of the fire at that moment.
We NOW know that ‘availability check’ came a
full 8 or 9 minutes before we ACTUALLY hear
OPS1 Todd Abel (himself) speaking to DIVSA
Eric Marsh. So at 1550 the situation was this…
– OPS2 Paul Musser had just done an ‘availability’
check radio call to DIVSA at 1542. The answer
was that they were, in fact, “committed to the
ridge” and OPS2 should look to Blue Ridge if
he felt he needed any Type 1 Hotshots for anything.
That ‘availability’ check was SUPPOSEDLY done
by Musser on BEHALF ( at the request of? ) OPS1
Todd Abel who was too busy that moment to make
that radio call himself.
– We can only assume Musser passed on the
response he got to OPS1 Todd Abel, since he
supposedly was just playing ‘relay’ at that point
and only made the call because Abel was too
busy to do it himself.
– 8 or 9 minutes later… OPS1 Todd Abel himself
is clearly heard telling Marsh…
1) Keep me informed ( of your situation )
2) Hunker and be safe ( in the black )
3) We’ll get some Air Support down there ASAP.
There is *NO* further request for *ANY* assistance
in this conversation. That all got settled 9 minutes
earlier when Musser did his ‘availabilty’ check.
( I am now going to ‘leave out’ the ongoing part of
this mystery where suddenly, less than 15 minutes
later… we are (apparently) hearing all kinds of
radio conversations with Marsh/Steed asking them
what their ‘status’ is and ‘can they please hurry up’ ).
>> mike also said….
>> so in real time, he have thought that way. But it is
>> possible he wants people to think that was what he
>> was thinking at the time.
Yes. It is. There are some very *odd* moments in
Todd Abel’s ADOSH interview. There are times
when he CLEARLY recalls certain radio conversations
but then ( in the SAIT investigation ) he says he
doesn’t even recall EVER having that clear
‘hunker and be safe’ conversation with Marsh
fully captured in the Caldwell video.
In BOTH interview situations… he is (apparently)
being very *selective* about what he remembers
and what he does not.
>> mike also said…
>> I know not knowing what happened in that famous
>> “14 minutes” is very frustrating. That time period
>> has been subject to great speculation. Some of
>> that speculation might seem to make a lot of sense
>> on the face of it, yet be totally wrong. However,
>> some of the other, later communications do
>> suggest there were people in Yarnell expecting
>> them. This would be consistent with the idea they
>> were moving to help.
Yes. I believe the YARNELL-GAMBLE video all
by itself is one mystery that NEEDS to be solved…
not only for why Blue Ridge Hotshot McCord would
have chosen that exact (telling?) NAME for his
video… but what else McCord MAY have heard
like the actual CALL SIGN of the person who
was contacting Marsh and asking if they could
please ‘try to get there a little faster’.
That conversation EXISTS… and it still needs to
be discovered WHO was urging them to ‘hurry’.
you guys are re-hashing old conversations… but i think it’s an opportunity to revisit what RTS had brought up long ago… there does seem to be a prevailing idea (call it speculation if you want) that GM did indeed, view themselves as the “structure protection specialists” among IHC crews… i believe this is evident on a number of levels:
-there primary mission prior to being an IHC was fuels mitigation in and around structures in the greater Prescott area.
-a number of their employees were enticed to join GM by the promise of structure quals and experience with the potential to move from wildland to structure department.
-they had just come off the Doce fire where they were heralded as heroes for saving structures.
-they’re primary management and oversight, Darrell Willis, seemed to have a prevailing attitude of “action at all costs” with regard to structure protection.
-GM’s determination to leave the cold-safe black in order to get to a place where they might be of more use.
there is no doubt that the mission of wildland resources, including IHC’s, has evolved over the last 10-20 years, both as a by-product of increased WUI and a changing culture. if you couple that with an agency and crew who view it as their primary “specialty” to save structures in the WUI, and ESPECIALLY in their own backyard… then you get an overzealous call of duty.
Right on– but in that blowup they could have done little
and would have arrived late based on the travel time.
do wild land fire fighters continue to try to fight structure fires or do they re evaluate that part of the expected suppression use? I believe it needs more clarity for hand crews, as there is more and more urban interface. Fullsail is that happening at all or being discussed?
bob- again, when they started their “walk” the fire was still moving in an easterly direction… and it was just starting to “blow up” but it was moving away from them. they didn’t view it as a threat to their “route” obviously, or they wouldn’t have taken their fatal hike.
and once again, no matter how hard WTKTT tries to insinuate some sort of ineptitude on behalf of Musser or Able being “mistaken” about crew locations, ANY request by ANY overhead, could have easily been turned down.
AND IN HINDSIGHT, after that fire spread had shifted to the south and “blown up” and destroyed hundreds of homes in Yarnell, GM would have been sitting on top of that ridge talking to Musser/Able over the radio saying, “God Damn! good thing we didn’t try going down there!…” and Musser/Able would have responded, “yeah, we’re sure glad you guys decided to stay on that ridgeline in the black…”
with regard to your other question, about what’s being addressed currently…
i think that local agencies are trying to improve relationships with cooperators, trying to define rolls between agencies and improv commo and attempting inter-agency training, but there’s no getting rid of the problem… we’re still going to be rolling up on WUI incidents in many places across the country on a regular basis. as a local Forest Service IA resource, i think we have an advantage over IHC’s in that we do a lot of cross training with local cooperators… but IHC’s generally don’t have that exposure, and still have a high expectation to perform.
i don’t think the “problem” with regard to GM possibly being over-eager to engage in structure protection is widespread among federal IHC’s. i think, just as RTS has said, that it was unique to that crew, because of the aforementioned reasons: their history, leadership and culture.
One more thing: Bob Powers always reminds us that, in order to be safe, “one foot in the black” is needed. But obviously that rule does not work if there is not *ENOUGH* black, correct? And presumably that rule only pertains to situations in which you are working on the fire, rather than leaving it, correct? Or no? Part of the reason why I ask is because, as I go back through all the videos and photos from the YHF, I am seeing guys all OVER who did not have “one foot in the black” if, by “black,” we mean “an appropriately-sized safety zone.” So, WTF does “one foot in the black” mean, and, more importantly, when does it APPLY versus when DOESN’T it apply? If it is easier for someone who actually knows some stuff to e-mail me, please do. I am at [email protected].
One Foot In The Black—Hand crews working on line construction safest place to be Direct line 1 foot in the black. If not near the black build and ID safety zones as you progress. With Cats Hand tools or find large open areas. Cat lines always build SZ as they go to fall back to. Small Fires do not make large runs at you so a small area of black may be good. As the fire grows in size the black grows in size. Engine crews ID areas to retreat to or in some cases drive into the black for safety.
The black is always the safest location. Even on IA a small fire will not have a larger fire run at it small spots and escapes will not cause large flame lengths.
Indirect line construction safety zones are built in in the best identified locations and flagged. One foot in the black means exactly that you are building line on the burned area. If you are not on the burned area then you need to be ID safety zones that are close and accessible and you ID or build new ones as you move. A 1 acre fire is the size of a football field It dose not take much to create a safe burned area.
On the YHF there were engines and crews, and a Cat building indirect line and improving that line. I would hope and assume they had SZ and locations they could retreat to as BR and the Cat did. Engines will ID defensible space on Houses or will not stay in those locations if the Fire is to severe.
The bottom line the safest place to be is next to or in the black. If 1 out of a 1000 times that’s not good find another SZ location.
Always Scout, Identify, and mark escape routes and SZ and move them as you move.
If you are going to leave the fire for any reason. First follow the black line back to where you started. Find the safest route off the fire and make sure you let your over head know where you are going. If you have to go thru unburned fuel have a lookout and communications. On a going fire never put your self or crew in unburned fuel when leaving the fire. Watch out situation #11 Unburned fuel between you and the fire. This one situation has killed and trapped more fire fighters than any other situation in the history of Wild Land Fire. If you have to put your self in that situation LCES is absolutely MANDENTORY.
“Alternate” Route to the Boulder Springs Ranch
Three points merit mention, at least two of which reflect info again articulated recently by the hikers:
1. If GM had stayed on the two-track rather than descending off of it down into the valley where the GM guys died, it appears that the two-track might have ultimately led to the BSR (as TTWARE’s acquaintance suggested), but it would have dwindled down into a likely overgrown, hard-to-see one-ish track the closer it got to the BSR, and it would have been a time-consuming trip. Meaning, GM still would have been burned over, just in a different spot.
2. The route the hikers took back to Candy Cane Lane SPLITS off from the route referenced above. Had GM taken the Candy Cane Lane route that the hikers took, it seems obvious (particularly given the recent hiker comments) that the GM guys would have perished… just in a different spot.
3. As corroborated in at least one of the ADOSH overhead interviews, staying on the two-track (which dwindled to a one-ish track) was not “feasible” – the GM guys still would have died – it was NOT an easy hike – it seems that it took the hikers a good long time, and they weren’t travelling in a pack of 18, with 40 pounds on their back, with big chainsaws. This notion that the GM guys should have taken the two-track because then they just could have jumped over the ridge down to Congress does NOT work with the timeline and the burn photos. The hikers started moving down that two-track in the very early afternoon, and, according to their most recent post, they still only beat the fire by 40 minutes. GM did start moving until some time AFTER 4:04 p.m. Also, at some point on that two-track qua one-track, GM would have lost sight of the fire unless they kept a lookout in the two-track while the others dropped down to either Candy Cane Lane or the BSR.
I continue to believe that the unexpected wind gust is what fucked everything up. For that reason, I sure wish someone who is not me was posting long, informative posts about the weather here on IM. As best I can tell, GM thought the potential weather change had ALREADY come when they left for the BSR, which is why they thought it was reasonable to leave for the BSR when they did. But that is a discussion for another day (at least with respect to me). For now, I have to get busy trying to make sense of Wildland Fire Associates’s footnote 6 on page 15….
What GM should have done is stayed put in the black.
Out of a range of less-good alternatives relative to staying put, staying on the 2-track would have been less-bad. Among other things, due to keeping elevation for longer, they would have both kept options open and had other benefits. Of all their options, they chose the worst possible one, namely dropping off of the 2-track, with certainty of losing sight of the fire, escape back uphill rapidly becoming lost due to the time it would take, and with a slow rate of travel assured by vegetation and other conditions in the steep rocky bowl they chose to descend. And, their rate of travel in fact was what they should have expected with knowledge of local conditions.
You are suggesting they bet everything on weather staying more or less constant during a thunderstorm? It is hard to address that proposition entirely seriously. Having been in similar storms a time or two, winds among other things change.
There is nothing certain about GM experiencing an entrapment if they had stayed on the 2-track, nor is it a given that, were they in whole or in part to have been caught, that the result would have been the same number of fatalities. You seem to be making some very illogical assumptions when you claim that it is “obvious” that the result would have been the same.
Simply by keeping elevation for a few minutes more, they may well have been able to see enough, also, to take other options that would have been better.
If I want to walk to a destination in town, and note that one route would take me by one street corner with a reputation for some gang violence and drug dealing, it does not follow that I should decide, Well, that could be dangerous, I should go straight through the worst neighborhood in town instead, with no regard to the clothes I am wearing, and count on the thunderstorm in the distance keeping any trouble inside.
SR—Absolutely correct and having not scouted any of the options and lack of LCES they should have stayed in the BLACK. I believe our discussion on the 2 track was only that they had some other options if they stayed on it not that it was better than staying in the black only that it was better than going into a brush field canyon. Eyes on the fire other open areas to retreat to. Or drop off the back side of the ridge where there were several more larger open areas. None better than staying put.
SR, if it were MY sibling, child, or spouse that died on June 30th, it would be useful for me to know that at least *someone* who has carefully compared and tracked the relevant data, photos, and videos does NOT believe that, if the 19 men had just stayed on the two/one-track on June 30th, they would still be here, easy-peasy.
If you disagree with me, please identify the relevant photos or videos from either the SAIT or the ADOSH package that refute my position (as opposed to defaulting to your normal rebuttal, which involves you simply deeming me “disingenuous,” which, by the way, does not mean what it seems you think it means). Gracias. 🙂
Again Elizabeth we were only stating that once they decided to go down the 2 track/ trail staying on it gave them more options than dropping into a brush field canyon. Eather way the time it took was to long and they would not have made it . How ever if you look at the post WTKTT did with the Google earth on the trail you will see some alternatives the crew would have had staying on the trail/2 track/1 track what ever. There are clearings and open areas that would have made better deployment sites off the back side of the ridge. Would they have survived? maybe, way better than the brush field canyon they went into.
Again the major mistake by GM overhead they did not scout the route or ER to where ever they were going, and there fore lost LCES. That is fact beyond any dought. Weather or wind was not the main cause, it was a factor only that was not considered by GM overhead. There were so many reasons not to walk off that mountain out of the black but they did.
I still believe ( based on many hours looking
at that alternate escape route in Google
Earth )… that by the time they reached
that point where they would have THEN
had to decide whether to even continue
on the EASTBOUND leg of that ‘trail’…
…they would have been standing on pretty
much the highest ground of the entire
SOUTHBOUND leg of the trip… and they
would have had a CLEAR view ( by then )
of where the fire really was, how fast it
had moved towards their intended
destination… and given that CLEAR view
from that high ridge… they would have had
to have been INSANE to then even decide
to continue their ‘mission’ and then
head EASTWARD into that ‘other blind
canyon’.
I have to believe ( at that point ) they would
have simply done exactly what Joy Collura
and Sonny (Tex) Gilligan did that day.
They would have simply KEPT heading
SOUTH, dropped off onto the Congress
side of the ridge… and simply worked
their way over towards the Candy Cane
Lane area… well below the ridge and
away from any fire that was about to
‘crest’ up there.
Even if the fire did come over the ridge
at that point… they would have had a
clear ‘drop packs and run’ all the way
down to Highway 89 ( or even on to
Wickenburg, if they felt like it ).
So yes… it wasn’t that the ‘alternate escape
route’ represented any kind of automatic
‘safe’ way to get to the Boulder Springs
Ranch that afternoon.
It *ONLY* represented an ‘option’ that, given
the dynamic circumstances they had
chosen to put themselves in… *MIGHT*
have afforded them more options to stay
alive that afternoon.
Reply to Elizabeth post on April 16, 2014 at 2:31 pm
Elizabeth… with all due respect… I don’t seem to
recall ANYONE involved in this particular ongoing
discussion at this particular website EVER
suggesting that taking the ‘alternate escape route’
would have been, in any way, ‘easy-peasy’ and/or
some sort of *automatically* SAFE escape route.
Only the Arizona Forestry SAIR report itself seemed
to suggest that… or at least… didn’t include the
right data or narrative to make it clear that it was
NOT some kind of ‘automatic safe route’.
I believe almost right off the bat ( in this very
discussion )… the math was done ( based on
the SAIR report… which was the only information
available and *assumed* to be accurate ) regarding
that ‘alternate escape route’ and it was based on
the SAIR’s own published ‘rate of travel’ for the men
on the initial ‘full two track’ leg of their journey from the anchor point to where the SAIR said the
‘Descent Point’ was. ( again… assumed to be
accurate at that time ).
Based on the ‘math’, and the SAIR’s own ‘fire
progression’ charts and times… it was perfectly
obviously from the get-go that taking the alternate
escape route was *JUST* as *RISKY* as going
the way they went.
Those initial estimates ( based on even the SAIR’s
own published distances and travel times ) proved
that even if they had taken the ‘alternate escape
route’… they would have *HAD* to maintain the
same ‘rate of travel’ established by the SAIR for
the first leg of the trip ALL THE WAY to the
Boulder Springs Ranch… or they would *STILL*
have probably been in deep trouble somewhere
over there in that ‘other’ blind canyon that the
alternate escape route passed through.
Even if they *HAD* been able to maintain that
same ‘brisk’ rate of travel ALL THE WAY… the
best math and estimates ( at that time ) were
showing they might have only made it into the
southern perimeter of the Boulder Springs Ranch
perhaps just 2 or 3 minutes before the fireline
reached the north perimeter of the Ranch and
then started burning around it.
It would have been a ‘close call’, no matter what.
ANY reduction in the same travel rate the SAIR
itself had established for the first leg of their
journey… and they might have been ‘trapped’
at various locations ( depending on how much
travel rate reduction ) anywhere over there in
that other *blind canyon*.
They shouldn’t have been out there even trying
to do what they were doing, at the time they
were trying to do it. They should have stayed
where they were… and then just walked the
safe *new* black back to town.
Feeling the need to *qualify* something I
said just above…
>> WTKTT said…
>> Based on the ‘math’, and the SAIR’s
>> own ‘fire progression’ charts and
>> times… it was perfectly obvious from
>> the get-go that taking the alternate
>> escape route was *JUST* as *RISKY*
>> as going the way they went.
I did *NOT* mean to imply, for one second,
that ‘alternate escape route’ would have
been, in any way, ‘obviously just as risky’
to THEM, that day.
Indeed… I still maintain that whoever stood
at that ‘Descent Point’ and decided to drop
into the fuel-filled box canyon ( Steed
alone? Marsh and Steed together? ) was
TOTALLY UNAWARE that the two-track
road heading DUE SOUTH at that point
would, in fact, eventually end up near the
Boulder Springs Ranch at all… much less
how ‘tricky’ it might have been OR the
fact that EASTWARD leg dropped into its
OWN ‘fuel-filled box canyon’.
When I said it was ‘perfectly obvious’ that
the ‘alternate escape route’ really was
‘just as risky’ that day… I was talking about
what we know NOW… and being able to
do the math for both distances involved
and fire progression rates.
So I didn’t mean to imply that someone out
there made some kind of “what the hell”
move and decided that, given both options,
the shortcut through the canyon was
‘just as risky’ as the alternate route.
THEY did NOT KNOW THAT ( whether the
other route was risky or not ).
It had NOT been scouted… not by Gary
Cordes who (apparently) pointed to that
road on a Google map and called it an
‘escape route’… or by Marsh or Steed
thesleves who were, ultimately, responsible
for doing that as well.
Any time the ‘alternate escape route’ is
discussed it is always good to frame those
discussions with the caveat that there is
no real proof they really even KNEW it
was ‘option’ that day… much less what
it looked like, where it really went, or
what ‘rate of travel’ they might have been
able to maintain on it.
It is much more likely that they attempted
the route they did because they really had
no frickin’ idea where that two-track went…
or that there was any other way to get to the
Ranch that day.
Even if Gary Cordes did point to that
‘trail leading to the Ranch’ on that Google
iPad that morning… there is no proof that
it even registered in Marsh’s brain or that
he was even paying that much attention
to be able to remember what he saw
that morning later in the afternoon.
WTKTT, your very last point disconnects from the underlying motivating of the GM guys moving when they did. Most Hotshots who have been willing to speak on the record have indicated that they believe GM did NOT stay in the black because GM wanted to re-engage and be of use on the east side of the fire, which was on the way to being threatened by the fire. If the GM guys had WAITED until after the fire had passed by in order to then head over to the BSR by using the newly-created black, that would have limited how useful they could have been, in terms of structure protection, point protection, assisting in evacuations, or whatever it is that the overhead was envisioning GM might be able to do when the overhead reached out to GM at roughly 3:42 p.m. It seems that everyone knew that the populations on the east side of the fire were vulnerable (in terms of elderly, not particularly wealthy, not a whole lot of defensive space created around all of the houses) – it seems obvious to me (as a non-Hotshot) that the GM guys would have wanted to be able to engage and help (hopefully in a preventative way) on the front end, rather than sitting in the black, watching the town burn, and then later going in to mop up spot fires that have destroyed homes or even lives. I’m not saying it is “RIGHT” – whatever that means. I am just saying that your last sentence disconnects from what it seems most of us are correctly concluding was GM’s underlying motivation for not just parking in the black to begin with….
Elizabeth
If they moved to reengage it was the worst mistake or justification they ever considered.
No one else was reengaging they were getting the hell out of the way.
The only people that said any thing about reengaging was Willis that was quoted in the SAIR.
They are wild land fire fighters not structure fire fighters.
My opinion after all this– They simply wanted off the fire. There assignment was over, get off the mountain and go home.
It is just pure fantasy to think or project that they were going to help all those poor people losing there homes (Hero think) They had at least an hour or more walk just to get to Glen Allah n hour to hour and a half would have been to late any way.
Or we go back to the un provable theory that someone ordered them.
No place have we seen where the crew said they were moving to reengage.
Many, Many crews have sat on a hill in the burn, in a safety zone, on a road in there vehicles and watched a fire blow up and run all over the place It happens all the time. When that happens you get out of the way let the fire lay down then reengage. Line construction or Engine work. As said before you watch and let the big dog eat until it is safe to go back to line building. Crews have watched fires blow up in the afternoons for ever, Because you can do nothing until it lays down GM knew that or should have known that. They could not reengage and no one else could either.
The fuel type is again very relevant here. The whole day, decisions were made that did not take into account fuel type and fire behavior.
I do believe that GM wanted to get to town to “help,” but re-engaging the fire by the time they got to town given fuel type and fire behavior is a notion that doesn’t make much sense. The reality, were they to have gotten to town, is you would have had 19 more people who needed to get out of the way of the fire.
What were they gonna do to protect homes built with no defensible space? In a “preventative” way, on the front end, as Elizabeth says? Does not compute. Were they planning on running into burning buildings to see if residents were left inside? Did they have any training in this? They obviously had no structural gear, and by the time they were done with their bushwhack they also would have been physically exhausted and at least a few also would have been suffering from some heat stress. To ask them to then take on tasks they weren’t trained or equipped to do, facing a fuel type and fire behavior that even as WFFs they were undermanned and underequipped against, would have been extremely reckless.
Bob, my understanding is that Paul Musser (Operations Musser) and Gary Cordes (Structure Protection 1) are INCREDIBLY experienced guys. My understanding is that Musser is an equivalent of RTS (or better). *THESE* were the guys asking DivsA if he had resources (e.g. GM or BR) to “bump” to the east side of the fire. Are you and SR saying that Musser *AND* Cordes were complete and utter idiots, too? Where I come from, you don’t ASK your colleagues to do something if you do not think that there is … something for them to DO. If they wanted to get home, presumably they would have asked Brendan to bump their buggies to the BSR. But they did not.
Gary Cordes was NOT
a ‘structure group
specialist’.
He didn’t even have that
‘rating’… even though
they made him SPGS1.
From the very start of
Gary Cordes’ ADOSH
interview… when they
were going over his
‘qualifications’…
Q2 = Dave Larsen
( Rest in Peace )
__________________
Q2: Hey Gary, I was just wondering you – I’m gonna presume that you have a structure uh, group specialist or however you got that on your red track?
A: No, I’m not a structure group specialist.
However, most of the division work I do is as a structured group, um, doing structure protection.
But I’m not a specialist.
__________________
Another relevant point
here. The actual FIELD
OPS1 Todd Abel on
the fire that day ( and
the man actually running
the extended attack for
most of the day ) agreed
with ADOSH in his
own interview with them
that there wouldn’t have
been much good GM
could have done in
town that day, even if
they had made it there,
and that they would, in fact, have just become ‘part of the problem’.
This is the point near the end of OPS1 Tod Abel’s interview where they are simply trying to fathom, themselves, what good Marsh/Steed might have possibly thought they could do even if they had made it to town.
OPS1 Todd Abel AGREES with Dave Larsen (Rest in Peace) that some guys with nothing more than a (quote) “shiny little hard hat and a Pulaski” weren’t going to be able to do much good at all.
Page 67 of ADOSH interview with Field OPS1 Todd Abel…
Q1: = Dave Larsen (RIP)
A: = OPS1 Todd Abel
__________________
A: Well yeah, you’re – you’re right. You know our priorities are life safety, property conservation, and – and incident stabilization that’s what we – we reach for. But, if I know I can’t get down there or get my crew down there safely, what good am I gonna do? I ain’t gonna do no good. I’m gonna add to the problem.
Q1: Do you know the hauling chart?
A: Mm-hm.
Q1: Familiar with it?
A: Yes.
Q1: People with – we’re talking about hand crews being relatively ineffective if – if the flame lengths are higher than three and a half feet, you’re kind of
out of it?
A: Yeah.
Q1: You’ve heard that?
A: I have heard that.
Q1: That’s common knowledge?
A: Yes.
Q1: That we, uh…
A: Yes, the hauling chart, yeah.
Q1: So we, uh – what are you thinking we’re gonna do with your shiny little hardhat and a
Pulaski?
A: Yeah.
__________________
Elizabeth I guess I would say that they were not what I would call qualified. After witnessing the total Chinese fire drilll for the day some of them had there head up there south bound extremity. That’s my opinion and I have believed that for a long time.
Reply to Elizabeth post on
April 17, 2014 at 11:14 am
Elizabeth… I am not going to disagree
with your last response at all as to
the WHY they decided to leave the
safe black that day. I think you are
correctly reporting what *most*
people are now *concluding*…
…but I would still have removed the
adjective “correctly” from your
“correctly concluding” phrase.
I think it’s still a little early to add
that adjective.
Yes… it is pretty obvious now that 2
employees of the City of Prescott,
( also functioning as Arizona State
employees on a state run fire ) made
a decision to lead 17 other men on
a ‘mission’ that put the ‘safety’ of
everyone ‘at risk’ that day… for
reasons that are still not fully
understood.
If the *SAFETY* of the crew had been
their paramount ( and ONLY ) concern
circa 4:00 PM… then none of this
would have happened. They would
have stayed ‘in the safe black’ and
let the fire pass by ( just as they
appeared to have first told OPS
they were planning to do and were
‘committed’ to doing that day circa
1550 ).
So (again)… yes… SOMETHING
made those 2 employees of the
City of Prescott reconsider the
absolute *SAFE* scenario for
the entire crew in a short 14 minute
time period from 1550 to 1604.
I don’t think we will be able to use
the “correctly” adjective in conjunction
with that decision making process
until someone who HEARD those
‘discussing their options’ conversations
comes forward and confirms their
actual thought process and all the
motivating factors… OR we hear more
from all of these people we seem to
be hearing on the radio ‘asking them
to hurry up’ and ‘asking them for status’
as they made their way towards town.
Mr. Powers ( and others ) *might*
still be right.
Maybe they didn’t relish the idea of
just ‘sitting there’ and dealing with
the fire ‘passing by’ and ( even though
they knew they would survive ) dealing
with all the smoke and whatnot and
then a nasty, hot, soot-filled hike for 2
miles afterwards.
Maybe they just wanted to get the
hell out of there before all that went
down and took off on the only route
they thought they had ( since they
probably still had no idea where that
two-track track eventually went ).
Maybe there was no “Hero” crap
involved at all.
Brendan McDonough ( and anyone
else like Willis who seemed to be
listening to the ‘discussing their options’
conversation ) still probably have the
real answer(s) to those question(s).
Bottom line: Yes. It certainly does look
like those 2 employees of the City of
Prescott decided to abandon the only
plan that *guaranteed* the crew’s
safety that day for a ‘mission’ that
involved “doing some good” back
in town. The FULL range of *reasons*
why those 2 employees would BOTH
agree to such a ‘mission’ and risk the
safety of the 17 other employees in
their charge are the things that are still
being explored ( job security?,
reputation?, reluctance to disappoint
and/or confront superiors?, prior bad
decisions with good outcomes?,
runaway hubris?, overdeveloped
hero complex?, exhaustion
leading to poor decisions?,
actual heatstroke affecting decision
making?, trying to have a very BAD
day turn out good in the end?, all of
the above?, etc. etc. etc. )
Not real sure where on earth, Elizabeth, with Bob Powers, RTS, TWARE, WTKTT, Gary Olson, me, and various and sundry other people (in no particular order) saying that GM should have stayed in the black, that you get from that that we are saying staying on the 2-track would have been “easy peasy.” I think in fact you read well enough to know that we have said GM should have stayed in the black. Following the 2-track was a less-good option than “hunkering down,” but though less-good simply better for numerous reasons than the route they did take.
If you, Elizabeth, believe, instead, that GM was better off taking what they would have known was an exposed, committing bushwhack through dense unburned fuel at a crawl’s with fire below, and staying with that bushwhack until escape back uphill became impossible, please state what sources you are relying on. For any sources who are people as opposed to public material, of course feel free to simply say “a WFF with X years experience” or some such, rather than stating their name. I am sure as an attorney you are used to indicating what you got info-wise without disclosing all specifics.
Here’s what I think: you have nothing. No credible thing that suggests that GM’s bushwhack through dense fuel was a BETTER option in the eyes of people with relevant experience than staying on the 2-track would have been. In which case, whatever your motives for blowing smoke and creating confusion, that’s all you are doing.
I suspect your experience hiking two tracks is rather limited, as is your experience hiking through chaparral. You’d probably get irritated if I tried to continually insist something that made no sense to someone with legal training, just based on a “feeling” that I have as a lay-person as to what seems right to me. Let’s say, insisting that WFF’s being able, or not, on the job to spout their own opinions about stand replacement fires often being good things, that don’t prevent conifer regeneration, is a 1st amendment issue, when it ain’t. I’m happy letting the college minds decide what you can and can’t say on the job. You should let the people who know inform you as to the hierarchy of choices available to GM. You should also avail yourself of the opportunity to travel to AZ and get a first-hand glimpse of some of the physical realities that we are discussing.
Now, I see Elizabeth has not stated any sources suggesting that the bushwhack GM took was a BETTER option than staying on the 2-track.
Putting words in people’s mouths, and then shooting down words that someone didn’t actually say, is not a good way to bring clarity to a topic.
In terms of hierarchy of options, I am very confident that, had GM stayed in the black, they would have all been perfectly fine. It is very reasonable to note that, of a range of less-good or more-risky options that they did have, some carried more risk than others. Because Elizabeth brings up the feelings of the families of the deceased, I don’t think it does them any favors to speak falsely to them and say I think GM chose the best option available to it. It clearly didn’t. GM wasn’t faced with a range of equal-risk options, either. If you add the 10 and 18, the option they chose had roughly 18 or so checked, and there are only 28 of them. Staying on the 2-track, even by that measure, would have looked better on several counts. Obviously staying in the black would have been better yet.
**
** SHUTTLE / CREW TRANSPORT HELICOPTER N14HX WAS
** STAGED AT THE HELIBASE LATE AFTERNOON SUNDAY, JUNE 30, 2013
It has always been a bit of a mystery whatever happened to the Yellow and White
N14HX Transport Helicopter on Sunday, June 30, 2013 after it was used in
the morning to ‘ferry’ the entire Lewis DOC Crew OFF of the same anchor
point where Granite Mountain would then be working the rest of the day.
The Yellow/White N14HX was captured by hiker Joy Collura that morning
making numerous ‘landings’ up at the helispot near the anchor point as
it finished the ‘dust off’ of the entire DOC Lewis Crew and also hoisted some
equipment away from the same anchor point where Granite Mountain was
now working.
As it turns out… when the ‘helibase’ was finally established up near those
large green crop circles up on Hays Ranch Road in Peeples Valley…
N14HX simply flew from the Yarnell Fire Station Helipad ( where it had
been delivering the entire DOC Lewis Crew that morning ) up to that
‘helibase’… and that is ( apparently ) where it sat (idle) for the rest of the day.
The photograph ‘linked’ below shows N14HX just ‘staging’ in the field up there
and right next to the place where the Ranger 58 DPS Helicopter was
also ‘staged’ that afternoon.
NOTE: It MAY have been used for one or two of the recon flights that OPS1 Abel
and OPS2 Musser made that day ( once in the morning and then again in the
early afternoon ) but this is still not certain. Other choppers ( like Ranger 58 )
might have been utilized for those ‘recon’ flights.
N14HX was a ‘Transport’ chopper and could seat 7 ( plus 2 pilots ).
It was never ‘converted’ that day to help with, or participate in any ‘bucket drops’,
and there is no record of it being ‘put to work’ to move any other crews after it
finished moving the Lewis DOC crew off the anchor point that morning.
The photo shows N14HX just ‘sitting’ idle in the field at 1520 ( 3:20 PM )
that afternoon… just 10 minutes before Byron Kimball would issue his
weather report about the winds changing drastically and just 20 minutes
before all of the following happened ( circa 1540 )…
– Brendan abandons his lookout because of fire threat and Brian Frisby
abandons the planned face-to-face with Marsh and, instead, picks Brendan
up at 1541 and then tells Marsh they will ‘evacuate’ both Brendan AND the
GM vehicles.
– The fire had reached SPGS1 Gary Cordes’ ‘trigger’ point for the full
evacuation of Yarnell.
– SPGS1 Gary Cordes requests the full evacuation of Yarnell ( at 1540 ).
So just 20 minutes after this photo was taken… Marsh and Steed became
fully aware that their ‘work assignment’ up at that anchor spot was now
a useless exercise and was OVER, but they had also (now) lost the opportunity
to return the way they came that day ( for at least the next hour or two until
they could just walk the *new* black back to town ).
There has always been some question about whether or not Marsh and
Steed considered a ‘dust off’ with a chopper as ‘one of their options’
in that timeframe… and during their ‘discussing their options’ conversations…
just like they had witnessed happening with the entire DOC Lewis Crew just
a few hours earlier from that same exact location.
I believe it has been assumed that the N14HX Transport Chopper had
somehow ‘left the scene’ that morning after evacuating the Lewis DOC Crew
and was, somehow, no longer available or ‘an option’ for Marsh and Steed to
get back to Yarnell.
This photo proves that was NOT the case.
The Transport chopper was THERE… just waiting for something to do ( such
as fly Granite Mountain off the ridge and to the Yarnell Fire Station, if they
really were perceived as ‘needed’ in Yarnell ).
Here is that photo of N14HX just sitting ‘idle’ at 1520 ( 3:20 PM )…
There is actually proof that it was ONLY the ‘Ranger 58’ helicopter
that was used for the only TWO recon flights flown that day
by ‘Operations’ ( Abel and/or Musser )… and that the Yellow/White
N14HX Transport Chopper was never even used for that
purpose at all that day.
The first of two ‘recon’ flights that day took place at 0945.
This is the one where both OPS1 Todd Abel AND OP2 Paul
Musser took a ‘tour of the fire’.
It was, in fact, DPS Helicopter Ranger 58 that took Abel and Musser
up for that first recon flight.
At 0945 that morning ( the time of the FIRST recon flight ) the
Yellow/White Crew Transport Chopper N14HX was still actively
removing the entire Lewis DOC Crew from the ‘anchor point’ that
was to be the same ‘work spot’ for Granite Mountain that day.
N14HX was ‘delivering’ the entire Lewis DOC Crew to the Helipad
at the Yarnell Fire Station. The Blue Ridge Hotshots were already
staged there at that time that morning and witnessing this ‘dust off’
of the entire Lewis crew. Members of the BR Hotshots actually
spoke to members of the Lewis Crew as they came off the N14HX
helicopter ( documented in the redacted BR notes and logs ).
This FIRST recon flight ( with both Abel and Musser onboard ) was
actually the first thing Ranger 58 did that day after ‘arriving’ in
Peeples Valley.
The SECOND recon flight ( crica 1345 ) was just OPS1 Todd Abel
by himself and ‘Ranger 58’ flew that second recon flight as well.
From page 3 of the Ranger 58 report document entitled…
M-Law-Enforcement-no-redactions ( PDF file in the SAIT release ).
_____________________________________________________
*FIRST RECON FLIGHT – 0945 – OP1 ABEL AND OP2 MUSSER
The (fire) command personnel advised us to land in the field near
the windmill and prepare for a recon flight of the area for 2
members of the incident management team. Ranger landed at
LZ1 ( see attached map ), at approximately 0852 hours and
removed all the gear from the aircraft and prepped the Bambi
Bucket so we would be ready to start water drops upon
completion of the recon flight.
At approximately 0945 hours, the 2 Firefighters ( OPS1 Todd
Abel and OPS2 Paul Musser ) arrived at LZ 1 and were cold
loaded aboard the aircraft. Ranger 58 departed for this recon
flight at approximately 0950 hours. The Firefighters on the recon
flight returned to LZ 1 and were hot off-loaded at approximately
1010 hours. Ranger (58) was advised that we would be used for
recon, search and rescue, and medical with a Type 1 helicopter
and a Type 2 helicopter doing the majority of the Bambi Bucket
work.
* SECOND RECON FLIGHT – 1345 – ONLY OPS1 ABEL
At approximately 1345 hours ( 1:45 PM ), Operations ( OPS1 Abel )
from the Incident Management arrived at LZ 2 and requested that
we take him on a recon flight over the fire perimeter. Heli-base
contacted Air Attack for permission to launch and we were asked
to delay for about 10 minutes while air tankers dropped. Air Attack
gave us permission to launch at approximately 1400 hours ( 2:00
PM ) and we completed the recon mission as requested. For this
flight, Operations (Abel) sat in the left front seat for a better view of
the fire. This flight was completed without incident and ended with
us landing back at LZ 2 at approximately 1430 hours ( 2:30 PM ).
______________________________________________________
So the Yellow/White Crew Transport Helicopter N14HX was NOT
used for either of the two recon flights that day, nor was it used for
‘bucket drops’ that day.
Apparently… after it finished flying the entire Lewis DOC Crew
off the ridge from the same anchor point where Granite Mountain
would then be working the rest of the day… N14HX (apparently)
wasn’t doing anything but ‘staging’ up at the helibase the rest of
the day and was a ‘free resource’ all day… even up through the
time it COULD have (possibly) been used to evacuate Granite
Mountain from the same exact place it had already evacuated the
entire Lewis DOC Crew that morning.
Eric Marsh had reported that the ‘winds’ were getting ‘squirrely’
up on the ridge in the 1540 timeframe… but by the time we
hear/see both the Caldwell ( 1550 ) and MacKenzie ( 1602 )
video(s)… there doesn’t appear to be any kind of big wind
event going on up there in that specific area near the helispot.
There is no ‘wind in the microphone’ noises or much visible
evidence of a ‘wind event’ in the videos themselves that would
have necessarily prevented a helicopter ‘dust off’ up there
around that timeframe.
Whether this ‘option’ was even considered that day is still not
known… but there is no doubt now that the N14HX Crew
Transport Helicopter was totally ‘free’ and available at that
time to attempt it… if requested.
Q: Who REALLY flew on the first Ranger 58 recon mission?
A: It REALLY was OPS1 Todd Abel AND OPS2 Paul Musser.
This is just to ‘clear up’ some confusion in the official
YHF documentation about who was actually onboard Ranger
58 for that first recon flight that morning.
In the ‘M-Law-Enforcement-no-redactions’ YCSO document,
DPS medic Eric Tarr just says it was ‘two firefighters’
that they took on the first recon. He doesn’t identify them
by name or position.
In that same document, however, Ranger 58 pilot Clifford
Brunsting identifies the ‘passengers’ for that first recon flight
specifically.
He says it was the ‘Incident Commander’ and ‘Operations’.
From the YCSO document…
_______________________________________________
Officer Tarr and I ( Clifford Brunsting ) flew to the fire area
where we were directed to land to await the Yarnell Hill
Incident Command officers for a fire recon. At this time (0900)
we stripped the aircraft and prepared the Bambi Bucket in
anticipation of our future assignment. As I was conducting
the perimeter recon with the Incident Commander and
Operations, the fuel trailer arrived at the landing zone. We
were then instructed to move to a new heli-base. At 1016
hours after completing my recon, I dropped the Incident
Commander and Operations at the original landing zone,
picked up Officer Tarr, and relocated to the new landing
zone. Of note, I observed and flew over the Granite Mountain
Hotshots deploying on the ridgeline on the southeast edge
of the fire on this flight.
_______________________________________________
So DPS Pilot Clifford Brunsting would appear to be stating
that he thought it was IC Roy Hall and OPS1 Todd Abel
making that first recon flight that day in Ranger 58.
In the ‘Ranger 58’ interview with the SAIT… the same
suggestion is made by the SAIT investigators in their
‘interview notes’… and they seem to say that the first recon
was with (quote) “IC and Abel”…
Page 24 of the YIN…
Interview with Ranger 58…
______________________________________________
The ship arrived and called AA made contact on command
A/G channel 16. They were the 1st helo on scene and told to
stand by because they wanted to do recon. They landed
at 0854 near the windmill. They set the bambi bucket up
and command was busy doing briefings, there was no
helibase set up at this time. 1 hr later they called and said,
it was the IC and Abel they loaded them and flew the
perimeter of the fire. The SE corner in the saddle was GM
and they mentioned that. Off @ 0950 landed @ 1016.
24 min flight. The concern was people’s valley. NW of fire
was the hottest
______________________________________________
NEITHER of these statements/suggestions seems to be true.
It seems that DPS Pilot Brunsting was simply mistaken about
either one of his passengers for the first recon actually being
the ‘IC’ ( Incident Commander ) that day.
Here’s the real proof of who flew that first recon mission…
In the ‘Combined Unit Logs’ document that wasn’t provided
by the SAIT until February 27, 2014… the ‘unit log’ for both
OPS1 Todd Abel and OPS2 Paul Musser definitely says
it was Abel and Musser onboard Ranger 58 for that first
1045 – 1100 AM recon flight.
Page 15 of those ‘combined unit logs’…
_______________________________________________
At about 10:20 am team assumed command of the fire.
OSC Abel and Musser flew fire at 1045-1100 am and at
that time fire moving to the N-NE. SEATS were working
on fire. Around 1200 first VLAT arrived.
T. Abel flew fire for the second time around 1230-1300.
At that time, fire was active on east flank and head of fire
was pushing to the north with a horseshoe shape. Fire was
pushing towards Model Creek and threatening structures.
_______________________________________________
In OPS1 Todd Abel’s ADOSH interview… he mentions
both of these recon flights but makes no mention of Musser
flying the first one WITH him. He makes it sound in his
ADOSH interview as if he was alone for both recon flights
instead of just the second one.
However… In OPS2 Paul Musser’s ADOSH interview,
Musser himself CONFIRMS that it was, in fact, he and Todd
Abel that took that first recon flight in Ranger 58, and IC
Roy Hall was NOT involved…
Page 11 of Paul Musser’s ADOSH interview…
_______________________________________________
Uh, the DPS helicopter, uh, was showing up right about that
time for a recon flight for Todd and myself. So we had them
set down. We did the briefing. Uh, we talked about the
notification and from what I’ve read it said the notification
went out at 10:21. I don’t know exactly, didn’t look at my
watch. Uh, so anyhow notification of the briefing went out.
Uh, talked to some of the resources there, kind of explained
what was going on afterwards and that we’d get back to
them as soon as we could get everything straight. Todd
and I went down, uh, got in the helicopter. Uh, started up
to the fire. Got to the north end, which by now was already
active and starting to burn.
_______________________________________________
**
** USDA AIR STUDY VIDEOS
** TRANSCRIPT OF DVD DISC 4 – FILENAME: VTS_01_1
**
** CAPTURES AIR-TO-AIR CHANNEL TRAFFIC DURING DEPLOYMENT
**
** ALSO CAPTURES DOZER AND ITS TRANSPORT VEHICLE
** GOING BY THE CAMERA AT +5:22 ( 1636.10 / 4:36.10 PM )
In addition to the Panebaker and Moore Air Study videos… there is also a folder
named USDA VIDEOS and it also contains Air Study videos. They are copies of
DVD discs and there are FOUR of them.
This is just a transcript of the main video contained in DVD DISC 4.
NOTE: These USDA Air Study DVD videos are ALL FOREGROUND
conversation and easily heard. For these videos… the specific Air-To-Air
channel (only) was apparently hard-lined right into the microphone jack of the
camera so there is no wind noise, traffic noise, or any other conversation
captured but the actual line traffic.
Very easy to hear (clearly). No audio ‘forensics’ required.
The only thing that blocks any conversation are the occasional TONES
heard over the in-lined Air-To-Air radio channel.
This USDA DISC 4 VIDEO is 12 minutes and 45 seconds long.
At the time this video was made… ‘Bravo 33’ ( Thomas French and John
Burfiend ) were performing both ‘Lead Plane’ AND ‘Air Attack’ duties since
‘Bravo 3’ ( Rory Collins ) had abruptly left the fire circa 1558 ( because his
pilot ran out of flying time ).
What Burfiend and French were apparently doing at the time this video was made
was that John Burfiend was ‘handling’ the ‘Air to Air’ traffic ( heard in this video )
and leading the drops… while Thomas French was handling the ‘Air to Ground’
traffic ( not heard directly in this video but referenced in real time by Burfiend ).
So the (AA) designation in the transcript below would appear to be the voice of
John Burfiend as he was performing Barvo 33’s ‘Lead Plane’ duties.
The video begins at exactly 1630.48 ( 4:30.48 PM ) and it covers the exact time
of the ‘Helmet-Cam’ radio captures and Steed’s MAYDAY call at 1639, Caldwell’s
further attempts to contact ‘Bravo 33’… and then Marsh’s eventual deployment
message(s).
When I say it ‘covers’ these other transmissions… it does not actually capture
them since since they took place on the ‘Air-To-Ground’ channel and only the
‘Air-To-Air’ channel itself was piped into this video recording… but you CAN
hear the moment when French was obviously informing Burfiend of what
he was hearing over the ‘Air to Ground’ channel and Burfiend informs ‘Kevin’
( in the DC10 VLAT ) what appears to be happening and puts him into a holding
pattern while they try to find out where GM is.
There is no TIMESTAMP in the titles of these USDA Air Study videos, ( as there
are with the Panebaker Air Study videos )… but the reason we can know the
exact time for the USDA videos is BECAUSE of those title-timestamps in the
Panebaker videos.
The USDA Air Study videos and the other Panebaker / Moore Air Study videos
OVERLAP and were being recorded at the SAME TIME.
The SAME RADIO TRAFFIC being heard in the ‘background’ in the fully
time-stamped Panebaker Air Study videos is also EXACTLY what can be
heard clearly in the ‘foreground’ these USDA Air-Study videos.
So we can easily determine the EXACT TIME for any of these USDA videos
by simply finding the places in the fully-timestamped Panebaker / Moore videos
where the same radio conversations are heard in the background… and then
just do the simple math required to get the actual STARTING time for any of
the USDA Air Study videos.
This partcular USDA DISC 4 Air Study video actually overlaps with TWO
of the other Panebaker Air Study videos… and the places where that happens
are indicated in the transcript below.
The LOCATION where this video was shot is the SAME location as the
Panebaker Air Study videos. They were parked on the north side of
Hays Ranch Road… up near the the ICP at the Model Creek Elementary
School in Peeples Valley… and just about even with the center of that
large green crop field that was being used as the ‘helibase’ that day.
The exact location (where the video was shot) is… 34.272128, -112.731040
A public copy of this DISC 4 USDA Air Study video is here…
*** USDA DISC 4 VIDEO STARTS AT 1630.48 ( 4:30.48 PM )
+0:13 ( 1631.01 / 4:31.01 PM )
TONE
(AA): Go ahead and… uh… hold at the dip.
(Unknown): Holding at the dip.
+0:24 ( 1631.12 / 4:31.12 PM )
NOTE: Tripod is set down in front of camera and camera is then panned to
the left so it is looking SOUTH from Hays Ranch Road at the huge smoke
column. In the left side of the frame we now see the back of a trailer that
belongs to one of persons in the Air Study group and the right rear tire of
a UTV that is strapped into that trailer.
+0:45 ( 1631.33 / 4:31.33 PM )
TONE
(AA): Got me in sight off your right side?
__________________________________________________________________
NOTE: This is where the SAME conversation is now being captured at the start
of the fully timestamped Panebaker video 20130630_163338_fire_behavior_EP.
Since the following “Allright I’m gonna get it as low as I can” transmission
(shared between both videos) is heard at exactly 7 seconds into the Panebaker
video…then that means the actual TIMESTAMP for this transmission would be
1631.29 ( the start of the Panebaker video ) plus 7 seconds… which is…
1631.36 ( 4:31.36 PM ).
This SAME transmission comes at exactly +48 seconds into this USDA
Disc 4 video…so that means the actual START time for this USDA video
is 1631.36 minus 48 seconds… which is…
1630.48 ( 4:30.48 PM )
From this point on ( until the Panebaker 163338 video ends ), the radio
transmissions are SYNCHRONIZED… and what is CLEARLY heard in this
USDA video is the exact background Air-to-Air traffic being heard in the
Panebaker 163338 video.
__________________________________________________________________
+0:48 ( 1631.36 / 4:31.36 PM )
(AA): Allright I’m gonna get it as low as I can… start your turn in… we’re gonna…
we’re gonna cross that ridge to left of the big white antenna.
+1:00 ( 1631.48 / 4:31.48 PM )
(Unknown): Which way are you turning?
(AA): I’m turnin’ right… my heading is through 300… I’m gonna roll out at about
three four… ah… zero
(Unknown): Roger that
(AA): I’m at 110.
+1:18 ( 1632.06 / 4:32.06 PM )
(AA): Your target’s gonna be at… uh… kinda the far end here… kind of up on
a little hill… some open flame… ok… I’m actually on a long final.
(Unknown): Ok… ah… you’re still far ahead of me… uh… I’ll just do what I can.
(AA): Ok.. ah… just kinda follow me… I’m passin’ the white antennas now.
+1:38 ( 1632.26 / 4:32.26 PM )
(AA): You’re gonna be kind of a gentle right turn on the exit.
+2:00 ( 1632.48 / 4:32.48 PM )
TONE
(AA): got me in sight… what I’d like to do is pretty much anywhere in here where
it’s heavy open flame is in the fuel… right through here…have ya got that?
(Unknown): Yea… is it like starting up the… ah… on the ridgetop or anything?
(AA): Affirmative.
(Unknown): Ok… do what I can
(AA): Then give me a gentle right turn on the exit
(Unknown): You got it.
__________________________________________________________________
NOTE: The OPS1 Todd Abel and SPGS1 Darrell Willis conversation captured
in one of the overlapping Panebaker 163338 video starts right here at this same
moment in time. That conversation snippet from Panebaker video
20130630_163338 is inserted here for reference…
( 1633.09 / 4:33.09 PM
(OPS1 Todd Abel): Structure Group 2, Operations Abel
( 1633.14 / 4:33.14 PM )
(SPGS2 Darrell Willis): Any real progress?
( 1633.19 / 4:33.19 PM )
(SPGS2 Darrell Willis): Try again.
1633.23 / 4:33.23 PM )
(Unknown – Could be OPS1 Todd Abel answering Willis’ question): Yup.
END OF INSERT FROM PANEBAKER VIDEO 163338
__________________________________________________________________
+2:36 ( 1633.24 / 4:33.24 PM )
(Unknown): Off the drop.
+2:38 ( 1633.26 / 4:33.26 PM )
(AA): Okay follow me around in the right hand and then… ah… load and
return, okay?
+2: 43 ( 1633.31 / 4:33.31 PM )
(Unknown): Roger that. Load and return.
+2:46 ( 1633.34 / 4:33.34 PM )
(AA): Yea… we liked your drop… I know there was a lotta fire in there… but…
ah… (laughter) nicely done
+2:50 ( 1633.38 / 4:33.38 )
(Unknown): Yea (laughter)… it’s… it’s like spittin’ at it.
__________________________________________________________________
NOTE: Panebaker video 163338 ENDS exactly on the line above but only
captures the ‘Yea’ word before it ends. This USDA video shows the rest of
that sentence captured at the very end of the Panebaker 163338 video.
__________________________________________________________________
+2:54 ( 1633.42 / 4:33.42 PM )
(AA): Yea… you bet… and, uh… be on the lookout for the DC10, there kinda
holdin’ seven miles out for… ah… 413, okay?
(Unknown): Yea… should I go out pretty low… like 5,000?
(AA): Yea… affirmative… that’ll work out just fine.
(Unknown): Okay… just whatever takes me through the ridges up here?
(AA): That’s affirmative… I think… I think you (TONE) should clear ’em.
(Unknown) Roger that. See ya on the way back.
(AA): Allright, thanks a lot, good work… and… ah…
(LONG TONE)
Just… ah… can you hold for just a minute?
+3:23 ( 1634.11 / 4:34.11 PM )
(AA): Perfect. Set… set me up a level… ah… 4 for now… whole load, and I’ll
get back with ya.
+3:32 ( 1634.20 / 4:34.20 PM )
(LONG TONE)
(Unknown 2 ): Go to half way back at the head of the fire.
(AA): Okay, copy that.
We’re gonna continue into the drop… did you want me up that valley
or do you want me to stay clear of them for now?
(AA): Uh… Keep workin’ where you were workin’ and you are clear to the drop.
TONE
(Unkown 2): ( Ten four? )
+3:48 ( 1634.36 / 4:34.36 PM )
LONG TONE
(Unkown 1): Go ahead
TONE
+3:52 ( 1634.40 / 4:34.40 PM )
(AA): Looks like Wickenburg is out of retardant… uh… can you make it
back to Gateway… load and return?
(Unknown): I can… uh… I might check into a private (club?).
Uh… uh… I might do the private (club?) in Wickenburg before I head over.
(AA): Approved.
(Unknown): Thank you. I’ll check and see what they want.
+4:43 ( 1635.31 / 4:35.31 PM )
(TONE)
+4:47 ( 1635.35 / 4:35.35 PM )
(Unknown): Copy.
+4:49 ( 1635.37 / 4:35.37 )
(AA): And hey… I’m also gonna bring the… uh.. the 10… uh… back in we
got.. uh… (TONE) him out there may just hold you at your… uh… hold on the
ground… are you… you kinda need to fuel by now?
(Unknown): Yea… why don’t I just drop the bucket and go for fuel.
(AA): Perfect, thank you.
(Unknown): Okay.
(AA): And let me know when you’re… uh… on the ground, helibase.
(Unknown): Will do.
+5:22 ( 1636.10 / 4:36.10 PM )
__________________________________________________________________
NOTE: DOZER AND ITS TRANSPORT GO BY THE CAMERA
At this exact +5:22 moment in this USDA video is when the camera captures
the DOZER and its TRANSPORT passing by headed WEST on Hays Ranch
Road, towards the ICP at the Model Creek Elementary School in Peeples Valley.
The DOZER on the trailer exactly matches the one in the photos taken by Blue
Ridge Hotshot Ball that morning while it was working on the ‘Cutover Road’
between the Sesame and Shrine area(s). The actual CLOCK time for this
moment when the DOZER passes the camera is 1636.10 ( 4:36.10 PM ),
only about 3 minutes before Captain Jesse Steed’s first MAYDAY call.
__________________________________________________________________
+5:37 ( 1636.25 / 4:36.25 PM )
(TONE)
(Unknown): Short final… landing just short of that helibase… in the green
circle here.
(AA): Okay copy that… are you gonna drop your bucket and
have to lift back somewhere else?
(Unknown): Yea… I’ll have to drop the bucket and then I’ll head for Wickenburg
for fuel.
(AA): Oh… okay… gotcha… okay… give me a call ready to lift.
(Unknown): Will do.
+5:58 ( 1636.46 / 4:36.46 PM )
TONE
(AA): You are cleared in… come on in at… 6,500 with nine eight zero.
_________________________________________________________________
NOTE: The following “And I’ve got a project for you” quote is ALSO captured in
Panebaker video 20130630_163700_fire_behavior_EP. at exactly +34 seconds
into THAT video. The “It’s all good” followup quote is ‘covered’ in that video by
the “What’s goin’ on back there?” radio transmission in THAT Panebaker video.
_________________________________________________________________
+6:08 ( 1636.56 / 4:36.56 PM )
(AA): And I’ve got a project for you.
+6:17 ( 1637.05 / 4:37.05 PM )
(AA): That’s affirmative… uh… on the east side… uh… we can’t really get in
where we really need it we’ll be a little bit further to the north… there’s just
a lot of open flame… that’s your target.
(Unknown): ?? Uh… ?? smoke ??
(AA): If you need more altitude let me know… you should be okay at sixty five,
only other aircraft I’ve seen is a media ship at this time (at) niner-thousand
five hundred.
+6:47: ( 1637.35 / 4:37.35 PM )
(Unknown): How far you want me to… ?? towards the white smoke…
or… ?? (black?) smoke?
(AA): Kind of in the middle.
(Unknown): Okay.
+7:27 ( 1638.15 / 4:38.15 PM )
(AA): You’re clear to lift (TONE) but hey… can you just fly direct west and go
around the west side of the fire?
(Unknown): I sure can. Here we go.
(AA): Yea… that would really help me out. You’re cleared… uh… west
departure back to Wickenburg… and hey… thanks for all the good
work… we’ll see ya in bit.
(Unknown): You bet.
+7:54 ( 1638.42 / 4:38.42 PM )
(Unknown? – Kevin?): Yep… (TONE)… just comin’ up over the ridge seein’ all
the open flame.
(AA): Okay, copy that. I’m a little bit out of position… but… I’ll try to sneak in
front of ya… I’m actually at your… oh… about… one o’clock.
(Unknown? – Kevin?): Okay… and we’re lookin’…
+8:15 ( 1639.03 / 4:39.03 PM )
(AA): And I’m at… uh… six thousand, Kevin, kinda low out your one o’clock
moving twelve.
(Unknown? – Kevin?): Yea… I got a beacon there… yea… I got your lights.
(AA): Okay copy that… It… ya know… it’s gonna be a little rough for the show
me ‘cus I’ve actually gotta angle back left… I do have you in sight.
Basically that… that open flame and the heavy fuel out your left si… correct…
yea… your left side… that’s what we’re gonna hit.
I’ll try to turn this into a show me. Ya still got me?
(Unkown? – Kevin?): I do and I’ll try to keep ya… I may end up going back
a one-eighty but, uh… yea… I’ll keep ya in sight.
(AA): Okay copy that… so… let’s do what we wanna do…
There’s a little bit of a… kinda of fuel break that snakes through here…
that’s gonna be your start point… I’m rollin’ in on short final now.
(Unknown? – Kevin?) Yea… I still got ya there.
__________________________________________________________________
NOTE: This is the moment when Captain Jesse Steed is making his first
“We are in the front of the flaming front” MAYDAY call, followed by
Robert Caldwell making repeated attempts to get “Air Attack” to respond
to them. The NEXT transmission captured in THIS USDA video is coming
from Prescott Air Operations… who heard this same radio traffic captured
in the Helmet-Cam video… and Prescott is trying to advise (AA) that
‘Operations’ is trying to get hold of him and that something is ‘going on’.
(AA) does not acknowledge the transmission OR respond to it… and just
continues focusing on the planned drop with ‘Kevin’ in the DC10 VLAT.
__________________________________________________________________
+8:59 ( 1639.47 / 4:39.47 PM )
TONE
(Uknown): Prescott Operations calling Air to Ground…
sounds like they got somethin’ for ya.
+9:05 ( 1639.53 / 4:39.53 PM )
(AA): Okay… if you’ve still got me in sight… basically we wanna start here…
and just kinda contour. I was at 49 at the start. 48 here… and we’ll just bring it
around level 4. If ya get to this… this point… just go straight towards the
meadow here.
(Unknown? – Kevin?): Okay… run it all the way out to the meadow
if we’ve got enough.
(AA): You betcha… and I kinda started at three six zero on the heading
and ended up at about three three five.
(Unknown? – Kevin?) Very good… I’ve gotcha down now… I’ll letcha come
out my right side.
(AA): Yep… that’s what I’ll do… and I’m gonna climb up to sixty five… I’m gonna
give ya a nice long final and… uh… uh… we might have to do a little bit of adjusting
on final… but expect your beginning drop to be about three three five or so.
(Unknown? – Kevin?) Perfect.
(AA): Okay… uh… I may dial it back a little bit… standby… keep it at coverage
level 4.
(Unknown? – Kevin?): Okay.
(AA): And you’ve got… we’re kind of alone on the fire now… you just got a nice
gentle right turn out… I’ll be a hard right… I’m comin’ up on your four o’clock.
(Unknown? – Kevin?): Very good. I’m just gonna keep your ??… and we”ll see ya.
+10:10 ( 1640.58 / 4:40.58 PM )
TONE
(Unknown 3): This is…
TONE
+10:12 ( 1641.00 / 4:41.00 PM )
(AA): Go ahead sir.
(Unknown 3): Yes sir. Uh… we’re complete. We’re heading back to Scottsdale.
Thank you very much… uh… (got a little) work down there… and… ah… I’ll
see ya tomorrow morning.
(AA): Okay… ah… (LONG TONE) …uh… thanks a lot… appreciate the…
uh… good como.
(Unknown 3): Thank you sir. Good night.
_________________________________________________________________
NOTE: This is now the moment when (AA) finally realizes that Granite Mountain
is in serious trouble… and the situation/plan changes. He calls ‘Kevin’ in the
DC10 to tell him this, cancel the drop they were just about to do… and he asks
him (Kevin) to go into a holding pattern while they try to locate Granite Mountain.
_________________________________________________________________
+10:30 ( 1641.18 / 4:41.18 PM )
(AA): Hey… uh… (TONE)… uh… we got… situation’s changed and we got some
folks in trouble and I don’t know where they’re at yet… uh… just… uh… standby.
+10:37 ( 1641.25 / 4:41.25 PM )
(Unknown? – Kevin?): Roger. I’ll just stay out here to the north and (the) east.
+10:43 ( 1641.31 / 4:41.31 PM )
(AA): Looks like we may have a deployment in progress so… uh… dial me up a
level six for now and I don’t know what the… ah… drop sequence is gonna be yet.
+10:51 ( 1641.39 / 4:41.39 PM )
(Unknown? – Kevin?): I’m just gonna tag in behind ya and follow ya, then.
+11:09 ( 1641.57 / 4:41.57 PM )
(AA): Come on back.
+11:12 ( 1642.00 / 4:42.00 PM )
(AA): Go get some water.
+11:20 ( 1642.08 / 4:42.08 PM )
(AA): I’m up at 6,000 and above.
+11:27 ( 1642.15 / 4:42.15 PM )
LONG TONE
+11:30 ( 1642.18 / 4:42.18 PM )
TONE
(AA): Go.
(Unknown): Yea… we’re ?? miles out… and… uh… ??
(AA): You’re clear direct to your dip. Call me at.. uh… 5 miles.
(Unknown): Copy.
(AA): What direction ya comin’ in from?
(Unknown): (North?)
(AA): Copy.
NOTE: No other radio communications are heard in this video during
the 60+ seconds left before the video ends.
+12:45 ( 1643.33 / 4:43.33 PM )
USDA AIR STUDY – DISC 4 VIDEO ENDS
WTKTT…. That dozer is NOT the one in the Ball photos. The proof is in the Caterpillar signage behind and below the cabin.
Ball photo (taken from behind) shows only a CAT sign with no connecting black and white stripes
USDA video (referenced above by WTKTT) shows what appears to be the word CATERPILLAR spelled out with black and white stripes extending from the sides all the way around to the back with the word CATERPILLAR between them.
WTKTT… ongoing thanks for all of your diligent work. There are some other subtle differences in the two dozers but the sign below the rear of the cabin is the most obvious (to me).
calvin… good eye. I was looking mostly at the SIDES but
you appear to be right. If you capture a photo of the dozer
from the video as it LEAVES the right-hand frame of the
video… it DOES appear to have those ‘black and white’
stripes extending around the BACK of the cab… while
the DOZER in the Ball photos only appears to have
that single black/white *CAT* sign on the back of the
cab, with no extending black/white stripes.
I also now think I am seeing ( on the back? ) that the
TOP headlights seen in the Ball photos are NOT
present on the back of the DOZER seen passing by
the camera in the USDA video.
Other than that… they *appear* to be the exact same
make/model of dozer right down to blade configuration.
There were, in fact, TWO DOZERS ordered by IC Russ
Shumate the night before… but only the one showed
up in the morning. I wonder if this one now seen
arriving up near the Model Creek Shcool ICP is the
second one from THAT previous night’s order… or
whether this is an entirely different ‘order’ placed
after that original one.
One of the things to notice in the transcript above is that there is
absolutely no mention of DIVSA Eric Marsh’s ( supposed )
“That’s exactly what we want” radio transmission at or about
the 1637 timeframe, as reported by the SAIR.
Since this USDA Disc 4 video was *ONLY* capturing the
“Air-To-Air” channel… I guess that isn’t surprising… but it
is PROOF that if Marsh really did make that transmission
then it most certainly *WAS* only on the highly-listened-to
Air-To-Ground channel… and Burfiend’s seatmate ( French )
would have been the one ( in the plane ) hearing it… since he
was the one monitoring “Air-To-Ground” traffic ( as proved in
the Helmet-Cam video itself ) and Burfiend was totally absorbed
with the “Lead Plane” duties and (only?) listening to the
Air-To-Air traffic.
There is a ‘Panebaker’ Air Study video that comes close to
covering the 1637 timeframe… but it (unfortunately) ends
just 1 second past 1637 and does not cover the 1637-1639
time window like the USDA video above does.
So finding actual ‘audio capture’ proof that Eric Marsh really
did make some kind of “That’s exactly what we want” radio
transmission circa 1637 remains in the ‘close but no cigar’
category ( for now ).
Having definite proof (now) that that (supposed) transmission
*MUST* have taken place on the highly-listened-to
Air-to-Ground channel still also means that it is odd that
NO ONE but ASM2 ( in their SAIT interview ) recalls hearing
any such transmission. Also… no one interviewed by ADOSH
recalls ever hearing any such thing, either.
So it would still appear that the only criteria the Arizona
Forestry SAIT people were using for ‘verified transmission’
with regards to this statement from Eric Marsh circa 1637
was simply Thomas French ( of Bravo 33 / ASM2 ) seeming
to ‘recall’ hearing it at or about that time.
The SAIR has always been using this one transmission from
Marsh as the ‘official’ end to the 30 minute ‘blackout’ period
described in the report when they say they have ‘no verifiable
direct communications’ with Marsh, Steed or GM.
It remains *odd*, then, that if they are trusting this simple
‘recollection’ on French’s part of something he thought he
heard around a time he thought he heard it… and the SAIT
considered this an ‘absolutely verified transmission’…
…that other simple recollections of transmissions from GM
during this same ’30 minute blackout’ period from other
‘witnesses’ were NOT also considered ‘verified transmissions’.
It would appear to be a pretty ‘flexible’ set of criteria that the
SAIT were using for what they deemed to call ‘verified
transmissions’ and worthy of mention in their final SAIR report.
You know what else is odd. The SAIR and the ADOSH reports neither mention the dozer operators (Justin Hernandez) well being and possible entrapment/ burnover. Another odd thing is the lack of mention in the notes about this person. From memory, the only notes that even mention the search and rescue for additional people (besides GM and DIV A) are from Eric Tarr and another helicopter that were preparing rappel gear (near or after dark). No BR guys mention the dozer operator. Todd Able doesn’t mention the dozer operator. Neither does Gary Cordes,Roy Hall.
Yes. There is no doubt that DPS medic Eric Tarr
thought they were ‘looking’ for 20-22 people
( Granite Mountain, DIVSA and a Dozer operator )…
…but it’s still a complete mystery who TOLD him
those are the people they should be ‘looking for’
from the helicopter.
From page 25 of SAIT Investigation Notes (YIN)…
Interview with ‘Ranger 58’…
Cliff = Clifford Brunsting – Pilot of Ranger 58
Eric = Eric Tarr. DPS medic onboard Ranger 58
_______________________________________
Cliff relayed to B3 we have 19 confirmed…fatalities B3 asked. Affirm. Eric was looking for 20-22 ppl he was told it would be the crew, dozer and a DIVS. So they walked the area very well.
________________________________________
Told by WHO???
WHO was it that talked to DPS Medic Tarr and not
only didn’t know that Eric Marsh WAS ‘DIVSA’ that
day… but also seemed to be pretty sure dozer
operator Justin Hernandez was ‘unaccounted for’
and might have been caught by the fire as well?
Bravo 33 ( French and Burfiend ) testified later that
THEY, themselves, had no idea that the DIVSA
they had been speaking to on the radio was also
the real Superintendent of GM ( and the 20th man
on that crew )… but ‘Bravo 33’ would have had no
idea about a ‘dozer operator’.
So if this ‘information’ about who to look for ( and
how many ) was relayed to ‘Ranger 58’ by ‘Bravo
33’ as they got clearance to take off for the search…
…then who relayed to ‘Bravo 33’ that they MIGHT
also need to be looking for a ‘dozer operator’?
When Blue Ridge ‘evacuated’ the cutover trail
and high-tailed it back to the Shrine area… did
they really just take their radio back from poor
Justin Hernandez ( a civilian entrusted to their care )
and say “you’re on your own”, and didn’t bother to
follow up and make sure he got out of there
successfully…
…or did BR Hotshot Ball ( turned HEQB ) actually stay
with Hernandez and make sure he made it back
to where his transport was down there at the
south end of the Sesame area where Lakewood
and Manaznita pavement ends?
If Ball actually did stay with him to make sure the
dozer got loaded up ( and the transport would
actually START )… then why the confusion?
Ball would have known ( in that case ) that Hernandez
was successfully loaded up and heading out of
the area… so why would ‘Ranger 58’ have even
been told to (also) be looking for a ‘dozer operator’
from the air?
No real answers to these questions yet.
We still don’t know how CLOSE the civilian
Hernandez actually came to being yet another
fatality that day.
its wood post and 3 strand barbwire fence…to answer someone what I saw 6-30-13 and all my hikes to that area the past almost decade in the location of describing the fencing for the Helm’s-
I confirmed it with another hiker and as well Yarnell local Buford-
I knew it was that but Sonny threw me off trying to tell me it was stucco but I told Sonny that was the front gated area not the area in question-
I hoped I answered the question I could not find and went with what Sonny told me to answer—
I am not sure why I was asked that but Sonny said I needed to come and answer someone; I scrolled to find the question to put it in right spot but I am still so tired and cannot locate it. I don’t know why the fencing matters right by the Helm’s but I can tell you ANYONE who is respectful before the fire or even after would not go that close in the tight terrain area yet they would possibly curve around their hill there by the dry cattle ground tank and go up where they came down during daylight not dark—then you scale the base of boulders & tight terrain around to the old grader wash road- I feel bad that the terrain burnt away because the Helm’s had a lovely private spot and they lost that from that fire because not only is their tight green terrain not there but people sneak in the restricted area and at times people are on their land (Helm’s) not even realizing it. GOOGLE Yavapai Assessor and you will see they own outside the areas of that fencing as well but people do not do what I do and get written permission from land/home owners if I am hiking off state or BLM land- it’s a respect thing. I know who owns every spot I lay my feet.
I put comment here: http://www.investigativemedia.com/chapter-iv-comments/#comment-25798
Thank you that helps a lot. Joy we were trying to determine how substantial the fence was if GM had got to it to get into the Ranch area or Safety Zone as it was called.
>>”If GM hadn’t been ‘informed’ about it at all…( the 1.6 to 2 mile distant ‘safety >>zone’ ) and ONLY had the ‘safe black’ to consider that afternoon after they lost >>the chance to come back down the way they went up…
>>…then they might all still be here today.”
Captain Hindsight strikes again! just wanted to make sure you were familiar with your namesake:
ECITW ( Every Caveat In The World )
This is what I ( me, personally ) believe is being said in both the foreground
AND the background of this video. Your mileage may, of course, vary.
This video is 2 minutes and 9 seconds long, so given the small note in the
README.TXT file that accompanies these Air Study videos which states that
they all use the VIDEO END time as the timestamp in the TITLE… then that
means this particular video STARTED at 1631.29 ( 4:31.29 PM )
NOTE: This is one of TWO videos where the Air Study group stationed on
the side of Hays Ranch Road ( right by the helibase ) focused the camera
on the tripod facing due southwest and directly at the enormous smoke
cloud that was now sitting over that ‘middle bowl’ just west of Yarnell.
The TIMEFRAME for both of these ‘south facing’ videos is just 7 to 8 minutes
before Jesse Steed would make his first 1639 “We are in front of the flaming
front” MAYDAY call.
ALSO NOTE: This video also shows a lead plane guiding a SEAT in for a
retardant drop to the EAST of the smoke cloud, down around the area just
west of Yarnell itself. The drop takes place in about the center of the video,
right near the end of the video.
This MIGHT be the ‘lining up a drop north of Yarnell’ practice run(s) referred to in
documentation right before Marsh’s (supposed) 1637 ‘That’s where want
retardant’ transmission, but it’s actually about 6 minutes before that
transmission (supposedly) happened.
That 1637 transmission from Marsh about ‘retardant’ was ONLY mentioned
in one place in the SAIR investigation notes. It was ONLY Bravo 33 ( French
and/or Burfiend ) who SEEMED to recall this transmission from Marsh circa
1637.. and was used by the SAIT to represent the official ‘end’ of the (supposed)
30 minute ‘communications blackout’ period. It has not turned up in ANY radio
captures and no one else interviewed by the SAIT or ADOSH recalls hearing that
transmission from Marsh over the well-listened-to Air to Ground channel that day.
NOTE: The YARNELL-GAMBLE conversation was captured on TAC 1 shortly
BEFORE this video was taken.
NOTE: By 1631 ( 4:31 PM ), OPS1 Todd Abel had now made his way down to
Yarnell from the north side of the fire, and if he is the ‘caller’ voice in the
Blue Ridge Hotshot McCord’s YARNELL-GAMBLE video… he had already made
his ‘would appreciate it if you could hurry it up a little’ call to DIVSA Eric Marsh
( presumably right Abel arrived in Yarnell and saw the situation there for himself ).
NOTE: When this video starts, someone is just finishing a conversation
they were having with someone on one of the TAC channels. The voice
sounds like a possible match for OPS1 Todd Abel.
NOTE: This transcript includes BOTH foreground and background
conversations heard in this video. The ‘AA’ designation below stands
for ‘Air Attack’ and he is the one flying the lead plane that is
actually seen in this video guiding the other SEAT in for the drop
which is also captured in the video.
VIDEO STARTS AT 1631.29 ( 4:31.29 PM )
+0:00 ( 1631.29 / 4:31.29 PM )
(Unknown – Sounds like OPS1 Todd Abel?): Be sure to talk to him and ask him
if that’s where they’re all supposed to be.
+0:03 ( 1631.32 / 4:31.32 PM )
(AA): Okay… (Beckam?) three… ya got me in sight off your right side?
+0:07 ( 1631.36 / 4:31.36 PM )
(AA): Allright I’m gonna get it as low as I can… start your turn in… we’re gonna…
we’re gonna cross that ridge to left of the big white antenna.
+0:19 ( 1631.48 / 4:31.48 PM )
(SEAT): Which way are you turning?
(AA): I’m turnin’ right… my heading is through 300… I’m gonna roll out at about
three four… ah… zero
(SEAT): Roger that
(AA): I’m at 110.
+0:37 ( 1632.06 / 4:32.06 PM )
(AA): Your target’s gonna be at… uh… kinda the far end here… kind of up on
a little hill… some open flame… ok… I’m actually on a long final.
(SEAT): Ok… ah… you’re still far ahead of me… uh… I’ll just do what I can.
(AA): Ok.. ah… just kinda follow me… I’m passin’ the white antennas now.
** OVERLAPPING CONVERSATION AT +0:57 ( 1632.26 / 4:32.26 PM )
FOREGROUND
+0:57 ( 1632.26 / 4:32.26 PM )
(AA): You’re gonna be kind of a gentle right turn on the exit.
BACKGROUND
(Unknown): (Unintelligible?)
+1:05 ( 1632.34 / 4:32.34 PM )
(Unknown 2): (Best com?) ( I can do is on? ) (seven?)
+1:09 ( 1632.38 / 4:32.38 PM )
(Unknown – Seems to be same speaker as +0:57 above): Try sixteen.
+1:19 ( 1632.48 / 4:32.48 PM )
(AA): got me in sight… what I’d like to do is pretty much anywhere in here where
it’s heavy open flame is in the fuel… right through here… have ya got that?
(SEAT): Yea… is it like starting up the… ah… on the ridgetop or anything?
(AA): Affirmative.
(SEAT): Ok… do what I can
(AA): Then give me a gentle right turn on the exit
(SEAT): You got it.
+1:39 ( 1633.08 / 4:33.08 PM )
(OPS1 Todd Abel): Uh… Structure Group 2, Operations Abel
+1:45 ( 1633.14 / 4:33.14 PM )
(SPGS2 Darrell Willis): Any real progress?
Followup… see post above regarding the transcript for
the USDA Disc 4 Air Study video.
The USDA Air Study DVDs contain videos that OVERLAP the
timeframes of the other Panebaker / Moore Air Study videos.
So a LOT of the conversations in the Panebaker / Moore Air
Study videos that are ‘hard to hear’ because of the wind noise
in the microphone for most of THOSE Air Study videos are also
CLEARLY heard in the other ‘USDA Air Study’ videos.
The audio tracks of the USDA Air Study videos were recorded
with a direct ‘inline’ plug into the microphone jack of the video
camera itself… so they contain PURE / CLEAR radio traffic…
with no ‘wind noise’ or ‘traffic noise’ whatsoever.
The video transcribed directly above ( Panebaker 163338 )
is one of the ones that is ALSO completely captured and
‘synchronized’ with USDA Air Study Disc 4 video(s).
MOST of the ‘background conversation’ in the transcript above
for Panebaker Air Study video 163338 is ALSO captured
clearly in USDA Disc 4 video(s)… and can be EASILY heard
and verified using BOTH videos.
Reply to Deborah Pfingston post on April 12, 2014 at 8:31 am
>> Deborah Pfingston wrote…
>>
>> The Helm’s were inside because the fire came up soooooo quickly.
>> They even still had their animals out. They just made it in their home
>> after rushing around putting them in.
Yes. They also had only ‘arrived’ home that day not too long before they
had to (quickly) do all that.
They also testified ( to ADOSH ) that the ‘air was full of smoke and embers’
and they also specifically testified that they NEVER saw any firefighters
( or FF vehicles ) on their property that day. Not anytime they were
actually THERE, anyway.
ADOSH interviewed Lee and DJ Helm in person ( since the Arizona Forestry
SAIT was NOT cooperating with ADOSH and would not share their own
interview with them ), at the ranch itself, and while there is no ‘transcript’ of that
ADOSH interview with Lee and DJ Helm… here are copies of the ‘notes’ that
the ADOSH investigators took during that interview…
In ADOSH document “N9589 Notes redacted.pdf”…
Page 32 ( of 35 pages )
_________________________________________________________________
ADOSH Interview ( face to face ) with Lee and DJ Helm.
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF ARIZONA
Occupational Safety and Health Division
FIELD NOTES – Date: 7/16/13
Company Name: Yarnell Hill Fire
Met with Mr. Lee Helm + Mrs. DJ Helm
– Spent morning in Peeples Valley watching the fire advance North.
– Left Peeples Valley around noon, ran some errands in Yarnell, and
returned home ( to the Boulder Springs Ranch ) around 2 pm.
– Looking out North window and saw advancing fire from north, ran outside
and put animals in Barn.
– From inside home the sky was filled with black smoke blacking out the sun. Embers and smoke filled the air.
– Never saw any firefighters on their property on Sunday, June 30.
Lee + DJ Helm: ( Address and phone number redacted )
Boulder Springs Ranch Security Gate Code: ( Redacted )
_________________________________________________________________
This actual ADOSH ‘interview’ document is online at…
>> Deborah also wrote…
>> All of the fence line is metal
Do you have any idea what that ‘fencing’ actually looked like?
It is now KNOWN to have been there on the western side of the ranch ( from
which Granite Mountain was approaching ) and GM would have had to ‘deal’ with
this fencing that afternoon, no matter what it was… but there is still no direct
evidence what that fencing *actually* looked like, or how substantial it might
have been.
There is actually a ‘folder’ that was part of the SAIT FOIA/FOIL release
package that is labelled “A52-Helm Ranch Photos Pre-Fire” and
(presumably) contains photos of what that fencing might have looked
like ( pre-fire, anyway ), but that folder is still not correctly linked and,
instead, goes to a folder called “Foley Site Visit Photos”.
So it is still not *generally* known what that ‘fencing’ actually looked like.
>> Deborah also wrote…
>> and the structures are stucco.
Yes… and porch posts were metal embedded in concrete pylons.
>> There was no exposed wood anywhere.
The Helms’ had a lot of old (wooden) wagons and carts and other antique
things ‘adorning’ the edges of their property… and there is evidence that
one of the wood ‘wagons’ or ‘carts’ near the northwest corner of the ranch
did, in fact, burn that day as the fire surrounded the ‘safety zone’… but this is
no valid indication that the area was not ‘survivable’ except for inside one
of the structures.
Indeed… one of the ‘other’ antique ‘wagons’ they had on the property was
not only wood… it actually had a ‘canvas’ cover… ( just like an old covered
wagon would ) and neither that canvas cover nor that green/red wooden wagon
appears to have burned at all. It’s location on the property DURING the burnover
is not known but it did, in fact, seem to never catch fire that afternoon.
There is no public copy of the actual 4.4 million dollars worth of ‘claims for
damages’ to this ‘safety zone’ that Lee and DJ Helm have already filed,
but 1 burned up antique wooden cart can’t possibly be worth 4.4 million.
>> Deborah also said…
>> They built wisely.
Yes, they did. They were ready for something like this to happen someday.
>> But I agree is was NOT true ‘safety zone’.
Whether or not it should have ever been a ‘predetermined safety zone’ according
to WFF standards for both ‘safety zones’ AND ‘escape routes to them’ is the
exact issue raised by the common claim 14 in ALL of the already-filed
‘wrongful death’ claims.
It will be up to true ‘experts’ to argue that one way or the other, I suppose.
>> But we all know if GMIHS would have made it to the ranch
>> they would have survived.
Since we know ( after the fact ) that there was no loss of life at that site ( human
or animal ) then yes… it must be assumed GM would have survived as well, had
they been able to actually ‘make’ it there.
In Eric Tarr’s (DPS medic) notes, he says that one of the residents of the Helms place rode to the ranch with 3 fire officials after GM deployment site was found. Was there a third person living at the ranch? The notes also say that after this person (whomever they were) was returned to their home, they were asked if they wanted to be evacuated.
>> calvin wrote…
>> In Eric Tarr’s (DPS medic) notes, he says that one
>> of the residents of the Helms place rode to the ranch
>> with 3 fire officials after GM deployment site was found.
>> Was there a third person living at the ranch?
I don’t believe so… but it certainly was a big enough
operation to have either ‘hands’ or a ‘caretaker’
living there.
However… that scenario wouldn’t really match the
conversation(s) that Eric Tarr says he had.
When Eric Tarr first arrived at the BSR… apparently
only DJ Helm was there ( Mrs. Helm, wife ). She is the one
who met Eric at first and gave him permission to use
the Ranch as a ‘staging’ area for the ‘incident’.
Mr. Helm ( Lee Helm ) appears to have left the
Ranch and gone into town during the hour or so following
the burnover ( and before the deployment site was
discovered ) and was then the one who ‘returned’ with
the 3 fire command people ( presumably in his own
vehicle ). See below.
When Eric Tarr describes his conversation
with this ‘other person’ that arrived with the fire commanders
he also describes asking HIM for permission to use HIS
property as a staging area… so that implies that it was,
indeed, Mr. Lee Helm himself, and not a ranch hand
or a caretaker.
>> calvin also wrote…
>> The notes also say that after this person (whomever
>> they were) was returned to their home, they were
>> asked if they wanted to be evacuated.
Correct. DJ Helm said she didn’t want to evacuate
when Eric Tarr first asked her… and then when this
‘other male resident’ arrived with the ‘incident within
an incident’ people… he, too, then declined to evacuate.
I think it’s obvious from Tarr’s written testimony that this
‘other male resident’ that arrived with the incident
commanders was, in fact, Lee Helm. Tarr was also
asking HIS permission to use HIS property as a ‘staging
area’ and HE also gave HIS permission.
From Eric Tarr’s actual notes in the ‘M-Law Enforcement-
no-redactions.pdf’ document…
_______________________________________________
I hiked out to the ranch house with the firefighters ( Brian Frisby, Trueheart Brown, Jason Clawson, Aaron Hulburd and KC (Bucky) Yowell ) and made contact with a female resident of the Ranch house and advised her of the situation and I also requested verbal permission from her to utilize their property as a staging location. She advised me she was the home owner and that we could do whatever we needed to do with their property and she offered any assistance to us she could give. She also advised me that she did not want to evacuate.
Three Firefighters arrived at the Ranch in trucks and they advised me they were incident Commanders for this ‘incident within an incident’. I briefed them on what I knew and had observed up to this point. A male resident had also arrived at the Ranch with the Incident Commanders. I spoke with him and again requested permission to use his property and he advised me we could do what we needed to do there and offered any assistance he could to us. He also declined to evacuate.
_______________________________________________
**
** OTHER BACK BURNS NEAR YARNELL ON JUNE 30, 2013?
>> Reply to Deborah Pfingston post on April 12, 2014 at 8:11 am said:
>>
>> Deborah Pfingston on April 12, 2014 at 8:11 am said:
>>
>> Thank you for doing this digging for me ( regarding local firefighter interviews).
>> I have theory – of which I have had many but discover they won’t work –
>> I really think there was a back burn set possibly by the trailers.
>> Thoughts!
Deborah…
There has always been a well-founded suspicion that (perhaps) some ‘other’
back burn(s) was/were ‘fired off’ that afternoon which then ‘became’ the actual
fire that entered the box canyon and entrapped Granite Mountain ( and that HAS,
in fact, been discussed in this ongoing forum )…
…but the ‘consensus’ seems to be that there is no evidence ( in the public
record, anyway ) that anything like that actually took place.
There WAS, almost right off the bat, some suggestion that a ‘burn out’
might have been initiated by the owners and/or working hands at the
Boulder Springs Ranch itself, which became the ‘westward’ moving
fireline that entrapped Granite Mountain… but again… after some discussion
and hard looks at the available evidence there is no real indication
anything of the sort ever happened ( or was ever even considered ).
There IS evidence in the ‘public record’, however, that SPGS1 Gary Cordes
did, in fact, consider a possible ’emergency burn out’ at the last minute to try
and specifically protect the Glen Ilah sub-division, and that he told Blue Ridge
Hotshot Ball to ‘scout that out’ in the area southwest of Yarnell ( and around
Glen Ilah proper ) and see if it was a possibility at the 11th hour, as the
fire was fast approaching Glen Ilah.
This was never mentioned in any official report ( SAIR or ADOSH ), but
it surfaced in the Blue Ridge Hotshots’ redacted unit logs/notes when
they were (finally) made public.
When it all started hitting the fan circa 1600 ( and a full 20 minutes AFTER the
evacuations of Yarnell and Glen Ilah had already been ordered by SPGS1
Gary Cordes at 1540 )… apparently Cordes still wanted Blue Ridge Hotshot
Ball ( who had been HEQB Dozer Boss all day ) to see if there was any chance
of the dozer quickly cutting more line to the southwest of Yarnell, around Glen
Ilah itself… and Ball apparently borrowed the Blue Ridge UTV Ranger to scout
this out ( and, at this same time, dozer operator Justin Hernandez drives over
towards the Manzanita/Lakewood area at west end of Glen Ilah and ‘stages’
there where its ‘lowboy’ transport trailer already was. )
THAT ‘last minute plan’ ( find a way to do a fast ‘burn out’ to specifically
try and protect Glen Ilah ) never really materialized, either, because by the
time Ball got to to the Lakewood/Manazanita area to search for a possible place
to cut such a ‘burn out’ line… the area was basically ALREADY on fire.
Page 11 of Blue Ridge (redacted) notes…
These are ( with little doubt, even redacted ) Ball’s own ‘unit log’ notes…
_________________________________________________________________
1600??: BRIHC disengaging to safety zone. BRIHC one informs Structure Group
One they are pushing everyone out of subdivision. (xxxxxxxxxxxxxx)
Structure group one assigns me and one other to locate possibility of dozer line
to southwest of Yarnell. Acquire ATV: travel into subdivision back to Dozer line.
Multiple structures fully engulfed and multiple spot fires in subdivision.
Notify structure group one about fire and structures on corner of manzanita and
lakewood (xxxxxxxxx). Started evacuations of subdivision. Helitanker drops water
near manzanita junction. Inquiry about helitanker availability. Told there are
other priorities (xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx). Evacuations for next couple of hours.
Signed: (xxxxxxxxx) 7 / 1 / 2013
_________________________________________________________________
So even that ‘last minute emergency burnout’ plan of Gary Cordes’ never
came to be. It was just a last-minute desperation move on his part but it
was too late to ‘cut any line’ there southwest of Yarnell around Glen Ilah,
much less ‘light any emergency back burns’.
So there really is no direct evidence that there were any ‘official’ ( fire command
sanctioned ) ‘burn outs’ that afternoon, anywhere west or southwest of
Yarnell or Glen Ilah.
However… that doesn’t mean the ADOSH investigators themselves weren’t
fully aware that SOMETHING might have been ‘lit up’ around there that
afternoon, which only then contributed to the disaster.
Throughout their interviews… the ADOSH investigators asked a LOT of
questions about this. They asked over and over if any of the ‘planned’
burns ever actually happened… or if there were ANY other manually set
‘burns’ that any of the interviewees were aware of that day down around
Yarnell and Glen Ilah.
The ‘planned burnouts’ around the Double-Bar-A ranch and ( eventually )
all along Model Creek Road up NORTH in Peeples Valley were already
well known to the ADOSH investigators ( and fully testified to by the
various interviewees )… but the ADOSH investigators were still careful
to ask interviewees about any kind of activity like that on the SOUTH
side of the fire that they might be aware of.
None of the ADOSH ‘interviewees’ could recall anything like that happening,
to their knowledge, at any time that afternoon.
There were a lot of ‘plans’ to do ‘burn outs’ down around Yarnell at some
point later that evening… and ( indeed ) this was the ENTIRE plan and
work that Gary Cordes had come up with to try and ‘protect’ Yarnell and
what Granite Mountain and Blue Ridge Hotshots and the Dozer were
‘preparing’ to do all day…
…but that ‘primary burn plan’ never happened. It was abandoned when
the fire ‘exceed their expectations’ and started blowing right through
all the preset trigger points. There was only time to evacuate, then.
There had even been a ‘rumor’ that just before Tyson Esquibel and his
‘Task Force 1’ crew(s) were forced to abandon their work down in the
draw in Harper Canyon… that they might have done a ‘what the hell’ and
‘lit up’ a back fire as they were leaving Harper Canyon.
That turned out to be just a ‘rumor’. No one working the Harper Canyon
area that day ever said anything like that was ever even considered.
They just got caught by the advancing fireline and didn’t have time to
do ANYTHING but get the heck out of Harper Canyon.
All of that being said… there is still a DISTINCT lack of ANY interviews of
ANY actual ‘residents’ of Yarnell or Glen Ilah on the part of BOTH the
Arizona Forestry Division SAIT investigators AND the Arizona ADOSH
investigators. Neither investigative team seemed to really feel the need
to interview ( or even talk to? ) anyone ‘local’ ( except for the 2 hikers, the
volunteer firefighters and Lee and DJ Helm ).
They apparently didn’t consider that some residents ( either out-lying or
close to town outskirts ) MAY have taken some actions on their OWN
part to try and defend their OWN property that day.
It is still possible something like that *MAY* have happened… but there
is certainly nothing in the ‘public’ evidence record ( at this time ) to
support it.
Small detail, but I think it’s important to keep the record straight for credibility. Ball didn’t borrow the Blue Ridge crew’s UTV. He procured one from the Yarnell Fire Department. And he was on it well into the evening, while Trew was using the Blue Ridge UTV to find a way into, eventually, where Granite Mountain had gone.
Also, I haven’t seen any evidence that Cordes was thinking of back burning near Glen Ilah.
Reply to Marti Reed on April 12, 2014 at 10:36 pm said:
>> Marti said…
>> Small detail, but I think it’s important to keep the record
>> straight for credibility. Ball didn’t borrow the Blue Ridge
>> crew’s UTV. He procured one from the Yarnell Fire
>> Department. And he was on it well into the evening,
>> while Trew was using the Blue Ridge UTV to find a
>> way into, eventually, where Granite Mountain had gone.
Those really do seem to be Ball’s own ‘unit log’ notes
but you are right… all he says is “Acquired UTV”. He
doesn’t bother to say where he got it.
>> Marti also said…
>> Also, I haven’t seen any evidence that Cordes was
>> thinking of back burning near Glen Ilah.
There is actually no mention of this ‘last minute plan’
at all in Cordes’ own ADOSH interview… but the
ADOSH investigators also neglected to ask him
about it.
So all we have to go on for this (rumor?) is Ball’s own
‘unit log’ blurb. Did Cordes really think just a ‘dozer
push’ was going to protect Glen Ilah, even if it was
possible to find someplace to do that at the 11th
hour… or did Cordes really think there was going
to be time to (also) ‘back burn it’ even if it could be
accomplished?
Only a re-interview with Cordes and some specific
questions about what Ball is saying will answer that.
IMHO. GM, and the dozer were going to work to clear a dozer line to protect Glen Isla, and they were planning to burn the line BEFORE the next burn period.
Yes… that was the ‘original’ plan, all along,
as decided at the 0700 briefing. Actually,
they were still holding open the option of
clearing out that north/south Jeep trail
that extended north from the Sesame
area, all the way to the active fire… until
it was scouted by Frisby/Brown in the
UTV and they reported it was not viable.
That’s when the whole ‘cutover trail’ between
Sesame area and Shrine Road became the
‘backup’ plan and added to the idea of
clearing a line all the way from the anchor
point to the Sesame area… and then on
to the Shrine area. The intention was
always to finish that by day’s end and
then ( hopefully? maybe? ) ‘burn’ that
dozer line in the late evening when the
winds died down.
It never happened.
The Dozer did all it could do and it was
then Blue Ridge’s turn to ‘clean up the
line’ on the ‘cutover trail’… but just as they
got to work on their part of that operation
they had to RTO ( Reverse Tool Order )
and evacuate back to the Shrine area…
then out to the Ranch House Restaurant.
There is now a video that captures the
dozer AND its transport passing by
the Air Study video crew’s camera up
by the helispot on Hays Ranch Road
and heade WEST for the ICP at Model
Creek Elementary School at exactly
1636.10 ( 4:36.10 PM ), just 3 minutes
before Steed’s first MAYDAY at 1639.
I will post the link to that USDA Air Study
video that captures the dozer/transport
in a new parent comment in a few minutes.
calvin… that post about a video showing the DOZER and its TRANSPORT passing by the camera in one of the USDA Air Study videos finally made it through up above
( took a few tries, for some reason ).
Title of that post is…
>> WantsToKnowTheTruth
>> on April 15, 2014 at 8:56 pm said:
** USDA AIR STUDY VIDEOS
** TRANSCRIPT OF DVD DISC 4
** FILENAME: VTS_01_1
**
** CAPTURES AIR-TO-AIR
** CHANNEL TRAFFIC DURING
** DEPLOYMENT
**
** ALSO CAPTURES DOZER AND
** ITS TRANSPORT VEHICLE
** GOING BY THE CAMERA AT
** +5:22 ( 1636.10 / 4:36.10 PM )
A public copy of this DISC 4
USDA Air Study video is here…
…and here is the part in the post
above that talks about the DOZER
going by the camera…
+5:22 ( 1636.10 / 4:36.10 PM )
____________________________
NOTE: DOZER AND ITS TRANSPORT GO BY THE CAMERA
At this exact +5:22 moment in this USDA video is when the camera captures the DOZER and its TRANSPORT passing by headed WEST on Hays Ranch Road, towards the ICP at the Model Creek Elementary School in Peeples Valley. The DOZER on the trailer exactly matches the one in the photos taken by Blue Ridge Hotshot Ball that morning while it was working on the ‘Cutover Road’ between the Sesame and Shrine area(s). The actual CLOCK time for this moment when the DOZER passes the camera is 1636.10 ( 4:36.10 PM ), only about 3 minutes before Captain Jesse Steed’s first MAYDAY call.
______________________________
Upon closer examination, calvin has discovered that the DOZER seen going by the camera in this USDA Disc 4 video does *NOT* appear to be the same dozer seen in the BR Hotshot Ball photos.
excellent statement here. If it was not for Brian Mockenhaupt going to Congress and speaking to my old hiking pal Ronda Carnes trying to find me in July, Joanna Dodder researching the details to my videos and photos and pointing out that the photos I took were of the men that died in the 6-30-13 fire and the Rolling Stones/Mens Journal Josh Eells seeking a hike we probably would of headed to Montana but it was the loss of the people in that town like Lobecks/Westfall who initially hit my heart and then the hundreds after is why we stayed and in staying we were still shocked 19 men died so all I want not from my photos alone but the community—share so this could be properly assessed. I never got my answers from the investigators or had them look into it so I strongly agree to this statement because I have seen some of there photos/videos and I do agree there needed to be more interviews from the locals—why me and Tex (Sonny) and a few others—just because we were at the fire line and the Helm’s lived near where they died—HOW ABOUT the many who were stationed on boulders taking photos between 2-7pm—they should of been interviewed too. Just my opinion. I hope in time they surface their photos/video—just my thought. Also in time I hope aerial comes forward more as well as the fire community that was on Shrine/Sesame/Candie Cane/Foothill & even on Hilltop where you can get good solid views. So many things could be looked in…We left that area for awhile; hiking the Grand Canyon area now—we were at Alamo Lake but Tex (Sonny) said it was sooo hot the mosquitos were even naked over there so we left there but an amazing area filled with nice gems/mineral kind of rocks for you rockhounds. I call them leaver-rites. Happy Easter everyone. Sonny is visiting old friends so I came on the wifi to catch up on reading here for a bit…
Do you know what the FENCING that was on the WEST
side of the Boulder Springs Ranch ( Helms’ place )
actually looked like?
It is actually visible in that photograph you took of the
Ranch that very morning… but it’s hard to tell from that
distance what it really looked like or how ‘substantial’
it might have been.
Was it just some simple ‘field fencing’… or was it much
more ‘substantial’ than that like ‘chain link’ or something?
Joy Collura answered the question above about
the ‘fencing’ on the WEST side of the Boulder
Springs Ranch in a new ‘parent’ comment up
above… and here is what she said…
>> Joy A. Collura on April 15, 2014 at 7:11 pm said:
>>
>> its wood post and 3 strand barbwire fence…to
>> answer someone what I saw 6-30-13 and all
>> my hikes to that area the past almost decade
>> in the location of describing the fencing for the
>> Helm’s – I confirmed it with another hiker and
>> as well Yarnell local Buford.
This video was taken by DOC Lewis crew boss Jake Guardinia while he was
standing on top of a vehicle parked on the north side of the ICP up at the Model
Creek Elementary School in Peeples Valley, late afternoon on Sunday, June 30,
2013… just minutes before the deployment.
Exact time is unknown, but a document submitted along with Guadinia’s videos
indicates the time may have been 1630 ( 4:30 PM ).
It shows the huge smoke column sitting over the middle bowl just to the west of
Yarnell proper.
The foreground conversation is about the huge smoke column in the distance but
there appear to be one or two background radio transmissions on the TAC
channel(s) captured in this video as well.
Jake Guadiana is an Airzona State Forestry employee who is/was the crew
boss of the Lewis DOC crew in Yarnell that weekend.
ECITW ( Every Caveat In The World )
This is what I ( me, personally ) believe is being said in the background of this
video. Your mileage may, of course, vary.
VIDEO STARTS
+0:00
(Unknown): ?? (to come?)
+0:12.93
(Unknown): One Task Force… what’s goin’ on with you… did anyone get out?
I’ve gotten ahold of some weather from around the fire. Next week I’ll try to do some modeling and show some runs on what the FB was in those areas. If anyone has found wx ops from the 30th tell me where I can find them so I can add them.
I posted this a little while ago under xxfullsailxx’s April 10, 8:21pm calculations comment, but it’s quite a ways down below, and I wanted to bring it up here, as it pertains to the current discussion:
xxfullsailxx,
Most of us agree that the original black, and the down and out along the two-track, were safe options up until the point of decent into the bowl.
The designation of BSR as a safety zone, may, or may not, have influenced GM’s decision at the top of the bowl.
More importantly, I think the result of the discusion of whether or not BSR should have been designated a valid safety zone, will be an important take-away for future learning on it’s own merit. I don’t think in any way, shape, or form, we are heading down a rabbit hole here.
While the IPRG formula you quote is correct, the 200′ figure stated in the Guide is the distance from ALL fuels (the radius, not the diameter). So at the widest, cleared point (250′) at BSR, someone would only be 125′ away from chaparral. 125′ is not even close to the 200′ in the formula. But, there’s more below.
From the guide:
“Separation distance between the firefighter and the flames should be at least four times the maximum continuous flame height. Distance separation is the radius from the center of the safety zone to the nearest fuels.”
Additionally, the formula listed in the guide emphatically states that it is for ZERO wind conditions.
“Downwind>More Heat Impact>Larger Safety Zone”, so the 200 figure never applied here from the get-go, because the wind never stopped blowing at some varying speed or direction.
Also, as we all know, structures ARE fuel, which decreases even futher the size of the available safe space. I think there is evidence out there that these structures came very close to burning, which would indicate to me that you don’t want a safety zone with a large amount of (bomb-proof??) fuel in the middle of it being used as space that is considered in your calculations.
Also from the Guide:
“A Safety Zone is an area where a firefighter can survive without a fire shelter.” Reports from the residents regarding the amount of heat outside, indicates that someone may have only survived out there WITH a fire shelter.
Although many firefighters passed through the BSR in the 24 hour period prior to entrapment, it seems nobody actually did the legwork to get the actual size of cleared ground (as noted by the wildly varying accounts, 6-8 acres, 20-30 acres, none of which were close to being correct), but instead they just eye-balled the contruction of the buildings and adjoining scraped-earth, and designated it ‘bomb-proof’ without further investigation.
So, leaving GM out of the equation for the moment, and looking just at the adequacy of BSR as a safety zone, I feel that the designation fails on many counts, as noted above.
Thanks for reposting that. I’d completely missed it in all the back and forth. Apologies for having made a redundant post. FWIW, I like yours better! 🙂
Again had someone truly scouted the Compound the would have noted fences and structures that were possibly flammable. Having a lot of background in wild land fire teams I am still very concerned about no engine protection at the ranch. You don’t just leave a place with people there with out protection, there had to have been a reason. May not know until a law suit goes to trial.
Arizona is one of the states where the law states that no one can be forced from their home, even in a mandatory evacuation. Once they have been notified though, and refuse to leave, they are on their own, PERIOD!
Many structures have been saved in recent years with only a pumpkin, a pump, and a structure protection sprinkler set-up, and nothing more. When the fire is bearing down and you don’t have a safe spot to make a stand, you start the pump and get the hell out, and let the fire do what it’s going to do, let the sprinklers do what they’re going to do, and when the front passes. try to go back in and do some good work and save something.
I still believe that the original intent for the pumpkin was to have the ability to make a stand with sprinklers without having to commit crews in a place where the escape avenue had a likely-hood of being cut-off.
When all the structures in the north were either threatened, or already burning, there’s a VERY high probablity that ALL that type of structure protection equipment was on the ground and in use. When the fire roared south, all bets were off, and there was no equipment or time available to carry-out a plan on the BSR.
Yes I agree with that. They spent a lot of time with that pumpkin but did they set up a sprinkler system? I think maybe I should move on I am fixated on why no engine after all the prep. SAFETY?????
-the BSR is SUBSTANTIALLY larger than a football field without even including the eastern barn area… there was more than enough cleared area inside the compound and around the structures of BSR to provide an adequate safety zone.
-the estimated flame lengths were AT THE MAX 50′ on that flat-ish ground around BSR. this takes into account the wind speed. sustained flame lengths were more likely in the realm of 20-30 feet.
-no matter which way the fire approached from, it was never going to be burning on all sides at the same time. the head of the fire approached from the north so after that initial pulse hit the ranch, it was [rapidly moving] flanking fire down the west side.
-please provide a reference for the amount of damage the structures sustained. otherwise, that is unsubstantiated speculation based on what DIDN’T happen. looks to me like all the structures held up pretty well. my speculation would be that most of the damage sustained was around the barn structure, the others all have more than enough clearance.
-again, i would refute most “civilian accounts”… just see any number of cheesy fire movies to understand how wildland fire is viewed by the general public… also, how exactly were they measuring “the heat outside” from inside the buildings? through the reflective windows you say? interesting…
-there is no reason to think that you couldn’t have (and wouldn’t have) been able to use a fuzee and/or drip torch to ignite fuels around the perimeter to expand the size. the most logical place for this would have been on the south side of the eastern barn structure which would have virtually “squared off” the SZ and quickly provided additional separation distance.
obviously there’s plenty of people who disagree, but in my view, BSR was an adequate safety zone for a crew +.
and again, safety zones are not always a green pasture with lawn chairs and coolers.
The Boulder Springs Ranch buildings survived because of the owners serious consideration when creating ‘defensible space’ on their grounds, along with the ‘fire-resistant construction’ of their buildings, and equally important, pure luck.
Almost all stucco constructed homes have roof over-hangs constructed with wood and soffit vents on the underside. Also, there are pictures taken of the ranch, both, before and after the fire, with several gable-end vents visible. Wildfires are quite capable of using these vents to bring heat and embers into an attic space, more so, when things are wind-driven. The photos also seem to show the certain sides of the home were closer to the vegetation than others. On the south side, there appear to be sliding doors with the vegetation being a bit closer on that side. Sliding doors are required these days to have tempered-glass, which is known to shatter between 550-720 F.
As I said, the owners did a GREAT JOB in preparing for the conflagration, but there were still ways for fire to get in the home, so a bit of luck was involved as well. It was a great ‘defensible space’, but not ‘bombproof’, and NOT a safety zone.
Regarding Safety Zones, the Incident Pocket Response Guide speaks for itself.
The open space requirements in the Guide are never even close to being met at the BSR. You’re not supposed to need to shelter in anything else (house, fire-shelter, or otherwise), and you’re not supposed to have to run all over the place in the space available to find a cool (read: survivable) spot.
An adequately sized safety zone will let you park your butt in the middle, knowing you’ll probably take some heat, but not have to do ANYTHING ELSE to survive. While burning-out is certainly an option, it should NEVER be required in a properly sized Zone.
The Incident Pocket Response Guide speaks for itself. The BSR never qualified as a Safety Zone.
I again find myself saying, thank you for an excellent post.
Because someone else was misstating that flame height takes into account wind speed, let me make the again very basic point that, in terms of SZ requirements, no, not even close. The basic SZ calculations take no account of convective heat, for starters. Downwind SZs require larger separation distances. Anyone who’s been downwind of a simple campfire can easily feel on a micro scale what the wind can do in this regard.
I do note that I don’t believe the arrogant ignorance as to actual SZ requirements that this comment thread has seen is a widespread issue in the real world. Cutting corners, though, is a real issue, but because people are rushed, tired, etc. and so did give sufficient priority to an issue they don’t think is critical that day, as opposed to being as ignorant of standards as one poster has been here. Because the same poster who continues to try to misrepresent SZ requirements also seems to have no familiarity with local vegetation or other aspects of local conditions, nor with many other relevant issues, his motivations for continuing to post misinformation must be interesting indeed.
Again you have both given excellent information. If your not wild Land Fire Fighters then I commend you for your Knowledge. You talk like seasoned veterans.
For those who are still fighting fires let me impart some old advice on Safety Zones. Brush fires Southern California rule of thumb not in any book. Safety Zone should never be more than 10 min. away from furthest crew member. over 15 Min. cuts your ability to reach it by 50%, over 20 min. start praying you don’t lose men. Beyond that ????
In this new age of extreme fires maybe you should start using my old rule of thumb gained from some old brush fire fighters. The Ranch was a SZ to far for GM no matter what its size.
i’ll bet dollars to doughnuts, that had you been with your respective module, be it an engine or crew, and your supervisor was briefed that day by Gary Cordes, and then came back to tell you that BSR was a potential SZ, that:
-you wouldn’t have gotten out your IRPG and tape measure.
-you wouldn’t have pulled out your pocket computer and run some BEHAVE models.
-you would have looked around and nodded your head, and gone on with your assignment.
because a safety zone is certainly what BSR looked like… and potentially was.
(and again, i would LOVE to see an inventory of BSR building damage… soon as you find it, you get back to me, otherwise, all you have is speculation.)
Yes, standards and guidelines aren’t really important. What’s more important are subjective feelings of comfort, particularly when that complacency is transmitted socially or, if widespread, socially. And then having individual behavior conform to that culture of complacency with a “nod of the head.”
Whatever FullSail’s actual motivations and actual background, he does articulate well what a dangerous culture of complacency looks and sounds like. What he does not do imo, however, is post in a way informed as to what the applicable standards are, or even at a more basic level post in a way informed by even the local conditions that were present.
Should have said, “or if widespread, culturally.” Empirically derived standards (which do exist for SZs), exist for real reasons, and a culture of complacency that treats them as irrelevant is a real threat to safety. And tends to lead to further bad decisions.
yep, i’d have been comfortable with BSR designated as a safety zone…
even more to your horror, i would have more likely been the module leader briefing you.
SZ’s often get designated that may require some degree of extra “effort” on the part of the people using it… i.e.:
-firing the perimeter or section of perimeter of the designated SZ.
-green grass that still supports some fire spread which may require an engine to deal with.
-short grass that requires firing… etc.
-the “cold black” that still has snag potential…
-the ‘ole “back to the rig and drive out” ER & SZ. (that probably 90% of resources working in the subdivisions were using.)
that’s great that you work in an area that always has acres of green pasture to kick back and relax in, but it’s not always reality in the west.
Because one poster is persisting in putting up blatantly uninformed posts on SZs as they relate to the BSR, let me make what is a real basic point: when you are looking at a clearing where, given fuels, weather and fire behavior, the fire may burn around the SZ, the required separation distance is the radius of the SZ. This is a basic point for anyone with experience on fires. As indicated, I think in the case of GM, this is not that meaningful to the events that did in fact occur. However, because it is never helpful to have uninformed individuals posting incorrect information persistently, and particularly when someone else might remember that wrong info and utilize it, it is worth noting.
TWARE is in short correct that the BST was not a bomb proof SZ, even if the answer to that point is, yeah, but as it relates to GM, does it matter.
When I say required separation distance is the radius of the SZ, another way to look at this is, in rough terms, you double what you’d need based on the 4x rule of thumb. That is even without thunderboomer winds.
Oh, and I’m assuming a safe area the size of a dot. For a full crew, obviously, the math gets even worse. I.e., TWARE even more correct the more you look at this.
Thank you, SR. Good post, both for its accuracy, and because it highlights the issues of cultural complacency in determining safety zones (they’re no good if you can’t get to them, and can’t fit your resources in a dot, and it’s important to base action on *expected* fire behavior, so just following the formula isn’t enough). It looks like WFSTAR has a safety zone module in the works, which would be timely.
**
** ADOSH INTERVIEWS WITH PERSONNEL FROM…
** YARNELL FIRE DEPARTMENT
** PEEPLES VALLEY FIRE DEPARTMENT
>> Reply to Deborah Pfingston post on April 10, 2014 at 9:15 am
>>
>> Deborah asked…
>>
>> Would anyone be able to guide me to any interviews with Yarnell
>> Fire volunteer firefighters that were in Yarnell – or – any structure
>> firefighters that were in Yarnell on June 30th? Thank you.
Deborah…
This ADOSH document… “L3419 Notes redacted.pdf” …contains TYPED notes
from ADOSH’s interviews with personnel from these departments…
* Yarnell Hill Fire Department
* Peeples Valley Fire Department
ADOSH also attempted to also interview people from the Congress Fire
Department but then decided those interviews were NOT relevant to their
investigation. ( See their notes below ).
This ADOSH document is at the following PUBLIC link…
These are not actual ‘transcripts’ of the entire conversation(s) but, rather,
the complete sets of notes they did for themselves FOLLOWING all
of the interviews.
NOTE about ‘redactions’ in this document…
They are NOT really redactions. All the information they tried to ‘redact’ is still
right there in the Adobe PDF file. Any place you see a ‘redaction’ and you want
to still read what is there… just ‘cut and paste’ the blacked out portion into any
text editor and all the ‘redacted’ information is still there fully captured during the
‘cut and paste’ operation. It’s a classic mistake that some people make when
they try to do redactions in an Adobe PDF file. They forget that just ‘blacking
out’ the text with that simple Adobe ‘blacking’ tool doesn’t actually REMOVE it.
NOTE: The only things ADOSH attempted to redact in this document ( but
failed to do so in a successful manner ) are simply phone numbers and web
site addresses. There are no ‘blocks of notes’ being redacted at all.
Their interview notes start on page 2 of the document…
** Yarnell Hill Fire Department
Yarnell Fire Department Personnel:
Captain Brad Haggard
Captain Sam Portillo
Daniel Harrison
Kristee Lewis
Ryan Gardner
Paul Murray
Aileen Casillas
Dani Koile
Anthony McComack
Brad Ruggles
7/18/2013 – An opening conference was conducted with the Yarnell Fire
District/Yarnell Fire Department on July 18, 2013 at 1005 by Marshall Krotenberg
and Bruce Hanna with Fire Chief Jim Koile. Chief Koile completed an information
sheet and provided a photo that he took of the lightning caused fire at the time of
the lightning strike.
Chief Koile stated that his station served as the Incident Command Post for the
Yarnell Hill Fire on June 29 and early on June 30 (until 1020) until the ICP was
relocated to Model Creek School in Peeples Valley, AZ which is about four miles
to the north. Chief Koile mentioned that his crew was sent to various locations
during the fire and that we should contact Captain Brad Haggard for further
information, exact assignments and employee interviews.
7/24/2013 – Spoke with Yarnell Fire Department Captain Brad Haggard at 1320
about fire personnel and responsibilities assigned to Department by the IC for the
Yarnell Hill Fire. Captain Haggard stated that IC requested that Yarnell set up a
temporary or portable water tank at the Ranch Road Restaurant adjacent to Hwy
89 and shuttle water using their water tender to a “pumpkin” set up at the Ranch
Restaurant and at the Helm Ranch House.
Water shuttling took place on Saturday evening June 29, 2013 starting at 2200 for
several hours and continued the next day by Captain Sam Portillo and Kristee
Lewis. At some point of Sunday June 30, 2013 (1300 to 1400) the Yarnell Fire
Department evacuated their station and headed to the ICP located at the Model
Creek School located in Peeples Valley, AZ.
Captain Haggard stated that six Yarnell Fire Personnel were asked to prepare
for the possible emergency rescue of 19 downed fire fighters and were sent
back to Yarnell, however only three fire fighters had wildland gear. Conditions
were too dangerous to enter the area so the team went back to Peeples Valley.
Sometime on Monday the Yarnell Fire Department returned to their station
except they had no electrical power. The Fire Department continued to
respond to EMS calls throughout Yarnell.
7/25/2013 at 0930 – I spoke with Captain Sam Portillo about his role in the
Yarnell Hill Fire. Captain Portillo stated that he and Kristee Lewis continued
to shuttle water to one portable water tank (may have been one additional
portable water tank at the Boulder Springs Ranch/Helm Ranch House) with
the water tender starting at 0600 on June 30, 2013 until evacuated later
that day to Peeples Valley.
On July 1, 2013 Captain Portillo stated that he provided support to hand
crews including structural protection and hot spotting in the Town of Yarnell.
He stated that there were several hot shot crews on site but only recalls
the Florence Hot Shot Crew.
Kristee Lewis stated that she had worked with both the Blue Ridge and Granite
Mountain IHC at a fire in New Mexico (Thompson Ridge) prior to the Doce Fire
and the Yarnell Hill Fire.
** Peeples Valley Fire Department
Page 4…
Peeples Valley Fire Department
17425 Burning Bush Drive
Peeples Valley, AZ
928-427-xxxx ( Redacted )
Captain Patrick McCray
Acting Fire Chief Shane Chaves for the Yarnell Hill Fire
Ken Shoup – Volunteer fire fighter who has a home in Peeples Valley,
AZ, works for the City of Scottsdale.
On July 18, 2013 at approximately 11:00 Marshall Krotenberg and Bruce Hanna
arrived at the Peeples Valley Fire Department to conduct an opening conference
with the Fire Captain Patrick McCray. Both doors to the facility were locked.
I contacted the Peeples Valley Fire Department on Thursday July 25, 2013 and
left a message for Fire Captain Patrick McCray.
I spoke with Shane Chaves today July 29, 2013. Mr. Chaves works for the
Yavapai Sheriff’s Department and was the Acting Fire Chief with the Peeples
Valley Fire Department during the Yarnell Hill Fire but as of July 25, 2013 he
resigned his position and is no longer affiliated with Peeples Valley Fire
Department. Subsequently Mr. Chaves may have returned to Peeples Valley
Fire Department as an EMT or Paramedic.
Mr. Chaves stated that he had four firefighters and two engines assigned to
the Yarnell Hill Fire (Structure Group 1) who were working off of Shrine Road
west of Yarnell on the south end of a dozer line while Granite Mountain IHC
was working on the north end of the dozer line with the Blue Ridge Hotshots.
I will have to verify with Peeples Valley Fire Fighters if any contact was made
with Granite Mountain IHC. Interviews had Granite Mountain assigned to the
east side of the ridge and dozer line and Blue Ridge Hotshots working the
east end of the dozer line in the flat off the ridge. The plan was to join the two
together.
7/29/2013 opening conference with Captain McCray
Information sheet partially completed by Bruce Hanna
Employee interviews – spoke with Captain McCray and Fire Captain Jake Moder
Four man crew and two engines were at the Yarnell Hill Fire assigned to
Structural 1 protection and fire line construction and were working off of
Shrine road waiting for a Dozer to arrive.
Fire Captain Jake Moder 928-910-xxxx ( Redacted )
Fire Captain Ron Smith 928-231-xxxx ( Redacted )
Bob Brandon 928-671-xxxx ( Redacted )
Matt Keehner 928-308-xxxx ( Redacted )
July 29, 2013 – spoke with Jake Moder. Captain Moder stated that Peeples
Valley was assigned by BLM to the Yarnell Hill Fire on June 30, 2013 at 0400
and was to report to Model Creek School at 0730. A briefing was held at 0800,
crew was assigned to Structure 1 protection in Yarnell. IC Task Force
Leader was Trainee Tyson Esquibel from Peoria Fire Department. Crew was
stationed on Shrine Road waiting for a Dozer. Dozer eventually dug a fireline
that ended at a wash. Lots of chainsaw work being done by the crew to tie
into ridge north of Yarnell. Made contact with a spotter from Central Yavapai
Fire District. Also had contact with Blue Ridge IHC and Sun City West.
Never made contact with Granite Mountain IHC but were maybe 3/4 of a mile
from the ridge and box canyon where the fire fighters were trapped. Matt Keehner
was assigned to scout area and serve as a temporary lookout and was assisted
by CYFD fire fighter. Wind shifted at 1545 and everyone immediately
evacuated the area.
Mr. Moder stated that he and the three other fire fighters were interviewed
together on July 10, 2013 for about 45 minutes by the investigation team
assembled by the Arizona State Forestry Division.
** Congress Fire Department
Page 8…
Congress Fire District
Congress Fire Department
26733 Santa Fe Road
Congress, AZ 85332
928-427-xxxx ( Redacted )
Opening conference
Information sheet
No contact made with Congress Fire District as of July 30, 2013.
The Congress Fire District may not be necessary for our investigation.
NOTE: No followup here and apparently ADOSH never conducted
any interviews with anyone in the Conress Fire Department.
Thank you for doing this digging for me. I have theory – of which I have had many but discover they won’t work – I really think there was a back burn set possibly by the trailers. Thoughts!
Reply to Deborah Pfingston post
on April 12, 2014 at 8:11 am
>> Deborah said…
>> I have theory – of which I have had many but discover
>> they won’t work – I really think there was a back burn
>> set possibly by the trailers. Thoughts!
Deborah…
See a longer post/answer/thoughts about this just above
with the date and title of…
WantsToKnowTheTruth on April 12, 2014 at 9:45 pm said:
** OTHER BACK BURNS NEAR YARNELL
** ON JUNE 30, 2013?
These possible ‘other back burns’ HAVE been considered
and talked about here in this ongoing discussion, but
there is nothing in the ‘public evidence record’ to
support it ( at this time, anyway ).
However… see ‘details’ in the post above about the
now known ’emergency burn out’ plan that was
apparently some sort of last-minute desperation
move on SPGS1 Gary Cordes’ part.
Debra- I am new to your name here so I am scrolling the comment wall while Sonny is visiting and your theory here—please do me a favor and talk to the homeowners near the trailers. You will be surprised to see the photos and videos. I think people who are seeking clarity should spend the time there and spend time with the community. I hope you get the answers you need for that theory. I hope the more interest shown may draw some to share public—
The pre-determined ‘bomb-proof’ safety zone. Hmmmm.
There has been a tremendous amount of discussion about this, so I decided to take a little better look at the BSR.
There are notes from Cordes I believe, describing it as 20-30 acres. Someplace else, someone states the actual size as being 6-8 acres. It seems those might be ‘land ownership size’ descriptions, and NOT the size of the ‘bomb-proof safety zone’.
As I look at the actual cleared area where the house is, including the open area to the north, the size is roughly 91,000 sq ft, or roughly 2 acres. There are several fingers of cleared land that push off from that chunk, but none of those are large enough to claim or use as a safety zone, including the narrow eastern finger with the barn on it, which is roughly 31,000sq ft, for roughly 3/4 acre.
There are media descriptions of the ranch owners having to shelter inside the house to survive the extreme heat (I’m hoping that Tex or Joy or someone else that knows them, can vouch for my memory on that, or else maybe remember the media source). If this is indeed correct, then this ranch was NEVER an appropriate safety zone, because, as has been described by others, as well, you DON”T need to take additional shelter (fire shelter, house, etc.), just to survive in an adedquate safety zone.
Very valid point. To me, it’s more of an OSHA point than anything, though, and obviously a training point going forwards. Not as jarring standards-wise as the tennis court. For me, I don’t see that it’s more than tangential to GM, as their motivation doesn’t seem to have been to get to the BSR to use it as a SZ (they had a better one where they were), and, had they made it to the BSR, even if they’d had to deploy, there likely would have been a very different outcome. Emotionally, I’m primed to think the issue of how adequate the BSR was as an SZ is more important, simply because one poster was trying to wave its (questionable) bomber nature around a bit much.
I guess ultimately, was GM affected by the characterization of the BSR? …is the test to me. Failure to completely take fire behavior into account in describing BSR as bombproof, if it didn’t directly affect GM, gets to be more of a side issue.
Looking close at the pictures it looks as if there was a 6 FT fence and gate around the entire property.
Also again I do not under stand why a Engine was not stationed at the Ranch which would be common practice.
unless the overhead felt it was unsafe to hang an engine out there.
What was the Pumpkin for? Extra water for house protection?
There is something very strange here and probably any explanation has been lost.
Questions for the Law Suit?
See my post down below regarding the pumpkin. I surmised that the intent was to support a portable sprinkler system. In the end, those supplies apparently all got committed at the north end when things went to crap up there.
bob- please provide a link to those pictures you’re referencing…
because every picture i’ve seen (including google earth) there seems to be a fence running down the length of the west side of the property, but the rest of it looks pretty open to me.
if i had to guess, i would say the fence is for nothing more that tumbleweed control, given it’s location and the fact that it DOESN’T go all the way around the property.
but i’d love to see the pictures you’re looking at.
i think you’ve recognized that BSR was indeed the target (not Yarnell, like you tried to state previously) not so much for a SZ, but more as a point at which to be able to consider reengaging the fire…
Again, you are wrong. With almost every post. Truly amazing. For other readers, the important thing to realize is that underneath the nasty attack posts, FullSail also seems consistently uninformed.
To “The Truth” – the Helm’s were inside because the fire came up soooooo quickly. They even still had their animals out. They just made it in their home after rushing around putting them in. All of the fence line is metal and the structures are stucco. There was no exposed wood anywhere. They built wisely. But I agree is was NOT true safety zone. But we all know if GMIHS would have made it to the ranch they would have survived.
Reply to Deborah Pfingston post
on April 12, 2014 at 8:31 am
>> the Helm’s were inside because
>> the fire came up soooooo quickly.
>> They even still had their animals
>> out. They just made it in their
>> home after rushing around putting
>> them in.
Yes. They also had only ‘arrived’
home not too long before they
had to quickly do all that.
They also testified ( to ADOSH )
specifically that they NEVER saw
any firefighters ( or FF vehicles )
on their property that day. Not ever.
ADOSH interviewed Lee and DJ
Helm in person ( since the Arizona
Forestry SAIT was NOT cooperating
with ADOSH and would not share
their own interview with them), at the
ranch itself, and while there is no
‘transcript’ of that ADOSH interview,
here are copies of the ‘notes’ they
took during that interview…
In ADOSH document
“N9589 Notes redacted.pdf”
Page 32 ( of 35 pages )
______________________________
ADOSH Interview ( face to face )
with Lee and DJ Helm.
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF ARIZONA
Occupational Safety and
Health Division
FIELD NOTES
Date: 7/16/13
Company Name: Yarnell Hill Fire
Met with Mr. Lee Helm + Mrs. DJ Helm
– Spent morning in Peeples Valley
watching the fire advance North.
– Left Peeples Valley around noon,
ran some errands in Yarnell,
and returned home around 2 pm.
– Looking out North window and saw
advancing fire from north, ran outside
and put animals in Barn.
– From inside home the sky was filled
with black smoke blacking out the
sun. Embers and smoke filled the air.
– Never saw any firefighters on their property on Sunday, June 30.
Lee + DJ Helm: ( Address and
phone number redacted )
Gate Code: ( Redacted )
______________________________
>> Deborah also wrote…
>> All of the fence line is metal
Do you have any idea what the
‘fencing’ actually looked like?
It is know KNOWN to have been
there on the western side of the
ranch, from which Granite Mountain
was approaching, but there is still
no direct evidence what that fencing
really looked like, or how substantial
it might have been.
>> Deborah also wrote…
>> and the structures are stucco.
Yes… and porch posts were metal
embedded in concrete pylons.
>> There was no exposed wood
>> anywhere.
The Helm’s had a lot of old (wooden)
wagons and carts and other antique
things ‘adorning’ the edges of their
property… and there is evidence that
one of the wood ‘wagons’ or ‘carts’
near the northwest corner of the
ranch did, in fact, burn that day…
but this is no valid indication that
the area was not ‘survivable’ except
for inside one of the structures.
There is no public copy of the actual
4.4 million dollars worth of ‘claims for
damages’ to this ‘safety zone’ that
Lee and DJ Helm have already filed,
but 1 burned up antique cart can’t
possibly be worth 4.4 million.
>> Deborah also said…
>> They built wisely.
Yes, they did.
>> But I agree is was NOT true
>> ‘safety zone’.
Whether or not it should have ever
been a ‘predetermined safety zone’
according to WFF standards for both
‘safety zones’ AND ‘escape routes
to them’ is the exact issue raised by
the common claim 14 in the ‘damage’
claims already filed. It will be up to
true ‘experts’ to argue that one way
or the other.
>> But we all know if GMIHS would
>> have made it to the ranch they
>> would have survived.
Since we know ( after the fact )
that there was no loss of life at
that site ( human or animal ) then
yes… it must be assumed GM would
have survived as well, had they
been able to actually ‘make’ it there.
I am listening to so many voices right now as Sonny is visiting old friends
and I thought Debra—thinking of Yarnell Debras and then it clicked you are the relative to one of the men- sorry for my last comment of your name being new to me—I travelled so far the past few days and hiked too much; sun drained. I am deeply sorry for your loss. Deeply. I do think if you went to that community so many would be touched and clarity seeked could surface— people are looking at me with tears naturally flooding my eyes right now—I’m so choked a lady handed me water. Our current jeep and truck is dedicated to the 19 and I will let you know time can go by—but it is like yesterday this all happened. I will have Sonny send you some links sometime. I am not logged on there.
Reply to TTWARE post on April 10, 2014 at 12:50 pm
>> TTWARE said…
>> There are media descriptions of the ranch owners having
>> to shelter inside the house to survive the extreme heat (I’m
>> hoping that Tex or Joy or someone else that knows them,
>> can vouch for my memory on that, or else maybe remember
>> the media source). If this is indeed correct, then this ranch
>> was NEVER an appropriate safety zone, because, as has
>> been described by others, as well, you DON”T need to take
>> additional shelter (fire shelter, house, etc.), just to survive in
>> an adequate safety zone.
I remember the media article(s) you are referring to and I also
seem to recall Lee and/or DJ Helm describing some ‘melting’
that took place on either some siding on the house or one
of the out-buildings… but I didn’t bookmark any of those
links. I will see if I can find those links again.
In the meantime… here is an article that seems to indicate
there was PLENTY of actual (serious) ‘damage’ to the Boulder
Springs Ranch as a result of the fire…
Hugh (Lee) and DJ Helm were part of that very first group of
homeowners file a suit for damages back in December.
The TOTAL amount of DAMAGES to their ‘Boulder Springs Ranch’
they are claiming?…
$3,300,000 ( THREE MILLION THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND )
( 3 separate claims for 1.1 million ‘equal’ amounts from 3
different responsible entities ).
From the article…
______________________________________________________
The Prescott Daily Courier – 12/20/2013 6:00:00 AM
13 new Yarnell Hill Fire claims filed
Late Thursday afternoon, the City of Prescott received 13 new
claims from Yarnell property owners, totaling more than
$40 million in alleged damages. That brings the total number of
property-owner claims from Yarnell property owners to 34 to date.
Along with the city, the claims name the State of Arizona, Yavapai
County, and the Yarnell Fire District. Like the previous 21 claims
from Yarnell property owners, the new claims demand equal
amounts from each entity.
Below is a list of Yarnell property owners who have filed claims of
negligence over losses in the June 30 Yarnell Hill wildfire, along the
amounts of their claims.
…
…
Hugh L. Helm & Diane J. Helm: State of Arizona – $1,100,000 , City of Prescott -$1,100,000, Yavapai County – $1,100,000, Yarnell Fire District – $1,100,000
______________________________________________________
So how’s that for a ‘bomb-proof’ safety zone?
The ‘owners’ of the ‘safety zone’ think they suffered 3.3
MILLION dollars worth of damage as a result of the fire.
I haven’t seen a public copy of the suit itself but I imagine it
probably details the damages such as ‘melted siding’ and
whatnot… if that really was the case.
SOMETHING adds up to $3.3 million in damages to that
‘safety zone’… and it sure wasn’t just the burned up
kitchen garden.
As far as damage, on their property overall they lost a lot of nice green scrub, and have next to their property more burnt area. In other words, while a lawyer would have to actually read their complaint, I think it likely that the $1.1 they’re looking for from 3 different entities involves a lot of property value loss and not much direct damage in terms of windows, siding etc. Again, I agree that there is a valid point that SZ standards overall might not always be rigorously applied. For OSHA and training, very big issue. But, just because one poster here tried out of ignorance to make overly much of how bomber the BSR really was, in reality it wasn’t torched and relative to GM itself I don’t see it’s bomber-ness being that central.
Copy that. Only reading the actual ‘claims for
damages’ from the owners of the ‘safety zone’
would show any kind of detailed list of what
happened overall ( that adds up to 4.4 million )
or if there is any indication the temperatures
*outside* the structures might have risen to a
non-survivable level, even if only for a few moments.
Sidenote…
On page 20 of the WFAR is one of the only known
photographs taken pre-fire from the ‘safety zone’
itself and looking out WEST into the fuel-filled
box canyon.
It’s ‘Figure 8’ on page 20 and the left side of the
photo shows how thick the manzanita really was
coming right up to the southern and western
perimeter of the ‘safety zone’ itself. It pretty
much matches the photo of the same ‘approach
to the ranch’ area that Joy Collura took that
morning looking back east towards the same area.
Even if they had gone the ‘alternate escape route’
it looks like it would have still been a confusing
‘bushwhack’ just to go that last few hundred yards
and get into the ‘safety zone’ itself. Not ideal.
Regardless… this is really all moot.
We KNOW that Lee and DJ Helm were THERE
at the Ranch as it burned over… and that they
SURVIVED. So did ALL of their livestock…
…but they were all INSIDE the various structures.
If Granite Mountain had actually made it into that
compound then SURELY then would have also
taken refuge INSIDE the buildings. Even if the
doors were locked by then… I wouldn’t put many
doors up against 19 strong guys with 4 chainsaws
to boot.
It’s all really about ‘context’.
No ‘safety zone’ is a ‘safety zone’ unless you
can REACH it ‘safely’.
It’s not like they had choppers standing by all day to
LIFT them over there to it in a hurry, or anything.
( Actually, maybe they SHOULD have. See below ).
They had to first GET there ( safely )… or it’s
appropriateness as a ‘predetermined safety
zone’ ( or not ) doesn’t mean jack.
It was 1.6 miles away from where they were
working that day ( 2+ miles if they had tried
to get there by NOT taking the ‘shortcut’
through the fuel-filled box canyon ).
It really should have never even been mentioned
as any kind of viable ‘safety zone’ for GM that
day, given where they were sending them to
work, just as it was never even mentioned the day
before to the Lewis DOC crew sent to the same
working spot. It was ( at best ) a 35 to 50 minute
(hard) hike from their workplace and that’s even
giving them a full non-stop 3 mph fast pace for the
ENTIIRE distance. Anything slower than 3 mph
and you get into the FULL HOUR travel time.
Who in the world thought that showing someone
a ‘safety zone’ that could be up to/more than
3/4 HOUR (hard/fast) hike away from where they
wanted them to be working was EVER a good
idea that day?
Heck… if they really wanted them in town that
badly and they thought they had the 3/4 HOUR
to wait for them to even get to the Ranch ( then
add time for the additional hike into town itself )…
then they could have organized a ‘dust off’ with
the (available) 7-person transport chopper from
the helispot in that amount of time and flown
them right into the center of town to the YFD
helipad ( just as they did with the entire Lewis
DOC crew from that same location just hours
before that very morning ).
If GM hadn’t been ‘informed’ about it at all…
( the 1.6 to 2 mile distant ‘safety zone’ ) and
ONLY had the ‘safe black’ to consider that
afternoon after they lost the chance to come
back down the way they went up…
…then they might all still be here today.
Just one more ‘lesson to be learned’ right there?
Always consider ( realistically ) even just the
DISTANCE of ‘predetermined safety zones’ from
actual work zones?
I certainly hope so.
If it was felt to be too far, then GM should have chosen another safety zone. GM, not Cordes or anyone else, was responsible for their own safety zones and escape routes. So there is no point in pointing a finger at whoever informed them about the BSR. Granite Mountain were big boys, if someone suggested something that did not make sense to them, they could have done something else. They knew how far the BSR was, or if they did not, it was their own fault. And they had another safety zone – the black. The problem was not the zone, the problem was reaching it at 4 PM that day. But things like that happen all the time, you may have to change your safety zones as conditions change. This is not news.
Your SZ always moves with you and the black is always close. Flag escape routes into the black and cut holes when ever necessary. Part of Fire training Mike. You always have good info to inject into this discussion. Thanks
Reply to mike post
on April 10, 2014 at 8:56 pm said:
I’m not going to disagree with your
followup post at all. Yes… AT ALL
TIMES that day… it was THEIR
decision about whether to move, or
not… and whether it was ‘safe’.
The questions I was asking like
“Who would think that was a
good idea?” were rhetorical because
the whole situation just doesn’t
even to make any sense.
So here’s the honest question…
How USUAL is it, really, for people
to be showing crews a ‘predetermined
safety zone’… and then sending
them almost 2 MILES away from
it for their work assignment?
I mean… does that happen a LOT…
or was this just one more screwy
thing that happened in Yarnell the
weekend of June 30, 2013?
2 MILES away from something
someone wanted you to even
CONSIDER to be one of your
‘safety zones’ that workday?
why do you continually leave out the fact that Cordes (who wasn’t responsible for GM) also identified the cold black as the “obvious” option for GM?
the reason it doesn’t make sense to you, is because you have no context from which to make judgments.
the BSR safety zone was “predetermined” in the context of, if and when we get to that point, or if you find yourself in the area… BSR is a survivable safety zone.
each and every crew had the right and responsibility to “trust but verify” and scout out their escape routes to ANY area they were thinking they may need as a SZ… see below…
That’s a good question, WTK. Resources pass each other scouting info all the time (e.g., yesterday’s fire behavior, conditions of back roads, gate locations, ponds, names of homeowners, etc., etc.). It is common practice that until the group leader (crew boss, squad boss, div sup) checks it out themselves, that kind of info is more of a helpful suggestion. Of course, it’s also nice when that kind of info is precise and accurate, but that can be tough to do when one is juggling a thousand pieces of info. That’s why the onus must fall on that field resource leader to check it out personally, and adapt if/when the situation changes.
once again… safety zones can be “identified” anywhere on a moving fire… like bob says, (paraphrasing here) they are fluid… you progress down the line and your previous SZ becomes obsolete and you either pre identify one or scout one that is appropriate for where you’ll be working next.
and next you could reference what mike has said… because he seems to have it figured out.
hmm, more personal attacks eh? your hypocrisy knows no bounds… you don’t have to try to be coy or passive aggressive, you can be direct with your attempts to insult…
you started out making a good point… but then you started talking about things you really don’t have a clue about… have you ever even been to a safety zone during a wildand fire? i didn’t think so.
might it have been smokey? sure, probably… … might it have gotten a little hot at times? sure, maybe… was there enough room to move around and feel “comfortable”? i think so.
are all safety zones just like what they talk about in guard school where you sit in your lawn chair and sit back drinking a cold one while the fire burns all around you? no.
Well said I think the problem was getting there no matter which way they went. They evidently had very little clue about how to get there and what they would face when they did. Thick brush Fences and not much time to dilly dally around.
wait, what? “well said?” you’ve been trying to argue AGAINST BSR being a safety zone this whole time…
i am here to tell you… IT WAS A SAFETY ZONE.
that fence that you speak of DOES NOT encompass the compound… from what i can see, it only runs along the western vegetation boundary.
the problem was NOT “getting there”… getting there was not a problem at all, they could have bushwacked their way there with little difficulty (as they tried to do) any day of the week. (insert SR’s passive aggressive attempts to refute my testimony here)
the problem was their lack of acknowledgment of the predicted weather and associated fire behavior.
Reply to xxfullsailxx post
on April 10, 2014 at 10:11 pm
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>>
>> that fence that you speak of DOES NOT
>> encompass the compound… from what
>> i can see, it only runs along the western
>> vegetation boundary.
Oh.. .you mean the side of the compound
that Granite Mountain WOULD have had
to deal with to get into the compound…
and now you clearly also acknowledge
the ‘vegetation boundary’ as well?…
…or were you talking about the other ‘sides’
of the Ranch… either completely blocked
by huge boulders or iron security gates?
Do you think Gary Cordes also gave
Marsh the code for the security gate…
or did he think the ‘gigantic’ 20-30 acre
size of the ‘safety zone’ negated him
mentioning THAT little detail?
It was a SECURE COMPOUND.
How often are places like that chosen
for ‘safety zones’? Inquiring minds
want to know.
>> the problem was NOT “getting there”… >> getting there was not a problem at all
Then why are they dead?
>> they could have bushwacked their way
>> there with little difficulty (as they tried to
>> do) any day of the week.
This wasn’t any day of any week.
It was the day 2 men led 17 others
to their death.
>> the problem was their lack of
>> acknowledgment of the predicted
>> weather and associated fire behavior.
No.. you forget.
Your “fire brothers” at the the Arizona
Forestry Commission have fully researched
this… spending a few million dollars in
the process.
they didn’t get there because they didn’t anticipate the fire behavior, because they weren’t focused on the anticipated fire behavior, they were focused on getting to their next mission.
and didn’t you just say they could have gotten into the structures if they really wanted to? what makes you think they couldn’t have hopped a fence or a boulder?
again, i would refer you to the intent and philosophy behind the SAIR. if “investigations” continued, as they did on the “Thirty Mile Fire” and the “Cramer Fire” then noone would have spoken a word about anything. they all would have lawyered up and plead the fifth for fear of being sued for trying to do their jobs, dealing with a situation that they didn’t create, but were trying to manage, despite the lack of preparation by the home owners, and despite their lack of cooperation and despite the worst conditions associated with rapid fire spread.
we do know what went wrong. pointing fingers and trying to fire people or suing the agencies involved, won’t change what happened and will prevent us (wff’s not YOU) from learning any lessons.
There lack of knowledge of the location?
I still do not think it was Bomb proof based on the heat it took the crew would have probably survived but again going to fire shelters. Again I ask you why was there not an engine stationed there? If it was so safe.
Google earth seemed so show fences and defiantly a gate was across the entrance with heavy brush along the perimeter. Tumble weeds? the brush would have stopped them in any direction. If getting there was not a problem then why did they not get there? To far, heavy brush, no marked trail, heavy brush and a fence at a location they would have hit the way they were coming and to say the least not scouted by GM, Escape route and SZ.
Why did they put a pumpkin there if it wasn’t to put a engine there for house protection and refill? I do not think they Overhead wanted to hang an Engine out in that brush field Bomb proof Ranch. That maybe part of the reason for the Law suit by the owners, they were left on there own?
Regarding the lawsuit, that certainly could be one component — but, since the damage to ranch structures wasn’t that great, prob not a big component.
I think the overall gist of the lawsuits will be, You guys had a fire that, given weather and fuel type, you knew you didn’t have the resources to deal with. (Insufficient IA will be another argument, too.) Rather than focus on defending what you could of Yarnell proper, you wasted what resources you had up on the hill, nearly got a lot of civilians killed with a very late evacuation, etc.
bob, you just agreed with me, when i said that BSR was a good safety zone based on our WRITTEN PARAMETERS for separation distance ( 4 X’s flame length). there was 250′ X 400′ AT LEAST (not including the barn footprint and not including a burn out ahead of the main fire)… a crew could have easily survived there without deploying shelters.
what heat did the structures take? i’d love to see a breakdown of how the building’s fared.
they didn’t put an engine there because it didn’t need defending… and they certainly had other priorities for the limited number of resources they had.
There was a statement that the windows melted awhile back I am assuming the Plastic type frames? some of the out buildings had some damage as well form the heat.
as would be expected. I agree that the zone was large enough Totally safe I still question that. Remember there has been clear-cuts that were cleaned out that crews still had to deploy shelters in.
xxfullsailxx, it sounds like you are arguing with Bob and SR about which hole in the swiss cheese was the most devastating. The reason that model has become popular (to the point of cliche) is because it addresses the issue of accumulation of compromised safety. Some are more important than others, certainly, but Bob and SR (and other posters) are not wrong for pointing out the other holes.
Given weather and fire behavior, your math is off. Survivable for most or all of the crew if they deployed? Yes. Survivable without deployment? Possibly. But, not quite big enough as a SZ. TWARE correct, even if it is not central to GM as opposed to OSHA and training.
umm, my math is off? but i showed my work!… it’s really very simple math, i realize you probably didn’t get past pre-algebra based on your previous “calculations” that you pulled from god knows where (.5 mph)… but it’s really pretty simple:
weather and fire behavior are factored in to the flame length calculations (as are the fuel type and fuel loading) … reference page 22 of the WFAR report: at 40 mph winds, flame length were modeled at 51 feet.
i think there’s an online version of the IRPG if you need a reference for calculating SZ size, as i realize you probably don’t have one.
nice try though! hey SR, did you want to answer the question about how much wildland fire experience you have?
Most of us agree that the original black, and the down and out along the two-track, were safe options up until the point of decent into the bowl.
The designation of BSR as a safety zone, may, or may not, have influenced GM’s decision at the top of the bowl.
More importantly, I think the result of the discusion of whether or not BSR should have been designated a valid safety zone, will be an important take-away for future learning on it’s own merit. I don’t think in any way, shape, or form, we are heading down a rabbit hole here.
While the IPRG formula you quote is correct, the 200′ figure stated in the Guide is the distance from ALL fuels (the radius, not the diameter). So at the widest, cleared point (250′) at BSR, someone would only be 125′ away from chaparral. 125′ is not even close to the 200′ in the formula. But, there’s more below.
From the guide:
“Separation distance between the firefighter and the flames should be at least four times the maximum continuous flame height. Distance separation is the radius from the center of the safety zone to the nearest fuels.”
Additionally, the formula listed in the guide emphatically states that it is for ZERO wind conditions.
“Downwind>More Heat Impact>Larger Safety Zone”, so the 200 figure never applied here from the get-go, because the wind never stopped blowing at some varying speed or direction.
Also, as we all know, structures ARE fuel, which decreases even futher the size of the available safe space. I think there is evidence out there that these structures came very close to burning, which would indicate to me that you don’t want a safety zone with a large amount of (bomb-proof??) fuel in the middle of it being used as space that is considered in your calculations.
Also from the Guide:
“A Safety Zone is an area where a firefighter can survive without a fire shelter.” Reports from the residents regarding the amount of heat outside, indicates that someone may have only survived out there WITH a fire shelter.
Although many firefighters passed through the BSR in the 24 hour period prior to entrapment, it seems nobody actually did the legwork to get the actual size of cleared ground (as noted by the wildly varying accounts, 6-8 acres, 20-30 acres, none of which were close to being correct), but instead they just eye-balled the contruction of the buildings and adjoining scraped-earth, and designated it ‘bomb-proof’ without further investigation.
So, leaving GM out of the equation for the moment, and looking just at the adequacy of BSR as a safety zone, I feel that the designation fails on many counts, as noted above.
well, the more this gets discussed, the more i have my doubts that GM would have been in any better shape had they stayed on the two track… sure, they may have had more options, but i think they still would have been scrambling to find a deployment site.
so you’re assuming that there was an area ignition event that went on around the full 360 degrees of the compound? or did the fire hit the north side of the ranch and then work it’s way around?
do you agree that, had a resource been assigned to BSR and were viewing it as their safety zone, that they would have fired out the perimeter in a logical fashion?
i think i can assume that you disagree that the buildings would have provided some degree of insulation… but i think they would have offered some additional buffering. it is totally disingenuous to say they were susceptible to burning… again, they look to meet all necessary parameters of being “FireWise”.
i have a hard time trusting civilian viewpoints (like SR’s and the folks at BSR) because they tend to exaggerate, much like tex’s observation that Marsh “bound like a deer” when hiking…
i hear what you’re saying, but i still hold true that the BSR was a viable safety zone for a crew or more.
Again. not credible. Directly counter to the way it works. Key takeaway here is that FullSail’s posts are persistently way off base and should not be relied on.
Yes, I think the fire hit on the north side and ‘worked it’s way around’ both sides like a freight-train. I think the property owners could probably vouch for that. And yes, I have been in a safety zone when all sides were burning with maximum heat radiation at the same time. I’m sure plenty of others have been in that situation as well.
On your second point, I think it’s impossible to fire out against a 30-45 mph wind and make any kind of difference at all.
On your third point, I do indeed believe that the buildings provided a high degree of insulation. The owners themselves stated, that getting deep into the house was the ONLY way they survived. And, it is not disingenuous to say that the buildings might burn. The window glass broke from the heat, and once that happened, the curtains and every other combustible inside is quite capable of bringing that fire inside in a hurry. Then, the last vestige of safety, becomes the thing that’s going to kill you. It sounds like many people are confusing Fire-Wise and ‘prepped’ as being ‘fireproof’. Nothing could be further from the truth! They are simply places that are easier ‘to defend’, and less likely than others to burn. They actually burn quite well if the conditions are right. Even structures that are built like BSR.
To your last point, you don’t have to trust civilian viewpoints, just use ALL THE INFORMATION in the IPRG regarding Safety Zones, instead of selectively using just one formula in a flawed fashion, and I think you will see that BSR as a Safety Zone, does not compute.
On insulation and using structures as radiative shields, similar to other topographical features, I’d note that both types of “insulation” depend on being on the right side, kinda like a breakwater (harbor versus exposed to surf). Yes the BSR obviously insulated people inside. Outside, given the layout of the structures and associated clearing, it would seem prudent given conditions to not be overly confident that the structures would shield versus act like the wrong side of the pizza oven. Given squirrely winds, which given forecast and the weather that did materialize were certainly there, convective heat also could come very much into play in particular around features like structures, though elsewhere as well. Even assuming the structures didn’t catch fire themselves — which as you correctly note, was far from a given.
The Truth Will Always Remain Elusive
on April 11, 2014 at 3:37 pm said:
>>”And yes, I have been in a safety >>zone when all sides were burning >>with maximum heat radiation at the >>same time. I’m sure plenty of others >>have been in that situation as well.”
hmm, then how did you get there? wouldn’t you’re escape route have been compromised? in 13 years, i have never had that experience… so, i question it.
>>On your second point, I think it’s >>impossible to fire out against a 30->>45 mph wind and make any kind of >>difference at all.
then why don’t you try burning WITH the wind instead of “against it?”
>>They actually burn quite well if the >>conditions are right. Even structures >>that are built like BSR.
again, this is speculation. the structures very obviously did not burn. there was no reason to think they would, given the general site preparation.
>>”just use ALL THE INFORMATION >>in the IPRG regarding Safety Zones, >>instead of selectively using just one >>formula in a flawed fashion, and I >>think you will see that BSR as a >>Safety Zone, does not compute.”
the point is separation distance. this was easily achievable. top to bottom there was 400+ feet and structures in between. getting the additional clearance on all sides would have been easily achievable given a burnout in the appropriate places. my example used the most extreme of circumstances and very conservative measurements of the area.
in my opinion, BSR was a survivable safety zone. in fact, they don’t get much better than that in those conditions and fuel type.
i think captain hindsight (WTKTT) came up with 2-3 acres too. i agree, that looks about right.
given the flame lengths and what we know about separation distance from the IRPG, the BSR was indeed a valid safety zone.
even if you had to move from one corner to another, i think it was certainly survivable without having to deploy a shelter or take cover in a structure. plus you always have the option to burn out around the perimeter to increase the buffer…
but that is all moot.
#1. BSR survived. in the aftermath, it looked like it had survived a bomb going off. it was an identified safety zone that had been scouted out.
#2. Cordes also mentioned “the cold black.” this would be GM’s primary safety zone throughout their shift.
#3. i think most of us have agreed, at one point or another, that GM wasn’t necessarily looking for a “safety zone”… they were looking for the nearest point at which to reengage the fire by helping out in Yarnell.
WTF are you talking about? you are SOOOOOO clueless SR. i suggest you stop trying to negate everything i say.
any crew that MIGHT have been there at BSR and was planning on utilizing it as a safety zone
WOULD HAVE FIRED OUT AROUND THE PERIMETER AHEAD OF THE FLAMING FRONT IN ORDER TO INCREASE THE SEPARATION DISTANCE FROM THE MAIN FIRE.
this is WFF’ing 101. well, maybe 201… intermediate level.
You are seriously asserting they would have had time to do that, given conditions? We’re not talking about a little dry grass here. I seriously doubt at this point that you have any exposure to local conditions. Or, there may be something else driving your consistently being so wrong and so uninformed.
when are YOU SPECULATING that GM would have gotten there? because that’s what you’re doing… SPECULATING about how and why GM went down the path they chose. SPECULATING about how much time they might have had. and your SPECULATION comes from hindsight and “what if” scenarios…
the scenario i provided you, was a crew, AT THE BSR anticipating the approaching fire…
i can’t account for your lack of reading comprehension. i am sorry that our public school system has failed you. i pay my taxes!
now stop stalking my posts, you’re not worth arguing with.
Reply to xxfullsailxx post on April 10, 2014 at 10:39 pm
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>> i think captain hindsight (WTKTT) came up with 2-3
>> acres too. i agree, that looks about right.
Then send SPGS1 Gary Cordes an email and let
know he was EIGHT to TWELVE times wrong about
the size when he decided it would be the
‘fully scouted predetermined safety zone’.
He might appreciate the update.
>> given the flame lengths and what we know about
>> separation distance from the IRPG, the BSR was
>> indeed a valid safety zone.
>> even if you had to move from one corner to another, i
>> think it was certainly survivable without having to
>> deploy a shelter or take cover in a structure. plus you
>> always have the option to burn out around the
>> perimeter to increase the buffer…
You’re kidding us now, right?
You’ve gone from ‘totally, unquestionable bomb-proof’
to now painting a picture of 19 poor guys scrambling
around ‘from corner to corner’… perhaps reaching
for their shelter bags… trying to achieve ‘survivability’…
…an oh yes… might have to burn out a little just
to make it safer.
It was 20-30 acres. ( Gary Cordes said so ).
They should have been able to do the ‘lawn chair’
thing, right?
>> but that is all moot.
Yes, it is. They all died before even getting there.
>> #1. BSR survived. in the aftermath, it looked like it had
>> survived a bomb going off. it was an identified safety
>> zone that had been scouted out.
Yes. Fully scouted. 20-30 acres. Nice job, Gary.
>> #2. Cordes also mentioned “the cold black.” this
>> would be GM’s primary safety zone throughout
>> their shift.
…and if Cordes had never showed them the ‘ranch’
at all… it probably would have been where they stayed.
>> #3. i think most of us have agreed, at one point or
>> another, that GM wasn’t necessarily looking for
>> a “safety zone”… they were looking for the nearest
>> point at which to reengage the fire by helping out in
>> Yarnell.
Not true.
There has been no real ‘consensus’ on that or any
definitive proof. Just speculation.
If that really was the case… then why didn’t they (GM)
SAY so? Why does not ONE person in fire command
come out and admit that was what was happening
that day with Granite Mountain?
So let’s look at it gain…
L = Nope
C = Nope. ( Real intentions never communicated )
E = Nope. This is where they died.
S = Still questionable.
apparently you missed the dozen or so engines and miscellaneous other vehicles that went in and out of BSR all night… i’d say that most of those resources had scouted out BSR pretty darn well… and you could cut Cordes a little slack (though i know that’s not your style) about the 20-30 acres… he was looking at it at night, and that can be pretty deceptive when you’re driving around in the dark.
>>…and if Cordes had never showed them the >>‘ranch’
>>at all… it probably would have been where they >>stayed.
i don’t think that’s even KIND OF credible… either way, they were watching that fire roll towards Yarnell… and they had the best view of the fire, the town AND BSR, which looks pretty bomb proof from up on that hill. further more, they must have been listening to radio traffic all day about whatever was going on in around BSR and Yarnell, so they knew the situation down there. they were looking to be more useful than they were from the heel of the fire, and they were obviously determined to stay in the game.
>>Why does not ONE person in fire command come out and admit that was what was
>>happening that day with Granite Mountain?”
just watch the briefing video (which is based on the SAIR), that is what was said. (para-phrased) “it is thought that GM was attempting to re-position, so they could reengage the fire.”
Reply to xxfullsailxx post
on April 11, 2014 at 8:52 am
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>> just watch the briefing video
>> (which is based on the SAIR)
Just read the ADOSH interviews
( which are based on real people who
were ‘in fire command’ telling what they
knew or didn’t know ).
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>> that is what was said. (para-phrased)
>> “it is thought that GM was attempting to
>> re-position, so they could reengage the
>> fire.”
Keyword = thought.
Translation = (para-phrased) “We just
spent a few (more) million dollars of
taxpayer dollars and we don’t have a
frickin’ clue why one of the most valuable
resources on the fire ( with ELEVEN
fully functioning radios onboard ) was even
attempting to move through a fuel-filled box
canyon in front of an oncoming fire train.”
L = Nope ( Seriously non-existent )
C = Nope ( Seriously bad )
E = Fatal
S = Questionable
**
** TRANSCRIPT OF MOORE AIR STUDY VIDEO
** 20130630_Yarnell_SM (23).MOV
**
** POSSIBLE *NEW* RADIO CAPTURE FROM ERIC MARSH CIRCA 1628
The ‘Moore\Pictures’ sub-folder in the ‘Air Study’ parent folder in Mr. Dougherty’s
online dropbox has 45 still pictures in it… but it ALSO happens to have 3 short
Apple Quicktime videos sort of ‘hidden’ in there.
This is a report on the first of those 3 videos in that ‘Moore\Pictures’ folder, which
APPEARS to capture a previously unknown radio transmission from Eric Marsh
( and a response from Jesse Steed? ) circa 1628.56 ( 4:28.56 PM ).
The actual folder name in the Dropbox for these ‘Moore’ photos/videos is…
AerialFirefightingStudy\Moore\Pictures
There are 3 Apple Quicktime Movies in this folder.
Unlike the Panebaker Air Study videos… these ‘Moore’ videos do NOT have
either the START or END time stamped into their filenames, and the usual
Apple Quicktime .THM thumbnails are missing which would normally have
the actual EXIF timestamp metadata in them from which to obtain the
video START time(s).
The 3 ‘Moore’ Air Study Apple Quicktime .MOV movie files are only named…
It is possible, however, to tell exactly when these ‘Moore’ Air Study videos
were taken based on Moore’s STILL photos shot just mere moments before
each video, which DO have proper time/date ( and GPS ) metadata
embedded in them.
The photo taken just moments before this first Moore video ( which shows
the exact same moment when fire was coming over a nearby ridge as the
video does ) is the following…
2013_Yarnell_SM (22): Date taken: 6/30/2013 – 4:28.50 PM
Actually… Moore took 3 still pictures very quickly just before shooting
the video of the same exact ‘fire coming over the ridge’ moment…
These exact ‘time/date’ values come directly from the EXIF metadata
embedded in all the ‘Moore’ photographs. They are also GPS stamped.
The ‘separation’ between the 3 still photos just before shooting the video of the
same scene averages 6 seconds, so assuming the same separation between
the last still photo ( at 4:28.50 ) and the start of the video… that would put the
start time for this first ‘Moore’ Air Study video at exactly… 4:28.56 PM.
This first ‘Moore’ Air Study video is 37 seconds long.
A public copy of this first ‘Moore’ Air Study video is in Mr. Dougherty’s
online Dropbox at…
ECITW ( Every Caveat In The World )
The following is what I ( me, personally ) believe is being said in the
background of this video. Your mileage may, of course, vary.
NOTE: No ‘audio filtering’ or ‘audio forensics’ required for this one.
There is some ‘wind in the microphone’ noise but ( unlike the Panebaker Air Study
videos ) there is no foreground ‘talk’ or Air-to-Air channel chatter whatsoever and
anyone with normal hearing should be able to hear what has been captured
in the background.
ALSO NOTE: When the video starts… someone is already ‘reporting’ to someone
else on one of the TAC channels in the background. It definitely sounds like the
distinct voice of Eric Marsh. He also definitely sounds like he is exerting himself at
that moment and he is breathing hard as he talks.
ALSO NOTE: This conversation would be shortly AFTER the radio conversation
captured in Blue Ridge Hotshot McCord’s YARNELL-GAMBLE video where we
(apparently) hear someone in fire command ( OPS1 Todd Abel? ) saying he would
‘appreciate it’ if Marsh and Granite Mountain could ‘come to town a little faster’…
and Marsh replied ( with some apparent exasperation in his voice? ) “They’re
comin’ from the heel of the fire”. This ‘can you please hurry up?’ conversation
apparently took place circa 4:20 PM, at or about the same exact moment the
SAIR says Steed and the Crew actually decided to take the ‘shortcut’ and drop
off the two-track road into the fuel-filled box canyon.
VIDEO STARTS AT 1628.56 ( 4:28.56 PM )
+0:00 ( 1628.56 / 4:28.56 PM )
(Eric Marsh): Don’t be upset… I’ve got quite a ways to come.
( slight pause ) I’m headin’ off the slope.
+0:07 ( 1629.03 / 4:29.03 )
(Unknown, but possible voice match for Jesse Steed): Copy… we’re all at the top…
NOTE: This video continues for another 30 seconds, but strong winds come up
in the foreground and the noise in the microphone obscures the chance of
hearing any other backround radio traffic, if any.
VIDEO ENDS AT 1629.33 ( 4:29.33 PM )
FINAL NOTE: If the timestamp for this video is correct, then it would be only
(exactly) 10 minutes from the moment this video ended to when Jesse Steed
would then make his first “We are in front of the flaming front” MAYDAY call
on the Air-to-ground channel, at 1639.30.
you have GOT to be kidding me… are you f$%^^’ing kidding me with this bullshit!? you know, most of your previous ad-libs are pretty impotent, and we both know that… but the first chance you get to perpetuate the controversy, you don’t hesitate. you put this bullshit “ECITW” half-assed disclaimer, then you go on to try to make yourself sound like some sort of audio forensic’s expert… which you’re very obviously NOT.
i suppose it’s the perfect opportunity for you to ad-lib whatever YOU want the story to be… the perfect opportunity for YOU to continue perpetuating some sort of conspiracy.
neither the voices themselves NOR the dialogue context are at all discernible… it could be the car radio on the local FM channel for all you know. and you SURE AS SHIT CAN’T TELL ME YOU THINK THAT’S MARSH’S VOICE FOR ANY GOOD REASON (other than the fact that it might fit your script.)
I stand by the transcription posted above.
I am NOT making it up.
That conversation is THERE.
I am a lifelong musician with perfect pitch, and I have
been told I have ‘far above average’ hearing… so I might
be wrong about what ‘normal’ hearing is… but I would
say that if you can’t hear at least half that conversation
( and the same exact words )… I would suggest you get
your ears checked.
If you are having trouble hearing the background… just
boost the GAIN a little bit on whatever player you
are using ( no audio forensics required ). That might
help you out.
And yes… I know EXACTLY what Eric Marsh’s voice
sounds like, after hours and hours of hearing it in
his training tapes AND on known verified radio
captures with modulation added.
He (Marsh) had a VERY distinct voice placement, pitch
and cadence. So did Jesse Steed, actually. His voice
signature is almost as distinct as Marsh’s if you bother
to listen carefully.
Could I be wrong about WHO it is speaking?
Perhaps.
Am I wrong about what is being said?
I don’t think so.
So whether it is Marsh or not… who else would be
saying, at EXACTLY 1628 that day… things like…
“I’ve got quite a ways to come”
AND
“I’m heading off the slope”
…and also be audibly out-of-breath while doing so?
i think it’s very telling that you’re all of a sudden going to qualify your “expertise” (word used VERY loosely) and try to make yourself sound like some sort of home grown voice “expert.”
“I have been told I have ‘far above average’ hearing”
As I said in the original posting… it really
doesn’t take ANY ‘expertise’ at all to hear
this one. There is just a little wind noise
in the microphone. No Air-to-air chatter
or foreground talk in this one like a lot of
the Panebaker clips.
Do what I said.
BOOST your GAIN a little.
If you still can’t hear that conversation
there at the start of this video…
I can’t make out much. Seconds 4-5 sound a bit like “going to have to go out [on? to?] the highway. The voice sounds similar to Steed’s. There is a voice that sounds similar to Marsh at about 8-10 seconds, but I can’t here anything it says. I don’t hear a low voice at the beginning (just the same youngish tenor from the start to 0:06), which comes in again later, between wind bursts. I’ve tried noise reduction, envelope resizing, and boosting the 300-500 Hz range, but that’s all I’ve got.
I ( me, personally, all caveats possible ) think
the conversation is perfectly understandable
even WITHOUT any ‘enhancements’ or
‘audio forensics’… but that’s just me.
I will do my best to extract/enhance this clip
and post it on Youtube, like I have done with
others.
It really doesn’t tell us anything that hadn’t
already been ‘figured out’ since the SAIR
came out ( that Marsh was quite some distance
BEHIND Steed/Crew that afternoon, etc. )…
…but the most important thing ( again, if that is
what is really being said ) would be the VERY,
very first thing being said… where Marsh ( if
that is really him ) telling Steed ( if that is really
who he was talking to )…
“Don’t be upset.”
( Was that enough ‘caveats’ up above or should
I lean on the keys some more? )
If that REALLY is what is being captured there,
then it’s significant. Given the timeframe… I
believe it proves ALL of the following…
1) Marsh and Steed WERE discussing their
‘move’ amonst themselves over radio channels
that were NOT just the GM private crew net…
so OTHER had a good chance of hearing this
conversation ( and others ). Could that be why
Blue Ridge Hotshot McCord named his own
video YARNELL-GAMBLE? Was this kind of
traffic between Marsh and Steed *actually*
showing up on the TAC channels… and others
were hearing this whole ‘gamble’ play out…
but have still refused to testify about hearing
anything?
2) Steed was UPSET ( about something ), and
it was Marsh telling him ‘not to be’. What would
Steed have been ‘upset’ about, at 1628?… that
he had been told to cut through some stupid
canyon ( that no one had scouted ) as a shortcut
and now it was turning into a nightmare ( and
he KNEW it ) and he wanted to bail out… but Marsh
was urging him to ‘keep going… I’ll be there in a
minute’?
Of COURSE this is all based on just a few
words heard in the background of a video…
…but what if I am RIGHT?
What if that REALLY is the conversation this
video accidentally captured?
Who else heard it? Who else heard MORE
of it? Why was Steed UPSET?.
Alternative theory for Steed being ‘upset’ would
be that, at that point, it was still only Eric Marsh
who had actually ‘seen the Google map on an
iPad’ at the 0700 briefing… and he wasn’t
even WITH Steed yet, even at that late time,
and Steed was being asked to make important
decisions without the only guy who had ever
even SEEN the route that day not even WITH
him. So that’s why Marsh was basically telling
him he was ‘hurrying’ to catch up ( but NOT
telling him to ‘stop the mission’.
I believe this one capture was worth calling
Mr. Moore himself in for an interview… to see
if he ( perhaps ) heard this all in real time and
in more context and remembers what the
full ‘context’ was… but neither the Arizona
Forestry Commission or ADOSH bothered
to interview him ( Moore ), or ask anyone
else if they overheard THIS conversation.
Followup… just in case something VERY
weird might be going on with your browser…
…what you SHOULD see in that video is
a zoomed closeup of the fire roaring over
a nearby ridge ( circa 1628 ) with a
telephone pole in the right-center of the
frame throughout the video.
That ridge is basically the ‘north side’
of the fire as it was filling up Harper
Canyon and about to burn the entire
Shrine road Youth Camp… from which
Blue Ridge, Tyson Esquibel ( and everyone
else ) were evacuating from at the very
moment this video was taken.
It really is a miracle even MORE firefighters
didn’t die that day.
I have been reviewing all comments. I have been through the Forest Service docs and OSHA docs. Since I was taken out to the Incident Site (I am the mother to Andrew Ashcraft) I knew this was not a tragedy caused by just happenstance.
I don’t post because there are days when I think some of the discussions are just ridiculous. But there are times when I see something that reminds me of a clue or fact that needs to be examined in more depth.
The truth of what happened that day will come out. We will learn lessons from this only when the truth is complete. I do want to caution several of you: until you walk the path the guys walked (and I mean actually put your feet on the path in Yarnell) – if you did not know this crew on a personal/professional level watch your assumptions – if you think you know it all be careful.
If any of you ever want to send the 12 families standing together for truth feel free to send me the info ([email protected]) – it will remain confidential if you choose.
Reply to Deborah Pfingston post on April 9, 2014 at 11:49 am
>> Deborah wrote…
>> I have been reviewing all comments. I have been through the
>> Forest Service docs and OSHA docs. Since I was taken out
>> to the Incident Site (I am the mother to Andrew Ashcraft) I
>> knew this was not a tragedy caused by just happenstance.
First ( and foremost )… my sincere condolences for your loss.
>> Deborah also wrote…
>> I don’t post because there are days when I think some of the
>> discussions are just ridiculous.
Yes. It can get that way. This is a PUBLIC forum, with no actual
‘leadership’ involved. Mr. John Dougherty is the ‘moderator’ of
this PUBLIC comment space… but his policy is that as long
as a commenter stays within his published guidelines for
civil disucssion… ALL are welcome to post a comment.
So anyone can ‘ask a question’ ( sometimes ridiculous ones ).
and anyone can give a ‘response’ ( sometimes equally absurd ).
But all in all… they are some very diligent and concerned people
commenting here that still just want to learn more about
what ACTUALLY happened in Yarnell that weekend.
There have, in fact, been a lot of ‘details’ about that weekend
that have only been ‘discovered’ via this public discussion, and
I expect that will continue.
>> Deborah also wrote…
>> But there are times when I see something that reminds me
>> of a clue or fact that needs to be examined in more depth.
If you don’t mind me asking… what are some/all of those
‘somethings’ that you feel need to be examined in more depth?
>> Deborah also wrote…
>> The truth of what happened that day will come out.
>> We will learn lessons from this only when the truth is complete.
It was ( and shall remain ) a historic event. Time has a way
of making sure the truth DOES comes out regarding such things.
>> Deborah also wrote…
>> I do want to caution several of you: until you walk the path the
>> guys walked (and I mean actually put your feet on the path in
>> Yarnell) – if you did not know this crew on personal/professional
>> level watch your assumptions – if you think you know it all be
>> careful.
No one ‘knows it all’. We are just trying to ‘learn more’.
Those who did NOT know these men, or have the chance
to ‘know them on a personal/professional level’ have forever
lost the opportunity to do so, and that is part of the tragedy
itself and why as much as possible needs to be known.
We now rely on others ( such as yourself ) to tell us what we
do not ( but SHOULD ) know in that regard.
>> If any of you ever want to send the 12 families standing
>> together for truth feel free to send me the info
>> ([email protected]) – it will remain
>> confidential if you choose.
Thank you. Is the “12 families standing together for truth” an
official organization? Is there a website or some other online
presence for this organization?
The only reason I ask is that I’m just curious which of the
19 firefighters are actually represented.
Are you at liberty to say?
Speaking of ‘at liberty to say’… I’d like to just ask you a
few more quick questions.
You OBVIOUSLY do not have to answer them unless you
feel comfortable doing so.
1) Do you know if Andrew’s cellphone/smartphone was
ever returned to anyone in his family when the Arizona
Forestry SAIT and Arizona ADOSH investigations ended?
2) If it was NOT… was any explanation given as to WHY?
3) Related to the above… do you know if ALL of the families
received the cellphones/smartphones back? Particularly
Amanda Marsh? Eric Marsh’s cellphone seems to have
‘disappeared’ from the deployment site and doesn’t seem
to have ever been entered into evidence as were ALL the
other cellphones/smartphones found at the deployment
site. I am just wondering if, even despite that lack of any official
documentation regarding Eric’s cellphone… if it ever actually
made it back to HIS family… or if it is still simply ‘missing’.
Do YOU ( or anyone in this ’12 families’ group you mention )
know anything about it?
First ( and foremost )… my sincere condolences for your loss.
>>Thank you.
Yes. It can get that way. This is a PUBLIC forum, with no actual
‘leadership’ involved. Mr. John Dougherty is the ‘moderator’ of
this PUBLIC comment space… but his policy is that as long
as a commenter stays within his published guidelines for
civil disucssion… ALL are welcome to post a comment.
So anyone can ‘ask a question’ ( sometimes ridiculous ones ).
and anyone can give a ‘response’ ( sometimes equally absurd ).
But all in all… they are some very diligent and concerned people
commenting here that still just want to learn more about
what ACTUALLY happened in Yarnell that weekend.
There have, in fact, been a lot of ‘details’ about that weekend
that have only been ‘discovered’ via this public discussion, and
I expect that will continue.
>> I truly find most comments very interesting and thoughtful. I do understand that no all comments will be accurate. But I am glad that most seem to be really trying to find the truth.
If you don’t mind me asking… what are some/all of those
‘somethings’ that you feel need to be examined in more depth?
>>I have a huge pile of research. We try our best to examine anything that seems logical. To be honest I am a little fearful to reveal certain things. Let’s be honest here – there is a cover up and we all know that. I know it is for several reasons. There are those responsible for this tragedy and they should be running scared.
It was ( and shall remain ) a historic event. Time has a way
of making sure the truth DOES comes out regarding such things.
>> I can only pray for this closure. I also pray that the truth will come out or be proven – we can only learn from it not this deception. Hotshot crews should be insisting on this – their lives depend on it.
Thank you. Is the “12 families standing together for truth” an
official organization? Is there a website or some other online
presence for this organization?
>> This is not an official name. There is no website or online presence. But maybe there should be. Social media is a double edged sword. The families I stand with are: Andrew Ashcraft (wife and parents), Robert Caldwell (wife and parents), Travis Carter(wife and grandfather), Christopher MacKenzie(parent), Grant McKee(father), Wade Parker(parents), John Percin(parents), Jesse Steed(wife), Travis Turbyfill(wife), Kevin Woyjeck(parents), William Warneke(wife and parents) and Clayton Whitted(wife and parents). We have filed to find the truth, to get the benefits for the wives and children, insist on change (to be a platform for hotshots everywhere) and to force the State, Forest Service, City, etc to realize these were men not tools that can just be replaced. But may I say what I write is from me. It could be that not all the families members feel as I do.
1) Do you know if Andrew’s cellphone/smartphone was
ever returned to anyone in his family when the Arizona
Forestry SAIT and Arizona ADOSH investigations ended?
>>Yes Juliann did get Andrew’s cell phone back. But no report that they were able to receive anything off it. Some families did receive a report. This in itself is unsettling.
2) If it was NOT… was any explanation given as to WHY?
>>They explain nothing to the families. The only time they talk is when we insist on it.
3) Related to the above… do you know if ALL of the families
received the cellphones/smartphones back? Particularly
Amanda Marsh? Eric Marsh’s cellphone seems to have
‘disappeared’ from the deployment site and doesn’t seem
to have ever been entered into evidence as were ALL the
other cellphones/smartphones found at the deployment
site. I am just wondering if, even despite that lack of any official
documentation regarding Eric’s cellphone… if it ever actually
made it back to HIS family… or if it is still simply ‘missing’.
Do YOU ( or anyone in this ’12 families’ group you mention )
know anything about it?
>> I will let Amanda Marsh answer this question. Eric always carried two phones. I do think this is an important vein of investigation that needs to be insisted upon.
>>Has anyone thought about a back burn? The human factors aspect/ the oppression GMIHS lived under from the city? Who could have had the power to make them go off the hill? Did the left hand know what the right hand was doing? Who was the Forest Service man who was at the restaurant talking on the phone saying “we really f- – – ed up.”? Any answers.
All I can say for the moment is, once again, the
most important thing…
I am very, very sorry for your loss.
Andrew Sterling Ashcraft was an extraordinary
man ( as were they all ) and the world was
blessed to have him here for ANY length of time.
The (whole) truth about what happened that weekend
will be known. There really is no stopping it, at this
point… and the least we (who remain) can do to
honor ALL these men is continue to try and
expedite that process.
I’m likewise very sorry for your loss, and the losses of all involved, and wish everyone the best resolution possible. I also realize this type of internet dialogue can be a bit of a blunt instrument, but do believe it is part of how the internet makes cover-ups harder overall. As for the rumor you’re asking about, Joy had posted about this perhaps 4 weeks ago, with some ensuing discussion. If someone knows how to search this forum, the discussion might be easier to find that way.
I would also say as some one who experienced the same loss as you and As a retired wild land Fire Fighter I have an understanding of both sides of the issue. I feel a kinship to you and all the families and occasionally cry when I see there faces or find many reasons to believe this did not need to happen. In my search for the truth if I have said things that upset you I am truly sorry. I was 9 when my father died and it took a long time to learn the facts and that he to made mistakes that cost the other 14 there lives as well. It will take time for all of you to find the truth in all of this but don’t give up looking. God Bless you all.
To all of you a heartfelt thank you. Andrew was an incredible man – as part of GMIHS and outside as a father, husband and son. His smile, humor, ‘Be Better’ attitude, hugs and his ‘Yello’ when I would call him are missed every moment of the day. I was blessed to know him. It is because of who he was and who these men were – a crew of honor and intelligence that I will, daily, seek the truth. I worked with crash investigators and veterans for a long time so no apologies for bluntness – I prefer it. If any of you want to share any truth you come across please send it to [email protected]. Again thank you for insisting on the whole picture. *Bob – Andrew’s oldest is just 6 years old but is having a very hard time with this loss. He was very close to his Dad. I am so sorry that you experienced this loss too.
Would anyone be able to guide me to any interviews with Yarnell Fire volunteer firefighters that were in Yarnell – or – any structure firefighters that were in Yarnell on June 30th? Thank you.
I haven’t seen any full transcripts ( or audio ) of any of the ADOSH
interviews with both Peeples Valley Fire Department and Yarnell
Hill Fire Department personnel… but they DID conduct extensive
telephone and in-person interviews with LOTS of people from BOTH
of these organizations who were working the Yarnell Hill Fire
that weekend ( Friday – Sunday ).
They took ‘Field Notes’ during all these interviews and those
notes were, in fact, published recently along with all the other ADOSH documents.
In the ADOSH investigation supporting documentation, there is a document called…
“L3419 YFD, Peeples Valley, CYFD field notes redacted.pdf”
It’s in the ‘ADOSH Notes and Emails’ folder up in the online Dropbox.
These all appear to be the ADOSH
investigtor’s handwritten NOTES
taken during teleconfernce interviews
with various members of the
Peeples Valley Fire Department and
the Yarnell Fire Department.
NOTE: The NAMES are handwritten
and very hard to read so some of the
‘guesses’ below might be wrong and
would need to be verified…
Page 7 – Peeples Valley Fire Department
Captain Patrick (McCroey?)
Shane (Chaves?)
Ken (Shoup?)
Others?
Page 8 – Peeples Valley Fire Department AND
Yarnell Fire Department
Chief Koile
Wesley (Romen?) – Volunteer – Used to be dispatcher
Christy (Captain) (Lewis?)
Page 12 – Yarnell Fire Department
Specific phone interview with Brad
(Haggard?) – YFD Fire Captain.
Brad supplied his own list of people
who were apparently ‘on duty’
for Yarnell Fire Department that
weekend. Some of the names he
wrote down appear to be…
Krsitee (Lewis?)
(Daniel?) (Harrison?)
Paul (Murray?)
(Ailean?) (Cursillo?)
(?) Koile
Anthony McCormack
Ryan (Gardens?)
Brad Ruggles
etc…
Page 18 – Yarnell Fire Department
Specific conference call with YFD
Fire Chief Jim Koile.
NOTE: This document also contains
all the emails related to ADOSH’s
repeated attempts to try and set up
an interview with SPGS1 Gary
Cordes via Yavapai County officials.
They were eventually successful.
See a new ‘parent’ comment
started up above for a much
more complete version
of the ‘interviews’ that ADOSH
had with personnel from both
the Yarnell and Peeples
Valley fire departments.
Unlike the hard to read
handwritten notes above,
these are fully-formed
typewritten summaries
of the same interviews.
That *new* post is up above
with this date and title…
WantsToKnowTheTruth
on April 10, 2014 at 11:15
pm said:
** ADOSH INTERVIEWS
** WITH PERSONNEL
** FROM…
** YARNELL FIRE
** DEPARTMENT
** PEEPLES VALLEY FIRE
** DEPARTMENT
Thank you for taking the time to guide us and remind us why we are here. I appreciate your caution about making assumptions. I hope to hike the path in Yarnell. I know it won’t complete the picture, but it should increase my understanding and empathy. We must never forget that we are missing 19 incredible people in our ranks, and that they all have loved ones who mourn them. I’m sorry I never got to meet Andrew in person. I’m sure I would have learned a ton from him.
As a current firefighter, I’m both comforted and made braver to speak out, knowing there are citizens out there who realize that we are not disposable, and recognize that some of the managers and directors and budget analysts have been treating us as just that. I’ve been very lucky with my supervisors and coworkers, but we still get that attitude from some of the organizations we get sent out to help. Like most WFFs, I’d read through case studies and tried to imagine myself in those circumstances. However, I’ve never been so moved with anger and loss as by the events and aftermath at Yarnell. Nothing before had made me question all the training, because never before had I seen so many violations so neatly swept under the rug. Never before had I seen so little respect for the families by the agencies, and so publicly displayed.
All of us in fire (heck, just all of us in general) have seen and made errors. We are human, and fires can be chaotic events that test us in every way possible. However, the good leaders among us admit our mistakes, learn from them, and help others learn from them. And ethical people don’t assist in covering up the truth.
Thank you for insisting on the truth. I hope it brings you some closure. I know that your efforts will make us safer out there, and I’m truly grateful for that.
ECITW ( Every Caveat In The World )
This is what I ( me, personally ) believe is being said in the background of this
video. Your mileage may, of course, vary.
This video is 1 minute and 49 seconds long, so given the small note in the
README.TXT file that accompanies these Air Study videos which states that
they all use the VIDEO END time as the timestamp in the TITLE… then that
means this particular video STARTED at 1623.19 ( 4:23.19 PM )
NOTE: This video starts just 19 seconds after the previous one
ended at 1623.00 ( 4:23.00 PM ). Most of the background conversation
in this video is obscured by very loud ‘wind in the microphone’ noise.
ALSO NOTE: At +28 seconds, two white-pickup-truck fire command
vehicles are seen speeding EAST on Hays Ranch Road AWAY from
the ICP at Model Creek School and (presumably) towards Yarnell.
One white pickup has a full emergency light-bar on the truck roof and
it is going full blast. The one behind it has no light-bar but emergency
flashers are also going full blast.
ALSO NOTE: At +34 seconds another white-pickup-truck appears heading
in the OPPOSITE direction on Hays Ranch Road and is seen ‘passing’ the
other two vehicles quickly heading WEST towards the ICP at Model Creek
School… also with full emergency cab-top light bar activated and flashing.
None of these ‘white pickup trucks’ with emergency lights on and running
circa 1623.49 ( 4:23.49 PM ) have been identified as of this writing.
VIDEO STARTS AT 1623.19 ( 4:23.19 PM )
+1:36 ( 1624.55 / 4:24.55 PM )
(Unknown – OPS1 Todd Abel?): Operations, Musser, ?? this is per
containing structure mod??…
+1:46 ( 1625.05 / 4:25.05 PM )
(Unknown): Were ya callin’ me?
I believe they already have ( almost from day one ) chimed in
and gone to great lengths to try to explain just *HOW* difficult
those manzanita patches in that exact area were to navigate,
even for one person… much less a line of 19 men trying to
stay in single file.
The only thing to complete the picture there would be for them
to say whether there was anything different about those same
thick ‘patches’ clearly visible ( in Joy’s own photographs ) over
there on the SOUTHERN approaches to the Boulder Springs
Ranch.
Maybe there were some ‘footpaths’ only visible at ground level
and not all that evident from satellite photos, or visible in
Joy’s own photograph. Maybe not.
Even if they were there… the other question would be if they
thought someone who had never set foot in that area before
would have been able to ‘find’ them quickly ( coming north
out of that draw on the final leg of ‘the journey’ ) even with
( perhaps ) a LOT of smoke and severe reduction in visibility.
Even if they had made it that far… to that ‘final push’ through
the draw and on into the southern end of the Ranch… they
wouldn’t have had much TIME to get even slightly lost or
confused. Minutes (seconds) would have probably mattered
a great deal, at that point.
Have the video cams pictures from the ranch come up on johns posting yet it would be interesting to see if they got any fire pictures as the fire blew thru the valley.
Mr. Dougherty just posted TONS of video that
is from a ‘Helms Ranch Security camera’… but
it happens to be the one that was focused on
the Helms Ranch FRONT GATE itself, and shows
all the vehicles coming and going from the
Boulder Springs Ranch from sometime Saturday
night on through Sunday.
There are ‘still-frame’ breakouts of someone did
that show all the vehicles that passed through
that gate in these timeframes.
There is only that ONE way to enter or leave
the Boulder Springs Ranch and this is the gate
that had the ‘security code’ on it that you had
to know to open it electronically ( HUGE gate ).
Sometime after the deployment… this big
electronic gate just got ‘propped open’ but until
then you had to know the CODE to get in ( or
out ) of the BSR compound ( where the
pumpkin had been set up late Saturday ).
There is NO SIGN of Gary Cordes’ vehicle EVER
passing through that front gate to either enter
or leave the Boulder Springs Ranch either all
Saturday night/morning… or anytime on Sunday.
So that is all very interesting ( and needs to be
looked at some more ), and MANY thanks to
Mr. Dougherty for the tremendous effort it took
to get these videos online and public…
However… that being said… here is where I
am a little confused.
What I was EXPECTING to see was some more
complete footage from some security cameras
that were KNOWN to be mounted on the
west-side fencing and pointed due north into
that ‘middle bowl’. Those cameras were meant
to capture traffic coming/going either over the
west-side fencing OR coming and going via
the north-side Jeep trail.
These would be the ones that would actually be
showing the ‘fire progression’ as it headed
TOWARDS the ranch through that ‘middle bowl’
that day… but so far I don’t see any footage from
THOSE cameras.
Some VERY short clips from THOSE cameras
first appeared in the MSM ( Mainstream Media )
the same day the ‘Helmet-Cam’ videos were
released to the media… and some of those
Helms Ranch west-fence security camera clips
were used as ‘background’ footage as some
announcers ( like on CNN ) were ‘leading into’
the main story… which was the Helmet Cam
video itself.
I thought THOSE were the ‘Helms Ranch’
security camera videos that we might be seeing
full footage from… but this is the first I’ve
even seen or heard that the FRONT GATE
camera footage was ALSO available ( and what
is now online in Mr. Dougherty’s dropbox ).
So… at the moment… there still doesn’t seem to
be any more actual footage available from those
west-fence mounted security cameras… or any
indication where the MSM got those clips THEY
were showing the day the ‘Helmet-Cam’ video
came out.
If the MSM got those west-side security camera
footage in THEIR SAIT FOIA/FOIL packages then
it would stand to reason that everyone else did
as well.
More on this later.
PS: There are also DOCUMENTS that accompany
these videos and apparently someone on the
SAIT team did a very diligent job watching these
videos and WRITING DOWN every vehicle that
came and went through that BSR main gate,
and at what TIME either Saturday or Sunday.
That complete ‘list of vehicles’ is also now
published… but so far… SPGS1 Gary Cordes’
vehicle is nowhere on that list. Might have
missed it so checking it again.
The actual Helms Ranch Security Camera
that is focused on the FRONT GATE ( and
the source for all the video, still photos, and
documentation just published in Mr.
Dougherty’s online Dropbox ) is actually
mounted on the northeast corner of that
large equipment barn on the east end
of the Ranch property and is EXACTLY
here…
34.219261, -112.770066
Unfortunately, it is, in fact, facing
due EAST and only shows what was
happening in THAT direction, ( and with
the front gate ) but there is a clear view in
the distance all the way back to the
Highway 89 area and landscape features
to the EAST of Yarnell proper.
Some pretty fascinating stuff, though.
There is one section that seems to
CLEARLY show that the fire was arriving
into Glen Ilah ( and burning that subdivision )
before it ever ‘arrived’ at the Boulder
Springs Ranch itself.
There is also footage that does prove that
prior to the fire even arriving at the perimeter
of the BSR itself… the heavy SMOKE was
pretty much putting visibility at near ZERO
around that Ranch compound.
So if GM had been trying to ‘work their way’
off the eastward leg of the alternate escape
route, and due north through that ‘draw’
for the final leg into the Ranch itself… it
looks like the ‘visibility’ for that final push
into the BSR would also have been
near ZERO.
Unless that final push to the ranch
compound itself was CLEARLY marked
or visible… or fully pre-scouted… they
would have had a heck of a time finding
their way throught that draw and into that
Ranch in that final ( crucial ) timeframe.
There were MANY vehicles
( engines included ) coming
and going through that BSR
front gate throughout the
early morning and daylight
hours on Sunday.
A surprising number,
actually. It was a busy place.
I don’t know if that pumpkin
that had been set up there
on Saturday evening ( only
AFTER the fire ‘escaped’
over the road up on the
ridge ) was the ONLY place
the engines were told to
refill from… but that was
certainly ONE of the places
that many of them were
refilling from on Sunday.
There is no evidence in
these videos or images
that anything ever ‘staged’
there… but I suppose that
could be verified by
comparing the list of vehicles
that EXITED the gate to the
lost of ones that ENTERED.
That might show that one of
the engines arrived there…
but then never left… or was
there for an extended time.
BTW: Despite Tyson
Esquibel insisting in his
ADOSH interview that the
GM Crew Carriers WERE
‘staged’ at the BSR at some
point on Sunday morning,
I don’t see any Crew Carriers
ever entering the compound
at any time.
You can check all this
yourself in Mr. Dougherty’s
online Dropbox. It’s easy
to navigate… and one of the
SAIT investigators actually
took the time to extract
STILL photographs of all
the vehicles that came and
went… and they are in
their own separate folder.
It is highly unlikely any engines were refilling at BSR.
The person in charge of water supply would have established an easy-in, easy-out spot, next to the highway perhaps, and not have everyone driving to the end of a remote road, using extra time and fuel to dump and fill-up.
In addition to that, an ideal spot would be one that could be continually used, and not compromised by the fire at some point.
The one thing that stands out to me, and I think this is the case here due to the BSR ranch sticking-out to the west like a sore thumb, is that the pumpkin was probably established to support a structure protection sprinkler set-up..
The engines seen were probably patrolling and getting the lay of the land to see what they had. The one group looked to be a task force, as they come in and leave together. The water tenders would likely have been filling the pumpkin for use when needed.
“The water tenders would likely have been filling the pumpkin for use when needed.”
Yes. Much more likely. The primary chopper refill site was the helibase up north on Hays Ranch Road… but MAYBE that pumpkin at the BSR was still a designated ‘fill’ site for some of the choppers working the south end. There isn’t much documentation to prove this one way or the other, AFAIK, but its worth another pass at the evidence to see what all that traffic coming and going at the BSR was really all about.
If the ranch had a good water source they may have had a sprinkling system set up as well on the buildings. we seem to have very little info on the ranch. If it had a sprinkling system it could have very well been a bomb proof area, just hard to get to from the top of the mountain.
boy, sure looks like that BSR was pretty well scouted out the night of the 29th now doesn’t it? sure looks like there were engines in and out of that thing all day long on the the 30th as well…
so much for all THAT speculation…
oh, and it turns out… that BSR really COULD survive a bomb going off! might even call it a “bomb proof safety zone!”
i suppose it’s POSSIBLE that sprinklers were set up… but i highly doubt it. that place looked pretty well prepped prior to any resources showing up. i’m not sure it needed any sprinklers set up, unless they had a haystack or woodpile outside… but from what i’ve seen, all the structures were modern construction with metal roofs and plenty of clearance on all sides. i’d have been comfortable sitting there with my engine waiting for the fire to roll through…
Most structures that have defensible space, or are prepped, are NOT wildfire-proof, they just have a much better chance of surviving a firestorm.
Like in structure triage, time, energy, and sprinkler systems, are not wasted on properties that are not defensible, if you have some that are, or would be, with a little help.
Bomb-proof structure settings in chaparel country, while rare, would still need protection, because the only way anyone knows for absolute certainty that they would survive intact, is after they have been tested. I think I recall hearing that several windows at BSR broke out from the intense heat. If so, it was indeed, a close call.
I still think because of it’s remote location, the pumpkin was intended to support a sprinkler set-up, negating the need to have crews or engines stuck out there with no escape, if they were to need it.
Remember, the pumpkin was set-up the night before, probably as a what-if back-up. The next day as the fire roared toward Model Creek, the structure protection trailers were probably stripped bare, having deployed every sprinkler, pump, and hose roll where the structures were burning and going to burn. By the time the fire turned south, more than likely, there was no equipment left to deploy.
I also think I remember hearing a news report the the owners of BSR had to retreat deep into their house, saying that no one outside would have survived the heat.
>> TTWARE said…
>> Remember, the pumpkin was
>> set-up the night before, probably
>> as a what-if back-up.
That pumpkin was originally ‘set up’
very quickly late afternoon on
Saturday AFTER the small 2-4
acre fire that the DOC Lewis crew
had been ‘mopping up’ on for
FIVE hours ‘escaped’ over the
two-track. Russ Shumate only made
his first move to start doing copter
bucket drops AFTER the fire
‘escaped’ that small 2-4 acre
area up there.
The BSR location for the pumpkin
was (apparently) NOT chose with
ANY ‘safety zone’ considerations
in mind whatsoever. It was simply
a place that would be CLOSE to
where the fire was for choppers
to dip from.
Which also brings up a curious
point about Saturday. The Boulder
Springs Ranch was in no way ever
mentioned as a ‘safety zone’ until
Gary Cordes was pointing at it
( to Eric Marsh ) on a Google map
on Dean Fernandez’s iPad at the
Sunday 0700 briefing.
The DOC Lewis crew, who had
been fighting the same fire in the
same location the entire day before
( and stayed the night up on the
ridge ) was NEVER told that that
Ranch was to be, in any way,
considered a ‘safety zone’ from
that location where they were.
All of sudden… on Sunday… it WAS
OK to be telling crews headed to
the same location to fight the same
fire ( the same long distance away )
that the BSR was a ‘safety zone’
for them.
So why was it suddenly ‘eligible’ as
a ‘safety zone’ from that far away
location on Sunday… when it was
NOT any kind of ‘safety zone’
on Saturday… for crews working
that SAME location way up there?
The crews on top, ALWAYS had the black, AND it was right next to them. The need for the ranch as a safety zone was never an issue at that time. In actuality, the same would have applied for the 30th, as well.
I wish I could remember the media source that supplied the info regarding the owners of the BSR and their description of when the fire came through. If my memory is accurate about what they said regarding ‘no one would have been able to survive outside the house due to the extreme heat’, that would certainly put into question the ‘safey zone designation’ anywhere on the property. If Tex or Joy knows them, perhaps they could verify the owner’s description of the fire-storm.
Copy that. I really wish
this stupid ‘Boulder
Springs Ranch’ had
NEVER ‘entered the
picture’ as ANY kind of
‘safety zone’ for guys
that were going to
be working upwards of
a mile and half+ away
from it.
If all they had to even
consider ‘safety zone’
was the black itself…
then maybe those men
would all still be with us.
The moment that BSR
even entered the picture
that day… it became
this ‘hypothetically
reachable’ destination.
If they hadn’t even
known it was there, it
is doubtful they would
have even considered
doing what they did
that afternoon.
I wish GM had been like
the DOC crew on
Saturday working in
that same location.
No one EVER told
THAT crew that the
BSR was ANY kind
of ‘safety zone’, that
far away from where
they were actually
working.
dude, that whole fire had SO MUCH on their plates… what makes you think they were concerned about sprinklers around BSR?
don’t you think they were already stretched thin for resources? way too thin to be putting sprinklers up around a property with FireWise spec’d clearances around 90% of the structures…
structure protection trailers? from the State of AZ or Yavapai County? Yarnell VFD? who brought those?
by the time we got out of that area to the cabin #15; that fire was already destroying the tree where we had parked our vehicle. We beat the fire by less then 40 minutes going the way we went by staying on the 2 track ridge to the Congress side passing Acri’s property on the mountain top then dropping down near Candie Cane Lane leaving out to the vehicle on Foothill.
There was only one possible way to escape. The way I dragged Joy; the stubborn mule. I did not want to get an abandonment charge if she roasted so I went back for her. I still love the mule; she is a good kid. From the Helm’s ranch there is a bulldoze fire break from the 60’s which is named the 2 track ridge road but it would not have been an alternate escape route at all. Also that road leads to a dirt cow tank near the Helm’s which divides State Land & Helm’s property line and from there is also a continuation bulldozed path/firebreak not a jeep road that does connect to the jeep road as they call it. It was so dang overgrown and also a pipe that would of sucked the fire up at probably at a much faster rate then the route they choose so it was not an alternative escape route. The only route was my route; less fuel but harder way to get down due to steep boulders.
ECITW ( Every Caveat In The World )
This is what I ( me, personally ) believe is being said in the background of this
video. Your mileage may, of course, vary.
This video is 11 seconds long, so given the small note in the README.TXT file
that accompanies these Air Study videos which states that they all use the
VIDEO END time as the timestamp in the TITLE… then that means this
particular video STARTED at 1622.49 ( 4:22.49 PM )
NOTE: Cordes = SPGS1 Gary Cordes, Musser = OPS2 Paul Musser.
This appears to confirm that OPS1 Todd Abel was still busy up on the
north end of the fire at 1622 but he still planned on ‘coming down that way’
( to the Yarnell area ) in about 5 minutes to join OPS2 Paul Musser and
SPGS1 Gary Cordes, who were already both there in Yarnell.
VIDEO STARTS AT 1622.49 ( 4:22.49 PM )
+0:02 ( 1622.51 / 4:22.51 PM )
(Unknown – Cordes or Musser?): Go ahead.
+0:03 ( 1622.52 / 4:22.52 PM )
(OPS1 Todd Abel): Okay… ahhhhh… we’ll probly be around there in about five.
Uhm… What’s your plan on the ground?
+0:10 ( 1622.59 / 4:22.59 PM )
(Unknown – Cordes or Musser?): What I’d like ( VIDEO ENDS )
NOTE: Video ends and cuts off right after the word ‘like’.
ECITW ( Every Caveat In The World )
This is what I ( me, personally ) believe is being said in the background of this
video. Your mileage may, of course, vary.
This video is 1 minute and 18 seconds long, so given the small note in
the README.TXT file that accompanies these Air Study videos which states
that they all use the VIDEO END time as the timestamp in the TITLE… then
that means this particular video STARTED at 1548.22 ( 3:48.22 PM )
Followup… the ‘Eric’ listed as one of the speakers in the
transcript above is definitely NOT Eric Marsh. The only reason
he is listed by name is because he clearly identifies HIMSELF
( by name ) in the background radio captures.
His voice in no way compares with Eric Marsh’s distinct voice.
This ‘Eric’ appears to be associated with the Air Study Group
itself. His conversations were not part of the foreground
Air-To-Air traffic which always dominates these Panebaker
videos. He was talking ‘underneath’ all that but since his
voice seemed to be captured directly by the camera
microphone and without ‘radio modulation’… it is assumed he
was standing right there near the Air Study camera tripod itself
there on Hays Ranch Road, by the helibase.
The document also details the EXACT location of the
other observation team and the location of the ‘Moore’
folder photographs ( and 3 videos ) taken that day.
It was not at the helibase, where the Panebaker videos
were all shot. The ‘Moore’ photos/video were all shot
at this other observation point on the west side of
Highway 89 about halfway between Peeples Valley
and Yarnell proper.
From the document…
________________________________________________
Hand written notes taken by Shannon Moore,
6/30/13, 1300-1900 – Yarnell Hill Fire
10:00-13:00 Travel from Flagstaff to Yarnell Hill Fire
13:30 Members from AFUE arrive on scene.
Eric Panebaker goes to ICP, I stay about
.5 miles west of the junction of hwy 89 and Hays Ranch Rd.
I wait to meet up with remaining members of AFUE, Ryan
Swartz and Robert Manwaring who is joining us from SDTC.
14:00 All AFUE on site and get radios cloned and get a brief
from Eric who had talked to Brad Zetler, Dan Sullivan both
air ops and Paul Musser-ops.
14:30 Robert and I depart for a view of East side (Right
Flank of fire). Find lookout spot on hwy 89 (Location about 3
miles south of hwy 89 and Hays Ranch Rd junction,
approximate N 34.25562, W 112.73572).
Etc… ( many more notes from that day )
________________________________________________
Hey Mike I’m wondering about this statement “If you start doing things that have a 99% chance of being safe on a regular basis, your chances of being an old hotshot are not going to be very good.” (4-7) I don’t know anybody who waits on a 100%. I honestly don’t think that all accidents are preventable, because we’re human. I also don’t WFF need to wait for 100% safe, it doesn’t show up. You can’t even stay in the house and be 100% safe. Just looking for feedback on that.
Fir Fighting has its own hazards as we all know. Following the 10 and 18 will keep you safe from the fire its self. There’s always that 1-5% accident, prop wash knocks the fire across the line or a back fire that gets across the line in a saddle. You generally survive those. The other accidents from falls, falling trees, vehicle roll overs, helicopter crashes and so on are inherent with fire fighting always first and foremost is prevention. I have never seen any one die from obeying the 10 and paying attention to the 18. LCES remains the critical ones, you are gambling if they aren’t in place, as GM did.
There’s a big difference between assuming some residual risk, and assuming a fair chance of catastrophic failure. GM had already, earlier in the day with no great stress nor any requests from the outside to do so, assumed a reasonable chance of a burnover for their lookout. And in fact McDonough’s reaction to his (close) trigger point being hit was to start evaluating possible deployment sites that may well not have been sufficient given fuels and fire behavior. The rest of GM seemed oddly complacent at this time? They then assumed more risk for the crew by deciding to head down to Yarnell. Then, when on the 2-track, they committed to a long slow bushwhack through unburned fuel in an unscouted terrain trap. (And, as noted, while a lookout certainly would have helped, fairly soon after beginning to descend, even if the lookout had warned them to escape uphill, given possible rate of travel back uphill this would have become impossible.)
I don’t doubt that they figured they could beat the fire. Part of the 10 and 18 are to give you an “out,” so that when you have a failure in one part of the system, you have a redundant check in place somewhere else. Someone gets one of the ankle sprains that “some people” like to sneer at, it may slow the crew, but doesn’t get the whole crew burned over because they helped one guy who sprained his ankle. In GM’s case, they either beat the fire (and even a simple sprained ankle could be the difference between beating it, or not), or, the whole crew was in dense fuel that inevitably was going to be a crown fire and without great options for escape.
Good points. I would add to that the fact that at 1540, just
as Brendan was ( in his own testimony ) ‘evaluating
deployment options’… Brian Frisby was just about to
round the corner, load him up, and tell Captain Brown
they needed to ‘evacuate all the vehicles… RIGHT NOW’.
Also at the same exact moment… (1540 ) SPGS1 Gary
Cordes is astonished at how FAST the fire is really
moving now… it is hitting his ‘AW SHIT’ trigger point,
and he (personally) orders the FULL evacuation of
Yarnell. In his later interviews, Cordes would testify
this is the moment he knew the fire had ‘totally exceeded
his expectations’ and was coming into Yarnell toot-sweet.
So this is 1540. A lot was happening that SHOULD have
given anyone the full heads up that they now had a
MONSTER on their hands… totally exceeding anyone’s
‘expectations’ and covering the distance between
1 hour trigger point intervals in just 15 minutes.
THIS is the ‘fire’ that Granite Mountain was now going
to decide ( but not even then… they still took another
20 minutes to decide ) to ‘cross the street in front of’.
It’s not like it was at some calm, predictable rate of
spread with predictable winds and direction when
they decided to ‘take the chance’. They had ALREADY
seen how the behavior was ‘far exceeding expectations’
a full 20 minutes BEFORE they even decided to try and
‘cross the street’ in front of it.
I was with a group of people the other day and without
any prompting on my part… the subject of Yarnell
just came up. Some of the people in that group still
only vaguely recall the MSM news reports and were
still convinced that those 19 men were all in a ‘safe’
place that day… and that this monster of a fire just
‘came and got them’.
Yes. It was a monster fire. They knew that.
No. It didn’t come and get them. They went out to meet it.
>> SR also wrote…
>> There’s a big difference between assuming some
>> residual risk, and assuming a fair chance of
>> catastrophic failure.
Yes. There is.
How ‘risky’ did THEY really think it was, but did it anyway?
What was Steed’s ACTUAL ‘comfort level’ when
Marsh was asking him (twince?) to say so?
Maybe that’s the essence of what Brendan McDonough
still doesn’t really want to talk about, even now.
>> SR said…
>> They then assumed more risk for the crew by deciding
>> to head down to Yarnell. Then, when on the 2-track, they
>> committed to a long slow bushwhack through unburned
>> fuel in an unscouted terrain trap.
As long as this particular thread is just talking more
about ‘risk taking’… and what ‘level’ the meter was
pegging that day on their part… I think it’s time to
remember that regardless of whether they were familiar
with that terrain ( they SHOULD have been… it was
their backyard )… there has always been the following
documented evidence that they were specifically
TOLD / REMINDED about the risks and the dangers
THAT MORNING, at breakfast… in Yarnell itself.
The following is a reprint of a post from back on
January 17 of this year when this same ‘level of risk
taking’ was being discussed.
It’s a reply to a post from NV…
>> WTKTT on January 7, 2014 at 4:01 pm said:
>> Reply to NV on January 7, 2014 at 2:26 pm
>>
>> NV said…
>> I realize they were a local crew and had to be very
>> familiar with that type of scrub. But at each juncture
>> during the day they don’t seem to have taken the scrub
>> itself into account in their decision-making.
A lot of them were ‘transplants’ from other states for this
2013 fire season… but yes… MOST of them were ‘local’,
the fire was in their own backyard, they worked off-season
doing defensive work… and they SHOULD have known all
about that terrain ( AND the risk levels ).
Even if they didn’t… there is DOCUMENTED proof that they
were TOLD / REMINDED about all the dangers of that
terrain that very morning while they were eating breakfast.
The proof of that comes from the same proof that they
( the crew, anyway ) actually did ‘stop for breakfast’
when they first got to Yarnell… and that is where the
45 to 60 minute separation between Marsh and the rest
of them began that morning ( which was never mentioned
in the SAIR. )
That evidence and eyewitness testimony has been
reprinted in at least 3 separate online Mainstream
Media ( MSM ) articles and one of them is linked and
quoted below.
While they were eating breakfast up at the ICP at the Model
Creek Elementary School in Peeples Valley from about 8:00
AM to 8:40 AM… a well-known local hiker and hunter named
Rick McKenzie, whose family had been in Yarnell for over
150 years, sat down and talked to them.
He (Rick) was helping out fire command that morning up
there at the ICP and he sat down with the Granite Mountain
Hotshot crew while they were eating breakfast to make
SURE they knew how dangerous and impassable that
terrain can be before they ever even went up there that day.
He spoke to the crew at the table in general… but
specifically to squad boss Travis Carter…
“Y’all be careful up on that mountain,” Rick told him. “That
brush is so thick that you can’t even crawl through it. And
that manzanita burns hot. If the fire comes down off the
mountain, man, watch out. It’ll blow up.”
So they were TOLD / REMINDED about the high ‘risks’
involved for both ‘making forward progess on a hike’
AND ‘what might happen if the fire got into the bowls’
THAT morning… at breakfast… by someone who
knew the area as well as anyone.
The ‘risks’ should have been ‘fresh on their minds’ at that
point, even if they weren’t thinking much about it on the
drive down to the fire.
Here is just one of the MSM articles that has that
testimony from Rick McKenzie ( no relation to Christopher
MacKenzie ) in it…
Men’s Journal ( Magazine )
Article: The Last Battle of the Granite Mountain Hotshots
By Josh Eells Oct 2013
SR: you have a very distorted view of the 10 & 18… they don’t provide anyone “an out.” they are two different concepts related to dealing with the same situation (wildland fire response).
one of them (the ten standard FIRE ORDERS), are “the rules” in order to engage the fire and the other (the 18 situations that SHOUT WATCHOUT) are prompts or “heads up” situations that require extra attention.
none of them “replace” the other, as you attempt to state… and none of them “provide redundancy”… they are all independent and complimentary of one another.
also: hotshots are 1000 X’s more likely to sprain an ankle during PT than they are on the fireline…
i would suggest you stop trying to talk about things you have absolutely no experience in and stick with your impotent speculations about how crow’s fly.
FullSail continues to show he doesn’t grasp just about every issue he posts about. I particularly like the sneering at ankle sprains and eye injuries, but that’s just me. Takes all kinds, particularly on the internet.
Have to wonder where the urge to be like that comes from. For anyone reading this who’s “just dropping in,” FullSaill has a pattern of making clueless statements that are disruptive both by virtue of potential confusion they can cause, and because they’re often aimed at disrupting dialogue. In this case, someone who knows and works with the 10 and 18 would know that they do create a redundant system. Using the example of an unexpectedly slow rate of travel due to injury (we know FullSail tries to call ankle sprains and eye injuries mere boo-boos, so let’s say someone has heat stress), if you know your fire and weather and have given your crew a good margin of safety, you can deal with the medical issue without the whole crew being at risk. Likewise, probably more relevant to the YHF, lookouts aren’t needed ALL the time. Watchout 12, order 5. One of the other things FullSail does is try to place words in people’s mouths. I never said that the 10 or 18 “replace” each other, as he claims.
Let’s look at another relevant to YHF. Watchout 6 and 7, order 7 (and 8). Well, in that case, if those two Watch Outs apply, among other things if you are able, clear things up.
FullSail is the same guy who claimed that GM would have reasonably been relying on game trails to accomplish their bushwhack through dense (unscouted) chaparral over steep broken rocky ground in a short time. In short, FullSail says a lot of stuff that is simply clearly uninformed and not credible.
well, thanks for actually trying to clarify what you’re trying to say. once again, the 10 & 18 are independent resources:
you utilize one to engage a fire (the 10 standard fire orders)… these were boiled down a while back by someone you’ve probably never heard of, Paul Gleason. who argued that LCES was the nuts and bolts of the 10…
you utilize the other (the 18) to prompt you about “heads up” situations that require extra attention.
although i like the fact that you’re always thinking “outside the box,” to take them into account the way you’ve [attempted] to describe would be very cumbersome to try to utilize in the real world.
i can certainly understand how someone with little to no experience of wildland fire operations might idealize the 10 & 18 to be some sort of great matrix of redundancy. but, that’s not really how it works.
I was talking about risk of serious problems – i.e. burnover. You do something with a 1% chance of that 50 times during your career, you are more likely than not to come up snake eyes.
I think the percentage’s are way different than that. When you start taking those kind of risks the snake eyes may be a higher percentage. The old saying when you start playing with fire you might get burned,
Yes, Fires are actually difficult to model with statistics in general (model accurately, this is), but they clearly were taking outsized risks. Maybe they thought they had a time cushion measured in minutes, but not hours?
Agreed that putting #’s on wildfire risk is very difficult. I was merely illustrating the point with numbers. The point being if you do something with even a small chance of a very bad outcome enough times, don’t be surprised when the bad outcome occurs. This is the statistical illustration of the concept of “bad decisions with good outcomes”. Eventually it catches up with you.
Go back to playing with my Horses and Fishing and hunting. Maybe a little travel.
Don’t have to fight any more crazy fires or deal with crazy Overhead but it use to be FUN.
Do you consider what they did taking an “obvious” risk?
My point was that when doing things that might risk a burnover, a standard of “I think we can make it” is far too dangerous. The standard needs to approach metaphysical certainty of safety (and I know, nothing is ever totally safe).
Nearly all WFF know this, this is not news. This is why there are so few of these events. Eric Marsh knew it. They just made a mistake that day. Others will determine if he was one who pushed the envelope too much. However, as an outsider, it does seem that applying the rules in that situation would have given them pause. Which goes to show the rules might be pretty darn important.
Having been on many trails like this when vegetation over grows the trail some times it is high enough that the trail looks like it stops. Actually when it is only used by hikers they walk under the higher branches of the large bushes. Most open trails for pack horses and riders are 6 to 8 ft. wide and show much better in areal photos. Higher growth of brush at the bottom might obscure the trail and it would still be there and accessible for hikers. Just my thoughts on trail talk.
For context, let’s remember that 1) based on the information available to GM at the time they decided on their bushwhack, they knew they were jumping off of a two-track that proceeded further. There’s no indication they had scouted the whole side of that two-track, so the condition would have been unknown, but the 2-track is going to go to somewhere. As it in fact does. So, what GM should have known, informed by prior experience, and what in fact was the case are consistent.
2) It’s not at all unusual for a two-track to peter out in one direction. GM was hiking, not relying on any vehicles. Not only was what GM should have known, based on experience, consistent with the 2-track, but the fact that it turns into a hiking path at one point is not unusual and would not have impeded GM. IF people are looking for different ways to normalize deviance in terms of making GM’s decision to jump off the 2-track and commit to their bushwhack seem required, any “difference” in the 2-track is useful for that purpose, as a distraction. But, not only would GM likely not have known, at the time they committed to their bushwhack, that the two-track further down stopped being passable by ATVs/ UTVs, HAD they known this, it wouldn’t have been directly relevant to them as they were on foot.
3) Elevation and commitment/duration of exposure. By dropping down, GM rapidly cut off the escape route option of retreating uphill, while they proceeded with a very slow bushwhack through unburned dense brush. Staying high on the 2-track would have both kept a view, and preserved options much better. Then, they could have either decided to make a much shorter committed push where they would have been exposed but for less time, or, as noted multiple times they could have pursued other options.
Basically, the 2-track condition, or where it terminates, is a non-story unless one is looking for distractions. Trails systems tend not to be designed by city planners with computers, and whether or not the trail terminated at Candy Cane Lane or BSR or connected via a connector to BSR, etc. etc. etc. is not a big deal. Known trail versus committed, prolonged bushwhack with escape uphill rapidly lost as an option is the key comparison for decision-making purposes.
All of your points are well taken, and I think you summarize
pretty well that there *must* have been this *accomplish
the mission* factor involved… and that *mission* was
NOT “just be safe” that afternoon.
Even if they *were* leaving the black because of some
perceived level of ‘uncomfort’ ( not believing it really
was safe, lightning concerns, yada, yada, yada ),
then you just pointed out ALL the options that remained
open to them that they did NOT choose that day.
They also had 6+ smartphones and at least one
( perhaps more, according to Brendan McDonough )
portable GPS unit(s) with them. 20 seconds and you
would know EXACTLY where that trail really went.
If just ‘getting out of there safely’ was their only *mission*,
they could have still accomplished that any number
of ways.
Something else was in play that day.
The inability to gauge their own safety against what
they *wanted* ( or were told l) to achieve.
They miscalculated. Badly.
Bad/poor decision WITHOUT a good outcome ( this time ).
Also don’t forget that it really does look like the
“Can you get here a little faster?” request from someone
in fire command heard in the YARNELL-GAMBLE
video is looking more and more like it took place
almost EXACTLY prior to the moment when they decided
to drop down into the fuel-filled box canyon.
Perhaps the sense of heightened/perceived *urgency*
for their *mission* that that radio call conveyed really
did contribute to that fateful decision that day.
More to come on this, I’m sure.
I still think Blue Ridge Hotshot McCord ( who was the
one who shot the YARNELL-GAMBLE video and
apparently the one who chose that mysteriously
descriptive name for the video itself ) needs to be ‘interviewed’ by someone.
What other radio traffic was heard just before/after that
video that didn’t get captured?
Did the caller who was urging them to ‘come a little
faster’ have any response to Marsh’s “They’re comin’
from the heel of the fire” statement… or was that
the actual END of that particular conversation?
We know that at least one person ( McCord ) heard that
ENTIRE conversation on the radio… but he was never
interviewed by ANYONE.
Reply to Bob Powers post on April 8, 2014 at 7:14 am
>> Mr. Powers said…
>> Having been on many trails like this when vegetation over grows
>> the trail some times it is high enough that the trail looks like it
>> stops.
That *appears* to be what *might* have been the case for that
final few hundred or so yards of the ‘alternate escape route’,
as far as getting ALL the way into the BSR compound.
As thick as some of that manzanita appears to have been
right around the southern approach to the compound, coming
north out of that draw, there also *appear* to be one or two
discernible ‘footpaths’ sort of ‘hiding’ under the top growth that
*might* have led right to the edge of the property and ( if there
was no substantial fencing ) also right into the southern edge
of the compound to the south of the actual residence.
Lotta *mights* and *maybes* in there, obviously.
Only someone who was really familiar with that area could
say for sure if these ‘footpaths’ were viable, or not.
And therein lies the real issue.
“Only someone who was really familiar with the area”.
Granite Mountain was NOT ( familiar with the specific area ).
I still think it’s safe to say that the final hundred yards or so
of the ‘alternate escape route’ *might* have been a little
confusing to a line of men who had NOT pre-scouted that
final push into the compound… especially if the area was
then filling with heavy smoke by the time they needed to
navigate through there.
It all still comes down to ( as you have said over and over )
‘planning/scouting’… or lack thereof.
The BSR could have been 20-30 acres and EIGHT to TWELVE
times larger than it really was ( as SPGS1 Gary Cordes seemed
to think )… but still be a questionable location for a ‘safety zone’ if
there really weren’t good, well-defined ‘escape routes’ to get you
there in a hurry. ‘safety zones’ and ‘escape routes’ are
inseparable. They have to BOTH be ‘good to excellent’ or you
have a potential problem in an emergency situation.
As regards the BSR, I’d keep in mind context. GM left the black not because of some of the crazy ideas advanced like being afraid of lightning, but in all likelihood to get to Yarnell to “help,” whatever form that would have taken. So the BSR wasn’t critical as a destination — they weren’t leaving the ability to hunker down in good black just to hunker down at the BSR. Had they been pushed south first, I don’t think they were that fixated on the BSR, anyway, versus simply getting down to Yarnell.
In terms of exposure to risk, the problem is they were continually increasing it versus other options, with the bushwhack being a prime example even once the decision was made to get to Yarnell.
See above. Spot on. Agree.
My response to your other post just above could
have been posted here as well.
There was a *mission*… and that *mission* did
NOT include making just ‘safe’ choices that day.
Not in their minds, anyway.
It was the YARNELL-GAMBLE.
Maybe Blue Ridge Hotshot McCord really did name
his video that way because there was no doubt
in HIS mind what HE was hearing over the radio
at the time he shot that video.
Fire command was asking them to take a chance,
and they were accepting that ‘gamble’.
I still think someone needs to interview McCord
and ask him about the REST of that ‘can you
get here a little faster?’ conversation he
(obviously) overheard on the radio.
No. Context.
The paragraph above that establishes
the context of the statement.
Perhaps THAT is what Blue Ridge
Hotshot McCord thought and *might*
be why he chose to name his video
YARNELL-GAMBLE.
Why do YOU think Blue Ridge Hotshot
McCord ( or anyone ) chose that
specific name for that video?
What do you think would have
prompted him to believe that
YARNELL-GAMBLE was
an appropriate name for it?
Reply to
xxfullsailxx post
April 8, 2014 at 8:35 pm
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>> fire command was
>> not asking them to
>> take a chance.
If Blue Ridge Hotshot
McCord *thought* that
was what he was
hearing over the radio,
that would explain
why he would name
his video…
YARNELL-GAMBLE.
Maybe one day we’ll
hear from him about
that. Someone should
have interviewed him.
No one bothered.
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>> why would i
>> speculate about
>> what someone i
>> don’t know would
>> name their video?
Because it means
something.
He could have chosen
any name… but he
chose…
YARNELL-GAMBLE
…and it’s the video that
captures someone
asking DIVSA Eric
Marsh if he could
‘get to town a little
faster’ circa 1620,
the exact moment
they were about to
decide whether to
drop into the fuel-filled
box canyon… or not.
it’s all about this internet conspiracy theorist with no life who likes to hyper-analyze a situation he has absolutely no direct experience of while hiding behind the cowardly comfort of his anonymous computer keyboard…
want to hear more about it?
cause i could talk about the lack of value of speculation, hindsight bias, conjecture, libel & slander, false allegations, lynch mobs, the plus’s and minus’s of the anonymity of the internet, wannabe investigative journalists, the psycho analysis of narcissistic conspiracy theorists, etc. etc. etc.
right, and in this scenario, (where you have a Div. Sup. and a crew responsible for anchoring and flanking one side of the fire) whose responsibility is it to “identify safety zones and escape routes and make them known?”
the Div. Sups. AND the crewboss’s… enough said.
also WTKTT, why do you continually (and conveniently) leave out the part where Cordes tells Marsh, “and of course, you have the cold black.” ?
SR: you are wrong. they WERE indeed fixated on BSR. Yarnell was a LOOOONG ways away from BSR (and yes, for you, even as the crow flies) and the only way they were going to get there was by buggy. BSR represented the nearest opportunity for them to get reunited with their ride.
i’m sure that you might try to argue now, that the distance they SHOULD consider between BSR and Yarnell is that of a straight line and NOT the road system that they would actually have to drive. because, that makes sense [to you].
Those photos ( and the Parker photo ) were taken here…
34.227511, -112.789962
The two-track road they would head south on in just a few
minutes was exactly 217 feet due south of that little ‘knoll’
they were ‘resting’ on and watching the fire.
In his VIDEO… if Christopher MacKenzie would have kept
panning his camera a little to the right, past the point where he
captured (Misner?) making that (apparently) sarcastic comment
in response to Marsh’s “I could just feel it, ya know” remark to
Steed, and then he (Misner?) spits on the ground… the video
camera would have captured a glimpse of that two-track heading
south… and the view at that point would have matched Marsh’s
later description over the radio of it “heading SOUTH…
mid-slope… cuttin’ over”.
The view directly SOUTH from where they were ‘resting’
looked pretty much exactly like THIS view in one of the
recently available ADOSH photographs…
Just to be clear. I am not talking about the images that were taken later in the day 6/30 (0885-0891). I am referencing the pictures from earlier in the day.(0877-0879 and 0882)
P 10 WAFR (image 0877) appears to me to show the two track and it is captioned with…..Photo taken by a GMIHC member on two-track road early on
June 30, 2013 during test-fire operations
P 12 WAFR (image 0882) doesn’t (in my opinion) show the two track it is captioned with….Photo taken by a GMIHC member on two-track road
early on June 30, 2013 during retardant drop on their burn out operations.
TTWARE said something concerning the two track that seemed to imply that the two track kind of became less of a two track as it moved south and basically ended up as a hiking/game trail as it approached BSR. (TTWARE please correct me if I am mistaken.) Which prompted me to return to the images from Mackenzie (Pre burn) and check the condition of the two track.
So I believe the two track in the images IS the same two track that makes its way SOUTH and the same Two track that makes its way near BSR and Candy Cane Lane.
Image 0882 (and others) seem to show some trail improvement (cuttings) on the lower side of the two track. If this is the case, and the two track had been improved/cleared where the trail was in its widest part, I am just curious how that reflects on the condition of the same two track as it moved south.
Calvin – I guess I misunderstood your earlier question, and I ‘m sorry. What I should have said is “not the portion that we were talking about below.” I see that you are asking a very different question, to which I do not know the answer, although I suspect it is either “yes” or “kind of.” If I get time, I’ll get back to you. 🙂
If I understand your question correctly. even though there are no ‘crew’ pictures of the two-track as it proceeds south NEAR the bowl, there IS a two-track where the photos you reference are taken. Those photos are taken substantially north of the ‘bowl’, at the place where they were cutting line and trying to burn earlier in the day.
The two-track jeep trail which comes up from the old grader, tees-off as it gets up the ridge a ways, and the right-turn passes by the photo site. The left-turn at the ‘T” continues south a ways and nears the ‘bowl’, it becomes a track-and-a-half, and then continues narrowing as I stated in my previous post.
Reply to xxfullsailxx post on April 7, 2014 at 7:35 pm
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>> I just don’t think there’s much more story to tell.
>> The rest of the story died with GM, sad to say.
Perhaps. Time will tell… but some of us still believe the FULL ‘story’ of June 30,
2013, involves more than just why Eric Marsh or Jesse Steed made the decisions
THEY did that day. Entire towns were almost totally lost. MANY more than 19
people COULD have easily died. The ‘complete’ story of that weekend still needs
to be told… and it WILL be… someday ( Hopefully sooner rather than later ).
>> xxfullsailxx also said…
>> some will argue that B. McDonogue (sp.?) has more of the
>> story… i have my doubts… he’s just some dumb kid (no offense meant)
>> in his second year on a hotshot crew… i doubt he really had a clue
>> what all was going on, until it was way too late. but maybe he’ll prove
>> me wrong some day.
Your ‘fire brother’ that you just called a ‘dumb kid’ and ‘clueless’, who
was at the end of his THIRD full season as a fully qualified member
of a Type 1 Hotshot Crew, and who was fully trusted by his own
highly experienced Supervisor to serve as a ‘lookout’ for 18 of his
own ‘fire brothers’…
…is named…
McDonough
Brendan McDonough
** B-R-E-N-D-A-N ** M-C-D-O-N-O-U-G-H
I have my own ideas about who was ‘in search of a clue’ that weekend ( and
there appear to be many )… but it is, at least, customary to try and get their
NAMES right.
WTKTT says:
>>Entire towns were almost totally lost. MANY more than 19
>>people COULD have easily died. The ‘complete’ story of that >>weekend still needs to be told… and it WILL be… someday ( >>Hopefully sooner rather than later ).
wow, so now you’re going to delve in to the politics of defensible space, home owner’s insurance, and evacuation policies… glad you’ve decided so late in life to familiarize yourself with WUI issues throughout the west. good luck with that!
>>** B-R-E-N-D-A-N ** M-C-D-O-N-O-U-G-H
thanks! but why so many hyphens… must be of Slavic descent?… i wasn’t really looking for the correct spelling… just acknowledging that i didn’t know it.
also fyi: my impression is that ** B-R-E-N-D-A-N ** M-C-D-O-N-O-U-G-H was put there because he wasn’t feeling well… GM had the best eyes on the fire that day… a lookout would have been better placed on the ridge line somewhere, in the black. 3 years you say? wow.
>>I have my own ideas about who was ‘in search of a clue’ that >>weekend ( and there appear to be many )…
oh i’m sure you do… i can only imagine what goes on in your maniacal brain that you don’t divulge on this website…
>> WFF said…
>> Yea you know where they deployed that is the only thing known after the
>> photos at the lunch spot. “We have a good idea where and when they
>> started” is speculation.
No. It’s not.
First of all… they did not ‘depart’ on their journey south from ‘the lunch spot’. There
really is no doubt that they ‘departed’ from the location of both the MacKenzie
videos ( 4:02 timeframe ) and the final Wade Parker photo at 4:04… the last known
photo from them and also taken at the same spot as the MacKenzie videos.
The ‘lunch spot’ ( form earlier in the day ) was a little northeast of that 4:00 PM to
4:04 PM ‘resting spot’ and further down the slope. They were close to the
two-track at that last ‘resting spot’ before they ‘gaggled up’ and headed south.
These (different) locations are now all known… so it is not ‘speculation’.
In case you missed the posts on that… the SAIT investigators themselves made
a great effort to nail down these various ‘exact locations’ and there is now a folder
in Mr. Dougherty’s online dropbox containing those results.
That folder is labelled the ‘Stewart Turner’ photos but has the following two
sub-folders in it…
Ashcraft Photo Location
Parker Photo Location
The SAIT actually found the EXACT spot where those photos were taken.
They then took their own GEO-STAMPED photos at those exact locations for the
Ashcraft 2:16 ‘lunch spot’ photo and the 4:04 PM Parker photo at the OTHER spot
that they would later ‘depart’ from… and the GEO stamps are accurate.
The exact location of the 4:04 PM Wade Parker photo ( the last known photo from
them and the location they departed from and headed south ) is…
34.227511, -112.789962
>> WFF also wrote…
>> Here is a question how do we know that when supposedly (paraphrasing)
>> Marsh said “that’s it, that’s exactly what we want” on A/G, he wasn’t talking to
>> Steed and just hadn’t changed his radio to the crew channel?
Because the SAIR says that Marsh specifically ‘called out’ (verbally) to ASM2 and
specifically identified himself ( verbally ) as “Division Alpha”, and specifically used
the entire phrase ‘That’s where we want the retardant’ ( which is absent from your
paraphrase of what was was published in the SAIR ).
If all of that ( in the published SAIR ) is true… then there’s no way that Marsh
could have been talking to Jesse Steed.
Page 27 of the SAIR ( Adobe Reader page 33 )…
_________________________________________________________________
At 1637, ASM2 flies a drop path for a VLAT north of Yarnell west to east and apparently over DIVS A, turning northward to avoid high ground at the end of Yarnell. DIVS A, seeing the flight, calls and calmly says, “[ASM2], Division Alpha, That’s exactly what we’re looking for. That’s where we want the retardant.”
_________________________________________________________________
So the SAIR says the specific ‘call signs’ were there for there to be no question
who Marsh wanted to say that TO, and no question on ASM2’s part that Marsh
was directing that statement to THEM and it was SPECIFICALLY about
‘a retardant drop’.
So… is all that really true?
Is that really what happened?
What is the ‘verifiable proof’ the SAIT had to back this up?
Well… let’s see…
The SAIT chose to PUBLISH both that QUOTE and put a definite TIME on it as if
it was an absolute fact. What made them so sure?
The only reference anywhere else in the SAIT material to this call from Marsh
about ‘retardant’ is in the few notes they made during their interview with Bravo 33.
From the SAIT Yarnell Investigation Notes (YIN)…
__________________________________________________________________
INTERVIEW with Bravo 33 July 9, 2013 – 1700
Interviewees:
John Burfiend-ATS Specialist
Clint Clauson – ATS Trainee
Thomas French – AT Specialist
Interviewers: Mike Dudley, Brad Mayhew, Tim Foley,
Jay Kurth, Jimmy Rocha
We needed to go back to the right flank (16:30 AZ time). Made 3 practice runs. Painted 2. We came around.
Got a call from Division A stating they were going down their escape route to the safety zone. Didn’t know Division A was the superintendent of the Granite Mountain hot shots. Asked him “is everything OK?” He replied “everything is ok, just heading to the safety zone”. We came around, made a practice run through the bowl, west to east. I was talking to Tom about the rising terrain on exit. Division A clad and said “that is what we are looking for, that is exactly right”. Within 5 minutes of that, they went in shelter.
__________________________________________________________________
So according to the SAIT investigator’s own notes… what Bravo 33 said they
heard from Marsh does NOT match what the SAIT ended up publishing as
a ‘direct quote from Marsh’ in there own PUBLIC report.
Bravo 33 ( in their interview ) say they ONLY heard this from Eric Marsh…
“that is what we are looking for, that is exactly right”.
The SAIT then comes up with this and publishes it as if its a direct, verifiable
quote from Eric Marsh…
“[ASM2], Division Alpha, That’s exactly what we’re looking for.
That’s where we want the retardant.”
The Bravo 33 ‘interviewees’ did, in fact, say that “Division A” called THEM… so
we can only assume that means they were remembering they DID hear the
correct “ASM2, Division Alpha” call signs to remove any doubt about whether
Marsh was trying to talk to someone OTHER than them…
…but Bravo 33 doesn’t say they specifically heard the word ‘retardant’ ( much
less the entire phrase “That’s where we want the retardant” ) from Marsh.
The SAIT either just ‘made that up’ or that part of the interview where those
words *might* have been recalled just never made it into the SAIT interview notes.
Either of those explanations would be *odd*… but I suppose anything is possible.
Notice also that Braov 33, themselves, never seems to nail this down to exactly
1637… yet that is the TIME the SAIT published for this transmission. There is no
indication how the SAIT came up with that 1637 timestamp.
** VERIFIABLE TRANSMISSIONS?? CRITERIA??
This actually brings up another important point that hasn’t been discussed
much and it has to do with what criteria the SAIT was actually using when they
say things like ‘verifiable transmissions’ in the SAIR.
Keep in mind that the 1637 “That’s where we want the retardant” transmission
documented above from Marsh to ASM2 is, in fact, being considered a
‘verifiable transmission’ and it is, in fact, the one they are using as the
official END of the 30 minute ‘blackout’ period when they say there WERE no
‘verifiable transmissions’ from GM.
As you can see above, however, the ONLY criteria they seem to be using
for this entire transmission is just that one little moment in the Bravo 33
interview when they say they ( and only they ) RECALL hearing something
like that… which doesn’t even match what the SAIR ended up publishing.
NO ONE ELSE reported having heard this transmissions from Marsh, even
though it was ( apparently ) over the VERY well-listened-to Air to Ground
channel. Only Bravo 33 reports hearing it in THEIR short interview, and
there is no known radio capture of that transmission.
So what kind of game is/was the SAIT really playing here when it comes
to what they considered ‘verifiable transmissions’, and worthy of being
‘acknowledged’ and ‘mentioned’ in their own final public SAIR document?
If their only criteria for ‘verifiable transmissions’ was whether or not just ONE
of their interviewees simply ‘recalls’ hearing something… then they left
awful lot OUT of that SAIR document.
There are any number of OTHER transmissions that day that were not only
‘recalled’ by one ( or even more ) interviewees… there is even defacto radio
capture evidence to back up some of those ‘recollections’…
…yet… a number of those NEVER made it into the report ( but the Bravo 33
recollection of Marsh’s radio message DID make it into the report and
officially ENDS the ‘blackout’ period ).
The Paul Musser radio call to Eric Marsh at 1442 is just ONE of those
‘obvious omissions’. It is backed up by BOTH some radio capture
evidence AND the testimony of others ( Todd Abel, etc. ).
The YARNELL-GAMBLE radio conversation(s) would be another example.
They are just as ‘verifiable’ as some simple (vague) recollection on the part of
Bravo 33… but were never even mentioned in the SAIR document.
So they really were ‘cherry picking’ when it came to what they were going
to call ‘verifiable transmissions’ and what they would not.
Somehow… as vague as Bravo 33’s recollection was… the SAIT thought that
Bravo 33’s recollection of Marsh’s radio call WAS ‘verifiable’… even though
no one else reports having heard it and there is no radio capture of it.
So ‘verifiable’ that they ended up using it as the bracketed END of the
period they chose to call ‘no verifiable transmissions from them’.
That really is rather odd ( or at least rather inconsistent ).
Maybe they thought the idea that Marsh *might* have been asking for a
retardant drop was so important to their OWN narrative that they totally relaxed
whatever criteria they WERE actually using for ‘verifiable transmissions’
in order to ‘paraphrase’ what Bravo 33 said… put their own words in
Eric Marsh’s mouth… and make sure that got published in the SAIR.
I would still love to hear Jim Karels himself explain ( in his own words ) what
they meant by ‘verifiable transmissions’… and why the (vague) Bravo 33
recollection somehow rose to or exceeded that standard ( versus other known
recollections ) in order ‘make the cut’ and be ‘published’ in their final report.
The (completely verifiable) OPS2 Paul Musser radio call to
DIVSA Eric Marsh about whether both Granite Mountain AND Blue
Ridge were still ‘committed to the ridge’ came at 1542 ( 3:42 PM )
and not 1442 as I accidentally typed up above.
Just to be clear… the TWO ‘events’ that the SAIR report itself
said are the START and STOP of the ‘blackout’ period when
they ( in their words ) ‘cannot verify communications’
are as follows.
START: 1604. They don’t say specifically what ‘event’ that
was but they must be referring to the 1604 Parker photo
which was, of course, a ‘verifiable’ text message with
hard-copy reception evidence.
*** 33 MINUTE BLACKOUT *** NO “VERIFIABLE” ***
*** COMMUNICATIONS, ACCORDING TO SAIR ***
STOP: 1637. The vague testimony from ONLY Bravo 33 that
they thought they remembered hearing Marsh say ( their
testimony, not SAIR ) “that is what we are looking for, that is
exactly right”.
From page 1 of the SAIR…
_____________________________________________________
There is a gap of over 30 minutes in the information available for the Granite Mountain IHC. From 1604 until 1637, the Team cannot verify communications from the crew, and we have almost no direct information for them.
_____________________________________________________
So the key line is still this one…
“The TEAM cannot verify communications from the crew.”
Doesn’t say they didn’t HAVE them.
Doesn’t say what the sources might have been.
It just says THEY ‘couldn’t verify’, according to some criteria
of their own which remains unknown and unexplained.
Yet… “The Team” totally accepted that ONE recollection on
(only) Bravo 33’s part of something Marsh seemed to say
to them at 1637… and used that for the official END of
the ‘blackout period’. To them… that supposedly constituted
a ‘totally verified communication from the crew’.
Why did they not ‘question’ that one vague recollection, drop
it into the ‘unverifiable’ category… and then say that the next
‘verifiable’ communication was Steed breaking in on Arizona
16 with his “We are in front of the flaming front” transmission?
The SAIT knew all about the Helmet-Camera video… very
early on. They KNEW there was going to be no way to deny
that it existed… or what was captured on it.
So why didn’t they just call THAT the ‘END’ of the “blackout”
and say the START was 1604 ( Parker photo, verifiable )
and the STOP was 1639 ( Jesse Steed on Helmet Cam )?,
and that the “blackout” was the full 35 minutes in-between?
Somehow… they decided to include this one vague recollection
on Bravo 33’s part in their own ‘verifiable communication’
category… and they used THAT for the official ‘STOP’ of the
supposed ‘blackout’ period, instead of the Helmet Cam video.
The only real explanation is that Jim Karels ( and the SAIT )
really wanted ( for reasons unknown ) that reference to Marsh
talking about a ‘retardant drop’ to make it into the official report…
regardless of whether it was meeting the same ‘verifiable
communications’ criteria they seemed to be applying to all the
other communications we ( and they? ) now KNOW took place
during that 33 minute ‘blackout’.
“The Team could not verify.”
is not the same as…
“The reported events could NOT be verified.”
All that line in the SAIR report means is that THEY could
not find a way to meet THEIR ‘verifiable’ criteria… whatever
that might have been ( since they don’t even say so ) for
certain ‘communications’ that they DID know about.
It doesn’t mean those ‘other’ communications aren’t ‘verifiable’.
Their statement just meant THEY could not ( or WOULD not )
accomplish the task.
Elizabeth, WTKTT, and others who are debating the two-track/single-track,
First, WTKTT, the single-track trail IS visible on Google Earth as it forks left toward BSR. It is also visible as it continues on past the west side of BSR and into the jeep trail off to the north. Not only is this track shown on Google Earth, it is also shown on state land maps (search azland.gov/webapps/parcel and there’s a menu button in the upper right where you can click-on ‘Open Street Map’), AS WELL AS other topographical maps, which list it as a pack trail as it heads east and around to BSR. One other important consideration is that the ‘ranch’ buildings appear to be fairly new, and these trails were probably in existence and in use long before BSR was, hence their appearance on many different maps.
Elizabeth, while the single-track certainly had SOME overgrowth, pre-burn it is visible from the air in many places along the drainage as a totally open traverse. It was a long-used pack/hiking/game trail, which would tend to beat down the overgrowth somewhat. It absolutely would NOT be a bushwhack on the order of the actual decent site.
I’m not trying to put forth an alternate agenda here as much as I’m just trying to add some background detail. It’s quite possible that if GM had proceeded down the single-track track the fire would have roared up that drainage and caught them anyway. The only thing for certain is if they had continued on the single-track, they would have had a few more minutes to be able to observe the fire and weather from the ridge-line before they dropped-down.
>> TTWARE said….
>> Elizabeth, WTKTT, and others who are debating the
>> two-track/single-track.
I’m not really ‘debating’ it. I would agree that it is not ‘technically’
correct to say it was a ‘two-track’ ( UTV capable ) all the way
to the Ranch… but it was THERE as a valid ‘hiking trail’, fer
sure and ( as you point out again ) CLEARLY visible even
from space, all the way to the Ranch ‘area’.
That is never going to change.
I still believe that Google maps is WRONG to be showing
( with Labels option on ) that the end of the eastward leg
of that ‘trail’ is somehow CLEARLY ‘connected’ to the
car-wide jeep trail that emerges from the north side of
the Ranch property… or that there was a totally CLEAR
final north leg all the way to the south side of the Ranch…
but that’s just me. I’m still seeing a lot of manzanita there
on the south side of the Ranch that they would have had
to ‘figure out’ at the last minute. Maybe it was all ‘taller’
than some other stuff and there were ‘footpaths’ they
could see but that don’t clearly show in satellite photos.
Joy and Sonny would probably know about that.
>> TTWARE also wrote
>> It’s quite possible that if GM had proceeded down the
>> single-track track the fire would have roared up that
>> drainage and caught them anyway.
Yes. See posts on this ongoing discussion from MONTHS ago
that even had ‘charts’ which pointed out how, if their ‘rate of
travel’ had fallen below what the SAIR says they were
accomplishing on the first part of the journey ( anchor point
to descent point )… then in various increments of lower
‘mph’ values… exactly where they might have been ‘caught’
in the middle of that other ‘blind canyon’ as the fire came
over those ridges in the 4:40 to 4:55 timeframe.
The ONLY chance of success on that ‘alternate trail’, if they
had chosen the eastward leg into that other ‘blind canyon’,
was to maintain a good pace and hope they reached the
large clearings at the end of that eastward leg.
Only then… given the time and fire progression… would they
still have had ‘choices’. If they didn’t think that last ‘due north’
leg to the Ranch was clear to them… they could have just
bailed out to the southeast towards Candy Cane lane, and
lived to tell the story.
If the fire had reached the ‘mouth’ of that other eastward leg
canyon BEFORE they got there… well… we might have heard
the same “our escape route has been cut off” radio transmission
anyway… and a ‘deployment’ attempt would have simply been in
another place that day.
I still say the IMPORTANT question is… was whoever decided to
NOT go that way and drop into a fuel-filled box-canyon instead
even AWARE that the ‘alternate trail’ was an option.
What did Eric Marsh REALLY mean when he used the phrase
‘predetermined escape route’ over the radio that day?
HOW ‘predetermined’ was it?… and by WHO?
Was it ‘predetermined’ all the way to the ranch, or only just
some kind of vague ‘head south on that two-track’ suggestion?
Or ( perhaps? ) was it actually ‘predetermined’ that they SHOULD
just ‘cross through that box canyon’ by whoever it was that
made the actual ‘predetermination’ that morning?
In other words… was crossing through the canyon actually
part of the ‘predetermined escape route’, or not?
We still don’t really know what Marsh actually meant when
he said ‘predetermined escape route’.
Well said were you saying it was ID or designated trail. You are right though a trail is faster than a bush whack they still may not have had time to get to the Ranch. Although they would have had other options that they did not have in the canyon.
There WAS no “two-track” that could have gotten GM safely and in a timely fashion directly to the Boulder Springs Ranch had they stayed on it.
If GM had not DROPPED OFF into the valley, they would have ended up having to bushwack ANYWAY to get to the BSR, because the overgrown one-track that is in there but not really particularly visible from anything that I have seen goes to CANDY Cane Lane, not to BSR, such that GM would have died in the brush slightly to the southwest of the BSR as opposed dying in the brush to the slight northwest.
Again, folks, before you believe someone who is claiming to assert the facts, do your own research. Or ask someone who has proven that they are doing decent research. Again, there WAS no obvious, easily-traversed, cleared-out, more-quickly-traveled two-track that would have taken GM to the BSR *without* requiring a bit of a bushwack. I say that with all due respect to everyone who has asserted otherwise.
TTWARE – I saw your comment below, which was helpful and for which I thank you, but even that “one-track” does not seem to go directly to the BSR, so that GM still would have had to bushwack back in.
There continues to be a disconnect here. Perhaps Elizabeth is primarily interested in, at all costs, making GM’s decisions look not simply reasonable but in fact the “only” decisions they could have made — scared of lightning, forced to bushwhack by 2-track “disappearance,” etc. I would recommend to Elizabeth that she actually read the posts detailing how the 2-track proceeds towards the BSR and the options available at various points. I also would again recommend to Elizabeth that she seek input from people with legit experience, and further, since she seems completely without relevant real-world experience and some big comprehension gaps, that she travel to AZ, hike the relevant area, and also hike some green chaparral on equivalent terrain. As it is, strictly as a matter of my opinion, her posts read almost like they are astro-turfing a “no negligence here” defense. I am sure of course that she has no such intention, therefore my rec that she travel to AZ and get educated in the hands-on, as opposed to college and grad school, sense.
SR, go read the post below from WTKTT, where he explains that the one-track that was the “other” option (as opposed to dropping down into the valley) goes to CANDY CANE LANE, as opposed to the Boulder Springs Ranch. Therefore, in order to GET to the Boulder Springs Ranch, GM was going to have to come OFF the one-track at some point and bushwack. If that is inaccurate, please explain WHAT part of it is inaccurate. Thanks.
I do, in fact, believe it is wrong for Google maps to
be indicating that the northward leg of that journey
would have been some absolutely CLEAR path
from where the eastward leg of the ‘trail’ terminates
in that large clearing… to the ACTUAL southern
perimeter of the Boulder Springs Ranch… but
huge CAVEAT here…
…that is all based on close inspection of pre-fire
satellite photos.
There does not APPEAR to be near as clear a
path to the actual ‘southern perimeter’ of the
Ranch from that super-large clearing as there
is CLEARLY a path to the SOUTH and around
to Candy Cane lane.
I don’t know why Google Maps ‘Label’ option
didn’t just show THAT route as the ‘continuation’
of that eastward trail since the continuation is
so much more obvious in that direction ( in the
satellite photos ) than it is in the northerly
direction towards the Ranch.
Actual ‘bushwhacking’ to traverse that northern
leg and get into the Ranch area? I don’t know.
I guess it would have depended on the height
of all that Manzanita clearly shown there.
If it was ‘taller’ than some of the other stuff…
maybe it would have been more like
‘bushducking’ than ‘bushwhacking’ with some
foot-paths visible that aren’t clear in satellite
imagery.
I suppose Joy Collura and Tex (Sonny) Gilligan
might know the answer to that one.
All I know is… if whoever was looking at ‘Google
Maps on an iPad’ that morning completely
trusted that the ‘trail’ went ALL THE WAY into
the BSR compound itself like the other parts
of that ‘two-track’ or ‘single track’… that wasn’t
the case. It would have gotten a little ‘confusing’
for those last coupla hundred yards to men who
were not familiar with the area at all and who had
done NO scouting of the full trip themselves.
Don’t forget about the SMOKE at that point.
It probably would have been pretty bad, at that point.
It’s actually doubtful that by the time they reached
the bottom of that eastward leg that they would
have even been able to SEE the BSR itself still
a few hundreds yard to the NORTH and NOT
right there at the end of the eastward leg of
the ‘trail’ they would have come down on.
“…that is all based on close inspection of
pre-fire satellite photos.”
That is not actually true.
There are other ground-level photographs
that reveal some good details here.
If this ‘how clear was the path from
the end of the eastward leg, north into
the ranch’ question is being revisited, don’t
forget there is always the photograph
of the ‘southern approach’ to the Ranch
that was taken by hiker Joy Collura
THAT MORNING ( June 30, 2013 )…
It was taken the morning of the incident itself,
as Joy and Tex (Sonny) Gilligan were
heading up into the Weaver Mountains to
look at the Yarnell Hill Fire for themselves
and they passed by the Boulder Springs
Ranch in about the same general area
where that eastward two-track terminated.
That entire area in the foreground is the
southern approach to the Ranch as it
looked THAT DAY… and shows pretty
clearly the possible ‘tangled mess’ that
GM would have had to deal with for the last
few hundreds yards of their journey after
turning north at the bottom of the eastward
leg of the ‘escape route’ trail…
The only assertion was that the 2 track would have been faster and possibly safer if they had to drop off the back side of the ridge. Much more choices that could be made than down into the canyon. Again the real problem was there was no escape route.
to BSR from the top of the fire. Without the knowledge they chose one of the worst decisions to head to the Ranch not knowing what they would have to do to get there. Or even how they would get there. No plan between point A and point B and they referred to it as an escape route. I still say the decision to leave the black was when they kicked the dominos over, and this tragic event started to unwind. The decisions from that point on just kept getting worse.
Hey Bob!
I think it’s time everyone,
Elizabeth
SR
WFF
Wantstoknowthetruth
etc.
reveal their complete names just like John, Rod, you and I do!, then we should meet at the Ranch House Cafe in Yarnell (I already have four wheel drive vehicles lined-out).
I also have a feeling Maclean’s snooping around in here somewhere (as all good authors do). John, you like your eggs scambled, over easy or sunny side up!
Larry, folks here already know alllll about me – first and last names, training, background, etc. 🙂 What more information about me do you want, Larry? Please contact me at [email protected] and tell me what more you need to know about me. I can send you a copy of my birth certificate, I can send you pictures of my non-visible moles, I can send you pictures of my teeeeeeny tiny tattoos. Whatever it takes to cement in YOUR mind that I am who I am I would be happy to do, Larry. Also, aren’t you and Bob RETIRED? That would explain why you are willing to plaster your name all over this website and current fire guys who are employed by the state and federal government and are trying to keep a low profile are not. Bob’s mentee, for example, is, as best I can tell, basically retired, but he still does odd fires and random overhead stuff here and there, and he *still* does not want his name all over this website.
Also, I’ll go to breakfast with you, Larry. I love breakfast – most important meal of the day. When would you like to do that? E-mail me, and we can set something up. 🙂
WTKTT April 7 1:47 PM check out his Google earth Map of the fly thru on that trail it to me is the classic 3 mph. double time it off the mountain. And if you notice several spots that could have served as SZ or the ranch on the back side before the drop into the BSR drop off and into the desert. Again scouting would have and should have been done to ID escape route and alternatives.
A lot of measurements and math was done a long time ago now
with regards to that ‘alternate escape route’.
IF they had been able to maintain the same FORWARD rate of
travel that the SAIR says they did from the anchor point area to
the ‘Descent Point’… then they *MAY* have made it to the
southern perimeter of the ranch just a few minutes before
the fireline reached the northern perimeter…
…but I still think once they realized they had to ‘figure out’
those final few hundred yards to the ranch ( and seen how
close the fireline was to the north and how fast it was heading
south ) they would have probably just exited SOUTH and
AWAY from the approaching fire out the draw and on to the
Candy Cane Lane area. Rushing headlong ( due north ) through
the draw and TOWARDS the fire and smoke, wouldn’t have
been the best idea in the world that afternoon.
Regardless… there is no question that ‘trail’ was there… and
it COULD have been used as an alternate way to get to the
BSR that afternoon.
The REAL question is ( and has always been )… was whoever
made the decision to drop into the fuel-filled box canyon even
AWARE of that option? There is still no definitive proof that
the person(s) deciding to drop into the box canyon had any idea
that alternate route even existed.
When Marsh reported ( several times ) over the radio that
Granite Mountain was ‘making their way out the predetermined
escape route’.
WHAT did that really mean?
THAT still hasn’t really been determined.
WHO decided what this ‘predertmined route’ was that Marsh
referred to ( multiple time )… and WHEN did they decide it?
Was the ‘predetermined escape route’ the alternate trail…
or did someone actually draw their finger over a fuel-filled
box canyon on a Google Map showing on an iPad and suggest
THAT was, in fact, their idea of an ‘escape route’? That’s still a
very important ‘detail’ about June 30, 2013 that hasn’t been
resolved yet.
Reply to Bob Powers post on April 7, 2014 at 2:52 pm
>> Mr. Powers wrote…
>> And if you notice several spots that could have served as SZ
>> or the ranch on the back side before the drop into the BSR drop
>> off and into the desert.
Yes. At the exact point where the ‘eastward leg’ of that
‘alternate escape route’ comes out of its own ‘blind canyon’
and it would have been time for them to evaluate/decide
whether to now start on the due-north final part of their
journey through the draw and on to the southern perimeter
of the BSR…
…there was a VERY large ‘clearing’.
ALMOST as large as the non-structure occupied cleared
area of the Boulder Springs Ranch itself.
I still think they would have had time to ‘bail out’ direct southeast
on the CLEARLY visible continuation of that ‘trail’ around to
the Candy Cane lane area… but that HUGE clearing at the
very base of that eastward leg is there… and might have
come into play if the timing required it.
I have completed uploading all files to the Serious Accident Investigation Report and the ADOSH investigation. The last big block of video uploaded was the Helm’s Ranch Security Camera video files in the SAIR report.
Once again… THANK YOU, John. I know it has been a
tremendous effort on your part to get this public FOIA ( Freedom
Of Information Act ) material posted online… but it is VERY
much appreciated.
One minor nit, though.
On your page of links where all the SAIR FOIA/FOIL material is
listed… which is here…
…there are the following two folders at the bottom of the list…
A51-Foley Site Visit Video:
A52-Helm Ranch Photos Pre-Fire:
That last one… which supposedly contains photographs of
the Helms’ Ranch ( Boulder Springs Ranch ) taken BEFORE
the fire… has a broken link.
Well… it’s not actually broken… but clicking that ‘Helm Ranch
Photos Pre-Fire’ link just takes you to the same ‘Foley Site
Visit’ folder as the link just above it.
Any chance of fixing the ‘A52-Helm Ranch Photos Pre-Fire:’
link so it actually shows those Boulder Springs Ranch photos?
Once again… THANK YOU for everything… including your
extraordinary patience with this ongoing discussion.
I’m with fullsail rate of travel is irrelevant. The lesson learned is in the mistake. Dropping off the road into the green possibly without a lookout. They sacraficed their ability to monitor the fire behavior going on and their ability to react. I haven’t seen anything yet that convinces me that they thought they were taking anything other than calculated risk with the observed behavior being an eastward movement that they observed for several hours. I am looking at some information that shows the fire may have been closer, but I haven’t figured it yet. There is also some indication that the forecast weather change may have been miscommunicated. There was a change at around 2:45 to 3. I still haven’t seen anything to indicate what was thought about it.
I don’t believe there is a single chance that anyone has any idea what the rate of travel was or that it would matter. Pure speculation. If they were going 100 or .01, dropping into the drainage is still the problem. Has been since July. Speculating what the rate of travel in brush was there that day, is 4th grade amature hour. Remeinds me of Ford/Chevy arguments. So if the point is that going down into a green drainage where you couldn’t see was a bad idea, it doesn’t take or require rate of travel to see that.
But, we do know where they deployed, for a fact. We have a good idea where and when they started. As a factual matter, the rate of travel (painfully slow) that they experienced matched up with what they would have reason to expect when they dropped down. Rate of travel is important. If they could have gotten to the ranch in 5 minutes, obviously we wouldn’t be having this discussion. Slow rate of travel is what made dropping down such a bad decision. Likewise, evaluation of the actual escape routes available during the bushwhack requires rate of travel as a consideration. Timed escape routes….i.e. rate of travel.
One lesson learned is in fact that rate of travel is key.
Yea you know where they deployed that is the only thing known after the photos at the lunch spot. “We have a good idea where and when they started” is speculation. “they would have reason to expect” is speculation. “Slow rate of travel is what made dropping down such a bad decision”, I disagree turn them around, rate of travel is incident to dropping off into a green drainage with no view. They dropped down lost their SA and ability to react to new changes. You don’t drop down it doesn’t matter how fast travel would have been. It doesn’t matter where the two track went they stay high and they would have kept their options open. Here’s my speculation, dropping down to me means they didn’t have a perception of a threat, they didn’t feel there would be a threat. That they would make and there wasn’t going to be anything close to them when they got there.
Here is a question how do we know that when supposedly (paraphrasing) Marsh said “that’s it, that’s exactly what we want” on A/G, he wasn’t talking to Steed and just hadn’t changed his radio to the crew channel?
WFF you make several good points but then state they took a calculated risk. They did not have a perceived threat? That tells me you think it is OK to not evaluate things that could happen and check the 10 and 18. They did not do either. Going back to the original discussion it was all about why they took a route that was very slow going and they should have known better. But then they should have known better than to do what they did when they left the black. The final out come has to do with the rules regardless of how they got there.
Well Bob you can speculate on what I think when ever it makes you happy. I didn’t say anything about what I would do or thought was OK. I speculated that they didn’t percieve a risk. Risk is walking out into traffic, calculated risk is watching for an opening in traffic that you think you can make it across. You’ve got allot of experience don’t discredit it by saying you never took calculated risk. That is what you used to do and what we still do. Burning is calculating that you can hold the road and using whatever mitigation you need to increase your odds. Putting in line on top of a ridge is calculated risk, ridgetops increase the odds of holding the line. When the PIG is 10%, it’s still that 10 out of 100 emmbers are going to start, but you’d burn with a 10% wouldn’t you. I’ve done allot of burning at higher than that. It does not appear that they percieved the risk. They made a mistake that I don’t think they percieved. Leaving the black and walking down the two track didn’t violate anything. They could have turned around and gone back. You said your self they could have bailed off the back. Someone also said that the two track went somewhere. Leaving the black wasn’t the mistake. Is it just impossible that they didn’t see it coming?
While I agree with your risks listed I never took a calculated risk when it came to safety. I guarantee it. I never had a accident with crews under me of worse than a twisted ankle. No broken bones and no deployments. 3 summers hot shots, 4 summers Engine Foreman, crew boss, sector boss, division boss, Type two line and fire boss, and ops and IC type two. Safety and fire safety were my priorities and they served me well discussed that with Gary way back. I lived and preached the 10 and 13 my entire carrier. I got a lot of rewards for my safety record and served on R5 Fire Safety First committee 1973. That’s where my real reputation in Wild Land Fire is and I am proud of it. when I talk about calculated risks I am talking SAFETY I believe they felt they could beat the fire to the ranch SZ and then down the road and out. Nothing heroic nothing fancy just decided to get off the mountain with out a safety plan. Can’t prove it so just my thoughts.
Agreed that staying on the two-track that Elizabeth may want to disappear would have kept their options open and been the way to go. In terms of weight to give 1) green drainage, 2) no view and no lookout, and 3) inevitable painfully slow speed, it’s a fair point that they all work together, if that’s your point. If GM was only going to spend 1 minute in the green, as an extreme example, though, I’d say the bushwhack would have been reasonable based on what they knew when they dropped down. But, it was obviously going to leave them exposed for much longer.
In terms of your assertion that dropping down meant that GM didn’t perceive there to be a threat, WFF, consider that there’s a difference between feeling there’s no threat, and feeling you can pull something off. Context suggests the latter. And in fact, given weather and fire behavior, their believing there was no threat again would be quite strange.
OK we don’t know what was obvious to them, so you’re speculating. We always take calculated risk, everytime we go to a fire. It’s what we percieve the odds are and we always mitigate to our advantage. That’s no revelation, or shouldn’t be. An emtire IHC got wiped out, so yea quite strange since you’re going for understatement. Your on the RTS bandwagon about Eric aren’t you? Prove it without speculation, second, or thrid hand information. Do it I want to see it, first hand. I think you’ve got nothing. I want you show me it was negligence, or it’s just slander.
Your problem you don’t want to believe what has already been said. RTS saw Eric do it as did current HS Superintendents and talked to him about it. It is fact not fiction or slander first hand knowledge by RTS who also received the information from Superintendents that surveyed the Fire and discussed what happened. If you want something more you may have to wait for the law suits if they make it to court.
How did they mitigate the risk when they dropped into the bowl? It seems as if they just went for it. Would have to believe that they did not perceive any real risk. If you start doing things that have a 99% chance of being safe on a regular basis, your chances of being an old hotshot are not going to be very good.
SSR – Is the question you asked trying to determine whether they did realize it or not, or asking the reason why they did not realize it?
If the former, I do not think they could have realized it because I really do not think they were wanting to chance dying. If the latter, I don’t know why they did not realize it.
WantsToKnowTheTruthsays
Reply to WFF post on April 7, 2014 at 11:25 am
>> WFF said…
>> Yea you know where they deployed that is the
>> only thing known after the photos at the lunch
>> spot. “We have a good idea where and when
>> they started” is speculation.
No. It’s not.
First of all… they did not ‘depart’ on their journey
south from ‘the lunch spot’. There really is no
doubt that they ‘departed’ from the location of
both the MacKenzie videos ( 4:02 timeframe )
and the final Wade Parker photo at 4:04… the
last known photo from them.
The ‘lunch spot’ was a little northeast of that
4:00 PM to 4:04 PM ‘resting spot’ and further
down the slope. They were close to the
two-track at that last ‘resting spot’.
These (different) locations are now all known…
so it is not ‘speculation’.
In case you missed the posts on that… the SAIT
investigators themselves made a great effort
to nail down these various ‘exact locations’ and
there is now a folder in Mr. Dougherty’s online
dropbox containing those results.
That folder is labelled the ‘Stewart Turner’ photos
but has the following two sub-folders in it…
Ashcraft Photo Location
Parker Photo Location
The SAIT actually found the EXACT spot where those
photos were taken.
They then took their own GEO-STAMPED photos at
those exact locations for the Ashcraft 2:16 ‘lunch spot’ photo and the 4:04 PM Parker photo at the
OTHER spot that they would later ‘depart’ from…
and the GEO stamps are accurate.
The exact location of the 4:04 PM Wade Parker
photo ( the last known photo from them and the
location they departed from and headed south ) is…
34.227511, -112.789962
>> WFF also wrote…
>> Here is a question how do we know that when
>> supposedly (paraphrasing) Marsh said “that’s it,
>> that’s exactly what we want” on A/G, he wasn’t
>> talking to Steed and just hadn’t changed his
>> radio to the crew channel?
Because the SAIR says that Marsh specifically
‘called out’ (verbally) to ASM2 and specifically
identified himself ( verbally ) as “Division Alpha”,
and specifically used the word ‘retardant’ ( which
is absent from your paraphrase of what was
was published in the SAIR ).
Page 27 of the SAIR ( Adobe Reader page 33 )…
__________________________________________
At 1637, ASM2 flies a drop path for a VLAT north of Yarnell west to east and apparently over DIVS A, turning northward to avoid high ground at the end of Yarnell. DIVS A, seeing the flight, calls and calmly says, “[ASM2], Division Alpha, That’s exactly what we’re looking for. That’s where we want the retardant.”
__________________________________________
So the SAIR says the specific ‘call signs’ were
there for there to be no question who Marsh
wanted to say that too, and no question on ASM2’s
part that Marsh was directing that statement
to THEM and it was SPECIFICALLY about
‘a retardant drop’.
So… is that really true?
Is that what really happened?
Well… let’s see…
The SAIT chose to PUBLISH both that QUOTE
and put a definite TIME on it as if it was an
absolute fact. What made them so sure?
The only reference anywhere else in the SAIT
material to this call from Marsh about ‘retardant’
is in the few notes they made during their
interview with Bravo 33.
From the SAIT Yarnell Investigation Notes (YIN)…
__________________________________________
INTERVIEW with Bravo 33 July 9, 2013 – 1700
Interviewees:
John Burfiend-ATS Specialist
Clint Clauson – ATS Trainee
Thomas French – AT Specialist
Interviewers: Mike Dudley, Brad Mayhew, Tim Foley,
Jay Kurth, Jimmy Rocha
We needed to go back to the right flank (16:30 AZ time). Made 3 practice runs. Painted 2. We came around.
Got a call from Division A stating they were going down their escape route to the safety zone. Didn’t know Division A was the superintendent of the Granite Mountain hot shots. Asked him “is everything OK?” He replied “everything is ok, just heading to the safety zone”. We came around, made a practice run through the bowl, west to east. I was talking to Tom about the rising terrain on exit. Division A clad and said “that is what we are looking for, that is exactly right”. Within 5 minutes of that, they went in shelter.
__________________________________________
So according to the SAIT investigator’s own
notes… what Bravo 33 said they heard from
Marsh does NOT match what the SAIT ended
up publishing as a ‘direct quote from Marsh’
in there own PUBLIC report.
Bravo 33 says they heard…
“that is what we are looking for, that is exactly right”.
The SAIT then comes up with this and publishes
it as if its a direct, verifiable quote from Eric Marsh…
“[ASM2], Division Alpha, That’s exactly what we’re looking for. That’s where we want the retardant.”
The Bravo 33 ‘interviewees’ did, in fact, say that
“Division A” called THEM… so we can only assume
that means they did hear the correct “ASM2,
Division Alpha” call signs were present…
…but Bravo 33 doesn’t say they specifically heard
the word ‘retardant’ from Marsh. The SAIT either
just ‘made that up’ or that part of the interview
never made it into the SAIT interview notes.
Notice also that Braov 33, themselves, never
seems to nail this down to exactly 1637… yet
that is the TIME the SAIT published for this
transmission. There is no indication how the
SAIT came up with that 1637 timestamp.
OK I didn’t say they left from the lunch. Congrats on the Mckenzie pic. So you know that wasnt taken while moving? I doubt it. With Marsh good I’m glad that isn’t the case.
Two things:
1. xxfullsailxx – I’m apologize to you. Many months ago, I thought you were just trying to be disruptive, and I realize now that I misunderstood what you were doing and, more importantly, WHY. I am sorry for being unkind to you. I apologize.
2. Does ANYONE have a photo taken AFTER the fire that shows that the two-track that GM was on before they then dropped into the valley actually EXTENDS southeast (then curves back a bit northish) to the BSR, such that GM COULD have stayed on that allegedly-existing two-track rather than dropping off into the valley? I have not seen a SINGLE photo taken AFTER the fire that reveals an obvious and well-defined two-track that GM could have stayed on and taken to the BSR at the exact point when they instead dropped down into the valley. If anyone has seen one in the HUNDREDS of pictures that are publicly available, please let me know (either here or via e-mail to [email protected]). Thanks. (This is relevant to Bob Power’s point to xxfullsailxx below.)
Sounds like Elizabeth is trying to “disappear” the two-track for purposes of analyzing YHF. Never existed. Never heard of that 2-track guy, officer.
Bob’s point regarding the 2 track is quite sound, and based on experience. And, one further benefit is that GM would have kept elevation for longer had they stayed with the two track, with obvious implications. Since GM chose not to stay on the 2-track, “disappearing” it seems irrelevant, anyway. They chose not to follow the obvious way down.
Elizabeth, you again need to find people with legit experience to get info from. Getting out to AZ wouldn’t be a bad idea, either.
>> SR said…
>> And, one further benefit is that GM would have kept
>> elevation for longer had they stayed with the two track,
>> with obvious implications.
Most definitely. If they had just kept walking south on
that two-track… it would have EVENTUALLY reached
that point where it was going to take the eastward
turn and want to drop them down into another
‘fuel-filled canyon’ for that eastward leg towards the
Boulder Springs Ranch…
However… they would have been CLIMBING even
higher during that continued SOUTHERN trek and
at the point where they would have then had to
decide whether to continue on the eastward part
of the two-track ( into that other canyon )… they
would have had a CLEAR VIEW looking back
to the north/northeast of what the fire was doing,
and its incredible speed increase SHOULD have
been quite evident at that point… at that high
vantage point.
All they had to do then was realize the whole plan to
get to that Ranch was now ‘not an option anymore’,
and drop off that high point to the south towards the
Congress side of the ridge and work their way east
towards the Candy Cane lane area, instead. ( which
is EXACTLY what the hikers Tex (Sonny) Gilligan and
Joy Collura did that day ).
I response to your query regarding the two-track, here are some details that were provided to me by a highly reliable source who is very familiar with the area in question:
The use of the descriptive term “two-track” becomes a bit of a mis-nomer, as the road passes by the bowl and GM’s point of decent. It’s more the size of a ‘track-and-a-half’, that continues to decrease in size as it heads slightly SW, until reaching the top of the rise, where it becomes a single track. When that trail reaches the next drainage over from ‘the bowl’, it turns eastward, following the drainage down. This portion is a very rugged single-track, sort of a ‘pack-trail’, if you will, and not even the sort of thing an ATV could traverse in either direction. Because it proceeds close besides, and then, back and forth through what is a pretty significant drainage, it may have only been barely evident, if at all, in any before OR after pictures taken in that area.
As far as how clear the trail was pre-burn from an egress standpoint, one would have to assume that there would be SOME over-grown brush affecting movement. But, having said that, the fact that the trail had been there for a LONG time, and was used periodically by hikers, as well as game, would lead one to assume that it would be an easier slog than a place where no trail existed at all.
In addition, I just pulled up google earth to look at the area, and if you make sure the ‘roads’ layer is checked, it shows the progression of this ‘roadway’, down the drainage and all the way back around to the Boulder Springs Ranch.
I used 2 track sience it was designated as such in the conversations. More of a basic trail, hiking, horses, Maybe mortercycles or maybe cattle. Used from the ranch to get to the top of the mountain. My experience says its a trail that starts at the ranch or end of the road. Not having scouted the ESCAPE ROUTE lose terminology I would have stayed on a trail not gone into thick brush and a canyon. My lesson in life, never on a fire go into a brush filled canyon for any reason or any body and Always know what the fire is doing and have a lookout.
Because there’ve been a considerable number of fanciful or downright strange assertions surrounding the bushwhack, pardon me for stating the obvious here, but: having something peter out into a foot trail isn’t at all unusual. So, before someone says, well, maybe they knew that the 2-track portion ended, so had no choice but to drop down on a bushwhack. No. Staying on the 2-track would have been the thing to do. Though staying in the black would have been better.
Everything you say above is true.
It ( the two-track ) turned more into just a ‘hiking trail’
as it turned eastward and descended into that ‘other’
drainage/canyon feature…
…but even with ‘Labels’ turned OFF in Google maps…
it is clearly visible from satellites all the way through
that ‘drainage/canyon’.
One minor correction to what you said, though…
>> TTWARE said…
>> In addition, I just pulled up google earth to look at the
>> area, and if you make sure the ‘roads’ layer is checked,
>> it shows the progression of this ‘roadway’, down the
>> drainage and all the way back around to the Boulder
>> Springs Ranch.
Yes… it does… However… the Google ‘Labels’ option is
making a critical mistake down there at the bottom of
that ‘two-track/hiking trail’.
The Google Maps ‘Label’ option is trying to make it
appear that that ‘two-track/hiking trail’ connects
DIRECTLY to the Boulder Springs Ranch and then
even goes on to become a contiguous part of the
full-road jeep-trail that exits the BSR on the northern
perimeter.
That is NOT the case.
That ‘two-track/hiking trail’ is actually more meant to
be a ‘connector’ to the Candy Cane Lane area and
does NOT actually go ‘directly’ to the Boulder Springs
Ranch. There is a ‘draw’ there at the end of the eastward
leg of that ‘trail’ and while the BSR would probably
have been in view to the due north, at that point, passing
north through that drainage and then through the heavy
manzanita on the southern side of the Ranch does
NOT appear to have been all that clearly marked.
They would still have had to sort of ‘figure out’ that
final due-north leg of their journey and do some
‘bushwhacking’ just to make it to the southern perimeter
of the Ranch ( while now hiking due north and straight
at the oncoming fireline/smoke ).
Their best option, at that point, would have been to
just exit southeast through the draw and over towards
the Candy Cane Lane area instead of still trying to
make the Ranch.
If this ‘how clear was the path from the end of the
eastward leg, north into the ranch?’ question is being
revisited, don’t forget that it’s not all based on
Google or satellite imagery. There are some good
ground-level photos to look at as well.
There is always the photograph of the ‘southern
approach’ to the Ranch that was taken by hiker Joy
Collura THAT MORNING ( June 30, 2013 )…
It was taken the morning of the incident itself, as Joy
and Tex (Sonny) Gilligan were heading up into the
Weaver Mountains to look at the Yarnell Hill Fire for
themselves and they passed by the Boulder Springs
Ranch in about the same general area where that
eastward two-track terminated.
The entire area in the foreground of that photograph
is, in fact, the southern approach to the Boulder
Springs Ranch as it looked THAT DAY… and shows
pretty clearly the possible ‘tangled mess’ that GM
would have had to deal with for the last few hundreds
yards of their journey after turning north at the bottom
of the eastward leg of the ‘escape route’ trail…
Reply to Elizabeth post on April 7, 2014 at 8:51 am
>> Elizabeth asked…
>>
>> 2. Does ANYONE have a photo taken AFTER the fire that
>> shows that the two-track that GM was on before they then
>> dropped into the valley actually EXTENDS southeast (then
>> curves back a bit northish) to the BSR, such that GM
>> COULD have stayed on that allegedly-existing two-track
>> rather than dropping off into the valley?
There is a PUBLIC YouTube video which is a complete
“YOU ARE THERE” fly-through of that alternate escape route.
It’s been sitting in a PUBLIC YouTube account since November
30, 2013.
That ‘fly-through’ video of the alternate escape route is here…
Here is the ‘About’ information accompanying that video…
TITLE: Fly-through of alternate route for GM Hotshots on 06/30/13
Published on Nov 30, 2013
A fly-through of the alternate escape route that could have been
taken by the Granite Mountain Hotshots on the afternoon of June
30, 2013… if they had only known about it. There is still no definitive
proof ( as of this date ) that any of the men were actually aware of
this alternate route that afternoon. The point where the roll of pink
tape was found ( which is shown in the video ) is assumed to be
the point where they actually left the two-track high ridge road
and descended into the box canyon.
Also… there was a post just a few days ago with some links to
some *new* post-fire photographs in the ADOSH material that
might be what you are looking for.
Here is a reprint of that post from a few days ago…
>> WantsToKnowTheTruth on April 3, 2014 at 12:43 pm said:
>> Reply to SR post on April 3, 2014 at 9:12 am
I still believe there’s a good chance that the ‘swiss cheese’
model was TOTALLY in play at 4:20 PM… and that the moment
Captain Jesse Steed saw that Ranch come into view… he
still had NO IDEA where that high-ridge two-track really went.
Even if someone had simply TOLD him that two-track went
all the way to the Ranch… from that ‘Descent Point’ where
he was standing it was still impossible to ‘see’ that and he
may have then doubted anything anyone even ‘told’ him.
If anyone else still has ANY doubts that it was IMPOSSIBLE
to see, from that point, where the two-track really went as
it headed south from that point… there is an amazing new
set of pictures released with the ADOSH material that
further proves that.
Photos 3-9 are actually a panaorama sequence taken at the exact
spot where Tex (Sonny) Gilligan found the roll of pink tape/flagging
at the ‘Descent Point’.
Photo 3 starts looking north back towards the anchor point and the
panorama sequence ends with photo 9 looking due south down
the two-track trail.
This is after the burn… but this photo was taken standing at the
EXACT spot where GM would have left the two-track road, and the
EXACT spot where Tex (Sonny) Gilligan found the roll of pink tape…
and it shows the EXACT view you would have had looking south
along the two-track at that point.
The trail starts to CLIMB away at that point and curl around the hill
and you can only see another 100 feet or so of the trail.
It is IMPOSSIBLE to tell where that trail goes at this point with
your own eyes.
You would HAVE to have known where it goes from that point.
If you did NOT have that prior knowledege… then dropping
into the canyon would have looked like the ONLY option,
regardless of what a PITA it was going to be.
Since you can only safely have one hyperlink in a post
here on this WordPress deal without risking a fall into
‘Message waiting for moderation’… here is a FOLLOWUP
post with another link to one of the specific photos
shown above.
This is the YOU ARE THERE photo… seeing exactly
what you could ( and could NOT ) see standing exactly
where Jesse Steed was standing. ( This is post-burn,
of course, but you will still get the full experience ).
The view is directly SOUTH, looking down the two-track,
from the ‘Descent Point’.
Just to the left ( out of frame ) would be the view down i
nto the box canyon and on to the Boulder Springs Ranch
in the distance.
Same spot as above… but this photo has just a bit of the
Boulder Springs Ranch on the left side. It is still the ‘view’
looking south down the two-track at the exact place the
roll of pink tape was found.
GPS stamp in this photo is… 34.221465, -112.781978
Camera: Pentax WG-3 GPS
Lens: 4.5 mm
Exposure: Auto exposure, 1/320 sec, f/7.9, ISO 125
Flash: Auto, Did not fire
Focus: Normal
Date: July 18, 2013 9:06:45 AM
Location: 34° 13′ 17.3″ North, 112° 46′ 55.1″ West
Location Decimal: ( 34.221465, -112.781978 )
Fullsail—To bring this discussion back into perspective.
Would you have done a bush whack thru heavy chaparral when you were in a hurry to get to a SZ ?
GM committed to a slow decent thru heavy brush which had not burned in over 40 years.
There rate of travel may have been faster by measuring the zig zag decent. But the distance in a striate line to reach there objective was taking a lot longer to achieve.
Working thru thick brush, following openings that you still have to cut openings thru and running into boulders that you have to go around or over is very time consuming.
Thus the travel is not at a normal crew pace. Their decision to drop into the bowl and thick brush field is in itself puzzling it was there back yard they should have known what it would take to do that.
Even if not scouted common science says the 2 track would take you to the Ranch. The 2 track had to start some where the Ranch or the end of the road it did not start from the top of the hill. The 2 track would have been way faster travel than what they did. Estimating rate of travel is just that an estimate of time and distance, or from point a to point b. When they left the 2 track there rate of decent was way slower and that is the fact that has been suggested. Another poor decision that should have been a major concern to the crew before they ever left the black,
In terms of time of travel, one key underlying point here is that time of exposure to risk is the thing that matters in the context of going through that bowl. (Or, elsewhere, time to reach an objective for other reasons.) There is no “A for effort” given. While FullSail’s assertion that GM could have kept a normal pace is not credible given conditions, let’s even say, hypothetically, that they were walking at 4 mph but having to circle around a lot. They were still moving forwards at less than a shopping mall pace. They were still exposed to a fire below and anticipated, realized weather shift and an uphill escape route behind them over uneven, rocky ground, dense brush, etc.
again, your reading comprehension leaves a lot to be desired. nowhere did i indicate that they would have been able to maintain a “normal crew pace.” what i was giving you with the 3 mph expected crew pace, was a frame of reference for you to understand just how far off your .5 mph assertion was.
there is nothing to indicate that GM perceived themselves as “at risk” to the fire when they made their descent. if they felt imminently threatened by the fire (like they might have needed an escape route) they would have stayed in the black.
their miscalculation was the fire behavior, not the route hiked. it’s easy for someone like you to make judgments in the after math of a tragedy like this… but your judgments are mis-guided, much like your logic.
#1. they weren’t in a hurry to get to a safety zone. they were in a hurry to get to a position where they could get a new assignment.
#2. i never said they were travelling at a normal crew pace… i said that .5 mph was a ridiculous assertion, which it is. nothing about the terrain looked all that difficult, we negotiate through terrain like that all the time. the chaparral in that area is not the same continuous-coverage chaparral that you find on hillsides in southern CA.
#3. i think we all agree that GM was very familiar with the terrain and fuels around the Yarnell area… they are very similar to that found around Prescott. they knew better than any of us about the advantages and disadvantages in attempting to walk across that ground as well as the pace of their crew on such a bushwack.
#4. there was nothing inherently wrong with trying to shortcut (not take the two track) across that ground. we do it all the time (just like you stated when you talked about 55 years of hiking with crews through chaparral.)
#5. the inherent mistake was not posting a lookout and not giving more consideration to the possible wind shift and associated fire behavior.
FYI: and only because SR seems to want to beat this point to a bloody pulp… i grew up in tucson moutain biking and hiking all over southern az… went to college in flagstaff, hiking and biking all over northern az… then started in fire in flagstaff, and spent two seasons working, guess where, ALL OVER AZ… so stop trying to make yourself seem like the expert you’re not SR.
Somehow in all that time you never noticed that dense chaparral takes a long time to walk through? Again, amazing,
What gets weird again is when you mention mountain biking…I assure you, mountain biking doesn’t give you great direct experience with hiking through dense brush.
Not having a lookout was certainly ONE mistake. But, given the fact that they set off on a committing, slow bushwhack, very soon after they committed to that bowl, the lookout also in a way was going to become useless.
Rate of travel. Again, key. In evaluating the escape routes available, if any, among other things. Not long after dropping over that lip, because of the painfully slow rate of forward travel and slower rate yet of any escape back uphill, if their lookout alerted them they were still without any good options. Because given the slow rate of travel they were already out of time.
Also Elizabeth should refer back to WTKTT info on where that 2 track came out at the ranch. Google earth? And fullsail is the only expert here according to ELIZABETH ??? fullsail you spend so much time trying to discredit others you are spinning in circles.
Reply to Bob Powers post
on April 7, 2014 at 11:58 am
>> Mr. Powers said…
>> Also Elizabeth should refer back to
>> WTKTT info on where that 2 track came
>> out at the ranch.
Correct. Actually… everyone should take
a ‘close’ look at that ‘actual’ situation.
That two-track which was (supposedly)
their ‘designated escape route’ to the
BSR did NOT actually ‘come out at the
right at the Ranch’.
If Marsh and Cordes really did spend any
time looking at that ‘road that leads to the
ranch’ with Google maps on an iPad ( and
there still is no real proof they DID )… then
they didn’t ZOOM DOWN enough.
Even though ‘Google Maps’ with ‘Labels’
turned on seems to clearly show that
two-track terminating AT the Boulder
Springs Ranch… that is actually NOT
the case. Google is trying to ‘connect’
the end of that two-track to the same
one that leads north out of the northern
perimeter of the Ranch itself… but that
clear ‘connection’ Google is trying to
show there when the ‘Labels’ option is
ON doesn’t actually exist.
If you turn ‘Labels’ OFF in Google Maps,
just about all of that ‘escape route’ is
still clearly visible from satellites as
‘dirt paths’… but it is actually meant more
as a path over towards the ‘Candy Cane
Lane’ area than any kind of direct path
to the Boulder Springs Ranch itself.
There is a ‘draw’ there at the bottom of
the eastward leg of the route that they
would have had to traverse… and THEN
there are patches of VERY THICK
manzanita surrounding the southern
approach to the Ranch itself that is as
thick as anything they would have been
encountering out in the fuel-filled box
canyon. They would have had to ‘bushwhack’
the last leg of the journey, anyway, just to
reach the actual perimeter of the Ranch,
or at least stop and ‘figure out’ that last
leg of the journey… but they would now
be heading due north and straight at
the approaching fire.
If they really had gone that way… one would
only assume ( and hope ) that by the time
they reached that draw… they would have
abandoned the final due-north bushwhack
to the Ranch itself and opted, instead, to
just head southeast and out the draw
towards Candy Cane Lane… which is
where that ‘two-track’ really goes at
that point.
“Google is trying to ‘connect’
the end of that two-track to the same
one that leads north out of the
northern perimeter of the Ranch
itself”
That two-track ( jeep trail ) leading
north out of the Ranch area itself
is NOT the same one as the
two-track known now as the
‘alternate escape route’ that
passes through its own blind
canyon to the SOUTH of the Ranch.
They are TWO DIFFERENT
two-tracks… with NO clear
‘connection’ between them.
Google Maps with ‘Labels’ turned
on is simply mistakenly trying to
make it LOOK like they are a
continuation of the same two-track.
I beg to differ, the connection is very apparent on many maps, as well as visible to the naked eye on google earth. The ranch appears to be fairly new, and those trails have been around since the mining days, probably long before Candy Cane Ln.
>> TTWARE said…
>> WTKTT,
>> I beg to differ, the
>> connection is very
>> apparent on many
>> maps, as well as
>> visible to the naked
>> eye on google
>> earth.
Fair enough… but I’m
still not ready to buy
‘very apparent’… not
to men on the ground
totally unfamiliar with
the area and who had
done no scouting.
The ‘way to go’ once
they reached the end
of the eastward leg
was perfectly apparent,
yes. There are clearings AND paths
through that first ‘draw’
as you now head due
north… but I’m still not
so sure it was ‘very apparent’ after that point
how to ACTUALLY cut through those manzanita stands and achieve the final part of the journey INTO the compound itself.
Check out this photo of the area in discussion taken that very morning by Joy Collura as she passed the Boulder Springs Ranch…
SR- i am done with you. you are like arguing with a brick wall. all you have going for you is self proclaimed experience/knowledge of all things “chaparral.” congratulations, you’re the self-proclaimed, internet’s own, shackleton of shrubbery.
beyond that, you continually whine about being “personally attacked” and then go on to make your own personal attacks… i don’t mind them, but you should stop whining about it like an eight year old school girl.
you continue to [try] call out folks for a lack of “experience” but have yet to provide any background for your own self-proclaimed doctorate of shrubbery… who are the people with “legit experience?” yourself? laughable. you’re worried about wff’s spraining their ankles hiking around in the woods…
you claim “fanciful notions” while talking about “escape hatches” and “blinking out” and google earth hypnotic images…
you continually (and conveniently) avoid the primary points that negate what your trying to speculate about… while again, trying to make yourself sound like you know something that you don’t.
i think we’ve established, that you’ve never spent a day on a wildland fire, let alone a fire crew and let alone an IHC… i certainly don’t think you have as much experience walking around in the woods as Eric Marsh or Jesse Steed. and i suppose THAT’s what really matters here. you seem to be continually speaking like you know something that they didn’t… but you don’t. they knew the terrain and fuels they were hiking through. they knew, better than you do, what kind of time they could make to the ranch. they chose the route because they thought it would be the quickest way to get to the ranch and be able to get a new assignment.
no amount of speculation by you, the self proclaimed expert of all things chaparral, is going to change that.
>>”That means it took them 19 minutes ( 4:20 PM to
>>4:39 PM ) to travel those 470 yards from the two-track
>>down to the deployment site.
>>19 minutes = 1,140 seconds
>>470 yards = 1,410 feet.
>>That’s a travel rate of… 1.23 feet per second ( 0.83 mph ).”
wait, you’re measuring their distance traveled in a straight line!? talk about smooth sailing! LMAO! you have got to be kidding me!? this whole time you’ve been measuring the distance traveled by GM after dropping off the two track and wiggling their way down to the deployment site by using the ruler function on google earth to measure a straight line!? that’s ridiculous… and further shows how far out of touch you are with this whole situation. i don’t know what the hell measurements SR was using to come up with .5 mph, but he’s even further off the mark. please reference the squiggly line shown in the SAIR for a possible path that GM walked… you would have to straighten out THAT line in order to come up with a relative distance measurement…
are you kidding me? i guess that’s MY BAD for not having bothered to check your work or asking… i guess it didn’t really matter until this point in the discussion when you’re so desperate for something new to sensationalize that you’ll re-ignite a past discussion to perpetuate any sort of controversy.
so NO, a straight line with the google earth ruler does not do justice to the path that GM would have had to walk down that drainage… they would have been winding their way around rocks and brush probably trying to connect GAME TRAILS, openings and drainage’s.
and again, Marsh and Steed were both very familiar with walking in a variety of AZ scrub and terrain. i’m sure they knew [certainly much better than you or SR] what kind of progress their crew could make through the drainage. and i think we can well establish that their pace was probably a steady walk while snaking their way down the canyon…
their fatal flaw was trying to short cut through the green and losing sight of the fire and not having a lookout to report the change in wind direction and thus, the fire spread.
Steady walk through dense chaparral over broken, rocky ground? Not credible, and reflective to me that FullSail is simply inventing fanciful notions.
GM made the progess you’d expect through that type of bowl: slower than a shopping mall walk. That slow pace would have been evident shortly after dropping over the lip. It is what it is.
i don’t think you have any “practical” experience as a wff… so stop making such spectacular speculations about the speed and time spent hiking as an IHC.
This is getting to be funny. It may be a surprise to FullSail, but WFFs of what sort don’t levitate. And, as we know, GM progressed through their bushwhack at less than a leisurely shopping mall pace. This was predictable, because of the dense brush. What they set out on had every reason to be a slow slog, which it was.
I’m not avoiding them, they’re just not directly relevant. You trying to question my experience is an obvious “rhetorical technique” or, more down to earth, a punk move, because you are persisting in saying something stupid and are trying to change focus with a personal attack.
As far as .5 mph versus .83 which WTKTT got, I honestly don’t think it’s that key. Both are a crawling pace. You don’t seem to understand that the bushwhack was predictably going to be at that pace, and are digging deeper.
one more thing… you seem to keep wanting to make a big deal out of the terrain as well…
nothing about that terrain looks foreboding… steep towards the top of the ridges and flattish in the valley bottoms… it all looks pretty typical of what you might find yourself hiking over while working on a fire… there are no cliff bands on the route down, nothing technical, just a lot of rock and brush. no need for “escape hatches” (fanciful notions you say?)
there is a big difference between “hiking” as a civilian (which i am assuming you are at this point) and “hiking” around while working as a wff… ask any wff.
The college educated among us might say FullSail is resorting to a “rhetorical technique,” namely, since FullSail’s persisting in saying something stupid, attacking someone personally when it’s pointed out that FullSail’s saying something that doesn’t hold up. Look, FullSail, the reality is they undertook a bushwhack that clearly was going to be a slow slog. And, did turn out that way. As we know.
Chaparral doesn’t have to look “foreboding” to be a slow slog to hike through. Which it was.
You can invent all sorts of weird ideas like, Well, they probably were really moving quickly, but just snaking back and forth a lot. Well, no. Not the way it works. Not credible, but more importantly, you don’t get extra credit in time to travel from A to B by snaking back and forth. The key question for them was, How long will we spend in this bowl, with escape back uphill quickly becoming impossible to us, before we make it the ranch or elsewhere reasonably safe? The clear answer was, A long time. As their progress indicates. We know where they started, we know where they deployed. Their lack of forward progress is not at all surprising.
What IS surprising is the decision to have started the bushwhack. To understand such an unconventional choice — a long, committing bushwhack through dense unburned brush — you need broader context. Including reports of prior unconventional tactics and a reported desire for secrecy over crew movements.
you make a claim (not unlike elizabeth) that you are being “personally attacked” because you have no logical retort.
my “foreboding” comment was with regard to the terrain, not the chaparral. nice try taking it out of context.
i disagree about your “A to B” comment… the straight line may show you that it’s only a mile as the crow flies from the two track to the BSR… but hiking down there, is quite obviously something different (which you contradict yourself by acknowledging and then quickly discarding that fact).
GM knew that fact as well, when they embarked down the bowl. what they didn’t anticipate was the wind shift and associated fire behavior.
I WILL AGREE WITH YOU, that hiking out in front (or flanking) the fire through the green is definitely an unconventional method of travel… just NOT for the reasons you’ve cited (the terrain and fuels).
I think you’ve again illustrated you don’t understand that travelling through dense chaparral is going to be slow.
Until you get more (some) direct experience, you’ll likely not be able to understand. Or, you’re simply looking to consciously normalize deviancy, in terms of trying to take something that was going to be a slow slog, and was, into something that seems more reasonable that it was.
Bottom line, anyone who thinks that the bushwhack undertaken by GM looked to be anything other than a slow slog when they started it, should spend some time in that kind of dense brush.
FullSail
I could say a lot in reply here to you. Over 55 years of walking thru thick brush both with crews and without. at work and hunting in heavy chaparral, you have chased your rabbit around in a circle to prove every body wrong and you right. Sorry you missed the boat on this one and SR is absolutely right on this one.
Because I hunted Rabbits, Quail both mountain and valley, Some times working deer out. I also spent time hiking to fires with small and large crews that had no road access. as well as ridge top fire breaks in the LA Basin with my HS crew. So yes I know a lot about walking thru brush. You can take or leave my credibility your is in great question. SR never said that a crew never slogged thru brush but they should have known what it was like and the time it took. I am doubting you have ever been there.
Experience gives shared referencepoints, that FullSail seem to lack.
WantsToKnowTheTruthsays
Reply to xxfullsailxx post on April 6, 2014 at 7:52 am
>> xxfullsailxx said
>> wait, you’re measuring their distance traveled in a straight line!? >> talk about smooth sailing! LMAO! you have got to be kidding
>> me!? this whole time you’ve been measuring the distance
>> traveled by GM after dropping off the two track and wiggling
>> their way down to the deployment site by using the ruler
>> function on google earth to measure a straight line!? that’s
>> ridiculous… and further shows how far out of touch you are
>> with this whole situation.
Fer cryin’ out loud.
Please read what is posted.
That measurement is taken directly from the SAIR… which you
seem to put such trust in.
See page 26 of the SAIR.
>> xxfullsailxx
>> please reference the squiggly line shown in the SAIR for a
>> possible path that GM walked… you would have to
>> straighten out THAT line in order to come up with a relative
>> distance measurement.
Once again… please read the SAIR.
That is the path THEY are assuming they walked ( without
providing any evidence why they thought so )… and I’m
also assuming ( unless they are even more incompetent than
has already been proven ) that the measurment they would
publish matches the route the believe they took.
If they didn’t… well… what can anyone say.
TOTAL incompetence.
>> are you kidding me? i guess that’s MY BAD for not having
>> bothered to check your work or asking… i guess it didn’t really
>> matter until this point in the discussion when you’re so
>> desperate for something new to sensationalize that you’ll
>> re-ignite a past discussion to perpetuate any sort of
>> controversy.
Whose desperate now?
Re-igniting discussions based on false assumptions.
>> so NO, a straight line with the google earth ruler does not do
>> justice to the path that GM would have had to walk down that
>> drainage… they would have been winding their way around
>> rocks and brush probably trying to connect GAME TRAILS,
>> openings and drainage’s.
So… why don’t you do something useful?
Check it yourself… then contact the SAIT and ask them why
their published distances don’t match their published diagrams…
…then come back here and let us know what they said.
If it really is ‘far off’… I’d love to know what THEIR explanation
is for that. I really would. They are the ones that had full access
to the site… and were being highly paid to come up with the
facts and the details.
are you talking about the map on page 27 of the SAIR? ah yes, i see, page 26 in adobe reader, not the page number…
the .27 miles? and didn’t you go in to google earth and “confirm” this measurement at some point?
see, the SAIR doesn’t go on to infer such things as a .83 mph rate of travel… because they admit to not knowing the exact route as well as time spent making decisions… (and apparently SR just missed the mathematical conversions portion of his “college education” to somehow pull .5 mph out of who-knows-where… so since you don’t contest that .27 miles is an accurate distance hiked, we can agree that .83 mph is way off the mark too… thanks.
this is your problem all along… false allegations based on shaky evidence and a lot of presumptions.
i think you would help yourself by revisiting the “investigative process” and “approach and philosophy” found on page 5 (SAIR pg. #) to understand WHY every minute detail isn’t needed and FOR WHOM the SAIR was written…
It would seem that walking through the brush was not really the problem, but when they did it was. Also not having eyes on the fire, having unstable weather etc.
I understand what you say about the SAIR not aiming to provide every detail, most times WFFs do not need all those details to learn lessons. But what about the families that do want the details and to know exactly “what happened”. Who is supposed to do the investigation to answer their questions?
It would have been dumb to do at virtually any time, given their other options, but you’re correct that the fire below and forecast weather change, that did occur, are what combined to make this so bad an idea at the time they did it. There are conditions where it would be perfectly safe, except for risk of the odd sprained ankle, eye injury, etc., to walk through that brush. (But, with better options, why bother?) In the case of GM, at the time they decided on the bushwhack they already knew it wasn’t safe.
SR- it’s easy to judge as an arm chair quarterback… especially when your frame of reference is outside the day to day operations of wildland fire management during the summer months.
sprained ankle? eye injury? really? you forgot to mention scrapes and other boo boo’s…
you really don’t have a clue about what wff’s do on a day to day basis during the active fire season do you? … yet you don’t hesitate to judge.
now whine some more about how you were “personally attacked.”
It is easy to sneer, on the internet, at ankle sprains or eye injuries when you’re not the one suffering them. Real-world, they are serious things, and ones that can impact the usefulness of a whole crew, not simply the one who suffers them. Recognizing the risk and minimizing likewise is important in the real world.
umm, SR… we are expected to wear 8″ leather boots and eye protection (PPE) to prevent those silly injuries… and we hike around on steep, rugged ground through vegetation ALL SUMMER LONG… so stop talking about things that you have absolutely no clue about.
mike- i would imagine the families had full access to the actual people involved… as well as the SAIT… (if they wanted it) at least until the lawsuits were filed. they were the first ones to hear and see the SAIR and have their questions answered.
and that’s why ADOSH got involved, right? to try to assign “blame” or to further investigate what happened.
if you’re suggesting that they come to this website and to have their questions answered, i would beg to differ with you. you end up with people like SR and WTKTT drawing illogical conclusions (.5 mph) and false allegations because of their severe lack of understanding about the situation they are hyper-analyzing… not to mention the pages and pages of scrolling through speculation and assumption.
One very useful part of this site is in fact debunking of assertions that don’t hold water. For the families, for WFF’s looking for lessons learned, etc. That’s why noting that FullSail is so fully off, without a factual basis, for so much of what he is saying in this case is a valuable function. The bushwhack that GM chose was, at the time they chose it, going to be a slow slog. Wishful thinking, or loud shouting, or personal attacks, can’t change that simple fact. People who question can among other things get experience in moving through dense chaparral and then reflect on what is obvious to those who have, namely that GM was in for a slow slog when they committed to their bushwhack.
yep, you’re right, i’m sure it’s very helpful to the families to have people with ABSOLUTELY NO WILD LAND FIRE EXPERIENCE to be second guessing the decisions made by their deceased family members (who were professionals). such as you, SR, who is basically saying that GM, though fully aware that their route would be a “slow slog” and “pathetically slow”, knowingly took the route anyways and despite realizing how slow (.5 mph by your ill-conceived math) their progress was, continued until it was too late… apparently blinded by the dense chaparral.
what “factual basis” are you speaking from? because i think it’s very apparent that you’re not very good at math or reading comprehension… oh wait, i know, you’re Dr. Chaparral!
I was not implying the answers would come from here. The sequence of events will be known when someone with the express intent of learning what happened is able to talk to those involved and put the story on the record.
I don’t think ADOSH was really that helpful. They were looking to hang the overhead on the fire, and they did. Whatever mistakes those guys made, they were not the primary cause of the demise of the 19. However, at least ADOSH did leave an interview record, so we know a lot more about the timeline than the SAIR gave us.
I am not sure the families have gotten the answers to their questions yet. I was one who earlier suggested that Musser might in fact have met with he families. One of the reasons given for the lawsuits is in fact to find out what happened.
i just don’t think there’s much more story to tell. the rest of the story died with GM, sad to say.
some will argue that B. McDonogue (sp.?) has more of the story… i have my doubts… he’s just some dumb kid (no offense meant) in his second year on a hotshot crew… i doubt he really had a clue what all was going on, until it was way too late. but maybe he’ll prove me wrong some day.
Your ‘fire brother’ that
you just called a ‘dumb
kid’ and ‘clueless’, who
was at the end of his
THIRD full season as a
fully qualified member
of a Type 1 Hotshot
Crew, and who was
fully trusted by his own
highly experienced
Supervisor to serve
as ‘lookout’ for 18 of his
own ‘fire brothers’…
ECITW ( Every Caveat In The World )
This is what I ( me, personally ) believe is being said in the background of this
video. Your mileage may, of course, vary.
This video is 31 seconds long, so given the small note in the README.TXT
file that accompanies these Air Study videos which states that they all use the
VIDEO END time as the timestamp in the TITLE… then that means this
particular video STARTED at 1541.07 ( 3:41.07 ).
NOTE: A conversation is already in progress in the background on
one of the TAC channels when the video starts and the talk now
seems to be about evacuations and the ‘people on the road(s)’.
Helicopter flyovers and loud foreground talk obscure most of the
background conversation and a VERY loud helicopter flyover
completely obscures the final 8 seconds of background audio,
but some of the background conversation can still be clearly heard.
VIDEO STARTS AT 1541.07 ( 3:41.07 PM )
+0.00 ( 1541.07 / 3:41.07 PM )
(Unknown): uh… bring it in here and… uh… be able to figure out
( if we’re gonna ) ?? …we’ve got all these people ( along? ) the road… ??
+0:17
(Unknown 2): ah… ??… not… ??… before long.
+0:23 ( 1541.30 / 3:41.30 PM )
(more background conversation in here but a VERY close
and loud helicopter flyover obscures it all from here to
the end of the video ).
ECITW ( Every Caveat In The World )
This is what I ( me, personally ) believe is being said in the background of this
video. Your mileage may, of course, vary.
This video is 43 seconds long, so given the small note in the README.TXT
file that accompanies these Air Study videos which states that they all use the
VIDEO END time as the timestamp in the TITLE… then that means this
particular video STARTED at 1535.39 ( 3:35.39 PM )
NOTE: This video STARTS just 7 ( SEVEN ) seconds after the
previous video ( 153532 ) ended and comes right after OPS1 Todd Abel
seemed to finish his conversation with Willis with “I copy”.
ALSO NOTE: This Air Study video ( and the ones posted just below that
immediately precede this one ) establish exactly where SPGS2 Darrell
Willis was during this entire timeframe and what he was doing. He was
very busy at this exact time conducting burnouts in the Model Creek
Road area AND trying to put out some ‘spotting’ at the same time. Willis’
own unit logs describe these activities but Willis was vague on the times.
These 3 Air Study videos ( taken in sequence ) establish EXACTLY when
he was actually doing all that AND when he was talking to OPS1 Todd Abel
about it all.
+0:07 ( 1535.46 / 3:35.46 PM )
(SPGS2 Darrell Willis): Say… can you catch that helicopter to pick up
those spots… uh… north of the… Model Canyon road?
+0:15 ( 1535.54 / 3:35.54 PM )
(Unknown): Okay… you’re… is that the main road… uh…
preppin’ stuff on ?? when we talked?
+0:19 ( 1535.58 / 3:35.58 PM )
(SPGS2 Darrell Willis): Yea… and that we’re just burnin’.
+0:22 ( 1536.01 / 3:36.01 PM )
(Unknown Air Attack?): Okay… we’re gonna bring… uh… some (tankers)
in there ??… uuuuh… if that’s what ( loud traffic noises here in the foreground ).
+0:30 ( 1536..09 / 3:36.09 PM )
(unknown): ?? copy… why dontcha come out in front of the ?? a coupla
times and ?? (drop?) across the road.
+0:39 ( 1536.18 / 3:36.18 PM )
(SPGS2 Darrell Willis): Okay… I’m talkin’ about the bottom part of the road.
ECITW ( Every Caveat In The World )
This is what I ( me, personally ) believe is being said in the background of this
video. Your mileage may, of course, vary.
This video is 1 second long, so given the small note in the README.TXT
file that accompanies these Air Study videos which states that they all use the
VIDEO END time as the timestamp in the TITLE… then that means this
particular video STARTED at 1535.31 ( 3:35.31 PM ).
NOTE: This video was shot starting just 21 seconds after the previous
one ended ( 153510 ) and is only 1 second long. OPS1 Todd Abel apparently
just says “I copy” back to SPGS1 Darrell Willis after he finishes answering
Abel’s previous question and fully reports his location ( on Model
Canyon Road ) and his status at the end of the previous clip.
ECITW ( Every Caveat In The World )
This is what I ( me, personally ) believe is being said in the background of this
video. Your mileage may, of course, vary.
This video is 23.6 seconds long, so given the small note in the README.TXT
file that accompanies these Air Study videos which states that they all use the
VIDEO END time as the timestamp in the TITLE… then that means this
particular video STARTED at…
VIDEO STARTS AT 1534.47 ( 3:34.47 PM )
+0:02 ( 1534.49 / 3:34.49 PM )
(Unknown, possibly OPS2 Musser?): Fire may light the structures
here… Do you copy?
NOTE: Next transmission seems to be catching OPS1 Todd Abel
and SPGS2 Darrell Willis in mid-conversation. Abel seems to be answering
the last thing Willis had said ( pre-video start ) and he does not appear
to be responding to the +0:2 transmission above.
+0:05 ( 1534.52 / 3:34.52 PM )
(OPS1 Todd Abel): My hope here is… that… the way… ya wanna keep…
I think we’ll be in good shape… but if we hit some type a weird wind shift…
ah… what exactly is your location?
+0:15 ( 1535.02 / 3:35.02 PM )
(SPGS2 Darrell Willis): Okay we’re comin’ up this road… uh… road, uh…
Model Canyon road… and lightin’ some (fires?) ( VIDEO ends and cuts
off the rest of his sentence ).
FYI: No revelations here… but a very interesting photo has appeared in one of
the new ADOSH investigation folders.
It is a high-res photo taken from back near the anchor point, looking due
SOUTH at the ‘escape route’.
This photo matches EXACTLY what Eric Marsh himself appears to have been
reporting over the radio over one of the TAC channels circa 1613.44 ( 4:13.44 PM )
in response to the direct query from someone in fire command…
“Granite Mountain… what’s your status right now?”
That’s the radio capture where Marsh jumps in ahead of Jesse Steed and
answers the radio call before Steed has a chance to, even though it really
wasn’t directed at HIM ( Caller asked speak directly with Granite Mountain
Sup ( Jesse Steed that day ) and NOT “Division Alpha” ).
Here is what Marsh’s response *appears* ( your mileage may vary, etc. )
to have been…
1613.44 / 4:13.44 PM
Eric Marsh: Well the guys… uh… Granite… is makin’ their way out the exact
escape route from this mornin’… an’ it heads… ah… (pause) SOUTH.
( slight pause ) mid-slope, cuttin’ over.
Key line here…
“(pause) SOUTH ( slight pause ) mid-slope, cuttin’ over.”
The following ADOSH photo shows EXACTLY that (description), and anyone
standing at the same location where THIS photo was taken would most probably
have used those EXACT same words to describe what THIS pictures
clearly shows… ( Heads SOUTH, mid-slope, cuttin’ over )…
So I wonder if it’s possible that this ADOSH photo actually captures just about
the spot where Marsh really was at 1613 ( 4:13 PM ) when that “What’s your
status?” radio call came in… and when he PAUSED and LOOKED SOUTH,
this is exactly what he saw and exactly what he described himself seeing at
that moment ( 4:13 PM ).
It might not be the EXACT spot where Marsh was at 4:13 PM and still trying to
‘catch up’ with Steed and the crew… ( he could have even been farther down
towards where the two-track junction is but still had the same exact ‘view’
to describe over the radio )… but it could be close… since his ‘description’ of
the route he was looking at matches this photo EXACTLY.
** SIDENOTE…
By the way… below is a rework of what I ( me, personally, only, your mileage
may vary, yada, yada… ) believe is the full transcript from the video referenced
just above with the TIMESTAMPS reworked based on the assumption that the
video title represents the END time for the video and not the START time…
That video is a long one ( 3 minutes 30 seconds ) so this ‘rework’ of the
timestamps now puts the “Granite Mountain… what’s your status?”
call from fire command into the 1613.30 timeframe.
** AIR STUDY VIDEO 20130630_161620
The following is a reprint of what I ( me, personally ) believe
to be a full transcript of this particular AIR STUDY video,
INCLUDING the part at the start of the video where ASM2
is actually requesting that someone ‘check on them’…
which is the REASON for the “Granite mountain… what’s
your status?” query that happens a few seconds later.
ECITW ( Every Caveat In The World )
This is what I ( me, personally ) believe is being said in the
background of this video. Your mileage may, of course, vary.
This video is 3 minutes and 30 seconds long, so given the
small note in the README.TXT file that accompanies these
Air Study videos which states that they all use the VIDEO END time
as the timestamp in the TITLE… then that means this particular
video STARTED at…
1612.50 ( 4:12 PM plus 50 seconds ).
VIDEO STARTS ( 1612.50 / 4:12.50 PM )
+0:08.23 ( 1612.58 / 4:12.58 PM )
(Unknown): ASM2, Copy that… behind the hills is where you
place Granite Mountain?
+0:12.726 ( 1613.02 / 4:13.02 PM )
(ASM2): They’re on the corner just repeatedly saying that they’re
comfortable and that’s not credible. ASK him whether Alpha can
be placed WITH them.
NOTE: A few seconds later… Someone OTHER than who
ASM2 was just talking to ( someone with what sounds like a
Cajun accent? ) does exactly what ASM2 just TOLD them to do.
He calls Granite Mountain directly and asks them to report their
STATUS. If the time stamp on the AIR STUDY video can be
trusted then it is now about 4:17 PM, just before the SAIR says
they are about to leave the two-track road and drop into the box
canyon at approximately 4:20 PM.
+0:40.52 ( 1613.30 / 4:13.30 PM )
(Unknown): Granite Mountain ( Five? )…
What’s your status right now?
NOTE: A pretty heavy accent on this speaker. Sounds like
Louisiana Cajun? What he says almost sounds like…
“Granite Montun… wuz yo status rat now?
ALSO NOTE: Even though the caller asked for ‘Granite
Mountain’ specifically, and not ‘DIVS A’… Eric Marsh responds
immediately on behalf of Granite Mountain before Jesse Steed
even has a chance to say anything. Jesse only ‘chimes’ in with
his own ‘status’ report about “we’re pushin’ our way down into
the structures” when Marsh is done speaking.
+0:54 ( 1613.44 / 4:13.44 PM )
Eric Marsh: Well the guys… uh… Granite… is makin’ their
way out the exact escape route from this mornin’… an’ it
heads… ah… (pause) SOUTH. ( slight pause )
mid-slope, cuttin’ over.
+1:07.18 ( 1613.57 / 4:13.57 PM )
( Another voice immediately adds to what Marsh said but it is )
( NOT Marsh this time. It sounds like Jesse Steed )
Jesse Steed: We’ll be pushin’ our way down into the structures.
+1:10.16 ( 1614.00 / 4:14.00 PM ) ( Another voice. Very quickly )
Copy that.
+1:21.17 ( 1614.11 / 4:14.11 PM )
( Unknown): Ten four. You with Granite Mountain right now?
+1:24.68 ( 1614.14 / 4:14.14 PM )
(Eric Marsh?): Uh… just checkin’ it out to see where we’re gonna
jump out at.
There appear to be some other background conversations
in this video before we hear the 11 ( ELEVEN ) shutter
clicks of the fellas in the foreground actually shooting photos
of the VLAT drop… but there is also HEAVY road traffic
at this point that will take a lot more work to filter out.
END OF AIR STUDY VIDEO 20130630_161620 ( 1616.20 / 4:16.20 PM )
Typo above. I typed a ‘7’ in one spot instead of a ‘3’.
The following paragraph above *should* have read like this…
If the time stamp on the AIR STUDY video can be trusted then it
is now about 4:13 PM ( when the “Granite Mountain, what’s your
status right now?” radio call takes place ), just before the SAIR
says they are about to leave the two-track road and drop into the
box canyon at approximately 4:20 PM.
On debunking the idea that GM was using “game trails” or shortcuts to afford themselves a decent speed of travel in dropping into the bowl:
A few times the idea has been advanced that GM didn’t have reason, before the fact, to know that dropping into to bowl would involve a long slog through dense brush. Along with this idea, it’s been suggested that game trails or shortcuts may have been used to allow the crew to move at a good clip. First, based on timelines, we know that GM was moving at roughly .5 miles an hour once they dropped into the bowl. That is painfully slow.
Second, there’s no indication that locals routinely used trails or shortcuts through that area to save time. Nor is there any firm indication that this route had been actively scouted by Marsh or Steed before it was taken. While it is not uncommon for steep rocky ground to have a chimney or crawl between boulders or some similar small shortcut to save a minute here or there, it’s also true that based on the layout of that bowl that a significant shortcut, that might save a half-hour or more, doesn’t seem to have been available. There was no continuous feature like a broken cliff that might afford a direct and much faster route down an “escape hatch.”
Third, local knowledge of that kind of brush, particularly paired with steep, broken ground, reflects that travelling through it will be slow. While it is often possible to “blink out” game trails, following a game trail doesn’t mean that dense brush is not an issue. Even if a trail also sees significant human traffic, without meaningful improvements the foot traffic itself doesn’t make for easy going through that kind of brush. GM obviously was a local crew, recently off of another local fire.
The “sawyer” theory is to me slightly more plausible. But, there was not time available to meaningfully improve a route through that bowl, no improvements had been made beforehand (nor does the route appear to have been scouted), and in fact the rate of travel shows that an improved route was not available.
In other words, it was reasonable for GM to believe, before committing, that the route through that bowl would be a slow slog. If they had been analyzing this as an escape route, it is imo unlikely they would have selected it, versus the other options available.
However you then characterize this kind of highly committing shortcut, I don’t believe GM had reason to believe, before the fact, that dropping into the bowl would go quickly because of “game trails” or other features. And, they did have feedback, from their slow rate of travel, very soon after dropping down that in fact this would be a slow route to complete.
I still believe there’s a good chance that the ‘swiss cheese’
model was TOTALLY in play at 4:20 PM… and that the moment
Captain Jesse Steed saw that Ranch come into view… he
still had NO IDEA where that high-ridge two-track really went.
Even if someone had simply TOLD him that two-track went
all the way to the Ranch… from that ‘Descent Point’ where
he was standing it was still impossible to ‘see’ that and he
may have then doubted anything anyone even ‘told’ him.
If anyone else still has ANY doubts that it was IMPOSSIBLE
to see, from that point, where the two-track really went as
it headed south from that point… there is an amazing new
set of pictures released with the ADOSH material that
further proves that.
Photos 3-9 are actually a panaorama sequence taken at the exact
spot where Tex (Sonny) Gilligan found the roll of pink tape/flagging
at the ‘Descent Point’.
Photo 3 starts looking north back towards the anchor point and the
panorama sequence ends with photo 9 looking due south down
the two-track trail.
This is after the burn… but this photo was taken standing at the
EXACT spot where GM would have left the two-track road, and the
EXACT spot where Tex (Sonny) Gilligan found the roll of pink tape…
and it shows the EXACT view you would have had looking south
along the two-track at that point.
The trail starts to CLIMB away at that point and curl around the hill
and you can only see another 100 feet or so of the trail.
It is IMPOSSIBLE to tell where that trail goes at this point with
your own eyes.
You would HAVE to have known where it goes from that point.
If you did NOT have that prior knowldege… then dropping
into the canyon would have looked like the ONLY option,
regardless of what a PITA it was going to be.
Since you can only safely have one hyperlink in a post
here on this WordPress deal without risking a fall into
‘Message waiting for moderation’… here is a FOLLOWUP
post with another link to one of the specific photos
shown above.
This is the YOU ARE THERE photo… seeing exactly
what you could ( and could NOT ) see standing exactly
where Jesse Steed was standing. ( This is post-burn,
of course, but you will still get the full experience ).
The view is directly SOUTH, looking down the two-track,
from the ‘Descent Point’.
Just to the left ( out of frame ) would be the view down i
nto the box canyon and on to the Boulder Springs Ranch
in the distance.
Same spot as above… but this photo has just a bit of the
Boulder Springs Ranch on the left side. It is still the ‘view’
looking south down the two-track at the exact place the
roll of pink tape was found.
GPS stamp in this photo is… 34.221465, -112.781978
Camera: Pentax WG-3 GPS
Lens: 4.5 mm
Exposure: Auto exposure, 1/320 sec, f/7.9, ISO 125
Flash: Auto, Did not fire
Focus: Normal
Date: July 18, 2013 9:06:45 AM
Location: 34° 13′ 17.3″ North, 112° 46′ 55.1″ West
Location Decimal: ( 34.221465, -112.781978 )
wow, you go to great lengths to disprove the speculation about your speculation… i’m not sure you can accurately claim that their pace was .5 mph since you don’t really know what all went on between leaving the lunch spot and deployment… at a brisk marching pace an IHC can move at ~3+ mph… i think that .5 mph would have been, as you say, painfully slow and a pretty unacceptable rate of travel.
are you or have you been a wff? because very often “we” will bushwack a direct route, rather than take a round-a-bout trail… there were a lot of evident game trails through the area, that were very well seen in post fire pictures… i don’t think it’s unreasonable to SPECULATE that they were at least attempting to link them together with drainage’s/crags/openings.
i think you would be amazed at what many wff’s can walk through/up/down while carrying packs and saws/tools.
also, did you mean “escape route” when you say, “escape hatch?”
because yes, i agree, that unless they had a route designated and flagged (which does NOT seem to be the case) they were simply trying to bushwack because they thought it might be faster/most direct.
FullSail, I am seriously beginning to doubt your overall level of experience here.
3+ mph through dense chaparral? Not only does the time line reflect that this didn’t happen — so based on what occurred, we can know that they did not travel anywhere near that pace — but, it’s also not credible.
As is this idea of linking game trails as a means of just “zipping along” in that kind of dense brush. You may not understand this, but game trails are usually made by four-legged animals that don’t do a lot of pruning or other kinds of trail improvement.
As far as “escape hatch,” yeah, I said it and meant it, but used it in quotes for a reason. You might recognize it as a whimsical term for a 3rd-classable chimney or other section of cliff, that often is crappy and scary but can allow you to get down a cliff quickly and unroped. Or, in your case FullSail, clearly you don’t recognize it as such. FWIW, I think given what we know that it still would have been unreasonable and imprudent for GM to have tried to utilize such a feature, had it existed, because of the risk of a fall or other serious injury, but the point is such a feature can allow much faster and more direct descent in some areas. But didn’t exist in this case.
I’m also not suggesting that anyone needs to know the term “escape hatch,” btw. The context in which it was used was pretty clear, and I think FullSail simply was seizing yet another opportunity to throw mud. In the process, FullSail however is showing that he sure ’nuff hasn’t tried to hike through much chaparral, or even without the timeline we do have he’d know that 3 mph ain’t happening, particularly for a full crew that hasn’t dropped gear.
FullSail is also doing a bit of normalization of deviance. WFFs don’t very often go on hour-long bushwhacks through dense chaparral over broken, rocky ground. It would be stupid. There is virtually always a faster, safer way, even if conditions are such (early morning, etc. etc.) that fire is not an issue. A pattern of excessive bushwhacking is itself a real question mark and judgment and safety issue.
The key words to bear in mind here are “dense chaparral,” along with related issues like “bowl,” “uphill escape route,” etc. More generally, many regions of the country have their own sort of virtually impassable dense brush. Having a good bit of exposure, I can say that dense chaparral is some of the worst to deal with, but in general, no, a prolonged committing bushwhack through dense brush is not a normal thing that WFFs “very often” do. Suggesting that it is normal is, to be blunt, irresponsible. Do WFFs often go off of established trails? Of course. The difference entails, among other things, judgment. That judgment should make clear that long bushwhacks through dense brush aren’t normal or very often done.
hmm, so maybe the intent of your original post was to try to argue with me? because again, you’re making a lot out of MY speculation (game trails) that was in response to YOUR speculation (about how and why GM chose to go down off the two track.) i made no reference to them “zipping along” through that terrain. that is your poor reading comprehension skills biting you in the rear.
i was giving the 3 mph figure as an example of what’s expected for a rate of travel for an IHC crew (a casual arduous pack test pace.) then, i was [basically] agreeing with you that .5 mph would have been “pathetically slow” and expounding the point by saying it would be unacceptable for an IHC’s rate of travel. (the 3 mph rate of travel is possible over a variety of terrain, and a variety of fuels… obviously that rate of travel would vary given percent of slope, up or down and fuel type.)
admittedly, i have not heard the term “escape hatch” other than those used on boats… in fact, when i google search images for “escape hatch” i don’t seem to see anything besides submarines. and i have CERTAINLY NEVER heard it used with regard to wff’ing.
so, moving on, let’s answer a few questions…
-do you think that GM was indeed familiar with the local terrain and fuels in and around the Yarnell area? right, i do too. then what makes you think that an IHC captain WOULDN’T be familiar with the pace his crew could walk through terrain and fuels that they were probably VERY familiar with?
-you keep expanding on the use of the term “dense chaparral”… and you seem to want to make yourself sound like an expert about it. have you actually been to that area of Arizona? would you happen to know, in terms of tons per acre, how dense that chaparral actually was? because, i don’t think you really do.
-do you think that GM was in a hurry to get down to Yarnell? i tend to think so, given the fact that their intent seems to have been to re engage on the fire and assist with structure protection… so then why would you think that .5 mph was an acceptable rate of travel for X number of minutes? because they were clueless about what they were doing? i don’t think so.
i am not looking to perpetuate this silly, speculative argument with you. i am trying to understand why GM decided to take the path that they did, same as you… (at least I THINK that’s your intention here). i tend to believe that Steed/Marsh had reason to think they could make reasonable time by taking the shortcut because they had game trails, openings and washes to connect their path down. in fact, the SAIR also SPECULATES this on page 38… and, indeed, openings, arroyos and game trails are all shown in the post-fire overhead pictures of the area:
YOUR THEORY seems to suggest that Steed/Marsh were either completely inept at their jobs (one of their primary jobs being the efficient movement of 18-20 men over terrain and through a variety of fuels) or they were on a suicide mission, with crew in tow, by knowingly hiking their personnel through dense brush at a “pathetically slow” pace without second thought.
Reply to xxfullsailxx post on April 3, 2014 at 10:15 pm
>> xxfullsailxx
>> i’m not sure you can accurately claim that their
>> pace was .5 mph since you don’t really know what
>> all went on between leaving the lunch spot and
>> deployment
It doesn’t matter ‘what all went on between leaving
the lunch spot and deployment’.
First of all… you are wrong about them ‘leaving the
lunch spot’. That is NOT where they departed from
when they finally decided to leave the safe black and
head south. It was from the location where the MacKenzie
videos were taken circa 4:02 PM and the same location
as the final known photo from them ( The Parker photo
taken at 4:04 PM, as they were leaving that spot ).
The exact location of 4:04 PM Wade Parker photo…
34.227511, -112.789962
Second… to establish their ‘rate of travel’ from the
two-track down to the deployment site… it only matters
what the estimated TIME is that it took them to cover
THAT part of the journey.
According to the SAIR… it actually was NOT .5 mph, but
it was *almost* as bad ( .83 mph ).
The SAIR itself says they left the two-track road and began
their descent into the fuel-filled box canyon at right about
4:20 PM. No one has yet really questioned that estimate.
The SAIR also says the exact distance from that
‘Descent Point’ down to the deployment site is
470 yards ( 1,410 feet ).
SAIR page 26
Descent Point to Deployment Site: 0.27 mi / 470 yards.
As for the TIME it (supposedly) took them to cover
those 470 yards… we now know that when Jesse
Steed’s first MAYDAY call comes onto the radio
at 4:39 PM, the ropes had already been pulled on
the chainsaws and they were running full blast
right next to him… which is why he is SHOUTING
when he says “We are in front of the flaming front”.
So that means they had already found the deployment
site by 1619 and were already ‘improving’ it before
Steed ever even decided to call Air Attack.
Regardless… even with ‘guesstimating’ how much
time had transpired before that moment… let’s say
they actually didn’t reach that spot until circa 1639.
That means it took them 19 minutes ( 4:20 PM to
4:39 PM ) to travel those 470 yards from the two-track
down to the deployment site.
That’s a travel rate of… 1.23 feet per second ( 0.83 mph ).
>> xxfullsailxx also said…
>> I think that .5 mph would have been, as you say,
>> painfully slow and a pretty unacceptable rate of travel.
Agreed. Given the circumstances, 0.83 mph was equally
unacceptable. They should have KNOWN they were
‘bogging down’ and definitely ‘getting into trouble’ with their
original TIME/TRAVEL estimates and they should have
stopped to re-evaluate their plan before it was too late
to turn back.
>> xxfullsailxx also said…
>> There were a lot of evident game trails through the
>> area, that were very well seen in post fire pictures.
There have also always been a series of ‘clearing’s that
are fully visible via pre-fire satellite imagery that ‘line up’
from west-to-east down the center of the canyon from
the two-track to the deployment site… but these ‘clearings’
were on the steeper part of the slope. They are still
clearly visible, even today, via Google maps since the
satellite imagery being used by Google for that area is
still pre-fire.
There is no evidence that GM descended in these
‘clearings’, or that these clearings were in any way
‘evident’ to them. They seem to have stuck to the
drainage area at the northern edge of the canyon
for their actual descent.
The keyword here ( for either game trails or clearings )
is ‘evident’.
What may be ‘evident’ in satellite imagery and/or photos
before and/or after the fire doesn’t mean they were ‘evident’
in any way to people who hadn’t even scouted that area
before trying to go through it.
so then, given the fact that they certainly did not walk in a straight line AND the fact that there was probably some time between stopping and realizing their tragic predicament and the moment they made the first radio transmission the rate of travel was probably upwards of 1 mph… maybe even pushing 2 mph if they were walking the squiggly line that the SAIR shows…
either way, it doesn’t change my PLAUSIBLE SPECULATION that game trails were present and probably played a role in the route they took. (and, once again, i am primarily basing this off of the post fire pictures that quite obviously showed a network of game trails.)
and you’ll enjoy this WTKTT…
i might further speculate that the network of game trails leading up and down the saddle-box canyon all seemed to be leading towards the BSR… i bet they have water, maybe salt licks and possibly feed out to attract wildlife. maybe we should indict the owners of the ranch for illegally feeding wildlife which created game trails which led GM to take a route off the two track!
I don’t think you’re checking your own notes,
or even your past postings here on this
ongoing discussion… and you’ve got us ALL
confused now.
IIRC… YOU are the one who has always scoffed
at ANYONE suggesting there was a chance
in hell of them ‘dropping packs and running’
at the MOMENT they realized their
predicament, and having any chance at all
of actually making it back up the to the ridge.
Now… here you are… somehow trying to
argue/speculate that maybe there were
all kinds of ‘game trails’ and maybe they
weren’t really having to ‘bushwhack’ much
at all and maybe now ( by your admission
up above )… maybe they really did have a
lot more TIME between realizing the trouble
they were in and the first MAYDAY?
You DO, realize ( right? )… that every moment
you are now giving them up above to reach
the increased rate of travel you seem to
be arguing for… ADDS to the time they
MIGHT have had to ‘drop packs and run’…
AND you also seem to be arguing that
maybe they would have had these ‘game
trails’ right there to help them escape?
So… how much EXTRA time ARE you
willing to give them between first realizing
they were in trouble… and then finally
making the first MAYDAY call at 1639?
oh you’re going to go back to this again… yay!
Cpt. Obvious saves the day… again.
first of all, “game trails” through chaparral doesn’t mean smooth sailing… it’s still a bushwack. as our astute brush expert, doctor SR has pointed out, four legged creatures don’t limb the brush on their way through. what they DO provide is a general direction and foot path… my main point has been that GM must have been travelling at a reasonable pace, even while snaking their way around rocks and brush…
regarding the rest of your confusion:
you do realize that the winds in that drainage were probably upwards of 30-40 mph right?
and while i realize that you have ZERO first hand knowledge, but when winds and slope align then the fire is probably moving that fast as well… especially in dry brush.
and you do realize that the fire (as shown on the well researched fire progression map) was probably racing up the hill behind them as well…
nothing i’ve said is contradictory… obviously there was a time lag between realizing the situation, sizing up their options and putting the saws to work… (as i’ve said before). but i don’t even think an extra FIVE minutes would have helped them at the point they realized their situation. and certainly was not enough time to try to RTO back up the hill…
Reply to xxfullsailxx post
on April 5, 2014 at 7:01 pm
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>> first of all, “game trails”
>> through chaparral doesn’t
>> mean smooth sailing
Probably not… but I’ll ask the
same question that SR did.
EXACTLY how much REAL
experience do YOU have
with THAT particular hiking
combination ( Game trails
in heavy Arizona chaparral )
in order to speak ‘expertly’
about it? I’m just curious.
Maybe you do know ‘all about
that’.
>> xxfullsailxx also said…
>> it’s still a bushwack. as
>> our astute brush expert,
>> doctor SR has pointed out.
There’s that world again…
‘expert’. See question above.
>> four legged creatures don’t
>> limb the brush on their way
>> through.
Not usually, no.
>> what they DO provide is a
>> general direction and foot >> path…
There still is no real evidence
that any such ‘foot paths’
were in any way visible in
that drainage… for the 470
yards west of the deployment
site that they were traversing.
>> my main point has been
>> that GM must have been
>> travelling at a reasonable
>> pace, even while snaking
>> their way around rocks
>> and brush.
Ah… okay. I see. So they
MUST have been? That
is defacto admission on your
part that you consider .83
( to, perhaps, 1.0 ) mph is
a perfectly ‘reasonable pace’.
Thanks. Now we truly know
what your ‘main point was’.
I disagree with you.
I still think that ‘pace’ range is
indicative of being seriously
‘bogged down’ on a hike.
>> xxfullsailxx also said…
>> you do realize that the
>> winds in that drainage
>> were probably upwards
>> of 30-40 mph right?
No, I don’t.
If they WERE… don’t you
think that should have been
just one more big RED FLAG
to them? Just one more
reason they should have
stopped and re-evaluated
that bad decision?
If you are right ( and even the
winds were that bad as they
were actually descending and
‘bushwhacking’ )… I think that’s
just ‘one more thing’ that
should have contributed to
them re-evaluating what
they were doing.
>> xxfullsailxx also said…
>> and while i realize that you
>> have ZERO first hand
>> knowledge, but when
>> winds and slope align then
>> the fire is probably moving
>> that fast as well…
>> especially in dry brush.
You are right… and ANYONE
with any experience SHOULD
have known ALL that.
So… are you NOW saying that
Jesse Steed and the rest of
Granite Mountain had
absolutely ZERO ‘first hand
knowledge’ of what all that
meant, as well ( combined
with the reduced rate of
travel )?
That seems to be what you
are saying.
>> xxfullsailxx also said.
>> and you do realize that the
>> fire (as shown on the well
>> researched fire
>> progression map) was
>> probably racing up the hill >> behind them as well…
It probably was… but THEY
didn’t know that WHILE they
were descending.
They were descending into
a fuel-filled box canyon with
no lookout. Whoops.
>> xxfullsailxx also said
>> i don’t even think an extra
>> FIVE minutes would have
>> helped them at the point
>> they realized their situation.
>> and certainly was not
>> enough time to try to RTO >> back up the hill.
Fine. So you are still sticking
with ‘no chance in hell’ for
ANY kind of ‘drop packs and
run’ scenario.
You still didn’t answer my
question.
You are now saying it is ‘obvious’ and a ‘given’ that
a certain amount of time
MUST have passed between
the moment they first realized
how much trouble they were
in… and then they finally
accomplished ALL of the
following things…
1) Made the decision to deploy
versus ANY other option.
2) Searched for and found
the chosen deployment site.
3) 18 – 19 men pulled up
from single file to a group.
4) Ropes were pulled on
the saws and work began.
5) Steed decides to call
Air Attack.
How much TIME do you
think actually transpired
to accomplish ALL of
those things listed above?
I’m still just curious what
your ‘expert’ opinion might
be on that.
Thanks, I need to check on the .5, but given your eye for detail let’s go with the .83. Yes, extremely slow. Retreating back uphill would obviously be slower, so each minute down cost a multiple of time in terms of nearest escape. And, as they got further in the bowl, progress would bog more as the brush got relatively denser.
And, they had every reason to know that this would be the case when the decision to descend via that route was made. Heat stress, psychological stress, and other factors can of course impair judgment along with the simply fact of having gotten away with similar things before.
Yes. Add to that xxfullsailxx’s new assertion
that the winds in their faces were ALREADY
clocking 30-40 mph and blowing them
BACKWARDS in the drainage… even WHILE
they were still descending… and…
Well… you get the picture.
It was a bad place to be taking a hike.
Every minute down was one more minute
they should have used to stop… re-evaluate
that bad decision… and GO BACK.
who said “ALREADY”? you did…
(pretty typical for you really, to be ad-lib’ing your own narrative… that’s your favorite game, why should i expect any less?)
again, you act like this all happens in a vacuum. there was a distinct change from when they descended the two track to when they realized what the fire was doing… they would have been (mostly) sheltered from the wind on the way down… being on the leeward side of the knob and descending into a bowl, right? (right). the wind-slope alignment would have come in to play once the fire wrapped around the knob below them.
they couldn’t see the fire, and couldn’t feel the wind switch out of the north… until it was too late.
i realize you’re running out of controversy, (and therefore, people to blame) but don’t go vomiting all over your shoes looking for the next scandal…
>> you do realize that the
>> winds IN THAT DRAINAGE
>> were probably upwards
>> of 30-40 mph right?
Now you say there was
hardly any wind in the drainage
at all ( that they could feel )…
>> xxfullsailxx
>> they would have been
>> (mostly) sheltered from
>> the wind on the way
>> down… being on the
>> leeward side of the knob
Fer cryin’ out loud…
Pick a story a stick with it.
You and SR can finish this
debate about what a ‘slow
rate of travel’ is.
I will always believe .83 to 1.0
mph represented an
unacceptable rate of travel
based on THEIR own imagined
travel rates/times to accomplish whatever the heck it was they thought were trying to do… and they SHOULD
have REALIZED that significantly reduced rate
of travel MIGHT be putting
them at GREAT risk that day.
Not much is ever going to
change my mind about that.
On game trails being “evident,” and rates of travel.
Basically, whether a game trail is “evident” or not doesn’t have much bearing on whether it’s reasonable to think it will make a bushwhack faster. Given the route GM took, what they seem to have followed is a natural drainage and not a game trail over the lip of the bowl. Would planning on linking up game trails and clearings be a plan with a reasonable likelihood of providing a prudent pace through that bowl? No. The ability to see game trails depends on factors ranging from lighting to the acquired skill of blinking them out, in addition to the thickness of vegetation in a given area. GM was not, I assure you, standing at the top of that bowl and able to see a network of game trails and how they linked to one another. It is not a credible idea.
FullSail to me clearly has not spent much time in that area, or would know how ludicrous it is to think this would be a reasonable plan. Likewise, the idea that GM was in fact cruising at 2 mph doesn’t hold water, on two levels. One, not credible given conditions and rate of forward travel. Two, if there WERE an incredibly snakey trail that they were following at 2 mph (not credible, but let’s assume), their rate of forward progress is what counts, and it was still slower than a shopping mall stroll.
FullSail has alluded a few times to the work capacity test as somehow suggesting that GM could have traveled faster. WFFs, in the “strenuous” version of the test, have to carry a 45 pound pack 3 miles in 45 minutes. Key point: they don’t do this through heavy brush. The fact that someone can pass a fairly easy standard on a flat hike doesn’t mean anything about what that same person can do in thick brush over broken rocky ground.
Even the way FullSail misuses the term arroyo suggest to me he doesn’t have much firsthand experience in the southwest.
Going with .83 as GM’s rate of travel, yes it is painfully slow. It is reasonable to believe they had slowed further by the time they stopped and made the decision to deploy. It is not surprising that a bushwhack of the type they chose resulted in such a slow rate of travel. It is the normal thing. If someone has not scouted the area (and GM had not) standing above GM’s route and planning on linking game trails that you don’t even know of would be reckless and not based on sound experience. There is no suggestion to me that this is what GM did, btw, I am simply addressing FullSail’s odd claim that this is what they may have done to expect to be able to go faster.
Because .83 mph seems a little abstract, let’s put it in terms of laps around a track. At 1 mph, you take 15 minutes to walk once around a track.
Key takeaway is that long committing bushwhacks are not “very often” done, for very good reason. And, ability to reverse, particularly uphill, goes away quickly so people should act quickly if they realize they aren’t making good time.
One other minor comment directed to WTKTT: re Google Earth, whether it’s a feature of the way they process images, or the way our brain perceives their images, it tends to be the case that chaparral, choked washes, etc. look much more passable on Google Earth than they are. Whereas things like cattails can look solid and be reasonable to get through.
hey SR… did you see all those game trails there on google earth? those GAME TRAILS that go up and down that very drainage that GM tried to hike through? all those game trails that are VERY EVIDENT in the pre-fire satellite images that google earth still has up?
i’m sure they “look much more passable on Google Earth than they are” because of “the way our brain perceives their images.”
wow, you have got to be kidding me with that shit… you would have been better served censoring yourself from writing that comment… what a joke.
i think we’ve established that .5 mph AND .83 mph are not even kind of close to reality. those figures are based on time and distance over a straight line (as the crow flies, if you will)… the path that GM took was very obviously NOT a straight line for the obvious reasons that you are so desperately trying to speculate about…
i have never spoke of game trails as if they provided GM a “planned route”… like they looked down the drainage pointing out game trails to each other like they were playing connect the dots. i SPECULATED about your SPECULATION about how and why they chose the route they did…
SR says,
>>FullSail has alluded a few times to the work >>capacity test
i spoke of the work capacity test once, and i believe i explained the context for which i was using it… glad you finally looked it up. now stop taking my example out of context.
“misuse the term arroyo?” oh please, do explain… apparently in your world it doesn’t mean “intermittently dry creek”…
SR says,
>>”their rate of forward progress is what >>counts?”
oh goodness… i don’t even know what to do with that… so you could be hiking down a hill on a switch back trail that is 5 milies in length, moving at 3+ mph but your actual FORWARD PROGRESS might only be 3 miles as the crow flies… and that’s what counts!? very sound logic… about as sound as your math skills.
i don’t think you have any clue what wff’s do on a daily basis… i also don’t think you have any clue how dense that chaparral was… i bet you don’t even understand that the term “chaparral” , when used outside of CA., is used as a general descriptor for brush… the actual “chaparral” in and around the Yarnell area consisted of scrub oak, cat claw and juniper… and, while dense in some areas, it grows in varying pockets and not the continuous coverage you find on southern CA hillsides…
you’re really hell bent on making the point that game trails were not used… okay fine, they didn’t walk down a single game trail… you speculate that (based on a complete lack of wildland fire experience)… i’ll speculate there were game trails that gave them some semblance of general route and path (based on 13 years experience).
Simply, FullSail continues to be clueless pretty much across the board on this point. Whatever his motivation for typing without the hands-on experience he is clearly lacking on this point, there’s not much to say except that he clearly hasn’t spent much (any?) time in relevant parts of the southwest.
**
** (1) DID SPGS1 GARY CORDES EVER ACTUALLY SCOUT THE
** BOULDER SPRINGS RANCH BEFORE ESTABLISHING
** IT AS SUNDAY’S ‘PREDETERMINED SAFETY ZONE’?
**
** (2) THE BOULDER SPRINGS RANCH HAD PERIMETER FENCING
In Gary Cordes’ ADOSH interview… there was some extensive discussion at the
start of it about what Cordes spent his time doing on Saturday evening and very
early Sunday morning.
Cordes actually arrived in Yarnell and checked in with IC Russ Shumate
at 2340 ( 11:40 PM ) Saturday night.
In his ADOSH interview… the ADOSH investigators were actually going over
Cordes’ officially submitted incident ‘Unit Log’ with him, line by line.
Cordes details some of his ‘scouting’ around the town of Yarnell itself and goes
into good detail about his time-consuming hike ( circa 4:40 AM ) all the way
out to within 200 yards of the fire.
At NO time, however, in either his own ‘Unit Log’ entries or during the ‘line by line’
talk-thru of it with the ADOSH investigators does Cordes ever actually say he
was ever physically at the Boulder Springs Ranch itself prior to the main
briefing at 0700 on Sunday morning when he started telling inbound
resources ( like Eric Marsh ) that it was the ‘predetermined safety zone’
for that day’s work cycle in that area.
The ADOSH interview also never fully establishes WHEN, exactly, Cordes
had actually DECIDED that the Boulder Springs Ranch would be the ‘designated’
Safety Zone for the Sunday work cycle.
All we know ( in the only evidence that has been made public, anyway ) is
that come the 0700 Sunday briefing… it WAS already the ‘predetermined
safety zone’… and SPGS1 Cordes was then telling ( soon to be DIVSA )
Eric Marsh that was the case for that work cycle.
There is actually what might seem to be some evidence in the ADOSH
interview transcript that Cordes might not have ever actually seen the
Ranch in the daylight at all ( like not EVER ) since he seemed to have
no real idea in his interview what the SIZE of the ‘safety zone’ even really was.
Even then, in his ADOSH interview more than 2 months after the incident ( on
September 11, 2013 ) Cordes was telling the ADOSH investigators that the
Boulder Springs Ranch ‘safety zone’ was ’20-30′ acres in size.
That is WILDLY wrong. Not even close.
It was no such thing. Not on June 30, and not two months later, either.
That may have been what someone told him the actual size of the entire
Helms’ entire ranch property was, or something, and it was sticking in
his brain even 2 months later during his ADOSH interview… but the cleared
area Cordes would end up designating as the ‘predetermined safety zone’
for the June 30 work day could never be realistically described as being
anything more than about 2.5 acres.
So even two months after the incident, Gary Cordes was telling ADOSH
investigators that the area he had designated as the ‘predetermined
safety zone’ for Eric Marsh and Granite Mountain was well MORE than
EIGHT to TWELVE TIMES as large as it actually ever was.
That’s a pretty big mistake to make for an experienced wildland firefighter
who is SUPPOSED to be a good judge of ‘acreage’, distances, and lot size(s).
The actual ‘clearing area’ at the Boulder Springs Ranch containing all the
primary structures was a ‘rectangle’ with the following ‘side’ measurements…
385 feet ( north to south, measured along the western perimeter fencing )
285 feet ( east to west, not including the isolated equipment Barn in the rocks ).
NOTE: This ‘rectangle’ does not include the small northern side ‘push out’
in the rock formations where some large cargo containers were stored.
This rectangle simply includes the entire area that could be considered ‘safe’.
385 x 285 = 109,725
Total square feet: 109,725 feet
Total acreage: 2.51 acres
NOTE: 1 (square) acre = 43,560 square fee
NOTE: A square enclosing one acre is approximately 69.57 yards,
or 208 feet 9 inches (63.63 metres) on a side.
Here is the moment in Gary Cordes’ interview where he tells the ADOSH
investigators the size of the ‘open area/site’ ( the safety zone itself )
was 20-30 acres.
NOTE: It is not a typo in the transcription writer’s part. If you listen to
the audio there is no doubt the transcriber got it right.
_________________________________________________________________
ADOSH INTERVIEW WITH GARY CORDES – 09/11/13 – 11:02 AM
Q = Bruce Hanna
Q1 = Barry Hicks
Q2 = Dave Larsen ( Rest in Peace )
Q3 = Brett Steurer
A = Gary Cordes
Page 11…
Q1: Now where – was the Boulder Springs Ranch and the Helm Ranch the same?
A: I’m guessing the la- it is the la – what’s the owners last name?
Q1: Helm.
A: Yeah, then that would be it. It, it’s, it’s the one where they deploy just west of.
Q1: Okay.
A: It’s a very large uh, 20 to 30 acre open site uh, that was real cleaned out and it
was pretty – it was bomb proof.
Q1: But did Eric actually go to the Helm Ranch with you?
A: No.
Q2: You, you pointed that out to him as you drove uh…
A: When we were parked on the, when we were parked on the uh, Sesame Street
Road, first of all, we pointed it out on the iPad at, at our initial briefing and
then while we were parked on the um, on the Sesame Street Road, I pointed in
the direction of where it was and said that’s where the ranch is over in that area.
_________________________________________________________________
** (2) THE BOULDER SPRINGS RANCH HAD PERIMETER FENCING
The following pre-fire photo of the Boulder Springs Ranch complex in Mr.
Dougherty’s SAIT FOIA/ FOIL dropbox clearly shows there was, in fact,
‘perimeter fencing’ on the western side of the Boulder Springs Ranch,
which is the direction Granite Mountain was approaching it.
It doesn’t look like just simple ‘field fencing’, either.
Sections of it ( in this photo, anyway ) appear to be full 5-6 foot high hard-post
chain link. Photo enhancement even shows what *appears* to be some
kind of angle-back barbed wire on the top on the sections near the residence.
It does not appear to have been ‘electrified’… but it still *might* have presented
quite an obstacle to the 19 men who would have had to deal with it coming
from the west, especially if the fire had been RIGHT THERE on the northern
perimeter of the property as they arrived and cutting off any chance to find
a way AROUND the fencing.
If it actually was just some field fencing… then it probably wouldn’t have
been much of a problem for fellas with chainsaws… but if it was really
anything substantial… well… I would say at least Marsh should have been
TOLD it was there since he would be coming from the west and have
to deal with it. Maybe he was (told). Maybe not. We don’t know ( at
this point ) if Cordes himself even knew it was there.
Here’s the pre-fire photo taken by hiker Joy Collura on Sunday, June 30, 2013.
It was taken the morning of the incident itself, as Joy and Tex (Sonny)
Gilligan were heading up into the Weaver Mountains to look at the
Yarnell Hill Fire for themselves and they passed by the Boulder Springs Ranch.
NOTE: The small BLACK boxes you can see mounted to some of the fence
posts on that west-side perimeter fence appear to be the housings for the
security cameras on that side of the ranch.
This ‘perimeter fencing’ is also clearly visible in Google Maps, which still shows
pre-fire images of that area. The fencing extends all the way along the
western side and then also appears to continue on to the north along
that ‘jeep trail’ leading away from the property.
NOTE: There are a number of post-deployment photos of that western side
of the Boulder Springs Ranch which do NOT show any ‘fencing’ of any kind
still remaining there… but I imagine it was all just removed by the dozer when
it cut that line towards the deployment site… and perhaps all the downed
fencing just got cleaned up before July 9, when the those post-deployment
photos were taken.
Perhaps when we get to see the actual security camera footage from
that western edge of the Helms Ranch it will show much better what that
perimeter fencing really looked like. ( simple or complex ).
#1. why do you keep using the words “primary” and “designated.”
-neither of those were used in the Cordes interview.
-neither of those are the case.
#2. why do you continue to conveniently leave out the part where Cordes says,
-“And black, and, and I told ‘em of course you have the black as a safety zone.”
#3. there might be one section of fence on that side with the black boxes… it doesn’t look too foreboding though and i would presume that it is more for the blocking of tumble weeds, than security.
-especially since the other three sides of the ranch appear to have no fencing at all
-“perimeter fencing…” huh, pretty funny.
#4. post fire, the BSR looked completely unscathed, right? in fact, it looked like a bomb went off around it, yet it survived! you might even describe it as “a bomb proof safety zone.”
#5. once again, Cordes is briefing them on what he has been scouting out since 2200 the night before. he is giving Div. A intel, so Marsh can proceed as Div. Alpha. beyond that, Cordes has no “authority” over Div. Alpha… they both work for ops.
-this includes designations of safey zones and responsibility for LCES. (Marsh is now responsible party for Div. Alpha resources in establishing LCES and the tactics).
-this also includes the dozer line operation, which is now part of Div. Alpha until another Div. Sup comes to change Division boundaries.
there’s no reason to think it wasn’t scouted by Cordes… unless you subscribe to the “guilty until proven innocent” philosophy that WTKTT continues to propogate.
From what I have read so far there is no indication any one scouted the ranch. If they did there would have been some note about the fence on private property. Which looks like it would have blocked GM on the route they took. Which also means they had no clue. It could also be that the 2 track went right into the Ranch or even had a gate on that side but no one made mention of that either. This again is the unknown that could have been fixed with a scouting of route and site. As stated before how safe would you have really been had the house or barn building caught fire
in the middle of the Bomb proof SZ?
There is also the fact ( as
Google maps clearly shows )
that the approach to the
Ranch property itself from
the two-track was NOT at
all ‘well defined’. There was
a point, at the end of the
eastward leg of the two-track
as it came out of its own
‘blind canyon’… that they
would have had to ‘figure out’
the last due-north leg of
the journey to get to the
Ranch itself. Even more
heavy manzanita there on
the south side of the ranch
to SLOG through just to
approach the Ranch perimter
from THAT direction.
They could have easily gotten
REALLY confused even at
that final part of the journey
and wasted a lot of time even
trying to figure out that last
coupla hundred yards, if
it hadn’t been fully scouted.
Fullsail
No backup and reread WTKTT was supporting my observations–OK
The structures didn’t burn true—Lucky??
I do not Know but I have a concern that no Engine was placed there for protection. Which leads me to believe and my thoughts only. Fire staff did not put an Engine for structure protection at the Ranch
because they felt it was unsafe to do so?
No escape route out if the road or Ranch compromised? The fact there is no Engine there when there should have been is interesting and some what puzzling don’t you think. A bomb proof safety zone should have still had structure protection for the errant sparks that catch buildings on fire?
Reply to xxfullsailxx post on April 3, 2014 at 7:02 am
>> xxfullsailxx wrote…
>> #3. there might be one section of fence on that side
>> with the black boxes… it doesn’t look too foreboding
>> though and i would presume that it is more for the
>> blocking of tumble weeds, than security.
You may be right.
Maybe it was ‘nothing to even mention’ to anyone
you were telling it was a ‘safety zone’… maybe not.
There is no doubt it was there ( fencing on the west
side ) the morning of the incident itself… but that one
picture taken by Joy was from quite a distance.
There is actually a folder in Mr. Dougherty’s online
dropbox for the SAIT investigation supporting material
that has this title…
A52-Helm Ranch Photos Pre-Fire:
…but the link is BROKEN.
If you click it… it simply goes to the same set of
‘Foley’ pictures as the folder listed ABOVE it… which
is this one…
I don’t know if that ‘A52-Helm Ranch Photos Pre-Fire:’
folder would have any better photos of that fencing
to see whether it really was a no-brainer, or not…
but it would be interesting to see ( the photos ).
Any comment about the fact that SPGS1 Cordes
thought the ‘safety zone’ was EIGHT to TWELVE
times the size it actually was… even two months
after the incident?
If he had ever actually seen the site at ANY time
( daylight or nightime )… do you think there’s any
chance he could still be describing it to anyone
as ’20 to 30 acres’?
Misjudging the 2.5 acre ‘safety zone’ to be 3 or 4 acres
might be understandable…
nice, you addressed 1 of 5 points… way to go. once again, you’re making bad judgments and accusatory statements (verging on libel & slander) based on some very shaky, unfounded evidence…
MAYBE you’re working for the defense of the state? since we’ve basically exonerated Cordes of any of YOUR speculative, unfounded accusations of “wrong doing” at this point…
oh btw, didn’t that BSR look like a pretty bomb-ass safety zone post fire? yeah, i thought so too.
Reply to xxfullsailxx post
on April 3, 2014 at 5:01 pm
>> xxfullsailxx wrote…
>> Since we’ve basically exonerated
>> Cordes of any of YOUR speculative,
>> unfounded accusations of “wrong
>> doing” at this point…
Who is ‘we’?
Regardless…
Until there is definitive proof, one way or
the other, that SPGS1 Gary Cordes actually
did ‘scout’ the location he was going to
designate on Sunday as the ‘predetermined
safety zone’ to all inbound resources working
the south end of the fire… and didn’t’ just
peek at some blob on a Google map and
think it would automatically be OK… and
until there’s proof he didn’t ACTUALLY think
the site was ’20 to 30 acres’ when it was
( at best ) only 2.4 acres…. filled with
structures that COULD have ignited…
…there is no evidence that anyone did
or didn’t do ‘anything wrong’.
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>> oh btw, didn’t that BSR look like a pretty
>> bomb-ass safety zone post fire? yeah, i
>> thought so too.
So that sounds like your “regardless of
whether the safety zone was scouted
or not… everything turned out OK in the
end, didn’t it… SO… nothing to see here…
move along… move along” point of view.
Hmmm… also sounds a lot like…
“Possible bad/poor decisions that just
happened to result in acceptable outcomes”
…doesn’t it?
I would still like to know… for sure and
certain… whether that safety zone was
‘scouted’ before it was being designated
as a valid one for the employees working
in that workplace that day… and that
INCLUDES ‘how to get to it safely’.
Safety zones aren’t much good unless
you can GET to them safely, under
emergency conditions. See ALL of
Mr. Powers’ comments for more
about that aspect of it all.
There might or might not be things to criticize Cordes for that day, but this safety zone issue is not one of them. Picking a safety zone, determining the routes to reach it and deciding when those routes were no longer operational due to the fire – that was ALL Granite Mountain’s responsibility. They are responsible for their own safety, which includes their safety zones and escape routes. This dog won’t hunt.
If the BSR had turned out to be inadequate, that would have been on Marsh or Steed – especially if THEY had not scouted it. It seems like it was adequate, but it could not be reached that afternoon. That too is on Marsh and Steed, which is the whole point of the last 6 months here.
Marti I was just reading the Mar 31- Apr1 post. I’m sorry for your loss. After all this energy your question is more than likely not going to get answered. Their may one or two people who have an idea or know, maybe. My guess is that they thought they had time. Bad decision that simple. Nothing worse than that kind of loss. GB
p99 SAIR At 1603, the ASM1 requested Dispatch to place resource orders for six additional LATs with SWCC, necessary due to the wind shift of 300 degrees, structures threatened and thunderstorms pushing the fire in multiple directions. At 1608, SWCC sent these orders to the National Interagency Coordination Center (NICC) in Boise, ID, which denied all the requests as UTF due to the “Very limited availability of airtankers with increasing activity in the western states. Unable to fill at this time.” The NICC Coordinator on Duty followed direction from the Multi-Agency Coordinating Group, responsible for the national reallocation of scarce resources at the National Interagency Fire Center, in issuing the airtanker UTFs to SWCC.
It seems interesting that ASM1/ Bravo1 was the actual aircraft that made the call for the 6 additional LAT”s at 1603 (after leaving the fire at 1445?) I mention this with the thought *someone* put out that Div A/GM might have thought they had a lookout in the air?
Questions:
1. Who notified ASM1/ Bravo3 and told them of a 300 degree wind shift, , structures threatened and thunderstorms pushing the fire in multiple directions, around 1603?
2. Is it possible Div A/ GM was in touch with ASM1 circa 1600?
What you just said confirms what I have been saying.
At 1600 the fire was being pushed in multiple directions with
300 deg. wind shifts. You don’t need a lookout you need to be deep in the black and hunkered down. Again moving was pure folly, with or without a lookout. Any line personnel should have been finding safety zones immediately not hiking a mile or more thru the brush……….GET IN THE BLACK
Reply to calvin post on April 2, 2014 at 4:26 pm said:
>> calvin wrote…
>>
>> It seems interesting that ASM1/ Bravo1 was the actual
>> aircraft that made the call for the 6 additional LAT”s at 1603
>> (after leaving the fire at 1445?) I mention this with the thought
>> *someone* put out that Div A/GM might have thought they
>> had a lookout in the air?
Well… in their interview with ADOSH… they don’t recall doing
anything of the sort. All they remember is saying they just did
an “all available” call and said “give us everything you have”
because it was perfectly obvious what was going to happen…
but then they are not even sure that OPERATIONS on the fire
even realized what THEY already knew…
_____________________________________________________
ADOSH INTERVIEW WITH
PAUL LENMARK AND RUSTY WARBIS
ADOSH interviewed them both together on in one interview on
September 24, 2013 – 9:00 AM
Q=Barry Hicks
Q1=Marshall Krotenberg
Q2= Bruce Hanna
Q3=Dave Larsen ( Rest in Peace )
Q4= Brett Steurer
A=Rusty Warbis
A1=Paul Lenmark
A2=Alex Viscusi
A or A1: And then I remember we had a conversation with dispatch too about it because we did an all available…
Q: Give you everything you could get.
A or A1: We’ll take it whatever we can get because Yarnell
is gonna be…
Q: Right, okay. So dispatch knew that, ah – ah fairly well and –
and – and you felt like operations was clear that that was gonna be
the case, ah – ah, at some – that Yarnell was gonna be an issue.
A or A1: I think so.
_____________________________________________________
>> calvin asked…
>> 1. Who notified ASM1/ Bravo3 and told them of a 300
>> degree wind shift, , structures threatened and thunderstorms
>> pushing the fire in multiple directions, around 1603?
That’s hard to say. I’m not sure anyone had to tell them that.
They were pretty much ‘running their own show’ that day.
I checked their ADOSH interview and while that transcript is pretty
much a mess and hard to follow…there is really NO mention of
anyone ever ‘telling’ them anything of the sort.
It’s really a strange interview they had with ADOSH, though.
These guys ( Warbis and Lenmark ) couldn’t remember
ANYTHING when it came to times or specifics or who was
really working the fire or who they ever really talked to that day.
Neither one of them could even remember the number of the
airplane they were flying on either one of their ‘shifts’ on
the fire that day.
It’s kind of a mystery where that whole entry on page 99 of the
SAIR came from… because even in the SAIT’s own ‘Investigation
Notes’ Warbis and Lenmark said no one EVER notified them
about any ‘wind shifts’…
Page 13 of YIN…
INTERVIEW WITH Bravo 3 – 7/7/2013 – 15:00
Interviewees: Rusty Warbis, Paul Lenmark
Q: Any communication of wind shift:
A: No. It was never communicated to me.
>> calvin also asked…
>> 2. Is it possible Div A/ GM was in touch with ASM1 circa 1600?
I really doubt it.
They didn’t know ANYONE by name ( only by position and they
were even confused about all that ) and the only conversation
they say they ever had with “Division Alpha” was early on in their
first 4 hour gig on the fire ( NOON to 4:00 PM ) when they said
even Division Alpha ( Marsh, but they didn’t know that ) was telling
them that he was unable to ‘anchor and flank’ and that whole
plan wasn’t even going to work.
That’s a pretty astonishing claim for them ( Warbis and Lenmark ),
to make… that even around NOON or 1:00 PM THEY knew that
Marsh was ‘out of the game’ already, based on what the fire was
actually doing even that early in the day… and that even Eric Marsh
already knew that the whole ‘anchor and flank’ thing that he had
been sent up there to do just wasn’t going to work…
…but here is exactly what they said to ADOSH investigators…
_____________________________________________________
Q: Yeah – yeah. Ah, so did you all ever talk to Division Alpha in
terms of what their – what their plan was or, ah, knowing that
they’re pretty much outta the game up there at this point in time.
Did you have any conversation with ‘em?
A or A1: Um, I had contact with those divisions. I was unaware
that th- th- th- that Alpha was the hotshot superintendent. Um,
my understanding was that Alpha was that rim on the other
side – the west side…
Q: Okay.
A or A1: …and Alpha, to me, was – with the other things that
were going on – head, um, and the right flank. To me, Alpha
was outta the game.
Q: Yeah, okay.
A or A1: Didn’t you touch base with them on that side just to
make sure to see how far along they were, and they weren’t…
A or A1: They weren’t…
A or A1: …and they were – they were coveyed back.
A or A1: Yeah, yep.
Q: So some time that morning, they had – they had figured out
they were not gonna be able to anchor and flank it…
A or A1: Yep.
_____________________________________________________
Lenmark and Warbis told ADOSH investigators that’s the only
time they talked with “Division A” that day… sometime right
after they got there ( NOON ish ).
They also assert to ADOSH that they NEVER actually SAW
where ANYONE was on the south side of the fire the whole time
they were there that day.
That pretty much puts the kibosh on any chance they
were acting as ANYONE’s lookout that day… or that anyone
could have possibly even THOUGHT they were.
_____________________________________________________
Q: Yeah – yeah, I understand that, so. Got it. Ah – ah, so take
us – take us through, ah – ah – ah, you – we got up to the
first VLAT drop and then you, ah, you’ve worked all these and
then you took a – took a good lap around and looked at what was
going on and, ah – ah, and you could – could you see those
guys up there on the – on the south end when you made your
turnaround? No visual…
A or A1: I never had visual with anybody on the south end of the fire.
Q: Is that right? Okay.
____________________________________________________
Lenmark/Warbis weren’t even in the air over the fire at 4:03…. Don’t believe what you read in the SAIR or the ADOSH reports (or sometimes even in the dispatch logs) as gospel without finding unrelated, reliable corroboration, hopefully from two unrelated sources (that is my rule of thumb, anyway).
Calvin, I gave you an answer to your 911 versus 910 question below. I took it from my notes (for those who are going to ask what my “source” was).
**
** OPS2 PAUL MUSSER ONLY CALLED
** DIVSA ERIC MARSH ONE TIME THAT DAY
Now that we can finally see ( thanks to Mr. Dougherty ) the ACTUAL transcript
of OPS2 Paul Musser’s ADOSH interview, we also now know the following…
1) OPS2 Paul Musser only ‘called out’ to DIVSA Marsh ONE time that entire day.
2) The CLEAR background radio capture of Musser calling “Division A” at
1542.14 ( 3:42 PM plus 14 seconds ) MUST be that ‘one and only’ call.
Here is OPS2 Paul Musser CONFIRMING that that radio call is the one and only
time he tried to communicate with either Marsh or Granite Mountain that day…
__________________________________________________________________
ADOSH INTERVIEW WITH PAUL MUSSER – 08/16/13 – 9:00 AM
Q=Brett Steurer
Q1=Bruce Hanna
Q2=Barry Hicks
Q3=Paul Katz
A=Paul Musser
Page 32…
A: Uh, got on the 89 to a vantage point and met with Gary Cordes. Face to face
with Gary. As far as – oh at that point, I’d also called Granite on their radio.
Because Todd was still tied up with Model Creek. I called Granite on the
radio and asked if them and Blue Ridge were still committed on the ridge?
They said that they were committed on the ridge. But Blue Ridge was on the
bottom and may, may be available. I talked with Gary, he said no their
committed to, uh, hold – to prepping and hold the dozer line.
Q2: You’re talking about Blue Ridge?
A: Yes, Blue Ridge.
Q2: Okay.
A: And that Granite was still committed in the black…
Q2: Okay.
A: …up on top.
…
Q2: Uh, and, uh – and you had no other conversations with Granite Mountain that
you recall?
A: No.
_________________________________________________________________
I believe some people had just been assuming that OPS2 Paul Musser
had made this ‘availability check’ with DIVSA Eric Marsh regarding Granite
Mountain AFTER OPS1 Todd Abel’s known exchange with Marsh ( captured
in the Robert Caldwell video at 1550 – 3:50 PM ) where OPS1 Todd Abel
said the following…
1) Keep ME informed ( of your situation )
2) Hunker and be safe ( in the black )
3) We’ll get some Air Support down there ASAP.
As it turns out… we can now be SURE that OPS2 Paul Musser definitely
made HIS ‘availability check’ with Marsh almost a full 8 minutes BEFORE
the ‘hunker and be safe’ exchange between OPS1 Todd Abel and DIVSA
Eric Marsh.
When OPS2 Paul Musser made that ‘availability check’ with Marsh
regarding Granite Mountain at 1542.14… Musser had, in fact, already
transitioned from being just a simple “Planning OPS” to the second fully
functioning “Field OPS” on the fire. Musser’s focus was now purely
‘structure protection’ and had already been doing exactly that in the
Sickles Road area before then moving to Yarnell to do the same thing,
right before he called DIVSA Eric Marsh ( that one and only time ).
So when Eric Marsh and Jesse Steed started having their (multiple)
‘comfort level’ and ‘discussing options’ conversation(s) in the 3:50 to
4:04 timeframe… this is now the right ORDER that the now fully-functional
TWO different “Field OPS” had contacted them prior to that…
3:42 – Field OPS Musser checks on ‘availablity’ of GM for specific structure
protection ‘prep’ work down in Yarnell. No help with ‘evacuations’ mentioned.
8 minutes LATER…
3:50 – Field OPS Todd Abel orders/tells/suggests/advises DIVSA Eric Marsh to
“Keep him updated AND hunker and be safe”. No requests for help with structure
protection OR evacuations were made.
14 minutes LATER…
4:04 – GM Captain Jesse Steed leads 17 men out of the safe black and
south towards the Boulder Springs Ranch with DIVSA Eric Marsh
‘catching up’ to them from the rear at some point.
**
** OPS2 PAUL MUSSER DIDN’T ACTUALLY
** SAY “CAN YOU SPARE RESOURCES”?
There has, of course, always been the ‘revelation’ in the ADOSH report that
OPS2 Paul Musser had called Eric Marsh and/or Jesse Steed and asked if they
could ‘spare resources’… which was NEVER reported in the SAIR.
From page 18 of the ADOSH report…
__________________________________________________________________
At approximately 1545 hours, Division A Supervisor Marsh had a radio
conversation with Operations Section Chief I Abel regarding the weather and the
position of Granite Mountain iHC. Marsh was located near the top of the Weaver
Mountains and had a clear view of the thunderstorm, the fire, and the valley below.
Marsh and Abel had been watching the storm for some time and discussed their
concerns regarding the storms effects. Marsh reportedly stated that Granite
Mountain was safe and in the black (i.e., previously burned wildland).
Marsh mentioned that the winds were “squirre|y” at his position and that the
retardant and dozer lines north of Yarnell were being compromised.
Shortly thereafter, Operations Section Chief 2 Musser radioed GMIHC and
asked if they could spare resources to assist in Yarnell.
Either Marsh or GMIHC Captain Steed responded that they were committed
to the black and that Musser should contact BRIHC working in the valley
(during his interview Musser stated that he wasn’t sure who he was talking with).
__________________________________________________________________
Keyphrase: “asked if they could spare resources to assist in Yarnell”.
Now that we can finally ( thanks to Mr. Dougherty ) see the actual interviews that
ADOSH was basing its own ‘narrative’ on…
Nowhere in Paul Musser’s interview with ADOSH did he ever specifically
say he asked Eric Marsh or Granite Mountain if they could “spare resources”.
What appeared to be an exact QUOTE that appeared in the ADOSH report now
appears to be just something that the ADOSH investigators came up with on
their own as they were typing their report.
That doesn’t mean Musser wasn’t trying to (quote) “check on their availablity”
and/or find out if there was any chance GM could somehow assist him with
(quote) “more prep stuff down here”. ( See interview quotes below ).
All that means is that there is no (public) evidence, at this point, that he ever
asked the direct question “Can you spare resources?” as ADOSH reported.
Here is what Paul Musser ( himself ) says he ACTUALLY said…
_________________________________________________________________
ADOSH INTERVIEW WITH PAUL MUSSER – 08/19/13 – 9:00 AM
Q=Brett Steurer
Q1=Bruce Hanna
Q2=Barry Hicks
Q3=Paul Katz
A=Paul Musser
Page 32…
Q2: Okay.
A: Uh, got on the 89 to a vantage point and met with Gary Cordes. Face to face
with Gary. As far as – oh at that point, I’d also called Granite on their radio.
Because Todd was still tied up with Model Creek. I called Granite on the
radio and asked if them and Blue Ridge were still committed on the ridge?
They said that they were committed on the ridge. But Blue Ridge was on the
bottom and may, may be available. I talked with Gary, he said no their
committed to, uh, hold – to prepping and hold the dozer line.
Q2: You’re talking about Blue Ridge?
A: Yes, Blue Ridge.
Q2: Okay.
A: And that Granite was still committed in the black…
Q2: Okay.
A: …up on top.
…
Q2: Okay. When you, uh – let me back up to when you made contact with Granite
Mountain, who – who did you talk to – Eric?
A: I think so.
Q2: But you can’t remember for sure if that was Eric or…
A: I – I – ‘cause I – I think I called division Alpha, not Granite, no.
Q2: Oh, okay.
A: That’s who I would have called.
Q2: Uh, so it would have…
A: Yeah, I wouldn’t have called Granite direct.
Q2: Okay.
A: I would have called – gone through their supervisor.
Q2: Okay.
A: Which at that point was division Alpha.
Q2: Okay. And, uh, so, uh, that conversation was you’re in the black and you need
to stay in the black?
A: No, no that conversation was are you still committed on top of the ridge. And
they said yes we are committed on top of the ridge.
Q2: Okay. And so you’re assumption was they were in the black?
A: If – if they were committed on top of the ridge, they would have one foot in
the black.
Q2: Okay.
A: Because that was their assignment, yes.
Q2: Okay. Uh, and that’s – that’s an important point here, I think Paul that – that,
uh, uh, as far as you know that was the last communication you had with those
guys?
A: I think that was, yes.
Q2: Okay. And, uh, so, uh…
A: I know Todd had talked to them earlier – a little bit earlier about the
thunderstorms that were coming in.
Q2: Right.
A: And making sure that they were in the black. Actually had air attack go up
and make sure that…
Q2: Right.
A: …everything was good.
…
Q2: Okay. So, uh, based on your flight, uh, up there, uh, from the point that those
guys were, uh, uh – or that you assume that they were, they could see the, uh,
progress of the fire from that – that it was no longer going northeast, that it had
turned and was moving to the south (unintelligible).
A: They had the best view of anybody on the fire.
Q2: Okay.
A: Uh, other than possibly air attack, ‘cause air attack can move.
Q2: Right. Right, yeah.
A: Uh, but not they had the best view of anybody on the fire.
Q2: Yeah, okay. So, uh, they’re knowledge of…
A: And that picture shows you that.
Q2: Yeah, they’re knowledge of the fire is – uh, or their view of the fire was
probably better than anybody else’s at this point and time?
A: Yes it is.
Q2: ‘Cause they weren’t im- obscured by smoke or, uh – and the brush…
A: Not according to the – yeah, not according to…
Q2: …And the brush was gone and so they had a – they had a good view?
A: Yes.
Q2: And so, um – and – and so that – that communication with Granite Mountain,
uh, do you remember about what time it was, ‘cause it…
A: I – it was prior to them pulling everybody out. It was some place from –
‘cause when I got down to Sickles I knew that the next…
Q2: Right.
A: …the next place was gonna be Yarnell.
Q2: Yeah.
A: And so I was checking the availability in case we got into something right there.
Q2: Right, okay.
A: Uh, so probably – and I don’t know what time Gary pulled everybody out. Uh,
I’m guessing before 4 o’clock.
Q2: Okay.
A: 3:30 to 4:00, I think, but I don’t know.
__________________________________________________________________
So Musser’s own best guess as to when he called “Division Alpha” Eric Marsh
to see if they were still (quote) “committed to the ridge” is sometime between
3:30 and 4:00 PM’.
* WHEN IT REALLY HAPPENED ( 3:42 PM plus 14 seconds )…
This is a reprint of a previous post about the moment captured in the background
of an AIR STUDY video when we clearly hear OPS2 Paul Musser attempting to
contact DIVSA Eric Marsh.
** On March 23, 2014 at 10:13 pm, WantsToKnowTheTruth posted…
**
** FULL TRANSCRIPT OF BACKGROUND RADIO CONVERSATIONS
** CAPTURED IN AIR STUDY VIDEO 20130630_154232_fire_behavior_EP
This is the AIR STUDY video that has always been reported to have the ‘callout’
from OPS2 Paul Musser to DIVSA Eric Marsh in it, but a public copy of that video
has not been available until today ( March 23, 2014 ).
We also now discover ( as the ADOSH investigation notes suggested ) that the
video BEGINS with what appears to be Eric Marsh ‘finishing’ a conversation with
some other (unknown) person.
AIR STUDY VIDEO…
20130630_154232_fire_behavior_EP.MOV
The video has a filename/timestamp of 154232 but this is now assumed to be
the END time for the video, so the actual START time for this video would be
154208 ( 3:42 PM plus 8 seconds ).
FULL TRANSCRIPT OF BACKGROUND RADIO CONVERSATIONS…
NOTE: No ‘audio forensics’ required here. All the background radio conversation
captured in this AIR STUDY video can be clearly heard by anyone with normal
hearing. Regardless… usual ‘caveats’ apply. This transcript is what
I ( me personally ) am hearing in this video. Your mileage may vary.
ALSO NOTE: This video BEGINS at 1542.08 ( 3:42 PM plus 8 seconds ).
That is about 2 minutes and 8 seconds AFTER Gary Cordes had officially
requested the full evacuation of Yarnell and Glen Ilah at 1540.00.
ALSO NOTE: When the video starts… someone is already answering
someone else’s previous radio call in the background and the voice that
is heard responding is a more than 90 percent probable match for Eric
Marsh. Even the ADOSH investigation notes confirm that it is most
likely him speaking at the start of this video.
VIDEO STARTS
+0:00 ( 1542.08 – 3:42.08 PM )
(Eric Marsh?): …towards the structures… uh… (pause) southern… uh…
(pause) into Yarnell.
NOTE: As soon as Marsh finished answering whoever he
was talking to… OPS2 Paul Musser calls him directly…
NOTE: Silence for a moment, then someone comes on and
simply says “Thank you” to (Marsh?) for his previous response.
+0:13 ( 1542.21 – 3:42.21 PM )
(Unknown – Possible match for Darrell Willis’ voice?): Thank you.
NOTE: There is no other background traffic in the remaining
11 seconds. Marsh does not respond to Musser by the time
the video ends at 1542.32
+0:24
VIDEO ENDS
So the exact ‘clock’ time for this clear attempt on OPS2 Musser’s part to
engage in conversation directly with DIVSA Eric Marsh is now known to be…
1542.14 ( 3:42 PM plus 14 seconds ).
That is about TWO minutes after the moment when SPGS1 Gary Cordes
officially called for full the full evacuation of Yarnell and Glen Ilah, and Musser
was known to be physically with Cordes at this time on the side of Highway 89
down in the north end of Yarnell, near the point where Shrine road meets 89.
** TODD ABEL’S VERSION OF WHAT MUSSER SAID TO MARSH
So the only thing missing now to fully explain where ADOSH came up with
that paragraph that appeared in their report is Todd Abel’s version of the
same radio call, in which he tells the ADOSH investigators HIS ‘interpretation’
of what Paul Musser told him.
So here is that piece of the puzzle…
________________________________________________________________
ADOSH INTERVIEW WITH TODD ABEL – 08/22/14 – 1:09 PM
Q=Bruce Hanna
Q1=Dave Larsen
Q2=Nicolas Cornelius
A=Todd Abel
Page 47…
Q1: His, uh – well we’ll talk – we will talk to, uh – yeah, all right. Okay so air
attack is obviously seeing something that has his – that he’s thinking it’s
gonna come in ( to Yarnell ). Uh, I expect that (unintelligible). And – and air
attack – no who – who then – I would let you speak – checked on Blue Ridge
crew when they were on the – on the dozer line?
A: Uh, Musser – Paul did.
Q1: Paul did?
A: Mm-hm, yeah.
Q1: Did he call them?
A: Uh, he actually – well I – this is him telling me what he did.
Q1: Okay.
A: Uh, do you want me to share that with you, ‘cause I…
Q1: Please.
A: Yeah, I didn’t hear it. He, um – he was looking to see if he could – he called
Division Alpha, Eric Marsh to see if they had anything available to bring it
down into Yarnell to help – you know start prepping some more stuff.
Q1: Mm-hm.
A: Um, and, uh, he said, uh, Eric Marsh said, um, Blue Ridge may be available.
Give them a call. And Gary at that time was standing next to Paul or I don’t
know if he was standing next to him or over the radio said, I got them – or – or
they – they are prepping the dozer line in – in case we have to burn it, yeah.
Q1: All right. Thank you for that.
A: Yes.
__________________________________________________________________
So the ADOSH investigators took the following two actual ‘quotes’ from
their actual interviews with Paul Musser and Todd Abel and then
‘munged’ them together…
* THIS…
(Paul Musser): “I called Granite on the radio and asked if them and Blue Ridge
were still committed on the ridge? They said that they were committed on the
ridge. But Blue Ridge was on the bottom and may, may be available.”
* PLUS THIS…
(Todd Abel): “He (Paul) called Division Alpha, Eric Marsh to see if they had
anything available to bring it down into Yarnell to help – you know start prepping
some more stuff. Um, and, uh, he said, uh, Eric Marsh said, um, Blue Ridge may
be available. Give them a call.”
* EQUALLED THIS…
This is ADOSH’s own ‘summary’ of those two statement taken together and
is what they ended up typing into the actual ADOSH report…
“Operations Section Chief 2 Musser radioed GMIHC and asked if they could
spare resources to assist in Yarnell. Either Marsh or GMIHC Captain Steed
responded that they were committed to the black and that Musser should
contact BRIHC working in the valley.”
So it’s interesting to see how ADOSH came up with THEIR own ‘narrative’
and that no one ever actually seemd to use that exact phrase ‘spare resources’.
ADOSH appears to have gotten the INTENT of the whole exchange correct,
of course, but again… just interesting to see what was ACTUALLY said
and how they ‘summarized’ it.
There ARE a couple of ‘revelations’ here, however.
1) OPS2 Paul Musser WAS ‘sure’ he had called “Division Alpha” ( Marsh ).
The blurb that appeared in the ADOSH report said that ‘during his interview
Musser wasn’t sure who he was talking to… Marsh or Steed’… but if you
read Musser’s actual interview there is no doubt in his mind that he CALLED
“Division A” and would NOT have called direct to “Granite Mountain”.
Musser is SURE of this… and the background radio capture in the AIR STUDY
video confirms this. If that 1542 radio capture really is the moment he was
making this call out to ‘Division Alpha’… then there is no question that
Musser called out to Eric Marsh… and he talked to Eric Marsh, not Jesse Steed.
2) OPS2 Paul Musser seems to have (mistakenly) thought, BEFORE and
DURING his radio call to “Division Alpha” Marsh, that BOTH Blue Ridge AND
Granite Mountain were ‘out on the ridge’.
Musser specifically asked Marsh if “them AND Blue Ridge were still committed
out on the ridge”. It was not until AFTER his radio call that Gary Cordes ( who
was standing right next to him ) then told Musser that he believed Blue Ridge
was still working on what he had them doing ( improving dozer line ). Even
Gary Cordes was clueless, at this moment ( 1543 ), that Blue Ridge was already
in the process of just evacuating the GM buggies and then beginning their OWN
evacuation to the Youth Camp. Blue ridge WAS becoming a ‘free resource’ at
that exact moment, but neither Cordes nor Musser really knew that (yet).
3) OPS2 Paul Musser seems to have been clueless about how FAR AWAY they
(GM) really were. He seems to have thought they were in the immediate area,
or at least close enough to be used for some immediate-need ‘structure prep’.
4) OPS2 Paul Musser did not ask them to help ‘evacuate’ anyone. The specific
reason for his request is Musser thought they might need help to start ‘prepping
some more stuff’ ( e.g – assist with structure protection ) there in Yarnell.
If Musser really had been fully aware of how FAR away GM actually was, and
how long it would take them to get back to town ( via any hiking route )…
he probably would have never even made that call at that time. He didn’t
have that kind of time to wait for what he was actually asking for
help with ( MORE structure prep… right HERE… right NOW! ).
Likewise… if Musser had really known, before he made that call, that
Blue Ridge was NOT ‘out there with GM’ as he (mistakenly) thought,
and that they were only a few blocks away at the end of Shrine road
and actually already evacuating their vehicles ( and GM buggies )…
he probably wouldn’t have made the specific radio call that he did
at that specific time. Blue Ridge was becoming immediately available
right there near him, to do exactly what he wanted help with circa 1543.
I might add which some are reading into the discussion of the thunder storms. Every one was concerned and watching them.
They are specifically watching the storm because of the erratic winds that accompany them. Lightning was at that time not there primary concern although I am sure they were keeping an eye on it. I think people are reading in a concern about the storm as being lightning when wind is way more dangerous and unpredictable. As a storm comes and passes an area the winds will shift from ( S, SW,N, all the way around as the storm moves thru) With all different speeds or erratic winds. That is the main thunderstorm concerns on fires. Another indicator that walking thru a brush field with a fire expected to burn in all directions is not a good decision.
>> Mr. Powers said…
>> Lightning was at that time not there primary concern
>> although I am sure they were keeping an eye on it.
I agree.
The consensus following the latest ‘Lightning Round’
and the revist on that based on the *NEW* evidence
in the ADOSH material that Todd Abel was just as
concerned about it as Russ Shumate was when he
based his entire IA plan on that concern…
…seems to match your conclusion.
Yes… it was something people were definitely ‘keeping
and eye on’ and ‘talking about’ on Sunday just as
they ‘should have’… BUT…
No… consensus seems to be that it is highly unlikely
those lightning concerns had any real effect on any
of the fateful decision making that afternoon.
Unless some *new* evidence comes to light…
I think the ‘lightning’ thing has now been officially
opinion-bombed.
So why is this “just Interestng” that someone paraphrased? Does that paraphrase somehow indicate an attempt to mislead or an attempt to conceal. I think phrasing Gary Cordes as “clueless” is interesting, sorta plants a seed that Gary doesn’t know what he’s doing or is going on. That’s how I interpet that. What indicates that Musser thought they were close or in the immediate area. He asked if they were still committed to the ridge, that seems to indicate that he thought they were on the ridge.
It paints a picture for me of supervisors trying to maintain a overall picture and how difficult it is during events like this to aquire that picture and to stay in the know of a fluid environment where other supervisors are taking independent actions to secure their AOs. Which is something that we value is wildland.
>> WFF wrote…
>> So why is this “just interestng” that someone
>> paraphrased?
It is ALWAYS interesting to me ( personally… your mileage
may vary ) to see the difference between what appears
in ‘official’ reports and what those statements were
really BASED on. I always prefer seeing the REAL
evidence, and the REAL statements, rather than just
one more layer of hearsay and interpretation. I like
to make up my own mind about things. That’s all.
You are free to make your own conclusions. I’m
just showing you the ‘layer’ underneath the report.
>> WFF also said…
>> Does that paraphrase somehow indicate an attempt
>> to mislead or an attempt to conceal?
In this case… I don’t think so… and I said so. See above.
>> WFF also said…
>> I think phrasing Gary Cordes as “clueless” is
>> interesting, sorta plants a seed that Gary doesn’t
>> know what he’s doing or is going on. That’s how I
>> interpet that
There is no gardening going on here. Again… you can
now see ( thanks to Mr. Dougherty ) what was actually
said… and make up your own mind whether people
‘knew what they were doing’ or ‘knew what was going
on’ at that time.
>> WFF also wrote…
>> What indicates that Musser thought they were close
>> or in the immediate area?
The timeframe and the circumstances.
The complete evacuation of Yarnell is now officially
in progess ( as of 1540 ). Musser had left the ICP and
his ‘Planning OPS’ duties behind about a half hour
before this and had inserted himself into the fire as
the second active ‘Field OPS’. He had already ‘pulled
resources’ to himself and handled the ‘Sickles Road’
situation by himself ( See the rest of his interview ).
Once Sickles Road was under control… he says he
knew Yarnell was next so he moved himself there
to start doing the same thing he had done up
at Sickles… direct and immediate structure/point
protection.
So there are now TWO direct… active ‘Field OPS’
on the radio looking for resources and trying to handle
the developing situation ( as there probably should
have been, given the situation, but the confusion that
might have been contributing to the situation is for
others to decide ).
Musser hits Yarnell and his immediate thought there
is “availability of resources” ( He says so in his interview ).
He had been functioning as just ‘Planning OPS’ all day
and there is no telling what he really did or didn’t know
about exactly what resources were down there, where
they might be, or what they might be doing.
Doesn’t matter. He had a radio. He could find out.
So that is what he did… but his GOAL was ‘structure
protection… ASAP’ as he had just taken care of around
Sickles… and those were the ‘resources’ he was looking
to ’round up’.
By the time he runs into Cordes on the side of the
Highway 89 right there near where Shrine road meets
Highway 89… Cordes is now seeing the fire hit what
Cordes called his “AW SHIT” ridge… which means the
fire IS going to come in ( to town ).
So the NEED that Musser was trying to address was
‘immediate need’… not an hour from then. He just
wanted to know who was around and available to
for structure/point protection work in the ‘immediate’
timeframe.
He thought that BOTH the Granite Mountain Hotshots
AND the Blue Ridge Hotshots were ‘together out on
the ridge’ and said so in his radio call.
He was mistaken. Apparently, he didn’t get a good
briefing from Cordes about all that until AFTER he
made the actual radio call. Blue Ridge was ‘local’
( just a few blocks from where he was standing
with Cordes )… but Granite Mountain was really,
really far away and he just didn’t seem to understand
that. He had been ‘Planning OPS’ all day and now he
was being the second active ‘Field OPS’. It’s hard
to say whether he had even been looking at any
maps that day until he jumped into the situation
to do structure/point protection work circa 4:10
PM or thereabouts. The ADOSH investigators never
pursued any line of questioning about that.
>> WFF also said…
>> He asked if they were still committed to the ridge, that
>> seems to indicate that he thought they were on the ridge.
Yes… and he ALSO thought Blue Ridge was out there
with them ( said so in his radio call )… so that itself
indicates a level of ‘unawareness’ at that point.
It’s understandable. It really is. See above. He had simply
been “Planning OPS” all day and now he’s jumping in
as the second fully active “Field OPS” on the fire.
He probably had to get “up to speed” ( in a hurry ) on
things everyone else had already had all day to become
familiar with like where people were really working and
what a lot of the actual distances involved were.
>> WFF also said…
>> It paints a picture for me of supervisors trying to
>> maintain a overall picture and how difficult it is during
>> events like this to aquire that picture
…especially when you have been just ‘Planning OPS’
all day… doing all that important work… and now you
are ‘jumping in’ as the second fully active ‘Field OPS’.
You said it yourself. It IS, in fact, ‘difficult’ to ‘aquire
the full picture’ in a hurry like that.
>> WFF also said…
>> and to stay in the know of a fluid environment where
>> other supervisors are taking independent actions to
>> secure their AOs.
All we are now seeing here ( thanks to Mr. Dougherty
and the new ADOSH material ) is a ‘better picture’
of everyone doing just that. Regardless of what Musser
did or didn’t know circa 1542… he had now transitioned
from just ‘Planning OPS’ to the second fully functioning
‘Field OPS’ with ‘structure protection goals’.
He had every right to get on the radio and start asking
people if they were ‘available’… regardless of whether
he fully understood where they were, what they were
doing, or how far away they might be.
So that’s what he did.
I STILL think ( me, personally ) it’s ‘interesting’ to learn
more about how all that was going down at that time,
why he made the ‘availability’ call to Eric Marsh, and
exactly what the TIME was when he did that.
It’s pretty much a given now that Paul Musser made
his ‘availability’ check with Eric Marsh BEFORE we
hear OPS1 Todd Abel on the radio with Marsh
telling him “Keep ME informed, Hunker and be safe,
we’ll get some Air Support down there ASAP.”
( circa 3:50 PM in the Caldwell video capture ).
I think some people had been assuming that Musser
made his ‘availablity’ call/request AFTER that
“Hunker and be safe” command/directive/suggestion/advice
from OPS1 Todd Abel.
So that changes things.
It changes the ‘sequence of events’ that preceded the all
important ( but still mysterious ) ‘comfort level’ and
‘discussing their options’ conversation(s) out there
on that ridge.
WTKTT said…..
I think some people had been assuming that Musser made his ‘availablity’ call/request AFTER that “Hunker and be safe ”command/directive/suggestion/advice
from OPS1 Todd Abel
You are right, but not everyone.
So does the timeline go like this?
1. Musser calls Div A 1542
2. Able calls Marsh. “Hunker and be safe, air support ASAP. 1550
3. Rory Collins leaves fire. 1558
4. Discussing options conversation (?)
5. At 1603, the ASM1 requested Dispatch to place resource orders for six additional LATs with SWCC, necessary due to the wind shift of 300 degrees, structures threatened and thunderstorms pushing the fire in multiple directions..
6. GM leaves (lunch spot/ Mackenzie photo spot?) 1604
I forgot to add #7 to the timeline (BTW #7 is referring to the request for 6 LAT’s from #5 of timeline above)
Entire timeline repost (from above)
So does the timeline go like this?
1. Musser calls Div A 1542
2. Able calls Marsh. “Hunker and be safe, air support ASAP. 1550
3. Rory Collins leaves fire. 1558
4. Discussing options conversation (?)
5. At 1603, the ASM1 requested Dispatch to place resource orders for six additional LATs with SWCC, necessary due to the wind shift of 300 degrees, structures threatened and thunderstorms pushing the fire in multiple directions..
6. GM leaves (lunch spot/ Mackenzie photo spot?) 1604?
7.At 1608, SWCC sent these orders to the National Interagency Coordination Center (NICC) in Boise, ID, which denied all the requests as UTF due to the “Very limited availability of airtankers with increasing activity in the western states. P99 SAIR
Confirming 1,2,3… but I think another
important ‘absolute known time’
that has also been figured out
here ( and not in any report ) is
that Frisby picked up Brendan
no later than 1541.30. That is
when Frisby had just loaded Brendan
into the UTV, called Brown, told
him to start evacuating vehicles,
and Brown did his ‘about face’
during his hike on Cutover trail.
( recorded by his GPS unit which
was getting time from satellites ).
That’s much earlier than any
report has put that event.
It COULD even be the reason Marsh
didn’t answer OPS2 Musser right
away at 1542. He was now in the
middle of those conversations with
Frisby after he had just picked
up Brendan.
As far as #4 goes… I think there
were multiple ‘comfort level’ and
‘discussing there options’ conversations all the way from
1541.30, when Frisby picked up
Brendan and called off the face-to-face with Marsh… right on
through what we hear in the
MacKenzie videos at 4:02 PM
and beyond that… to 4:03 or 4:04.
I also still think it is possible to nail
down a time on most of them.
#6 – They definitely ‘gaggled up’
and headed south circa 4:04
( Parker photo, etc. ). It was
also definitely from the MacKenzie
video location and NOT lunch spot.
I think we’ve had this conversation
before but just looking at the demeanor
and activities of the men in the
4:02 videos ( stowing chaps, gloves,
relaxing, taking photos ) I still believe
it’s obvious that the ACTUAL decision
to leave the black came right AFTER
the MacKenzie videos in a small 70
second window from 4:02.20 to
4:03.30. At 4:02.20 those men didn’t
look like they had ANY plans of
going ANYWHERE.
As for 5,7 and who actually told
ASM1 those details about what
was happening in Yarnell… stay
tuned. ADOSH interviewed Bravo 1
but I haven’t gotten to that one yet.
Actually it doesn’t change the sequence. The sequence remains what it always was. This may have changed your perception But not the sequence was what happened, not what has been speculated.
i think what’s happening here is that WTKTT’s conspiracy world is crumbling around him and the more he scours the evidence, the more he realizes that all his speculation and unfounded accusations over the last six or so months are eroding away into a little pile of meaningless dirt laying at his feet.
so he assigns the words “clueless” and “mistakenly” in order to insinuate a lack of awareness or ineptitude to the folks involved as if the events unfolded in a vacuum where all the overhead have this omniscient view of the entire fire area and developing situation.
he does this for a number of reasons, the first of which, i think, is because he is nothing more than an internet conspiracy theorist and he is always looking for an angle to assign blame in order to perpetuate the conspiracy.
another reason is an overall ignorance of how these complex wff’ing situations play out in the real world, and not in his micorscopic internet vacuum.
it’s not all his fault… i feel kind of sorry for him.
There was conversation a couple of days ago that I’ve been wanting to say something about. It has to do with Granite Mountain and the media. It has to do with the fact they were somewhat spotlighted by a photographer during the Station Fire.
I did quite a bit of google searching for images of crews, while trying to get a bead on what the related crews and their vehicles looked like. I saw a lot of stuff on both the Internet general and also YouTube. What I found never led me to think that the coverage of Granite Mountain was either unusual or remarkable. Crews get spotlighted by photographers and media fairly regularly. Maybe some crews are more comfortable being photographed and maybe some crews are less. But I don’t think there’s much of a big deal to that.
I’m writing this on my iPad while I’m screen- recording on my iMac so I can’t provide links and stuff, so I’m just writing this out of my head. If you want more documentation of what I’m saying, do your own googling.
The Blue Ridge Hotshots have been featured periodically by photographers in various fires, also. Does that imply they need the publicity? Given the fact that they don’t do much pr on their own, I would say no.
Lots of crews do annual wrap-up videos on YouTube. Including Granite Mountain. They use YouTube to do their own (often totally creative and fun and informative) public relations.
I think the conversation that wound up apparently agreeing that Granite Mountain somehow needed/invited an unusual amount of public relations because they were under pressure is mistaken. I think that dog don’t hunt.
I just, as a photographer, want to say this. I don’t think they were hunting for attention.
There was never any ‘agreement’ whether that was the case,
or not ( that Granite Mountain was being encouraged in any
way, shape, or form, to ‘seek publicity’ because of their
unique ‘city owned’ status, or something ).
It was simply the LA times photographer himself reporting that
on that day ( in 2009 ) at the Station fire… other crews kept
physically turning their backs on him and refusing to be
photographed… until he met up with Granite Mountain.
Granite Mountain had a completely different policy than
the other crews ( THAT day, on THAT fire anyway )… and
seemed to WELCOME the publicity. That’s what raised the
‘possibility’ that they might have been ‘instructed’ to be that
way by their manager(s), but there is certainly no PROOF of that.
I’m still actually just curious about what that LA times photographer
said one of the crews told him… that if ANY of them allowed
their face to be photographed they would end up owing the
entire rest of the crew a ‘case of beer’… and that was their
POLICY.
Is that just something weird with just a couple of crews that
this photographer happened to run into on the Station Fire,
or does that kind of ‘no pictures please’ and ‘case of beer’
policy thing crop up quite often?
WHO CARES!! What in heavens name does that have to do with what happened at YHF? So, GM let a photographer take a couple of photos. Your link also shows other non GM WFF photos at the Station Fire, so your assertion that GM “had a completely different policy” is bunk. As I said before and Marti notes again the internet tubes are flush with photos of WFF crews. I said it before and will again. You paint this “cooperation” as something “VERY interesting.” Generally when someone uses the term “VERY interesting” it ain’t good. So out with it Truther-don’t imply-Just SAY IT: WHAT IS SO INTERESTING about that story/photo that has anything to do with what happened to GM on June 30, 2013? And if you answer is nothing-they aren’t related, then why “VERY interesting”? I’m just trying to figure out why you thought posting that was relevant in the first place. Because frankly, it reads to me like a smear.
Hey Marti, you’re right there is no relevance. Most crews give their people a hard time about press attention. It’s just small time crew fun. Whats happening on this thread is why most firefighters don’t like or trust the press. Speculation, misleading statements by people who don’t understand what they’re talking about. I think that WTK likes to plant little seeds of insinuation and watch conspiracy mongers over react. WKT does good research and details are their thing, but he likes the speculation. GM took someone on more than likely because they liked him.
Contents of this 3 line text file…
_________________________________________________________________
3 data collectors (Moore, Panebaker, Swartz) took these photos and videos on
June 30, 2013 for a US Forest Service FAA project (Aerial Firefighting Use &
Effectiveness). Robert Manwaring of the San Dimas Technology & Development
Center provided these files, along with the collectors’ descriptive information, to
the Accident Investigation Team. The time stamp on the video is the end time
of the video, not the beginning.
_________________________________________________________________
There is also this Microsoft Word DOC information in the specific Panebaker
video folder. It also discusses the general Air Study video date-time filename
formats but makes NO MENTION of them being END times, but I suppose the
other 3 line text file blurb in the other folder applies to Panebaker videos as well.
I don’t know if you have seen this document but it might help determine when
VLAT drops are being shown in certain videos…
_________________________________________________________________
Panebaker Photo and Video Information.
All photos and videos were taken from a location on the North side of Hays Ranch
Road in Peoples Valley (34 16.327 X 112 43.863). Photos were taken primarily
with a Canon EOS REBEL T3i, a couple were taken with a Nikon Coolpix P520.
Video in the video folder was also taken with the Nikon Coolpix P520.
Video in the “video_with_134175_audio” is video taken with a Contour 2 camera
and the audio from the Air-to-Air frequency 134.175. This footage is almost a
constant feed of the of the air-to-air radio traffic. There are a few breaks due to
battery issues and the footage cut off when we left the Peoples Valley location
to assist with the medical/recovery task force.
The naming convention for all of the photos and videos is –
“date_time_photographer/videographer initials”.
All times are in Mountain Time (no daylight savings UTC-7) On several of the
videos there are brief descriptions immediately following the time. Below is a
brief summary of my actions on the 6/20/2013. (many of the times are estimated)
~1030 Depart Flagstaff for the Yarnell Fire.
~1315 Drive through Prescott.
~1400 Arrive Yarnell ICP (Peoples Valley School). Talk to Dan Sullivin and Brad
Zettler (Air support for local team). Get radio clone and tell them our intentions.
The AFUE group plan was to observe and document retardant use from the road
and stay out of the way of the ground resources. Briefly talk to Paul Musser (OPS
on the local team) and advise him of our plan as well.
~1440 VLAT (T911) drop
~1442 T810 drop
~1445 Another SEAT drops
1459 T910 – 9 miles out
1459 T874 Drop
~1500 AA->T910, plan is it widen the line in the lighter fuels to protect the homes. Coverage level 6, whole load.
1507 T910 drop
1516 T810 on scene, plan is to pretreat holmes with CL 6
1523 T810 drop.
~1525 T874 inbound, point protection in someone’s front yard
1530 T874 drop.
1542 Div A to AA? Wind shifted and the fire has burned through the retardant.
1540 T830 on scene.
1549 T830 drop.
~1550 T911, 20 mi. out, look at the town of Yarnell for drop.
~1555 T413 CL4, 125 drop speed. (rough estimate of drop time)
1606 T911 in area, CL4, 150 drop speed.
1607 T874 in area.
1615 T911 split load, drop 1, 2000 gal left.
1617 T911 split load drop 2.
1624 T874 and T830 drops, close proximity to houses.
1624 T413 in area.
1633 T413 drop.
1640 Possible deployment in division A, hold T910 drop.
1647 Still can’t find people or get ahold of Div. A or Granite Mountain.
1658 T910, CL4 full load.
1706 T910 drop
1708 T06 on scene.
1723 I stop filming/taking pictures, start helping Medical response task force.
_________________________________________________________________
NOTE: The Panebaker videos were shot with a Nikon Coolpix P520 which does
default to the Apple Quicktime .MOV format but does NOT add time/date stamps
to the movie filenames. It uses the same DSCN0001.MOV movie filename
format approach as other digital cameras. Obviously the Air Study videos were
all manually renamed before being given to the SAIT… but why someone would
chose to use END times in the filenames versus standard START times
is anyone’s guess.
Anyway… here are the ‘reworked’ answers to your questions from the other day…
>> Reply to calvin post on March 30, 2014 at 4:26 am
>>
>> calvin said…
>>
>> The 161620 Vlat video shows the same retardant drop
>> as the 161858 video, right??
Based on the filenames/timestamps for the AIR STUDY videos being
the END times instead of the START times… here’s the *new* answer to
the question(s) you posed earlier…
No. They are two different drops… but even assuming timestamps are END
times something might still be a little ‘wonky’ with the timing here.
The 161620 video is 3 minutes and 30 seconds long.
That makes the actual starting time 161250.
The actual VLAT drop in this video begins at +2:32 into the video.
That makes the actual drop time 161522.
The drop lasts for 12 seconds and ends at 161534.
The 161858 video is 1 minute and 49 seconds long.
That makes the actual starting time 161709.
The actual VLAT drop in this video begins at +0:03 into the video.
That makes the actual drop time 161712.
The drop lasts for 6 seconds and ends at 161718.
( only HALF as long as other one ).
That means that the elapsed time between the END of the first 12 second
drop ( 161534 ) and the START of the second 6 second drop ( 161712 ) is…
1 minute and 38 seconds. ( 98 seconds ).
If this is (supposedly?) the same VLAT making BOTH drops, then that’s a pretty
quick ‘turnaround’ time for a lead plane and a DC10 VLAT air tanker to make two
extremely low-level drops at the same exact location… but I suppose if they were
both in a hurry and in a tight turnaround loop coming out of the first drop ( with no
other aircraft around to worry about or have to avoid )… it’s doable.
I can find no evidence that we are watching two drops from two different VLATS
( 910 and 911 ) in this video, so if all the filename timestamps ARE correct…
then only the one VLAT ( 910? ) must have been able to achieve that
98 second turnaround time.
>> calvin also wrote…
>> In the 161620 video we hear (I assume) the VLAT pilot saying
>> he has about 2,000 gallons left (following that drop.) And then we
>> see the VLAT drop again in the 162508 video and again in the
>> 163338 video. Is that correct?
The 161620 video is 3 minutes and 30 seconds long.
That makes the actual starting time 161250.
The 162508 video is 1 minute and 49 seconds long.
That makes the actual starting time 162319.
NOTE: The title of the 162508 video is actually…
20130630_162508_2SEATS_EP
It is, in fact, a video of two SEAT drops and not a VLAT drop.
The first SEAT drop is at +0:34 ( 162353 ).
The second SEAT drop is at +0:56 ( 162415 ).
They are dropping at the same location as the VLAT drops seen in the other
videos… but the VLAT itself isn’t in this video.
The 163338 video is 2 minutes and 9 seconds long.
That makes the actual starting time 163129.
>> WTKTT… can you tell me a little about the 163338 video.
>> Like where the camera is filming, which side of the fire the
>> retardant drop is made, and where GM were. Many Thanks!
The 163338 video is 2 minutes and 9 seconds long.
That makes the actual starting time 163129.
The (single) SEAT drop in this video begins at +1:49 into the video.
That makes the actual drop time 163318.
The (single) SEAT drop lasts for 3 seconds and ends at 163321.
The Nikon Coolpix P520 camera used to shoot this video was on a
tripod that was exactly here…
34.266758, -112.716906
REMINDER: Just cut-and-paste that line with the comma above into the search
bar of Google Maps, hit ENTER, and a large GREEN ARROW will be pointing
to that exact spot.
It’s that spot up on Hayes Ranch Road near those ‘circular’ crop fields and where
the established ‘helibase’ was that day and where most of the other AIR STUDY
videos were shot.
This particular video is shot looking almost due southwest from that location.
For more of an exact idea of the ‘orientation’ here…
At +1:02 in this video, as they are zooming in on the two planes to the left of the
smoke column ( that means they were flying on the EAST side of the column,
coming from pretty much due south and heading due north ) there is a distinct
electronics tower seen in the left of the frame on a hill in the distance.
It only appears for a moment… then they pan back right… but that gives you a
reference for the ‘line of sight’ for this particular video from that particular location.
The ‘line of sight’ from the camera… right down the center… would be pretty much
directly to the center of Glen Ilah, in the distance, even though the ridge in the
foreground is obscuring both Yarnell and Glen Illah.
The same electronics tower is also seen in this video earlier on in left of the
frame, at +26 seconds, but it’s much easier to see exactly what it looks like in
the +1:02 moment after they have ‘zoomed in’.
The reason I say ‘electronics’ tower is because that is NOT the primary cell
tower for Yarnell. That sits on a hill farther south of town.
It’s a Verizon tower and the exact location of the power shed at the base
of the antenna is…
34.192114, -112.754748
The electronics tower seen in this Panebaker video MAY have some cell
pods on it… but it’s hard to tell.
It’s on a hill east of Yarnell, about the center of town.
If you took ‘Happy Way’ ( about two blocks south of where Shrine road meets
Highway 89 ) east out of Yarnell and continued on when it changes from
pavement to dirt and went all the way to the top of the hill, you be at the power
shed for this electronics tower seen in the video.
The center of the roof of the power shed at the base of that tower is exactly here…
34.216253, -112.743606
So given the fact that the electronics tower is at about the midpoint of the town
of Yarnell… it looks like those planes are flying pretty much due west of the center
of Yarnell, from due south to due north, on the EAST side of the smoke plume,
and trying to lay some retardant to keep the fire out of Yarnell.
At 1631 plus 29 seconds ( which seems to be the actual START time for the
video named 163338 )… ALL the drop-capable aircraft on the fire had already
been given the go-ahead to ‘drop-at-will’ for more than a half-hour.
Gary Cordes couldn’t transmit on Air-To-Ground circa 1600 because his
Bendix King had taken a dump and then he switched to the Motorola in his
truck… but circa 1600 he requested OPS1 Todd Abel to immediately tell Air
Attack to start ‘dropping at will’ and try and save whatever ‘town’ they thought
they could ( from Cordes ADOSH interview ).
Makes sense to me that a video would reference its time stamp to its ending point since that’s when it’s saved. But I would understand how it’s easy to get confused here.
Well… actually… when it comes to using the Apple
Quicktime MOV format for movies on these digitial
cameras they all pretty much do the same thing.
They do NOT store the ‘CreationDate’ ( actual START
time ) in the movie itself. They create a file with
extension THM ( Thumbnail ) and that’s the little photo
you see of the start of your movie on the LCD screen
on the device itself.
All the EXIT metadata for that movie is in the THM
thumbnail… and NOT in the .MOV movie itself.
( A THM file is just a JPEG file with a different extension ).
That’s why we still don’t know the EXACT time for
Blue Ridge Hotshot McCord’s YARNELL-GAMBLE
movie when we hear SOMEONE telling Eric Marsh
they would ‘appreciate it’ if GM could ‘come to town a
little faster’. Mccord renamed it himself, and supplied
it to the SAIT investigators… but he didn’t give them
the associated .THM thumbnail file that had all
the metadata in it.
It’s been narrowed it down to right around 1619 ( 4:19 PM ),
at almost the exact moment that either Steed alone or
Marsh/Steed together made the decision to leave the
two-track road and descend into the fuel-filled box
canyon… but it’s through ‘indirect’ evidence.
If McCord had just given the SAIT the THM file that
belonged with that Apple Quicktime movie… we would
know the exact time according to his own iPhone
But it IS ‘normal’ for a movie to be saved according to the
actual START time, and not the end time.
Whatever. It’s no big deal either way.
The math is easy.
WTKTT. Are you serious?
1615 T911 split load, drop 1, 2000 gal left.
1617 T911 split load drop 2.
Soooo, T911 was finished dropping all of its retardant after the 1617 video? Really? This was the load of retardant the SAIR describes as overhead waiting to be dropped (all 10,743g) during time of deployment?
Calvin, Tanker 910 was the VLAT that was overhead at the time of the deployment, and he had a full load (whatever he came in with, that is) at the time of deployment. I had posted about this on a prior thread, and I am going off my notes here: According to my notes, at roughly 4:36-ish pm, Bravo33 (e.g. the lead plane) cleared in Tanker 910 and was getting ready for a live run, when the flaming front cut off GM. Tanker 910 got in behind Bravo33, in case the chance to make a good drop for GM became clear, which it didn’t, which is why 910 ultimately dropped elsewhere on the fire. 911 was gone at this point (on a trip to Phoenix, I think, for a “load and return”).
Marty Reed said: “I agree with that, believe me…[b]ut what I’m trying to get at is WHY did they make THAT decision, when the “escape route” was, according to Brendan, the two-track ALL THE WAY to the ranch, if it wasn’t for the PERCEIVED speed advantage?”
I wouldn’t put too much emphasis on Brendan’s after-the-fact recollection. But, as to why make the choice they did, I’d say lack of familiarity/experience is one possible explanation. Another is the emotional and social compensation that can come from doing something others recognize as having been difficult. Particularly if overhead’s self-perception had been that prior unconventional tactics had generated recognition.
I’m pretty much agreeing ATM that Brendan’s repeated seeming certainty may be fairly unreliable. It kind of struck me though. But I haven’t had time to listen, which could possibly change my opinion.
One of the things that has bothered me a lot, though, is that, if he was listening on to the intra-crew frequency while bumping the Sup truck, which we apparently assume (for good reasons) he was, how was it he didn’t seem to know, when the search crews were headed out, that they had taken the shortcut into the bowl, and why. My wondering is based on assuming there was some kind of communication between Steed and Marsh about that decision, which I have no evidence to assume was in the original plan. But I have no evidence to assume it wasn’t either. I’m kinda sorta thinking ATM that if they made the decision on the fly to cut down instead of staying on the two-track, they (meaning probably Steed with or without a convo with Marsh) might have just guessed that shortcut would have gotten them to the ranch faster than staying on the two-track. Which leads me to think that decision didn’t have much to do with all the other contextual complexities, but just a basic mis-calculation. and maybe, under the circumstances, fairly understandable.
Lesson Learned: An escape route is not an escape route unless scouted and made safe.
And, of course, I trust you know that and I’m not really saying that to you. I think you are right that what drove them to leave their totally adequate black had much to do with a desire to redeem their otherwise frustratingly inefficient day. But their decision to cut down into the bowl seems to be pretty much a miscalculation that they could do that faster by cutting down.
I really wish Brendan felt comfortable enough to speak honestly about what he heard and didn’t hear.
If the view is that a simple miscalculation was involved, more attention needs to be paid to ensuring other crews are familiar with local conditions, as well as mindful of time as a big issue in terms of escape routes and overall situational awareness. While this was a local crew, just off of another local fire, certainly it’s possible that they’d just not had the experience of being suckered into a bushwhack before.
Because of the reports of a culture of secrecy over crew movements for GM, I’m inclined that the second case, of knowing that the bushwhack was an issue, and doing it anyway, may have been at play instead.
Another aspect that was discussed a long, long time ago, but perhaps forgotten over time, is where the two-track ‘seems to go’, from the point where they dropped down into the bowl. From the point at the top of the bowl where the crew headed down, and where the Boulder Springs Ranch comes into view across the way, the two-track then heads up and out of sight over the ridge in a slightly SOUTHWESTERLY direction, giving the impression that if they were to continue on the two-track, they would actually be going away from the ranch and heading down toward Congress.
If they didn’t actually have a map in hand at this point, they might have been confused about whether the two-track eventually ended-up at the ranch, which it did, hooking around and coming in from the south.
I’m not saying that this would be the only factor in their decision process, but it certainly could have played a role in it.
There was no written Operation plan on the 30th which leads back to the state being sued along with the overhead. This is a real problem with no maps, no clear divisions, and no clear directions. leaves a lot open to question and assumptions.
>> TTWARE said…
>> If they didn’t actually have a map in hand at this
>> point, they might have been confused about
>> whether the two-track eventually ended-up at
>> the ranch,
Exactly right.
The Arizona Forestry SAIT had always tried to
‘establish as fact’ that ‘they’ ( plural? ) KNEW
that two-track went all the way to the Ranch.
Now that we can (finally) see Gary Cordes’ actual
ADOSH interview transcript… we learn that
while there WAS, in fact, a moment at the 0700
briefing when Cordes was using Dean
Fernandez’s iPad to ‘show Marsh the ranch’
on either a Google or a USDA TOPO map…
Cordes admits that was just a ‘breakout’ from
the general meeting so it was really just him
and Marsh looking at the iPad.
Cordes also still does not CONFIRM that he
SPECIFICALLY showed Marsh that two-track
road that led all the way from the anchor point
to the Ranch. All Cordes says is that they
“had an iPad out and were looking at the roads”
( all of them around there ) in a general way…
and nothing SPECIFIC about that high ridge
two-track ‘escape route’.
If it was Google Maps with the ‘road labels’ turned
on… then Marsh *probably* did see that high-ridge
two-track curling south and then east to the ranch,
( because you can hardly miss it, even now, in
Google maps with ‘labels’ turned on )…
…but there is no specific verification even from
Cordes that that ‘escape route’ was specifically
shown to Marsh, or discussed in any way.
Regardless… that all only concerns Marsh, and
what he may of may not have seen on an iPad.
That doesn’t automatically mean Steed saw
ANY of that, at ANY time.
So back to your point.
Yes… it was IMPOSSIBLE to know, just by
standing at the ‘descent point’, that the two-track
would, in fact, take an eastward turn to the
ranch if you just stayed on it heading south
for a little longer.
That is something that Jesse Steed would have
to have KNOWN before he got to the ‘decision
point’… or he would have been mightily confused
about what to do at that point.
If there was an intra-crew radio discussion about
THAT confusion and THAT decision… then
Brendan McDonough probably heard it.
If Brendan didn’t hear anything on the intra-crew
related to THAT decision… then either Steed
just made that decision on his own OR Marsh
was already there with him and they made
that decision together, in person, no radio traffic.
>> SR said…
>> I wouldn’t put too much emphasis on Brendan’s after-the-fact
>> recollection.
Agreed. He was *really* hedging there as to whether that is
something he was TOLD that morning… or something he
just ‘assumed’. He also then let it slip ( when they asked him
to run Google Earth because they couldn’t even figure out
how to run it correctly ) that he ( Brendan ) had been ‘using
Google Earth’ himself since the incident and had ‘looked over the
area’ in Google Earth at least 3 times all on his own… AFTER
the incident and BEFORE that ADOSH interview.
Maybe that entire crew WAS told that that the two-track went
all the way to the Boulder Springs ranch that morning when
they arrived up on the ridge for their ‘third’ briefing that day
( according to Brendan ).
Maybe not. Maybe Brendan was just reflecting the claims
of the already published SAIR report, and what he had seen
himself since then in Google Earth… and he was just telling the
ADOSH investigators what he thought they wanted to hear.
>> SR also said…
>> But, as to why make the choice they did, I’d say lack of
>> familiarity/experience is one possible explanation.
>> Another is the emotional and social compensation that can
>> come from doing something others recognize as having
>> been difficult.
The ‘flip side’ to that consideration ( which hasn’t been discussed
much )… would be the possible ’emotional’ and ‘social’
‘consequences’ of NOT trying to ‘get to town’. Maybe that
actually crossed their minds as they saw that fire racing
to town.
I mean… at that point ( circa 4:00 PM and their ‘discussing
their options’ conversations ) no one knew what was going
to happen. For all anyone knew… that entire frickin’ town
was going to burn to the ground and be (literally) wiped
off the map.
Maybe ( just *maybe* ) the thought crossed their minds that
if that really did happen… and they had simply ‘sat it out’
up on that ridge… that they would have a ‘lot of explaining
to do’. If there were dozens ( perhaps hundreds ) of citizens
killed or wounded… maybe some SAIT investigators would
have been asking THEM a lot of questions about just
sitting up there and watching it all happen ( even though that
really was all they could have done ).
So that phrase ’emotional and social compensation’ has
a flip side, too.
The flip side would be ’emotional and social CONSEQUENCES’.
It can also factor into ‘decision making’.
No citizens died. Zero. Zip. Nada.
( Well… except for some suicides following the incident
after people lost all they had. Tex and Joy know about those,
I believe, and I think Tex even actually had to go out and find at
least one suicide hikers body ).
It was NOT a complete and total nightmare that day with
hundreds of casualties and a completely ‘lost town’.
But at 4:00 PM… from high up on a ridge… it might have
looked like there WAS a high probability it WAS going
to be ‘that bad’.
>> it was IMPOSSIBLE for T911 to have been over the fire
>> during the deployment, waiting for visual confirmation
>> of GM location WHILE (10,743g) of retardant was still
>> in the plane.
Yes. I agree with you… but have been sidetracked
lately looking at the enormous amount of *new* information
that is now available regarding this Yarnell incident.
Do you have, yourself, a good ‘re-estimate’ of how much
retardant T911 actually DID have left while it was
‘standing by’, to dump on GM in the box canyon, if
instructed by ASM2 / B33 to do so?
My immediate answer to your question is, I have no idea how much retardant T911 departing from Wickenberg at 1543 had available at the time of deployment. But, it doesn’t appear that it had all 10,743 gallons available as the SAIR states.
This is what I think I know about it though. T911 departs Wickenberg and arrives over the north part of the fire where it makes a 12 second retardant drop at approximately 161522 as seen in the 161620 video. Following that drop, someone announces they have 2,000 gallons (of retardant) left. Then we see a second drop lasting an additional 6 seconds at approximately 161715 in the 161858 video.
The actual STOP time for T911 departing Wickenberg at 1543, according to page 101 from SAIR is 1651 (also at Wickenberg.) If that is the case (T911 landing aircraft at 1651 at Wickenberg), then T911 MUST have left the fire, safe to say, before the actual call from Caldwell reporting “in front of the flaming front”
There is only one airfield in Arizona capable of handling slurry operations for 910 & 911, and that is Williams Gateway in the Mesa/Chandler area. The ONLY tankers operating out of Wickenburg were the SEATs.
Short answer, no I don’t. Those DC10s are capable of flying very fast, but in this senario, flying low with a load on, they were more likely lumbering along (for them) because the distance to Yarnell is only around 85 miles, but they may have had to add a bunch to that to get around Sky Harbor in Phoenix.
Reply to xxfullsailxx post on March 31, 2014 at 4:51 pm
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>> their primary designated safety zone was the cold black.
Not according to SPGS1 Gary Cordes, who briefed them.
Keywords (here) = primary / designated.
Cordes ‘designated’ the Boulder Springs Ranch FIRST ( sic: primary )…
in the briefing… and then just adds ‘and black, of course’.
From Gary Cordes’ ADOSH interview…
Q2=Dave Larsen ( Rest in peace )
A=Gary Cordes
_________________________________________________________________
Q2: …uh, sevenish, escorted Granite Mountain down Sesame Street and
shared the location of the safety zone at Boulder Springs…
A: Ranch, right?
Q2: …and, and what – I can’t get that next word, what is it?
A: …and black, and, and I told ‘em of course you have the black as a
safety zone… Um, and this…
Q2: Oh.
A: …and this was also, this was also discussed at our, at our briefing. We had a,
an iPad out looking at the roads and everything and I showed them on the
iPad, the ranch on the iPad as well um, and referred to it there in that, during
that briefing as well.
Q2: Okay, this is, this is a briefing, uh, well, whatever, 6:45 or 7:00…
A: Yeah. Yeah. When we – when I – when we met with everybody was there,
we – there were several break outs where we discussed, had little briefings
with each other and uh, there was a point where we were at a table inside the
fire station with an iPad and we went over the – we were looking at the maps
on the iPad.
__________________________________________________________________
>> xxfullsailxx also said…
>> Cordes had been scouting out the fire area since 2200 the previous evening.
That is true… but AFAIK there is no detailed account of ALL his movements.
>> xxfullsailxx also said…
>> he had personally scouted out the BSR as a safety zone.
Okay… full stop. Is that your OPINION?… or do you have a specific
source that establishes that as a fact?
I would LIKE to believe he did… and would certainly HOPE that he did before
just willy-nilly telling multiple resources ( not just Granite ) that that was the
‘designated safety zone’ for the Sunday work period…
…but have you seen proof that he did ( actually go scout it ) anywhere
in the evidence record?
I haven’t. Not yet anyway.
Please provide a source reference for your ‘statement’.
I honestly hope I have just ‘missed’ it and you can point me right to it.
First of all, Cordes does not pick the safety zones for Granite Mountain, that is a decision for Granite Mountain itself. Second, safety zones are fluid in nature. No matter how safe a spot is, the instant you can no longer reach one safely, it stops being a safety zone. The ranch should no longer have been viewed as a safety zone that afternoon, and the black was their best, and had become their “primary”, safety zone.
I agree… but that’s not what happened on June 30, 2013.
SPGS1 Cordes ( perhaps with help from BLM Rep Dean
Fernandez ) was the one who CHOSE that area, at
some point, and was also the one ‘designating’ the
Boulder Springs Ranch as the ‘bomb-proof safety zone’
for ALL incoming Type 2 Short Team resources ( not
just Granite ) that were arriving that morning and were
going to be working the south end of the fire.
No one seemed to doubt him.
No one seemed to object.
and ( as far as we know )
No one who was told it was their safety zone went
over there to check it ( or the possible escape
routes to it ) out for themselves.
again, look up “chain of command” or take an I-200 course. your Wildland Fire 101 by google isn’t doing you much good…
like mike said, SPGS Cordes doesn’t designate Div Sup Marsh’s safety zone. and he certainly doesn’t make the “primary” or the “designated” call. “Keywords (here) = primary / designated.” and, he didn’t “brief” them, he was showing them around the area he had been scouting all night (he says so in his interview).
in the post fire pictures, it sure looks like it was a “bomb proof SZ”… doesn’t it… what reason do you have to think Cordes DIDN’T scout out BSR?
and who are you to demand an account of every minute of each person’s time? are you even an AZ taxpayer? who holds you accountable for your false accusations and libel? what is your name and phone number in case any one of the many people you have falsely accused of wrong doing or falsely claimed were implicit in the death’s of GMIHC want to take issue with the many wrong things you’ve said?
you are nothing but a narcissistic internet hack with nothing better to do who has found his audience…
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>> what reason do you have to think Cordes DIDN’T
>> scout out BSR?
Nice dodge of the question.
I am not the one who just claimed, on a PUBLIC forum,
that it was an absolute FACT that Gary Cordes personally
visited the Boulder Springs Ranch at some point prior to
the 0700 briefing ( yes,it was an official briefing ) and was
then ‘designating’ ( yes, designating ) that area as the
‘predetermined safety zone’ ( as Marsh himself would
refer to it later, several times ) for that work cycle.
YOU are the one who made that ‘statement of FACT’.
I asked you if it that was just your OPINION, or if you
had any evidence to back that up.
You dodged the question.
So I’m going to take that as a “Yes… I am simply assuming
he went there at some point and I don’t know it for a fact.”
Unless you want to try again?
Once more with evidence?
well, actually, you’re the only one making a big deal about the BSR being labelled a safety zone. and the more you speak about it, the more evident it becomes that you have no clue what you’re talking about.
didn’t you think that, post fire, that the BSR looked like a pretty safe place to be? yeah, i thought so too.
you’re going to try to call me out on “making claims on a public forum?” really? now THAT’S hilarious! you do sound down right defensive, and a little desperate… i’d be happy to address your issues, as soon as you address mine:
who are you to demand an account of every minute of each person’s time? are you even an AZ taxpayer? who holds you accountable for your false accusations and libel? what is your name and phone number in case any one of the many people you have falsely accused of wrong doing or falsely claimed were implicit in the death’s of GMIHC want to take issue with the many wrong things you’ve said?
Reply to xxfullsailxx post
on April 1, 2014 at 8:02 pm
>> xxfullsailxx said
>> well, actually, you’re the only one making a
>> big deal about the BSR being labelled a
>> safety zone.
Well, actually, no.
I guess you missed the post below about
claim 14 from the ‘Wrongful Death’ notice
of claims for just TWO of those poor men
that died that day?
That same claim 14 is in ALL of the
‘Wrongful Death’ Notice of Claims…
and it is coming from one of your own.
A former ( Western Division ) Hotshot,
and experienced WFF… now turned attorney.
I’m sure there are going to be all kinds
of ‘experts’ ( like yourself? ) being called
to the witness stand to testify about this
Boulder Springs Ranch… if/when the
trials begin.
I’m also sure the photos you mentioned will
be shown in court.
>> xxfullsailxx
>> you’re going to try to call me out on
>> “making claims on a public forum?”
Yep. See my ‘greeting’ when you
resurfaced. If you are here for no other
reason than to just ‘watch me’… then
( as I said )… I’m going to be watching
you just as hard.
I know you might have trouble fitting the
following statement into your brain… but
when I said above that I really hoped you
DID have some piece of evidence that I
was unaware of to back up your statement…
…I meant it.
I *really* was hoping you did.
Once again… this isn’t a contest, fireboy.
If you find something out before someone
else does… more power to you.
Man thats rediculous. No one assigns “priamry” SZ. Stop saying things you don’t know anything about. Hey and did you know there was an engine moving to the ranch to stag there. Find that, wow you’d be surprised how far behing you are. Why don’t you find me some Wx Ops so I can provide some solid FB runs. That would be useful.
>> WFF said…
>> Man thats rediculous. No one assigns “priamry” SZ.
>> Stop saying things you don’t know anything about.
Who is that addressed to?
I am not the one who FIRST said that anyone ‘assigned
a PRIMARY safety zone’ to anyone and that it was
an absolute FACT.
That was your buddy xxfullsailxx.
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>> their PRIMARY designated safety zone
>> was the cold black.
His ‘statement of fact’ and his ‘choice of words’, not mine.
All I did was show Cordes explaining ( himself ) what
he actually said in his ‘unit log’ to the investigators,
and what might be considered his ‘primary’ designation
( or ‘predetermined zone’, as Marsh would then refer
to it the rest of the day ) if anyone wants to start using
that kind of terminology to describe what he said.
I will leave it to others to decide if he was setting something
as a ‘primary’ or a ‘secondary’ or a ‘tertiary’ or whatever
adjectives someone wants to use.
Just read what Cordes said and make up your own mind.
>> WFF also said…
>> Hey and did you know there was an engine moving
>> to the ranch to stag there.
Hey… yeah. Multiple times. What about it?
What do you think that represents?
That’s where the pumpkin was.
Why wouldn’t some ‘engines’ be going there?
>> Why don’t you find me some Wx Ops so I can
>> provide some solid FB runs. That would be useful.
Youre getting sorta defensive now that not everyone is stroking you. Hold the fries. I’ll take that as you haven’t seen any wx ops. Is that laugh my fat ass off?
You got me. I WAS the one that typed
the adjective p-r-i-m-a-r-y first in the
exchange referenced above.
So scratch most of the above and you
can just stick with this…
“I will leave it to others to decide if he was
setting something as a ‘primary’ or a
‘secondary’ or a ‘tertiary’ or whatever
adjectives someone wants to use.”
“Just read what Cordes said and make up your own mind.”
SPGS1 Gary Cordes’ interview with
ADOSH is still right here…
Tyson Esquibel was a Task Force Leader Trainee ( TLFLD(t) ) assigned
directly ( and only ) to SPGS1 Gary Cordes in Yarnell on June 30, 2013.
ADOSH INTERVIEW WITH TYSON ESQUIBEL – 08/28/2013 – 1:11 PM
Q=Bruce Hanna ( AOSHA )
Q1=Rick Picard ( Deputy Chief / Operations Chief – Peoria Fire Department )
A=Tyson Esquibel ( TFLD(t) under Gary Cordes in Yarnell, 06/30/13 )
** Tyson Esquibel says Granite Mountain Crew Buggies were
** ( at some point that morning ) parked at the Boulder Springs Ranch itself.
Page 16 ( of 107 pages )…
__________________________________________________________________
Q: Well, this – this is the Helms Ranch right here ( Points to map ).
A: Okay.
Q: This is the deployment site. This is the top of the ridge.
A: Okay.
Q: My understanding from talking to these guys is that here’s the old grader right
here. They had their buggies out in here somewhere, and they woo- walked
up – I don’t know if they walked up this trail or somewhere along here,
because this is a photo that was taken at 4:04 by Wade Parker.
A: Um, I do not believe they were parked up here. Um, one of our first
assignments after we put LCS in place, lookouts, communications, escape
runs, and safety zones.
Q: Maybe they were parked – maybe they were up in here.
A: Um, they were parked at that ranch, Boulder Springs Ranch. We sent a
couple resources down this road here, and they, uh…
Q: They had the gate open on the Helms Ranch?
A: Uh, I believe so. One of the first assignments was to, uh, check their buggies
and make sure they were in a good secure area.
Q: So you think they were – they were staged there at the ranch?
A: Uh, yes, sir.
Q: Huh. It’s a little different than what we were told, but – they had a basket
there for water, right, for the helicopter?
A: Uh, yes.
Q: That they had – Yarnell had put in, and they were moving water all night, I
guess, on the 29th?
A: Yes, sir. They had a pumpkin in there.
Page 20…
Q: So, did you ever go to the Helms Ranch?
A: Uh, yes, sir.
Q: About what time did…
A: Uh, I think – I think we’re calling it two different things. I called it, uh,
Boulder Springs.
Q: Boulder Springs? This is…
A: Yeah.
Q: Yeah, okay.
A: Um…
Q: Where did you hear that term? Did somebody tell you that’s what it was?
A: Well off of this map here, let’s see. It might’ve been a different map. Um,
there was Boulder Springs Road that ran right up to it.
Q: Okay.
A: Uh, so we were calling it Boulder Springs Ranch.
Q: And what did you guys – you had parked there? You had staged vehicles there?
A: Uh, that’s – my understanding was that’s where the port-a-tank was.
Q: Right.
A: We’re talking about the same place?
Q: Right.
A: Uh, Granite Mountain buggies were in that area, and we sent 2 trucks in there
to, uh, check on those buggies and, um, to start, uh – uh, structure protection
triaging and, um, identifying hazards and roads back in that area.
Page 29…
Q: Okay. Let me look through (your notes) here. 1030. Engine 103 and engine 146
Manzanita Rooad to Boulder Spring Ranch to meet with structure group 1.
What does this say here? Assess?
A: Uh, assess Granite Mountain buggies and, uh, start triaging the area.
Q: So at 1030 in the morning, the buggies were parked there?
A: Uh, yes, sir.
Q: To the best of your knowledge?
A: Yes.
Q: Okay. So how in the heck did they get from there up to here?
A: I don’t believe they did.
Q: Well, the hikers saw ‘em up here. The old grater was up here, and they –
could they have moved the buggies at some point?
A: Yeah, that’s possible, but, um, I don’t think there was any passable roads in
that area.
Q: None of these?
A: Not by, uh…
Q: There are viable ways of getting in and out of there?
A: …a crew buggy. It’s possible, but to the best of my knowledge they were
down here. ( Points to map ).
Page 80…
Q: Okay. I just wanna go over one point again.
A: Okay.
Q: Do you think – you’re saying you think that Granite Mountain had parked
their buggies at that ranch.
A: Boulder Springs Ranch?
Q: Yeah.
A: Yeah.
Q: You’re like 100 percent sure?
A: Um, I know in the morning they were definitely there.
Q: At some point they were – they were there?
A: Yeah.
Q: How would they have moved ‘em?
Would they have sent a couple guys back and?
A: Uh, how do they normally move them…
Q: Yeah.
A: …or how did they move them that day?
Q: Do you think they moved ‘em?
A: Uh, I heard that they were moved.
Q: Oh, you did hear they were moved?
A: Yeah, but I don’t know who or – or…
….
Q: Uh, there’s – there’s, uh, the 2 hikers, have you heard about the 2 hikers
supposedly had spoken to ‘em several times up here, Eric Marsh?
A: Okay.
Q: They – they sent us a picture and clearly the two buggies are parked out in this
area somewhere.
A: Are they? Okay.
….
Q: But, yeah. I – I can’t disagree. I mean, if you say they were there at some
point, that’s – that’s fine, you know.
A: Yeah, in the morning at a minimum they were there.
_____________________________________________________________
** Tyson Esquibel seems to suggest that Brendan McDonough
** MAY have told Blue Ridge to start looking for GM in the area
** just west of Boulder Springs Ranch, at the end of Lakewood Drive,
** since that’s where Blue Ridge wanted to start the search.
Page 62 ( of 107 pages )…
_______________________________________________________
Q: Okay. Let’s go back to your notes a little bit more.
A: Okay.
Q: Okay. So we hear about a deployment, and then does Gary Cordes give you
some specific directions as to what he wants you to do?
A: Uh, right after we heard the deployment, uh, yeah. We met at the, uh – we
were all at the café.
Q: Right.
A: Uh, we got together with Blue Ridge.
Q: Okay.
A: And, um, the plan was to, um, get all the ALS gear into the pickup that I was in.
Q: Mm-hm.
A: And we were gonna take, um, uh, four additional medics with
myself. I’m an EMT.
Q: Okay.
A: They were – they were gonna take the 4 medics, um, and then we were gonna,
uh, either try to locate them or treat them when they were located. Uh, my
truck was gonna go in with the Blue Ridge, um, supt, and, uh, they had a
Rhino, and then they were gonna take their sup truck along with us; so it was
gonna be those 3 vehicles that were gonna go – either try to locate them when
it cooled down enough or, um, start treatment whenever they were able to find ‘em.
Q: And where were you going to go in?
A: Um, we were…
Q: And how far were you gonna go?
A: We were thinking that they were down, um, this Lakewood Drive. Um, the
fire was pushing through there at that time, so the, um, Blue Ridge sent their
Rhino in there to start scouting it out to try to figure out how we could get into
‘em. We had no clue where Granite Mountain was at that point.
Q: You thought that Granite Mountain may have made it down into that area?
A: Uh, we thought that they were back up beyond, um, Boulder Springs Ranch,
somewhere in that area.
Q: How did you – how did you come to that conclusion?
A: Um, I think that, uh, Blue Ridge had their lookout with ‘em, so he had, uh,
and this is all, uh, speculation. I don’t know how they knew that.
Q: No, I understand.
A: But he, uh, my guess would be that he was – he was the – he knew where they
were previously, so that’s all we had to go by. I personally did not know
where they were.
Q: Okay, so the speculation is that the Blue Ridge lookout may have seen the last
location where they had been working?
A: I think they had a better idea than we did. Yes.
_________________________________________________________________
They knew where they were previously? No one told them they were headed to BS ranch. So again they were not looking there. If McDonough and Cordes knew where they went why did they not say something. Maybe at that time they really didn’t know and in the interview had 20/20 hindsight? just an open thought.
Reply to Marti Reed post on April 1, 2014 at 8:21 am
>> Marti said…
>> Wow. That so totally doesn’t make any sense
>> inside my head at this point.
I’m not sure what to make of that, either.
ADOSH investigator Bruce Hanna himself was having
such a hard time believing this that he came back
to it FOUR separate times during the interview just to
try to VERIFY… and despite the fact that Esquibel wasn’t
sure of a lot of other things… he seemed to be pretty
damn sure about this one thing ( that, at some point,
the GM Crew Carriers WERE staged right at the BSR ).
So I guess it’s conjecture time again.
Let’s assume he’s right.
WHY would they have gone there at all?
Did they just get LOST trying to find the Sesame
area and ended up there just to try and get ‘directions’
on how to find the ‘Sesame area’, where they were
SUPPOSED to go?
Remember… Cordes ONLY showed Marsh ( in his
Supt truck ) and perhaps Steed ( in the Chase truck )
how to get out to Sesame. The GM crew was still
making their way down from the ICP in Peeples Valley
where they stopped to have breakfast.
By the time GM got to Yarnell ( circa 8:00 AM, an hour
after the briefing at the fire station )… Cordes had long
since gone about his business and no one was
‘showing them’ ( the Crew Carriers ) how to get
anywhere. They were on their own with either maps
or GPS to find this ‘Sesame area’ and the
GM Supt and Chase trucks already ‘staged’ out there.
Chief Dan Andersen saw the two GM Crew Carriers
pass his house on Lakewood ( heading west ) at
exactly 8:03 AM. That is just four minutes before
Marsh would meet the hikers WAY out west on the
ridge. Andersen’s house was on the extreme eastern
end of Lakewood ( you could see it from the Ranch
House Restaurant ), so that doesn’t tell us whether
GM Crew Carriers took the correct path towards
Sesame as they went east.
Maybe they got ‘lost’ and just ‘ended up’ at the
Boulder Springs Ranch looking for a moment
looking for directions… and Esquibel happened to
see them there for that short time and then just
thought that’s where they were ‘staging’.
Who knows.
I will tell you who knows ( if Esquibel is right )…
Brendan McDonough.
>> Marti also said…
>> “When you have eliminated the impossible, whatever
>> remains–however improbable–must be the truth.”
This entire incident has become an exercise in
‘accepting the improbable’. I expect it will continue.
I seriously dought in the time frames of Marsh or the crew they went to the BS ranch. And I have named it the BS ranch because of so many assumptions being made about it. But I diverse The crew came from town to there Parking spot the time frame dose not give any time to take a trip some where else and Marsh would have told them where to come and park. I think there was some confusion by the witness ( maybe a lot of confusion). But the improbable rules here it seems.
With regard to some talk of “foreboding clouds” and thunderstorms, and arguing against the GMHS decision to leave their perfectly good SZ on June 30th, you posted “making clear that moving to the Boulder Springs Ranch was an irrational act….. how would GM have anticipated the almost rogue wind change that came somewhere around 4:24-ish?)”
YES ELIZABETH, THE GMHS LEAVING THEIR SZ AND MOVING TO THE BOULDER SPRINGS RANCH WAS IN FACT AN IRRATIONAL ACT.
“Based on what I am understanding about the weather and fire behavior and predicted fire behavior at 4:04-ish, I continue to develop the view that it was not irrational for GM to move as they did, when they did, toward the Boulder Springs Ranch.”
It posted before I was finished. So continuing with the above ….
For the life of me, I CANNOT understand where you are going with this one and how you’re coming to these conclusions. Fear of lightning is a bogus argument, because they were NOT on a ridgetop, and could have easily move to safe ground to avoid lightning. Lightning should have been the LEAST of their worries. This argument is similar to the 30 Mile Fire where the WFF feared getting hypothermia in a cold stream over burning to death in a fire. Totally unrealistic and a Liberal legal manuever.
And “how would GM have anticipated the almost rogue wind change that came somewhere around 4:24-ish?” Pretty simple on this one. It was a COMMON Southwest thunderstorm in their own backyard. They had experienced very similar weather earlier on the nearby Doce Fire.
Myself and most all other experienced WFF hold the view that “it was irrational for GM to move as they did, when they did, toward the Boulder Springs Ranch.”
Thunderstorms, almost by definition, not only can have dramatic or “rogue” wind shifts, there can be multiple wind shifts too. I would imagine that not marching into the unburned anywhere close to a fire when a thunderstorm is present is pretty much a no-brainer, no matter what you think a thunderstorm is going to do. They are predictable in their unpredictability.
The lightning theory just seems to be a reach. Its beauty is that it really can’t be disproven. But the point is that if that was the reason they left the black was lightning (I don’t believe it was – the alternative explanation makes more sense and has more evidence), they still did almost certainly the worst possible thing they could have done. Trying to go to Yarnell to help at least explains the direction they went.
I think Elizabeth again needs to look for advice from people with real-world, relevant experience. In the case of lightning, people with WFF experience would be a good place to start, but also anyone who works outdoors in either AZ or for that matter around the CO front range. Is lightning a concern to be kept in mind? Yes, beforehand it’s best, if other safe options exist, to not plan to sit on a ridge during a thunderstorm. (And GM was not faced with doing so.) Is it very common to see lightning in the distance? Yes. If you see lightning in the distance, does it mean you’re at imminent risk of getting struck? No. Nor does it mean you have to stop what you’re doing just because of that distant lightning. If you see distant lightning, should you assume a fairly high risk of dying through other means to avoid lightning exposure? Try to downclimb a loose cliff, spend an hour in dense unburned fuel with a fire blowing towards you, that kind of thing? No.
All well said
If Lighting would have been close and over the fire where would all the air craft be? Not over the Fire
If Lightning was near or over the fire would the Air craft have been talking about it? YES
Would the Air Attack be telling IC and OPS and ground forces that Lightning was Eminent on the fire? Yes
Simple question where is the proof?
Air attack would have been all over it…..
RTS- i agree with 90% of what you’re saying… especially about lightning in the southwest. and, if lightning were a major factor that day, the reports would have said so.
one thing i hesitate to agree with you about, is the fact that GM’s decision was wholly irrational. if i try to put myself in Eric’s shoes, i think i could potentially “rationalize” my way to BSR… of course, in hindsight, it might be easy to say that the decision was irrational (though i’m not even sure that’s the “right” word).
i know you’re not a fan of the SAIR, but i think one of it’s contributions to trying to understand HOW it happened, is that it at least attempts to challenge the reader to place yourself on that ridge, and rationalize your way off it. i am referring to the “Analysis” portion and the “course of actions.”
I think a lot of us, if we tried to put ourselves in their shoes up there, could for many different reasons, rationalize beginning to move-out to the south. Other than the lack of succinct comm with adjoining resources, including Div A’s higher-ups, when they began to move-out, they had their bases covered. They could see the fire, see the weather, and had easy access to a down and out off the backside.
As they moved along, those bases remained covered until they reached the point where they uncovered all of those bases, and decended into the bowl. I think that’s the point where any rationality ended.
why don’t you consult the SAIR like i told you? i think that all the speculative reasons are there…
why do YOU think they dropped off the two track?
do you think there were external factors involved? like someone demanded they do something against their own will?
or maybe they were fooled by an ice-cream truck mirage down in the box canyon? maybe they thought they saw a beer cart? women’s swedish volleyball team?
unless you think there was some sort of external factor involved (which i don’t), it’s all speculation.
Unless, when they got to that point, they thought it would be faster, and therefore maybe safer, than staying on the two-track, which was longer, and (as WTK has described) may have had its downsides.
My comment above was meant to be a response to this comment.
“So then, why do YOU think they decided to drop into the bowl?”
I think we all pretty much know, relatively speaking, why they decided to head to Yarnell. But why did they decided to take the “shortcut” if it wasn’t for the perceived speed advantage?
I agree, at this point, that lightning was most likely not a major factor in their decision.
And my speculating is not based on WTK’s thinking, it’s based on my own.
I grew up here in New Mexico, camping, back-packing, horse-packing all over. I was a Girl Scout, a GS camp counselor and riding director and Leader. In my mind, from the very get-go of this I can’t imagine “short- cutting” into a manzanita-filled potential chimney with a fire headed in its direction under a thunderstorm.
On the other hand, my 15-year-old Eagle Scout brother got himself killed and risked the lives of five other people making a similar “shortcut.” Because his scoutmaster yelled at him, saying “You guys hurry up and get down from there, we’ve gotta go!”
Thinking that dropping into the bowl was faster is problematic. A reasonable person, with prior experience walking through that type of brush over and through a steep and rocky bowled drainage, would know that kind of bushwhack didn’t make sense. They would have done it once or twice before, and realized that it is a bad idea. Moreover, if they did try it again, after the first few minutes of making literally only a slow crawl in terms of progress, again they would have headed back up, realizing that retreat uphill would become impossible otherwise later on.
This is somewhat analogous to experience with lightning. In that area of AZ during monsoon, as other posters have noted the thunderstorm at Yarnell is a normal occurrence, and seeing lightning is a normal and regular occurrence. Likewise knowing that the bushwhack GM undertook is going to be painfully slow and difficult is simply a normal thing. To be blunt, I believe OSHA would be warranted in saying that a bushwhack of that nature, when other alternatives existed, was a violation even without a fire involved. That is because minor injuries are quite possible from taking a full crew on that type of bushwhack, and there’s no corresponding need to expose them to that.
On the faster point, I’d even suggest posters here think about their own experiences with unplanned sustained bushwhacks, and how many actually did end up being faster?
I agree with that, believe me. That exact same thinking got my brother killed. But what I’m trying to get at is WHY did they make THAT decision, when the “escape route” was, according to Brendan, the two-track ALL THE WAY to the ranch, if it wasn’t for the PERCEIVED speed advantage?
The big IF…
IF they had scouted the 2 track to the ranch.
I believe they could have made the Ranch with a little time to spare.
The move was still a calculated risk
You make it or you don’t.
When they dropped into the bowl all bets were off.
Scout the escape route make sure it is feasible before you commit to the unknown.
Elizabeth’s theory about the lightining being a major saftey concern and that being the main catalyst for GM to move from the black certainly merrits everyones attention. It’s one thing that I never really gave alot of consideration too until she brought it up. The way Elizabeth lays it out, It is hard not to give it some serious consideration..
I think the other thing to consider is that we have also really only
seen the evidence ( revealed only in Darrell Willis’ ADOSH
interview transcript )… that there WAS a time ( in 2012 ) when
“Death from above” was a BIG concern for Marsh, Steed
AND the entire crew. I’m talking about Wesley fire incident that
Willis still says they were “sent home from” because of that
refusal by Marsh to ‘go direct’ when there was so much
‘Death from above’ ( falling tree ) potential.
Yes… I know… falling trees and lightning are certainly NOT
the same thing… but here’s the point I want to make.
Eric’s own unit log from Wesley indicates how concerned his
CREW was with the situation. So it wasn’t just all about him.
He was hearing these “Death from above” concerns from
his OWN men… and like any good supervisor SHOULD do
he was paying attention to them. He also AGREED with
their concerns.
So fast-forward to being on top of the highest ridge in the
neighborhood, where a fire had already started with multiple
lightning strikes… and a thunderstorm is rolling in ( and you
can HEAR the thunder ).
We DO NOT KNOW how that might have factored into the
decision making… but what if the approaching storm ( and
the potential lightning risks ) really were part of what Marsh
meant when we hear him say to Captain Jesse Steed…
“That’s why I called you before to ask you what your comfort
level is.”
Is it possible ( just like Wesley ) that the CREW itself had
already been expressing their OWN concerns about possible
“Death from above” out there… and ( just like Wesley ) it
was time for management to realize they really WERE
concerned ( maybe not all but perhaps a few of them )?.
Base on the *new* evidence we can now read ( thanks to
Mr. Dougherty publishing it ) with regards to OPS1 Todd
Abel’s direct concerns about the same thing ( lightning up
on that ridge )…
I believe it IS possible that those kind of “Death from above”
considerations *may* have factored into the decision making,
regardless of anything else anyone was ‘asking’ them
( or even trying to tell them ) to do.
The only real head-scratching moment would be is if the
potential ‘lightning’ threat really was involved in any way,
shape or form in their ‘comfort level’ and ‘discussing their
options’ conversation…
…then why would anyone be reluctant to report that as
having been the case?
Brendan McDonough has chosen NOT to talk about everything
the SAIR even says he ‘heard’ that afternoon.
Fine, whatever… but why in the world would he be reluctant
to say that they were VERY concerned about the lightning,
if that really factored into it at all?
Does he really think that would be bringing some kind of
‘shame’ to his ‘fire brothers’ or something and needs to
remain a ‘secret’?
I mean.. who is NOT afraid of lightning? ( If you aren’t… you
actually need to re-evaluate because you SHOULD be ).
I once knew someone that was so deathly afraid of lightning
that if we were out on the football field… even at just practice…
and he heard thunder… he would curl up in a ball in fear and
we had to CARRY him off the field.
The very sound of thunder… and him knowing he was outside…
just put him in a catatonic state. It was that bad.
Not saying there was anyone like that on the Granite Mountain
crew ( certainly they’d been exposed to field lightning many,
many times before )… but just like Wesley… what if a
‘consensus’ was emerging amongst the crew that day
when they heard thunder that that ridge wasn’t the best
place to be… no matter how much BLACK there was?
I left the important word RECENTLY out of the first sentence.
Should have read like this…
“I think the other thing to consider is that we have also
really only RECENTLY seen the evidence ( revealed only
in Darrell Willis’ ADOSH interview transcript )…”
There is a LOT of stuff that we are only now seeing
because ( thanks to Mr. Dougherty ) it has only
RECENTLY been (publicly) published.
So combine what has come out of Darrell Willis’
heretofore unheard ADOSH interview ( the Wesley
fire incident ) AND what we can now read in OPS1
Todd Abel’s interview ( his ongoing concerns that
day about lightning on the ridge and his specific
discussions with Marsh about it )…
…then that’s why I believe the whole ‘lightning’ thing
deserved another round of discussion.
That’s what can/should happen when *new* evidence
comes to light. You ‘revisit’ things. Maybe the wattage
of the light being shed on some things just got
ramped up… but maybe not.
I think the ‘consensus’ amongst experienced WFF is
going to be the same as before… that ‘lightning concerns’
could not possibly have factored into their decision
making that afternoon… but so be it.
I still think this ( and a lot of other things ) deserve a
‘revisit’ now that we can finally see this actual
ADOSH investigation material.
i would suggest you go visit the Wildland Fire Lessons Learned webpage to see how many lightning accidents are out there.(while you’re at it, check out hazard tree accidents to understand just how “NOT the same thing” they really are)
i don’t think you could survive on an IHC in the southwest (or anywhere for that matter) with an irrational fear of lightning (as your stupid anecdotal story attempts to suggest.)
As someone born and raised in the SW I tend to agree with you here. I have a really (and some would say irrational) powerful fear of lightning. Seriously. But I have had to learn how to deal with that. I know how to “hunker down.” I think lightning may have been a concern among the GM hotshots, but not a defining one, all things considered.
Here is where you call me crazy. I love to watch lighting. I have sat in a lookout during a storm, Anselmos fire (SPELLING). I have seen the blue electrical light dance around the edges of a lookout from being hit so much. As a patrolman I have sit in my truck as storms moved thru to check for fire starts.
I have been on mountains with horses move to young tree stands tied up and hunkered till the storm passed. I have been on small lightning fires in the mountains and hunkered while new storms passed. Wild yes but you can stay safe and some times watch a better show than the 4th of JULY.
I LOVE watching lightning when I’m in a vehicle or inside a building!!
I’m sitting here remembering times somewhere in the middle of the Grand Canyon with lightning going off all around, above, and below me. I would just make myself as tiny as I possibly could. Many of my friends would have just kept walking! I hated it at the time, but I love remembering it. Awesome!
OTOH I have black widow spiders living in my garage and I’ve never been willing to go to all the bother to try to get rid of them.
Ever since I saw the new ADOSH material and ( for the first time ) could read
about OPS1 Todd Abel’s own ‘lightning concerns’… I was putting this post
together as kind of a ‘lightning summary’.
I mentioned it somewhat and Mr. Powers ( and others ) have already refuted
most of the ‘lightning concerns’ with regards to any ‘decision making’ that
day… but since Elizabeth just brought up ‘lightning’ again ( and her prior
attempts to discuss this topic, even before the ADOSH material became
available ) I thought I would just go ahead and post this, anyway.
There is plenty of documentation now to support the base theory that Russ Shumate based his own IA ( Initial Attack ) Plan for Saturday on well known
concerns about crews being unsafely exposed to ‘lightning risks’ in that kind
of high ridge environment, at that time of year.
The Weaver Mountains seem to ‘famous for it’ and always an area of
high concern with regards to ‘lightning’.
Indeed… the fire itself BEGAN because of ( multiple ) lightning strikes up there
on the Weaver Mountain Ridge in the late afternoon on Friday, June 28, 2013.
** OPS1 Todd Abel’s concerns about lightning
In the recently released ADOSH supporting material ( many thanks again to Mr.
John Dougherty for publishing this information ), we only NOW learn that OPS1
Todd Abel really was quite concerned with the ‘lightning safety’ on Sunday…
almost as much as IC Russ Shumate was the day before when he basically
based his entire IA ( Initial Attack ) plan on his own concerns for the safety
of any crews he might put up on that ridge…
…and that Todd Abel even took Eric ‘aside’ after one of the briefings and
specifically mentioned HIS ‘lightning’ concerns for that day’s work cycle…
* START OF EXCERPTS FROM TODD ABEL’S ADOSH INTERVIEW
_________________________________________________________________
ADOSH INTERVIEW WITH TODD ABEL – 08/22/13 – 1:09 PM
Q = Bruce Hanna
Q1 = Dave Larsen ( Rest in Peace )
Q2 = Nicolas Cornelius
A = Todd Abel
Page 8…
A: And, uh, so once again the type fire, 4 IC Russ Shumate was kind of giving
them the same briefing that I had just received from him a half hour ago.
Q1: Right.
A: And, uh, Eric was able to listen to that.
Q1: Okay.
A: Um, and – and hear that briefing. Um, and then once they got done and started
going over about some other business about getting aircraft ordered and all
that stuff. And, um, you know, trying to fill some more positions on the team.
Um, uh, me and Eric kind of stepped to the side and I gave him a more formal
briefing. I wanted to make sure that all the information that I got I wanted to
pass onto him. And that briefing pretty much went, uh, you know, just like a –
a – that briefing checklist in the – in the IRPG. Uh, basically followed that
format. But obviously went into a lot of details on the – you know the fire
behavior they had yesterday. Um, the predicted, uh, um, cell build ups this
time of year with the outflows and the lightning strikes and all that.
Page 13…
Q1: Current monsoon weather. Tell me what – what – what that means to you,
current monsoon weather? ‘Cause that doesn’t mean a lot to me.
A: Okay what – what that monsoon wea- possibility of monsoon build ups, to me,
it – it – obviously it does a lot of things to fire and safety for firefighters.
Knowing that these guys could be at – were gonna be up on this ridge,
lightning was a concern for me.
Q1: Okay.
A: I wanted them to make sure that they kept good lookouts and watched for
those build ups, ‘cause of the lightning.
Q1: Okay.
Page 44…
NOTE: We already knew that OPS1 Todd Abel and DIVSA Eric
Marsh had talked about the ‘weather’ situation and Marsh telling
Abel the winds were ‘getting squirrely’ up on the ridge… but only now
( in the recently released ADOSH material ) do we discover that
Abel’s ongoing ‘lightning concerns’ that day ( which he had ALREADY
expressed to Marsh that morning ) were specifically discussed
during that conversation… and that OPS1 Todd Abel was still
worried about it ( lightning ) and their safety up on that ridge…
A: …3:45. This all was about in the same timeframe of wind shifts, the
conversation with Eric. He was the first one to feel those squirrely winds start,
right?
A: Yeah.
Q1: And he’s talking to you about he’s got wind issues.
A: Mm-hm.
Q1: Let me ask you this, you say you’re nervous, um, because of this…
A: This cell building over here.
Q1: …this cell – what does that mean to you?
A: That means outflows, possible lightning strikes, all that stuff.
Q1: Okay.
A: So that’s why I wanted to make sure that he had eyes on it to make sure he
watches that thing and make sure that if it’s getting too – if he gets to really
start feeling those winds changing and everything that they can get hunkered
in that black – that 250 acres of safety zone there.
Q1: Mm-hm.
A: And – and stay out of harm’s way. You know they could even drop down off
the ridge for lightning purposes if they had to.
Q1: Sure.
A: Was my thought process.
________________________________________________________________
* END OF EXCERPTS FROM TODD ABEL’S ADOSH INTERVIEW
We still do NOT know how concerned Marsh himself was about being up on that
ridge with regards to potential ‘lightning’ risks… but at least we NOW know that
his direct supervisor ( OPS1 Todd Abel ) was VERY concerned about, was
expressing that concern to Marsh, and those concerns WERE part of his intent
when he told Marsh to ‘hunker and be safe’ (up there) that afternoon.
We also still do NOT know if any ‘lightning concerns’ were, in any way, part of
Marsh’s own ‘what’s your comfort level?’ queries to Steed about their option of
staying up on the ridge.
Only someone who heard that ‘discussing their options’ conversation and is
willing to talk about it might be able to say whether that was, in any way, part
of the ‘comfort level’ discussions at that time.
The rest of this is just sort of an ‘all-in-one-place’ SUMMARY reference of what
the other official documents have already had to say about ‘lightning’ that day…
including the account that at 4:20 PM, the exact moment Steed/Crew were having
to decide whether to stay on the high-ridge two-track OR drop into the canyon,
loud THUNDER was heard in Yarnell and they would have ALSO heard it.
Again… there is no evidence that influenced their decision making at 4:20 in ANY
way… but it’s still interesting to note the timing on that and the fact that they HAD
to have ‘heard’ this thunder.
SAIR – Page 7
Late afternoon on June 28, the Yarnell Hill Fire started high on a ridge
west of Yarnell, Arizona when lightning ignited multiple fires.
SAIR – Page 14
Multiple lightning ignitions occurred from thunderstorm activity on lands
southwest of Prescott at about 1700 Phoenix Standard Time (PNT) on
Friday, June 28. Of the seven lightning fires discovered, four were on
State, private, and adjacent Bureau of Land Management (BLM) lands.
The Yarnell Hill Fire was one of these four.
SAIR – Page 17
Friday, 28 June 2013 – Several parties notify the Arizona Dispatch Center
(Dispatch) of a lightning-ignited fire on State of Arizona land west of Yarnell
at about 1730 ( 5:30 PM ) on June 28. It is one of four fires on state lands in
the vicinity caused by significant lightning activity. Dispatch begins documenting
the incident at 1736 ( 5:36 PM ) as the Yarnell Hill Fire.
An Arizona State Forestry Division (AZSF) firefighter, a qualified Type 3 Incident
Commander (ICT3) who has worked in the local area since 1995, coordinates
responses to the lightning strikes. He and the BLM Duty Officer on scene
anticipate multiple new lightning-caused fires in the morning.
NOTE: Shumate and BLM Duty Officer ( Dean Fernandez? ) were already
expecting more lightning the next MORNING ( not afternoon ).
SAIR – Page 18
On Friday evening… ICT4 is concerned about firefighters moving across the
rugged terrain at night, and he knows he cannot provide logistical support for
them overnight. He is also concerned about potentially exposing firefighters
to lightning on the ridge. In consideration of these factors, the relatively low fire
behavior and the attention required by other fire starts, he prepares to begin full
suppression efforts on Yarnell Hill the following morning ( Saturday, June 29 ).
He requests two Type 2 Department of Corrections crews, a light helicopter,
and an AZSF engine for the morning.
Saturday, June 29, 2013
The fire is holding on all four sides and none of the other starts from the day
before shows smoke. At 1442, ICT4 advises Dispatch he is releasing Air Attack.
At 1540, he releases the BLM brush engine and a local Peeples Valley fire engine,
because the multiple fire starts he had expected do not materialize. ICT4 releases
the two SEATs for new assignments and the State of Arizona Aviation Officer
orders them to reposition to the Wickenburg SEAT Base.
Weather conditions are hot and dry, and increasing west-southwest winds elevate
fire activity at around 1600. ICT4 responds at 1610 by requesting the two SEATs
and Air Attack to return to the Yarnell Hill Fire. One SEAT and Air Attack launch
from Wickenburg but the second SEAT stands by for potential new fire starts
from active lightning across central Arizona.
SAIR – Page 21
SPOT WEATHER FORECAST FOR SUNDAY, JUNE 30, 2013
DISCUSSION…STRONG HIGH PRESSURE OVER THE SOUTHWEST WILL
MAINTAIN THE HEAT SPELL THROUGH THE WEEKEND. LIMITED MOISTURE
WILL RESULT IN ISOLATED THUNDERSTORM ACTIVITY SUNDAY AFTERNOON
AND EARLY EVENING. THESE STORMS WILL PRODUCE LIGHTNING AND
GUSTY WINDS…BUT LITTLE OR NO MEASURABLE PRECIPITATION.
NOTE: Lightning was EXPECTED that afternoon wherever cells developed.
SAIR – Page 28
Circa 1300 ( 1:00 PM ) or 13:30 ( 1:30 PM )…
GM Capt ( Jesse Steed ), GM Lookout ( Brendan McDonough ), and others talk
over the radio about thunderstorms coming in. GM Capt ( Jesse Steed ) mentions
he might have seen a few lightning strikes.
SAIR – Page 77
Figure 8 shows the lightning between 1300 and 1530 as the storms were
tracking west-southwest ( towards Yarnell ).
SAIR – Page 78
Around 1620 MST, field personnel near Highway 89 in the Yarnell area
began to hear thunder, and shortly afterward noted spritzes of rain or mist
mixed with ash. The Earth Networks Total Lightning Network verified the
thunder, showing two in-cloud lightning flashes at 1620 (Figure 11).
NOTE: 1620 ( 4:20 PM ) is the exact moment the SAIR says that
Steed and the Crew decided to leave the two-track high ridge road
and drop into the box canyon.
SAIR – Page 81
As the outflow boundary raced towards the fire location between
1500 to 1600 MST, the parent line of storms lagged several miles
behind. Various lightning detection systems showed lightning flashes
within the parent storms, but lightning strike locations and trends would
not indicate a significant change in storm movement.
Some indicators appeared after 1600. Subtle indicators included the gradual
change in wind direction as the boundary approached (west-northwest) as
well as a brief lull just prior to the outflow passage. Distinct indicators included
an abrupt change in wind direction and speeds, referred to as “ripping” when
the outflow boundary hit the northern end of the fire. Other distinct indicators
included “spritzes” of rain, thunder, and some flashes of lightning
( both cloud-to-ground and in-cloud ) that coincided with the rapidly increasing
fire column and fire behavior.
** IC Russ Shumate’s concerns about LIGHTNING…
From ADOSH report…
Friday, June 28, 2013
Shumate developed a full suppression strategy based upon the policy of the
Arizona State Forestry Division. The tactic for the next day was to use a
helicopter to transport people to and from the fire. This suppression strategy
was concerned with mitigating risks of the predicted monsoonal LIGHTNING
and rains, but did not initially appear to plan for potential extreme fire behavior.
Saturday, June 29, 2013
On June 29 Shumate returned to the fire early in the morning and began
assigning resources to the Yarnell Hili Fire, which was the only lightning-caused
fire still active from the storm on June 28. Sometime after 0700 and prior to
1100, Dean Fernandez, a BLM representative, took a morning flight to update
the situation of the fire and estimated the fire to be approximately eight acres.
From this assessment, Shumate and Fernandez developed an initial attack plan
to put six firefighters from the DOC Lewis Crew and one helitack crew member
on the fire using the helicopter for transportation. Shumate also planned to
remove the firefighters from the fire by 1530 due to perceived
LIGHTNING RISK from afternoon storms.
huh, interesting… so apparently you’re not from the southwest.
because even any layperson from the general area would know that thunderstorms and lightning are pretty prevalent starting in late june and running into july and august in the southwest U.S.
and, i suppose it’s because you’re a layperson, without any prior knowledge of wff OR the southwest in general, that you need a long winded explanation of the dangers that might present themselves while working out of doors in the southwest during late june and early july.
congratulations on educating yourself. we’re all very proud of you.
WTKTT said, “Thought we weren’t going to hear from you today. Glad you’re still reading!”
well, some of us have lives… you know, a job, a wife, kids, a dog that needs walking… none of us have the “commitment” to the “salt mines” like you do… (that’s another way of saying compulsive narcissism)
WTKTT said, “So… now that you have your ‘daily attack’ fix out of the way…”
i think you mean “constructive criticism”… it’s not my fault you’re too obstinate to understand.
WTKTT said, “Do YOU think the (obvious) lightning concerns had ANYTHING to do with any of the decisions that were made out on that ridge that day?”
hmm, well let’s see… as usual, you want to try to speak for the deceased and put thoughts in people’s heads… no, i don’t know if Marsh or Steed considered lightning to be an imminent threat. neither do you.
as i tried to say above in my constructive criticism… lightning is always a “hazard” consideration in the southwest whenever monsoons are forecasted. you can check your IRPG for current lightning guidelines as well as definitions for Lightning Activity Level (LAL).
GM moved because they were watching the fire roll towards Yarnell and were out of position. they weren’t satisfied with sitting in the black, so they attempted to move towards BSR.
Do you think that PFD Willis’ comment regarding this same notion may have influenced the GMHS to leave the black? Remember that Willis made almost this identical claim during the YHF fatality site news conference. “GM moved because they were watching the fire roll towards Yarnell and were out of position. they weren’t satisfied with sitting in the black …”
I agree that Willis’ very similar statement regarding sitting in a SZ and doing nothing (compared to engaging) did NOT directly influence Marsh, Steed, and the GMHS decision. Do you think that it may have INDIRECTLY, subtley influenced them, since that attitude seemed to have been somewhat of a PFD standard?
RTS- i haven’t listened to the Willis interview yet… would like to soon. my initial reaction since seeing the GM crewmembers background was that yes, there were a lot of wanna-be structure guys and that was a big draw to get on with GMIHC…
would like to pick up on this discussion after i’ve heard willis’s interview.
Several things:
1. God bless you, xxfullsailxx. Welcome back.
2. It troubles me that there is the tendency for various anonymous posters to assert things about the Yarnell Hill Fire as if those things were fact, whereupon other posters then ADOPT the non-facts as if they WERE facts and keep repeating them until everyone forgets that they never WERE verified facts to begin with. One good example of this pertains to Marsh “hiding” his location on June 30th – that is not a FACT – we have no verified evidence that that actually happened, and the evidence that we DO have suggests exactly the opposite. Another example pertains to lightning – I asked about the lightning back in OCTOBER. I was told nononononono – there was noooooo lightning that day. We now see that ACTUALLY there WAS lightning that day, including a pop right in the time of the escape route being cut off. (I have no idea if the lightning is relevant – my only point is that there WAS lightning, contrary to the previously proffered “facts.”) My hope is that people reading this thread do their own research if they care enough about finding actual facts rather than relying on things that some anonymous guy here says. Doing your own research involves finding the relevant SOURCE documents or materials in the stack o’ information that has been released regarding the fire or contacting me at [email protected] if you want tips on making further public records or FOIA/FOIL requests.
3. The videos that Calvin and WTKTT are watching are named by their ENDING time. So the 161620 video ENDS at 4:16.20 and the 161658 video ENDS at 4:16.58. See point “2,” above.
4. I will mail $50 to anyone who can show me proof that, as of 4:04 on June 30, there was a SERIOUSLY foreboding pyrocumulous cloud in GM’s line of sight making clear that moving to the Boulder Springs Ranch was an irrational act. I am pretty sure that there was NOT such a cloud (visible) until AFTER it was too late (e.g. some time after 4:35 p.m.), but foreboding clouds are not my area of expertise. (P.S. There ALSO were no SOUTHERN winds at 4:04 p.m., so, absent a crystal ball, how would GM have anticipated the almost rogue wind change that came somewhere around 4:24-ish?)
5. The only reason I EVER mentioned Cordes is because I was sick of reading anonymous posters on this thread bash poor Willis, who was on the other side of the fire at the time of the deployment and who already had his cell phone records inspected by ADOSH to assess whether he (Willis) had actually been the person who somehow ordered GM to the Boulder Springs Ranch. (I was also sick of the gross misstatements about Marsh….) I ABSOLUTELY 100% am not pointing any sort of finger at Cordes, and WTKTT’s attempt to turn my comment about Cordes being the overhead who particularly wanted help from GM into some sort of WTKTT-all-caps-asterisk-headline-revelation that the families of the deceased GM guys should be specifically noting was what some might deem an “asshole” move. See point “6,” below, and point “2,” above.
I have found NOTHING to suggest that Gary Cordes did a DAMN thing blame-worthy or somehow suspect.
6. Based on what I am understanding about the weather and fire behavior and predicted fire behavior at 4:04-ish, I continue to develop the view that it was not irrational for GM to move as they did, when they did, toward the Boulder Springs Ranch.
7. The SAIR addresses LCES. If you missed that reference, go back and re-read the SAIR. Even if you didn’t miss that reference, go back and re-read the SAIR.
8. The SAIR never said there was a 33-minute black-out in all possibly relevant communications related to GM. Rather, the SAIR said there were no “verifiable” communications, presumably because there is no way to 100% verify who was saying what – exactly, with any degree of certainty – in the accidentally-recorded background voices in the video clips.
9. Before condemning the SAIR, go back and read it AGAIN. As I see it, the biggest problem with the SAIR is that it is not written in clear, direct, 4th-grade language. (Of course, it if answered all of the questions that could be answered, and it did so in crystal-clear language, it would be a 300 page document that took 18 months to prepare at a cost of 2x the current cost.) Actually, one of the biggest problems with the SAIR (and the ADOSH report) is that the timeline is off. If the SAIR (or ADOSH report) says that something happened at 4 p.m., don’t bet the farm on it.
(Marshall, HI!!! …waving…. Did Andy tell you that page 19 is wrong?)
Elizabeth… let me be the first one to say that now that we can
actually SEE the ADOSH investigation supporting material… there
really was no reason for a lot of the recent consternation.
A LOT of the ( what other people, not me ) called your ‘wild claims’
about some things that seemed to be coming out of nowhere
ARE, in fact, SUPPORTED by *new* information contained
in the ADOSH material. Particularly the ACTUAL audio and
written transcripts of the ADOSH interviews with people like
Abel, Musser and especially Cordes.
All you had to do was SAY that was where a lot of your thoughts
and assertions were coming from… and a lot of the needless
back and forth could have been avoided.
I was the one who kept pressing you to at least SAY what you
were basing your public assertions on… and now that we can
see the same material you obviously had I still don’t understand
why you were being so secretive about it all… but my comment
above still stands.
A LOT of what you were asserting recently APPEARS to
be based on some solid testimony.
I still haven’t gotten through even half of what Mr. Dougherty
has published recently… but I’ve already seen the quotes
from interviews with people like Musser and Cordes that
were obviously the basis for some of the claims you
were making.
I wished we had known that you were just ‘quoting the
ADOSH material’. Could have saved a lot of back and forth.
What… you’re surprised that all I really wanted to
know was what you were BASING your assertions
on? That really is all I ever wanted to know but
you kept refusing to answer. I still don’t understand
that at all. Honestly, I don’t.
I will even say it again ( since it’s Lent )…
Now that WE ( thanks to Mr. Dougherty ) can
see the same evidence that you apparently
had but were refusing to name… there IS
evidence to back up a lot of the claims you
were making.
Why didn’t you just say so ( or show the parts
you were referring to )?
>> Elizabeth said…
>>
>> 3. The videos that Calvin and WTKTT are watching are
>> named by their ENDING time. So the 161620 video ENDS at
>> 4:16.20 and the 161658 video ENDS at 4:16.58.
I certainly HOPE you ARE right about that… because now that
we can finally see ALL of these AIR STUDY videos I don’t
like the alternative workload of having to figure out which ones
might be off and which ones aren’t…
…but would you mind telling us exactly how/where you, yourself
became aware of that?
I don’t see that exact ‘detail’ about the filenames/timestamps
explicitly stated in any of the accompanying material… so
I’m just wondering how you, yourself, became aware that
the filenames/timestamps are the ENDS and not the
STARTS of the videos.
you can take your “blessings” and put them somewhere that doesn’t see the light of day much… (that’s me restraining myself)
i really enjoy how you talk about your “professional reputation” and how anyone who contacts you can rest assured that you won’t sell them out or that you can be trusted to keep their anonymity…
but when push came to shove, you didn’t hesitate to try to use what personal information i provided, and try to throw it back in my face.
furthermore, anytime anyone disagrees with your silly hypotheses, you feel personally “attacked” and you start throwing around the word “god” like a priest throwing holy water at a prostitute.
NOTE: No ‘revelations’ here… but found a VERY interesting photograph.
The ‘Station Fire’ burned in Los Angeles County, CA from August 26 to
September 25.
Eric Marsh and the Granite Mountain Hotshots rotated onto that fire the first
week of September, 2009.
There ended up being a FAMOUS picture from that Station Fire that
includes Eric Marsh and the Granite Mountain vehicles.
By FAMOUS… I mean it was taken by an AP photographer and quickly
‘made the rounds’ in the MSM ( Mainstream Media ), appearing with
almost every major outlet story covering the ‘Station Fire’.
Here is that picture that AP Photographer Jae C. Hong took of Eric Marsh
at the Station Fire…
Firefighters Eric Marsh, left, of Prescott, Ariz., and Lincoln Peters, of Neddles,
Calif., watch a wildfire burn during the Station Fire in La Crescenta, Calif.,
Tuesday, Sept. 1, 2009. (AP Photo/Jae C. Hong)
NOTE: Eric’s Superintendent truck and the two Granite Mountain Crew Carriers
can be seen in the distance on the right side of the photograph, parked along
the curb of a road in the middle of the residential area they seemed to have
been instructed to try and protect… down below the hill where photo was taken.
Another (related) followup… The LA Times itself ran an article
about Granite Mountain’s involvement with the Station Fire.
Again, no ‘revelations’ here… but an interesting mention that
Granite Mountain seemed to have a completely different
attitude about ‘publicity’ than most other Type 1 Hotshot Crews,
or at least the ones that were working the Station Fire.
An LA times photographer had been struggling to find any
firefighters on the fire that would even let him take any
photos of them. Whenever he raised his camera… they would
all turn their backs on him. Some even said their policy was that if
any press person got a picture of their face they would have
to buy a case of beer for the rest of the crew.
Not so with Granite Mountain.
They ‘welcomed’ the attention and even allowed this LA
times photographer to ’embed’ with them all day.
The article ended up publishing two pictures of Granite
Mountain working the Station Fire doing a ‘burnout’ that day.
One of Clayton Whitted and one of Christopher MacKenzie.
When a crew’s employer has threatened to dismantle the program a time or two, perhaps high-profile PR is seen as a need, rather than a bother. Another example of external forces???
>> TTWARE said…
>> When a crew’s employer has threatened to
>> dismantle the program a time or two, perhaps
>> high-profile PR is seen as a need, rather than a
>> bother. Another example of external forces???
Spoken like a true AICT.
( Anonymous Internet Conspiracy Theorist ).
LMFAO.
My own opinion?
It’s possible. When your Wildland Division Chief
has to struggle for funding and support like no
other Type 1 crew’s upper level management
really does… then any PR you can give him to
take into the City Council meetings DOES help.
City Managers like that kind of stuff.
No… I take it back.
City Managers *LOVE* that kind of stuff.
I kind of disagree with you and WTK here. I’ve looked a lot at media representations/outreach regarding/by hotshot crews.
Some crews publish videos of their activities every year. Many Native American crews do that. Many other crews do, too.
Blue Ridge Hotshots don’t do that all that much of that themselves, but I found them featured in several stories. I don’t think Granite Mountain featured in some stories being all that remarkable or unusual.
What is the point here? Are you saying the GMIHS were media whores? (“…a VERY interesting photograph.”) Is that the point? Funny thing. Your link shows pics of a whole lot of FF who are not GM guys. Google shows lots of pictures of hotshots. Sometimes I think fullsail is being a jerk. Then you post something like this and almost prove his point. Perhaps Clayton Whitted was just a nice guy ( ice cream rather than beer) and was just helping a reporter understand wildland fire fighting. But not to you WTKTT. No siree. It’s a “VERY interesting” story. And then The Truth Will Always Remain Elusive takes it and runs with it to the exact spot you were pointing to. It’s all nefarious! NEFARIOUS!! (Although I am in agreement with Elizabeth’s supposition that you Truthers are one in the same).
There’s nothing nefarious in my comment above. If you understood local small-town politics, you would know that sometimes, one has to show the local polititians that your job is important, because for the most part, they don’t have a clue what you’re doing out there.
The pols prove that from time to time, by threatening to cut, or eliminate your program (which was done to GM), without REALLY understanding what it entails.
And yes, maintaining good PR, can be a very important aspect in staying in the good graces of those back home, who control the purse strings.
My comments were not a direct criticism of GM, or the individual crewmembers. I was simply stating what is sometimes a fact of life, when dealing with polititians in that kind of environment. Over time, employees get a sense of whether or not PR may help the over-all cause, and if they think it will, they don’t turn it down.
It’s not nefarious or improper, but simply a fact of life in some political environments.
Small town political machinations have been in existence across this country for eons, long before GM, or YH. It doesn’t take a tremendous amount of exposure to it, to understand how the system works.
For you to suggest that it took WTKTT to lead me by the hand, down the primrose path, for me to be able understand it, and then, as you say, ‘run with it’, is laughable.
Equally laughable, is though you in-correctly criticise me for ‘running with it’, in the VERY NEXT STATEMENT, you spew out a previous gem from Elizabeth, that “WTKTT and I are the same person” and YOU “run with THAT’, to exactly the place where she wanted you to take it.
Next, you will probably be jumping on commentary from RTS, and accusing him of being a ‘disgruntled, former GM crewmember who had been fired’, another one of Elizabeth’s gems.
Apparently, during all of your ‘Observations’, you haven’t noticed that as Elizabeth rides through here on her high-horse, repeatedly chastising posters for not being factual in their commentary, she routinely makes incorrect suppositions about others that are not factual.
Sort of like, when someone incorrectly accuses someone of ‘running with it’, and then turns right around and ‘runs with’ someone else’s incorrect supposition.
aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa I have certainly never thought you guys were one in the same infract you impress me as a old WFF and have your ST** together. And incase some one brings it up RTS is not my son. But he did work for me a long time ago.
TTWARE keep up the good work…
Yes… I thought it was ‘interesting’ that of all the
firefighters working on that Station fire that day
that this guy approached were physically ‘turning
their backs’ on a professional photographer ( and
were actually under some kind of ‘unspoken
rule’ that would cost them beer/money if they
didn’t behave that way )…
…but Granite Mountain was the opposite.
And yes… being “better than everyone” but also
being “nice” WERE the stated objectives for
this group ( as reported publicly even by Duane
Steinbrink, the first Prescott Wildland Divison Chief )
So they were just living up to their own standards.
They were just “being nice”, it seems.
But it’s still interesting.
It ‘sets them apart’ from their peers, is part of
their ‘story’ now… and is worth noting.
It also certainly did not HURT the program to have
good PR, given their unique status within the
WFF and their unique funding complications.
Nothing ‘nefarious’ at all.
It’s just… well… ‘interesting’.
I did. I agree. It varies from crew to
crew, apparently. I still think the word
‘interesting’ applies to the fact that
some crews have some kind of
weird ‘aversion’ to allowing their
picture to be taken… to the point
where it costs them money/beer
if they let it happen…
You posted : “So in your career you were always on, never made a bad decision? Obviously you didn’t make one that cost anyone their life, but never had a close call? You were always on 100% everyday all the time every fire. That’s pretty special.”
I made plenty of bad decisions in my career, however, I learned from them and did my very best to NOT do them again. It’s called Lessons Learned.
I never claimed to be ‘100% on everyday, all the time, every fire.’ I never said that. I don’t claim to be ‘special’ in any sense of the word.
I have NEVER deployed a fire shelter nor has anyone I have ever supervised. I have NEVER had a serious accident on my Crew nor anyone I have ever supervised.
I have had my share of ‘close calls’ during my career, usually in the Watch Out #19 category of Death From Above. However, I give all the credit to Jesus Christ watching over and protecting me and assuring that I follow ‘The WFF Rules.’
OK that works. I know that no one is “on” everyday, espcially under circumstances like that. I’ve spent plenty of time in SZ, no time in a shelter, but I know people who have. I won’t debate Eric’s work habit. I didn’t know him to be careless, but I wasn’t with him his entire career. Your faith is in the right place.
**
** LOCATION OF PANEBAKER AIR STUDY VIDEO
** 20130630_161858_VLAT_split_2_EP.MOV
Reply to calvin post on March 30, 2014 at 4:26 am
>> calvin said…
>>
>> The 161620 Vlat video shows the same retardant drop as the 161858
>> video, right??
No. Same location… but two different drops.
The VLAT drop in the 161620 video lasts a full 12 seconds.
The VLAT drop in the 161858 video only lasts 6 seconds.
However… something is not right in Denmark here.
Based on the FILENAMES / TIMESTAMPS and the ‘overlapping’ time(s)…
you would THINK these would HAVE to be two different videos of the
SAME drop, right?
Well… that doesn’t appear to be the case.
Best I can figure with a quick look at one is…
In the 1616.20 video… we spend most of the time in that video just ‘waiting’
for the drop, which comes near the end.
The actual VLAT drop in the 1616.20 video begins at… +2:32 ( 1618.52 ).
The drop lasts for 12 seconds and ends at 1619.04.
The actual VLAT drop in the 1618.58 video begins at… +0:03 ( 1619.01 ).
The drop lasts for 06 seconds and ends at 1619.07
( only HALF as long as other one so it can’t be the same drop ).
That’s pretty much impossible.
According to those TIMESTAMPS… we should be seeing the SECOND VLAT
drop begin before the FIRST one is even over.
The flight paths and exit out of the drops are also slightly different in the two
videos so they really CAN’T be the ‘same drop’ even though they are carrying
similar timestamps ( but even those aren’t quite the same ).
Even though its the same exact LOCATION for BOTH of these VLAT drops…
the TIMESTAMP on one of the videos ( or BOTH? ) has to have been WRONG.
I believe they actually had TWO video cameras with them… so now the question
is which one was filming which of any of the particular videos… and which one
had the wrong time?
Maybe BOTH of them did ( have the wrong time set ).
This is a big deal… because we have been trusting a lot of the AIR STUDY video
times for a lot of the captured background radio conversations and the real truth
about these AIR STUDY video times ( which camera was correct ) has to be
figured out.
Oh well. Another day at the salt mines with even MORE work to do.
ROFL. More on this later…
>> calvin also wrote…
>> In the 161620 video we hear (I assume) the VLAT pilot saying
>> he has about 2,000 gallons left (following that drop.) And then we
>> see the VLAT drop again in the 162508 video and again in the
>> 163338 video. Is that correct?
Yes… that also seems to be what I am hearing… but see above.
I’m not sure now we can fully trust these FILENAME / TIMESTAMPS
on these AIR STUDY videos.
>> WTKTT… can you tell me a little about the 163338 video.
>> Like where the camera is filming, which side of the fire the
>> retardant drop is made, and where GM were. Many Thanks!
The camera was on a tripod that was exactly here…
34.266758, -112.716906
REMINDER: Just cut-and-paste that line with the comma above into the search
bar of Google Maps, hit ENTER, and a large GREEN ARROW will be pointing
to that exact spot.
It’s that spot up on Hayes Ranch Road near those ‘circular’ crop fields and where
the established ‘helibase’ was that day and where most of the other AIR STUDY
videos were shot.
This particular video is shot looking almost due southwest from that location.
GM was, unfortunately, exactly where you might think watching this video. They
are directly on the OTHER side of that smoke column with the fireline bearing
down on them and only had about 3 or 4 minutes to live ( if the TIME on this
video can be trusted… which may now NOT be the case. See above ).
The FLAMES that are seen in about the center of the video after they zoom in
are, geographically, right near the ridges on the north side of the Shrine Area.
These are the same flames that would be seen a few minutes later ( circa 1620 )
cresting the ridges near the Shrine Youth camp in Blue Ridge Hotshot McCord’s
YARNELL-GAMBLE video and the other Blue Ridge photos taken circa 1620,
right as they were preparing to evacuate the Youth Camp.
For more of an exact idea of the ‘orientation’ here…
At +1:02 in this video, as they are zooming in on the two planes to the left of the
smoke column ( that means they were flying on the EAST side of the column,
coming from pretty much due south and heading due north ) there is a distinct
‘electronics’ tower seen in the left of the frame on a hill in the distance.
It only appears for a moment… then they pan back right… but that gives you a
reference for the ‘line of sight’ for this particular video from that particular location.
The ‘line of sight’ from the camera… right down the center… would be pretty much
directly to the center of Glen Ilah, in the distance, even though the ridge in the
foreground is obscuring both Yarnell and Glen Illah.
The same ‘electronics’ tower is also seen in this video earlier on in left of the
frame, at +26 seconds, but it’s much easier to see exactly what it looks like in
the +1:02 moment after they have ‘zoomed in’.
The reason I say ‘electronics tower’ is because that is NOT the primary cell tower
for Yarnell. That sits on a hill farther south of town which is verifiable here…
Just enter Prescott, AZ ( Yarnell, AZ won’t work ). When Prescott comes up in
Google maps, just ‘pull’ the map down to Yarnell with your mouse and you will
then see this Cell tower location in Yarnell.
It’s a Verizon tower and the exact location of the power shed at the base of the
antenna is…
34.192114, -112.754748
The ‘electronics’ tower seen in this Panebaker video MAY have some cell
pods on it… but it’s hard to tell.
It’s on a hill east of Yarnell, about the center of town. If you took ‘Happy Way’
( about two blocks south of where Shrine road meets Highway 89 ) east out
of Yarnell and continued on when it changes from pavement to dirt and went
all the way to the top of the hill, you be at the power shed for this tower.
The center of the roof of the power shed at the base of that tower is
exactly here…
34.216253, -112.743606
So given the fact that the ‘electronics’ tower is at about the midpoint of the town
of Yarnell… it looks like those planes are flying pretty much due west of the
center of Yarnell, from due south to due north, on the EAST side of the smoke
plume, and trying to lay some retardant to keep the fire out of Yarnell.
At 1618… ALL the drop-capable aircraft on the fire had already been given the
go-ahead to ‘drop-at-will’ for about 18 minutes already.
Gary Cordes couldn’t transmit on Air-To-Ground circa 1600 because his Bendix
King had taken a dump and then he switched to the Motorola in his truck… but
circa 1600 he requested OPS1 Todd Abel to immediately tell Air Attack to start
‘dropping at will’ and try and save whatever ‘town’ they thought they could ( from
Cordes ADOSH interview ).
SIDENOTE: I don’t believe the ‘drop’ being caught in this video is a VLAT
drop at all. When they zoom in… it looks like just a lead plane coming
in and then a SEAT making the actual drop behind it.
Followup… the 163338 video TIMESTAMP may be WRONG.
See above about the discovery that something now appears
to be really ‘wonky’ with some of these AIR STUDY video
filename / timestamps.
If the TIME really was 1633 plus 38 seconds at the start of
this particular video… the smoke plume itself really should
have been much larger at that point ( See the Matt Oss
video taken from about the same distance away but on
the opposite Congress side ).
The FLAMES that we also see in the center really are
geographically about where Blue Ridge was about to see
them ‘cresting’ over those ridges near the Shrine Youth Camp…
but the times seem to be a little off.
It would almost appear that even though this AIR STUDY
video has a filename / timestamp of 1633 plus 38 seconds…
…what is being filmed seems EARLIER than that.
Perhaps as much as 10 or 13 minutes earlier and more in the
1620 to 1623 timeframe.
Thanks again. I really didn’t mean to make this an issue. My initial point was only that it was IMPOSSIBLE for T911 to have been over the fire during the deployment, waiting for visual confirmation of GM location WHILE (10,743g) of retardant was still in the plane.
Now that we can finally see ( I believe? ) ALL of these
infamous Panebaker AIR STUDY videos ( and the
moments they seem to capture )… I was already scratching
my head about some of the TIMESTAMPS.
Your post just brought that into focus.
Ever since Elizabeth first started posting them on
Youtube… we have been *assuming* that the hard-coded
filename/timestamps coming off the camera(s) was
accurate.
I’m just not sure we can continue to automatically
assume that.
If/when I have the time… I’ll try to get my ‘head around’
what the real problem is there. It might just be one
or two of them that have ‘wonky’ filename / timestamps…
…or it might be ALL of them.
Either way… if someone didn’t have the brain cells to
be doing an official ( expensive ) AIR STUDY tactics
video and even bother to make sure the TIME on their
damn camera was correct…
…all we have to do is discover what the ‘offset’ for
the camera that was set WRONG is.
Standard stuff when people aren’t paying enough
attention to have the right time set on their devices.
>> it was IMPOSSIBLE for T911 to have been over the fire
>> during the deployment, waiting for visual confirmation
>> of GM location WHILE (10,743g) of retardant was still
>> in the plane.
Yes. I agree with you… but have been sidetracked
lately looking at the enormous amount of *new* information
that is now available regarding this Yarnell incident.
Do you have, yourself, a good ‘re-estimate’ of how much
retardant T911 actually DID have left while it was
‘standing by’, to dump on GM in the box canyon, if
instructed by ASM2 / B33 to do so?
What fuel type? I’m using the 40 model. I don’t believe that there was a heavy grass component in the drainage, just straight Manzanita. What about a SH4 or an SH7. Difference is basically half ton of fuel per acre. I’ll need some help so this is relevant, that will help keep the speculation down. I’ll run a SH7
I’m using the RAWS station at Congress AZ. the print out is for June 29-30, 6pm to 6pm. Right out of the gate the readout for 1400 to 1800 6-30 is winds SSW. Nothing out of the N or NE and low speeds 12-13mph so this won’t be reflective. But we can see what the FB was at those variables.
Can you attach stuff to this or am I going to have to do something fancy?
I was remembering they ran something in the SAIT but you would have to go back and dig that up. we were messing with some of that 4 months ago or so. Might look there.
I can see the battle continues. There’s good points all around and I am inclined to take Willis, Abel, and Musser out to the whipping post myself but the decisions made by Marsh sealed the fate of his crew.
Early on in this fires infancy a Heliport was constructed and used to transport firefighters. Why didn’t the Granite Mountain/Blue Ridge crews use this resource instead of hiking in? What a important resource to use! You can deliver fresh crews, supplies, water and in this case evacuate or transfer a crew to where they may be needed! The incident commander(s) …sounds to me that there were several of them…were unable to collectively recognize the value of this Heliport and use it.
The incidents official report is a joke. I think the highest point in Florida is what, 300 feet and that’s a freeway overpass. Who picked Mr.Karel’s anyway! There isn’t even a definition of ‘escape route’ in the report…yikes!
“Hot Shot” crews are self contained units of experienced firefighters that can be relied upon to safely construct fire line for as much as 48 hrs. or more with limited supervision. They are specialists in fighting wildfires, not protecting structures or evacuating stubborn residents. This distinction should be made and the “Hot Shots” mission restored.
Recommendations for flashy fuel environments:
Re-establish the “Mission”
Re-establish the 10:00 a.m. rule.
Re-establish initial attack.
Fight fire at night.
Create, restore and maintain Fuel Breaks.
These observations, complaints, and recommendations are not all my own. They are from Southern California’s old foreman and superintendents who innately possess the sixth sense needed to fight fire in the most extreme fire behavior on Earth.
Any thoughts?
Larry Sall
Little Tujunga Hot Shots
Angeles National Forest, Southern California
1970/71
I’ll always remember Oak Grove. Especially Woody Wood Pecker smoking a cigar. What a great crew symbol! I also liked the superior line you guys put in. I’ll say hello for Rod, Walt and Gary Reynolds and I’ll tell them your on watch.
Reply to Larry Sall post on March 30, 2014 at 4:03 pm
>> Larry wrote…
>> Any thoughts?
Haven’t seen anyone respond yet… so here’s a few.
>> Larry also wrote…
>> Early on in this fires infancy a Heliport was constructed
>> and used to transport firefighters.
Yes. When the Lewis DOC Crew Boss was asked by IC Russ
Shumate at 0900 on Saturday morning ( June 29 ) to see if there
was any way to ‘drive’ or ‘hike’ his DOC crew up the fire… he said
NO ( even though any of the local YFD fire personnel could have
easily pointed out the two-track roads that led all the way there
and would, in fact, be used the following morning by Granite
Mountain to accomplish the same task ).
That’s when Shumate requested helicopter transport for them, a
suitable ‘landing spot’ was found up on top of the ridge, and 7 FF
were flown directly up there circa 10:30 AM ( Saturday morning ).
>> Larry also wrote
>> Why didn’t the Granite Mountain/Blue Ridge crews use this
>> resource instead of hiking in?
Good question.
The answer *might* be that when Marsh agreed to be DIVSA
at the 0700 briefing ( but did not officially BECOME DIVSA
until hours later when the command transfer to Type 2
team actually took place )… he decided not to wait on anyone
or anything ( not even his own crew ) and ‘took off’ hiking up to
the fire right after that 0700 briefing. That’s when he first met
hikers Tex ( Sonny ) Gilligan and Joy Collura ( who were already
up there ) at about 8:07 AM.
The ‘transport’ helicopter ( seated seven plus pilots ) was still
being used, at that same time, to get the Lewis DOC crews
OFF the fire, where they had all spent the night.
The landing spot up there had burned over during the night
( and burned up some of the Lewis DOC crew supplies
in the process )… but it appeared to be ‘usable’ as a landing
spot again on Sunday morning ( June 30 ) since they WERE
actively flying the full DOC crew out of there ( with multiple flights )
while Marsh was hiking in.
The rest of the Granite Mountain crew had stopped for breakfast
up at the Model Creek School ICP in Peeple Valley… and they
didn’t even arrive at their Sesame clearing staging area until
sometime just after 8:00 AM ( at about the same moment Marsh
was already all the way up on the ridge and meeting the hikers ).
Former Yarnell Chief Dan Andersen says he was drinking
coffee on his porch on Lakewood Drive in Glen Ilah and
saw the two GM Crew Carriers pass his house heading
west at exactly 8:03 AM. That would put GM out to their
Sesame clearing staging area and getting ‘geared up’
for their hike no earlier than about 8:10 AM.
So that’s pretty much it.
Just shift transition overlap ( and confusion? ).
The chopper was being used to get the previous night’s crew OFF
the ridge and back to the Yarnell Fire Station but Granite Mountain
(crew) didn’t go to the Yarnell Fire Station where the helipad was.
At the same time the ‘dust off’ was happening with the chopper for
the previous crew… Granite Mountain went to Sesame area and
‘geared up’ for the hike in.
There was a point when Blue Ridge was staged at the Yarnell Fire
Station when they thought that was going to happen. They were
late to the fire that morning, had missed all the briefings, but there
had, in fact, been *assigned* to DIVA ( Eric Marsh ) who was
already out there scouting up on the western ridge.
While they were ‘staged’ at the Yarnell Fire station is when the last
of the Lewis DOC crew arrived via chopper at the YFD fire station
helipad and some members of the Lewis crew had discussions
with some members of the Blue Ridge Crew ( See Blue Ridge
unit logs ).
So Blue Ridge was staged there at the YFD fire station, where the
helipad was, and they were watching it be actively used to bring
the Lewis crew back from the same ridge that Granite was ‘hiking’
to ( and they seemed to have been already informed they were
assigned to DIVSA Eric Marsh that day )… so for a while I believe
they thought they were just going to be flown out there when the
chopper was done doing the Lewis crew.
It didn’t happen. Blue Ridge ended up staying ‘in town’ and really
not doing much of anything at all that day ( the majority of the
crew, that is ).
Blue Ridge HS Ball became HEQB for the dozer ( since he
didn’t have a card ) and stayed with the Dozer most of
the day… and BR Supt Frisby and Captain Trueheart Brown
were ‘all over the place’ meeting up with Marsh/Steed ( others )
and scouting all around that day with the UTV… but the only time
the other 17 members of the BR crew were ever actually put to
work at all that day is when they got them all spread out on the
dozer line to try and ‘improve’ it circa 4:00 PM. However… just
minutes after they got to doing any actual work there they were
given the RTO ( Reverse Tool Order ) and evacuated back to the
Shrine Youth Camp and out of the area back to the Ranch House
Restaurant, with no further assignment(s).
So the actual Type 1 Blue Ridge Hotshot Crew really did nothing
but ‘stage’ at numerous places all day taking lots of pictures and
waiting for someone to give them some real work to do.
They weren’t even given any real assignments as the fire came
into town… at the exact same time we are supposed to believe
Granite Mountain was ‘hurrying’ to be there ( from 2 miles away,
cross-country ) because THEY thought they were (somehow)
needed in town.
>> Larry also wrote…
>> What a important resource to use!
>> You can deliver fresh crews, supplies, water
Yes… you do have to wonder about this.
Example: If they were actively removing one entire crew
( the Lewis DOC crew ) with a helicopter from the same exact
area they were now asking another crew ( GM ) to start
‘working the fire’… then why didn’t they coordinate this so that
as one load of crew came OFF the fire… the chopper could take
fresh crew back OUT on the next trip?
Granite Mountain was already pegging high on the ‘fatigued
crew’ charts before they ever showed up in Yarnell on what
was supposed to be their day off. Saving them that 2 mile hike
with packs just to GET to work would have helped them out.
It didn’t happen. Granite hiked in ( whether they needed to or not ).
Maybe the chopper simply wasn’t going to arrive to start doing the
Lewis crew transfers off the ridge before the time when Granite
Mountain felt they could just get out there themselves and they
didn’t want to stand around waiting for it… losing any good
‘morning’ time with little to no wind out there.
>> Larry also wrote…
>> and in this case evacuate or transfer a crew to where
>> they may be needed!
That’s a very interesting ‘what if’ scenario that you just raised.
The helispot up there was KNOWN to be usable that day since it
was, in fact, actively used that very morning to fly the entire Lewis
DOC crew out of there.
Hiker Joy Collura’s photos from that day SHOW this happening.
( She even still maintains that the rotor wash from the several
landings up there to retrieve the Lewis crew is what actually
torched up the fire in that morning timeframe… and her entire
set of fire progression photos from that morning does seem
to support that. )
So they ( fire command ) KNEW ( or SHOULD have known ) they
had a viable landing spot up on that western ridge that day.
When GM’s lookout ( and their vehicles ) had to be evacuated
because the fire had totally reversed direction… it should have
become clear to SOMEONE that they could just chopper those
fellas off that ridge at that point… just like they did with the
Lewis DOC crew just hours before that.
Add to that the fact that they were (supposedly) CALLING them
on the radio and ‘asking them to come down’… if they felt they
needed THEM so bad from THAT far away AND they HAD agreed
to ‘send some help’… why would you think you even had the
time to let them hike two miles to get down from there?
If you were so short handed in town that you needed guys who
were more than two miles away ASAP… then why not just
OFFER TO COME GET THEM via that usable helispot up there
and with a landing pad right there in the middle of town?
Sure… the WINDS might have been a factor in exercising what
should have been that clear option at that time… but it’s interesting
to note that even though Marsh had reported the winds getting
“squirrely” up there just before Brendan had to abandon his lookout
post… we can still see ( and hear ) for ourselves what conditions
were really like ‘up there’ in the 1600 ( 4:00 PM ) timeframe
because of the MacKenzie videos.
The wind didn’t seem to much of a problem for some chopper
landings in that timeframe. There wasn’t even really any
audible ‘wind noise’ in MacKenzie’s camera microphone
around that time.
Also… choppers were not ‘grounded’ at that time ( 1600 ) or
even for more than 40-50 minutes after that. There is plenty of
video and photographic evidence of ‘choppers’ flying
all over that area even right up to ( and during ) the
Helmet-Cam video circa 1639 when Jesse Steed sent out his
first MAYDAY call. So the choppers were ‘up’ and flying
that area all during that 1600 to 1640 timeframe.
Maybe ‘removal by chopper’ like they had done with the Lewis
Crew from that same location just hours earlier that day really
was part of the now infamous ‘discussing their options’
conversation between Marsh and Steed. Maybe they did
consider ‘asking about that option’. They had SEEN the
Lewis DOC crew being taken out of that same exact location
just hours earlier. So what were THEY… chopped liver?
Only someone who actually overheard them ‘discussing their
options’ and who wants to talk about it could tell us that.
Again… you raise a very valid ‘what if’ scenario with regards
to using that existing helispot better that day.
Thank you sir,
Your comments are very much appreciated along with the time line you present. The Helicopter prop wash sturring up the fire is a very interesting point. In the last few months (un related to the Yarnell Hill incident) I’ve been talking with my old Hot Shot foreman Walt Sniegowski and we are convinced the presents of helicopters close to the line on active fires, even over cold trail, may inadvertently cause fire to come alive, jump firelines and trap firefighters (ex.The Loop Fire 1966) especially helicopters dropping on fire below a crew. Thanks for pointing out the helicopter observation.
Anyway, back to the Yarnell Hill Fire. The Lewis inmate crew apparently didn’t do anything. Why were they dispatched for an initial attack? Good grief…a twenty man pick up crew could have driven up to or hiked in to this fire early on and stomped a line around it with their boots without even using hand tools!! I know it would reek to high heaven but they could have all surrounded the hot spot and pissed on it! This just frustrates the hell out of me!!
Sorry for the rant. Lets just see what kind of Standard Operational Procedure the State of Arizona generates. It will tell us a lot about whether they were listening or not.
The situation on Saturday was a little more complex
than at first glance ( reported and photographed
from the air at 10:30 AM Saturday to be just 2-4
acres, little to no fire, little to no smoke ).
Even the words being used at that time by IC
Russ Shumate ( 10:30 AM Saturday ) were
‘mop-up operations needed’.
At 10:30 Saturday morning… that simple 2.-4
acre fire seemed to be dead and already in its
coffin but still just needed the nails.
So not even the whole Lewis crew was sent
up because Shumate was more concerned
about getting whoever he sent up there OUT
of there quickly due to lightning concerns if
a storm popped up.
So for FIVE HOURS… the crew up there was
supposedly doing nothing but ‘mop-up’.
Next thing anyone knows, the thing has
FLARED up, jumped its eastern 2-track road
fire break… and the rest is history.
The ‘official’ explanation was that ‘a small
island of unburned fuel on the eastern flank
flared up and jumped the road’.
That was after FIVE hours of mop-up
on just a small 2-4 acre deal.
There is no evidence whatsoever that the Lewis
crew themselves might have CAUSED this
‘flare-up’ by conducting their own ‘burnouts’
up there that day. There is no evidence of any
‘authorization’ for them to do anything of the
kind from fire management and no evidence
they even tried any ‘indirect’ stuff.
So it really is still quite a mystery what actually
happened on Saturday. I have been calling it
the ‘second Yarnell Hill Fire’. The FIRST one
was the lightning strike from Friday and the
one that appeared to ‘die’ by Saturday morning.
The SECOND one was at the end of the
DOC crew work shift when something
suddenly FLARED, jumped a road, they were
somehow unable to catch it or get the resources
in play to control it… and was nw officially the
‘escaped fire’ that would go on to kill Granite
Mountain the next day.
However… we DO know now ( as even more
evidence is revealed in public ) that even that
little 2-4 acre deal on Saturday was in VERY
rocky, steep and tough terrain for ANY hand
crew of ANY experience level to really deal with.
Some of the points involved are now being
described as actual CLIFFS with heavy
vegation. Impossible for any hand crew.
The only question(s) all that raises, then, is
what ANY hand crew was doing for FIVE
hours without ALSO providing a realistic
evaluation back to management… so that
bucket drops could have been employed
and the nails would have been in the coffin.
IC Russ Shumate didn’t even request local
YFD to set up a ‘pumpkin’ for potential bucket
drops at the Boulder Springs Ranch until
AFTER he was told the fire had ‘escaped’.
The pumpkin was then set up fairly quickly at
the Boulder Springs Ranch at that point… but then
(apparently) nothing happened.
It was too late. The ‘escaped’ fire had gotten
into that downslope manzanita fuel-fest backed
with wind and that’s all she wrote.
The only cure was prevention.
That thing needed to be ‘stomped out and
pissed on’ sometime during that FIVE hour
period on Saturday when the Lewis crew
was actually UP there, with little to no wind,
AND there AIR resources around to help.
Yep, I guess I’d be tired to if I’d been up all day Friday and then being put in charge of a lighting fire late in the afternoon. The drive, the logistics, the coffee pot, glassing the 2-4 acre fire from town, making phone calls and checking my overtime math. Yep, after 30 hours I’d be tired to.
**
** WRONGFUL DEATH LAWSUIT(S) AND THE BOULDER SPRINGS RANCH
Since it came up recently… a number of people seem to be unaware what the
currently filed ‘wrongful death’ lawsuits have to say about the crucial decision
that day to actually even ‘designate’ the Boulder Springs Ranch as a ‘safety zone’
in the first place.
Anyone can ‘Google’ copies of the ‘Notice of Wrongful Death Claims’…
but here’s at least one place where you can find the one filed
on Christopher MacKenzie’s behalf…
MOST of the currently filed wrongful death claims are coming from the same
attorney ( Thomas K. Kelly, a former WFF Hotshot ) and they all have the same
‘claims’ in them.
Notice of Claim
Decedent: Christopher MacKenzie
Date of Death: June 30, 2013
Claimant: Michael MacKenzie and Laurie Goralski
Defendants named ( thus far ) as of December 19, 2013…
State of Arizona
Roy Hall – Incident Commander
Russ Shumate – Incident Commander
Arizona State Forestry Division
County of Yavapai
Central Yavapai Fire District
Todd Abel
City of Prescott
Darrell Willis
With the limited disclosure available to Claimant described
above ( and based on the only evidence available so far as of
this Dec 19, 2013 filing ), the following willful, reckless, negligent
and careless acts supporting this claim each contributing to the
wrongful death of Christopher MacKenzie and other members
of the Granite Mountain IHC:2
NOTE: There are 31 ( THIRTY ONE ) separate ‘negligence’ claims
that are then listed… but here is the one that specifically calls
into question the decisions made by whoever had chosen ( or
was designating ) the Boulder Springs Ranch as a valid ‘safety
zone’ for that workplace that day…
14. On June 30, 2013, the Incident Management Team identified
the Boulder Springs Ranch as ?an excellent safety zone.?
(SAIR Report pg. 15). The Boulder Springs Ranch was surrounded
by unburned fuel, heavy brush and terrain which did not make it
an ?excellent? safety zone. To exacerbate the misinformation, in
order to access the designated safety zone, the Granite Mountain
IHC would be required to leave the safety of the black and traverse
steep, rocky, difficult terrain in thick, heavy, unburned chaparral fuel.
Granite Mountain IHC lacked necessary maps to properly determine
the distances between their safety zone in the black and the Boulder
Springs Ranch. The Boulder Springs Ranch was not a ?bomb proof?
or ?excellent? safety zone as described and designated by Incident
Command; (ADOSH Report).
Followup… the ‘Wrongful Death Notice of Claims’
also fail to mention that even the (only) two-track road
leading from where they were going to be working and
the Boulder Springs Ranch had its OWN set of
‘obvious’ issues.
That road did NOT stay up on that ridge.
It had its OWN ‘eastward leg’ that dropped down into
its own ‘blind canyon’ that was also filled with
unburned fuel.
If they had stayed on the two-track… they would have
ALSO lost sight of the fire for about the same amount
of time that day and depending on their forward
progress… could have just as easily been ‘trapped’
in THAT canyon versus the one they did die in.
About the only thing that might have saved them was
if they had just stayed on that high ridge two-track
long enough to actually become AWARE of the
incredible forward progress of the fire BEFORE
they dropped into EITHER of the ‘canyons’ they
would need to traverse to get to the (supposedly)
‘bomb-proof’ safety zone.
If they had caught a glimpse of what the fire was
doing just before they had to turn east and drop
into that OTHER canyon… they would now have
been at the same point where the hikers dropped
off to the Congress side and worked their way
around back to Candy-Cane lane that day.
So if the whole idea of even setting that Ranch as
the ‘safety zone’ was that it was supposed to be
adequate for all resources working the western ridge
AND the ‘middle bowl’ area that day…
…they really did forget to check out the ‘escape route’
part of that so that no one would be in blind canyons
walking through unburned fuel.
Yes… Marsh could have taken an hour or two to go
‘check that out for himself’… but I suppose he was
just trusting what he was told that day.
Just looking at a ‘Google map on an iPad’… it really
does sort of LOOK like that two-track road stays
‘up on the ridge crest’ as it works its way east to
the Boulder Springs Ranch…
…but that is NOT TRUE.
They would have to have been looking at it in 3 dimensions
with Google Earth to know that eastward leg of the
two-track dropped into its OWN ‘fuel filled blind canyon’.
Also ( in case anyone is interested ) here is one of
Attorney Thomas K. Kelly’s BIOS confirming that he was
a WFF Hotshot ( working the Western region(s) )…
http://my-gratitude-project.blogspot.com/2011/04/james-arthur-ray-legal-dream-team.html
________________________________________________
Tom Kelly was born and raised in Prescott, Arizona. After
graduating from NAU with a degree in zoology and
chemistry, Tom worked in a variety of fields. Prior to
attending law school he worked as a union ironworker
helping construct high-rise buildings and bridge decks,
as a high school teacher and coach helping educate
young people in science and athletics and, working as
a U.S. Forest Service Hotshot, Tom spent years helping
suppress wild-land fires throughout the western U.S.
________________________________________________
Every one should read when you see the family it could have been any of us in our early carriers. Made me think and shed some tears. Thanks for the Post WTKTT.
There is similar (personal) information and
family photos in EVERY one of the ‘wrongful
death’ claims for ALL of them.
I only posted links for two ( Ashcraft and
MacKenzie ).
The toughest parts are the detail about
how each and every family member
actually found out about the death(s).
There might be some ‘lessons learned’
for the future there as well with regards
to ‘getting a handle on incidents’ if/when
they DO take place… but that’s for
another forum entirely.
Bob just read your response about firing on the Peyette. 23 years 26 states all 40 fuel models. I came up working for two of the most recognized hotshot sups in the Nation. Pally you don’t have anything on me, just a more recognized name. So put your tape measure up and zip your pants up no needs to see it or hear it.
And then You should know what I am saying. And now I know you are not some kid I will call it accordingly. And I worked for some of the Best IC in the Country so we Bothe Need to talk a little more about facts and quite gaming each other. Right??
Also I speak of the Payette based on 15 years in R4 and the Payette was a Neighbor Forest. Also my FMO who I was assistant to was a Type 1 IC with a full team for 8 years so I got a lot of info from him and members of his team that were on the Payette. Talking to some Overhead lately it has gotten worse in R4 as I am sure you are aware.
The impetus for the ‘hurry up’ statement, overheard in radio traffic in regards to GM’s movement, either right before, or right after, GM was making the determination to drop down into the bowl, could have been driven by, either, of a couple of opposing factors.
One is, ‘hurry up’ because everything’s hitting the fan and we really need your help, and the other is, ‘hurry up’ because the fire’s blowing-up and we don’t want you guys to get caught. The motive behind the request to hustle seems like an important detail to know for obvious reasons.
It certainly would be informative if that particular radio conversation could be fleshed-out a bit, by any of the participants, or others who heard it.
**
** LOCATION OF PANEBAKER AIR STUDY VIDEO
** 20130630_161858_VLAT_split_2_EP.MOV
Reply to calvin post on March 30, 2014 at 4:26 am
>> calvin said…
>>
>> The 161620 Vlat video shows the same retardant drop as the 161858
>> video, right??
No. Same location… but two different drops.
The VLAT drop in the 161620 video lasts a full 12 seconds.
The VLAT drop in the 161858 video only lasts 6 seconds.
However… something is not right in Denmark here.
Based on the FILENAMES / TIMESTAMPS and the ‘overlapping’ time(s)…
you would THINK these would HAVE to be two different videos of the
SAME drop, right?
Well… that doesn’t appear to be the case.
Best I can figure with a quick look at one is…
In the 1616.20 video… we spend most of the time in that video just ‘waiting’
for the drop, which comes near the end.
The actual VLAT drop in the 1616.20 video begins at… +2:32 ( 1618.52 ).
The drop lasts for 12 seconds and ends at 1619.04.
The actual VLAT drop in the 1618.58 video begins at… +0:03 ( 1619.01 ).
The drop lasts for 06 seconds and ends at 1619.07
( only HALF as long as other one so it can’t be the same drop ).
That’s pretty much impossible.
According to those TIMESTAMPS… we should be seeing the SECOND VLAT
drop begin before the FIRST one is even over.
The flight paths and exit out of the drops are also slightly different in the two
videos so they really CAN’T be the ‘same drop’ even though they are carrying
similar timestamps ( but even those aren’t quite the same ).
Even though its the same exact LOCATION for BOTH of these VLAT drops…
the TIMESTAMP on one of the videos ( or BOTH? ) has to have been WRONG.
I believe they actually had TWO video cameras with them… so now the question
is which one was filming which of any of the particular videos… and which one
had the wrong time?
Maybe BOTH of them did ( have the wrong time set ).
This is a big deal… because we have been trusting a lot of the AIR STUDY video
times for a lot of the captured background radio conversations and the real truth
about these AIR STUDY video times ( which camera was correct ) has to be
figured out.
Oh well. Another day at the salt mines with even MORE work to do.
ROFL. More on this later…
>> calvin also wrote…
>> In the 161620 video we hear (I assume) the VLAT pilot saying
>> he has about 2,000 gallons left (following that drop.) And then we
>> see the VLAT drop again in the 162508 video and again in the
>> 163338 video. Is that correct?
Yes… that also seems to be what I am hearing… but see above.
I’m not sure now we can fully trust these FILENAME / TIMESTAMPS
on these AIR STUDY videos.
>> WTKTT… can you tell me a little about the 163338 video.
>> Like where the camera is filming, which side of the fire the
>> retardant drop is made, and where GM were. Many Thanks!
The camera was on a tripod that was exactly here…
34.266758, -112.716906
REMINDER: Just cut-and-paste that line with the comma above into the search
bar of Google Maps, hit ENTER, and a large GREEN ARROW will be pointing
to that exact spot.
It’s that spot up on Hayes Ranch Road near those ‘circular’ crop fields and where
the established ‘helibase’ was that day and where most of the other AIR STUDY
videos were shot.
This particular video is shot looking almost due southwest from that location.
GM was, unfortunately, exactly where you might think watching this video. They
are directly on the OTHER side of that smoke column with the fireline bearing
down on them and only had about 3 or 4 minutes to live ( if the TIME on this
video can be trusted… which may now NOT be the case. See above ).
The FLAMES that are seen in about the center of the video after they zoom in
are, geographically, right near the ridges on the north side of the Shrine Area.
These are the same flames that would be seen a few minutes later ( circa 1620 )
cresting the ridges near the Shrine Youth camp in Blue Ridge Hotshot McCord’s
YARNELL-GAMBLE video and the other Blue Ridge photos taken circa 1620,
right as they were preparing to evacuate the Youth Camp.
For more of an exact idea of the ‘orientation’ here…
At +1:02 in this video, as they are zooming in on the two planes to the left of the
smoke column ( that means they were flying on the EAST side of the column,
coming from pretty much due south and heading due north ) there is a distinct
‘electronics’ tower seen in the left of the frame on a hill in the distance.
It only appears for a moment… then they pan back right… but that gives you a
reference for the ‘line of sight’ for this particular video from that particular location.
The ‘line of sight’ from the camera… right down the center… would be pretty much
directly to the center of Glen Ilah, in the distance, even though the ridge in the
foreground is obscuring both Yarnell and Glen Illah.
The same ‘electronics’ tower is also seen in this video earlier on in left of the
frame, at +26 seconds, but it’s much easier to see exactly what it looks like in
the +1:02 moment after they have ‘zoomed in’.
The reason I say ‘electronics tower’ is because that is NOT the primary cell tower
for Yarnell. That sits on a hill farther south of town which is verifiable here…
Just enter Prescott, AZ ( Yarnell, AZ won’t work ). When Prescott comes up in
Google maps, just ‘pull’ the map down to Yarnell with your mouse and you will
then see this Cell tower location in Yarnell.
It’s a Verizon tower and the exact location of the power shed at the base of the
antenna is…
34.192114, -112.754748
The ‘electronics’ tower seen in this Panebaker video MAY have some cell
pods on it… but it’s hard to tell.
It’s on a hill east of Yarnell, about the center of town. If you took ‘Happy Way’
( about two blocks south of where Shrine road meets Highway 89 ) east out
of Yarnell and continued on when it changes from pavement to dirt and went
all the way to the top of the hill, you be at the power shed for this tower.
The center of the roof of the power shed at the base of that tower is
exactly here…
34.216253, -112.743606
So given the fact that the ‘electronics’ tower is at about the midpoint of the town
of Yarnell… it looks like those planes are flying pretty much due west of the
center of Yarnell, from due south to due north, on the EAST side of the smoke
plume, and trying to lay some retardant to keep the fire out of Yarnell.
At 1618… ALL the drop-capable aircraft on the fire had already been given the
go-ahead to ‘drop-at-will’ for about 18 minutes already.
Gary Cordes couldn’t transmit on Air-To-Ground circa 1600 because his Bendix
King had taken a dump and then he switched to the Motorola in his truck… but
circa 1600 he requested OPS1 Todd Abel to immediately tell Air Attack to start
‘dropping at will’ and try and save whatever ‘town’ they thought they could ( from
Cordes ADOSH interview ).
SIDENOTE: I don’t believe the ‘drop’ being caught in this video is a VLAT
drop at all. When they zoom in… it looks like just a lead plane coming
in and then a SEAT making the actual drop behind it.
Okay… this ENTIRE COMMENT (above) ended up in the
totally wrong place.
It was supposed to be a reply to Calvin, not TTWARE.
Mr. Dougherty… if you are following along at all… could you
please delete the entire comment above that was a reply
to Calvin and NOT to what TTWARE ( The Truth Will
Always Remain Elusive ) was saying.
Thanks ( and apologies to TTWARE for this misplaced
post ).
So Gary Cordes is the whipping boy, now. Man we’ve gone from Willis ordering them down, to Musser, to Abel, to AA not doing their job, then it was Marsh the risk taker, then Sciacca wasn’t doing his job taking roll call, now we’ve got a documented hero who saved lives who should have also been able to performj a monitoring of mlvements of a crew and DIV that weren’t his responsiblity.
So the entry 3-29 11:45 a converation xxfullsailxx is on again, but if you listen you loose your reason to keep speculating. You don’t have any idea what a day like that is and isolated resources become dealing with chaos. You’re not sherlock holmes you’re watson.
Wouldn’t Marsh have driven past the “ranch” that morning? If he did then he saw it. An electric fence? wow. Youve never been in a briefing like that have you. People are trying to establish a picture, man cmon stop makiing guesses. You’re strength is research, just do that, you don’t have the experience for speculation. You don’t have any idea who else knew what. You keep dragging Brendan back into this like he owes you something who are you that anyone owes you? Can you prove that Willis and Brendan were/could listen to the crew freq? Have they said so. Are you sure you’re not liable for defamation of character with all this speculation? How do you know that xxfsxx isn’t using his macro capability, just more speculation.
I do not believe that either Musser or Cordes should be “whipping boys”, they were both dealing with a chaotic situation where people were in danger. But, it appears they were both involved in requesting Granite Mountain’s help, and as such are part of the story. I think it is apparent that without that request, the GMHS would have stayed put. After the request, they made a very bad decision and they got caught. The story here is frustratingly incomplete. The ADOSH version is that the request occurred, got turned down, and the next thing everyone knew was deployment had taken place. That clearly does not appear to be the case (the “come faster” conversation etc). We do not even know what the GMHS were supposed to do besides “help” – but certainly that is known. I do not believe Cordes or Musser were focused on structure protection, unless it related to the protection of lives. How was Granite Mountain supposed to aid in that? There is a more complete story to be told, and I do believe the families do want to know the events that led to the deaths of their loved ones. Maybe some people will feel like they are getting blamed if a more complete story is told, I do not know. Why are we not getting a more complete story of what happened, when those details are certainly known? Even more frustrating, why do some people appear resistant to having a more complete story told?
I fear that Granite Mountain got requested to move to do something that had become moot and inoperative before they even got there. In essence they died totally in vain, and no one wants to admit that.
Yea Mike I agree with most of that. I think GM was probably asked if they could get in the mix. And if they declined (seems to be consenus) that is standard. I think that the work here will tell the best story. As long as this has been going on it seems there is no relavent way to expect that the investigations wold have been able to peice the details together in the time they were given. The investigation should still be taking place. I don’t believe that anyone other than who decided to drop off the road is accountable for the fatalities. Everyone else (and most of the decisions makers have been named at one point or another) were too busy to take special interest in one resource especially since that resources supervisor was there.
The only thing that I’m resistant to is speculation and insinuation. I think there is going to be a detail specific timeline, just stop making accusations and keep putting the story together. In the end there will be many things that people will be able to blame that is what the Swiss cheese model looks like when the hole goes through.
WFF
No Marsh did not drive by the Ranch his vehicles were on the other side of the fire. A separate road goes to Bolder springs Ranch. And yes now that we know that Cordes knew where GM was going and supposedly he told them it was a safety zone he holds some blame in this fiasco and there deaths Marsh used his info which he had not scouted. That is why the law suit talks about the ranch. We are here trying to find out the whole story. This discussion has turned up a lot of unknown information science The SAIT was released.
Hey Bob I don’t think you know whether he went in and looked or not. I don’t think you know why or the specifics on the law suit, it probably covers a lot of things just to blanket possibilities. Everything that you guys are doing can be done without accusations. Formulating possibilities and bouncing them off each other is fine. Just don’t act like its fact.
From where I come from if I think an accusation is warranted I will say it. You can disagree your choice.
According to the info from Joy and Tex he went up the NE side of the line and was scouting from there after the briefing. He would have had no time to drive to Bolder springs Ranch and back to where he Parked and walked up to the fire, when Joy and Tex saw him. Also the Law Suit specifies that the SZ at the ranch was not scouted and the information should not have been given to Marsh. That assisted in the decision and death of the fire fighters.
I appreciate you asking me about facts and I try very hard to stick to them. I am an old WFF and I call a spade a spade been like that all my life. Fire Fighters Die because of bad decisions or bad information always double check both personally and talk to others when your decision affects your life.
I would have never picked a safety zone over a mile from where I was working. Would you? All my SZ were close to the line or in the burn and never more than 100yrds away. That is just common science.
#1: if you were crewboss and someone told you, “hey bob, there’s a bomb proof safety zone down at the end of that road…” wouldn’t you go scout it? right… you would. then wouldn’t you go look at the possible routes that would get you from your assignment, back to that SZ? right… because that’s SOP’s.
#2: Cordes had no responsibility for Div A or GM. he had his own mess to deal with. and once shit was hitting the fan, he had PLENTY on his own plate and no need to be micro-managing what an IHC was doing… it wasn’t his responsibility. it was Div Alpha’s. period.
do your own research and stop drooling over what WTKTT vomits out.
I have been doing research for 50 years including here. The only bomb proof safety zone is the one I chose and yes I would scout it out. I do not see any Info that Marsh checked on it at any time show me that information. Again a SZ in the middle of a brush field and a mile and half walk to it
does not fit my definition of a safety zone.
Situations that shout watch out, stop and rethink cover the bases LCES or stay where you are………..IN THE BLACK.
The Ranch was plowed to protect it not done to provide a safety zone for crews or Engines. I do not believe that any one looked at the ranch from a safety zone stand point, also if it was such a good spot why did they not assign an engine for protection? Seems to me some one must have been concerned about that. Decided not to put an engine in harms way. Just a question I have no answer for at this time.
The ranch was in as much jeopardy as the other homes in town right? I think you know the answer to that, after burning up engines on several fires in the past no one wanted to stick an engine at the Ranch in the middle of that brush field.
Not on the ‘org’ chart… but he
WAS the one officially tasked
that morning with providing
them with their ‘intel’ and
SHOWING them what
HE ( himself, alone? ) had
chosen as their primary
‘designated safety zone’
for that workday.
Whether that was what was
supposed to happen or not
( via the org chart ) can
be debated… but that’s the
way it actually went down.
Reply to xxfullsailxx post on March 31, 2014 at 4:51 pm
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>> their primary designated safety zone was the cold black.
Not according to SPGS1 Gary Cordes, who briefed them.
Keywords (here) = primary / designated.
Cordes ‘designated’ the Boulder Springs Ranch FIRST ( sic: primary )…
in the briefing… and then just adds ‘and black, of course’.
From Gary Cordes’ ADOSH interview…
Q2=Dave Larsen ( Rest in peace )
A=Gary Cordes
_________________________________________________________________
Q2: …uh, sevenish, escorted Granite Mountain down Sesame Street and
shared the location of the safety zone at Boulder Springs…
A: Ranch, right?
Q2: …and, and what – I can’t get that next word, what is it?
A: …and black, and, and I told ‘em of course you have the black as a
safety zone… Um, and this…
Q2: Oh.
A: …and this was also, this was also discussed at our, at our briefing. We had a,
an iPad out looking at the roads and everything and I showed them on the
iPad, the ranch on the iPad as well um, and referred to it there in that, during
that briefing as well.
Q2: Okay, this is, this is a briefing, uh, well, whatever, 6:45 or 7:00…
A: Yeah. Yeah. When we – when I – when we met with everybody was there,
we – there were several break outs where we discussed, had little briefings
with each other and uh, there was a point where we were at a table inside the
fire station with an iPad and we went over the – we were looking at the maps
on the iPad.
__________________________________________________________________
>> xxfullsailxx also said…
>> Cordes had been scouting out the fire area since 2200 the previous evening.
That is true… but there is no detailed account of ALL his movements.
>> xxfullsailxx also said…
>> he had personally scouted out the BSR as a safety zone.
Okay… full stop. Is that your OPINION?… or do you have a specific
source that establishes that as a fact?
I would LIKE to believe he did… and would certainly HOPE that he did before
just willy-nilly telling multiple resources ( not just Granite ) that that was the
‘designated safety zone’ for the Sunday work period…
…but have you seen proof that he did ( actually go scout it ) anywhere
in the evidence record?
I haven’t. Not yet anyway.
Please provide a source reference for your ‘statement’.
I honestly hope I have just ‘missed’ it and you can point me right to it.
that is what happens on going fires during initial attack. resources get moved around and requested, priorities change. the environment is very dynamic and fluid. those resources have a duty to assess their current situation and decide if it is safe and prudent to disengage from their current assignment in order to change locations.
there is ABSOLUTELY NOTHING WRONG with operations requesting resources be re-allocated to more pressing needs. it happens ALL THE TIME. it is how developing incidents deal with a shortage of resources, which 90% of the time is the case. it takes time to get the proper overhead (Div Sups, Safety Officers, crews, engines, IMT’s etc.) to the incident, briefed and then sent to there respective assignments.
for the umpteenth time, the onus was on GM and Div. A… not only to scout their own escape routes and safety zones, but also to evaluate whether or not is was reasonable to leave their current assignment.
what part of the story do you feel is missing? yep, Musser and Able were both looking for help in the subdivisions. i have been on plenty of crew assignments where we were dealing with structure protection. it is not at all uncommon for crews to deal with structure triage, firing operations, spot fire patrols etc. there are any number of ways the crew could have been used.
i don’t think that WTKTT making PRESUMPTIONS about Cordes “failing” to let anyone else know about the BSR safety zone does anyone any good (if it’s even true that is).
it is all hindsight. it is all speculation. don’t you think the families have plenty of “if only…” scenarios?
I was not implying there was anything wrong with either Musser or Cordes making a request (although I do think it came from being somewhat desperate) but it is part of the story and should be known. One of the reasons there is so much speculation is that details known to people who are still alive have not been brought to light. What happened after GM turned down the request? What communication took place with GM during that time – we should not have to be listening to the background noise of air videos to discern that. What specific purpose did Musser and Cordes have in mind? GM has taken a lot of heat for possibly being over-committed to structure protection. Was this true of Musser and Cordes?
GM was responsible for itself and failed to do what was needed to come home safely. But a lot of things went wrong on the Yarnell Hill Fire, and focusing on just that one decision and neglecting the rest of the story (why were evacuations so delayed etc?) misses things that could be done better in the future.
I was just reading Mart’s comment on her revelation (3-27 around10p). You know I’m glad you see that. I agree with xxfull sailxx. The lesson is right there and has been since the day after. You guys are pulling the seeds out of a cotton bail. There isn’t going to be a smoking gun because what happened is obvious. The overhead is responsible for the death of the crew. Everything else didn’t cause the decision. Listening to the options conversation could prove the bad decision process, but it’s right there One, two, or four people made the decision
I can’t explain or understand what you think you’re going to get out of every detail. You guys have an insatiable need to pick this out. I think it’s therapy, you guys can’t let go and just take it for what it is.
John Dougherty is a genious. You guys are all doing his research and giving him credit for letting you do it. It’s the ultimate Tom Sawyer painting the fence.
I’d like to know if John or someone is putting together an overall timeline with all this research. I think that would be a useful tale to tell, but it won’t change the lesson it would tell it more clearly. I said early on that the investigation happened to fast in a rush and I don’t see why anyone would think either could have been done well.
**
** THE APPLE IPAD THAT WAS USED TO SHOW ERIC MARSH
** THE BOULDER SPRINGS RANCH ( AND ROADS LEADING TO IT ).
The original SAIR report has always said this…
SAIR page 21…
________________________________________________________________
At the 0700 briefing ( at the Yarnell Fire Station ) on June 30, ICT4 (Russ
Shumate) and others from the previous shift meet at the Yarnell Fire Station
with incoming personnel including ICT2 (Roy Hall), two Operations Section
Chiefs (OPS1 (Todd Abel) and OPS2 (Paul Musser) ), SPGS1 (Gary Cordes),
a fire behavior analyst (FBAN (Byron Kimball)), YCSO deputies, and the
Granite Mountain IHC Superintendent (Eric Marsh).
The briefing covers strategy and tactics, the previous night’s spot weather
forecast (Figure 4), and radio frequencies.
They review the area using Google Maps on an iPad, and they note
Boulder Springs Ranch as an excellent safety zone.
_______________________________________________________________
And this…
SAIR page 41…
_______________________________________________________________
The Granite Mountain IHC heard the Boulder Springs Ranch was a
“bomb proof safety zone” that morning. Using Google Maps and an iPad,
they had seen the Ranch, as well as potential trails and roads leading to it.
_______________________________________________________________
NO other ‘official’ report ( WFAR or ADOSH ) ever mentioned any such thing,
so it has always been a mystery whether that actually happened Sunday
morning… or not.
Gary Cordes’ ADOSH interview seems to clear that mystery up.
According to Gary Cordes… all of that DID happen… and he was the one
pointing out the Boulder Springs Ranch( and the roads ) to Eric Marsh
( and, perhaps, Jesse Steed ).
I have also always wondered, myself, that if that moment really did happen…
then WHO was showing Marsh the ‘Boulder Springs Ranch’ and (supposedly)
‘the roads leading to it’ on that iPad… and WHOSE iPad was it?
Again… Gary Cordes’ ADOSH interview answers both of those questions.
It was Gary Cordes himself showing the Boulder Springs Ranch
( and the roads? ) to Marsh… and Cordes was apparently using Dean
Fernandez’s GPS activated iPad to do it.
Cordes says in his ADOSH interview that there were a number of iPads floating
around that morning at the 0700 briefing at the Yarnell Fire Station… but Cordes
also specifically recalls that the one he was using to show Marsh the Boulder
Springs Ranch ( and, supposedly, the roads that led to it ) belonged to either
OPS1 Todd Abel or BLM Rep Dean Fernandez.
We don’t have any photos from Todd Abel to see if he had an iPad that day…
but we DO have photos from Dean Fernandez proving that HE did.
Even though the SAIR report never reported BLM Rep Dean Fernandez
as being at that crucial 0700 briefing… we have always KNOWN he WAS
there due to other documents and actual photographic evidence ( his own ).
We also know for a fact he was already there at 6:25 AM and part of
all those informal ‘pre-meeting’ meetings we also now know took place.
There has always been this photo sitting in the ‘Dean Fernandez Photos’ folder
in Mr. Dougherty’s SAIT FOIA/FOIL release package Dropbox…
It was taken with Fernandez’s Apple iPad at exactly 6:25 AM, Sunday,
June 30, 2013. He was standing in the parking lot of the Yarnell Fire
Station. ( It is GPS stamped and proves this )
Here is the EXIF metadata from that photograph…
Camera: Apple iPad
Lens: 4.3 mm
Exposure: Auto exposure, Program AE, 1/355 sec, f/2.4, ISO 50
Flash: No flash function
Date/Time: Sunday, June 30, 2013 6:25:13 AM
Location: Latitude/longitude: 34° 13′ 21″ North, 112° 44′ 46.8″ West
Location Decimal: ( 34.222500, -112.746333 )
File: 1,936 × 2,592 JPEG (5.0 megapixels)
Filename: 2013-06-30-06.25.13.jpg
There is no direct evidence of it… but it’s seems possible that since he was
much more familiar with Yarnell than Gary Cordes AND Frenandez had been
on the fire the day before ( Saturday ) and helped to set up the pumpkin
at the Boulder Springs Ranch…
…that it was Dean Fernandez himself who probably told Gary Cordes that the
Boulder Springs Ranch would be an ideal ‘safety zone’ to designate for Sunday.
Cordes obviously agreed since that is exactly what he was telling inbound
resources on Sunday… but there is still no evidence that Gary Cordes himself
ever visited the Boulder Springs Ranch prior to telling everyone working that area
that that was to be their ‘bomb-proof safety zone’ on Sunday.
ALSO… now that this ‘Apple iPad’ moment appears to be verified… we
can now also see where a major problem began that day.
Apparently… Cordes simply took Marsh ‘aside’ for this moment and
was privately showing him the Boulder Springs Ranch on the iPad,
which is contrary to what the SAIR said.
The SAIR was trying to establish that this ‘presentation of the Boulder
Springs Ranch’ as a ‘bomb-proof safety zone’ was formally part of
official meeting and that THEY ( plural, everyone there ) ‘noted’ it
as a good safety zone.
That part of the SAIR ‘story’ still appears to be fiction.
Apparently… ONLY Cordes and Marsh were looking at the iPad,
and all the other fire overhead wasn’t paying attention.
IC Roy Hall, OPS1 Todd Abel and OPS2 Paul Musser would all testify
later that even when they heard Eric Marsh was ‘heading out his
escape route’ and ‘heading to his pre-determined safety zone’…
…they had absolutely no idea WHERE that was or what he was
really talking about.
When that meeting ended… only Eric Marsh and Gary Cordes really
knew what Marsh was going to be referring to later in the day.
If EVERYONE at that meeting had been fully aware of DIVA’s designated
‘safety zone’ and ‘escape route’ ( as the SAIR implies they all were )…
and EXACTLY where it was and what his ‘predetermined escape route’
was to have been…
…things actually might have turned out differently that day.
I believe this represents what Gary Cordes himself has said is one of the
actual ‘lessons to be learned’ from the Yarnell Fire with regards to
‘complacency’, ‘inattentiveness’, and ‘creeping normalcy’.
On a day like that… with extreme fire behavior actually EXPECTED… it is
astounding that the IC and BOTH OPS on the fire were standing RIGHT
THERE at that meeting and (apparently) didn’t even bother to at least be
sure they knew what ‘safety zone’ was being established for their own
Division Supervisor… exactly where it was… and whether THEY
( fire command ) really felt it ( and the escape route being set )
was adequate for the terrain, circumstances, and EXPECTED
conditions that day.
It’s not like there were 20 Divisions on that fire.
Marsh was their ONLY Division Sup that was going to be all the way
out in the boondock that day… in harm’s way… and they ( fire command )
left the meeting not having any idea what he was going to mean later on
when they would hear him say ‘predetermined escape route
and safety zone’ over the radio at a critical time.
“Creeping normalcy”.
They simply weren’t paying attention and didn’t feel the need to.
WTKTT—The real thing that continues to haunt me is why you would designate Boulder Springs Ranch as a SZ.
1. Not scouted
2. The ranch was plowed for its safety not as a Safety Zone.
3. It was no where near any crews, Equipment etc.
4. it was in the middle of a huge brush field.
5. Over 1 mile from where GM was. That is just to far in an emergency to be a true safety zone. SZ should be close and accessible with in a short time. Five minuets or less, that’s why the Black for a crew is the most reliable. If you have to run you do not want to run very far, very few have survived that last dash.
Mr. Powers… I believe everything you just pointed out
is why this decision itself is, in fact, a part of most of
the ‘wrongful death’ lawsuits filed so far.
It’s a FUNDAMENTAL set of questions to ask since that
location itself ( and the attempt to reach it ) played such
a vital role in what happened later that day.
Unfortunately… even with all the evidence that has
already come to light… there isn’t any detail at all,
really, about WHO really made that decision, and/or
why.
As I said above… it is POSSIBLE that Dean Fernandez
simply pointed it out to Cordes that morning on his
iPad… in one of the ‘meetings before meeting’… and
Cordes just simply agreed that it ‘looked fine’.
Whether Dean Fernandez ( BLM Rep ) himself was
‘qualified’ to even make that evaluation according to
WFF standards… I do not know.
Even Eric Marsh had the opportunity, after someone
just pointed to it on an iPad, to raise his own
objections or raise any of the points about it that
you make above.
None of that happened.
They just pointed to the iPad… and that was that.
It is still unknown if enough time was actually taken
for Marsh to be FULLY aware of the ‘roads leading
to it’… but Brendan McDonough’s new ADOSH
interview transcript seems to indicate that WAS
the case.
Brendan is now saying that even HE seemed to be
aware that the two-track road eventually ‘wound up’
at the targeted ‘safety zone’ ( BSR )… as early as
that morning… after they ( the crew ) were also
‘briefed’ by Marsh/Steed.
But unless we start to seriously question Gary Cordes’
interview with ADOSH… then the mystery of whether
Marsh was ever actually SHOWN the location of that
(supposed) ‘bomb-proof safety zone’ before he ever
went up on that ridge is over.
He was ( shown the location on a map )…
…and it was Gary Cordes himself who showed it to him.
Reply to xxfullsailxx pos ton March 29, 2014 at 2:55 pm
That a good video.
I wish everyone who had worked the Yarnell Hill Fire
had seen it the night BEFORE they showed up there.
Ironic that he continually uses the word ‘shortcut’
itself in part of his ‘lecture’…
_______________________________________________
You take the shortcut… even though you know you
are violating safety procedures… and what happens?
Nothing.
Nothing bad happens.
The absence of something bad happening then means
it was SAFE to take the shortcut.
So what happens then?… you do it again. Same result.
You get away with it so many times…
The SHORTCUT becomes the NORM…
Until… something bad DOES happen.
_______________________________________________
BTW: I was totally familiar with the term “normalization of deviance” for quite some time ( Like almost a lifetime )…
but I still like the way Cordes phrased it…
It was in full play that weekend… and despite
your “there’s nothing more to see here…
move along… move along” attitude you
now seem to be indicating that you,
yourself believe that it ( tomato )
was ‘in play’.
This ‘lesson’ from Yarnell goes all the
way up the ladder… from poorly
planned/executed IA, to failure to identify
proper extended attack and assign the
right ‘team type’ as early as possible,
to really, really bad ( or non-existent,
as in Blue Ridge’s case ) briefings,
right on to poorly chosen safety zones,
escape routes, reliance on deployment
as an ‘option’, taking walks through
fuel without proper lookouts, intel, or
planning… yada, yada, yada.
It ( tomato ) was ALL in ‘full swing’ that
weekend. I still agree with Cordes’
own evaluation of that weekend.
Everyone in the WFF business needs to
ask themselves if they, personally, are
( or have been steadily ) slipping into
that slot where you might get ‘tomato’
back in your face.
“You say tomato… I say….
Call it whatever you want.”
well, since mullane coined the term, i’ll go ahead and call it “normalization of deviance” … but that wasn’t my point. my point is that you are SO arrogant and SO ignorant that you will do and say anything to make yourself feel and seem like a self proclaimed expert.
“you now seem to be indicating that you, yourself believe that it ( tomato )
was ‘in play’.”
we all know you don’t hesitate to assign words or thoughts to people who can’t speak for themselves… don’t try to speak for me. there is nothing in what i said that indicates what i believe was or was not in play. i was simply attempting to correct your ignorance… a moot point i realize.
“It ( tomato ) was ALL in ‘full swing’ that
weekend. I still agree with Cordes’
own evaluation of that weekend.”
you continue to use the term (tomato) out of context. dealing with wildland fire in and around the urban interface is a complicated task. lots of moving parts. i wouldn’t expect you to understand. your laundry list of “lessons” means nothing… because it comes from an anonymous internet hack with too much time on his hands.
(see, i don’t need a function key, i like to change it up every once in a while)
** PANEBAKER AIR STUDY VIDEO
** 20130630_161858_VLAT_split_2_EP.MOV
Transcript is below.
ECITW ( Every Caveat In The World )
This is what I ( me, personally ) am hearing in the
background of this video. Your mileage may, of
course, vary.
NOTE: No filtering or audio forensics needed for this
one. Most of this background conversation is easily heard
by anyone with normal hearing at those places where
the loud foreground conversation is not obscuring
the background conversation.
+0:00 ( 1618.58 – 4:18.58 PM )
(Corey Moser?): I’m gonna head over there and check
the ranch out and see if they’ve got that… uh… mostly cleared.
+0:10 ( 1619.08 – 4:19.08 PM )
(Unknown): Ah… ( six five?)… Did you copy that?
+1:17 ( 1620.15 – 4:20.15 PM )
(SPGS2 Darrell Willis?) (Cory?)… if you’ve got time and
it’s in any way possible… right now… ??… get with
(Barry?)… ??… there so we gotta pick up the slop.
+1:32 ( 1620.30 – 4:20.30 PM )
(SPGS1 Gary Cordes): Copy… but the intel I am getting from, uh…
Blue Ridge is that they have… uh… lost that dozer line up
( loud foreground voice obscures this part ) where we’d… uh…
planned to do the ??.
VIDEO ENDS
NOTE: This *seems* ( emphasis *seems* ) to be the moment
that day when SPGS1 Gary Cordes is finally telling either OPS1
Todd Abel or OPS2 Paul Musser that burning out that dozer line
that Blue Ridge and Tyson Esquibel had been working on is no
longer an option for protecting Yarnell.
If that is the case… then this is happening almost a full
30 minutes ( half-hour ) later than the time when SPGS1
Gary Cordes was first informed by Blue Ridge Superintendent
Brian Frisby that the ‘burn out’ option was no longer viable.
According to the SAIR… 1620 is the exact moment that
Granite Mountain was leaving the two-track road and
dropping into the fuel-filled box canyon… and also the
exact moment that the entire Blue Ridge crew was
retreating from the dozer line back to the Shrine
Youth Camp in order to evacuate that area.
ALSO NOTE: Now that there is a full hour and a half of
Gary Cordes’ voice ( recorded in his ADOSH interview )
to listen to… it’s fairly easy to identify his voice in some
of these other captured recordings. Like Eric Marsh…
he has a very recognizable voice print and speech pattern.
In the video T911 makes a retardant drop at 1618, right??
SAIR p100 says….Weather: Although there were sufficient airtankers assigned to the fire, the afternoon’s severe weather hampered the tankers’ effectiveness by closing reloading bases periodically and at other times by making flying to and from the fire unsafe. However, this was not the case at the time of the entrapment as a Very Large Airtanker (VLAT) was over the fire carrying 10,743 gallons of retardant and was prepared to drop at the ASM’s order if the crew could be located.
If T911 is making retardant drops as early as 1618 I would think it almost impossible that at 1635 and beyond T911 still has 10,743 gallons of unused retardant.
Yes, but T910 was not on the fire at 1618, or during deployment. And the SAIR says it was specifically T911 that was carrying 10,743 gallons. And we now know that it was T911 making a drop in the video above
Reply to calvin post on March 29, 2014 at 12:07 pm
>> calvin said…
>> In the video T911 makes a retardant drop at 1618, right??
Yes. One of the foreground guys ‘misses’ his chance to
take still pictures of the moment and says…
“Oh… I missed it… F**k!”
>> calvin also said…
>> If T911 is making retardant drops as early as 1618
>> I would think it almost impossible that at 1635 and
>> beyond T911 still has 10,743 gallons of unused
>> retardant.
Good point. It’s possible.
Calvin… speaking of 1635 and that timframe…
Have you seen a few of the *new* Panebaker Air
Study videos uploaded by Mr. Dougherty that we
have never heard about or seen before in
that same 1630 – 1635 timeframe.
TWO of them clearly show the enormous firestorm
and column that is about to entrap Granite Mountain…
…but they ALSO show what appears to be this
infamous ‘lining up a retardant drop’ flight that
Marsh would ( supposedly ) SEE and say “That’s
correct… that’s where we want the retardant”
at 1637.
From looking at these new videos in the 1635
timeframe… if those really are the ‘practice runs’
being referred to… I don’t see how it is even
remotely possible that Marsh could have been
seeing that from the OTHER side of that huge
smoke column clearly seen in the video.
So I now tend to agree with what I think you said just
a short while ago… that there now should be a lot
of doubt that this 1637 Marsh radio call about
retardant ever happened at all… or if there was a
radio call to that effect at that time… it was
NOT Eric Marsh making it. Whoever was reporting
that it was him making that call might simply have
been mistaken.
The 161620 Vlat video shows the same retardant drop as the 161858 video, right??
In the 161620 video we hear (I assume) the VLAT pilot saying he has about 2,000gallons left (following that drop.) And then we see the VLAT drop again in the 162508 video and again in the 163338 video.
Is that correct?
WTKTT… can you tell me a little about the 163338 video. Like where the camera is filming, which side of the fire the retardant drop is made, and where GM were. Many Thanks!
Ok— We know that Cordes knew where GM was going, Interesting I think.
First he heard the same discussion we have discussed between Marsh and Air Attack with no specific reference to Bolder Springs ranch. From that conversation Cordes knows exactly where GM is headed. Big question how did he know or surmise that?
If he really knew that why did he not tell them to stay in the Black as he was in the middle of a lot of fire activity. Critical fire activity and GM was headed to a clearing in the middle of a large brush field that may or may not have been bomb proof and they had to walk thru over a mile of brush to get there,
This leaves one conclusion for me if one or more overhead knew what GM was doing and allowed it, then the state investigation is right and the state is liable.
Gary Cordes could be sued as well for being implicated in the move that caused the crew to lose their lives.
I can not respect Cordes if he said nothing about GM not following LCES or the 10 and 18, he just simply ignored that. You decide that’s my feeling on it.
Reply to Bob Powers post on March 28, 2014 at 12:23 pm
>> Mr. Powers said…
>> Ok – We know that Cordes knew where GM was going.
No doubt about it. There is also now no doubt that the SAIT
investigators knew this as well ( and all the other details
we can now read for ourselves in the ADOSH interviews ).
It is not believable to think that ANY of these dozens of
people that ADOSH interviewed would have told any
remarkably different stories during their interviews with
the SAIT investigators.
>> Mr. Powers also wrote…
>> First he heard the same discussion we have discussed
>> between Marsh and Air Attack with no specific reference
>> to Bolder Springs ranch.
Yes. It was amazing to hear Dave Larsen ( Rest in Peace )
nail Gary Cordes down about that. If you listen to the AUDIO
of Cordes’ interview at the same point… you can clearly
hear how UNBELIEVABLE Dave Larsen thought that was
and that he really couldn’t believe what he was hearing
from Gary… that a man was about to take 18 other firefighters
for a ‘walk in the fuel’ right in front of an advancing fire… with
no lookout… and wasn’t even bothering to make sure whatever
was up there flying over him knew EXACTLY where he was going.
This very section from Cordes’ interview *MAY* be where
Elizabeth was coming from recently with all her queries
about WHY would anyone be calling ‘Air Attack’ to tell
them where they were going… but NOT tell them where
they were going?
This still needs more research ( why Marsh chose Air channel
for that ‘announcement’ ). In Cordes’ interview… he says that
right around that time he, himself, HAD been trying to talk
to Marsh directly ( he doesn’t say why… which is even
more to find out )… but Cordes says he was somehow
UNABLE to contact Marsh at that point.
Did Marsh’s Bendix King take a dump that day just like
Cordes’ did… but Marsh didn’t have another one to fall
back on like Cordes’ did? Is it possible in that late
timeframe that Marsh was making that ‘announcement’
on the Air channel because just like people could no
longer seem to raise HIM on the TAC channels… Marsh
also discovered he was not able to get OUT on the
TAC channels, either? Was the Air channel the only
one that was working at all for him at that point?
More to come on that, I’m sure.
>> Mr. Powers also said…
>> From that conversation Cordes knows exactly where GM is
>> headed. Big question how did he know or surmise that?
You need to read Cordes’ entire interview transcript.
It has these answers.
Cordes was the one who ‘briefed’ them that morning, and
Cordes was the one who now VERIFIES that there WAS,
in fact, an iPad at that meeting showing ‘maps’ of the
area and Cordes is the one who showed Marsh where
the Boulder Springs Ranch was on that iPand. Cordes even
answers the question I’ve had for a long time as to WHOSE
iPad it might have been. Cordes says there were even 2 or
3 of them ‘floating around’ that morning but the one he
specifically used to show Marsh the Ranch belonged to
either OPS1 Todd Abel or BLM Rep Dean Fernandez.
Cordes says that the ONLY ‘safe zones’ he ever mentioned
was either ‘in the black’ or ‘to the Boulder Springs Ranch’.
There was never anything about ‘back to the vehicles’.
So when Cordes heard Marsh say he was ‘leaving the
black’ and heading out their ‘predetermined escape route’…
that was an ‘either/or’ situation as far as Cordes knew
and it HAD to mean Marsh was now headed to the
Boulder Springs Ranch.
>> Mr. Powers also said…
>> If he really knew that why did he not tell them to stay
>> in the Black as he was in the middle of a lot of fire activity.
Cordes says specifically that he didn’t think anything about
what Marsh said because Cordes was also as sure as
he could be that Marsh/Steed/Crew had all the time in the
world to accomplish that.
He was wrong to think that ( dead wrong )…. but that’s what he
thought… and why he didn’t even think to say anything about
their decision.
The fire had ALREADY ‘totally outperformed’ his expectations
and totally blown through his ‘trigger points’ at a rapid rate…
yet Cordes still somehow just felt that GM had all the time
in the world to accomplish the move they just announced
over the radio. Unbelievable.
>> Mr. Powers also wrote…
>> Critical fire activity and GM was headed to a clearing in the
>> middle of a large brush field that may or may not have been
>> bomb proof and they had to walk thru over a mile of brush
>> to get there,
See above. Even if Cordes had no idea they would ‘shortcut’
through the canyon… he still was absolutely convinced
they had the time to get all the way to the Ranch even by
taking the ridge two-track all the way to it. Wrong again.
Also… speaking of ‘may or may not have been bomb-proof’…
…did you know that all of the ‘wrongful death’ lawsuits that
have been filed to date actually call this fundamental choice
of the Boulder Springs Ranch as a ‘safety zone’ into question?
The ‘wrongful death’ lawsuits allege that, itself, was an
uninformed decision and there is ‘negligence’ there in anyone
even deciding that the Boulder Springs Ranch was, in fact,
an absolute up-to-speed, certifiable safety zone ( Large
propane tanks on-site, area filled with structures that
could burn, etc. )
I suppose that will all be debated at trial, with experts testifying
for both sides.
>> Mr. Powers also wrote…
>> This leaves one conclusion for me if one or more overhead
>> knew what GM was doing and allowed it, then the state
>> investigation is right and the state is liable.
I am absolutely sure that the moment Arizona Forestry
was advised there were FF fatalities on a State-run fire…
their primary focus was then ‘limiting liability’. Jim Karels
( in charge of the SAIT ) fully understood that, I’m sure.
>> Mr. Powers wrote…
>> Gary Cordes could be sued as well for being implicated in the
>> move that caused the crew to lose their lives.
Yes. He could.
I am sure that’s going to be all over the news if the man
who just received Prescott Wildfire Academy’s Firefighter
of the Year award is suddenly added ( by name ) to the
existing multiple ‘wrongful death’ lawsuits.
>> Mr. Powers wrote.
>> I can not respect Cordes if he said nothing about GM not
>> following LCES or the 10 and 18, he just simply ignored that.
>> You decide that’s my feeling on it.
I still respect Cordes for pointing out that what the WFF industry
really needs to take a hard look at is this ‘creeping normalcy’
within the ranks when it comes to ‘bad decisions with good
outcomes’… but I hear what you are saying.
Cordes might be the new AWA “Firefighter of the Year”… but
he’s not ‘clean’ with regards to what happened on June 30, 2013.
Creeping normalcy Cordes was part of it and while he brought it up he turned around and in his statements said he was using it in what he did. His award is laughable. Also while I did not know about the law suet on the part about the safety zone I had early concerns about it. When you do not scout a escape route and check your safety zones you fail your basic training and safety of your crew as a Division Boss or a crew boss that is one of your primary responsibility’s. Never take any thing for granted. I go back to what I have been saying for months Bolder Springs Ranch was not a SZ or was there an escape route. Until scouted they were nothing but marks on the landscape. The Black was the only true Safety Zone. They needed no escape route, They were there own look out on top of the mountain they could see the fire front. They had communications both radio and phone with there supervisors, adjacent crews, and Air Attack. They had the entire 1o standard orders covered. The 18 situations that shout watch out were covered. I do not know how much clearer I can make that. They went from the best possible scenario to the worst possible scenario.
How could Cordes or any one else think that was a good move????
Reply to Bob Powers post
on March 28, 2014 at 3:58 pm
>> Mr. Powers wrote…
>> I go back to what I have been saying for months
>> Bolder Springs Ranch was not a SZ or was
>> there an escape route. Until scouted they were
>> nothing but marks on the landscape.
Correct.
There is still ( as yet ) no evidence that even
though Gary Cordes had been in the area since
the night before… that he ever actually visited
the Boulder Springs Ranch before pointing to
it on an iPad the next morning and telling
anyone “that’s your safety zone. It’s bomb-proof”.
What if that ranch happened to have an 80,000
volt electric fence on the west side… or even
just some substantial no-pass-thru fencing?
That would have been quite a suprise to Marsh
and Steed if they had even made it there and
the fire was RIGHT behind them.
Do Hotshots normally carry wire cutters?
What about guard dogs ( BIG ones ) ?
Anyone bother to check that out before
‘setting the safety zone’?
I suppose that will all come out at trial… but
there was certainly some ‘creeping normalcy’
going on there as well. Just point at a map,
draw your finger around… everything will
be fine.
>> The Black was the only true Safety Zone.
>> They needed no escape route,
That true… but stay tuned for a post I’ve been
putting together called “LIGHTNING ROUND”.
There is *new* evidence in the ADOSH interview
transcripts that LIGHTNING was just as much
of a concern that day as it was the day before
when Russ Shumate based his entire IA Plan
on a fear of leaving ANY men up on the Weaver
Mountains if a thunderstorm kicked up ( even
though they had ‘safe black’ as well that day ).
OPS1 Todd Abel’s interview itself seems to
prove that Abel was just as concerned about
this as Shumate was the day before… and
TOLD this to Marsh.
There is also new evidence that there were
more than just a ‘few’ lightning strikes and
loud thunder in the area just moments before
the decision was made whether to stay up on
the high ridge two-track… or drop down into
the box canyon.
If they had stayed on the two-track, at that point
when they were both SEEING lightning in the
area AND hearing loud thunder… they would have
had to climb even HIGHER to the next ridge,
with no cover whatsoever… and been 19 walking
lightning rods at that point.
We also see now from the Wesley fire incident
that the CREW itself was VERY much aware
of “Death from above”… and would not hesitate
to say so when it was bothering them.
So… I’m not saying that the LIGHTNING issue
is the reason for the decision making that day…
but it *may* have contributed.
There’s even a chance that’s what Marsh was
actually referring to by ‘comfort level’ in that
converstion with Steed captured in the MacKenzie
video.
There is no question that ‘black’ was ‘safe black’…
but it was still on top of the Weaver Mountains
and a thunderstorm was arriving.
If they were really, really afraid of the lightning
aspects up there… then all the ‘safe black’ up
there in the world wasn’t going to make them
feel any better about staying up there at
that time.
I fall back on what Gary said. No fire fighter has to my knowledge been hit by lighting. WTKTT you drop just off the back side of the ridge and stack your tools get away from them and sit out a storm if it comes you way.
all the info on lightning was cloud to cloud or NE of the fire no cloud to ground on the fire its self according to the lightning radar equipment.
There was no lightning ground strikes on the fire that day. Fire fighters have lived with lightning for years you are trained on what to do.
Copy that. It also doesn’t
matter how worried Todd Abel
was about it… it only matters
how worried Marsh/Steed/Crew
were concerned.
There IS, however, some new
evidence that OPS1 was
VERY concerned… and that
this concern was made
clear to DIVS A as the
storms rolled in.
If you haven’t had a chance
to read Mr. Abel’s ADOSH
interview transcript… give
me a little time to finish
assembling the breakout
post and I will show you
that part.
The Weaver Mountains were
considered ‘high risk’ for this
sort of thing, apparently.
True but Things to conceder…..
1. Planes still flying in the fire area.
2. No discussion of Lighting on any radio traffic.
3. Nothing noted on BR notes.
4. There were no huge thunder clouds over the fire from the pictures of the blow up and McDonough pictures in the vehicle only the smoke column.
5. No discussion of Lighting accompanying the high winds that hit the fire.
That info leads me to believe there was no lighting over the fire.
it sounds to me like Gary Cordes was dealing with much more than having to worry about where GM was. the assumption, in that situation, would be that your crews were doing the right thing by either staying put, or making their way to a safe place. there was no time context given on his ASSUMPTION that GM was going to Boulder Springs Ranch. as far as he knew, they had plenty of time to make it there and a clear path. Cordes was dealing with evacuating people out of the subdivision, people who had previously refused to leave but whose homes were now burning, all the while GM was probably on the move. besides the fact, that neither Div A (marsh) nor GM were working for Cordes…
Bob i would suggest you listen to the Gary Cordes interview yourself to understand the circumstances of what he was talking about. to try to hold him somehow accountable for GM’s actions is unwarranted. stop relying on WTKTT’s half-assed assessments and start doing your own research if you want to make such unsubstantiated suggestions.
Reply to xxfullsailxx post on March 28, 2014 at 8:48 pm
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>> there was no time context given on his ASSUMPTION
>> that GM was going to Boulder Springs Ranch.
Not true.
Cordes could not recall the exact ‘time’… but he gave all
the CONTEXT in the world needed to set the exact TIME.
Cordes, himself, was careful to advise the ADOSH
investigators that HE was not sure what exact TIME
he heard Marsh say ( Cordes’ quote ) “heading to our
pre-designated safety zone”… or whether it was before
or after he definitely also heard Marsh say that Marsh
was witnessing the fireline “cross the dozer line at
the grader location”…
…but Cordes is/was as sure as he can be that he
heard Marsh make his ‘announcement’ about the
‘heading to our pre-designated safety zone’ directly
to ‘Air Attack’ over the ‘Air to Ground’ channel.
The ADOSH investigators took special care to
CONFIRM that detail with Cordes.
So that is all the ‘context’ needed to put a ‘timeframe’
on that even when Cordes could not.
That ‘specific announcement’ from Marsh to
‘Air Attack’ only happened ONE TIME that day, and
a lot of people heard it.
According to Arizona Forestry’s SAIT investigators…
it happened as late as about 1630 that day…
Page 15 of SAIT Yarnell Investigation Notes (YIN)…
______________________________________________
INTERVIEW with BRAVO 33 ( ASM2 )
July 9, 2013 -1700
Interviewees: Bravo 33 ( ASM2 )
John Burfiend – ATS Specialist
Clint Clauson – ATS Trainee
Thomas French – AT Specialist
Interviewers: Mike Dudley, Brad Mayhew, Tim Foley, Jay Kurth, Jimmy Rocha
I didn’t remember the conversation about Granite Mountain
being in the safe zone until I was shaving. This past
Saturday I visited with Todd Able – he confirmed the
conversation.
We needed to go back to the right flank (16:30 AZ time).
Made 3 practice runs. Painted 2. We came around.
Got a call from Division A stating they were going down
their escape route to the safety zone.
Didn’t know Division A was the superintendent of the
Granite Mountain hot shots.
Asked him “is everything OK?” He replied “everything
is ok, just heading to the safety zone”. We came around,
made a practice run through the bowl, west to east.
I was talking to Tom about the rising terrain on exit.
Division A called and said “that is what we are looking for,
that is exactly right”.
Within 5 minutes of that, they went in shelter.
_______________________________________________
NOTE: Marsh also made the same ‘going out the
exact escape route from this morning’ announcement
at about 1616 ( captured in the background of that
Air Study video in response to the “Granite Mountain…
what’s your status right now?” query )… but that
announcement on Marsh’s part was NOT directly
to Air Attack over the Air to Ground channel… so it
could not be the one that Cordes is sure he heard.
cool, thanks… because again, what this shows is your complete ignorance of what is going on in that situation. you continue to speak as if this is all happening in a vacuum because you have absolutely no frame of reference as to the chaos that might be going on in the background, let alone trying to deal with a radio that is blowing up, that you are having technical difficulties with, while you are driving around trying to talk to overhead, your own crews/engines and dealing with the public who, after previously refusing to leave, are now looking for help in leaving.
WTKTT says, “Even if Cordes had no idea they would ‘shortcut’ through the canyon… he still was absolutely convinced they had the time to get all the way to the Ranch even by taking the ridge two-track all the way to it. Wrong again.”
yes, YOU are wrong AGAIN. Cordes overheard some radio traffic on A-G. he ASSUMED that they were headed to BSR and he ASSUMED that if they were headed there, that they had enough time to make it. Cordes was not responsible for Div A or GM. he had his own mess to deal with.
again, more false allegations based on shaky evidence from some anonymous internet conspiracy theorist with an audience who has no idea what he is talking about.
Reply to xxfullsailxx post
on March 29, 2014 at 6:30 am
( Heavy sigh )
I never said Cordes wasn’t busy, or
that he didn’t have all the reasons in
the world to not know the exact time.
Hardly ANYONE ever knew what time
it was that day. The ONLY time OPS2
Paul Musser EVER looked at his own
watch that day was at 12:04 when he
distinctly remembers looking at it as
he witnessed a VLAT drop.
I was telling YOU that YOU were wrong to
assert that there was no ‘time context’ for
when Cordes heard Marsh say they
were ( Cordes’ quote ) “heading to our
pre-designated safety zone”.
Even though Cordes wasn’t sure of the
time ( understandable )… he gave all
the context we need to ‘figure it out’
for him.
>> xxfullsailxx also said…
>> Cordes overheard some radio traffic on
>> A-G. he ASSUMED that they were
>> headed to BSR and he ASSUMED that
>> if they were headed there, that they had
>> enough time to make it.
Correct ( nice to see you are actually
reading the real evidence this time ).
His ‘assumption’ was dead wrong.
>> xxfullsailxx
>> Cordes was not responsible for Div A
>> or GM. he had his own mess to deal with.
Technically correct. He was just SPGS1.
But HE ( Cordes ) was also the one who
CHOSE the ‘Boulder Springs Ranch’ to
be the designated ‘safety zone’ for
incoming resources in the Yarnell area
on Sunday morning.
HE ( Cordes ) was the one showing that
‘safety zone’ to Marsh at the 0700
briefing ( and supposedly the road that
led to it )… without also making sure
that the other fire overhead ( IC Roy Hall,
OPS1 Abel and OPS2 Musser ) standing
right there at the same meeting were also
( at the very minumum ) aware
that’s the IMPORTANT information he was
telling THEIR DIVSA.
Hence… the confusion and cluelessness
later on the part of fire command.
ONLY Cordes knew what Marsh was
really talking about at a time when it
was critical for ALL the fire overhead
to know what he ( Cordes ) knew.
Even AFTER the deployment… it appears
that Cordes was still the ONLY one in
Yarnell ( besides Brendan McDonough
and anyone else ( like Willis ) who had
been listening to the GM crew frequency
that afternoon ) who knew where they
had ACTUALLY been going… and how
to find them quickly… but somehow never
communicated this to people who THEN
needed to know that.
I’m not BLAMING him for anything.
I am telling you what the evidence says.
>> xxfullsailxx also said…
>> again, more false allegations based
>> on shaky evidence from some
>> anonymous internet conspiracy theorist
>> with an audience who has no idea
>> what he is talking about.
As I have told you before…
Your browser has macro capability.
You could put all that into a function key
and that would save you both time
and keystrokes.
The Panebaker video files have been uploaded to the SAIR Supporting Documentation post. In addition, the A31-Tom Story photos are now available. Additional files are being uploaded. Thank you.
WFF said: “The lessons learned are obvious. …. Downhill into a green drainage, during an extreme fire day, without the ability to monitor current conditions. Really everything else is details to statisfy curriosity and need to know. The lesson is right there, bad judgement.”
I think that structurally, organization and training-wise, you have a different set of problems here. Not just one bad decision, and bad decisions throughout an organization. Take SZs. To me it is clear, looking at the lookout, tennis court and GM, that there was a persistent problem. Either lack of awareness, or deciding that these details were trivial and could be ignored because that’s the “way to roll.” Someone somewhere should be attentive, even if in private with no notes taken, of documenting when this issue appeared out of PFD, and how, so that better steps can be taken to make certain it doesn’t crop up and persist elsewhere.
Likewise, treating deployment as…just another day? With their lookout just walking around evaluating deployment when his (close) trigger point got hit — THAT was organizationally acceptable? It is a little point in evaluating the accident that actually occurred , but as a training point, it is jarring to me that the radio traffic that should have been occurring at that time, didn’t happen.
Poor evaluation of SZs and deployment sites, and poor to no analysis of escape route and timing. There is a certain seat-of-the-pants calculating ability, whether figuring SZ geometry or speed of travel, that seems lacking, whether because people didn’t know how to do them, or because people didn’t have the discipline to do them. Again, hopefully someone is looking at which of those it is, and trying to ensure that this is not a pervasive problem that extends to other crews.
Obviously, the broader bad judgment/good outcome issues, which seem recurrent.
I don’t disagree that bad judgment is at the bottom of many of these, but I think there was a systemic organizational failure here as well. Which does make it different.
**
** DOZER TRANSPORT WAS STAGED AT LAKEWOOD / MANZANITA
Calvin ( and Marti )…
There was some discussion during Cordes’ ADOSH interview about
whether any other group of ‘structures’ in the Sesame area ( other than
the Boulder Springs Ranch ) was being referred to as ‘a ranch’ that day.
Turns out ( From Cordes’ perspective ), there was.
Cordes himself was ( that day ) referring to the group of structures at
the bottom of the Sesame area ( where GM buggies were staged )
as ‘a ranch’. It’s that group of residential buildings ( and a barn ) that
were right there where the pavement of Lakewood / Manzanita ended
and the start of the ‘dirt road’ that heads north into the Sesame area.
This would be the exact area shown in some of Ball’s Blue Ridge photos
with that ‘white fence and gate’ on the right of the photo.
It’s also the same place where we already discovered the Blue Ridge
Chase Truck with the UTV trailer was ‘staged’ most of the day
( at the bottom of the Sesame Area near those buildings ).
So that’s the spot that Cordes is calling ‘a ranch’ in his ADOSH interview…
…and towards the end of the interview he happens to mention that is
ALSO where the DOZER TRANSPORT was staged all day and the
spot where they ‘unloaded’ the dozer that morning.
Makes sense.
That spot, at the bottom of the Sesame clearings, was ideal for the dozer to
quickly get to all those areas it was working that morning and afternoon in the
Sesame area and on that ‘Cutover Trail’ to the Shrine area.
From Gary Cordes’ ADOSH interview…
_________________________________________________________________
Q: Okay. And the other question I have is, um, you said that you took Granite
Mountain down Sesame and there’s a ranch house in that area near where
their buggies were parked…
A: It was um, there’s a ranch house, what we called the ranch, it was a big ole
barn and, and an A-frame building that was in there, that was the original,
what they called the ranch. I wanted to say it started with a W. Um, I don’t
remember the name of it, but that’s where we dropped the um, we dropped the
uh, transport for the dozer.
_________________________________________________________________
Thanks. I have not seen any evidence that the dozer was moved “north.” I am not saying it was or wasn’t. But Cordes had asked Ball to scout the area around Glen Isla for a place to build indirect line (with the dozer.) Ball went to the YFD to get a quad in order to scout as asked. Ball then returned to scout, and it appears he was still in Glen Isla at the time of entrapment/burnover. p 9 YIN…. Ball got a quad from FD and was trying to get on the dozer line to tie in with Justin (Hernandez) to check it people evacuating trying to get out. P10 YIN…. The fire was pushing hard it was passed Ball called Travis and said let no one else in.
According to Ball, after he got a quad from FD, he TRIED to tie in with Justin. The notes do not say that he does tie in with Justin, but does lead me to believe that Justin and the dozer were still on the south side of the fire. TOL… if Ball was trying to return to Justin (his subordinate), I would think he had not yet taken the radio back, Maybe the batteries died in the spare radio that was provoded to Justin by BR?
Also… Cordes ordered resources (engine/ WT?) to Boulder Springs Ranch at 1632
That does make sense to me, finally. This has been so difficult to piece together.
Based on Ball’s 3:30 photo of the dozer on the cross-over, 3:50 photo of the white gate, and 4:28 photo at YFD, in the context of what the rest of Blue Ridge was doing, I had pretty much decided Ball had walked down to the gate. Nobody mentions, iirc, driving Ball down to that area. And he could easily have walked it in 20 minutes.
I have WONDERED if he then walked to the Ranch House Cafe or drove the utility truck/trailer there. The truck he rode shotgun in to YFD was white, and, as some noticed, doesn’t look like any of the photographed crew trucks. I had speculated that it might have been Cordes’ truck, which is the lowest-slung white pickup of the herd. I just don’t think he was involved in the whole “bumping of the trucks” over to the Youth Camp and then down to Yarnell scenario, given the time-stamps on his cellphone photos.
As the story of the dozer slowly emerges, I have been wondering if, in fact, the dozer came down to its staging area with Ball. As in, he rode with it down. That makes even more sense. They seem to have come at the same time. Which ties in with him getting the quad from YFD. In my head, the fact that his YFD photo is at 4:28 puts him going from there to his first trip into Glen Isla (his first photo there is at 4:43) right during the time of the deployment.
Ball’s last photo from that first trip in was taken at 4:48. His next photo, from his second trip in, was at 5:43. I don’t remember, ATM, when the dozer got tangled up in the power lines.
So, I guess we’re finally getting relative clarity on Calvin’s persistent question, “What happened to the dozer?” We still don’t know what happened to its driver…..
PS If anybody would like to view the timeline video I made from Blue Ridge Hotshots 6/30 photographs, you can see it here: http://m.youtube.com/watch?v=-Fkg_DDO2zI
(I’m hoping that link works–I’m doing this on my iPad…)
Reply to Marti Reed post on March 28, 2014 at 7:33 am
>> Marti said…
>> As the story of the dozer slowly emerges, I have been
>> wondering if, in fact, the dozer came down to its staging
>> area with Ball. As in, he rode with it down. That makes
>> even more sense. They seem to have come at the
>> same time.
Yes. That makes sense.
As soon as Blue Ridge Supt Brian Frisby accidentally
came across Brendan and realized they BOTH they
to ‘get the heck out of Doge’ ( at exactly 3:41.30 )…
Frisby knew that ‘all bets were off’. As he is even
leaving the old-grader location with Brendan he
calls his Captain Brown and tells him so. He tells
him to immediately pull guys off that ‘dozer line
improvement’ work and hustle them around to
the Sesame area to evacuate ALL the vehicles
over there ( Their Supt truck and GM’s 4 vehicles ).
By the time they accomplish that ( get the vehicles
all the way around to the Shrine Youth Camp )
Cordes is seeing his second ‘all firefighters off the
fire’ trigger point get met… and it’s time to get
EVERYONE ‘out of Dodge’.
At that point… the ONLY ‘safe’ thing for the DOZER to
have done is to head back SOUTH through the Sesame
area to that Lakewood/Manzanita termination pavement
termination point where the DOZER TRANSPORT was.
MOST of the Blue Ridge team went EAST on the
cutover trail and back to where their buggies now were.
Ball was still HEQB and most probably stuck with the
DOZER and most probably went SOUTH off the Cutover
trail and evacuated to the DOZER TRANSPORT spot.
Nothing else would really make any sense once Cordes
sent out the order for ‘all resources OFF the fire’.
Others have scoffed at anyone even caring where the
dozer was… or its involvment with this incident… but
the reality is that this dozer was one of THE most
important resources on the fire that day… and its
whereabouts and activities help to ‘tell the story’
of what fire overhead was really trying to do.
We also now discover that there *may* be, as yet,
this very important (heretofore) UNTOLD story of
how the dozer might have been involved with the
GM’s decision to ‘come down’.
There *MAY* have been this *OTHER* plan, in the
11th hour there… to try to use the dozer to just push
an emergency ‘break’ around the Glen Ilah area, since
it was now obvious the fire was going to roll over that
place like a wave at the beach ( and they had been
mostly ignoring that possibility most of the day ).
Ball was told ( by Cordes? ) to go ‘scout that out’, and
the dozer was evacuating back SOUTH to where its
transport was down there in Glen Ilah.
Maybe ( just maybe ) part of the ’emergency plan’
was to have Granite Mountain ‘arrive’ over there to
the west of Glen Ilah at the same time the DOZER
was getting that ’emergency fire break’ plowed up,
wherever that was going to be.
There wasn’t even time for that plan to even begin
to work… but that doesn’t mean it wasn’t the
‘last minute plan’ to try and save some of Glen Ilah.
More to come on this ( still reading ADOSH material ).
Why if they had BR with the Dozer would they need GM? And BR and the dozer were totally bailing out any way. As you say his trigger point to get every one off the line had been met. With all that happening why would GM even think getting to Boulder Springs Ranch was safe? Just makes no simple common science to me. Even when GM got to the Ranch they would have been stuck there till the fire burned over them. Again makes no science.
Reply to Bob Powers post
on March 28, 2014 at 2:00 pm
>> Mr. Powers said…
>> Why if they had BR with the Dozer
>> would they need GM?
Good question. I’ve been asking this one
from day one. Why would there have
been any need to even ASK GM to
‘come down’ when, in the same timeframe
the request was supposedly made… it
was perfectly known to SPGS1 Gary
Cordes that this ‘burn the dozer line’
thing was never going to happen and
Blue Ridge was now totally free for
a new assignment.
At the same time GM was still advancing
to their deaths in the canyon… Blue
Ridge was totally ‘buggied up’ and ready
to convoy to the Ranch House Restaurant
with no further ‘assignment’ but to ‘be safe’.
Even if GM had never left the black… Cordes
had an entire crew of 20 elite Hotshots
just standing around in a parking lot and
never gave them anything else to do at all.
>> And BR and the dozer were totally bailing
>> out any way. As you say his trigger point
>> to get every one off the line had been met.
Yes. We now also discover that Cordes
was right up there near Shrine road
and SAW them ‘evacuating’ so he knew
exactly when they were ‘free’ for other
assignments ( if he needed any Hotshots
at all )… but he just let them go stand
around in a parking lot and didn’t need
them to do anything at all.
They even had FOUR Crew Carriers
that could have been used to help with
evacuations ( Both Blue Ridge Carriers
and both GM Carriers ).
That’s enough room for ( at least )
FORTY people ( comfortably ).
…but Cordes didn’t even bother to use them
for that, either. He just let them ( Blue Ridge )
stand around in that parking lot doing nothing
at all at the same time GM was still trying to
make it there thinking THEY were ‘needed’.
>> With all that happening why would GM
>> even think getting to Boulder Springs
>> Ranch was safe?
We still don’t know how ‘safe’ they did
or didn’t think it would be ( how much
risk perceived ). Brendan McDonough
knows that… but he’s not talking.
>> Just makes no simple common science
>> to me. Even when GM got to the Ranch
>> they would have been stuck there till the
>> fire burned over them.
Absolutely true. It was another half-mile,
at least BEYOND the Boulder Springs
Ranch to the majority of the western
Glen Ilah ‘structures’.
If Marsh/Steed really thought this ‘exit’
was a ‘no-brainer’… then why didn’t
they just ask Brendan to make sure
and meet them at the Ranch with
the Carriers so they would be
immediately mobile when they arrived?
**
** GARY CORDES — ON LESSONS TO LEARN FROM YARNELL
Just 15 days ago… The 12th annual Arizona Wildfire Academy’s
‘Firefighter of the Year’ award was presented to Gary Cordes
in Prescott, Arizona.
Gary has been fighting wildfire for 24 years.
He single-handedly saved MANY lives in Yarnell on June 30, 2013.
At the same time we now learn ( from Cordes’ own ADOSH interview )
something we SHOULD have known from the Arizona Forestry Division’s
taxpayer-funded ‘investigation’ ( that anyone who didn’t have shit-for-brains
at the Yarnell Hill Fire should have known that Granite Mountain was
no longer ‘in the black’ and WERE headed for Boulder Springs Ranch )…
…there is also something else at the end of Gary’s ADOSH interview
that pretty much anyone who calls themselves a Wildland Firefighter
needs to read.
It’s the standard part of ALL the ADOSH interviews where they gave
the interviewee a chance to say pretty much anything they wanted
with regards to ‘what lessons can be learned from this?’.
Gary Cordes had been thinking about it… and his 24 years of fighting
wildfire… and he had a LOT to say.
In a nutshell… it’s about ‘hubris as a bad habit’ and ‘taking chances and
getting away with them’ and the ‘creeping normality’ that causes…
until it bites you in the ass… and how all that needs to STOP before
more fine men get KILLED.
I’m going to post the link to the transcript of Gary Cordes’ ADOSH interview…
but I am ALSO going to post his entire ‘closing comments’ below… because…
well… because they are IMPORTANT… and as compared to the powerful
message Mr. Cordes has for the WFF community… bandwidth is dirt cheap.
Gary Cordes’ *advice* to any WFF filled with ‘hubris’ and a ‘nothing to see
here.. can we just move on?’ attitude about WFF fatalities like Yarnell might
just be enough to save some lives all by itself.
It really ought to be published in a WFF manual somewhere and not just
buried in a transcript of an interview. Maybe that will happen.
And here is what Mr. Cordes had to say…
_________________________________________________________________
ADOSH INTERVIEW WITH GARY CORDES – 09-11-13/11:02 am
Present at this interview…
Q = Bruce Hanna – OSHA Investigator
Q1 = Barry Hicks – WFA Contractor for ADOSH
Q2 = Dave Larsen – WFA Contractor for ADOSH ( Rest in Peace )
Q3 = Brett Steurer – OSHA Investigator
A = Gary Cordes – SPGS1 at Yarnell
Q1: Gary… you may have the best view of this thing of anybody that
we’ve talked to yet, um, um, and uh, give you the chance to share anything
you may wanna share in hindsight now and we all have better vision, uh, in
hindsight than we do ahead of time. But uh, just think about that, Gary, for
a minute and share whatever you wanna share with us.
A: Well I really don’t have to think that long on it. Uh, obviously any of us that
have been involved in this, whether we’re laying on the back of the truck
trying to sleep and, and uh, get ready for the next day uh, as we stayed on this
incident trying to figure out, you know, what we could’ve done better, what
we could’ve done different, you know, how did this occur, um, you know,
obviously um, I’m 56 years old, um, um, I’m a training Chief, so I’m, I’m
close to retirement, I’m like what can I, what can I offer, um, in this and not
walk away with my experience and just disappear, how can we make
something better. Uh, so given all that and having thought of that, two weeks
after this incident I go to this state uh, Fire Chiefs convention, and I sat in a
uh, in a lecture that was about two and a half hours long that was given by a
uh, an astronaut that’s in his late 60’s from um, NASA, and uh, he was a part
of the state, uh, the space shuttle program and, and I’m paraphrasing and I’m
gonna try to surmise it fairly short, but basically the events that occurred with
the space shuttle were – occurred because of design and even though we had
many successful missions, the failure missions were where we were pushing it
against the edge and, and uh, I think in the fire service we see the same thing.
Um, and he talked about anytime you violate, and by no means am I saying
anybody violated anything in this, and, and that’s not where I’m headed with
this, but anytime you violate a safety standard, 99% percent of the time
nothing goes wrong, and so that creates a new norm and so people start
feeling comfortable with that and I go, I relate back and I use a lot of
analogies which irritate people, but I used to work in the lumber business
years and years ago and the guys run those saws without guards because the
wood hangs up on it, and it’ll break your hip when it kicks back. Well
inevitably what happens is, after about two or three years of running that saw,
a guy lops a finger off. He never does before because cognitive and, and very
focused. But we start to get comfortable and that norm changes for us and so I
take all of that and I sit down and I look at what happened on the is fire and
I’ve talked to a lot of people that have made comments that are on shot crews
that said, we’ve walked a ridge similar to that during a fire. We have, we
have, we’ve taken those same risks and I think what happened here is, and my
closing statement in the AAR I did with my, my group before we left the
incident was, the fire outperformed out expectations. And, I think they saw
the fire across the dozer line, I think they saw um, it not moving as
aggressively um, as whether that other column collapsed or whether it got
push- pushed harder with the winds, but I would, I would anticipate that that
crew felt that they had time to make it from point A to point B and they just
miscalculated it, no different than I miscalculated my trigger points that, that
got ate up in 15 minutes that I figured I have over an hour. Uh, it was just
things had come into alignment so I take that and I look at it and say, what do
we, we don’t need to swing the pendulum so far to the, to the other side, but
we do need to say, are we establishing norms that we’re becoming
comfortable and, and we know there’s risks in all of this business and, and uh,
and it’s really hard to ascertain you know, all of those factors and, and uh, I
think that fuel model, given the conditions and the lineup and, and everything
just way outperformed what anybody um, had anticipated and, and I, I
personally have a new definition of extreme, um, in fire behavior, and uh, I
don’t, you know, I don’t know how to, how to – and I’m still working on, how
do we bring that into a training mode, how do we, how do we educate people
to, to understand that, but what I did do on the last fire I was on was we had a,
a guy with a singed mustache, that was operating a dozer, um, because they
decided to go direct and, and uh, it happened to be a piece of my equipment I
loaned to a, to the next division over, um, we did an AAR on that, called it a
near miss and there’s a lot of people that didn’t wanna call it a near miss, and I
think that’s that pride in the Forest Service and, and in firefighting in general
is, is we do have near misses, but I, but what I did with all the young
firefighters, we had probably 60 people in our AAR the next day, uh, with that
division who was very sobered by it and um, my structure group, um, I – my
point to them was, we do not wanna create a new norm and I brought up the
whole NASA thing and all that and I, and I said, don’t let this be your new
norm. Because that was too close. Had we added a foot or two to that sage
brush model we were 2198 in, in Idaho, we’d have probably killed somebody. And,
and so you know, I’m taking this really serious and I’m looking at it and, and
I’m not trying to be the alarmist, but I think we need to move the pendulum a
little bit to the right and, and, and tell people we shouldn’t be taking these
risks or we need to super analyze it and I’ve sat here in a lot of incidents and a
lot of briefings and you hear the same thing, the Haines of six, um, the fire
behavior is extreme and nothing happens, so what is that doing in the back of
our minds subconsciously, uh, where it’s setting a, it’s, it’s erasing that, that
intent I guess, is what I’m trying to say and, and uh, um, I think it’s just
inherent when we don’t see these things happen, that, that creates that norm.
Uh, hopefully that makes sense.
Q1: Well it makes a lot of sense to me, I agree. I’m, I’m glad you’re thinking of
this thing and I, I think you’re exactly on the right track um, um, and um, I,
you know, as you were talking I’m, I’m thinking to myself um, on the same
video uh, with Darryl Willis and was Jim Paxon saying I’ve left the black
hundreds of times, or something like that…
A: Right.
Q1: …and, and um, and um, and I, I do believe that new norm thing is um, is
maybe alive and well and we sure outta take a hard look at it, uh, in terms of
what that new norm is, but…
A: Well what, what have we seen – and I’m not a big global warming fan, but on
the other hand, I look at it and say what have we seen in the last 10 years with
fire behavior, it’s increasing. What are we seeing with the fuel models and,
and uh, even though we’re burning and we’re doing good mitigation, we’re
still way behind the uh, eight ball on all of this and uh, I think we’re seeing
those intensities uh, and more – we’re seeing bigger fires. And, and uh, and,
and that’s not all because we’re, we’re making a bigger box around it and
lighting it off, it’s – we’re seeing a lot more aggressive uh, behavior in all fuel
models. And I think we need to look at that and recalculate and that’s the
whole thing in all of this is, you know, these guys used, and, and I know – I
knew Eric, worked with him on a lot of different fires, I worked with that
crew, um, he, he was a solid individual and, and uh, we – I know we will all
take risks, and I’m not saying he, he intentionally took a risk, but what I’m
saying is, we all have that – those comfort zones but uh, I also know he’s very
intelligent and, and uh, would’ve calculated in the fa – in their favor and, and
uh, somewhere in all of this um, as I go back to my one statement, the fire
outperformed our expectations and it just flat did and, and I’m not saying that
is an excuse, I’m saying there was some components that we just didn’t
realize were gonna wind up like they did. Or maybe we’ve heard it at those
briefings so many times and never saw it happen that we didn’t antici – truly
anticipate that we would see it like we saw it.
Q1: Um, well um, I think you’re exactly right and um, well Gary, anything else
you wanna share with us before we close this thing out? I really appreciate
your candor and…
A: You know, I, I would like to say something and, and uh, there’s been some
rumors out there that these guys were trying to save structures and that they
were structure department, um, these guys were about as green as, as, and
when I say green, I’m talking Forest Service green, as a, as a, as a uh, type 1
team could be, or crew could be, uh, working for a structure department.
There was no – these guys were not structure guys, and, and uh, um, they,
they were solid and I don’t, I don’t, truly don’t believe that they, they thought
they were gonna come down there and just save structures and, and, and that
that was the greatest influence. And, and um, I think it’s, it’s strictly they
were trying to probably read, trying to stay in the game, come down out of an
area that was, was inactive ‘cause it was very inactive where they were at, um,
and they’re on a, they’re on the dog end of the fire basically, and if it hadn’t
hooked around, there wouldn’t have been an issue at all, we wouldn’t be here
today.
Gary Cordes
________________________________________________________________
These are appropriate sentiments and needed to be said. However, IF (as has been alleged – it is a big IF, but given the circumstances it is very plausible) Cordes was “involved” asking GM to move to Yarnell, offering lessons in the abstract without acknowledging your own role is a bit much. I think he and Musser know exactly why Granite Mountain took the action they did. This thing is not going to be put to rest until someone comes out and says “They moved because we asked them to.”. Enough of this “they were trying to get in the game” crap. The onus is still, and always will be, on Granite Mountain for actually doing it, but until people admit the truth of the events that day, the healing for everyone impacted will not begin.
Gary Cordes from an old Fire Fighter
HORSE SHIT BULLSHIT
UNPLAND EXIT FROM THE BLACK
NO LCES
UNBURNED FUEL BETWEEN YOU AND THE FIRE
NO COMMUNICATIONS WITH OVERHEAD
When you continue to break the rules, you put your self in a position for injury or death. That’s where he should have stayed with that conversation……
Try to out guess a fire in unburned fuel and sooner or later you are going to DIE………In this day and age you have all the tools at your call use them. And stick with the basics.
Some of you may disagree with me but that is where I stand………………
The part that caught my eye was Cordes mentioning that Marsh was very intelligent and would have calculated in GM’s favor, which I read to mean would have made all his assumptions as favorable as possible to reach the conclusion that what they did would be ok. That they wouldn’t be moving at .5 m/hr but instead maybe 3, etc. etc.
Someone should ask Cordes about the prior experiences that led him to think Marsh would find a way to calculate in such a way.
This is why we kill fire fighters to much complacency and no real supervision. In this day and age if we keep this up in these type of burning conditions. There is going to be a lot more funerals……………..
I am, in fact, impressed with Cordes’ obviously
deeply considered ‘reflections’ on what happened
and the ‘lessons to be learned’… and I think he
is SPOT ON about the ‘creeping normality’
syndrome when you get USED to breaking the
rules and nothing bad happens ( yet! )…
…but I’m certainly not ready to absolve him of
any ‘failures’ that day… no matter how many
“Firefighter of the Year” awards they give him.
He NEVER says… in his interview… that he
personally requested Marsh or Steed to do
anything at all… but it turns out that Elizabeth
was right… when the shit started to hit the
fan down there he is directly telling OPS2
Paul Musser that they need to ‘get him some
more resources’ if there’s any chance at
saving some town.
There is also (indirect, not direct) evidence now
that Musser relayed this to Todd Abel, who
was still up NORTH and busy as heck at
that moment… and Todd Abel *may* have
then told Musser to call Granite.
So the whole ‘fuss and muss’ with Elizabeth
recently about her claiming all of this was
a FACT ( but refusing to simply say that is
what you can infer from these ADOSH
interviews… which now seems to be what
she was ‘mysteriously’ referring to )…
…may turn out to be true.
The evidence DOES seem to be there… but
so far I would still call it ‘indirect’ and not the
‘direct’ kind of evidence Elizabeth was
recently claiming to have on this.
Examples…
– There doesn’t seem to be any DIRECT evidence
that Cordes specifically ‘asked for GM’… but
there is ‘direct’ evidence he was pleading
for ‘more resources’ to OPS2 Abel and Musser.
– There doesn’t seem to be any DIRECT evidence
that Abel told Musser to call GM and ‘ask them
to come down’… but there is ‘indirect’ evidence
that is what happened.
– There doesn’t seem to be any DIRECT evidence
that Musser even used the phrase “can you
spare resources for Yarnell?” when he did
talk to Marsh, as the ADOSH report itself
seemed to claim. Musser only says he asked
them if they were ‘still committed to the ridge’
and Marsh said YES to THAT question only…
but there is ‘indirect’ evidence that it was made
clear to Marsh that they were needed in town.
This is a ‘developing story’ given the TONS of
new information that is now available.
I do wonder, though, whether that whole frap
with Elizabeth making what seemed to be
‘wild claims’ recently was simply that SHE
was reading these detailed ADOSH interviews
herself and seeing the same ‘new evidence’…
but simply let the whole thing turn into a
wheel spinning because she ( for some reason )
didn’t even want to reveal that her claims
were coming from this ADOSH material.
We can all see the ADOSH material now, so
there’s no for anyone to be ‘secretive’ about
their ‘sources’ anymore… if that’s what that
debate was really all about.
Dropped the word ‘need’ in the last paragraph
above. Last paragraph should have read…
We can all see the ADOSH material now, so
there’s no NEED for anyone to be ‘secretive’
about their ‘sources’ anymore… if that’s
what that debate was really all about.
xxfullsailxx – I told you “welcome back”, and I meant it because I think we need checks and balances. BUT…the overall message you keep sending is that there is “nothing to see here.”
I just checked the number of people who visited this thread today, against the number of people who visited it last night, and I was surprised at the number of people who have visited it so far today. I don’t think they are logging on because there is “nothing to see here.” FYI.
Also…WTKTT is the engine that is driving this thread. Without him, who would there be to throw rocks at? Is WTKTT always right? Probably not. But without him (and John Dougherty) we wouldn’t have anything except what the liars said in the very beginning.
I am just glad that WTKTT, Sitta and others have thick skins, otherwise…well, there wouldn’t be anything to see here. Would that make you happy? I’m just askin’?
from my viewpoint there are a few different “themes” in this commentary…
one theme would be: looking to understand more about what went on… without all the accusations or condemnation of actions. another theme would be the discussion of lessons learned…
then you have WTKTT’s theme of leading a lynch mob, twirling his noose while hiding behind a white cloak (cowardly accusing people of wrong doing behind the anonymity of the internet)… who learned everything he knows about wildland fire from google and the few people here who have had the patience to try to steer his ignorance toward some sort of constructive amateur investigation. who continues to use technical terms and make proclamations about a situation he has ZERO experience with. whose whole frame of reference is based on one of the worst tragedies in wildland fire… it’s this lynch mob-accusatory-self proclaimed expert-hiding under a rock mentality that i am so against.
WTKTT has nothing to do with John Dougherty, that is, unless John is using him to do his dirty work… by digging up pieces of information and throwing out false accusations like a monkey throwing shit. it is unprecedented for someone to publish a FOIA request to a public website. part of me commends John for doing that, because of the access it provides the friends and family of GM and WFF’s who want to understand more or do their own research. part of me condemns it, for empowering anonymous internet junkies into thinking they have something to say about an occupation they know nothing about. i have told John as much through email.
you seem to be standing behind WTKTT but in front of the lynch mob. you seem to be cheering on the pursuit, and looking for someone to hang. but all of those people involved with that incident, from the very beginning, to the very last smoke mopped up, had good intentions. none of them were hoping to burn up a hot shot crew that day. they were all dealing with a situation that they didn’t create, in the best way they knew how. yet you continue to fuel the fire of controversy and conspiracy like someone (Darrell Willis) had the malice or incompetence or whatever to send GM into harms way.
I agree that everyone was trying to do their best, and there are really no “villains” here. But there has not been an honest accounting of what happened that day of the things that led to Granite Mountain moving, The SAIT tried to create the impression that EVERYONE was clueless as to why that happened, when that clearly is not the case. I thought maybe people were holding back on truth-telling due to legal fears. It appears now that the individuals were much more forthcoming than it appeared, and it was the investigative that shaped or altered the narrative. People need to know what happened that day, however painful the details might be (talking about friends, families and fellow WFF).
Reply to xxfullsailxx on March 28, 2014 at 3:59 pm
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>> it is unprecedented for someone to publish a FOIA
>> request to a public website.
You’re kidding us all with that one, right?
There is nothing you’ve said above that you haven’t
said about a dozen times now. Everyone gets it.
Ever since you got your butt kicked off of Mr. Gabbert’s
Wildfire Today site because of your rabid attack-dog
Yahoo chat room public posting style and your
(obvious) opinion that no one who isn’t a firefighter
has the right to comment on anything that has anything
to do with ‘firefighting’ and/or ‘the brotherhood’…
…everyone KNOWS where you ‘stand’.
You pee forest-green and think anyone who doesn’t should
find another bathroom… or something.
We get it.
You really don’t have to keep repeating it.
If doesn’t surprise any of us at all that your definition
of FOIA seems to be…
Firefighters Only Information Act.
You and your ‘band of brothers’ are PUBLIC SERVANTS.
Welcome (back?) to a PUBLIC forum.
>> xxfullsailxx also said…
>> all of those people involved with that incident, from the
>> very beginning, to the very last smoke mopped up, had
>> good intentions. none of them were hoping to burn up
>> a hot shot crew that day. they were all dealing with a
>> situation that they didn’t create, in the best way they
>> knew how.
And THAT, my friend… is something you and I will
ALWAYS be able to agree on.
Now… back to reading more of the ‘evidence’ and
finding out more about what actually HAPPENED.
i’m not quite sure what you found so controversial about the FOIA comment… apparently you can find controversy in just about anything. all i was saying is that in the history of WFF fatalities, never before has the “evidence” been made public. and that has both positive and negative consequences… you, in my opinion, are a negative consequence.
and, a “right to comment” is one thing. throwing around false allegations and slander while hiding behind your keyboard is a wholly other thing. a very cowardly sort of thing, wouldn’t you agree? you can try to make yourself sound as noble as you want, but you and i both know what you really are.
WTKTT says, “And THAT, my friend… is something you and I will ALWAYS be able to agree on.”
no THAT, “my friend”… is hilarious!
your tone, since you walked in to this room and to this day is one of judge, jury and executioner. you have accused nearly every person involved in Yarnell Hill Fire of wrong doing or gross negligence at some point over the last six months. from the initial attack IC to Blue Ridge to Musser to Roy Hall and now on to Cordes… for you to try to say that you ALSO thought everyone there that day was just doing the best they could is a fucking joke. you have been looking for someone to hang since the day you got here.
Well…I don’t think Sitta has demonstrated any signs of being part of any mob or faction other than a wildland firefighter who is interested in learning as much as she/he can to pass on to her/his crew. Although I ‘m sure she/he can speak for herself/himself, I am just glad she/he has thick skin.
As far as WTKTT, I know he/she has thick skin. And I should have said WTKTT is the primary engine that drives this thread, not the only one, but I would hate to see him quit.
As far as I go, yes I am standing behind WTKTT, I don’t want to do the work he/she does, nor can I do the work he/she does, it is much easier to evaluate his work than do mine own. And I hope he/she doesn’t leave, I’m not sure anyone else is going to step up and take over if he leaves. We have already lost Elizabeth.
Now as far as my role…there is no chance anyone is going to be lynched here. The powers that be state wide, not to mention in Prescott itself has a narrative that they are that they are not only comfortable with, they really embrace it, “they” made of their minds how things went on the Yarnell Hill Fire within the first few hours based on the Willis interview and nothing is going to shake their confidence in that story.
You would probably be shocked how many people there are in Prescott and even family members, who are more than happy to accept the original narrative that God had a different plan for those men. I am the heretic that should be stoned to death. There is not going to be a lynching…ever…of anyone who contributed to what happened on the Yarnell Hill Fire. The only question…will be how many awards and ceremonial dinners and accolades they get.
I suppose it is possible I could get lynched (just kidding – I think), I am the problem, not Darrell Willis or Gary Cordis or anyone else. I have experienced a problem with one negative interaction so far (and counting) in Prescott with a friend of the home town heroes, the ones who didn’t die.
I am the bad guy, not them.
Now as far as what I think, I think all of the problems started AFTER the Granite Mountain Hotshots died. As I have said many times, I agree Eric Marsh made a catastrophic mistake, even though he was told take his crew to Yarnell ASAP, the decision was his.
The lies, the cover-up, the whitewash, hiding the facts and the evidence and manipulating the investigation to arrive at the conclusion “they” wanted, that is where it went south. And I am the bad guy, not them. I’m the one who has a problem, they are all safe behind their circle of wagons which is defended by many of the citizens of Prescott, maybe even many of the families, nobody wants to let go of the original narrative, it all fit into place so neatly. The 100 Club, the dinner where Gary Cordis got his award, the events to support that narrative has been non-stop and will probably really pick up the closer we get to June 30,2014. Brendan McDonough has been hired to take the lead as the PTSD counselor for the Wildland Firefighter Foundation, none of them need your defense, but they probably won’t tell you to stop.
The wildland firefighters already have what they need out of the lessons learned here. They have been stated many times by many of you. Everybody knows what went wrong, for the most part, and what to do to keep it from happening again. Follow all of the rules all of the time.
This thread is now just “investigating” the cover-up. I have quit several times before, and I am going to quit again…unless and until I get at least 1 email from a Granite Mountain Hotshot family which tells me they appreciate what we are trying to do here. If there is not even one family who supports this thread…well, I think we have enough lessons learned for the WFF’s. My email (once again) is [email protected]
Because frankly, repeatedly being accused of leading a lynch mob, not to mention my recent negative interaction of Prescott while watching all of the local news coverage of all of the heroes who are anything but heroes in my book, well…I have gone to far and said to much, just as WFF has said. It has been a very slippery slope. I’m not even a firefighter, nor or any of my family members, and if fact, I don’t really know anybody who does fight wildfire these days except for you…and I don’t know you very well, but I do appreciated what both you and my new friend WFF do to protect our national resources (although I hope you watch out for that structure protection part of the job).
So…the bottom line, let’s just go with your version of events and call it good.
Reply to Marti Reed post on March 27, 2014 at 11:44 pm
>> Marti said…
>> I have read, periodically, that the ADOSH report has something
>> like 80 or so mistakes in it. Has this been documented
>> anywhere to anyone’s knowledge?
I don’t think it’s been ‘documented’ ( yet )… but perhaps RTS
( Robert the Second ) knows more about that.
RTS was the one who first posted something like that
way back on February 2, 2014, in response to a question
YOU, yourself were posing about whether the ICP had
ever officially been ‘evacuated’.
That was one of the ‘inaccuracies’ in the ADOSH report,
but it was RTS who then replied and said a number of
other people were saying there were at least 79 more.
Here’s that original exchange from early February…
____________________________________________________
Marti Reed on February 2, 2014 at 11:24 am said:
Where did Incident Command move after Evacuating Model
Creek School? I have it in my head they went to Yarnell Fire
Department. Is that a mistake?
WantsToKnowTheTruth on February 2, 2014 at 6:33 pm replied…
Marti… I don’t think it ever actually ‘moved’ at all.
ADOSH said they ‘evacuated’ the Model Creek School when
they never really did.
Robert the Second on February 2, 2014 at 10:32 pm replied…
WTKTT and Marti,
Several folks, claiming as many as “80 inaccuracies and
inconsistencies” in the ADOSH report, state that the ICP was
NEVER evacuated and NEVER moved.
_____________________________________________________
sounds pretty skookum to me… in his tactics presented, in looking out for his crew AND in how he dealt with an overzealous Div Sup…
i realize there were probably a variety of first hand experiences with GM, but this one instance speaks to a pretty strong leader, looking out for his folks.
I disagree with you been on a lot of those fires. in Idaho when the fire drops back to the ground you go direct. To try and go indirect and burn out can move the fire back into a crown fire and cause all kinds of new problems. Send sawyers swappers and a lookout ahead and drop the snags near the line before the crew gets there. Been doing that and building line ever science we started using chain saws. Standard tactic in timber fires. From what I under stand other crews were doing it and he refused.
Depends on the fuel type. But in some instances yes. I am very familiar with the Payette as they were a next door neighbor to my forest. You have PJ mixed with pine and Doug Fir and a lot of ground fuel and very steep slopes.
bob-
there are very few universal truths in fire. for you to say “in Idaho when the fire drops back to the ground you go direct” is complete and utter ignorance. aren’t there a lot of other qualifiers or quantifiers to be able to make such a statement? i.e. wouldn’t it depend on the number of snags to be felled? what timber type? what time of year & local conditions?
and if the number of snags to be felled presented a greater work load (and therefore, greater exposure) than connecting an indirect piece of handline and burning it out, then it would certainly make more sense to do the latter.
and from what i read, it looked like he was trying to provide options to a Div Sup and building a consensus with his counter parts while looking out for his crews safety.
so stop trying to “school me” with your condescending tone…
Burning does not automatically lead to fire in the crowns. Damn Bob you know good and well it’s not that black and white. For Pete’s sake stop misleading people with absolutes.
If you have never been on the Payette then you need to do some info research. That is where I was talking about not every fire. Also hells canyon splits the Oregon and Idaho border which then has the same burning conditions, they have had sever problems on the Payette for years when they have gone indirect and so quit doing burn outs from indirect line, WFF you are not any where near the background I have
So do not assume to tell me I would mislead people with absolutes. I referred to one specific location. The IC and Plans Said no Firing out line that’s what they meant. Marsh was arguing a losing cause and the Division said to set up fallers for snags Other crews did he did not. When is the last time either one of you fullsail, WFF went against plans, Line, IC or the Division boss who was following orders and a smoke jumper from Idaho who knew the country.
I would also add before any of us make a final judgment it would be good to have the other side of the story. The FIRE RATEING, we are looking only at Marshes Direly. Since this fire went for 7 days plus this would have been a type 1 team.
They would have looked at all the safety before assigning direct line on the fire. The Division boss and OPS would have been part of that Type I team as well.
I did read them and I was actually fairly impressed with his observations, his decisions based on THE RULES, and such. What confused me though is how he (GMHS) was so skookum then, but NOT at all on the YHF.
So in your career you were always on, never made a bad decision? Obviously you didn’t make one that cost anyone their life, but never had a close call? You were always on 100% everyday all the time every fire. That’s pretty special.
Just so it doesn’t get lost in the weeds and roots, what I wrote below in response to the convo re Prescott Fire Department with-holding not only Chris’s Powershot camera but also cellphones and gps units from the chain of evidence and thus the SAIT and SAIR:
“Writing as the one who spent about a month and a half during the holidays piecing this together, thinking I had discovered something significant:
The thing I learned from this, regarding the SAIR, was that it, IN FACT, was NOT a real investigation. That was a real eye-opener to me.
It didn’t/doesn’t MATTER (legally) that the camera, cellphones, GPS units, etc, were not entered into the chain of evidence. It doesn’t MATTER (legally) whether anybody told the truth or not. It doesn’t MATTER whether anybody heard the conversation when the Granite Mountain Hotshots were discussing their options and making their decision. (As I have written repeatedly, we DON’T KNOW what they decided, much less why they decided it; all we know are the consequences; EVERYTHING else is SPECULATION).
No truth was required in any of this so-called “investigation.” There was no legal enforcement for ANYTHING.
It didn’t MATTER whatsoever that the Yavapai Sheriff’s Department was gathering anything. They may as well have not even been involved in any of it. It didn’t MATTER whether or not they sent the cellphones they gathered from the deployment site to be investigated.
As a citizen and a concerned person, my biggest “lesson learned” by my involvement in this ASAIT has been that, given that there is no obligation to actually discern the factual truth in this event, and nothing to actually/legally hold anybody accountable to disclosing it, there is mostly NO BASIS for determining ANYTHING, much less anything related to any “lessons learned.”
Wildland Fire Fighters beware.
There is nothing in any of this so-called “investigation” that has anything to do with either a commitment to the facts of the incident, or, thus, to learning anything real (and, thus in YOUR interest) from it.”
And then I wrote:
“And by “this ‘so-called investigation’” I don’t mean the ASAIT, I mean the SAIT. The ASAIT has no teeth, no power, unless someone decides to do something with what the ASAIT has done.
Apparently, the SAIT decided to have no power, either.”
And I’m not even mentioning all those radios, which were meticulously photographed on the deployment site before taken to the YCSO, for what significance I truly have no idea.
RTS and Gary Olson have reminded us this many times before, but the way you worded it just now was like a solid hit in the gut.
I also saw the WFSTAR Yarnell video for the first time today, which tries very hard not to draw any conclusions (other than that climate change and WUI is making wildland fire fighting more dangerous).
I guess I’m feeling somber because, despite the incredible amounts of work people have put in here, it still seems like we’ve got a long way to go to get any truth out, much less change the culture.
you obviously haven’t been paying attention because both those videos have been out for months. pretty disappointing that WFSTAR couldn’t come up with something a little more creative…
you need lessons learned spelled out for you by “the experts?” or you want some anonymous internet posters to provide you with some talking points?
you say, “As I have written repeatedly, we DON’T KNOW what they decided, much less why they decided it; all we know are the consequences…”
i disagree.
-“we” (WFF’s) DO know what they decided… they decided to leave the black…
-“we” (WFF’s) DO know why they decided to leave the black… because they thought they could be of help in Yarnell.
the SAIR’s stated intent:
“This report does not identify causes in the traditional sense of pointing out errors, mistakes, and violations but approaches the accident from the perspective that risk is inherent in firefighting. LEADERS ARE RESPONSIBLE for guiding firefighters in consideration of the tradeoffs between safety, risk management, and other organizational goals.”
GM would have been fine had they sat their butts down in their safety zone for the rest of the afternoon. NOONE would have blamed them for that and NOONE expected otherwise. THEY were the ones who were not satisfied with sitting in the black. THEY were the ones who chose to try to walk out.
are there external pressures involved? sure. are those pressures exacerbated by city budgets, communities threatened by wildfire, bad supervisors, chaotic developing situations? sure. none of that changes the fact that a crewboss’s first responsibility is to his/her crew.
there is a happy medium, between scouring every detail of every piece of evidence, and providing a timely written account of events. just because the SAIR doesn’t meet your [civilian] expectation of what an investigation should contain, doesn’t mean it doesn’t have value to the people it was actually written for (WFF’s).
and while we may not agree with the SAIR’s methods, we (WFF’s) don’t really need the evidence scoured and spit-shined to understand the situation that day, or what went wrong, or why it went so wrong.
According to Brendan, according to his ADOSH interview, the escape route was the two-track ALL THE WAY to the ranch. We don’t know who decided to leave that. Or why.
And yes we know they left the black they were in. That’s what I mean when I say, all we know is the consequences. We have absolutely no idea why they decided to do that. Everything that has been written here is SPECULATION. Because it was done via a conversation that there are no consequences for not investigating.
You wrote: “-”we” (WFF’s) DO know what they decided… they decided to leave the black…
-”we” (WFF’s) DO know why they decided to leave the black… because they thought they could be of help in Yarnell.”
The point I am making is that, yes, it appears that way, but only AFTER the SAIT didn’t report that, it has been wrestled out by others. AND we DON’T know if that was even FACTUALLY the content of their discussion.
Very, very, very, good Marti. This is without a doubt your single greatest contribution to this thread in a long list of contributions. This comment alone and your identification of this shameful truth should silence anyone else who would ever challenge the value of this thread or John Dougherty’s reporting on this event.
Without this tread and the participation of everyone who has contributed to it so far…without this thread…all any of us would know is what the paid liars, shills and shameless hucksters have said. I don’t need to name them again, you and they know who they are.
Thank you for everything you have done, and thank you for this comment which sums up where we are and clearly summarizes how truly ashamed the Yavapai County Sheriffs Office, the City of Prescott, the State of Arizona and the U.S. Forest Service (because they supplied the paid liar, shill and huckster who acted as the assistant Team Lead for the ASAIT) and ever other agency and person who has been involved in the shameful chapter in wildland firefighting history.
Yes, in case you are wondering…I do feel a little better…thank you. The big question is…how do the families of the 19 heroes from the Granite Mountain Hotshots feel? A secondary question is, how do you feel about yourself…Brendan McDonough?
Why do the details of my work history matter? Because if you don’t know what I was, and what I am now, you wouldn’t know how much weight to put on my opinions on this matter. As it is, I think you should accept what I say as a matter of fact.
I was one of them, I know what they look like, how they talk, and why they do what they do. I had a seat at the table were people like these sell their souls. That is a fact, even if I sound like your crazy uncle once in a while.
The powers that be (you know who you are) have betrayed the Granite Mountain Hotshots, their memories and their families…shame on all of you.
I went to Prescott College 1969 to 1973. My friends were on that hotshot crew and I worked for the caterers.
I spent the 1980’s in Flagstaff, both in town and out in the forest. My daughter’s father and half-sister live there. I’m pretty sure when Terra comes back to New Mexico after getting her Masters in Public Planning this year, we’ll be visiting Flagstaff. I really want to meet you in person!
**
** SPGS1 GARY CORES NEVER HAD ANY DOUBT THAT
** GRANITE MOUNTAIN WAS HEADING SOUTH TOWARDS
** THE BOULDER SPRINGS RANCH
On page 23 of the SAIT Yarnell Investigation Notes ( YIN ) document, at the
end of their interview with SPGS1 Garey Cordes, there has always been this
little blurb…
Q: Were you surprised where they were?
A: No.
Calvin ( and others ) caught this right away when that YIN document was
finally released publicly.
Assuming the ‘they’ meant ‘Granite Mountain’, that’s always been a slight
mystery given the overall conclusions of the SAIT that no one at the
management level ever really knew where Granite Mountain was going.
Well… as it turns out… there is no mystery at all about this statement
from SPGS1 Gary Cordes to the SAIT investigators.
In the recently released transcript of Cordes’ interview with ADOSH investigators,
Gary Cordes says that he NEVER had *ANY* doubt that when he heard Eric
Marsh say they were ‘making their way out their escape route’ over the radio…
that Marsh meant they would be heading SOUTH all the way to the Boulder
Springs Ranch.
The full transcript of SPGS1 Gary Cordes’ interview with ADOSH
investigators is publicly available here…
Here is the part where he says he never had any doubt Marsh and Granite
Mountain were heading to the Boulder Springs Ranch…
__________________________________________________________________
ADOSH INTERVIEW WITH GARY CORDES – 09-11-13/11:02 am
Q = Bruce Hanna – OSHA Investigator
Q1 = Barry Hicks – WFA Contractor for ADOSH
Q2 = Dave Larsen – WFA Contractor for ADOSH ( Rest in Peace )
Q3 = Brett Steurer – OSHA Investigator
A = Gary Cordes – SPGS1 at Yarnell
A: There was a point where Eric said he was headed to the safety zone,
his designated safety zone.
….
Q2: So that message came from Eric?
….
A: Yeah, what I had actually heard, and that’s what I was touching on a little bit
earlier, but I didn’t wanna get too, too far into it, ‘cause I’m not sure of the
timeframe and what had actually occurred, but I did hear Eric say that he was,
he was headed to his pre-designated safety zone. And, and so my assumption
was that he was headed to the um, to the Boulder Springs Ranch.
Q1: So that was your assumption is that he was going to the Boulder Springs
Ranch and not the black, is that right?
A: Yeah, exactly.
…
Q1: Okay, so then somewhere in there he, and he actually called you rather
than somebody else…
A: No, he did not call me, he, he made the announcement to air attack on
air to ground.
Q1: Oh.
A: That, that he was going to the pre-designated safety zone.
…
Q1: Uh, he tells air attack that he’s going to his designated, pre-designated
safety zone?…
A: Right.
Q1: …and he doesn’t say where that is, he just says, safety zone?
A: Right.
Q1: And so your assumption is…
A: He had plenty of time to get there and, and he was headed to the Boulder
Springs Ranch.
So… as usual with this incident… the minute we finally learn a little more
of the TRUTH and answer some lingering questions… it leads to more valid
QUESTIONS.
If there was NO DOUBT in SPGS1 Gary Cordes’ mind that when Eric
‘announced’ they were ‘making their way out their pre-determined escape
route’ that it couldn’t have meant anything other than he was heading
SOUTH to the Boulder Springs Ranch…
Then…
1) Why did the SAIR pretend GM’s move was such a COMPLETE mystery?
2) Why didn’t the other fire overhead make the SAME conclusion?
3) Why would fire overhead still be assuming they were ‘in the black’?
4) Why was there all the confusion after deployment about where
they should even start looking for Marsh and GM?
5) After the deployment… why wasn’t Gary Cordes making sure everyone around
him at the Ranch House Restaurant knew what he was already SURE of?
I have, ever since I read that, had it echoing in my mind.
Coupled with wondering why, if Brendan was listening, he didn’t say something when the search teams were looking. Then, after reading Brendan’s interview, I believed he really believed the escape route was the two-track ALL THE WAY to the ranch.
I truly am mystified by Gary’s response. He was the one who pointed GM, on the way in, to the ranch as the “bomb proof” safety zone, at a time when he probably wasn’t concerned with what exactly would be the way to get there.
If he was not surprised that they wound up where they did, apparently he was about the only one (unless Brendan and maybe some other/s aren’t divulging) who wasn’t.
And if Cordes wasn’t surprised since he figured GM would have taken that shortcut, why didn’t he say something when the search crew was looking ( unless he was, as seriously may be the case, totally focused on the evacuation of Glen Illah, which it seems to me he was.)
Reply to Marti Reed post on March 27, 2014 at 9:54 pm
>> Marti said
>>
>>…unless he was, as seriously may be the case, totally
>> focused on the evacuation of Glen Illah.
He certainly was. Right before, during, and after the
deployment… Cordes was the one making 4 separate
trips deep into Glen Ilah and driving back out with
elderly people.
Gary had lost his Air-to-ground frequency when the
microphone on his Bendix-King portable took a dump
back around 1600, and he was from then on relying
only the Motorola radio in his truck which had the
TAC frequencies… but not Air-to-ground.
So Cordes never heard the MAYDAYS or the actual
deployment traffic over Air-to-ground. He was
actually no-shit rescuing lives in Glen Illah during
the actual deployment.
SIDENOTE: We now discover that it was Gary Cordes
himself who was the ‘mysterious hero’ who saved
Glen Ilah resident Bryan Smith and his 85 year old
cousin, who had collapsed in the street with fire
all around her. Cordes was the one who picked her
up off the street and put her in his vehicle and saved
them both.
Only on one of his ‘trips’ delivering civilians back to the
Ranch House Restaurant did Charlie Reyes, boss of
Engine 59, tell Cordes that Granite had deployed.
Cordes was SO SURE that Granite was headed to
Boulder Springs Ranch and had had plenty of time to
get there… his only initial response to Reyes was…
BULLSHIT!
They’re in their (ranch) safety zone and it’s BOMB-PROOF!
Not only was Gary Cordes absolutely sure that Marsh and Granite
Mountain were ‘escaping’ SOUTH to the Boulder Springs Ranch…
he was also so sure that they had had plenty of time to make
it there that when the Captain of Engine Crew 59 ( Charlie Reyes )
first informed Cordes that Granite Mountain had ‘deployed’… Cordes’ first reaction was…
“BULLSHIT!”
“They’re in their (ranch) safety zone and it’s BOMB-PROOF”.
Page 39 of Cordes’ ADOSH interview transcript…
_____________________________________________________
Q1: Okay. Um, so uh, at, at some point um, air uh, during all of
this, um, um, how did you uh, how did you hear of the uh,
deployments?
A: That was back when I met with the group uh, before I went in
to do the rescues, uh, when I met with Engine 59. It was Engine
59 that told me that they had transmitted over the radio, over air
to ground that they had deployed and I, and I, it was Charlie Reyes
whose the, whose the engine boss down there and I told him BS,
that uh, they didn’t need to deploy ‘cause the safety’s, they were in
their safety zone and it was bomb proof and he said no, they never
got – made it there, they got cut off. And that’s when I knew
obviously something bad had most likely occurred.
Q1: Okay. Um, so there was no, there was no question in your
mind though that when, when Eric indicated he was going to the
safety zone, he wasn’t talking about the black, he was talking
about the, the Helm Ranch?
A: Yes, that would, that was my interpretation, yes.
_____________________________________________________
A minute or so after that, Q2 ( Dave Larsen – Rest in Peace )
then just wanted to verify with Cordes that he was sure
Marsh had heard the weather reports AND was aware that
the fire was ALREADY progressing south/southeast when
Marsh said he was going to head to the Boulder Springs Ranch…
____________________________________________________
Q2: Okay. Is the timing of, of all of this, and again, I’m kinda
slow on the uptake, uh, too many night shifts.
A: Yeah, I hear that.
Q2: I uh, Granite Mountain is saying that they are heading to
the pre-destined, pre1833 designated…
A: Safety zone.
Q2: …safety zone and you think that is, is uh…
A: Boulder Springs Ranch.
Q2: …after – yeah, and that has occurred after the wind advisory?
A: Yes.
Q2: And, and you’re saying he had the information at that time that
it had crossed the uh, crossed the road at the grater?
A: Yes.
Q2: So he knew that he was, it’s already blowing by him, below
him and he’s heading to safety, a safety zone?
A: Right.
Q2: That, is that an accurate assessment of, of the, of the
picture there?
A: Yes.
_____________________________________________________
This may help some regarding the weather for June 30, 2013.
The link is for the Stanton RAWS (3600′) east of Congress. The SAIT used this site. One of the key readings to focus on are the HIGH NIGHTTIME TEMPERATURES ABOVE 81 DEGREES. Next, would be the LOW RELATIVE HUMDITIES and the WINDS (increasing and shifting).
The times on the left are in GMT (Greenich Mean Time), so you must subtract 6-7 hours for AZ times. For example, 0600 GMT is midnight (2400) Mountain Standard Time. and 1200 GMT is 0600 Mountain Standard Time. Or something like that.
Just out of curiosity, I figured a (rough) FDFM and PIG with the RAWS data and my wildland app.
INPUT: Temp 92, RH 15%, Slope 10%, Aspect East, Date/Time June 30, 24:00, Fire is 1000′ above me, Fuels Shaded [this represents midnight in Yarnell, extrapolated from the QSTA3 RAWS data, which is when temperature was lowest and RH close to highest]
OUTPUT: Fine Dead Fuel Moisture = 7%, Probability of Ignition = 50%
INPUT: Temp 106, RH 9%, Date/Time June 30, 15:00, Fuels unshaded, all else the same.
OUTPUT: FDFM = 2%, PIG = 100%
Caveats: this is based on a RAWS station located 4 or 5 miles SSE of Yarnell, and about 2000′ lower in elevation than the fire, not on weather readings taken at the scene. Just wanted to see a rough notion of how the readings would compare to what I’m used to seeing.
Hey Sitta, I haven’t had a chance to do a run yet. In and out of meetings. A lower elevation would probably give a higher temp/ low RH, probably result in a higher FB, but thats not a sure thing. Hold on to that and I’ll see if we can come up with a couple of other locations. A cross reference would be probably give the best overall perspective. In all those 214s there are going to be Wx recordings.
I didn’t get any response from WFF’s (current or former) to this comment, so I am reposting it. I would like to know if this is a valid point? And if it is, I want it to be posted here as something for the State of Arizona to at least think about.
Well…that brings up another bone I have to pick with the State of Arizona Division of Forestry, which I also stand ready to be corrected on.
During my years on the fire line, I worked beside a lot of “con” (Department of Corrections) crews in many states, on MOP UP. By and large, I observed these crews to be above average for Type II (?) crews because they wanted to please, stay outside a little longer, get paid a little money, they ate better food, and they were proud of their crews and themselves while they were doing rewarding work.
I did not EVER…as a firefighter or as a fire coordinator (and please keep in mind I worked in fire operations – expanded fire dispatch, from Alaska to North Carolina and in many western states) have any experience in working with, or sending con crews on initial attack.
New Mexico did not even use con crews for mop up or on anything else (that I can remember). Although on a fire in Nevada (I think, or maybe it was northern California) con crews thought that the Santa Fe Hotshots were from the New Mexico State Penitentiary in Santa Fe (which had the bloodiest prison riot in U.S. history) which automatically got us a lot of deference and respect from those crews.
In any case, I think Arizona State Department of Forestry needs to take a hard look at using con crews for initial attack, and is just one more symptom of their overall cost cutting, save money at any cost, including increasing the danger to wildland firefighters and the citizens they serve disease they have.
I strongly believe that IF, the Granite Mountain Hotshots, or any another crew with first rate initial attack credentials would have been used on the Yarnell Hill Fire, it would just be another insignificant fire in the history of wildfires in Arizona.
I know that the ASF was using Inmate Crews for IA back in 2007 with fairly good results. Like all other Type II Crews, they MOSTLY performed mop-up
There was a big push by the State and the Governor’s Office to INCREASE the number of these Crews several years ago. Each Inmate Crew is supervised and managed by a Crew Coordinator. And they even established a position out of the Phoenix office a few years ago for a Supervisor to oversee ALL of the State’s Crew Coordinators.
As you well know, each Crew is a little different and they’re all based on the Leadership styles of the supervisors. But with the new Overseer Coordinator position (for lack of a better term), there should be at least some ‘quality’ standards for them.
Yea Gary they’d be able to tell the difference between Hotshots in 75 and 13. Your picture would be Polaroid and their pic would digital. Sort of a reflection in irony on is own.
And we always said and believed lighting never strikes twice in the same place, but had a stand of young trees close and off the ridge line incase any body got nerves.
Also Gary thanks for the reminder of the good time we had on all those small lightning fires. Sea Rats- and making coffee in a food can you had to watch it didn’t burn your lips.
That’s a good one WFF, dry humor, sarcasm, thoughtful wit, I am starting to really like you. Plus you are contributing some good comments. Keep up the good work!
Reply to calvin post on March 26, 2014 at 3:32 am said:
>> calvin said…
>> Mcdonough does state that he did have a written “unit log” that (a copy) was
>> provided to the SAIT. The ADOSH team asked to see the original copy during
>> Mcdonough’s interview.
>>
>> I would like to see this document.
>> Specifically the time of the last weather observation.
calvin… see the post ( and the reprinted ADOSH emails ) just below this
post regarding ADOSH having obtained ALL of Willis’ emails.
In the same emails we see them making the actual ‘requests’ for
Brendan’s original weather reports and field logs that they told him they
were going to make during his ADOSH interview.
Through Marsha Collier of Prescott Fire… Brendan says he cleaned out
his car and no longer has the original documents.
Lori Burkeen of Prescott Legal department is, herself, now telling ADOSH
that if they want those copies of Brendan’s field logs and weather reports
that Brendan freely gave to Arizona Forestry SAIT… they would have to
take that up with them.
So now we KNOW ( for sure ) that the SAIT has ALWAYS had copies of
Brendan’s actual weather reports ( and field logs ) from June 30.
These documents were NOT included in the SAIT FOIA/FOIL package.
Maybe someone on the SAIT ‘cleaned out their car’ and lost them as well.
Have you seen those? It might be good to do some runs on those and see what kind of fire it results in. I’d like to know if there was spotting, what the distance was, and what the PIG was. Actually several or any Wx recorded from different locations would be a good start.
I may have gotten confused about which way was North in this. when GM dripped off the two track into the drainage, that drainage ran southeast-northwest? So they were traaveling east/southeast to the ranch?
No speculation, no long winded tutorial, no you said this and I respond with this, just the weather ops. If I need a conspiracy theory I’ll ask how the masons were involved or watch the SCIFI channel.
Please read the post above. AFAIK no one has
seen Brendan’s actual weather reports and/or field logs
( both of which are know to exist ) from June 30, 2013,
other than the Arizona Forestry SAIT investigators.
Those documents were not included in the SAIT
FOIA/FOIL package. They should have been.
>> I may have gotten confused about which way was
>> North in this. when GM dripped off the two track into
>> the drainage, that drainage ran southeast-northwest?
>> So they were traaveling east/southeast to the ranch?
Once they were in the fuel-filled box canyon… Yes.
**
** ADOSH OBTAINED ALL OF DARRELL WILLIS’ CELL PHONE RECORDS
** AND
** ERIC MARSH’S CELL PHONE WAS PAID FOR BY CITY OF PRESCOTT
Circa September 4, 2013, ADOSH investigators already knew for sure that
both Darrell Willis and Eric Marsh had cell phones on June 30… but they
weren’t quite sure yet if BOTH of them were supplied/owned by the City of
Prescott or not.
So they requested that the City of Prescott supply all cell phone records
for BOTH Willis and Marsh to see what would happen.
Turns out Willis’ cell phone is/was ( owned by the City of Prescott ), but Eric
Marsh was using his own personal cell phone ( but was receiving a stipend to
pay for it from the City of Prescott ).
The City of Prescott was then obligated to obtain/turnover Willis’ cell phone
records… but because they were only paying Marsh a ‘stipend’ for his phone…
they said that ADOSH would have to make that request through his widow…
Amanda Marsh. ( Marsh’s cell phone is already known via public reverse lookup
on his published number to have been a ‘Nextel’ account in Prescott ).
The City of Prescott DID supply ALL of Willis’ cell phone records to ADOSH,
but there is no evidence in the recently released ADOSH information package
that indicates they ever followed up with a similar request to Amanda Marsh.
ALSO NOTE: ADOSH investigators had already learned by September 4
that Brendan’s original Weather reports had already been ‘discarded’
by the City of Prescott. Marsha Collier of Prescott Fire had already said in
a separate email that Brendan said that he had cleaned out his car and now
couldn’t any of the original documents )… but ADOSH still made another
attempt on September 4 to obtain Brendan’s original weather reports.
There are THREE emails reprinted below…
The FIRST one is the ADOSH request for both Willis’ and Marsh’s
cell phone records to Lori Burkeen of Prescott Legal Department.
The SECOND one is her reply ( 13 days later ) with ‘inline’ comments
about all the documents ADOSH requested.
The THIRD was sent by Lori Burkeen just 4 hours after the second one and
had an attached file containing ALL of Darrell Willis’ cell phone records for
the month of June, 2013
That attached file was named…
“Darrell’s Cell Phone Records June 2-30.pdf”
EVERY document being requested below is present in the recently released
ADOSH investigation materials folder… EXCEPT for the file containing Willis’
cell phone records. It was not released.
Not too surprising. I’m sure this entire document is being withheld
from FOIA/FOIL requests due to privacy laws and the ‘exceptions’ allowed
under FOIA/FOIL… but it’s still interesting to FINALLY learn that at least
SOMEONE obtained ( and HAS ) Willis’ cell phone records from June 30, 2013.
** THE EMAILS
** From page(s) 16-20 of ADOSH document: “Emails L3419 12-30-13.pdf”
This is the first email that ADOSH sent requesting the cell phone records
( and other documents like Brendan’s original weather reports / field logs,
and any documentation about the Wesley fire GM was ‘sent home from’ )…
________________________________________________________________
From: Hanna, Bruce – OSHA State (AZ-SP)
Sent: Wednesday, September 04, 2013 1:20 PM
To: Burkeen, Lori ( Risk Management Technician, Prescott Legal Department )
Subject: Additional documentation requested.
Good afternoon, Lori,
Our consultants two of which you have met have requested the following
documentation from the City of Prescott Human Resources Department
and the City of Prescott Fire Department:
– Brendan McDonough’s Field Notes from Yarnell Hill Fire (Copies previously
provided to SAIT).
– Darrell Willis – City supplied cell phone call history for June 29 and 30, 2013
and cell phone number, service provider, and account number.
– Eric Marsh – City supplied cell phone call history for June 29 and 30, 2013
and cell phone number, service provider, and account number.
– Eric Marsh personnel and medical file provided for review by ADOSH at
City of Prescott
– Eric Marsh payroll records for 2013
– Jesse Steed payroll records for 2013
– Granite Mountain IHC assigned work schedule for 2013
– Granite Mountain IHC “Standards for Interagency Hotshot Crew Operations
Annual IHC Preparedness Review for 2013, 2012 and 2011 (Appendix B).
– Granite Mountain IHC “Standards for Interagency Hotshot Crew Operations
Annual IHC Mobilization Checklist for 2013, 2012 and 2011 (Appendix C).
Chief Willis mentioned in his interview that Granite Mountain refused two
assignments and got unfavorable reviews. The Chief stated that he may
have copies of those particular incidences. We would like those reports if
they are available.
Again, thank you for your cooperation and assistance in this difficult time.
Bruce B. Hanna
State Industrial Hygiensit II
Arizona Division of Occupational Safety and Health
800 W Washington St
Phoenix, AZ 85007
__________________________________________________________________
It took 13 days for Lori Burkeen to REPLY to ADOSH… but when she did
she provided a full ‘status’ report on all the documents requested with
‘inline comments’ inserted into the original request…
__________________________________________________________________
From: Burkeen, Lori
Sent: Tuesday, September 17, 2013 11:07 AM
To: Hanna, Bruce – OSHA State (AZ-SP)
Subject: FW: Additional documentation request.
Attachments: OSAH-ERIC MARSH 2013 hours (3).docx;
OSHA-JESSE STEED 2013 hours.docx
Mr. Hanna:
I apologize for the delay. I was hoping to gather ALL documents before replying to
you. However, I am delayed on a few items. Here is the status of the documents
thus far:
– Brendan McDonough’s Field Notes from Yarnell Hill Fire (Copies previously provided to SAIT)
Lori: Per Marsha Collier at Fire, Brendan McDonough has advised her that he
no longer has these documents. They will need to be requested from SAIT. If
you wish to speak with Mr. McDonough to question why he no longer has them
available, please let me know if we can assist you in speaking with Mr. McDonough.
– Darrell Willis – City supplied cell phone call history for June 29 and 30, 2013
and cell phone number, service provider, and account number.
Lori: Darrell Willis does have a City supplied Cell phone Verizon provider
( cell phone number redacted ). I’m still working on getting the call history.
– Eric Marsh – City supplied cell phone call history for June 29 and 30, 2013
and cell phone number, service provider, and account number.
Lori: Eric Marsh did NOT have a City supplied cell phone. He received $25/month
stipend for his personal cell phone. You would need to request that information
from his widow, Amanda Marsh.
– Eric Marsh personnel and medical file provided for review by ADOSH
at City of Prescott
Lori: Personnel file is available. I have it copied and is available for release. It is
too large to scan. Please let me know if you wish to pick it up or would like
me to mail it to you. Per our City Attorney, we cannot release Marsh’s medical
documents without a subpeona or written release from his widow.
– Eric Marsh payroll records for 2013
Lori: Attached
– Jesse Steed payroll records for 2013
Lori: Attached
– Granite Mountain IHC assigned work schedule for 2013
Lori: Granite Mountain IHC assigned work schedule for 2013 was 01/01/2013
Mon-Thur 0700-1730 10 hrs per day four days a week with a 1/2 hr lunch break.
04/09/2013 Tues-Sat 0800-1630 8 hrs per day 8 days a week with 1/2 hr lunch
break. Their work schedule would have remained Tues-Sat until the end of fire
season, in past years they would switch back to 4 10’s sometime in October.
– Granite Mountain IHC “Standards for Interagency Hotshot Crew Operations
Annual IHC Preparedness Review for 2013, 2012 and 2011 (Appendix B).
Lori: Will send via separate email ( documents too big for one email )
– Granite Mountain IHC “Standards for Interagency Hotshot Crew Operations
Annual IHC Mobilization Checklist for 2013, 2012 and 2011 (Appendix C).
Lori: Will send via separate email ( documents too big for one email )
Chief Willis mentioned in his interview that Granite Mountain refused two
assignments and got unfavorable reviews. The Chief stated that he may have
copies of those particular incidences. We would like those reports if they are
available.
Lori: I have one log from Eric Marsh. I will send via separate email.
Document too big for one email.
Lori Burkeen
Risk Management Technician
City of Prescott Legal Department – Risk Mgt Division
( Phone number redacted )
__________________________________________________________________
About 4 hours later ( same day ), Lori Burkeen sends ADOSH another email
with Darrell Willis’ complete cell phone records as a file attachment…
__________________________________________________________________
From: Burkeen, Lori
Sent: Tuesday, September 17, 2013 2:51 PM
To: Hanna, Bruce – OSHA State (AZ-SP)
Cc: Ripley, Linda
Subject: RE: Marsh personnel and medical file/Tom Cooley
Attachments: Darrell’s Cell Phone Records June 2-30.pdf
Yes, Mr. Cooley works for the Prescott Fire Department – Fire Suppression
Division.
Also, I have received the cell phone records for Darrell Willis. They are attached.
I believe we have made available or have produced everything to date that
you have requested. Please let me know if we are still missing anything.
As always, please let me know if we can be of additional help.
Lori Burkeen
Risk Management Technician
City of Prescott Legal Department – Risk Mgt Division
( Phone number redacted )
__________________________________________________________________
Just want to say thanks again for digging into the documents like you have. I haven’t even gotten everything downloaded yet — it’s nice to have you cataloging/summarizing and linking what you find.
I’ve had time to read through some of it, and look at some of the pictures and videos, but not enough to really sync anything much in my head, much less converse about any of it.
I really appreciate WTKTT’s pulling things out and transcribing them here.
One of the ‘indirect’ revelations coming out of the
ADOSH material is, of course, even more proof
of how MUCH the Arizona Forestry SAIT
investigators MUST have known.
Example: Just read Gary Cordes’ ADOSH
interview… then compare that with the SAIT
Investigation Notes ( YIN ) and Cordes’
handwritten ‘Unit Log’ from that day.
The SAIT KNEW that Gary Cordes never had
any doubts that Granite Mountain had ‘left
the safe black’ and were headed to the
Boulder Springs Ranch.
Same thing applies to all the other ADOSH
interviews. It is not believable that these men
would have told any remarkably ‘different’
stories to the SAIT investigators… with the
same information we can now see.
The SAIT was a ‘coverup’.
There really is no doubt about it now… and I
think the taxpayers of Arizona should ( at the
very least ) be asking for the 1 or 2 million dollars
back that THEY paid for this worthless document.
As I have stated before, Tony Sciacca was a highly respected hotshot crew boss from my generation. I also know that in later life, he was a highly respected USFS Fire Management Officer, and he rose to be one of the most highly respected fire commanders in the nation before he retired from the USFS.
I would imagine he is a good safety officer today. There is a lot that happened on the Yarnell Hill Fire that I can’t explain, to myself or anyone else except to say that chaos was running the fire on June 30, 2013. Which as I have said before, is not uncommon, especially in the first 36 hours.
Copy (all) that… but that still doesn’t mean there aren’t little
‘details’ that have emerged ( and are still emerging ) from
the YHF that might not fall into the top level ‘Lessons learned
from the Yarnell Tragedy’ category… but they just *might*
( emphasis *might* ) be some ‘good things to remember’
in the future.
Such as…
1) For Hotshots… don’t believe your radio is going to be usable
once you get into a REAL ( foil lined ) fire shelter. It might be
working from under those green ‘practice’ things… but the situation
is probably going to be much different when it’s the ‘real thing’.
2) For Line Safety Officers…. if you are ever tasked with making
sure ALL firefighters are ‘accounted for’ and ‘safe’… don’t assume
that just because you see a Crew Carrier parked somewhere or
you see it go by you that it *actually* has the Crew in it. Find out
for sure.
3) If you are asking important/direct questions over the radio
and you even get the slightest feeling that the person on the other
end is trying to ‘dodge’ your question… Be polite… but
ASK IT AGAIN and make SURE YOU GET A GOOD ANSWER.
Although I believe that in part because Tony Sciacca is himself a former hotshot and he knew Eric Marsh and Jesse Steed very well personally, and I imagine he had the utmost respect for both men.
I think he probably had the miscellaneous structure groups and the John Q. Public’s who were still walking their dogs in the shadow of the pyro cumulous cloud of ash and fire (as xxfullsailxx said) more on his mind than some of the best of the best. Just sayin’.
i don’t think any of us WFF’s need any lessons learned from an anonymous internet conspiracy theorist who has never set foot on a fireline or even probably thought about WFF’ing prior to this incident.
The lessons learned are obvious. Most aren’t new there the same ones from other fires. People aren’t perfect the higher the stress level and the responsibility role the tougher it is to not make mistakes. Anyone who has worked fire on days like this knows well how hectic and loose it is.
All other speculation aside. Downhill into a green drainage, during an extreme fire day, without the ability to monitor current conditions. Really everything else is details to statisfy curriosity and need to know. The lesson is right there, bad judgement.
I think most of the lessons learned are obvious to those who have been on the fireline for a few years, but there’s a new crop of hundreds (thousands?) of WFFs every year, who haven’t had this pounded into their heads. And then there’s the public, who needs to know the consequences of firewise vs. fire hazards (and by the looks of most WUI, is not even aware of the game yet). We need to keep teaching the lessons until the public (or insurance companies?) grok them. Most disturbingly, there are the folks in leadership positions in fire who *should* OBVIOUSLY know all this stuff, but based on their actions (which have only been scrutinized as far as they pertain to actual WFF deaths), obviously do not commit it to action.
When people quit dying, we can quit pretending that the lessons discussed here are obvious for everyone.
Which of course, is why it is so important to have experienced people responsible for firefighters lives, and to follow all of the rules all of the time as Bob Powers and RTS say. Yes…I am conflicted.
The rules were designed to fit each situation.
Gary — I get you now, you used them to fit your situation and used what you needed to stay safe.
****(Follow the rules all the time)****
Little difference same concept…………
And that is why, Gary, it concerns me to hear upper fire management (administration) suggest that the vast majority of WFFs ought to be college students on summer break (such seasonals, after all, are cheap, disposable, and still on Mom and Dad’s insurance plan).
**
** ERIC MARSH’S UNIT LOG FROM THE WESLEY FIRE, 2012
After Darrell Willis informed ADOSH investigators that he recalled at least one
time ( in 2012 ) when Granite Mountain had been ‘sent home from a fire’ ( The
Wesley Fire )… ADOSH asked Willis to produce any documentation regarding
that incident.
Willis produced a ‘Unit Log’ that Marsh wrote telling his side of the story on the
Wesley fire.
NOTE: When Brendan McDonough was asked the same question in HIS
ADOSH interview about ‘ever being sent home from any fire’… Brendan said
that as long as he had been with the crew ( 3 seasons, 2011, 2012, and 2013 )…
…it had NEVER happened.
Here is Eric Marsh’s handwritten Unit Log from the Wesley Fire…
1. Incident Name: Wesley – DIV A
2. Date Prepared: 09/22/12
3. Time Prepared: 1600
4. Unit Name/Designators: Granite Mountain IHC
5. Unit Leader ( Name and Position ): Eric Marsh, SUPT
6. Operational Period: 09 21-22 12
7. Activity Log ( Continue on Reverse )
Time: N/A
Major Events
On 9/21, a plan was prepared by TFLD(t) Humbach to use some of our existing
control line/features and tie in a piece of indirect line across Lick Creek from the
East to West ending up in an open area with sparse fuels. I scouted the line out,
and soon after tied in with Snake River’s SUPT and we both looked at the line,
made some adjustments, and made a plan to begin work.
Talked to TFLD(t) Humbach about the specifics of the piece of indirect work and
the plan was to start on it a.m. 092212.
When arriving @ (?) spoke @ the end of shift, I tied in with DIV A Sayer and
discussed the indirect, got some feedback concerning other line construction
that would hopefully tie in to our indirect , and also updated on fire movement
during the shift. ( signed Eric Marsh ).
On 9/22, assignment for us after 0700 radio briefing was to engage in construction
of indirect piece crossing Lick Creek. We left camp, parked @ DP5, and hiked in
to begin work.
Soon after, DIV A Sayer and TFLD(t) Humbach tied in with me at the start of our
line and said they had a change in plans. Our new assignment was to do direct
into Lick Creek. I stated that I was not comfortable with that tactic based on the
exposure to hazardous trees (snags / fire damaged). Sayer stated that his
comfort level was high and that they had gone direct in hazardous conditions the
first 5 or so days of the fire. My crew had been in DIV A for 7 days, loosing direct
and indirect line.We had also constructed control/contingency lines. As a lookout
over a three day period prior to 9/22, in Lick Creek fire area I heard and witnessed
multiple hazard trees fall. My Captain, Jesse Steed, and other crewmembers also
had similar experiences.
I had ruled out going direct due to control issues, but more because of safety
concerns in Lick Creek prior to a.m. 9/22. This feeling was crew consensus
.
I stated that I would not go direct. We then argued about going direct vs. burning
the indirect. I stated that the same conditions would need to exist for either tactic
to be successful, so the question is which is safer.Sayer and Humbach hiked up
the hill to scout out the direct line from the top. Approximately 20 minutes later, I
chose to scout the direct line from the Lick Creek drainage to the top of our
indirect. I did this with the intent of investigating to my fullest potential the direct
line construction option for DIV A and also to assess current fire conditions,
location, work loads, time frames, escape routes, and hazardous trees. My
scouting mission revealed low to moderate fire behavior with occassional
single to small group torching with calm winds to updrainage 0-2 mph. Fire edge
was fingered with (?) spots 5-150 feet from the dominant fire edge. Approx.
3/4 mile of direct fire edge. Within one hour time period while scouting in the Lick
Creek, six hazard trees fell in the fire area, the closest one (about) 50 yards away.
Evidence of both snags and “green” trees that had fell in previous days was
abundant. The sixth tree that fell was behind Sayer as I tied in with him on the
black edge; the distance back maybe 75 – 100 yards. My comfort level for working
in that area remained low.
We continued our discussion about risk vs. reward, differing comfort levels, his
reluctance to burn the indirect, and my primary job being to ensure the safety of
my crewmembers. We parted ways again without consensus on any plan. My
crew continued constructing the indirect line while I scouted through the siutation
with the help of my Captain.
My discussions with Sayer were not mean or vindictive, but they were
opinionated and passionate.
I simplified it down to there being 3 options for dealing with this piece of ground.
(1) Construct indirect and burn
(2) Construct indirect and let the fire bump it.
(3) Go direct.
Since there was such resistance to burn, I decided to remove that option.
I thought going direct was too hazardous, so that left option (2), indirect and let
the fire bump it. I then contacted TFLD (?) and told him a summary of the
morning events and that we could construct the indirect, (?) it and set up
sprinklers. I later tied in with (Crane?) Valley IHC and they tied into the West
side of our line from their anchor.
I then informed (Shoban?) #1 (Sam) that we had turned down the assignment to
go direct, to ensure that they had that knowldege. ( Signed: Eric Marsh ).
Date Prepared: 092412
Time Prepared: 2130
Operational Period: 092412
Time: 1730
Major Events
As the crew was leaving DIV A enroute to ICP to close out our day 14, I was
asked to tie in with DIV A and DIV A(t) @ (Bitter Spike?). DIV A(t) John Segan
telling me how we had done some good work but due to our refusal to go direct
on 9/22, that we had failed to meet their operational directives for their division.
They handed me an evaluation that stated such which I refused to sign based
on the inaccuracies.
The eval stated that after presented with options to mitigate the snags, that I still
refused the assignment.
Options cited were IHC fallers and/or professional fallers. I ran an IHC so I have
my own fallers ( BandC ). My concern was not the complexity of the trees but
the condition of the trees based on fire damage.
Also I refused the assignment based on the fact of sheer numbers of hazard
trees. Can you cut them all?
This negative evaluation appeared to be a reprisal for saying no to DIV A’s plan.
I presented an option to him that allowed my crew and other resources to work
in safety – indirect. The same assignment that was already tasked to my crew!
During the eval discussion, it was stated by DIV A that the indirect line, which
he assigned to me, was not in line with his objectives. He then discussed my
unwillingness to change tactics based on fire behavior. Again untrue.
The fire was backing towards the indirect line at a reasonable and predictable
rate. Since I was not allowed to conduct any firing operations, even with
favorable conditions, our ability to utilize proven and safe tactics were limited
by DIV A. This info was presented to me as I was leaving, after we had held
the fire with out indirect line ( rain helped ). No discussion with DIV A
occurred between the refusal and our demob 9-22 to 9-24.
Points:
(1) Resources need the ability to refuse unsafe assignments without
fear of reprisal.
(2) Crew’s side of the story needs told. This is not about me vs. DIV A, but
rather about a crew being punished with a bad eval for trying to go home safe.
He was only on the fire 7 days. And says he was closed out on day 14 to go home? So was he sent home intentionally or did they go home after 14 days on duty? So the excuse was they met there 14 day rest period rather than the fire sent them home. Willis says they were sent home I tend to believe that. The crew may have been told they hit there 14 day brake. There excuse for refusing the direct line was week when fallers could have secured the snags along the line. Marsh made up his mind he did not want to do it and wanted to do it his way.
>> Mr. Powers said…
>> He was only on the fire 7 days. And says he was
>> closed out on day 14 to go home? So was he sent
>> home intentionally or did they go home after 14 days
>> on duty?
Good question. ADOSH requested ALL material that
Prescott Fire might have had regarding BOTH of
‘incidents’ that Willis talked about in his ADOSH
interview…
…but all Prescott Fire coughed up was this one
handwritten log sheet from the Wesley fire.
Marsh IS, in fact, making it sound like he was already
on his way to just ‘check out’ from the fire ( as if they
knew they were done )… and then he gets ambushed
with this ‘bad evaluation’ and refuses to sign it.
He does, however, still use the word ‘demob’ in his
unit log. Is there only one meaning for that word in
the WFF biz… or more than one.
If you simply leave a fire because your contract has
officially ended ( no incidents or bad reports )… can
you also just simply refer to that as your ‘demob’
moment? That’s what Marsh seems to be trying to
establish in his written unit log, anyway.
>> Mr. Powers also said…
>> So the excuse was they met there 14 day rest period
>> rather than the fire sent them home.
Maybe that’s what Marsh ( and/or Steed ) simply
told the crew… and why Brendan said in his ADOSH
interview that they had NEVER been ‘demobbed’
or ‘sent home from a fire’.
>> Willis says they were sent home I tend to believe that.
I can’t imagine why Willis would say that to the ADOSH
investigators unless it was, in fact, the truth.
>> Mr. Powers also said…
>> The crew may have been told they hit there 14 day
>> brake.
It’s possible. If that’s what happened ( and it really
wasn’t true )… then how usual / unusual is THAT?…
…for a Type 1 Hotshot Crew Boss to LIE to his men
about something like that?
Wouldn’t that be quite a risk that someday your own
men will be talking to some other crew who knows
the REAL story… and would suddenly find out that
you ( The Supt ) had LIED to them?
It’s a small world in WFF, right?
>> Mr. Powers also said…
>> There excuse for refusing the direct line was week
>> when fallers could have secured the snags along the
>> line. Marsh made up his mind he did not want to do
>> it and wanted to do it his way.
Marsh wanted to ‘burn freely’.
Said so himself ( in his post-incident unit log ).
They weren’t letting him.
He didn’t like it.
I have no doubt he meant his last two sentences,
but I still can’t help shaking my head at the irony…
Marsh closed with…
(1) Resources need the ability to refuse unsafe
assignments without fear of reprisal.
(2) Crew’s side of the story needs told. This is not
about me vs. DIV A, but rather about a crew being
punished with a bad eval for trying to go home safe.
Keyphrase: “This is not about me vs. DIV A”.
I wonder if that is exactly what was going through
Jesse Steed’s head during the ‘discussing their options’
conversation on June 30, 2013… when (now) HIS
“DIVS A” was actively pressing him about HIS ‘comfort
level’ for some assignment HE was being asked to
‘perform’ by “DIVS A”.
We all know what “comfort level” means now the minute
it appears in any WFF conversation. Standard lingo.
It means someone is trying to get someone else to
do something they want them to do.
“Tell me your comfort level” means “Tell me why you
are hesitant to do something I want you to do.”
Thanks. So the fact that Eric himself used
the world ‘demob’ in his own notes means
nothing, really. They *might* have been
hitting a normal ‘off the fire’ point ( as
Brendan says happened at Wesley ) OR
they might have actually been being
‘sent home early’ ( as Willis testified
to ADOSH ).
I guess only some more documentation
regarding Wesley fire is really going to
clear that up.
Maybe I assumed to much from that statement. I did not see a start date only the last date. If that was the open line DIV that would normally be where the Hot Shots were.
A need to know is when they arrived. Thanks WFF
Regardless of any ‘time limits’… there is still the fact
that Prescott Wildland Division Chief told ADOSH
investigators that GM was, in fact, “sent home from
the Wesley fire” because they refused an
assignment.
I can’t even imagine a scenario where Darrell
Willis… the ‘defender of GM’ at all times… would
say something like that it wasn’t the truth ( or
he didn’t fully believed that is what happened ).
Additional videos have been uploaded to the Aerial Firefighting Study in the supplemental information for the Serious Accident Investigation Report. Two additional videos will be uploaded shortly to complete this folder.
“State lawmakers took the first steps Tuesday to immunize the Land Department from mistakes and negligence that result in forest fires — even if that means destroyed homes and dead firefighters.”
I am confused…again. I know that I haven’t been on the fire line for a long time. OK…it’s been a really long time. BUT…I think I could show photographs of hotshots working on a fire line in 2013, AND photos of hotshots working on a fire line in 1975, and the general public wouldn’t be able to tell the difference.
In fact, wildland firefighters may not be able to tell the difference, if they did not look closely at the equipment or tools that are being used. Camelbacks for water on firefighter backs now versus hard plastic and metal 1 gallon canteens that have narrow nylon straps that cut into your shoulders, and bang you in the back of your head every time you swing your tool while bent over working the fire line or mopping up.
Not to mention some of the weird looking tools that are being used now, brooms and garden rakes with short handles, and some kind of hybrid (even more hybrid than the original) trenching tool, which we did not have way back when. It also looks like McCloud’s have disappeared…good. MEDC has been busy.
And if you see a photo of a firefighter eating MRE’s, instead of eating out of small metal olive drab cans, that is also a dead-give-away. Although I was still with the Santa Fe Hotshots with Region sent out the MRE’s for us to taste test. They got four stars, or however many stars the very finest cuisine get.
That being said, there were a number of things we never said to each other, and no fire manager officer or other fire overhead ever said to us either. Here is my top 10 list. Listing all of the things that we never said, heard or worried about would be kind of like proving a negative, how do you name all of the things you never thought of, heard, or worried about.
Number 10. You had better not go fight a wildfire because you might get eaten by a bear or a mountain lion.
Number 9. You had better not go fight a wildfire because you might get hit by a falling widow maker or tree.
Number 8. You had better not go fight a wildfire because might get wet and cold, and die from hypothermia.
Number 7. I couldn’t think of any more off the top of my head…so I skipped directly to Number 1.
Number 1. You had better not go fight a wildfire because you might get hit by lightning.
WTF…as others have said!
I have said many times that I do not blame the field level Arizona Division of Forestry managers e.g., Russ Shumate, for the Yarnell Hill Fire, because I think they are just doing (as they have always done) the best job they can, and play the hand the cheap-ass Arizona State Legislature, and the conservative (cheap-ass) citizens of Arizona deal them.
I will also defer to RTS, and others who have more initial attack experience in Arizona than I do, although I spend 6 years on the Happy Jack Hotshots on top of the Mogollon Rim (lots of lighting), where our district, the Long Valley Ranger District had the forest helicopter. And 4 years with the Santa Fe Hotshots flying to lighting fires out of the Santa Fe National Forest Helibase in the Jemez Mountains to the Sangre de Christo Mountains and beyond.
Plus going to lighting fires on the Tonto N.F. in small teams of hotshots (and other forests, including the Prescott N.F., Weaver Mountains and all) which were our bread and butter during the monsoon season, and things were slow out-of-state. Easy money…and it all paid the same.
Lightning fires. Such a fond memory. I feel some more random thoughts coming on. Lighting fires, otherwise known as helitack, and smokejumper fires. I think you already know what a “hotshot” fire is, if you have been following this thread.
Now let me tell you what a lighting fire is like. It’s like going camping with your buddies, except no alcohol. Yes, you will have to cut a little line, very “little” I might add. You will probably have to cut down a tree or two. Do a little mop up, very “little” I might add.
And maybe make a little hooch out of your poncho, because it is either raining, or it will be raining. Build a warming fire, because it will be cold after you cut a little line, work up a sweat, and the chilly night air sets in. Poke a couple holes in your little can of beanie weanies, and heat it up. And best of all, poke a couple of holes in your little can of pound cake (or something like a brownie), pour a little water in it, steam it over the warming fire, and it will taste just as good as it did when it was first baked…during the Vietnam War.
Kick back, make a pillow by folding your gloves on top of your hard hat, put on your hoodie and goose down vest, and settle in to tell some lies to each other that get better each time you tell them. Drift off to sleep thinking about the “oats” (overtime), not to mention the hazard pay, and night time differential you are making while you are waiting for daylight so you can hike out to a road carrying all of the equipment and tools that flew in with you so you can be picked up by a miscellaneous district person driving a 4×4.
Not go fight a wildfire because you might get hit by lighting? Are you kidding me? Has anybody out there ever heard of a wildland firefighter getting killed by lightning? I know it must have happened somewhere, but that sure as hell doesn’t stop crazy golfers from going golfing does it? As the old joke goes, hit the ball, drag your buddy, hit the ball, drag your buddy. I think you have a better chance of getting killed if the damn helicopter augers in on auto rotate…and nobody ever stayed at base because that might happen.
FYI – I have written long enough that you have finally found out one of my most innermost secrets. I always wanted to be a helitack, and then a smokejumper, but I was to damn big (fat). I would have needed a cargo chute not to go splat on the ground. Jealousy can be a terrible thing.
i don’t think that having a bunch of resources hanging out on a scabby ridgeline through mid-afternoon monsoon or, worse yet, dry lightning is a good idea. i wouldn’t keep my crew up there through a lightning storm.
though i do continue to struggle with the initial attack decisions of the Yarnell Fire… on one hand, i can totally understand the response that was made and minimal resources thrown at it that first day. i can only imagine the budget constraints that AZ DOF is under these days (nice work blue hair conservative AZ voters)… and i know BLM took their share of budget cuts last year…
on the other hand, it was a Type 4 incident, with a trainee, and neither of them were up on the hill assessing the work load, or the progress that was being made or the possibility of needing more resources or improving access in to the fire?
it seems to me, that if it is near the end of June in the southwest and you have dry fuel advisories, long term drought, and a lightning start in 40 year decadent brush that is also within close proximity to three communities, that you better damn well stomp it out the first chance you get…
but then you look at the photos of that fire on the afternoon/evening of the 28th and it looks like it put itself out and is hung up in the rocks… and you put yourself in the shoes of a duty officer, with limited resources and a lot of potential other starts and the decision to throw a short DOC crew up on the hill to mop it up until potential t-storms develop seems pretty reasonable.
Well…that brings up another bone I have to pick with the State of Arizona Division of Forestry, which I also stand ready to be corrected on.
During my years on the fire line, I worked beside a lot of “con” (Department of Corrections) crews in many states, on MOP UP. By and large, I observed these crews to be above average for Type II (?) crews because they wanted to please, stay outside a little longer, get paid a little money, they ate better food, and they were proud of their crews and themselves while they were doing rewarding work.
I did not EVER…as a firefighter or as a fire coordinator (and please keep in mind I worked in fire operations – expanded fire dispatch, from Alaska to North Carolina and in many western states) have any experience in working with, or sending con crews on initial attack.
New Mexico did not even use con crews for mop up or on anything else (that I can remember). Although on a fire in Nevada (I think, or maybe it was northern California) con crews thought that the Santa Fe Hotshots were from the New Mexico State Penitentiary in Santa Fe (which had the bloodiest prison riot in U.S. history) which automatically got us a lot of deference and respect from those crews.
In any case, I think Arizona State Department of Forestry needs to take a hard look at using con crews for initial attack, and is just one more symptom of their overall cost cutting, save money at any cost, including increasing the danger to wildland firefighters and the citizens they serve disease they have.
I strongly believe that IF, the Granite Mountain Hotshots, or any another crew with first rate initial attack credentials would have been used on the Yarnell Hill Fire, it would just be another insignificant fire in the history of wildfires in Arizona.
Reply to Gary Olson post on
March 26, 2014 at 11:57 pm
>> Gary said…
>>
>> I strongly believe that IF, the Granite Mountain
>> Hotshots, or any another crew with first rate
>> initial attack credentials would have been used
>> on the Yarnell Hill Fire, it would just be another
>> insignificant fire in the history of wildfires in
>> Arizona.
Strongly agree. This is not meant to be a ‘dis’
aimed at the DOC crew… but given the location
of the fire, the terrain, the conditions, etc… I
believe it was just ‘outside’ their expertise but
either didn’t realize it for 5 hours that day or
were afraid to admit it.
If Granite Mountain has been called up the night
before and were there in the AM… they would
have probably had the nails in the lid of the
coffin on that thing before 3:00 PM ( when the
winds started to pick up ).
Even if the terrain was a nightmare… I believe
THEY would have determined that very early
on and the much-needed bucket drops that
day would have been rockin’ and rollin’ LONG
before anything ever ‘jumped a road’.
There are LESSONS to be learned here still…
even from just what happened ( or didn’t
happen ) on Saturday.
Copy that. Brendan McDonough
himself, in his ADOSH interview,
says he’s the one who took a small
‘crew’ over the west ridge to do
some ‘cold black tie in’ work… and
Brendan described some of that
terrain where the fire had been
burning on Saturday as (literally)…
“cliffs with heavy vegetation”.
There’s no ‘hand crew’ in the world
that could really fight that on foot with
nothing but Pulaskis and Chainsaws.
You posted some statements here regarding what YOU believe are the duties, functions, and responsibilities of Safety Officers.
WTKTT posted “Sciacca said: “And I was like, well I guess everybody’s in the buggies. You don’t ask those questions.”
“Are you f**king kidding me? “You don’t ask those questions.” Really?… even when you are being paid to be a ‘Line Safety Officer’ and it’s time for you know EXACTLY where ALL the crews are?” … Unbelievable.”
Not really. That’s totally believable to me that he did and said that. I think you’re giving way too much responsibility and maybe even culpability to the Safety Officer(s) and NOT the GMHS themselves. The GMHS was responsible to maintain PROMPT communication with their supervisor and adjoioning forces (Fire Order #7) and they didn’t do that.
“One more ‘lesson’ ( for future Safety Officers ) to take away from the Yarnell Hill Fire… Just because you see Crew Carriers driving by you… do NOT *assume* anyone is actually IN them. … Find OUT if they are… and if not… then find out WHERE that entire crew REALLY is… ASAP.”
Safety is NOT in the Operations realm; they are in the Command and General Staff area. Safety Officers are NOT suppossed to get involved operationally.
“There was still time for him to have gotten on the horn and found out EXACTLY where they were… EXACTLY what they were DOING and what their plans were… and if they were SAFE ( and going to remain so ).”
There MAY be a bit of ‘hind sight bias’ here because in the normal sense of fire operations, Safety Officers don’t normally concern themselves who is or is not in every vehicle that they encounter.
As WFF, we should be safe because it’s the right thing to do, not because a Safety Officer is present or we might get ‘caught’ by a Safety Officer. The bottom line to me is that Marsh and Steed and GMHS were engaging in unsafe actions by NOT following ‘the WFF Rules’ that day. And I allege this was the result of ‘prior bad decisions with good outcomes’ or put another way, they continued to get away with their unsafe actions and it strongly influenced continued unsafe behaviors. And I NOT buying either Willis’ or McDonough’s assertions that they were always safe and everyone always spoke up and whatever else they alleged.
RTS… ALL your points are well taken and I was expecting a
fair amount of ‘push back’ on this one.
It was just ‘a moment’ that day in a lot of ‘moments’ that might
have gone differently.
I still think it was a ‘bad assumption’ on Sciacca’s part… to
be functioning ( on scene trying to make sure all FFs are
getting safe ) that entire Hotshot crews were headed to
safety when their buggies were, in fact, EMPTY.
Could you explain the difference between a ‘Line Safety Officer’
and a normal ‘Safety Officer’?
I am assuming ( perhaps wrongly ) that the distinction is that
a ‘Line Safety Officer’ is, in fact, supposed to be ‘Out on the
Line’ and making sure the ‘Line’ resources are both…
1) Following all established Safety Procedures
2) Actually ‘intervening’ directly when it is discovered they are NOT
I also still think it’s astounding that Sciacca was NOT more
aware that there were TWO Hotshot Crews even working
the fire that day until he (apparently) ‘accidentally’ found that out.
Perhaps some of Sciacca’s testimony about how all anyone
ever told him was that there were ‘3 structure protection groups’,
and that Musser’s IAP ( Incident Action Plan ) apparently didn’t
even show the presence of 2 Hotshot crews… was some of
the evidence ADOSH used for their conclusion that there
was WAAAY too much emphasis on ‘structure protection’
going on that day… and not enough emphasis on the (true)
location and safety of ALL resources working the fire.
I’m sure this debate will continue for a loooong time.
Fair enough, good comments. The Fireline Safety Officer (SOFR) functions as you stated, “on the fireline.” They are required to be Task Force Leader (TFLD) qualified pass the ‘arduous’ Pack Test. The Safety Officer Type 2 (SOF2) is Division/Group Supervisor (DIVS) qualified and only has to pass the moderate Pack Test. However, BOTH can and do function as SOFR on wildfires.SOF2 are often ordered to ‘FILL’ SOFR resource order requests. Such was the caseon the YHF.I think that BOTH Sciacca and Cole are Red Carded as Type I Safety Officers.
Yes, empty Crew Carriers would imply that the Crews are out on the firelines somewhere, but it is generally accepted and understood that they are practicing the WFF Rules wherever they are and whatever they’re doing. If I saw empty Crew Carriers, that’s how I would take it. In the light of what occured on the YHF, I will likely change my attitude toward those observations.
WTKTT posted that Safety Officers are to:ensure that the WFF are “1) Following all established Safety Procedures [and] 2) Actually ‘intervening’ directly when it is discovered they are NOT.”
Yes, to a point. Safety Officers can only intervene into the Operations realm when it is in fact a safety concern or potential safety concern. However, NOT all Safety Officers are proactive, as you are implying should have been the case in the YHF that day.
One consequence of Wildland Urban Interface (WUI) fires these days, is that the actual WILDLAND firefighting takes a back seat compared to the actual Structure Protection or now-called Structure Defense, after the YHF debacle.
>> RTS wrote…
>> Yes, to a point. Safety Officers can only intervene
>> into the Operations realm when it is in fact a
>> safety concern or potential safety concern.
>> However, NOT all Safety Officers are proactive,
>> as you are implying should have been the case
>> in the YHF that day.
I also did not meant to imply that the moment
Sciacca even might have ‘felt’ something
‘wasn’t quite right’… that he could have immediately
even done anything about it.
See my own quote below about how ( I don’t
know where I heard this but I believe it is true )
the ONLY time a ‘Safety Officer’ can immediately
override the normal ‘chain of command’ is when
there is, in fact, an IMMEDIATE threat to life or
serious injury.
Even if Sciacca had realized that not ALL of the
firefighters were ‘accounted for’ ( GM totally
missing ) circa 4:15… there would still have
been a number of other things that would have
had to have happened before he ( or anyone
else ) could have ‘intervened’.
There would have to have been enough SERIOUS
concern about their whereabouts AND about
the fire progress to really believe an ‘intervention’
countdown should have started.
Example: Clawson, Hulburd and Yowell were
right there on Shrine road with Sciacca. If
Sciacca had actually noticed the GM buggies
were EMPTY as they drove past him… he
MIGHT have then turned to one of them to
ask them if the knew what the heck was
going on and if they knew where GM really was.
That wouldn’t have done any good.
We can hear with our own ears in the Helmet Cam
video that all three of them (also) believed Granite
Mountain was ‘in the safe black’ and when the
MAYDAYS started to appear on Air-to-Ground
they were just as dumfounded as anyone as to
why Granite would be running saws and saying
they ‘deploying shelters’ in the safe black’.
So even if Sciacca was trying to determine exactly
where this ‘missing Hotshot crew’ really was…
his own concern could have then gotten
short-circuited if he trusted what someone
else near him was telling him.
The ONLY ‘countdown to intervention’ that would
have done any good is if he really did decide
for himself to trust no one’s ‘assumption’ about
where they were and had called them DIRECTLY
in the 4:15 to 4:30 timeframe.
“We can hear with our own ears in the Helmet Cam video that all three of them (also) believed Granite Mountain was ‘in the safe black’ and when the MAYDAYS started to appear on Air-to-Ground they were just AS DUMBFOUNDED AS ANYONE as to why Granite would be running saws and saying they [were] ‘deploying shelters’ in the safe black’. WTF? WTF? WTF? WTF? WTF?
ALL of us, EVERY ONE of us feels that same way, EXCEPT for the rare few that believe that some strange, intense smoke or the possibility of some super-intense heat or possible lightning FORCING them out of their perfectly good SZ.
Paul had only been there since that morning what do you expect his IAP to be. Is this even 24 hours after the start? Common man you’re doing alot of research but not showing allot of knowledge. You think that someone was running chick in during this, maybe people were showing up at a card table and presenting their Red Card that’s in the manual too.
You’re givng way too much credit for people having total SA. Listen to RTS he’s a carded SOF, probably wouldn’t have taken the time to show it that day..
>> WFF said…
>> Paul had only been there since that morning
>> what do you expect his IAP to be?
If it’s the ‘IAP’ he was (apparently) showing to
all the mid-afternoon inbound Type 2 ordered
overhead… I EXPECT it to be ACCURATE…
or at least not give the false impression that
there were ONLY ‘3 structure groups’ working
the fire.
>> WFF…
>> Is this even 24 hours after the start?
Start of the fire?
Start of the decision to try a Type 2 short?
Not sure what you mean there.
>> WFF
>> Common man you’re doing alot of research but
>> not showing allot of knowledge. You think that
>> someone was running chick in during this,
>> maybe people were showing up at a card table
>> and presenting their Red Card that’s in the
>> manual too.
Again… not fully ‘parsing’ what you were trying
to say there… but what I AM doing at the moment
is listening to the audio interviews and reading
all the transcripts of the recently released
ADOSH investigation material.
There is a LOT of it… and it is providing a level
of detail that’s long overdue.
We can debate the ‘actual’ check-in procedures
( flawed or not ) or the ‘actual’ job descriptions
for some of these people… but there is no longer
any mystery about what they, themselves, had
to say to ADOSH.
Sciacca SAYS he just ‘assumed’ the entire
Granite Mountain crew were ‘safe in their buggies’
circa 4:15 PM.
He was dead wrong.
>> WFF said…
>> You’re givng way too much credit for
>> people having total SA
Not asking for ‘total SA’. We all know that was
‘out the window’ at the Yarnell Hill Fire.
I was ‘hoping’ for at least ‘enough’ SA that a
Line Safety Officer ( at a moment when it was
absolutely critical to know where ALL the crews
were ) would not just ‘assume’ 19-20 firefighters
are in Crew Carriers… when they are NOT.
>> WFF also said.
>> Listen to RTS he’s a carded SOF, probably
>> wouldn’t have taken the time to show it that day.
I do listen to RTS.
I listen to YOU as well.
You both seem to know what you are talking about,
so why wouldn’t I?
RTS- thanks for at least ATTEMPTING to straighten out WTKTT.
WFF- forgot to mention… there has been some discussion about WTKTT being nothing more than an internet conspiracy theorist. i think that’s the lens through which to view his assertions…
WFF: please don’t beat your head against that brick wall. I appreciate what you’re saying, but trust me, it falls on deaf ears.
WTKTT makes a lot of assertions that are way off base and his evaluations of this entire incident carry very little water. he has ZERO wildland experience and has only recently (as of this incident i would guess) come to realize that wildland fire even exists. his learning curve is long, and his obstinate ignorance runs even deeper. this is where his criticisms come from… deep ignorance. oh, and nothing better to do.
besides, he’s an anonymous internet source… and you know how seriously people in the real world take anonymous internet sources.
WFF and xxfuelsailxx ??? Anonymous What
Don’t beat a dead horse that you are riding too…….. Although I have been taking you serious. An WTKTT has been doing a lot more research than any of us and giving good written feed back. Some time’s we all have to keep him on the right path. But he is really trying to help and I appreciate that. There are a lot here not willing to put there names out there and I am OK with That.
Those of us that put our real name out there have nothing to lose and we will be held to a higher standard because you know who we are.
Mackenzie Camera… Does anyone find it odd that the SAIT had the Mackenzie camera in their possession but chose to not include any photos or videos from the camera into the SAIR?
Question. The SAIR indicates GM began moving SOUTH about/ after 4:04pm. How was this time determined? From the Mackenzie camera?
>> calvin said…
>>
>> Mackenzie Camera… Does anyone find it odd that the
>> SAIT had the Mackenzie camera in their possession but
>> chose to not include any photos or videos from the camera
>> into the SAIR?
I don’t believe the SAIT ever had the actual camera.
As the story goes ( one of them, anyway ), after someone
( Willis? Some other PFD person? ) took the camera away
from the deployment site *without* turning it over to the
YCSO police inestigators… it then somehow magically got
into the bag of MacKenzie’s personal effects that was
already over at the Medical Examiner’s office. The ‘chain
of possession’ on the camera itself up to that point is
still totally unknown. Then the Chino Valley FD people took
care of delivering the bags of personal effects back to
all the families.
When MacKenzie’s father got Christopher’s camera… the
original article says his stepdaughter was the one who
then discovered it had pictures/video on it.
Somehow a CD was made ( that managed to preserve all
the original date/time stamps and filenames ).
MacKenzie’s father brought that CD with him to Christopher’s
funeral in California. Darrell Willis was at that funeral.
Christohper’s father walked up to Willis and handed him
the CD and said something like “I think you need to see
this. It has photos and videos on it from Christopher’s
camera.”
Willis (supposedly) pretended to be ‘amazed’, and acted as
if he had no idea there ever was a ‘MacKenzie camera’.
Willis then delivers that CD ( or perhaps a COPY of it that
he made ) to the SAIT investigators.
There is no record that the SAIT ( or the YCSO police or
ADOSH ) ever requested to see the original camera.
That being said…
Yes… I do think it’s odd that no MacKenzie photos appeared
in the SAIR report.
Here is a possible scenario why…
The SAIT knew those photos/video/audio existed.
ADOSH didn’t know anything about it until Darrell Willis
‘announced’ he had seen them in his ADOSH interview.
The SAIT was NOT cooperating with ADOSH at that point.
It’s possible that the attorneys for Arizona Forestry were
still debating whether AFD had any obligation to release
the MacKenzie material publicly, or not… and so the SAIT
pressed forward ‘assembling’ their SAIR document under
the assumption they would NOT… and that no one would
ever know those photos existed.
At some point… the attorneys realized that it was GOING
to become public knowldege… so that that’s when they
decided to do a ‘co-release’ of both the SAIR document
AND the MacKenzie photos/videos on the SAME DAY.
Actually… the MacKenzie photos/videos were published
in public about 2 hours BEFORE the SAIR was published.
It was totally ‘coordinated’ with the Prescott Courier. The
Courier had all the photos/videos long before September
28, 2013 so they could do all the ‘prep’ for their own
article… but the Courier had secretly totally agreed to NOT
publish the material until the same moment the SAIR
was published.
So they did that. I think 10:00 AM was the target time on
the 28th… but then there was some kind of screw-up on
Arizona Forestry’s part and THEY didn’t get the SAIR
actually published until a few hours later than that.
>> calvin also asked…
>> Question. The SAIR indicates GM began moving SOUTH
>> about/ after 4:04pm. How was this time determined?
>> From the Mackenzie camera?
I believe so… and the ‘Parker’ photo.
I believe the SAIT was sure that they ‘left’ that rest spot to
head south based first on the Parker photo… and then the
MacKenzie material just ‘reinforced’ that timeframe when
the SAIT finally saw the MacKenzie material.
They added 60 seconds… and then just put the exact time
for them ‘heading south’ at 4:05 PM in the SAIR report.
BY THE WAY…
calvin… in the recently released ADOSH material, there
is a full explanation for why the dozer got caught in power
lines.
It’s in the Paul Musser interview transcript.
As it turns out… it wasn’t about ‘drooping’ powerlines at all.
Most of the powerlines in the west end of Glen Ilah were
actually ‘on the ground’ or partially so. It was a mess.
They had to wait for hours to get the power company to
confirm that all the juice was off… and they even wanted
the power company to come out and ‘cut’ some of the
lines so they could get the dozer out to the ranch to
start plowing the road to the deployment site.
The power company eventually confirmed that all those
lines were ‘dead’… but they refuse to come out and
cut or clear anything. They told Paul Musser and Todd
Abel to just ‘drive through them’… ‘do whatever you want’…
so they tried that… and that’s when the dozer got totally
tangled in some of the powerlines.
From Musser’s ADOSH interview transcript ( page 54 )…
8-16-13/9:00 am – Case # Musser
Q=Brett Steurer
Q1=Bruce Hanna
Q2=Barry Hicks
Q3=Paul Katz
A=Paul Musser
A: Uh, to get us in there. Still active fire going on structures and
stuff. Uh, a lot of power lines down. Um, so we had to figure how
we could get in and get around the power lines and stuff like that.
Q2: Right.
A: …to gain ground access. Met with, uh, APS ( Arizona Public
Service – Utility Company ) – several different people in APS to
make sure that everything was dead. Which took us a while to do.
‘Cause we had confirmation that it was dead, but I couldn’t talk to
the person that gave that confirmation, so…
Q2: Oh yeah.
A: …so I had to talk to them personally that everything was dead,
um, because we were gonna bring a dozer in to, uh, help clean
up and create access. Tried to get them to cut the lines, they said
just push it over and move on. Which then tangled up in the
dozer and…
Q2: Right.
A: …so we had to deal with a few of those things. But once
we were able to clear access, um, and then we got the dozer
in, uh, later that night. I don’t know what time it was – midnight
maybe.
So this entry is just speculation. You know you have a pretty good research ability, lots to detail. Just provide information, leave out the conspiracy Mulder.
>> WFF wrote…
>> So this entry is just speculation.
Nope. The only thing ‘speculative’ about it is
the fact that a crucial pieced of physical evidence
that SHOULD have gone through the normal YCSO
police investigator’s ‘chain of evidence’ procedures
somehow ended up OUTSIDE that process…
…and we don’t fully know how ( or why ).
>> WFF wrote…
>> You know you have a pretty good research
>> ability, lots to detail. Just provide information,
>> leave out the conspiracy Mulder.
I’ve never used that word.
That is YOU ‘using that word’.
The facts will be the facts… when they are
(finally) fully known.
Writing as the one who spent about a month and a half during the holidays piecing this together, thinking I had discovered something significant:
The thing I learned from this, regarding the SAIR, was that it, IN FACT, was NOT a real investigation. That was a real eye-opener to me.
It didn’t/doesn’t MATTER (legally) that the camera, cellphones, GPS units, etc, were not entered into the chain of evidence. It doesn’t MATTER (legally) whether anybody told the truth or not. It doesn’t MATTER whether anybody heard the conversation when the Granite Mountain Hotshots were discussing their options and making their decision. (As I have written repeatedly, we DON’T KNOW what they decided, much less why they decided it; all we know are the consequences; EVERYTHING else is SPECULATION).
No truth was required in any of this so-called “investigation.” There was no legal enforcement for ANYTHING.
It didn’t MATTER whatsoever that the Yavapai Sheriff’s Department was gathering anything. They may as well have not even been involved in any of it. It didn’t MATTER whether or not they sent the cellphones they gathered from the deployment site to be investigated.
As a citizen and a concerned person, my biggest “lesson learned” by my involvement in this ASAIT has been that, given that there is no obligation to actually discern the factual truth in this event, and nothing to actually/legally hold anybody accountable to disclosing it, there is mostly NO BASIS for determining ANYTHING, much less anything related to any “lessons learned.”
Wildland Fire Fighters beware.
There is nothing in any of this so-called “investigation” that has anything to do with either a commitment to the facts of the incident, or, thus, to learning anything real (and, thus in YOUR interest) from it.
And by “this ‘so-called investigation'” I don’t mean the ASAIT, I mean the SAIT. The ASAIT has no teeth, no power, unless someone decides to do something with what the ASAIT has done.
Apparently, the SAIT decided to have no power, either.
Yes, I find it very odd. And in spite of what xxfullsailxx thinks, I think there have been several of odd things the ASAIT has uncovered that none of the 3 official reports did, in addition to a long list of contributing or casual factors that the SAIT blew by.
Mcdonough 7/5/2013 YIN… says at 1445 he takes the weather 3 times and decides it is time to move
Mcdonough 8/20/2013 ADOSH interview…. says he left his lookout post at approximately 1550.
Interestingly, Mcdonough refuses to guesstimate on any times during the ADOSH interview, except the lookout departure time, which, he remembers DIFFERENTLY than he did just 5 days after the YHF incident.
Follow up…. Mcdonough does state that he did have a written “unit log” that (a copy)was provided to the SAIT. The ADOSH team asked to see the original copy during Mcdonough’s interview.
I would like to see this document. Specifically the time of the last weather observation.
In his ADOSH interview… the ADOSH investigators asked
Brendan if he still had the ‘original’ document. Brendan
said he wasn’t sure if he still had it or not ( hard to
believe he wouldn’t know one way or the other but that’s
what he told ADOSH ).
ADOSH investigators said flat-out… “We think we’ll need
to see that” and Brendan said he would “check and see
if he still had it.”
Brendan also then told him that he definitely gave a
COPY of his original document to the SAIT.
I don’t see the document ANYWHERE in the recently
released ADOSH material… nor does it appear to
have ever been released in the SAIT FOIA/FOIL
package.
Either Brendan did NOT give a copy to the SAIT, or
that’s just one more thing that is still ‘missing’ from
the SAIT materials that they are ‘withholding’ from
FOIA/FOIL requests.
It is now an established FACT that Brendan DID
give copies of his original Weather reports and
Field logs to the SAIT investigators.
Lori Burkeen, of the Prescott Legal Department,
has confirmed this in emails to ADOSH dated
September 17, 2013.
Lori was responding to document requests from
ADOSH and informed them that she was
told ( by Marsha Collier of Prescott Fire ) that
McDonough told Collier he could no longer
find his originals because he had ‘cleaned out
his car’… and that if ADOSH wanted the copies
of those documents that Brendan gave to
the SAIT… ADOSH would have to contact SAIT.
The SAIT was not cooperating with ADOSH
circa September.
Brendan’s documents were also never included
in the official SAIT FOIA/FOIL release package…
…and they SHOULD have been.
There were ‘withheld’ from FOIA requests by
Arizona Forestry… for unknown reasons.
>> calvin said…
>> Interestingly, Mcdonough refuses to guesstimate on any times
>> during the ADOSH interview, except the lookout departure time,
>> which, he remembers DIFFERENTLY than he did just 5 days
>> after the YHF incident.
It’s obvious in his ADOSH interview that Brendan’s private
attorney ( she was with him at the interview ) had already
advised him NOT to even try and mention any times.
Brendan makes an ‘announcement’ to that effect at the start
of the interview… as if prompted by his attorney to do so.
Matter of fact… it’s not recorded in the transcript… but if you
listen to the AUDIO recording of Brendan’s ADOSH
interview… the first time ( early in the interview ) when
anyone asked him about a ‘time’… there is a slight pause
and I believe you can hear Brendan’s attorney ‘whispering’
to him. That’s when Brendan makes his ‘announcement’
that ‘the times really fuzzy to me that day so I’m not going
to try and even say any times’.
I believe what happened there is that Brendan already knew
he had been getting into trouble with his ‘times’ between his
media interviews and his SAIT interview… and his attorney
was now telling him he better lay off saying anything about
any times altogether.
If you listen to all of the other interviews and gauge
the ‘level of cooperation’ exhibited by just about
everyone else… then on a scale of 1 to 10
for ‘freely sharing information’ and/or ‘willingness
to cooperate with the investigation’… Brendan’s
interview rates about a 1.5.
He didn’t want to be there.
He wasn’t seeing ‘the point’ of it all.
He even admitted during the interview that he,
himself, had been using Google Earth to
review the area prior to that interview ( 2 or
3 times since the incident, I think he said )…
…but then when they fired up Google Earth
at the interview he mostly just said “These
maps are horrible” and “I don’t recognize
anything”.
They even let him drive Google Earth, eventually,
because he knew how to do it better than they
did… but he still wasn’t telling them much of
anything at all.
When Tony Sciacca’s actual ‘unit logs’ were released just a few weeks ago…
we finally learned that he was, in fact, clocked in and ‘on duty’ as the one-and-only
Line Safety Officer hired for the Yarnell Hill Fire as early as 1500 ( 3:00 PM )
on June 20, 2013.
That’s a full 1 hour and 42 minutes BEFORE GM’s deployment.
The person hired to be the overall ‘Safety Officer’ ( Marty Cole, also from
Prescott like Sciacca ) wasn’t there yet and didn’t even arrive in Yarnell until
just before the actual deployment.
In Sicacca’s actual ADOSH interview ( now publicy available )…
…we learn a lot more.
Sciacca did, indeed, arrive at the Model Creek ICP even before 3:00 PM
( 2:55 PM ) and was fully ‘clocked in’ and ‘on the job’ in his contracted
‘Line Safety Officer’ capacity just before 3:00 PM that day.
Sciacca checked in with Roy Hall, IC, right at 1500 ( 3:00 PM ) and asked the
standard “Whadda ya got” query. Sciacca said Hall was already overloaded and
just said “Well look (at) it. I got a mess.” Hall was too ‘busy’ to even give Sciacca
any kind of proper briefing and basically blew him off and punted him over
to OPS2 Paul Musser.
From page 10 of Sciacca’s interview transcript…
A = Tony Sciacca
_________________________________________________________________
A: Came in and tied in with Roy. And I said, you know, asked him what he had
and he said, “Well look (at) it, I got a mess.” He told me that, uh, he was busy.
He had a lot of distractions going on at the time. I asked him, I said, “So, uh,
you have a safety officer?” and he goes, “Well tie in with Paul Musser.”
Tied in with Paul and I said, “Hey, you know, what do you
got going?” and he says, “Well I’ve got three structure protection groups
going on,” and Byron Kimball was there.
He was there as the FBA and, uh, we were talking about what
was going to happen and, uh, I looked at Paul and I said, “Is your safety
officer here yet?” “No, not yet. He’s not around,” so I said, “Well can you
preference for me?” “Well no.” I said, “Well I’m going to tie in with, uh,
Willis on that north end,” because I know Darrell and we work together a lot, so.
_________________________________________________________________
So Musser himself bascially ‘blows him off’ as well and only informs
Sciacca that there are ‘3 structure groups’ working the fire with NO
mention of Granite Mountain OR Blue Ridge Hotshots.
Sciacca even says Musser (quickly) showed him a piece of paper that
Musser was calling his IAP ( Incident Action Plan ), which just had a bunch
of handwritten notes on it about ‘Structure groups’ and approximately where
they were working. There was nothing on OPS2 Musser’s own IAP about
ANY ‘Type 1 Hotshots’ even working on the fire. It was just all about
‘structure protection groups’ working the fire.
NOTE that Sciacca also OFFERED to sub in ( at that moment ) and be the
overall ‘Safety Officer’ ( something Sciacca was also fully qualified to do )
since there wasn’t one working the fire circa 3:00 PM… but OPS2 Paul Musser
said NO… he didn’t need/want him for that.
Sciacca then just leaves the ICP to go find his buddy Darrell Willis.
He finds Willis, gets a good clone from Willis’ radio, and then sets off
ON HIS OWN just trying to fulfill his ‘Line Safety Officer’ duties and first
just find out ( again, on his own ) who the heck was working the fire and
where the heck they were working.
Even Willis didn’t tell him that there were TWO full Hotshot Crews working the
south end of the fire… so even at this point… Sciacca is only ‘looking for’ 3
‘structure groups’.
Once Sciacca got a feel for who was fighting the fire up NORTH, he moved
towards Yarnell to get the same ‘eyes on’ who was working the fire down there
and he bumped into Gary Cordes.
This was now around 1600 ( 4:00 PM ) and when Sciacca bumped into Cordes
he was also ultra-busy and already actively “pulling all his people off the fire”.
Cordes told him about the Youth Camp at the end of Shrine road and
that that is where his ‘people’ were currently evacuating from.
So this is now when Siacca is already known to have gone down the Shrine
road and now we learn that he went all the way down to the Youth Camp,
where the Blue Ridge and Granite Mountain vehicles had been staged…
but are now ‘evacuating’.
This is really the first moment that Line Safety Officer Sciacca became
aware that the Blue Ridge and Granite Mountain Hotshots were even
there at all… when he first saw all the Hotshot Crew vehicles LEAVING
the Youth Camp.
Page 15 of Sciacca’s interview…
_______________________________________________________________
A: So when I – yeah, when I came around, trying to figure out who was in
Yarnell when that fire was coming there I wanted to see…
Q1: Right.
A: I pulled in. Sheriff had some evacuations going on.
Q1: Right.
A: And I drove up that canyon, that’s when I saw the Blue Ridge
and the Granite Mountain buggies.
I was told by, uh, one of the Engine Captains there was a piece of dozer line
that I never saw that was in there some place and they – I saw – when I was up
in this little draw here, Blue Ridge came out with, uh, looked like they were
three engines, a water tender, Blue Ridge Hotshot buggies and Granite
Mountain Hotshot buggies. And everybody was driving out.
Q1: Coming out?
A: Coming out. And I was like, well I guess everybody’s in the buggies. You
don’t ask those questions.
________________________________________________________________
So not only was this the first moment that the only ‘Line Safety Officer’ on
the fire that day even became aware there were two full Type 1
Hotshot crews working the fire… he also believed that both Hotshot
crews were already simply ‘in their buggies’ as they passed by him
and evacuated the area.
Sciacca then got totally absorbed in what he called the ‘public safety aspect’
of being a ‘Safety Officer’, since he saw people on Shrine road just walking
their dogs and was telling them to “get out of here!”… and he made no other
attempt to determine the whereabouts of Granite Mountain… until someone
told him about 30 minutes later that there had been a deployment ( because he
wasn’t even monitoring Air to Ground and didn’t hear any of that traffic himself ).
He had seen all FOUR of the GM vehicles leaving the Youth Camp and
he had just *assumed* they were all onboard, and safe.
Sciacca said:
“And I was like, well I guess everybody’s in the buggies.
You don’t ask those questions.”
Are you f**king kidding me?
“You don’t ask those questions.”
Really?… even when you are being paid to be a ‘Line Safety Officer’
and it’s time for you know EXACTLY where ALL the crews are?
Unbelievable.
One more ‘lesson’ ( for future Safety Officers ) to take away from
the Yarnell Hill Fire…
Just because you see Crew Carriers driving by you… do NOT
*assume* anyone is actually IN them.
Find OUT if they are… and if not… then find out WHERE that entire
crew REALLY is… ASAP.
I wish Sciacca had. I really do.
There was still time for him to have gotten on the horn and found
out EXACTLY where they were… EXACTLY what they were DOING
and what their plans were… and if they were SAFE ( and going to
remain so ).
Sciacca says he saw BR and GM buggies coming out. He doesn’t say anything about Supt trucks or chase trucks. TOL…. if Sciacca had seen Eric’s supt truck (with Eric driving it) it would seem that Sciacca would have communicated directly with him. Since he knew him (presumably quite well.) If he saw GM supt truck with someone else driving it (Mcdonough) it would seem logical to actually ASK where Eric Marsh was.
WTKTT…. did you add that Sciacca saw All FOUR GM vehicles? Is that your opinion?
>> calvin said…
>> Sciacca says he saw BR and GM buggies coming out.
Yes… but BEFORE he says that he says this…
“And I drove up that canyon, that’s when I saw the Blue
Ridge and the Granite Mountain buggies. I was told by, uh,
one of the Engine Captains there was a piece of dozer line
that I never saw that was in there some place.”
You are technically correct that he never specifically
says he saw all FOUR of the GM vehicles… but from
what he says above it would *appear* that two things
happened…
1) He made it down to the Youth Camp in time to
see ALL of the vehicles that were there since he
actually SPOKE to one of the engine captains
back there just BEFORE the entire convoy
started to head out. If that is the case… then whether
he actually SAW the GM Supt truck and GM Chase
truck there… they WERE there to be seen.
>> calvin also said…
>> He doesn’t say anything about Supt trucks or
>> chase trucks.
See above. Never mentions them specifically but if
he went as far back as he says he did and was
talking to one of the engine captains back there…
all FOUR of the GM vehicles were there.
>> calvin also wrote…
>> if Sciacca had seen Eric’s supt truck (with Eric driving it)
>> it would seem that Sciacca would have communicated
>> directly with him. Since he knew him (presumably quite
>> well.)
Yes. Sciacca knew Eric. He ALSO knew Brendan quite
well. Sciacca knew Brendan even before he started
taking fire classes and even before Brendan joined
the GM Hotshots. Brendan’s MOTHER used to work
for ‘Forestry’ and Sciacca knew her as well.
Brendan was THERE… and he WAS driving the
GM Supt truck… but apparently Sciacca either never
saw him or didn’t have time to speak to him.
>> If he saw GM supt truck with someone else driving it
>> (Mcdonough) it would seem logical to actually
>> ASK where Eric Marsh was.
Yes, it would.
We also know now ( from the recently released
redacted Blue Ridge unit logs )… that Brendan was
actually the SECOND vehicle in that convoy that
left the Youth Camp. Brendan drove out right
behind the first BR Utility truck that was LEADING
the convoy and that’s why we don’t see him as
part of the convoy in the BR video of them all
driving south on Highway 89. Brendan WAS in
that convoy… but he was NOT back there with
the GM Carriers. He was, in fact, one of the LEAD
trucks and was in front of the cameraman in
the second BR Crew Carrier.
Regardless…
I would think that even if Sciacca had seen Brendan
driving the GM Supt truck ( instead of Marsh )… that
should have struck him as a little ‘funny’ and then
caused him to verify what was going on and whether
or not the GM crew really WERE in those buggies,
or not.
He (Sciacca) didn’t do that.
Whether he ever ‘caught a glimpse’ of who was
driving the GM Supt truck or not…
He just assumed the entire GM crew were all ‘safe’
in their buggies.
>> WTKTT…. did you add that Sciacca saw
>> All FOUR GM vehicles? Is that your opinion?
See above. It’s not an opinion… it’s an assumption
based on exactly what Sciacca says he did ( went
all the way back to the Youth Camp and had time
to speak with an engine captain before THEN
witnessing all the vehicles leaving. )
Sciacca himlself ‘stayed’ back there to make sure
EVERYONE got out. He says there was one last
firefighter walking towards the last engine and
Sciacca purposely stayed back there to be sure
he witnessed this last FF actually get INTO that
engine… and then Sciacca personally led that
engine ‘out of there’ making sure it was in his
rear view mirror.
It sounds like to me Tony self dispatched. He just showed up and expected people to fit him in. He asks if Musser can you “preference me”, that’s not Paul’s call and he wouldn’t have had time for that. There was already an assigned SOF. Your a SOF no ones going to question it just do it. Tony was pimping at the wrong time. A briefing in that kind of chaos is thin at best, you get immediate SA in your AO and get to work. The team was behind the fire and just trying protect the public thats the only option they could engage in, suppression was over. Its clear that they needed help just get in there pick some ground to help with, tie into who is there, and start helping. Why would you ask if the crew is in the buggies? There are people walking their dogs, the SO has evacs going, and you’re going to stop say “hey is everyone here” Tony was prioritzing and going to protect the public was the call. Everyone including GM was aware of that. It’s what caused them to make their decisions.
Even if Tony had been aware that GM wasn’t there, BR wasn’t in their buggies either. What was he going to do run around trying to locate them. What in those conditions would have indicated to him that they needed special attention over the public and structure protection groups.
Is there anyone here that believes that WFF should have packed up and disengaged leaving structure protection?
>> Reply to WFF post on March 26, 2014 at 8:13 am
>>
>> It sounds like to me Tony self dispatched.
>> He just showed up and expected people to fit him in.
>> He asks if Musser can you “preference me”, that’s
>> not Paul’s call and he wouldn’t have had time for that.
>> There was already an assigned SOF. Your a SOF no
>> ones going to question it just do it. Tony was pimping
>> at the wrong time.
Tony Sciacca was specifically called and ‘asked’ to
come to Yarnell and serve as a ‘Line Safety Officer’
by Glen Joki… Roy Hall’s right-hand-man ( Deputy ).
A BIG problem that day… though… was that it was really
Roy Hall and Glen Joki who were doing the ‘pimping’
and it was outside of the ROSS system ( which Roy
said he didn’t want to deal with ).
There was this incredible confusion that day because
shortly after trying to fire up the day with the ‘Type 2
short team’ decided on the night before… they realized
that wasn’t going to get the cows in the barn… so then
they were trying to ‘ramp up’ ( off the ROSS system )
to a ‘fully Type 2 team’. That’s when guys like Jason
Clawson, Aaron Hulburd and Casey (KC) Yowell
from Prescott got thrown into the mix.
But then it was shortly after all this ‘off the ROSS radar’
ramp up to full type 2 was the moment they decided
even THAT wasn’t going to be good enough so the
decided to skip Type 2 altogether and go straight to
the ordering process for a full Type 1 incident.
So all this ‘off the radar’ ordering turned into a mess
as people like Clawson showed to supposedly help
with a ‘Type 2’ incident but it was already going up
the ladder to ‘Type 1’.
Regardless… There is no mention of whether Sciacca
was an ‘off the ROSS radar’ ( at 1:50 PM Sunday which
is when Glen Joki called him )… but Sciacca was
definitely ASKED to be there as a ‘Line Safety Officer’.
The only difference is that Sciacca left Prescott as
soon as Joki asked him to work Yarnell over the
phone… but Marty Cole ( overall SO ) just waited in
Prescott most of the afternoon for his ‘paperwork’
to appear before he even bothered to leave Prescott.
From Tony Sciacca’s ADOSH interview transcript…
________________________________________________
ADOSH INTERVIEW WITH TONY SCIACCA
August 20, 2013 – 8:48 AM
Q=Bruce Hanna
Q1=Barry Hicks
Q2=Dave Larsen ( Rest in Peace )
A=Tony Sciacca
A2=Jon Paladini
Page 9…
Q1: Uh, yeah. Uh, so, uh, could you, uh, could you, uh,
walk us through, uh, from the time you got ordered for
the Yarnell Hill fire and, uh, uh, and actually, uh, take us
back a little before you got – actually got ordered ‘cause
I – it seems like you and Roy might have had some
conversations or you and somebody had some
conversations if – if you could take us back to…
A: Yeah.
Q1: …that and then up through the ordering process till
when you actually arrived?
A: Yeah I basically got – heard – I heard from Glenn Joki
who was working as – he usually works as Roy’s Deputy
on that team.
Q1: Right.
A: He was at the dispatch center there at, uh, Arizona.
Gives me a call and says, “Hey, can you come down be
safety officer – line safety officer?” “Sure.”
That was about, eh, ten minutes to 2:00 thereabouts.
I kind of knew it was coming. I jumped in the car.
Drove, uh, you know 55 minutes down the hill.
I showed up, um, at the school there in Yarnell about five
minutes to 3:00, thereabouts. And Roy and I – Roy was
there, another retired Forest Service guy.
>> WFF also said…
>> The team was behind the fire and just trying protect the >> public that’s the only option they could engage in,
>> suppression was over.
Not exactly correct at YHF. Not in the timeframe when
Sciacca met with Cordes and went down the Shrine
road. Suppression was still active up NORTH… and
the moment Sicacca ‘bumped into’ Cordes down
in Yarnell… Cordes was actually ( at THAT moment,
anyway ) more focused on making sure all FFs
were evacuating, since THAT trigger point had
just been met and it was time to ‘get ’em out of Dodge’.
He (Cordes) has just given the order for ALL firefighters
to EVACUATE… and that’s why he was up near the
Shrine road area. He had set a specific trigger point
for Yarnell evacuations. That had been met more than
a half-hour earlier and was was ‘in progress’ with
YCSO fully in charge of that. Cordes had ALSO
set ANOTHER trigger point for “All firefighters off
the fire” and THAT trigger point had just been met
before Sciacca runs into Cordes so THAT was
the priority ‘at that moment’.
Sciacca did not go down Shrine road looking for
citizens. He initially went down there because Cordes
just told him that’s where all his ‘resources’ were
evacuating from and it was his job as Line Safety
Officer to go make sure that was happening.
Which he did.
Sciacca was so concerned about making sure
all the FFs were ‘out of there’ that he waited ‘back
there’ near the youth camp until the last FF that
was walking to an engine got into the truck, and
he personally led that truck out of there.
It was only AFTER he was sure that all the firefighters
were ‘out of that area’ ( his first priority ) that he then
saw people on Shrine road just standing around in
shorts looking at the fire and saw people (quote)
“walking their poodles like nothing was happening”.
Only THEN did he turn his attention to helping any
‘citizens’. He thought both Hotshot crews AND all
the other FFs were now ‘safe in their buggies’ and
evacuated off the fire. He was wrong.
>> WFF also wrote…
>> Its clear that they needed help just get in there pick
>> some ground to help with, tie into who is there,
>> and start helping.
Which is exactly what Sciacca did… but the FIRST
priority ( at THAT time ) was making sure all FFs
were ‘getting off the fire’ and into a SAFE place.
>> WFF also wrote…
>> Why would you ask if the crew is in the buggies?
Why would you NOT ( If you are a Safety Officer? ).
See above. The EXACT priority at that EXACT moment
when Sciacca jumped in down there as ‘Line Safety
Officer’ was to make sure all FFs were evacuating.
Sciacca didn’t get lost in warning ‘civilians’ when he
first went down Shrine road. He knew what the
priority was ‘at that moment’ and he went ALL the
way to the Youth Camp out of concern for ALL of
the fireghters back there.
Only when he was ( mistakenly ) sure all the FFs
were ‘off the fire and safe’ did he start warning civilians.
If he had only known that the Crew Buggies he saw
go by were EMPTY… he might have gotten on the
radio to find out EXACTLY where that entire CREW
really was… and the outcome that afternoon might
have been different.
A ‘Safety Officer’ ( or ‘Line Safety Officer’ ) is allowed
( and, indeed, is SUPPOSED to ) override the normal
chain-of-command when there is a (quote from the
manual) “Immediate threat to life or risk of serious injury”.
In the 4:20 to 4:39 timeframe… if any ‘Safety Officer’ at the
Yarnell Hill Fire had been aware of both 1) Exactly where
Granite was ( in the box canyon ) 2) The actual fire
progression in their area…
…that would have CERTAINLY constituted an ‘immediate
threat to life’ for that crew and any Safety officer working
the fire would have been able to directly ORDER them to
take immediate life-saving measures ( go back, change
course, get the hell out of there NOW, whatever ).
Your descriptions of what you think a WFF ‘Safety
Officer’ is supposed to do or be responsible for
doing obviously aren’t matching my understanding.
Do you have a link to an actual job description, or the
course materials for certification as an SO or LSO?
Ok thats not the way it was presented, but fair enough. I know Tony so I don’t have a doubt that he was doing a good job. No one knows Casey as KC he goes by Bucky, him, Clawson, and Hulburd work for the FS in Prescott so they could have been IA at the very least closest resource. If Roy felt that he needed to go outside ROSS, then he knew he was behind or would be soon.
You want to learn about SOFs go to the SWCC site on the left side below the title “Fire Management and Administration” click on Training on the right side click on National Incident Qualifications and Certifications System (IQCS). You know a manual but don’t know IQCS? I’m not aware of a qual. called LSO.
Saying that if Tony had asked or known where GM was things would have turned out different is purely speculation. I doubt in that confusion he would have done any better than anyone else did and I like Tony. They were only in a life threatening position going into and in the drainage and ORDERING them is drama. If they were hiding their intentions/actiions then why would Tony have accomplished what no-one else did? I didn’t give a description of what I think a SOF is responsible for I discribed what I thought Tony was probably doing under those circumstances.
>> WFF said…
>>
>> Ok that’s not the way it was presented,
>> but fair enough. I know Tony so I don’t
>> have a doubt that he was doing a
>> good job.
I don’t ( know this Sciacca ) guy.
All I have to go on is his OWN unit logs
( and now ) his own ‘story’ that he told
ADOSH investigators.
>> No one knows Casey as KC he
>> goes by Bucky
Ah… ok… thanks.
His actual ‘unit designation’ name
in the ROSS computer system is…
Yowell, KC ( AZ-PDC ).
>> him, Clawson, and Hulburd work for the
>> FS in Prescott so they could have been
>> IA at the very least closest resource.
That is exactly what happened when this
Roy Hall guy realized the type 2 short
wasn’t cutting the mustard. He told
everyone around him ( Bea too ) to
‘order close and get them here ASAP’.
He said so in his own SAIT investigation
notes. Prescott was only 55 minutes away
so he was ‘preferencing Prescott’ to try
and flush out the type 2 short to a full type 2.
>> If Roy felt that he needed to go outside
>> ROSS, then he knew he was behind or
>> would be soon.
There is no actual documented ‘moment’
when they all realized the type 2 short
that had been decided on the night before
just wasn’t enough horsepower… but it
was shortly after the actual morning
briefings on Sunday.
>> You want to learn about SOFs go to the
>> SWCC site on the left side below the title
>> “Fire Management and Administration”
>> click on Training on the right side click
>> on National Incident Qualifications and
>> Certifications System (IQCS). You know
>> a manual but don’t know IQCS? I’m not
>> aware of a qual. called LSO.
Thanks for the link(s).
>> WFF also said…
>> Saying that if Tony had asked or known
>> where GM was things would have turned
>> out different is purely speculation.
Of course it is.
>> WFF also said…
>> I doubt in that confusion he would have
>> done any better than anyone else did
>> and I like Tony.
See a post somewhere above.
If Sciacca had realized GM wasn’t in
their buggies… and even felt like a lifting
a finger to find out where they REALLY
were… there’s still a good chance he
might have just asked someone who
was right there with him on Shrine
road like Clawson, Hulburd or Yowell.
That wouldn’t have done any good.
We can hear with our own ears now
in the Helmet-Cam that they were just
as convinced GM was in ‘safe-black’
at that moment as fire overhead was.
The only thing that *might* have made a
difference is if Sciacca had wisely decided
not to trust what anyone was ‘assuming’
and had called GM directly in the 4:15
to 4:30 timeframe.
I wish he had.
>> WFF also said…
>> They were only in a life threatening
>> position going into and in the drainage
>> and ORDERING them is drama. If they
>> were hiding their intentions/actiions then
>> why would Tony have accomplished
>> what no-one else did?
See above. Maybe. Maybe not.
It would have depended how insistent
Sciacca was being on knowing EXACTLY
where they were, EXACTLY where they
going, and EXACTLY how much they
knew about the fire in their area.
Even so… they may still have even given
Line Safety Officer Sciacca the ‘run around’
and the same ‘obtuse talk’ they were
practicing that afternoon… even if he HAD
called them directly in the 4:15 to 4:30 timeframe,
So yea… there’s only a SMALL chance
Line Safety Officer Sciacca could have
made a difference in the final outcome
for GM… but it’s a moot discussion, anyway,
because he never even tried.
>> WFF also said…
>> I didn’t give a description of what I think a
>> SOF is responsible for I discribed what I
>> thought Tony was probably doing under
>> those circumstances.
Copy that. Titles actually didn’t mean
much at that point. The shit was hitting
the fan so hard the blades were brown.
Wow… We must be at a standstill for opinions and evidence if people are stooping to name calling and cussing in their messages… Been away for a while, time to do it again, don’t think I am missing much…
Not sure if this has been assessed in all of the discussions….
20130630 161620 VLAT split 1 EP on Youtube, Elizabeth Nowicki uploaded, to me it sounds like, right around the 0:53 mark that I hear “Granite Mountain coming off the mid slope, heading SOuth”, “heading to the structures”….
NOT VERBATIM, just paraphrased. Do we know who is actually speaking??? Is it Marsh, Steed???
>> Rocksteady said…
>>
>> 20130630 161620 VLAT split 1 EP on Youtube, Elizabeth
>> Nowicki uploaded, to me it sounds like, right around the
>> 0:53 mark that I hear “Granite Mountain coming off the mid
>> slope, heading SOuth”, “heading to the structures”….
>>
>> Not sure if this has been assessed in all of the discussions
It has ( somewhat… perhaps not enough yet )… and you are
confirming that you also hear what others do.
>> Rocksteady also said…
>> NOT VERBATIM, just paraphrased. Do we know who is
>> actually speaking??? Is it Marsh, Steed???
There appears to be little doubt that it is Marsh who speaks
first in response to the “Granite Mountain… what’s your
status?” query… and Marsh informs the caller that “the guys”
are heading “SOUTH”… and then it appears to be Jesse
Steed who quickly adds to that with his own ‘status report’ and
says “We’ll be pushin’ our way down into the structures.”
The following is a reprint of what I ( me, personally ) believe
to be a full transcript of that particular AIR STUDY video,
INCLUDING the part at the start of the video where ASM2
is actually requesting that someone ‘check on them’…
which is the REASON for the “Granite mountain… what’s
your status?” query that happens a few seconds later.
ECITW ( Every Caveat In The World )
This is what I ( me, personally ) believe is being said in the
background of this video. Your mileage may, of course, vary.
Almost two months ago… from Chapter IV ( FOUR )
of this ongoing discussion…
WantsToKnowTheTruth on January 31, 2014 at 4:15 am said:
Actually… here is what I believe is the FULL transcript of that
video… including the part at the very beginning which is
what causes someone to actually call Granite Mountain
to ask them what their status was ( at 4:16 ).
What is actually captured at the start of this video is someone
confirming with ASM2 that he ( ASM2 / Bravo 33 ) can
actually SEE Granite Mountain ‘behind those hills’ and ‘on the
corner of the fire’… but ASM2 is concerned that they keep
saying they are ‘comfortable’ where he can see them.
ASM2 says that is ‘not credible’ ( based on the fire behavior
he is seeing at 4:16 ) and he INSISTS that someone
on the ground call Granite Mountain and at least insure that
DIVS A (Marsh) is ‘with them’. ASM2 was being forced to play
double duty as Air Attack at this point since Rory Collins
abruptly left the area a few minutes earlier… and ASM2 needs
to KNOW if ‘DIVS A’ ( or simply ‘Alpha’, as ASM2 says ) is
actually with GM where he can see them down there at 4:16 PM.
HUGE CAVEAT: This is MY best interpretation of the background
audio for that entire video. Your mileage may vary, of course, but
I would put money on the following translation for the background
captured radio traffic in this ENTIRE AIR STUDY video…
AIR STUDY VIDEO 20130630_161620 STARTS
+0:08.23
(Unknown): ASM2, Copy that… behind the hills is where you
place Granite Mountain?
+12.726
(ASM2): They’re on the corner just repeatedly saying that they’re
comfortable and that’s not credible. ASK him whether Alpha can
be placed WITH them.
NOTE: A few seconds later… Someone OTHER than who
ASM2 was just talking to ( someone with what sounds like a
Cajun accent? ) does exactly what ASM2 just TOLD them to do.
He calls Granite Mountain directly and asks them to report their STATUS. If the time stamp on the AIR STUDY video can be
trusted then it is now about 4:17 PM, just before the SAIR says
they are about to leave the two-track road and drop into the box
canyon at approximately 4:20 PM.
+0:40.52
(Unknown): Granite Mountain ( Five? )…
What’s your status right now?
NOTE: A pretty heavy accent on this speaker. Sounds like
Louisiana Cajun? What he says almost sounds like…
“Granite Montun… wuz yo status rat now?
ALSO NOTE: Even though the caller asked for ‘Granite
Mountain’ specifically, and not ‘DIVS A’… Eric Marsh responds
immediately on behalf of Granite Mountain before Jesse Steed
even has a chance to say anything. Jesse only ‘chimes’ in with
his own ‘status’ report about “we’re pushin’ our way down into
the structures” when Marsh is done speaking.
+0:54.09 to +1:03.81
Eric Marsh: Well the guys… uh… Granite… is makin’ their
way out the exact escape route from this mornin’… an’ it
heads… ah… (pause) SOUTH. ( slight pause )
mid-slope, cuttin’ over.
+1:07.18
( Another voice immediately adds to what Marsh said but it is )
( NOT Marsh this time. It sounds like Jesse Steed )
Jesse Steed: We’ll be pushin’ our way down into the structures.
+1:10.16 ( Another voice. Very quickly )
Copy that.
+1:21.17
( Unknown): Ten four. You with Granite Mountain right now?
+1:24.68
(Eric Marsh?): Uh… just checkin’ it out to see where we’re gonna
jump out at.
There appear to be some other background conversations
in this video before we hear the 11 ( ELEVEN ) shutter
clicks of the fellas in the foreground actually shooting photos
of the VLAT drop… but there is also HEAVY road traffic
at this point that will take a lot more work to filter out.
Regarding the PFD Wildland Chief Willis interview.
Willis talked about the INTENSE fire behavior on the previous Doce Fire (similar fuel type, terrain, weather) and the initial stges of the YHF. Very “intense downhill fire behavior”, a definite indicator of EXTREME conditions every time on every fire.
The YHF repeatedly ‘burning through retardent lines’ – a common indicator of intense burning conditions and heavy fuel loadings.
Then he gets into what several of us call the dangerous Municipal -Structure -Wildland BLENDING of strategy, tactics, and safety talk. Willis stated “They (GMHS) had a choice. They’re not just hoping to sit here … They wouldn’t want to sit around an do nothing … there’s NO CREW IN THE NATION that would do that …” REALLY? No Crew in the entire nation? I don’t think so. I know of most Crews and WFF that would be totally satisfied doing that. As investigator Dave Larsen (RIP) stated tha he figures he’s spent half his career in Safety Zones.
One of the Investigators then asks Willis “what triggered the [GMHS] movement” to leave the balck they were in. Willis responded ” They had a PERFECT SZ, they could have ridden it out. Then Willis goes on to contradict this statement and engage in a number of LOGICAL FALLACIES next. “I agree with you on that [SZ issue] BUT not for agressive FF’s … why do structure FF’s run into burning buildings?”
WTF? How does one LOGICALLY segue from talking about Wildland FF to Structure FF strategy, tactics, and hazards in the same sentence basically? One CANNOT do this logically, so one must resort to logical fallacies to accomplish the transition. Once again, I’m posting the link for logical fallacies from Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_fallacies
This dangerous blending of Structural/Municipal/Wildland tactics, strategy, and hazards attitude is a very real threat and a very real concern to many of us that are strictly WFF. And it needs to be addressed and dealt with realistically on a national level.
Amen RTS!!! I am a former WFF and married to a hotshot, and I almost s*#t myself when I heard Willis say this about “…no crew in the nation that would sit in the black and do nothing” (paraphrase). Why say such nonsense that goes against WFF?! Because, RTS nails it, with Willis’ blending of the structure/wildland, that mentality creates extremely dangerous expectations from very different disciplines! I can assure you Chief Willis that our hotshot crew is the epitome of aggressive firefighting AND they aren’t expected to run into burning buildings. They do all they can to save homes but the crews safety comes first always and shouldn’t it?!! Logical fallacies can really mess with a persons head. I imagine if it was the opposite: if the Fed IHC’s were expected to do structure work and aspire to ultimately end up in the suppression side which has nothing to do with wild land? Weird. The exact mission gets convoluted and how could a person get really good at just one discipline while trying to do two? And that’s not even going into the issues of budget and personnel at the PFD. You Supt’s out there imagine keeping 19 FF’s safe, fighting fire, logistics, planning, etc AND then believing your crew could be cut any day any year. That feeling just doesn’t happen on the Fed side. I suppose it was one way for Willis to keep GM motivated.
Adressed at the national level yes. Do Managers recognize that when fires are prioritized it’s mainly the threat of structures used to get resources? Of course they do. So what kind of fire are we fighting–wildland or structure? Anymore it’s both at the same time and no way of getting away from it so why not address it and bring it to the forefront?!!
I am still having a problem with Willis and McDonough discrepancy on the bad ratings and being shipped home. Willis as supervisor would have seen the ratings and known what was in them. This may be a case of McDonough covering for the crew. I am surprised they did not follow up on that, get the records from the file pure and simple. This should have been part of Willis’s ratting in 2013.
Do you think it’s possible that BOTH of them are telling the
truth ‘as they know it’?
Is it possible that GM was ‘demobbed’ and sent home… but
the CREW itself was never really AWARE of that?
If Marsh or Steed didn’t specifically tell the entire crew they
were booted off the fire… and even (perhaps) just lied to
them and said their work was simply ‘finished’ and they
were allowed to leave… then Brendan really would think
he’s telling the truth.
If a ‘terrible evaluation’ followed… I’m assuming that’s an
email these days.
Would a CREW normally know about that?
Maybe Brendan ( and the others ) were simply totally
clueless about what REALLY happened up at the
management level regarding the Idaho incident.
See a new post above containing the FULL
transcript of Marsh’s handwritten ‘Unit Log’
from the 2012 Wesley fire.
On September 24, 2012… Marsh was called to
a meeting with DIVS A and the DIVS A(t) working
the fire.
The DIVS A(t) trainee was the one who HANDED
Marsh ( in person ) their ‘bad evaluation’… and
Marsh refused to sign it.
So yea… looks like the ‘eval’ took place in person
as the demob was happening.
Whether or not even that hand-delivered ‘bad
eval’ document was ever seen ( or known about )
by anyone else ( Steed included? ) is still
a mystery.
Obviously Willis saw it ( eventually, since he refers
directly to it in his ADOSH intverview )… but one
of the only explanations for Brendan insisting that
GM was never ‘demobbed’ in 2012 would be that
he simply wasn’t even aware that it happened.
“A: My safety zone what they had established for me was that grader. That was
that dozer – had pushed that out.”
What ‘THEY’ had established for me, like the GMHS ‘they?’ In other words, he didn’t chose his own SZ location? Either way, a pretty poor choice if you ask me based on experience, the IRPG SZ Guidelines, and all AND based on the day’s YHF fire behavior they were experiencing AND MOST OF ALL, the fire behavior that the GMHS had experienced on the previous Doce Fire. The diameter was TOO SMALL, more like a ‘deployment zone.’
Then match this up with the tennic court SZ for 30+ WFF PLUS vehicles. It appears that SZ discernment and selection was lacking in the PFD world.
Brendan’s statement ( that this old-grader location was
established FOR him as his safety zone ) doesn’t even match
his multiple other accounts to investigators about what
he did when he left his lookout post.
Brendan has always said that ONE of the things he did after
walking down from the knoll itself was to spend some time
‘looking for a safe place to deploy’.
He says he even considered other spots around there.
Now… in is ADOSH interview… he says that had already
been ‘figured out’ for him ahead of time.
As with this entire incident and investigation… every time we
get some ‘new’ evidence it seems to answer lingering
questions… but then raise complete new ones as well.
It really, really would have been nice if everyone had just
told the whole truth from day one instead of creating this
jigsaw puzzle that still has to be fully assembled.
p21 SAIR…BR Supt and BR Capt depart and drive GM Lookout down to the old grader, dropping him off at 1239. They feel comfortable leaving him at this spot, and BR Supt tells the lookout, “If you need me, call, and I’ll come get you.”
THEY (BR) FEEL COMFORTABLE LEAVING HIM (Mcdonough) AT THIS SPOT.
At 1239… there really wasn’t any reason to NOT feel
comfortable leaving Brendan there.
The fire was still heading AWAY from that location
and no one knew the day was going to suffer the
hellacious turnaround yet.
The only thing Brendan was to be ‘looking out’ for at
THAT time was just to make sure the ‘backing action’
of the tail of the fire didn’t start ‘creeping over’ to
where GM was working.
No one knew that the tail was GOING to become
the fast-moving HEAD… in just a few hours.
There Main Safety Zone was really to call BR and have them run over with the ATV and Pick up
McDonough. That has always concerned me, again I would not have put a look out there with out a better plan. Like there own ATV and or a good SZ.
When you are in brush with no line between you and the fire there are a lot of things that can go wrong. I think his inexperience caused him to not move sooner (and call BR to pick him up).
There are a LOT of ‘revelations’ and things never heard in public before
contained in this interview.
Here are just a FEW of them…
ADOSH INTERVIEW WITH BRENDAN MCDONOUGH
Augsut 20, 2013 – 1:00 PM
At City of Prescott Legal Department
Q = Bruce Hanna
Q1 = Barry Hicks
Q2 = Dave Larsen ( Rest in Peace )
A = Brendan McDonough
A1 = Attorney Emily Dolan
*** First report that Steed ( and others ) attended morning briefing at YHF…
Q2: Okay. Ah, did you guys have a – th- th- overhead – go to a briefing?
Or hear a…
A: Yeah. They went to a briefing at Yarnell Fire Department.
Q2: Fire Department?
A: Mm-hm.
Q1: Who – who all went? Was it, ah, Eric and some more there?
A: Eric and Steed and few other of the overhead.
Q1: Okay.
NOTE: This is the first we hear that there was a chance Captain Jesse Steed
actually attended that 7:00 AM morning briefing at the Yarnell HIll Fire Station
along with Eric Marsh. This is the ‘briefing’ where the SAIR said they all
(supposedly) were looking at ‘Google Maps on an iPad’ and identifying the
Boulder Springs Ranch as a ‘bomb-proof’ safety zone, AND someone
(still unknown) was ‘pointing out the roads leading to it’ such as the high-ridge
two-track. There is still some doubt as to whether that ‘Google Maps on an iPad’
moment ever happened at all, since ONLY the SAIR is reporting that, but
if that moment DID happen… and Steed WAS there… then BOTH Marsh and
Steed would have been fully aware that the high-ridge two-track went all the
way to the Boulder Springs Ranch.
*** More confirmation there were 4 GM vehicles there that day…
Q2: I ran the Helena ( Hotshots ). Tell me about how you guys were
organized? Did you have, ah, Eric and an assistant? Did you have three mods
or two or what – tell me about that?
A: It’s based off, like, any other Hotshot crew, you have your sup, captain, squad
bosses, your saw bosses, your lead saws, your senior fire fighters.
Q2: Okay.
A: Ah, two squads.
Q2: Two squads.
A: And a chase truck and a superintendent truck.
Q2: How – how – how – and so how many – how many buggies did you have? Did
you have two of those?
A: Two buggies.
*** Brendan says the GM crew received THREE briefings that morning…
Q2: Okay. So when you got up here, um, and assembled after hiking up – the hike,
you guys talk for a while? A brief?
A: Yeah. We had a briefing before we even got up there. We had two briefings.
We had a briefing at Yarnell and then we had a briefing when we parked.
Q2: Sure.
A: And then we had another briefing when we got to the top of the ridge.
Q2: What did you talk about when you did your own crew briefing and you – you
park? What do you guys say?
A: The weather, fire behavior, safety zones, escape routes. I mean, what we
could expect, what they know. To try to get a lookout established, ah,
communication plans. Things like that. Just hazards that we might run into.
Snakes, high heat, um, to make sure we were hydrated and bring extra water.
*** Brendan says they were absolutely aware that MORNING that the two-track
*** up on the ridge went ALL THE WAY to the Boulder Springs Ranch…
Q2: Where – were they talking about your safety zone? When would you talk
about that? Where – where was it?
A: I – one of our safety zones was back in the black.
Q2: Right.
A: And they had another one for the ranch.
Q2: Oh, that big…
A: That clearing.
Q2: …big ranch thing? Okay.
A: It was cleared out.
Q2: Yeah. We saw that.
A: ‘Cause it had a, I mean, there was a nice two track leading pretty much right
to it almost.
Q2: Was there? Okay.
A: Somewhat. From what I understand. Yeah.
Q2: So that’s where you got – that – was that the escape route if you decided that –
you de- decided either you were go in it and stay in the black or go to the
ranch?
A: From what I was informed, yes. But I had moved to a different position.
Q2: Sure. Right. So you were on your own. You – what was your, um plan?
A: My safety zone what they had established for me was that grader. That was
that dozer – had pushed that out.
Q2: Okay.
Q2: If they were gonna do a – a safety zone at the ranch, ah, what was their
planned escape route? What – was it along, I mean, was it a along the ridge?
A: There’s a two track that’s up there.
Q2: Right. So that was it? The plan?
A: From what I understand. Yes.
*** Brendan says the two-track escape route was ‘clear’.
Q2: Going back to the – to when they were gonna think about going to the ranch
they were gonna go out along the two track on the ridge. That being their
plan? Did they – did they send a saw team back to spruce that up some?
A: It was clear.
Q2: It was clear. Okay. So they didn’t.
A: Not. I don’t know.
Q1: Not when you were there or anything?
A: Not when I was there.
*** Brendan uses the same ‘mid-slope’ description of the two-track
*** escape route that Marsh uses later in captured radio conversation,
*** and confirms again that he understood it went all the way to
*** to the Boulder Springs Ranch.
NOTE: At this point in the ADOSH interview with McDonough they are all
looking at the upper ridge and southern two-track in Google Earth
Q1: Now Dave, that looks like a two track right there.
A: That’s the two track that would be have been the escape route that they took.
Q1: Oh okay.
A: Kinda mid slope along that ridge.
Q2: Right. When it was time to go the ranch, that’s what they were gonna use?
A: I believe so.
Q1: Okay.
Q1: Okay. That – that helps us. That helps us. Now, ah…
Q2: And they’re gonna walk out this ridge to this thing- is this the ridge?
A: This is the ridge right here.
Q: Gotcha.
A: And this two track ties all the way – it goes all the way around from what I’ve
heard to back down…
Q2: Back down — yeah, it does. We – we had a guy walk it from behind the ranch
up and around.
A: Mm-hm. Yeah.
Q2: It does? Okay.
*** Brendan”s third weather ‘spin’ had to be much earlier than
*** his stated time of 3:50 PM
Q1: Yeah. Ah, so you were doing them on the hour. Were you noticing any
change during or having – how many of those did you take while you were
there before you pulled out? Do you remember?
A: I believe I was working on my third weather which was…
Q1: Okay.
A: Which was, they deploy at 4:47. Correct? So it would have been 3:50.
NOTE: Not possible. Brendan had decided to leave his lookout position
15-20 minutes before that and Frisby was actually picking him up down by
the Old Grader location in the UTV Ranger at exactly 3:41 PM. That’s one
minute after Cordes had ordered the official evacuations for Yarnell and
Glen Ilah at 3:40 PM and 10 minutes after Byron Kimball’s weather warning
of wind shifts and 40-50 mph winds went out over TAC 1 channel at 3:31 PM.
*** Brendan contradicts official reports and says he was NEVER
*** supposed be serving as Blue Ridge’s lookout.
Q2: Sure. Right. So you were on your own. You – what was your, um plan?
A: My safety zone what they had established for me was that grader. That was
that dozer – had pushed that out.
Q2: Okay.
A: And then just back down the road and Blue Ridge superintendent actually
came to meet with Eric and their Captain to talk about what’s going on. And
they took me to my lookout position and they said, “We can see what’s going
on. If you need, we’ll come pick you up.” That’s exactly what happened.
Q1: So you – were you serving as a lookout for Blue Ridge as well as?
A: No sir.
Q1: So Blue Ridge had their own lookout?
A: Yes sir.
Q1: Was he in a…
A: They showed up a later time.
Q1: And do you know where their lookout would have been or did you ever know that?
A: They were closer to town working off a road I believe.
*** Brendan says that circa 4:00 PM… the winds were ‘straight out of the
*** north/northeast and the fire was actually moving ‘straight up and down
*** as North / South’… but it was simply the terrain of a ridge that was
*** making it move somewhat ‘east/southeast’ as well.
Q2: Four? Okay.
A: At this point, the fire is moving straight up and down as north South. It’s
moving – it’s starting to come out of the north but it’s really moving east so
that my way out is getting cut off sooner than theirs. They had more concern
at that point for me and my safety.
Q1: Right.
A: Just because of the direction of the fire.
Q2: Right.
A: So it was – the winds were out of the north, northeast but primarily due to the
terrain of that ridge, it’s moving to the east.
NOTE: At 4:00 PM… if Brendan was fully aware that the fire was already
heading in ( his words ) “straight up and down as North / South”… then
that means Marsh and Steed were fatefully mistaken during their
infamous ‘discussing their options’ conversation(s) to ever believe
they would be travelling ‘parallel’ to the fire on their trip to the ranch.
*** Brendan is asked if he ever heard that Marsh/Steed/Crew
*** were moving out of the black towards the Boulder Springs Ranch
Q2: So when you – you went and they picked you up and you moved vehicles and
all that stuff that’s going on, do you know what the – what the crew was
doing? Were they moving towards the ranch?
A: That wasn’t relayed to me. I just told – ‘cause I knew – I knew the storm was
coming in. I knew they weren’t — I mean, you don’t want to sit there and be a
Chatty Cathy on the radio. ‘Cause I told them, “Hey if you guys need anything?
I’ll be with Blue Ridge.” They knew that. “Um, just let me know.
And I’ll get ahold of you and I’ll see you guys soon.”
Q1: Right.
A: …last transmission that (unintelligible).
Q1: Yeah. Anything else, Dave, that you can think of?
Q2: Well, did you – we heard that there was some transmissions as th- as
they were beginning to deploy, did you hear any of that at any time?
A: That was over command.
Q2: Did you HEAR any of that stuff?
A: Yeah. Eric had called in saying that they were deploying, ah, preparing a
deployment site and trying to give a general location and you could hear
chainsaws in the background cutting out an area.
NOTE: Brendan wasn’t asked if the information and/or the decision to
move was specifically ‘relayed’ to him… he was only being asked if he
HEARD or KNEW anything about it.
Brendan then ‘falls back’ to the same thing he told the SAIT and only talks about
the last time HE, himself, had anything to say TO THEM or inform THEM about,
and refuses to talk about anything he might have simply HEARD, even if it
wasn’t directed at him.
None of the investigators ‘caught this’ and tried to clarify.
Brendan had already stated to them in this very ADOSH interview that
‘listening to the crew channel’ was his number one priority that day… but no
one pressed him on what he did or didn’t simply HEAR over that crew-channel
during the crucial ‘discussing their options’ timeframe.
The SAIT investigators apparently did.
The SAIR still states ( unequivocally ) that Brendan DID hear Marsh and Steed
‘discussing their options’… but never said another word about it.
“WantsToKnowTheTruth on March 22, 2014 at 5:53 pm said:
If you also read most/all of the ‘Who were the Granite Mountain Hotshots’ pages with bios and memorials… you see a recurring theme.”
“Most of the ‘rookies’ specifically mention ‘looking up to Steed’ and ‘wanting to be like him’ and more than one described his amazing physical abilities and their admiration for the shape he was in.”
“There isn’t a whole lot of mention of Marsh in those same ‘bios’ and ‘memorials’.”
Reply ↓
“Robert the Second on March 23, 2014 at 9:34 am said:
WTKTT,
“You are closer than you think here. There were at least two former GMHS that did NOT return to the Crew after both the 2011 and 2012 fire seasons. And the alleged reasons mentioned by these men to their parents and friends related specifically to ‘bad decisions with prior good outcomes.’”
September 4, 2013 – ADOSH e-mails five ex-Granite Mountain
Hotshots requesting interviews.
There was never another ‘timeline’ entry saying whether
those requests for interviews were granted by ANY of
the FIVE former GMHS they contacted… or if any of
those ‘interviews’ ever took place.
I have been scouring all the latest ADOSH information
published by Mr. Dougherty… but so far I can’t even find
the emails that were ‘sent’ to the former GMHS… much
less any ‘replies’ or any evidence the interviews happened.
If you ( or anyone ) find anything pertaining to these
ADOSH ‘former GMHS’ interviews before I do…
so, i am curious to know… and this is a genuine question, not rhetoric.
what do you think are the top five revelations (or call them “discrepancies” or “truths” or “cover ups” if you want) that have been “dug up” by this internet commentary? anything that was not covered in one of the three investigation reports?… i am not talking about all the little details that surface by scouring the FOIA materials, i am talking about revelations that were not revealed in official reports or that would actually negate the reports.
i am just looking for the gist of the matter, not long winded explanations.
For me, the revelations/lessons learned have been:
* No 30 min radio blackout
* Abuse of the terms “escape route” and “safety zone” (both from GM and Darrell Willis)
* Application of the 10 (and 18) (I still do not know why the SAIR did not use these as a measure of situational awareness and/or appropriate risk management.)
* This was not unprecedented fire behavior, and weather reports did reach the crews. It was another plume dominated fire, with the addition of storms cells that were observed and reported. Nothing mysterious or unforeseeable there.
* Human factors that I have not personally experienced: having to justify one’s organization to a funding agency that is threatening to cut support; potential loss of life in WUI due to slow evacuation roll out; authoritarian leadership, such that those of lower/lowest rank may not have felt empowered to call out serious safety issues.
I’m sure there’s more, but those are the elements that stand out for me, and I’ll be trying to relay them to my coworkers. I think that some here have made a compelling case for the issue of prior bad decisions/good outcomes. At this point, I doubt the scope is limited to GMIHC.
Thank you Sitta, I agree with all of the “lessons learned” that you identified. And I am going to try to think of more myself. I think others have been identified throughout this thread. But I also think our greatest strength is our free form, and our greatest weakness is our free form.
I really do mean it when I say I a glad xxfullsailxx is back in his role as the most vocal member of the loyal opposition, since we need a system of checks and balance.
Elizabeth played an important part in that system, but well…I (and maybe some others) caused her to well…I’m not sure, but she hasn’t posted here since that flare up occurred. I do hope Elizabeth’s absence from this thread is temporary, and she returns to help us work through this disaster.
In my defense however, I for one…was never even completely house broken and I sometimes experience little “accidents”, and arguing in a civilized manner was never my strong point.
I can’t remember anymore what my strong points were, except that (as I have said before) I had a habit of swinging whatever tool my supervisor handed as hard as I could until I was told to stop, which continued with me through my second career. So…I am still hoping that Elizabeth returns, and I will try to disagree in a less disagreeable manner with her next time. I think I have acknowledged before that I am not a nice person, and I was never paid to make friends, only try as best I could to get the job done.
The last time I thought about this problem seriously, I unilaterally named “us”, the Alternative Serious Accident Investigation Team (ASAIT), which was when I also unilaterally appointed WTKTT to be our lead investigator. Which probably did not sit well with everyone who was actively involved scouring for “all the little details”, but still very important facts surrounding this incident that the SAIT blew by with their SAIR. And in the end, WTKTT declined to accept my unilateral appointment anyway. As a result, I didn’t throw out my other bureaucratic inspired suggestions.
And sometimes… bureaucratic can be a GOOD word. Like when you want to organize something, and get measurable, meaningful and perhaps even long lasting results in addressing a very real problem.
All “joking” (and given my dry, sarcastic, self-deprecating punctuated by ego driven flare-ups of hubris sense of humor, it may be hard for some to tell when I am joking and when I am being serious) aside, I am finally going to throw out my other suggestions in response to xx-fullsail-xx’s challenge.
We need a system to vet, and then approve, maybe with caveats or asterisk included, conclusions the ASAIT comes up with, although given our free-for-all style, I’m not sure how this is would be possible, much less organized.
I specifically remember a long list of conclusions that Bob Powers came up and documented several months ago, and you and I have also made other lists in the past. Although I would have to extensively search through a lot of material to find them at this point. I don’t think most of the things that were named were particularly controversial, and I hope at least some of them could be “approved” by even a largely anonymous, and completely informal working group.
So…in the meantime, I think we need a “recorder” to start keeping track of the important conclusions the ASAIT comes up with, otherwise most of what we manage to conclude with continue to be largely lost to the volumes of comments on this thread. Therefore, I nominate YOU.
Now…given how your last suggestion was received, or at least responded to, (it had to do with organizing the comments on this thread, I didn’t respond to your grand suggestion because I didn’t know what to say), or a whole bunch of other reasons, you may not be receptive to this nomination.
But…I hope you will at least consider it, and then once we at least have a list of recommendations or identified issues, we can then at least then fight about them in an attempt to meet the challenge of our loyal opposition and good friend, xx-fullsail-xx has issued to the ASAIT.
Or barring these suggestions, do any of you have any others? WHAT SAY YOU (Lord of The Rings)?
I agree on the appointment…..
One other thing that stood out was the Type 2 team. Not a full team and not a setup team. This caused a lack of organization and leadership that caused a lot of confusion on the fire. Teams should be organized as a group and assigned to work short and long Teams. Not a haphazard mix. Note that NIFC is addressing this. The States need to as well.
And Sitta covered every thing I posted earlier. We talked about but never got into the slow evacuation of the towns and civilians. another lack of planning and timing.
And, I don’t think our list would necessarily have to be about revealing smoking guns, I think it should be about systematically documenting lessons learned, since as Bob Powers already said a long time ago, all of the previous investigative reports used to do that. The SAIR is the first one that did not, I think. Maybe when we are “done”, John Dougherty would even write and article and document our list in that manner. That actually may end up being helpful in wildland firefighter training, as least as discussion points.
I know you query involved anything not covered in the “3” reports, but as far as revelations go, I have to go back to, what I believe, was Gary (hopefully I’ve got the correct person here), stating, both, before and after the SAIT was released (and prior to the release of any other reports), that based on his experience, “he believed that GM was asked, or requested, or ordered, to go into Yarnell”.
At the time, without any other supporting evidence, I personally didn’t automatically discount that “gut feeling based upon experience”, deferring for the time-being, ‘to that experience’.
With the release of then ADOSH report, which included the previously unknown ‘request from Musser’, that experience-based gut-feeling was proven to be correct.
So, in answer to your question, this revelation, while initially based upon an ‘experienced-based gut-feeling’, became a basis in fact, with the release of additional reports and information.
Maybe this doesn’t fit into the top five revelations, but personally, I found it to be quite important as a recognition of experience-based validated insight, being provided by some of the posters here.
Yes, that has been my favorite drum to beat since this started, other than I thought to much emphasis was placed on structure protection on the Yarnell Hill Fire and that the culture of wildland firefighting and structural firefighting should never be mixed. Although I always implied or outright said that I thought it was Darrell Willis who told Eric Marsh to move towards Yarnell ASAP (other requests aside). I still do.
okay, so i am not going to negate the responses, because that wasn’t the intent of my query… but i will say this:
i think there are valid talking points that you all have brought up, but really no “revelations” that weren’t already brought to light in at least one of the three reports. by that i mean, nothing that really changes “the facts” as stated in any of the reports.
MAYBE there is something to the “no 30 min. radio black out” theory, but even that has yet to be truly vetted as fact.
P64 SAIR…1637 ASM2 flies a drop path for a VLAT north of Yarnell west to east. DIVS A acknowledges the drop.
I do not believe this (Div A acknowledges the drop) to be true. There was no drop, Eric Marsh didn’t acknowledge it.(as far as all the notes and audio recordings indicate)
After he calls for the drop (that didn’t come) IMHO.. he hauls ass to get to the crew… and then makes a call out to Bravo33 once he arrives at the DZ.
The whole past bad decisions with good outcomes aspect never was documented or even looked into explicitly except on here (that I am aware).
If I recall correctly, there’s been discussion both on here and on wildfiretoday about GM having chosen the worst possible place to deploy, counter to Willis’ assertion that they chose the best place possible. I haven’t seen that discussed explicitly in a report.
Related, I haven’t seen a coherent decision tree of: making a judgment that deployment is likely survivable a predicate to deployment, addressed explicitly except on here.
A persistently carefree approach to SZs was partially addressed by ADOSH, but more fully discussed here. And I believe there is more fleshing out that could be done, and people should be concerned that this not be a pervasive issue that applies to many other crews.
Some flaky theories that were floated here were also debunked on here. That may not seem productive, but better they be debunked on here than allowed to hit the mainstream without existing objections to their credibility.
I think the ADOSH report was better than the discussion on here in noting that many significant decisions throughout the day seemed to take no notice of the fuel type and fire behavior.
WTKKT’s audio crunching may have caused Maclean to back off a little on the sawyer theory, which to me was not flaky but may have been used to assert that GM did have a legit escape route, as opposed to what they did have.
I’ve only seen on here and on wildfiretoday explicit discussion of how dumb it is, even after an initial decision to bushwhack downhill, to stay with it when the early going is .5/m/hr in pace. Since, reversal was in this case back up hill, and likely therefore even slower. There’s a general situational awareness issue there, too.
Dehydration, hypoglycemia and other impaired judgment issues might bear more discussion and probing, but I haven’t seen them explicitly discussed but for here.
Sorry for rambling a bit. But, I think a lot has been done on here. Whether any of it is used constructively to effect changed practices? I think some will.
none of those are revelations that change the overall synopsis of the reports.
i wasn’t talking about what has been discussed on here… those are talking points, sure. but talking points on an internet site full of anonymous posters leaves little to be desired. it sounds to me like you’re just looking for someone to hang GM out to dry. i think it’s easy enough to see that their decision making that day was poor.
I just thought of something important discussed specifically here: the quality of the investigation.
Unrecorded interviews, contradictions not followed up on, unaccounted for GPS units, cameras, and phones. Apparently no attempt to look for phone records. The SAIR summary that blaringly ignores LCES and the 10 & 18. I know this wasn’t a “criminal” investigation. But if the time spent and frustration seen in this discussion forum suggest anything, it’s that a thorough, transparent investigation in the beginning would do a lot to quash rumors, conspiracy theories, and perhaps even lawsuits later on. And that more than the hundreds reading this forum would learn the applicable lessons and share them, so that more people don’t die.
I can only hope this forum could change the way investigations are run, if just by a little.
You’re assuming that “THEY” want to know the truth. It’s been my experience that particualrly involving fatalities, that is NOT the case. And that’s why they FIRST establish the conclusion and then find the ‘facts’ to support their ‘conclusion.’
from us we there is the homeowners/others photos n videos. people need to be focused to seeing those- much different then reports. people need to show their photos/videos publicly. this would help in this process XXXfullsbilXXX (my letter before b does not work)
**
** DARRELL WILLIS ADOSH INTERVIEW – PART 2
**
** GRANITE MOUNTAIN WAS ‘SENT HOME’ FROM A FIRE
Immediately after Willis ‘announced’ to the ADOSH investigators that
the MacKenzie photos and videos existed… the very next topic of
conversation in his interview was whether Willis recalled any prior
‘incidents’ with Granite Mountain on other fires.
Willis then recalls at least 2 incidents within the previous 3 fire seasons.
Wills reports that GM was actually ‘demobbed’ from the Wesley Fire ( Payan ).
The were actually ‘sent home’ and ‘terrible’ evaluation report followed.
Willis also talks about some ‘knock-down-drag-out’ fight GM got into with OPS
on the Horseshoe 2 Fire ( Coronado ). There were not ‘demobbed’ from that
one but it was messy.
NOTE: The CONTEXT of Willis reporting these ‘incidents’ with Granite Mountain
was all about SAFETY and whether Granite Mountain had ever actually
REFUSED any assignments out of ‘safety’ concerns. So these accounts from
Willis are in response to that question and not whether there were any
‘incidents’ where they were caught ‘freelancing’ or performing ‘bad decisons
with good outcomes’.
What is ODD, however, is that when the ADOSH investigators interviewed
Brendan McDonough… they asked him the same question(s) about GM’s
‘prior behavior’ and ‘past performance’ on other fires… and whether there
had been ANY times they got a ‘bad writeup’ or were ‘demobbed’ for
ANY reason…
…and Brendan McDonough said ( unequivocally )…. NO, NEVER…
…even though the two incidents that Willis is reporting in his interview
were within the previous 3 fires seasons and McDonough WAS with
the crew for both of them.
START OF SECTION FROM ADOSH INTERVIEW WITH DARELL WILLIS
Date/Time: 8-19-13 / 1:05 am – Case # Willis – Page 31
A = Interviewee, Darrell Willis
Q1 = Barry Hicks – Wildland Fire Associates contractor for ADOSH
Q2 = Dave Larsen – Wildland Fire Associates contractor for ADOSH ( Rest in Peace ).
NOTE: Prescott City Attorney Jon Paladini was present for this interview.
Q1: Mm-hm. Um, so your – your best guess is they see the structures down there
and they figure they need to go….
A: And they had the time and the distance.
Q1: Figured.
A: They figured. I – I don’t know that. Only Eric can tell you that. And Jesse. But
I also understand that they’re, ah, they wouldn’t want to sit around and watch
the town burn down.
Q1: Yeah.
A: In the black. If they could help.
Q1: Yeah.
A: That’s my feeling. I don’t think there’s any crew in the nation that would want
to do that. Just sit on a – on a black spot. If – but – but here’s the thing. They’re
good decision-makers. Last year they got kicked off a fire in Idaho for
refusing to do, ah, a go direct on a fire and they worked with the division that
wouldn’t – wouldn’t budge on it and so he demobed them. So that proves to
me they’re safe. I mean, they’re not gonna do something that they think is
gonna, ah, be dangerous to the crew.
Q1: Did you hear what fire that was?
A: Uh, (W)- (W)- Wesley?
Q1: I hadn’t heard about that one.
A: It was on, uh, Payan, I think.
Q1: Oh, it was? Um, so they actually got demobed for refusing an assignment?
A: Got a terrible evaluation.
Q1: Um…
A: They ended up coaxing another crew into doing the work that they wanted to
do – that they wouldn’t do.
Q1: Now…
Q2: Talking about going direct, I don’t understand this getting kicked off for…
A: They, uh – they kept getting beat up going direct. And they said, “This is – this
is killing us. Why don’t we just take it out – ” They were in mixed comm. And
you know the controversy between fire and out and mixed comm and all that.
Q1: Yeah.
A: And they said there’s a good road down here, let’s try this. We’re just keep –
we’re just beating ourselves up trying to go direct. And the division said, “No.
We’re not – ” He – they provided them another plan, which is that turn-down
policy is if you – if you’re not gonna do it, give us another plan.
Q1: Mm-hm.
A: We gave them another 1389 plan and they said, “You guys are done, we don’t need
you.”
Q1: Right. Um, so – uh, and I – I just need to make sure Bruce heard that right.
That these guys turned down an assignment and got disciplined for doing that.
Uh, and…
A: And that was fine.
Q: Is that in writing?
Q1: Well, I would – I would…
A: It would be in writing.
Q1: …bet that it was – be in writing.
A: It was in writing. They got an evaluation.
Q1: Yeah.
A: I don’t know if I can pull up, find it. I’ll try…
Q1: I think that would…
A: Because we were…
Q1: That would be important information for us to have from – from your
standpoint. Uh, doesn’t – doesn’t necessarily apply to this situation, but that’s
one of the things these guys do and, uh, so – uh, and – and I just personally
don’t like hearing those kinds of stories about firefighters getting disciplined
for, um, raising a safety issue, uh, and getting sent home. Uh, not a – not a way
we ought to be doing business, I don’t believe.
Q2: Is this the only time that you – that’s ever occurred, to your knowledge?
A: I heard, uh, that on another opportunity – or another fire that they were on, the
Horseshoe 2, they got into a big disagreement with the Ops Chief about, uh, a
firing operation and they shut the firing operation down for, I think, two days
and the crew actually was right on it and they had other crews that said they
wouldn’t do it, either. They singled out Granite Mountain because they refused
to do it. This was, like, two years ago down in the – in the, uh – on the
Coronado, on Horseshoe 2.
Q1: Yeah, I remember that one.
A: Same kind of – not similar. They just got into a fight. The Ops Chief said do it
and they said, “No, we’re not – we don’t have the – we don’t have the spacing,
we don’t have the horsepower to accomplish what you wanna accomplish.”
Q2: Mmm.
A: And that – and, you know, if you have some fire experience, you know that
you pretty much gotta go with the guts of those hotshots because they’re the
ones that have been doing it a lot, and – you know, they’re not always right,
and you can push back, but…
Q1: But they’re…
A: …a lot of times their gut feelings are right.
Q1: Yeah.
Q2: Did they have a history, or have they ever stories, uh, of – of sitting one out in
the black? Had they had that experience?
A: I don’t know. I’ve never heard that. Nothing that I can bring to mind.
END OF SECTION FROM DARRELL WILLIS ADOSH INTERVIEW
Some corrections and clarification are in order on this on if that’s okay.
It was the Wesley Fire on the PAYETTE (not Payan) NF in Idaho in September 2012.
You posted this: “They were in mixed comm. And you know the controversy between fire and out and mixed comm and all that.”
Listening and interpretation errors on this one. More likely, what was said was they were in mixed CON (as in conifer). … controversy between FIRE AND OUT (should be FIRING OUT) and mixed CON [conifer] and all that.”
So, the sentence (answer) SHOULD read – ‘They were in mixed con [conifer]. And you know the controversy between [firing out] and mixed [con] and all that.’
Hopefully, that should flow better and make more sense.
Now Willis responds almost identical to what he said at the fatality site news conference regarding “no wildland firefighter is satisfied sitting in the black doing nothing when the fire is progressing below them.’
WILLIS – “A: That’s my feeling. I don’t think there’s any crew in the nation that would want to do that. Just sit on a – on a black spot. If – but – but here’s the thing. They’re good decision-makers. …. So that proves to me they’re safe. I mean, they’re not gonna do something that they think is gonna, ah, be dangerous to the crew.”
REALLY? And what about June 30th when they left they’re perfectly good SZ?
And one of the Investigators comments on the Turn Down Protocol as follows: “I just personally don’t like hearing those kinds of stories about firefighters getting disciplined for, um, raising a safety issue, uh, and getting sent home. Uh, not a – not a way we ought to be doing business …”
He’s absolutely correct here UNFORTUNATELY that is more like what happens in the real world. I heard an experienced WFF refer to that as “Being shipped to Division Siberia, somewhere that’s been cold out for a week, for refusing an assignment based on safety concerns.” It happens much more than I like.
Payette Fire
Indirect line on the Payette dose not happen very often.
Refusing to go direct?? That was the plan of the fire to keep fire fighters safe. You would have To do a lot of explaining about that not being safe. The Overhead for some reason did not want to go indirect and felt it was safer to go direct. You cant refuse direct as a safety concern as that is the safest fire line to build. If the plans did not want to do any indirect line then you beat the fire line until you get a line on it. THIS WAS NOT A SAFETY CONCERN.
That is the first thing that I thought just as soon as I read the post. “And they said there’s a good road down here, let’s try this. We’re just keep –
we’re just beating ourselves up trying to go direct.”
Is NOT a safety concern. I can’t imagine a hotshot crew ever turning down or even arguing over an assignment that makes them work to hard! That goes against the entire work ethic of the hotshot culture.
Mr. Powers… see my response to RTS on
this subject thread below. Not only did Brendan
McDonough totally DENY they were ever
‘sent home’ from ANYWHERE…. Brendan also
totally refutes what Willis’ account of what
went down in Idaho. Willis said they had been
‘going direct and were just getting beat up
and wanted to go indirect’… but McDonough
says it was the exact opposite. The assignment
they refused from the smoke jumper who was
their DIV was when he WANTED them to
start going ‘indirect’ and GM thought it wasn’t
safe to do so… specifically because of possible
falling tree concerns.
I agree with RTS, as I have said before, there weren’t turn down protocols in my day, and I am sure there are penalties, at least some of the time, for exercising them today. It is not a perfect world.
And if you think I am full of myself and hubris, for even what I used to be, just wait until you meet some fire overhead. We called them fire gods for a reason. Doctors are not the only ones who have a God Complex.
>> RTS said…
>>
>> Some corrections and clarification are in order on
>> this on if that’s okay.
>> It was the Wesley Fire on the PAYETTE (not Payan)
>> NF in Idaho in September 2012.
Copy that. Darrell Willis himself ( in the audio recording )
seems to say something more like ‘Payenne’ than
‘PayAN’, as the ADOSH transcriber wrote, but he
was still not quite right ).
BTW: That transcript above is, in fact, ADOSH’s own
published transcript of their own audio recording.
>> RTS also wrote…
>> You posted this: “They were in mixed comm. And you
>> know the controversy between fire and out and mixed
>> comm and all that.”
>>
>> The sentence (answer) SHOULD read – ‘They were in
>> mixed con [conifer]. And you know the controversy
>> between [firing out] and mixed [con] and all that.’
>>
>> Hopefully, that should flow better and make more sense.
Yep. Sure does. Thanks.
In the actual audio recording… Willis DOES say
‘con’ ( with an ‘N’, not an ‘M’ ). Again, the ADOSH
transcriber just seems to have heard that wrong.
By the way… as far as the incident where GM got
‘sent home’ ( according to Willis ) from Idaho in
2012… not only does Brendan McDonough say
that NEVER happened ( in HIS interview )… his story
about what happened is the complete opposite of
what Willis told ADOSH.
Willis told ADOSH they were ‘sent home’ for refusing
to continue to ‘go direct’… but Brendan says it was
the opposite. They had been going ‘indirect’ and
refused to go ‘direct’ because of possible safety
issues with falling trees.
See below for Brendan’s actual testimony to ADOSH,
the day AFTER Willis’ interview.
>> RTS also said…
>> Now Willis responds almost identical to what he said
>> at the fatality site news conference regarding “no
>> wildland firefighter is satisfied sitting in the black doing
>> nothing when the fire is progressing below them.’
There is even more stuff like this towards the end
of Willis’ interview. The WFA and ADOSH investigators
press him about his attitudes on this and Willis just
launches (again) into this bizarre ‘speech’ about what
HE believes ‘any good/aggressive firefighter would do’.
Dave Larsen ( Rest in Peace ) disagrees strongly
with him and says something like “I think I’ve spent half
of my entire career in the black… and I’m proud of that.”
Willis also launches into one of his weird ‘Urban
Interface’ speeches as well, towards the end.
I STILL think the weirdest thing about this new information
from the Willis interview about ‘prior incidents’ ( on
other fires ) with Granite Mountain is that the very
next day… when the ADOSH investigators specifically
asked Brendan McDonough about what Willis said…
Brendan says that the Idaho ‘demob’ NEVER HAPPENED.
** BRENDAN DENIES THEY WERE EVER SENT HOME
The day after ADOSH first interview Darrell Willis was the
day they interviewed Brendan McDonough.
They asked Brendan directly about being ‘sent home’ from
any fires ( like the one in 2012 that Willis described )…
but Brendan says it NEVER HAPPENED.
BEGIN SECTION FROM ADOSH INTERVIEW
WITH BRENDAN MCDONOUGH
8-20-13/1:00 pm – Case # McDonough – Page 49
A = Interviewee – Brendan McDonough
Q = Bruce Hanna – ADOSH investigator
Q1 = Barry Hicks – ADOSH contractor
Q2 = Dave Larsen – ADOSH contractor ( Rest in Peace )
Q1: Bruce, you got anything ( for Brendan )?
Q: Yeah. I got a couple questions. The – Chief Willis we talked to yesterday.
A: Mm-hm.
Q: He talked about you guys going out on some
assignments where you declined them because of
safety issues.
A: Oh yeah
Q: Is that true?
A: Multiple assignments, um, Eric and Steed – from top
to bottom, they asked every single person what your
comfortability level was. And even a first-year guy, if they
said something it’s always taken into consideration. Um,
if you were thinking it, you knew they were.
Q: Right.
A: They had kids and there’s — yeah, there was quite a
few assignments that we declined and a lot of people on
the team were upset about that, and they didn’t care.
Q1: Do you remember one in – Idaho?
A: Yeah. Idaho, we declined the assignment, our
superintendent was a smoke jumper was, um, Shaff by
chance was his name?
Q1: Which one?
A: Ah, the division was Shaff. The guy’s name Shaff.
Probably about 5’6”, Asian gentleman. We declined an
assignment because of tree hazards…
Q1: Right.
A: …going downhill, um, really unstable, we hear trees
come down all the time.
Q1: Right.
A: And they wanted us to go indirect. It was really ratty,
didn’t burn solid, just a lot of potential and terrain and stuff.
There’s other viable options that we could have used.
Q1: What was the outcome of that one? When you
declined the assignment?
A: We just did an indirect piece.
Q1: But was the – did you all, ah, get sent home
because of…
A: No.
Q1: You did NOT get sent home?
A: We’ve never…
Q1: …so they changed the…
A: Yeah. I personally since I’ve worked on the crew we
have NEVER been sent home for declining an assignment.
Q1: Oh okay. Okay, ah, and, um, so you declined the
assignment. They gave you ah… you gave them an
alternative?
A: Yes, sir. Multiple alternatives.
Q1: And so…
A: Just like…
Q1: …they chose one of your alternatives?
A: Just like in the IRPG, verbatim.
Q1: Okay.
A: Verbatim or…
Q1: It – it worked just the way it was laid out to go? Okay.
Gotcha. Ah, well that’s good news. That – glad to hear that.
A: Yeah.
Q2: Very much.
Q1: Yeah. And, ah, so you’ve never had a – an assignment
where you’ve had a safety issue and got sent home
because you raised the safety issue?
A: No. They’ve always acknowledged it.
Q1: Okay.
A: Within the crew and on the team. Since I have been
there we have NEVER been sent home because of a
safety issue.
Q1: Okay.
END SECTION FROM ADOSH INTERVIEW
WITH BRENDAN MCDONOUGH
Ok then. If the GMHS (Marsh and Steed) were SO safety conscious and SO safety oriented according to Rookie McDonaugh in his ADOSH interview, WTF happened on June 30th? WTF happened to convince 18 men to walk DOWNHILL into a CHUTE and ultimately into a BOWL of very thick UNBURNED chaparral under very ADVERSE WEATHER AND ADVERSE AND INCREASING FIRE BEHAVIOR on June 30th without the benefit of a REQUIRED LOOKOUT to at least warn them they weren’t going to make it and to turn about? WTF?
Exactly… what are we supposed to take
from what EITHER Willis OR McDonough
were trying to say in their ADOSH
interviews.
Willis is saying what ‘excellent decision
makers they were’.
McDonough is even trying to establish
that Marsh/Steed ALWAYS checked the
‘comfort level’ about decisions with
EVERY crew member… even rookies.
Horseshit.
They were deathly afraid of ‘trees’… but
not of actual ‘fire’, or something?
I really don’t believe either of them.
It would be interesting to know what the
real truth is about Idaho, however, since
one person is saying they were definitely
‘booted’ off the fire and a ‘terrible’ evaluation
followed… and the other person is saying
that it never happened at all.
About the only thing that proves at this
point is that if McDonough and Willis did
‘get together’ to ‘get their stories straight’
prior to these interviews… they didn’t
do a very good job.
Speaking of ‘getting together’… Willis does
admit in his ADOSH interview that one of
the first things he did after the deployment
was ‘find McDonough’…
…but Willis ( unprompted ) immediately
adds that he ‘never asked him any
questions’… he just wanted to see how
he was doing.
Willis says he never even bothered to ask
Brendan why he happened to be standing
there in the parking lot even though a
helicopter was out looking for the rest his
crew… OR even asked Brendan if he
had any idea where they might be.
This first ADOSH interview with Darrell took place on August 19, 2013,
at 1:05 AM in the morning, in Prescott. Jon Paladini, the Prescott City
Attorney, accompanied Willis at this interview.
There are any number of very ‘odd’ things being said by Willis in this interview
that haven’t been heard before… including his accounts of the times Granite
Mountain had actually been ‘kicked off’ a number of fires ( actually sent home
with scathing write-ups )… but more on THAT part of the interview later.
This ( first post of many regarding this interview, probably ) is just about
ONE of these ‘odd’ moments in his interview and concerns the ‘story’ he tells
the ADOSH investigators about the MacKenzie camera, and also ( perhaps
even more important )… what he does NOT tell them about it.
Since it was only August 19, the ADOSH investigators had no idea, at this point,
that Christopher MacKenzie’s camera had actually been found, returned to his
father, who is only then (supposedly) the one who discovered there was anything
on it, made a CD of the contents, and then (supposedly) handed that CD back
to Darrell Willis at Christopher’s funeral.
Only then did Willis (supposedly) pass that CD on to the SAIT investigators,
and it was all happening OUTSIDE the normal ‘YCSO police chain of
evidence’.
So the SAIT had ALL of the MacKenzie photos, video and audio at this time…
( on August 19 ) but since the SAIT was not cooperating with ADOSH… the
ADOSH investigators had no idea about MacKenzie’s camera until Willis
casually ‘announces’ the camera’s existence in this interview.
Here is the transcript of that moment in the interview when Willis ‘announces’
to the ADOSH investigators that HE has, in fact, already seen the photos and
videos from MacKenzie’s camera…
Barry Hicks = Wildland Fire Associates contractor for ADOSH
START OF SECTION FROM AUDIO INTERVIEW
+50:05 ( 50 minutes and 5 seconds into the interview )….
Barry Hicks: And you never heard any conversation with… between Granite
or Eric and Air Attack sayin’… we’re movin… um… and…
now… there was a… there’s a text message from one of the Granite
Mountain Hotshots, too, I believe it was to a Mother, wadn’t it?… uh… that says…
Darrell Willis: Yea… Wade Parker
Barry Hicks: …we see structures that need to be protected…
and Do you remember what time that was… that…
Darrell Willis: I’m thinkin’ it was after 4 o’clock.
Ah… I think it was 4:04 or somewhere in there.
I’ve… I’ve heard about that.
I’ve seen some… ah… pictures… that were about the same time.
We got some pictures from a camera… that was… MacKenzie.
The Sheriff picked it up… and they thought it was a burned up phone.
The sent it home with the parents.
Dad took it down to Walgreens.
They pulled a SIM card out of it and they pulled a whole bunch a pictures out of it.
Barry Hicks: Oh, really… huh.
Darrell Willis: And it was some of these pictures, in fact,
There’s some video there of where the fire was sittin’ at this time.
Almost exact same as that Parker
Barry Hicks: About the same time?
Darrell Willis: Uh-huh
Barry Hicks: Um… Did the video show anything different from…
Darrell Willis: Not really… you could just see that line of fire comin’ back to the south.
END OF SECTION FROM AUDIO INTERVIEW
Points…
1) MacKenzie’s camera was NOT ‘burned up’, or at least not in any kind of
condition that would cause any investigator to believe it was ‘garbage’ or ‘not
worth examining’. Christopher’s father himself described to the media how
he was amazed at what GOOD condition it was in when he received it and
that the ‘cloth cover’ wasn’t even burned. Christopher’s father also expressed
his amazement to the media that he would even be ‘receiving’ this camera
( with photos and videos ) back when he already knew the police were still
holding Christopher’s smartphone ‘as evidence’. What Christopher’s father did
NOT know at that time is that the only reason he received the camera is because
of the effort that was made to keep it OUTSIDE the ‘normal chain of evidence’.
2) Even if the camera had visible damage or appeared to be ‘burned up’… any
Sheriff or YCSO police investigator would have still submitted it into evidence
to be fully examined… ESPECIALLY if ( as Willis says )… they actually even
remotely thought it might be a ‘phone’. Those were stated as ‘high priority’
evidence items in the YCSO police reports themselves.
3) The Sheriff did NOT ‘send it home with the parents’. As far as we know… it
somehow left the deployment site, then somehow was ‘transported’ ( outside
the normal investigation channels ) over to the Medical Examiner’s office and
‘added’ to a bag of personal effects of Christopher MacKenzie. That ‘bag’ of
effects was then given to Christopher MacKenzie’s father by the Fire officials
( Chino Valley? ) in charge of doing that. The ‘Sheriff’ and/or the YCSO
investigators were not the ones delivering ANY of the personal effects back
to the families.
4) Darrell Willis is announcing to the ADOSH investigators, as early as August
19, that the MacKenzie camera WAS found, and it DID contain photos and
video, and that HE himself has seen/heard all of that… but he carefully does
NOT tell them about the most important thing of all about the videos… the fact
that they captured part of the ‘discussing their options’ radio conversations
and were the first proof that Marsh was not physically WITH Steed and the
crew circa 4:04 PM.
For someone who appeared to be ‘fully cooperating’ with the ADOSH
investigation… his mis-representation of the ‘chain of possession’ on the
MacKenzie camera and his failure to disclose the most important aspect
of what was ON it is VERY strange.
ALSO NOTE: In this very part of the interview… Mr. Barry Hicks DID ask
Darrell Willis the crucial question…
“And you never heard any conversation with… between Granite
or Eric and Air Attack sayin’… we’re movin?”
…but then doesn’t even give Willis a chance to answer and suddenly
‘changes the subject’ to being about the Wade Parker text photo.
Willis then talks freely about the ‘photos’… but ignores that first question about
whether he actually ‘heard’ any of GM’s conversations about ‘moving’.
Willis would go on to admit just a month or so later in his interview with
military.com that he was, in fact, ‘listening’ to the GM private intra-crew
radio channel that afternoon… and around the time they ‘decided to move’.
Thanks for retelling this, WTK. Being the one who researched it all, I was thinking it would end up in the foggy bins of past history. And it’s very important.
Especially since I just read in Brendan’s October interview that GM had four GPS units with them on June 30.
And PS, reading his interviews, it’s becoming more and more apparent to me that he KNEW that the “escape route” was the two-track road all the way to Boulder Springs Ranch. I have been befuddled, all along, that Brendan, after listening to all the convos on the crew channel, never said where GM had gone when they were searching for them. I couldn’t believe he didn’t know.
Now I realize, and believe, he didn’t know because he was very clear the escape route was the two-track ALL THE WAY to Boulder Springs Ranch. So he must have never heard any conversation regarding cutting down into the bowl. That leaves its own possibilities…..
Regarding Ball and the UTV, he didn’t borrow it from BR, he borrowed it when he was driven to the Yarnell Fire Department, after walking to Yarnell from the dozer line. The whole thing with Ball, the dozer, his two trips into Glen Illah, etc., are both less and more confusing to me after reading the unit logs and the current interviews, and I still have no clue how the BR Utility truck and trailer were brought out and when.
And also, I never believed GM had two trucks–sup and chase–despite what you wrote, because I have every vehicle in every related photograph keyworded and have seen absolutely nothing showing a GM chase truck. But you were right. And it was Steed’s, according to Brendan. Reading these interviews is quite enlightening, indeed.
Thx for keeping up the good work. I don’t have time to do much commenting and problem-solving, but I definitely keep up with reading.
Marti, I agree that Ball borrowed the quad from the YFD, not BR. But I think he actually rode with Mcdonough in the Supt truck or he was riding with Trew Brown in the chase truck when he went to retrieve the quad.
I do want to add one additional clarification to my earlier comment to Joy. It is to easy for me just to say the Granite Mountain Hotshots were my hero’s BEFORE they died, not because they died. They were my hero’s because they earned their living and supported their families, by moving towards a fire, moving towards the danger, for all of us.
**
** FULL TRANSCRIPT OF BACKGROUND RADIO CONVERSATIONS
** CAPTURED IN AIR STUDY VIDEO 20130630_154232_fire_behavior_EP
This is the AIR STUDY video that has always been reported to have the
‘callout’ from OPS2 Paul Musser to DIVSA Eric Marsh in it, but a public
copy of that video has not been available until today.
We also now discover ( as the ADOSH investigation notes suggested )
that the video BEGINS with what appears to be Eric Marsh ‘finishing’
a conversation with some other (unknown) person.
AIR STUDY VIDEO…
20130630_154232_fire_behavior_EP.MOV
Video was shot on June 30, 2013 beginning at 1542 ( 3:42 PM ) plus 32 seconds.
Length: This video is only 24 seconds long.
FULL TRANSCRIPT OF BACKGROUND RADIO CONVERSATIONS…
NOTE: No ‘audio forensics’ required here. All the background radio
conversation captured in this AIR STUDY video can be clearly heard by
anyone with normal hearing.
ALSO NOTE: This video BEGINS at 1542.38 ( 3:42 PM plus 38 seconds ).
That is 2 minutes and 38 seconds AFTER Gary Cordes had officially
requested the full evacuation of Yarnell and Glen Ilah.
ALSO NOTE: When the video starts… someone is already answering
someone else’s previous radio call in the background and the voice that
is heard responding is a more than 90 percent probable match for Eric
Marsh. Even the ADOSH investigation notes confirm that is is most
likely him speaking at the start of this video.
VIDEO STARTS
+0:00
Eric Marsh: …towards the structures… uh… (pause) southern… uh…
(pause) into Yarnell.
NOTE: As soon as Marsh finished answering whoever he
was talking to… OPS2 Paul Musser calls him directly…
+0:06
Paul Musser: Division Alpha, Operations Musser.
NOTE: Silence for a moment, then someone comes on and
simply says “Thank you” to Marsh for his response.
My opinion only: The voice saying “Thank you” SOUNDS like it COULD
have been Darell Willis. It is a good match for other radio captures of
Darell Willis’ voice.
+0:13
(Unknown): Thank you.
NOTE: There is no other background traffic in the remaining
11 seconds. Marsh does not respond to Musser by the time
the video ends at 1542.56
+0:24
VIDEO ENDS
So the exact ‘clock’ time for this clear attempt on OPS2 Musser’s part to
engage in conversation directly with DIVSA Eric Marsh is now known to be…
1542.38 ( 3:42 PM plus 38 seconds ).
That is TWO minutes after the moment when SPGS1 Gary Cordes officially
called for full the full evacuation of Yarnell and Glen Ilah, and Musser was
known to be physically with Cordes at this time somewhere in Yarnell ( probably
the Ranch House Restaurant staging area ).
Some typos above. The video itself begins at 1542.32
( 3:42 PM plus 32 seconds ) and not 1542.38 as accidentally
typed up above in some places.
The radio call from OPS2 Musser to DIVSA Marsh happens
+6 seconds into the video, making the time of THAT radio
call 1542.38 ( 3:42 PM plus 38 seconds ).
well, as usual, you get the most obvious of the dialogue correct, but are circumspect at best about the rest of it… good to know nothing really changes.
the first part of the video (that you attribute to Marsh) could be anyone and is more likely air attack, since they are actually talking about the fire burning over the retardant lines and towards Yarnell… (which you fail to pick up on apparently?)
lucky for you i am back! …to hold your feet on the ground, before you go leaping again.
“90% probable match” is pretty optimistic i’d say.
Reply to xxfullsailxx post on March 24, 2014 at 7:24 am
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>> well, as usual, you get the most obvious of the
>> dialogue correct, but are circumspect at best about
>> the rest of it…
What are you referring to?
Obviously the ‘foreground’ dialogue is not included
in the transcription above. Is that what you are
talking about?
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>> good to know nothing really changes.
Apparently not. Here to just make trouble again?
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>> the first part of the video (that you attribute to Marsh)
>> could be anyone and is more likely air attack, since
>> they are actually talking about the fire burning over
>> the retardant lines and towards Yarnell…
>> (which you fail to pick up on apparently?)
See below. I am the one who found the ADOSH
AIR STUDY video notes from the recently released
ADOSH investigation supporting documentation, and
it is the ADOSH investigators themselves who
first heard this dialogue and their own notes say
they believe it is Eric Marsh.
I agree with the ADOSH investigators.
It sounds just like Eric Marsh.
I am also the one ( again, see below ) that pointed out
that it is, in fact, NOT totally clear what Marsh ( or
whoever that is ) might be talking about.
He MIGHT be talking about the FIRE
OR
He MIGHT be talking about their plans to leave the black.
That’s what we do now.
We talk about it.
>> xxfullsailxx also said…
>> lucky for you i am back! …to hold your feet on the
>> ground, before you go leaping again.
And I am still here to let YOU know when I think you
are full of it as well. Type away.
Reply to xxfullsailxx post on March 24, 2014 at 7:24 am
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>> well, as usual, you get the most obvious of the
>> dialogue correct, but are circumspect at best about
>> the rest of it…
WTKTT asks, “What are you referring to? Obviously the ‘foreground’ dialogue is not included
in the transcription above. Is that what you are
talking about?”
i was referring to the one thing you got right, the most obvious thing, that Musser’s voice is very clear in the video. the rest of it is just blind speculation, as usual.
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>> good to know nothing really changes.
Apparently not. Here to just make trouble again?
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>> the first part of the video (that you attribute to Marsh)
>> could be anyone and is more likely air attack, since
>> they are actually talking about the fire burning over
>> the retardant lines and towards Yarnell…
>> (which you fail to pick up on apparently?)
WTKTT also says, “See below. I am the one who found the ADOSH AIR STUDY video notes from the recently released ADOSH investigation supporting documentation, and it is the ADOSH investigators themselves who first heard this dialogue and their own notes say they believe it is Eric Marsh. I agree with the ADOSH investigators. It sounds just like Eric Marsh. I am also the one ( again, see below ) that pointed out that it is, in fact, NOT totally clear what Marsh ( or whoever that is ) might be talking about. He MIGHT be talking about the FIRE OR He MIGHT be talking about their plans to leave the black. That’s what we do now. We talk about it.”
i really love how you tout “I FOUND THIS” or “I FOUND THAT” like you’re a petulant child looking for attention. “IT’S MINE, IT’S MINE!”
>> xxfullsailxx also said…
>> lucky for you i am back! …to hold your feet on the
>> ground, before you go leaping again.
WTKTT also said, “And I am still here to let YOU know when I think you
are full of it as well. Type away.”
WTKTT says, “See ADOSH investigation notes.
They are 100 percent sure ( no qualifying notes on
their decision that it is Marsh ).”
you get a lot of mileage out of some hand scribbled notes on a yellow pad with no qualifiers. i don’t think you’re hearing what you think you’re hearing…
WTKTT says, “At least I added the ’10 percent doubt’”.
i think you should qualify all your statements with a 50% doubt… meaning there’s a 50/50 chance you might know (or understand) what you’re talking about.
Reply to xxfullsailxx post
on March 24, 2014 at 8:03 pm
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>> i really love how you tout
>> “I FOUND THIS” or “I FOUND THAT”
No ‘touting’ involved. YOU are the one who
seemed to be unaware in YOUR post
that the ADOSH investigators had
already found the same audio capture
before I even mentioned it… so if you
have a problem with what you think
is being reported… take it up with ADOSH.
You’ve only been back for a few posts
and once again I have to remind you…
This is NOT about ME… and it’s NOT
about YOU. It’s about what really
happened in Yarnell on June 30, 2013.
>> xxfullsailxx
>> i think you should qualify all your
>> statements with a 50% doubt…
>> meaning there’s a 50/50 chance you
>> might know (or understand) what
>> you’re talking about.
I take it back. Maybe some things CAN
change. You are willing to at least give
me 50 percent now, it seems.
Send me your address.
I’ll send you an autographed baseball.
( I think only Gary is going to fully pick
up on that one ).
…”into Yarnell” sounds a bit like Marsh. “Thank you”, sounds a bit like Willis.
But, apparently, THE KEY CONVERSATION ON THIS VIDEO for all of us, comes right AFTER all of that, when someone says, “Where do we document that, at?”. Whoever was participating in THAT discussion, heard the entire conversation, and knew who all of the various participants were, along with, the complete conversational verbiage!
It’s a shame it didn’t last for more than 24 seconds.
I’m absolutely sure that just after the video ends…
Eric Marsh probably ‘answers’ the direct callout to
him from OPS2 Paul Musser.
If he didn’t… I’ll bet Paul Musser called him again.
OPS people don’t take kindly to being ignored
by DIVS people when they are calling them directly.
I do NOT believe this video was actually ‘edited’ or
‘cropped’ and here is why…
If you look in the background… all they were really
trying to do is capture that quick SEAT drop that
is taking place… and there is just enough video
to do that successfully.
It’s a little odd that this particular video is an Apple
Quicktime MOV format and the others are MP4,
but I also don’t think that’s proof of any ‘editing’
after-the-fact.
It seems to just be what it is. A short little video
someone took ( with their iPhone? ) to be sure and
capture that quick SEAT drop in the background,
which they do.
i think that you are making the very bad assumption that they were making any reference at all to what was being said over the radio. they could have been talking about anything… they could have been joking… they could have been talking about the air show, they could have been talking about the traffic, they could have been talking about passing gas…
maybe you were joking in your above comment? at least i hope so.
Okay… maybe I ‘deciphered’ what you
were trying to say.
Were you trying to say that the comments
by the guys in the FOREGROUND ( the
‘they’ you may have been referring to ) may
have had nothing to do with the radio
conversation taking place in the
BACKGROUND?
That wasn’t my comment…. but if that’s
what you were trying to establish above
then I would tend to agree.
I don’t think any of the foreground chatter
in this video has anything to do with the
background chatter. I don’t think they were
paying attention.
They were focused on the SEAT drop
that was happening and you can even hear
the 5 or 6 shutter clicks as they focused on
getting their own photographs during
the drop.
There is now a (public) copy of this infamous AIR STUDY video
available that does, in fact, capture OPS2 Paul Musser making
a radio call directly to DIVSA Eric Marsh.
The exact time of that ‘callout’ is now known.
It took place at exactly…
1542.38 ( 3:42 PM plus 38 seconds ).
See above for a full transcript of ALL the background radio
transmissions captured in this particular AIR STUDY video.
I had the opportunity to talk with the YHF Type 3 IC (ICT3) Russ Shumate recently, and he shared some details on the initial and extended attack of the YHF (June 29, 2013) that are pretty informative.
The SAIT states that 7 firefighters were helicoptered onto the Weaver Mountains ridge on June 29th. The fire was “holding on al four sides …” The SAIT further stated “that night 13 firefighters remain[ed] on the hill …”
Based on several year’s worth of past wildland fire experiences on the Weaver Mountians (site of the YHF), ICT3 Shumate said for SAFETY REASONS DUE TO LIGHTNING POTENTIAL, he had a fairly strict standard operating procedure. He learned to ALWAYS LIMIT the number of WFF on top of the Weaver Mountains to ONE OR TWO HELICOPTER LOADS, approximately an HOUR’S WORTH OF FLIGHT TIME, to ensure he could get all the WFF off the Weaver Mountains and out of harm’s way in short order, once a lightning storm was imminent and before the lightning was upon them. He said years’ worth ofoccurences of this limited him to the one hour and 1-2 helicopter loads, so that’s what he based his strategy and tactics on that weekend.
ICT3 Shumate stated on June 29th, the YHF had BACKED DOWNHILL on the very STEEP slopes through the THICK CHAPARRAL amongst the HUGE BOULDERS. This made it very difficult and unsafe to fight fire on the STEEP slope(s) in the THICK BRUSH amongst the HUGE BOULDERS at that time of day under the HOT, DRY, AND WINDY conditions.
The SAIT further stated that the “fire eventually jumps the two-track road on the east flank and grows to about six acres by late afternoon.” So, it makes more sense to me now that the fire was backing INTERIOR down the steep slope(s) underneath the VERY DENSE, VERY DRY, VERY DECADENT chaparral overstory scrub oak brush, amongst the large boulders. Once it flared up as the relative humidity dropped with increasing wind, it wouldn’t have taken much effort for it to run to the road and jump it. They had NO Engine there for water, only bladder bags.So, it may have even crossed the road as a slopover rather than as spot fires, which would have made it more difficult to catch without an Engine right there.
Moreover, by now you know that SEVERAL of the Watch Outs would have applied:
8) CONSTRUCTING LINE WITHOUT A SAFE ANCHOR POINT.
9) BUILDING FIRELINE DOWNHILL WITH FIRE BELOW.
11) UNBURNED FUEL BETWEEN YOU AND THE FIRE.
14) WEATHER GETTING HOTTER AND DRIER.
15) WIND BEGINS TO INCREASE AND/OR CHANGE DIRECTION.
17) TERRAIN AND FUELS MAKE ESCAPE TO SAFETY ZONES DIFFICULT.
So, this explained to me a bit more ICT3 Shumate’s reasoning in limiting the number of WFF to engage the YHF that day. Moreover, he stated the Inmate Crew did all they could under the circumstances AND that the Crew Boss feels really bad about them ‘losing their line,’ even to this day.
yeah, after reading shumate’s account in the unit logs i had much more sympathy for what they were doing in the first 24 hours of the incident. the fire looked down right docile from the air attack photos when it was first flown and it didn’t look like good country to be stumbling around in the dark trying to find an assed-out fire… i think their initial response was pretty reasonable, even more so given the number of potential starts that they thought they might be dealing with after the lightning bust. besides the fact that it’s not just shumate making the calls… you also have duty officer’s from both BLM and ASFD working on the sidelines with line officer’s in the mix too, presumably.
i don’t quite understand why they didn’t launch the type 2 ship with bucket to help squash the slop over though. the ship and crew were still on scene and they couldn’t get any other air resources in so why not use it? … the other thing that bugs me about the response was, it wasn’t more than a 1-2 hour hike in… so crew-shuttle by helicopter wasn’t the only option to get people on OR off the hill. i know lightning is a big factor, but it’s something we deal with all the time…
of course, that’s all hind-sight… i think people have been pretty harsh on shumate and the initial attack strategy, excessively so.
Shumate was pretty adamant about the lightning from past experiences in the Weaver Mountains. Watch Out #19, Death from Above you know.
I don’t know about why they didn’t use bucket work, didn’t ask him that. I told him, I thought he did the best job he could under the circumstances.
When you make the time, listen to the Willis interview tape(s). He reveals a lot about the fire behavior on the Doce Fire as well as the YHF that was interesting, particularly the very active NIGHTTIME FIRE BEHAVIOR.
Reply to xxfullsailxx post on March 24, 2014 at 7:48 pm
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>> i don’t quite understand why they didn’t launch the
>> type 2 ship with bucket to help squash the slop over
>> though. the ship and crew were still on scene and
>> they couldn’t get any other air resources in so why
>> not use it?
The only evidence that Shumate even tried to get
some bucket drops going that day ( even though some
say that should have been happening ALL day ) is
contained in his own unit log(s).
It wasn’t until 1600 ( 4:00 PM ), after the fire had
‘escaped’ and was now ‘established’ on the east
side of the two-track that Shumate made his first
move to even ‘prepare’ for bucket drops that day.
From Shumate’s unit log(s)…
_______________________________________________
1600 – Spot across the road was established and crews
were having a difficult time hooking it. Slop was (now)
approximately 1-2 acres. Ordered AA and SEATS to
launch. Ordered Yarnell Fire Department ( YFD ) Water
Tender to utilize for creation of a dip site for potential
bucket work.
_______________________________________________
This ‘appears’ to be the first time the YFD then made
any move to set up that ‘pumpkin’ over at the Boulder
Springs Ranch ( which remained set up there even
throughout the night and the next day ). They also
apparently got that done fairly quickly…
…but then (apparently) nothing else happened.
>> xxfullsailxx also said…
>> the other thing that bugs me about the response was,
>> it wasn’t more than a 1-2 hour hike in… so crew-shuttle
>> by helicopter wasn’t the only option to get people on
>> OR off the hill.
The next morning… it only took Granite Mountain 45
minutes to make the same hike west from the
Sesame clearing staging area all the way up to
where the fire had been burning Saturday and the
same spot where the Lewis DOC crew had been
working all day Saturday.
The only attempt Shumate actually made on Saturday
to see if they even really needed to use a chopper that
day as the ONLY way to get people to/from to the fire
was early that morning ( on the 29th ).
At 0900… Shumate specifically asked the Lewis CRWB
( Crew Work Boss ) to ‘scout that out’ and see if there
was any way to drive or hike up to the fire.
He said there wasn’t ( even when any local YFD person
could have easily told him there were, in fact, clear
two-tracks leading all the way up there ).
From Shumate’s unit log
( Page 36 of full SAIT ‘unit log’ document )…
________________________________________________
Saturday, June 29, 2013 – 0900
Assignments: Lewis crew; CRWB ( Crew Work Boss ) to
determine if there is a route to drive or hike to fire, being
mindful of if the fire behavior changes, would the crew be
safe hiking through the fuels. Lewis CRWB reports that
none of the roads are drivable and that a hike in would not
be achievable with the (DOC) crew.
________________________________________________
So it wasn’t that there weren’t ways to hike any number of
firefighters to/from the fire on Saturday… it was that
the DOC Crew Boss either didn’t do a good job ‘scouting
this out’ and/or didn’t think his crew would be able to
(physically) ‘accomplish’ the hike.
>> RTS said…
>> Shumate said for SAFETY REASONS DUE TO LIGHTNING
>> POTENTIAL, he had a fairly strict standard operating
>> procedure. He learned to ALWAYS LIMIT the number of
>> WFF on top of the Weaver Mountains to ONE OR TWO
>> HELICOPTER LOADS, approximately an HOUR’S WORTH
>> OF FLIGHT TIME, to ensure that he could to ensure he could
>> get all the WFF off the Weaver Mountains and out of harm’s
>> way in short order, once a lightning storm was imminent and
>> before the lightning was upon them.
Yes. In the recently released SAIT unit logs… Shumate’s own
unit log confirms that that WAS his ‘thinking’ that day.
The real reason he went with the ‘chopper lifts’, however, is
because he had asked the Lewis DOC crew boss at 0900
to see if there was any way to hike his crew up there… and
the DOC crew boss told Shumate ‘No’ ( Even though any
local YFD person could have told either him or Shumate all
about the known/clear two-tracks leading all the way to the fire
and, indeed, were the very same two-tracks that Granite
Mountain used the next morning to make it all the way to
that same spot with just a 45 minute hike. )
>> RTS also wrote
>> So, this ( and all the other reasons above ) explained to me
>> a bit more ICT3 Shumate’s reasoning in limiting the number
>> of WFF to engage the YHF that day.
Yes… everything he told you and you then relayed/described up
above definitely explains HIS reasoning for HIS IA plan that day…
…but whether or not that overall IA plan was, ultimately, adequate
for the situation ( or not ) will ( and should ) remain a subject of
debate.
It still all falls squarely into the ‘Are there ANY lessons to be
learned from the (whole) Yarnell Hill Fire?’ category.
>> Moreover, he stated the Inmate Crew did all they could
>> under the circumstances
Probably so. In reality… if the terrain, conditions and fire behavior
as described above really were not suitable for the Lewis DOC
crew to successfully fight fire there that day ( which is the
impression your information above is giving), then given ALL
these conditions and their level of training and competence…
…maybe they shouldn’t have even been up there in the first place.
Maybe the IA that day needed a different approach with a better
chance of success.
>> AND that the Crew Boss feels really bad about them
>> ‘losing their line,’ even to this day.
I’ll bet he does.
Did Shumate (himself) mention the ‘chainsaw gas’ situation and
( if or how ) that factored into them being unable to ‘catch’ the
slopover when it happened?
There is no mention whatsoever of this ‘running out of chainsaw
gas’ situation that afternoon in Shumate’s own unit logs even
though it is well documented in the official reports.
Did he mention how he was able to get 7 more crew members
up there in the late afternoon along with enough supplies for them
to spend the night up there… but was somehow unable to get
them chainsaw gas when they really needed it?
Did he mention how he only began to consider or prepare for
bucket-drops that day AFTER the fire ‘escaped’… but then that
never really got organized or even took place until long after the
fire was out of control and darkness was coming?
ICT3 Shumate did NOT mention any of those things you asked about in your last few paragraphs, e.g. saw gas, etc., and I never asked him. The saw gas responsibility would fall on the Lewis Crew Boss and NOT the IC. Likewise, the helicopter bucket work would have been the Lewis Crew Boss’ responsibility, i.e. Fire Order #3 – Base all actions on current and EXPECTED behavior of the fire.
Personally ( after FINALLY getting to see Shumate’s
own unit logs ) I don’t think just having working
chainsaws ( or not ) would have made a whole
lot of difference after they let that thing jump
that road… but it’s still curious how it was mentioned
in all the reports and that it rendered the ground
team (quote) “ineffective”… but Shumate says
nothing about it himself.
The only real cure was prevention that day.
Shumate had 5 hours to just ‘put the nails in the
coffin’ on that 2-4 acre thing with little to no fire
activity and little to no wind.
**
** FULL TRANSCRIPT OF BACKGROUND RADIO CONVERSATION
** IN AIR STUDY VIDEO 20130630_153014_SEAT_EP.MOV
**
** CONTAINS BYRON KIMBALL’S 1531 WEATHER REPORT
** GOING OUT ( LOUD AND CLEAR ) ON TAC 1
Reply to Bob Powers post on March 23, 2014 at 7:01 am
>> Bob Powers said…
>> 38 min start of the above noted 40-50 MPH out flow winds with in a 1/2 hour
>> by weather person. Then 22 min. after that GM and Marsh are on the move
>> in the brush field.
>>
>> This is critical.
>>
>> Why would any crew go into unburned fuel with those kind of wind predictions?
VERY good question.
Still deserves a VERY good answer but I’m afraid we still don’t have that (yet).
>> The above are tape times can you or do you have exact times to
>> coordinate to?
As with ALL of these AIR STUDY videos… the exact DATE and TIME when
the video begins is supposedly right there in the recorded FILENAME of the
video itself.
In this case… AIR STUDY video title / filename of…
20130630_153014_SEAT_EP.MOV
…means it was shot on June 30, 2013, starting at exactly
1530 ( 3:30 PM ) plus 14 seconds.
>> Bob Powers also wrote…
>> If the crew moved which I believe they did after this critical weather report
>> then they truly ignored what was a real and verifiable warning. This caught
>> my attention I know we have discussed this earlier but this also helps set
>> time frames.
If the DATE / TIME stamps in the AIR STUDY videos can be trusted as totally
accurate ( no one has said they can’t be, at this point )… then the ACTUAL time
when Byron Kimball’s detailed and ominous weather report went out ‘loud and
clear’ over the TAC 1 radio channel would be…
VIDEO starts at exactly 1530 plus 14 seconds.
Byron Weather report is at exactly +0:47.9 seconds into the video… so that
makes the EXACT time the weather report actually began over the radio…
1531 plus 1.9 seconds ( 1530.14 + 47.9 seconds )
That’s 3:31 PM ( plus 1.9 seconds ).
Here is the actual FULL transcript of the background radio conversation in this
AIR STUDY video that captured Byron Kimball’s detailed weather report
going out ( loud and clear ) over TAC 1 at 3:31 PM.
NOTE: There is no need for any ‘audio forensics’ here. The background
conversation in this AIR STUDY video is CLEARLY heard by anyone with even
normal hearing… and Byron Kimball himself is speaking especially LOUDLY
and CLEARLY as he gives his weather report over the TAC 1 radio channel.
Notice in the transcript below that when Byron was giving his weather report and
was CLEARLY warning everyone of the wind change and HIGH wind speeds
to be expected… he was ALSO giving detailed information about the expected
outpoint to outflow location(s), but the video cuts off before we hear the rest of
his detailed weather report…
AIR STUDY VIDEO…
20130630_153014_SEAT_EP.MOV
NOTE: This is one of the AIR STUDY videos that *has* been made public and
is still available at the following YouTube link…
+0.02.6
(Unknown): (?) is gonna be with me (?) has to do and get (torches?) out.
+0:14.1
(Unknown): Copy
+0:30.3
(Unknown): Task Force (common?) to Task Force Six.
+0:37.8
Byron Kimball: Operations Abel, Fire Behavior, on TAC 1
NOTE: The responder to this callout sounds more like OPS2 Paul Musser
than OPS1 Todd Abel.
+0:43.5
( Todd Abel or Paul Musser ): Go ahead, Byron
+0:47.9
Byron Kimball: Within the half-hour, (pause) EAST winds. (pause)
Possibility of as high as 50 miles an hour or likely 25 (pause) definitely
25, 35 gusting 40 (pause) east / northeast within the half hour. Um… the
outpoint to outflow line also ( will be ) located…
( At this point… both a Helicopter and a fixed-wing make a loud flyover and the
background conversation in the last few seconds of the video cannot be heard. )
+1:10.5
VIDEO ENDS – REST OF WEATHER REPORT CUT OFF
I would like to interrupt this deadly serious conversation for a minute to share with you a hilarious short video that explains the smokejumper versus hotshot rivalry better than I ever could. It also gives some insight into both jobs, and wildland firefighting in general.
Good one and pretty accurate too. I lked it when the HS asked the SJ “with all the tanning, gardening, and nail filing. I was wondering if you and your bros actually like women?’ The HS also asks him “. …. do you even remember how to work?”
I have a questions for the experienced WFF folks here. I know that Marsh and Marquez had a disagreement about the line of demarcation for Div A and Div Z responsibilities. Interestingly, Marquez notes don’t make it a big deal, but others say it was a heated discussion. My questions are-Is this type of disagreement common? Isn’t there a superior that would step in and make that decison?
No not common. Yes and that should have been in the Plan.
Divisions should be clearly marked on the Fire map. Just another part of this total cluster on the fire. I do believe they settled what ever the questions were. Marquez never really took over the Division for any length of time.
Reply to Observer post on March 23, 2014 at 11:43 am
>> Observer wrote…
>>
>> I know that Marsh and Marquez had a disagreement about the
>> line of demarcation for Div A and Div Z responsibilities.
>>
>> Interestingly, Marquez notes don’t make it a big deal, but
>> others say it was a heated discussion.
>>
>> Isn’t there a superior that would step in and make that decison?
Supposedly… OPS1 Todd Abel resolved that with Eric Marsh,
and they did it in a PRIVATE ‘cell phone call’ between Marsh
and Abel, shortly after ‘the argument’ with Marquez.
Page 27 of the SAIR report…
_____________________________________________________
Division Supervisor Zulu (DIVS Z), a single resource ordered for the Type 3 team, arrives at the Blue Ridge crew carriers around 1210 and calls DIVS A to discuss a division break and resource assignments. DIVS Z is having radio problems, so he uses a Blue Ridge crew radio to talk with DIVS A over the Blue Ridge intra-crew frequency. DIVS A and DIVS Z cannot agree on the break location or associated supervisory responsibilities, resulting in uncertainty among some personnel about the physical break between Divisions Alpha and Zulu. ( See Footnote 6 ).
_____________________________________________________
The ‘Footnote 6’ being referenced at this point in the SAIR
then says this…
(6) DIVS A ( Eric Marsh ) and OPS1 ( Todd Abel ) communicate
later about the division break being at the grader.
In his SAIT Investigation Interview… OPS1 Todd Abel said
that this ‘communication’ with Marsh about the division
breaks was actually a CELL PHONE CALL with Marsh.
Page 1 of the SAIT Yarnell Investigation Notes ( YIN )…
Interview with Todd Abel by J Karels on 8/14/2013
_____________________________________________________
Blue Ridge was assigned to Division A. He thought he told either Frisby or True over radio. While working their way in, Cordis already had line going in so they were tying in with him. In his mind the whole corner where the dozer line tied into the ridge was Alpha.
Sent Rance in, to contact Div a and decide div break. Marsh’s phone call, they talked about resources and division break between z and alpha (Marsh said somewhat heated discussion, but they worked out the break, which abel understood to be: down off hill near the grader spot was where the break was going to be. rest of line to the east is zulu. (Believes this was last cell call, other convos were over radio).
_____________________________________________________
NOTE that Todd Abel says this ‘cell call’ with Marsh about
the division break argument with Marquez was the (quote) “last
cell call ( with Marsh ), other convos were over the radio”.
That proves the following…
1) Eric Marsh had has own cell phone ( or smartphone ) that
day and
2) Eric Marsh was freely using his cell phone ( more than once )
that day to communicate privately with fire command and
OPS1 Todd Abel himself.
Eric Marsh’s cell phone has never been found.
It was never reported as being recovered from the deployment
site, and it was never entered into evidence along with the
other cell phones / smartphones recovered from the
deployment site.
Eric Marsh’s cell phone simply VANISHED.
Only Darrell Willis and others with the Prescott Fire Department
know what really happened to Eric Marsh’s cell phone.
Regarding the ‘let’s all get along and sing Kumbaya’ discussion above; it seems to me that instead of debating the merits of an idea, some of the people here prefer to express outrage over how they FEEL about ideas, facts, allelgations, or whatever they disagree with, i.e. EMOTIONALISM. So then, it appears that these emotional protests against these perceived outrages has replaced rational dialogue. And so, subjective feelings have transcended objective discussions about ‘the truth.’
Just as there are Rules for WFF, there are also Rules for debatting, logic, and the like. Here’s some basic Rules of Logic – http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logic .You can also search out the rules of debate.
I for one will continue to express disagreement when it is needed using the other person’s words (hence cut and paste). I am NOT going to be a Team Player and merely ‘go along to get along’ – a form of Groupthink. It’s OKAY to disagree because that’s all it is, disagreement. It is NOT intolererance or any other Liberal ‘crime.’
**
** NEW ADOSH MATERIAL – PART 1 – AIR STUDY VIDEO NOTES
In the latest public release of ADOSH investigation supporting documentation,
there are some notes made on a piece of yellow legal paper by one of the
ADOSH investigators while he was listening to various AIR STUDY videos…
A photo of that piece of yellow legal paper is here…
Here is the (full) transcription of those handwritten notes…
_________________________________________________________________
1/8/14
M. Krotenberg ( ? )
20130630_153014_SEAT_EP – 00:38
Bryon Kimball with WX update on TAC 1
– Outflow winds due within 1/2 hr.
– 40-50 mph
20130630_154232_fire_behavior_EP
– Towards the structures – Southern – towards Yarnell ( Marsh )
– Division Alpha – Operations Musser
20130630_161620_VLAT_split_1_EP – 1:00
Granite is making their way to the structures. Able?
20130630_161858_VLAT_split_2_EP
1:35 – Blue Ridge lost dozer line
________________________________________________________________
With regards to TWO of those videos that the ADOSH investigator
( M. Krotenberg? ) was making notes on…
>> ADOSH NOTES for…
>> 20130630_161620_VLAT_split_1_EP – 1:00
>> Granite is making their way to the structures. Able?
Apparently… the ADOSH investigator is confirming that he hears what has also
been heard by others in this AIR STUDY video at the +1:00 mark.
In the +1:00 timeframe, the only comment he could be referring to is when
(apparently) Jesse Steed adds to what Eric Marsh just said and says…
“We’ll be pushing our way down into the structures”.
That entire conversation is the “Granite Mountain, what’s your status?” sequence
starting at +0:40.52 and the actual transcript ( not completely confirmed )
appears to be as follows…
_______________________________________________________________
+0:40.52
(Unknown): Granite Mountain ( Five? )…
What’s your status right now?
NOTE: A pretty heavy accent on this speaker. Sounds like
Louisiana Cajun? What he says almost sounds like…
“Granite Montun… wuz yo status rat now?
ALSO NOTE: Even though the caller asked for ‘Granite
Mountain’ specifically, and not ‘DIVS A’… Eric Marsh responds
immediately on behalf of Granite Mountain before Jesse Steed
even has a chance to say anything. Jesse only ‘chimes’ in with
his own ‘status’ report about “we’re pushin’ our way down into
the structures” when Marsh is done speaking.
+0:54.09 to +1:03.81
Eric Marsh: Well the guys… uh… Granite… is makin’ their
way out the exact escape route from this mornin’… an’ it
heads… ah… (pause) SOUTH. ( slight pause )
mid-slope, cuttin’ over.
+1:07.18
( Another voice immediately adds to what Marsh said but it is )
( NOT Marsh this time. It sounds like Jesse Steed )
Jesse Steed: We’ll be pushin’ our way down into the structures.
_______________________________________________________________
There are really no revelations here… but it is SIGNIFICANT to see the
actual written PROOF that the ADOSH investigator himself is hearing this
“direct communication with Granite Mountain” and an indication of their exact
intentions right smack in the middle of the ‘blackout’ timeframe when the
SAIR said there were no such ‘verifiable’ communications.
>> ADOSH NOTES for…
>> 20130630_154232_fire_behavior_EP
>> – Towards the structures – Southern – towards Yarnell ( Marsh )
>> – Division Alpha – Operations Musser
THIS is that same ‘mysterious’ AIR STUDY video that no one has released
publicly yet and the one that apparently has the radio callout from OPS2
Musser to DIVSA Marsh in it.
The ADOSH investigator now seems to CONFIRM that it does, in fact, contain
this ‘callout’ from OPS2 Musser to DIVSA Marsh… but now we ALSO learn
there is something else very interesting captured in this video.
Something to do with Eric Marsh talking about ‘the structures’ and using
the word ‘SOUTH’ and the words ‘towards Yarnell’.
Is this captured audio just Marsh talking to someone about the FIRE activity
( and Marsh says just SOUTH and not SOUTHEAST, which itself would be
very interesting )…
…or is this captured audio something about GM’s intended MOVEMENTS
away from the ‘safe black’?
We know that both Elizabeth and Mr. Dougherty have this AIR STUDY video in
their possession… but it still has not been ‘released’ publicly even now.
The same AIR STUDY video was listed as also being part of the SAIT
investigation and was apparently distributed in the SAIT FOIA/FOIL package
with the following SAIT evidence item record number and inside the
following SAIT CD folder…
The fact that this particular AIR STUDY video has NOT been made public
yet was discussed once again ( two weeks ago ) back in Chapter V.
Mr. Dougherty then said the following with regards to this video back during
Chapter V of this ongoing discussion… on February 28…
>> John Dougherty on February 28, 2014 at 12:24 pm said:
>>
>> I’m uploading it now and it will be available in
>> AerialFirefightingStudy>Panebaker>Video folder shortly.
It’s been more than two weeks and it is still not there yet.
The folder still just says ‘Partial, uploads underway’…
John ( and/or Elizabeth )… any update on when this particular AIR STUDY
video might actually become publicly available?
I’m honestly *NOT* trying to be a naghead about this… but it seems to be even
more important now than ever before to hear what is really being said in this
particular AIR STUDY video and see if a real ‘transcript’ can be produced,
or if there is, indeed, even anything ELSE in this video that hasn’t been
reported or documented yet.
A note on times WTKTT–
38 min start of the above noted 40-50 MPH out flow winds with in a 1/2 hour by weather person. Then 22 min. after that GM and Marsh are on the move in the brush field. This is critical why would any crew go into unburned fuel with those kind of wind predictions? The above are tape times can you or do you have exact times to coordinate to? If the crew moved which I believe they did after this critical weather report then they truly ignored what was a real and verifiable warning. This caught my attention I know we have discussed this earlier but this also helps set time frames.
Reply to Bob Powers post on March 23, 2014 at 7:01 am
>> Bob Powers said…
>> A note on times WTKTT–
>> 38 min start of the above noted 40-50 MPH out flow
>> winds with in a 1/2 hour by weather person. Then 22
>> min. after that GM and Marsh are on the move in the
>> brush field. This is critical why would any crew go
>> into unburned fuel with those kind of wind predictions?
VERY good question.
Still deserves a VERY good answer but I’m afraid we still
don’t have that (yet).
>> The above are tape times can you or do you have
>> exact times to coordinate to?
As with ALL of these AIR STUDY videos… the exact
DATE and TIME when the video begins is supposedly
right there in the recorded FILENAME of the video itself.
In this case… AIR STUDY video title / filename of…
20130630_153014_SEAT_EP.MOV
…means it was shot on June 30, 2013, starting at
exactly 1530 ( 3:30 PM ) plus 14 seconds.
>> Bob Powers also wrote…
>> If the crew moved which I believe they did after this
>> critical weather report then they truly ignored what
>> was a real and verifiable warning. This caught my
>> attention I know we have discussed this earlier but
>> this also helps set time frames.
If the DATE / TIME stamps in the AIR STUDY videos
can be trusted as totally accurate ( no one has said
they can’t be, at this point )… then the ACTUAL time
when Byron Kimball’s detailed and ominous
weather report went out ‘loud and clear’ over the
TAC 1 radio channel would be…
VIDEO starts at exactly 1530 plus 14 seconds.
Byron Weather report is at exactly +0:47.9 seconds
into the video… so that makes the EXACT time
the weather report actually began over the radio…
1531 plus 1.9 seconds ( 1530.14 + 47.9 seconds )
That’s 3:31 PM ( plus 1.9 seconds ).
Here is the actual FULL transcript of the background
radio conversation in this AIR STUDY video that
captured Byron Kimball’s detailed weather report
going out ( loud and clear ) over TAC 1 at 3:31 PM.
NOTE: There is no need for any ‘audio forensics’ here.
The background conversation in this AIR STUDY video
is CLEARLY heard by anyone with even normal hearing
and Byron Kimball himself is speaking especially
LOUDLY and CLEARLY as he gives his weather
report over the TAC 1 radio channel.
Notice in the transcript below that when Byron was
giving his weather report and was CLEARLY warning
everyone of the wind change and HIGH wind speeds
to be expected… he was ALSO giving detailed information
about the expected outpoint to outflow location(s), but
the video cuts off before we hear the rest of his
detailed weather report…
AIR STUDY VIDEO…
20130630_153014_SEAT_EP.MOV
NOTE: This is one of the AIR STUDY videos that *has*
been made public and is still available at the following
YouTube link…
+0.02.6
(Unknown): (?) is gonna be with me
(?) has to do and get (torches?) out.
+0:14.1
(Unknown): Copy
+0:30.3
(Unknown): Task Force (common?) to Task Force Six.
+0:37.8
Byron Kimball: Operations Abel, Fire Behavior, on TAC 1
NOTE: The responder to this callout sounds more like
OPS2 Paul Musser than OPS1 Todd Abel.
+0:43.5
( Todd Abel or Paul Musser ): Go ahead, Byron
+0:47.9
Byron Kimball: Within the half-hour, (pause) EAST winds.
(pause) Possibility of as high as 50 miles an hour or
likely 25 (pause) definitely 25, 35 gusting 40 (pause)
east / northeast within the half hour. Um… the outpoint
to outflow line also ( will be ) located…
( At this point… both a Helicopter and a fixed-wing make
a loud flyover and the background conversation in the
last few seconds of the video cannot be heard. )
+1:10.5
VIDEO ENDS – REST OF WEATHER REPORT CUT OFF
Joy – I did not call Elizabeth a “fool.” In fact, I did not call anyone a fool. I said I did not argue with fools. That statement implied that I thought Elizabeth’s stable of closet fire experts who are attempting to make a case that the Granite Mountain Hotshots had to leave the black and march in front of a wall of flames were fools, and I was not going to argue with them. Now, if Elizabeth wants to try on that shoe, and if it fits her, that is up to her.
The bottom line is this. Tex instinctively knew to leave the area in the right direction (there were several to choose from) at the right time (other times would have worked as well) but the Granite Mountain Hotshots under the leadership of Eric Marsh as the Division A Supervisor and Jesse Steed as the Acting Crew Boss made a calculated and conscious decision to march their crew in the direction the fire was burning, south by southeast, as it was being driven by very strong outflow winds from a thunder cell that had been predicted to appear by the National Weather Service well in advance. AFTER being strongly advised to remain where they were, SAFE and in the BLACK.
And both Eric Marsh and Jesse Steed acknowledged that they received that warning and in fact observed the weather event in progress, and they clearly observed the fire had in fact reversed direction, and was now putting up a pyro cumulous cloud of ash and smoke that rose several thousand feet in the air, which every firefighter and every other person with any common sense knows means the situation has deteriorated to the point that there is nothing any person, or any equipment invented or built by people, can do to try and control said fire.
I have long been asking the question, “Why did the Granite Mountain Hotshots die?” in an attempt to reconcile what I had heard from others about Eric Marsh with what Eric Marsh did. RTS has now answered that question based on the consensus of the most highly recognized and respected leaders in the field of hotshot crews today…and that was a group of hotshot superintendents who walked the remains of the Yarnell Hill Fire. Eric Marsh made a catastrophic mistake, and he killed himself and his crew.
Although RTS is technically correct, Jesse Steed could have overruled Eric Marsh who was acting as Division Group Supervisor, since Jesse Steed was Acting as the Granite Mountain Hotshot Crew Boss, and refused to follow him…so Jesse Steed does have some responsibility for that decision as well. BUT, I think that we all can acknowledge (or at least I can) that in the real world, Jesse Steed was obligated to follow Eric Marsh once his decision was made.
The crew also had some obligation (according to others, not me) to voice their objections to follow their leaders down such a reckless path, which was a death chute, and that path was obviously a death chute, since similar death chutes have been killing hotshots since 1966, and they have been pointed out in countless training exercises to be death chutes. But I happen to know in the real world of hotshots, that choice was not an option for the crew…so they died as hotshots. Doing exactly what their leaders ordered them to do, which by the way, works almost all of the time, in fact, that method for survival has only failed hotshots 4 times in the history of wildland firefighting, the Loop Fire of 1966 (12 El Cariso Hotshots dead, including the crew boss), the Battlement Creek Fire of 1976 (3 Mormon Lake Hotshots dead, including the crew boss, with a fourth hotshot severely burned), and the South Canyon Fire of 1994 (9 Prineville Hotshots dead)…and the Yarnell Hill Fire of 2013 (19 Granite Mountain Hotshots dead, including the crew boss).
I have reconciled what I heard about the Granite Mountain Hotshots with what Eric Marsh did, because I had heard how good Eric Marsh was from Darrell Willis and his circle of fire buddies. That assessment turned out to be exaggerated or misplaced or something else altogether, other that correct. Eric Marsh decided to break almost all of the rules that have been developed over more than 100 years of widland firefighting in American, specifically to protect wildland firefighters…all at once, and apparently without a backup plan.
So…the big question has been answered for me. There remains however, several unanswered questions which are…exactly what role did everyone else play in contributing or casual factors in the deaths of the Granite Mountain Hotshots? I’m afraid that discussion is going to outlive you, me, and everyone else who is participating in the thread. BUT…I am convinced that there are many others who are also responsible for the deaths of those 19 heroes, and most of them work for the State of Arizona, Division of Forestry, and the City of Prescott, Prescott Fire Department.
HOWEVER, I think the leadership of the both the City of Prescott of and State of Arizona should take a look in the mirror and ask themselves, “What could I have done to prevent this tragedy?”
Now…may God bless both you and Tex in all of your future hikes and endeavors together, and I want to thank both you and Tex for all of your tireless efforts to bring some clarity to what is now the worst disaster (baring the Idaho fires of 1910, which don’t really count) in the history of wildland firefighting in the United States. May you find what we are all searching for…a way to fix our broken hearts, or at least make them feel just a little bit better.
I need to add a few remarks to clarify my comment above.
1. There isn’t universal agreement on this thread that the sequence of events occurred as I outlined them. That MAY not be what actually happened. We may never know for sure, and we probably won’t know for sure until WHEN, and IF those individuals who have first hand knowledge of the day’s events come forward, and tell us what they know. For example, the decision to go down the death chute may not have been made by Eric Marsh, it may have been made by Jesse Steed, and Eric Marsh was simply attempting to catch up with the crew.
2. My conclusions are drawn from my education and training, and most importantly, my conclusions are based on my experiences in 10 years as a hotshot, 7 years as a hotshot crew boss.
3. The Yarnell Hill Fire disaster was not cause by a single event or decision, e.g., the decision to hike down the death chute. This tragedy was cause by a cascading sequence of decisions and events, many of which were outside of the control of the Granite Mountain Hotshots leadership. And many of the decisions were made by people who should have known better, and were in fact, fighting the Yarnell Hill Fire by the theory of organized chaos.
4. Even though I believe Eric Marsh made the fatal decision, I can still mourn the loss of his life. As a hotshot crew boss who was trained and conditioned to fight fire AGRESSIVELY…but provide for safety first…I made many similar decisions and mistakes. But in the end, I was luckier than Eric Marsh. The bottom line is this…wildland firefighting is not even as safe as most people think it is. Chaos is often running the wildfire, AND calling the shots.
5. The Granite Mountain Hotshots were my hero’s BEFORE they died, not because they died.
Oh…and one more thing, Eric said, Sitta, I do not want to see good people leave this discussion because of the b.s. back and forth stuff. We are all guily of it at one time or another but we need to bring focus back.”
Elizabeth, Eric and Sitta are right. I don’t want to see anyone leave this discussion either, especially you. You have gone to a great deal of time and expense to obtain all of the FOIA materials you have, and to analyze that material and make it available on this thread.
I sincerely apologize for offending you in anyway, and for the negative comments I made. Please accept this apology, and continue to support this thread, as an old friend told me once, “we owe it to the kids on the fire line today.”
This is in response to and clarification of your GMHS Station Fire Performance Evaluation post.
“Elizabeth on March 20, 2014 at 2:40 pm said:…. evidence that *I* have gathered does not suggest that Jesse Steed or Eric Marsh had a pattern of behaving in a needlessly and excessively risky manner. Marsh was actually commended by an outside fire official for GM’s and his work on the Station Fire.”
Okay then. That means several things to me (and probably other WFF). Marsh and Steed and the GMHS may have very well done a ‘commendable’ job on the Station Fire. It also means to me that the ‘outside official,’ could have merely been politically correct and given them a commendable rating or merely a boilerplate version like all the other Crews that worked for him. It may have also come from a municipal/wildland fire supervisor that had little or no wildland experience. The ‘commendable’ rating MAY have resulted from Marsh and/or Steed schmoozing or kissing ass to the ‘outside official’ and he just thought they were all ‘nice guys.’ And some overhead from some agencies won’t even go up on the firelines, but supervise from their command vehicles in California. I would have to see the rating to see where the ‘outside offical’ was from, what Agency, what position, and what region of the country.
Commendable ratings’ in-and-of themselves mean very little to experienced WFF supervisors.
Folks, let’s quit the back and forth bullshit of arguing and insinuating amongst ourselves. I have been in the fire service too long to have any patients for this! No one is getting paid to post in here or do the hours of research they have done. ANYONE!.. Let’s knock off all the copy and pasting and ” this one said this and that one said that!”
Agree to disagree and move on!…..Everyone here, is here because they give a crap about knowing the truth of June 30, 2013. So let’s get off this path to nowhere and back onto the road to what matters and open sharing of information. If you are unable to share sources, that is understandable, however those conversations are best not discussed on this thread. There are no sides here, we are all for the same cause….
Well said. It’s easy to get frustrated because the stakes are high (the truth, the reputation of those living and those gone, the feelings of the loved ones, and the safety of current and future WFFs).
Eric is right. We are ultimately on the same side, and we are all invested in this. We’ve learned we should keep the private conversations separate from this public thread; we can move on from here. It looks like JD’s posted plenty of new ADOSH info that can use some eyes: https://www.dropbox.com/sh/20inrene9tcx74a/ZbnvFe9JW5
Sitta, I do not want to see good people leave this discussion because of the b.s. back and forth stuff. We are all guily of it at one time or another but we need to bring focus back..
“Elizabeth on March 21, 2014 at 8:23 am said:
Gary, Bob, and RTS: Some of your most recent comments toward me have been needlessly and personally attacking, not to mention completely hurtful and upsetting (e.g. Gary calling me a “fool,” RTS mocking me, …. not needlessly insulting or attacking) …. but you have ignored my pleas.”
Needlessly and personally attcking you? I think NOT. You make statements and I and others respond if/when we disagree or whatever, so therefore they are NOT needless. As far as ‘personally’ goes, I think NOT again. “Mocking [you].” I think NOT again. To the best of my knowledge, there have been no ad hominem attacks on you personally. I can’t help it if you got offended by my ‘Queen’ of the Hill or whatever comment awhile back. I have been attacking your ACTIONS, your WORDS, your LOGIC, and the like. Those are NOT personal attacks. And as far as these being “completely hurtful and upsetting” I’m afraid you’re engaging in drama and histrionics here. COMPLETELY? Really? You’re on your own on the hurtful and upsetting prongs because those are entirely YOUR reactions. Nobody caused those but you.
….
Regarding RTS’ claim of Being Christian, you posted “…. , I expect RTS to be honest and kind in his response. Unless he was lying about being a Christian. (Love thy neighbor, RTS, I believe is on the Christian “to-do” list….).”
Nice hypocrtical slam here. You do have a talent for that and logical fallacies as well. Honest? I have been completely HONEST in my posts and my replies to you. But that seems to be what offends you, my HONESTY. So, I am NOT lying about being a Christian. Why would I do that? Yes, I am a Christian and I’m very thankful for that. ‘Love thy neighbor’? Got it. None of this or any other blog has anything to do with that. So then, what’s that comment all about? It’s the words, the actions, the how, why, what, when, where that counts.
“Elizabeth posted on March 21, 2014 at 9:47 am: …. I am trying to figure out what they were THINKING, whether there could have POSSIBLY been a reason why the black did not sit well with them. There is no way to figure that OUT without examining all possible reasons why the black might have been bad, right? …. it seems useful to try to think about why they might have rejected the idea of sitting in the black. ….”
And “Elizabeth on March 21, 2014 at 10:21 am said: Where did I make a misleading suggestion that GM got scared down?”
Come on now, I think you pretty much insinuated that above.
What were they thinking? I allege they were thinking about other times they had similar experiences and gotten away with it, and this situation is similar, so …. I’ll tell you what they were NOT thinking – they were NOT thinking about the WFF rules. And “whether there could have POSSIBLY been a reason why the black did not sit well with them?” Among other things, how about the influence of PFD Wildland Chief Willis’ comments at the fatality site news conference that “no wildland firefighter is satisfied sitting in the black, in a SZ watching the fire progress below them” [while they sit there and do nothing]. Thetre was ABSOLUTELY NO GOOD REASON, NONE, to leave their perfectly good SZ when they did. NONE! Get over it, the black was NOT bad. I allege they rejected the idea of sitting in the black because they BLATANTLY violated most of the Fire Orders and LCES. Moreover, they BLATANTLY failed to recognize,heed, or mitigate many of the Watch Outs. And also for the other above stated and quoted comments.
“Elizabeth on March 21, 2014 at 10:21 am said: ….(Do you remember the time that I was falsely accused of calling Rory Collins a coward? I never said it – it wasn’t me.). That’s right it WASN’T you nor was it me that used the word ‘coward.’. What I said was that he was acting in a COWARDLY manner speaking of his actions (not an ad hominem attack) when he unexpectadely abandoned the YHF.
This is one of my favorites when you posted “Whereas RTS might be the guy that Eric Marsh fired a few years ago, ….” And just where may I ask did you come up with this gem? When did I allegedly work on the GMHS? And was I fired because I stressed the WFF Rules (10 and 18 and LCES). Was that why I was fired? Or was it because I spoke up (against the GMHS Groupthink) about their alleged recurrent pattern of ‘bad decsions with prior good outcomes’? Which one was it? Or was it both of them or maybe some other reasons I was fired from a Crew I never worked for?
I am very thankful for all that you have done on this forum with all the documents and downloads and such that you have posted. Ongoing thanks for all that effort.
Update on Dave Larsen— He moved out of the Superintendent job in 1988 (from RTS) and up the ladder to Fire Management Officer before he retired. He would have been an over head in 2009 not in charge of the hotshots, when he gave the rating to Granit Mountain. I knew him from work and training a class individual. If he was in charge of the burn out then he was there and on top of the crews no one would have done any thing on there own.
Reply to Bob Powers post on March 22, 2014 at 3:17 pm
Mr. Powers… you are correct.
I was wrong to say that Dave Larsen was *actually* still the active
Superintendent of the Helena Hotshots in September/August 2009
during the ‘Station Fire’.
There is still evidence that Dave Larsen was THERE ( working
the Station Fire ) and supervising the Helena Hotshots from the
‘operations’ level… but you are right… Mr. Larsen had long since
moved up to higher management from his days when he WAS
the actual ground Superintendent of the Helena Hotshots.
During their assignments at the ‘Station Fire’ in 2009, the acting
Superintendent for the Helena Hotshots appears to have actually
been a Mr. Fred Thompson.
I found a PHOTOGRAPH that appears to prove this.
The following is a link to an article in ‘Sky and Telescope’
magazine that was written a year after the ‘Station Fire’ and
is entitled…
This article has a PHOTOGRAPH of the Helena Hotshots posing
with Hal McAlister, the Mount Wilson Observatory director.
The photo was taken DURING the actual ‘Station Fire’, 2009.
It’s about halfway down in the middle of the article.
The caption on this photo of the Helena Hotshots at the
‘Station Fire’ reads…
_____________________________________________________
Members of the Helena Hotshots pause for a group shot in front
of the CHARA building atop Mount Wilson. Click on the image
to see the full team, along with observatory director Hal McAlister
at far left and team leader Fred Thompson at far right.
_____________________________________________________
For anyone who might be wondering just from reading this
one particular message who Mr. Dave Larsen is…
Dave Larsen was one of the authors of the Wildland Fire
Associates Report that was contracted by Arizona
ADOSH as their ‘official’ investigation into the deaths
of the 19 Granite Mountain Hotshots.
Mr. Larsen was the one tasked with investigating the
‘organizational’ and ‘operational’ aspects of the Yarnell Hill Fire
for the ADOSH / WFAR report.
Dave Larsen was adamant that the cultures, philosophies,
and protocols of ‘Wildland Firefighting’ and ‘Structural
Firefighting’ were ( and should remain ) separate and not
be ‘mixed’. He has been often quoted saying he could NEVER
understand the mindset of risking lives to save structures.
Sadly… Dave Larsen passed away suddenly a few weeks ago.
Here is a link to his obituary ( which has a great picture of him )…
From Dave Larsen’s Obituary…
___________________________________________________
Dave Larsen — the man, the myth, the legend — left us without
warning on Feb. 12, 2014. Dave was born April 6, 1952, in
Omaha, Neb., to Delbert and Frances (Hamon) Larsen. He
joined his older brother, Dan, and they spent their early years in
Nebraska, Missouri and Kansas on various Air Force bases.
In 1961, his father got a job in Kalispell, where Dave lived until
moving to Helena in 1968 and graduating from Helena High
School in 1970. Dave went on to earn both a bachelor’s degree
in history and an electrical engineering degree from MSU
(Go, Bobcats!).
Dave spent the majority of his career working for the U.S. Forest
Service in fire management, beginning with a job manning
Hogback Lookout and, after more 30 years, retiring as the fire
management officer on the Helena Ranger District.
To say Dave’s career was amazing is an understatement.
He became nationally recognized as an expert in all aspects of
fire management. He held numerous positions over the years on
incident command teams, achieving status as one of the few and
elite National Type 1 Incident commanders. He became one of
only five IC’s who were certified in all three genres of firefighting…
fire suppression, prescribed fire and the use of fire in wilderness.
In addition to the numerous fire assignments around the country,
Dave also played a support role in historical events such as
Hurricane Katrina and Columbia Shuttle Recovery efforts.
Utmost in Dave’s philosophy, however, was firefighter safety.
He could never understand risking lives to save structures.
As such, a recent accomplishment he was very proud of was his
work with Wildland Fire Associates on an investigation of the
Yarnell Hill fire in Arizona last summer where 19 firefighters
perished. Dave felt like his contributions would make a difference
in keeping lives safe in the future.
___________________________________________________
Well done, Dave Larsen.
Rest in peace.
We all share your hope that one day, a FULL, complete
investigation of what really happened in Yarnell on June
30, 2013, will help save lives in the future.
Side note—-
Angeles National forest. 1969 thru 1971 I was Clear Creek Fire Prev. Tech. and Mount Wilson was part of my patrol area. It is all under special use by the Forest Service and Had all the local TV station transmitters as well as several Observatories. A very high value area to the Las Angeles basin. I had yearly responsibility for Fire safety inspections to insure hazardous fuels were removed.
Mr. Dougherty requested that, at this start of this new Chapter IV, we all
express a preference for whether the latest comments should be appearing
first ( a with Chapter V ) or last ( as with earlier Chapters ).
My own opinion is that the newer ‘latest comments first’ format seems to
be the way to go. It *seems* to be easier to have (different) ‘contiguous threads’
within the format with a parent comment and then people ‘adding’ to that
parent comment with child comments.
There is still a tendency for people to not ‘scroll down’ and read things and
a lot of things have to get drawn back up as new ‘parent comments’ so
they don’t get ‘lost in the noise’… but that was true with the previous
format as well. Important points were being ‘drawn down’ instead so
the could continue to be talked about.
WordPress is really not the ideal format for this kind of ongoing discussion,
but once you get the ‘hang’ of it… it works fine.
There’s going to be a fair amount of ‘scrolling’ involved no matter which
way you try to use it… so I would say ‘stick with latest comments at
the top’.
What it *might* help some people to know ( if they don’t already ) is that there
is always a FIND option on your Browser Toolbar that can FIND words and
phrases within a page such as this. If you are looking to ‘draw up’ an important
point and make a new parent comment out of it… you can always just FIND
the original comment quickly using the Browser toolbar option(s).
Robert the Second on March 22, 2014 at 9:55 am said:
I wrote this phrase down yesterday to touch on it today. It’s been bandied about a few times recently. “Speaking ill of the dead.”
We’re NOT ‘speaking ill of the dead’ but we are speaking to and addressing what they DID or DID NOT do that resulted in their deaths. THEY were the ones that made the bad decisions with the bad outcomes. No one else made those fatal decisions for them, no one held a virtual gun to their heads, there was NO Sword of Damocles hanging over their heads threatening them.
So, it’s only fair that I back off Marsh being the one totally responsible for the GMHS fatalities. Marsh was the Division Supervisor of DIV A that day and Jesee Steed was the Acting GMHS Superintendent. Therefore, Steed was fully responsible that day for the GMHS safety and welfare. Even though Marsh may have been tangentially responsible for the fatal outcomes that day, Steed was the one ultimately responsible for what happened June 30th.
Steed and Matrsh knew or should have known better to strictly follow the well established WFF Rules on June 30th.
Never seen anybody make anything other than technical observations as to the deceased here. People may have criticized Marsh’s communication style, but poor communication, particularly for someone also a strong leader, is a legitimate safety issue along with a social issue. (It is in part a safety issue because of the social dynamics involved with small groups, as well as between the group and the “outside,” in this case.)
I don’t know that some of the more fanciful assertions made on GM’s behalf necessarily put them in a better light, either. E.g., Elizabeth’s assertion that GM may have suddenly deemed the black too risky, whether because of islands of unburned, or “superheated gases” and “catastrophic smoke” that it appears Elizabeth may or may not have heard from unnamed sources would have been too much for GM had they stayed put. Does anyone really think that it would put Marsh or Steed’s professional judgment in a better light to say that they, after initially assessing the black as a safe place to be, in a manner consistent with other’s assessment at the time, other’s assessment now, and consistent with actual facts, then made a sudden about-face because of completely unfounded fears, decided they had no choice but to try to make it back to Yarnell by basically the worst possible way,….and told no one about the supposed “danger in the black” that they had suddenly identified?
Likewise, Elizabeth has also so far refused to name any sources for her conclusion that it looked reasonable to GM at the time they started down, for them to take the route they did. Is she saying they had no experience with local vegetation, particularly on uneven steep slopes, so had no idea the brush would be painfully slow to walk through? Does that really make them look better? Is she suggesting that crews in the future shouldn’t give any consideration to speed of travel, ability to retreat, and other practical boot-on-ground issues, and just go with their feelings instead?
Part of the job, unfortunately, is that if a serious cluster happens, other people get to learn from it. But for the fact that some people are trying to make even the route chosen by GM look “reasonable” on here, I don’t fwiw think there’s that much to learn from the actual route. People knew that type of thing was a bad mistake a long time ago. There are however important training and reporting issues that are part of the “swiss cheese” that allowed some of this happen. It starts by acknowledging there was a mistake and some underlying problems.
>> RTS said…
>> So, it’s only fair that I back off Marsh being the one totally
>> responsible for the GMHS fatalities. Marsh was the Division
>> Supervisor of DIV A that day and Jesee Steed was the Acting
>> GMHS Superintendent.
Absolutely… and I don’t think this ‘fact’ has actually been
talked about perhaps as much as it should be.
I still believe the fact that Marsh suddenly became DIVSA
that day ( AFTER his attendance at meetings that Jesse
Steed ‘missed’ because he did NOT know he would end
being GMHS Sup himself that day ) had a LOT to do with
what happened later that day.
Steed was eating breakfast with the rest of the crew up
at the ICP in Model Creek when Marsh ( only ) was down
at the Yarnell Fire Station attending the ( brief but important )
meeting that took place there circa 0600 – 0700.
NOTE: The ‘formal briefing’ at the YHF station took place at
0700 but all the public evidence now indicates that there was a
lot of important ‘off the cuff’ planning conversation taking place
BEFORE that meeting even started… like even in the
parking lot of the Yarnell Fire Station.
Steed ‘missed’ ALL of that.
Even if there WAS a moment when someone was firing up
some iPad with Google Maps on it at that meeting ( which
the SAIR originally said happened but I believe is total fiction
since no other report either mentions or can verify it )…
Steed missed ALL of that too ( Google maps on an iPad at YHF ).
There is also the fact that we KNOW, now, that following Marsh’s
employee evaluation on May 3 ( just 57 days before YHF ),
Darrell Willis made it CLEAR to Marsh that he wanted him to
“start mentoring Steed as his replacement” and wanted Marsh
to “start letting Steed take more responsibility for the crew”.
Well… that is EXACTLY what Marsh was doing that day.
He was doing EXACTLY what Willis told him to do on May 3.
He was LETTING Jesse Steed be the sole ‘Supervisor’ for
Granite Mountain that day and was hardly ever with them
at all ( physically ) for almost the entire day.
But here are the ‘exceptions’ to that ( other than Marsh
being with Steed for the NOON face-to-face with Frisby/Brown )…
A NUMBER of times that day… People were calling out to
“Granite Mountain” ( specifically ) on the TAC channels…
but Marsh ‘jumped in’ to respond before Steed even had
a chance to answer the call.
We have actual AUDIO CAPTURE proof of that.
That really means only one of two things…
1) It was just habit. Marsh was just knee-jerking when he
heard radio calls for ‘Granite Mountain’ that day and just
wasn’t stopping to give Jesse the benefit of the doubt to
answer those ( specific ) callouts.
2) Marsh did not totally trust Steed to answer some of the
radio calls specifically aimed at ‘Granite Mountain’.
It depended on WHO was calling, perhaps.
So how much ‘decision making’ was Marsh REALLY letting
Steed do that day? How much did Marsh really TRUST him?
It’s hard to say.
Brendan McDonough probably knows more about this
aspect of what was going on that day.
Steed MAY have even said something about it only in the
crew’s hearing like… “If he wants me to run the crew today
I wish he would just let me do it”… or something like that.
There is also, in fact, still that ‘sarcastic’ comment being made
by ( Misner? ) as captured in the MacKenzie video right
after Marsh told Steed… “I could just fee it, ya know”.
The fact that Marsh had NOT been with them all day and
they were witness to Steed trying to run the crew all day
but still being ‘interrupted’ on the radio by Marsh at
various times might have been a situation that was not
lost on the men…. and hence… the sarcastic comment
out of Marsh’s hearing.
I also believe ( WARNING: Not a verified fact. Just a
possibility that only McDonough could probably verify )
that the following ‘summary’ is the way it *might* have gone
down with the late-day radio calls and the ‘request for resources’
from OPS2 Paul Musser.
NOTE: No TIMES here… since this is just an overview
of a possible (unverified) theory…
– Marsh made it clear to any number of people ( or at least
gave the impression ) that HE *and* GM were ‘in the black’
and everyone later testifies this WAS their ‘understanding’.
– OPS1 Todd Abel tells Marsh to “Keep ME updated, hunker
and be safe ( in the black )”.
– We don’t know what Marsh said in response, but it might
have just been “Copy that” ( As in… yes… we’ll do that ).
– Steed HEARS this exchange between Abel and Marsh,
but doesn’t really say anything. He just assumes that is,
in fact, now their plan *at this point*.
– Musser comes on the radio AFTER this and makes his
infamous ‘request for resources’… but he prefixes his
call with “Granite Mountain, OPS2 Musser, on TAC X”
and Musser SPECIFICALLY asks to speak with GM
( and not DIVSA ).
– THIS time ( that day )… Steed keys his mic button BEFORE
Marsh can ‘jump in’… and Steed is the one who ‘responds’
to this request from Musser.
– Steed is now just reflecting what he absolutely believes
the ‘plan’ to be ( as per moment before when Marsh was
talking to OPS1 Abel )… and Steed is the one who simply
replies with the standard TDWA ( Turn Down With Alternative )
and tells Musser they are ‘committed to the black’ ( as he
heard Abel tell them to do )… and Steed suggests Musser
ask Blue Ridge since they are already down there and
already ( at that time ) are a ‘free resource’ with no
official assignment. ( This is now verified by BR unit logs ).
– Musser just says ‘copy that’, even though he then testified
later he wasn’t sure who had been speaking ( Marsh or Steed ).
*** Now something WEIRD happens…
– Marsh heard that exchange ( between Steed and Musser )
and maybe might have even been pissed that Steed got to
his mic button before Marsh did ( that time ).
– Marsh now wants to ‘talk about this’ and have a ‘comfort
level’ discussion with Steed about what he just told Musser.
– Marsh is not convinced that Steed should have turned
down Musser’s request so quickly… and now wants to
see if he can, perhaps, change Steed’s mind.
The rest is now the infamous ‘discussing their options’
conversation… and Brendan McDonough ( and others
who might have been listening on the GM private frequency
like Darrell Willis ) still know exactly how that conversation went.
If they ever talk about it… we might discover that the
‘feel this coming’ and ‘comfort level’ part of that ‘discussing
their options’ was nothing more than Marsh trying to not
assert total authority over Steed and just TELL him to
change his mind…. Marsh was still trying to let Steed
‘run the crew’ and was just doing his best to ‘persuade’
Steed to ‘change his mind’.
Fast forward 20 minutes and we still don’t know WHO
actually made the decision the leave the two track…
but I still believe there is more than a good chance that
even though Marsh was able to ‘persuade’ Steed to
change his mind about the TDWA he gave Musser…
…that Marsh then ‘backed off’ his ‘interference mode’ and
let Jesse (alone) make all the decisions about the exact
route to take that afternoon.
I still believe Marsh himself might have been fully shocked
to see the decision Steed had made about cutting through
the canyon when Marsh finally caught up from behind.
At that point, however, Marsh simply just followed them
down because for him, it was simply a matter of…
“There they go… and I must follow them… for I am their leader.”
>> RTS also said…
>> Therefore, Steed was fully responsible that day for the GMHS
>> safety and welfare. Even though Marsh may have been
>> tangentially responsible for the fatal outcomes that day,
>> Steed was the one ultimately responsible for what happened
>> June 30th.
Agreed.
Obviously what I wrote above is all total conjecture on my
part ( but it’s possible ).
All I was trying to do here is echo your comments and say
that the fact that Jesse Steed was SUPPOSED to have
been totally in charge of Granite Mountain that day… and
how that played into what happened… really hasn’t been
fully explored yet.
Copy that. Very plausible though. I do know that the GMHS was MUCH more comfortable working for Captain Steed. The GMHS had gotten used to working with Steed and preferred his supervisory style.
Regarding “…. Marsh himself might have been fully shocked
to see the decision Steed had made about cutting through
the canyon when Marsh finally caught up from behind.”
That’s a tough one. Shocked maybe, but Marsh did acquiese (unless he said something otherwise on Crew Net) which means he approved of the decision and the subsequent action.
We still have no ‘definite’ time for the
YARNELL-GAMBLE video, where someone ( yet
to be identified ) is definitely urging Marsh and
GM to ‘hurry up’…
…but it is looking very much like that ‘urging’ could
have been right around 1618 or 1620… the exact
moment the SAIR itself says they were making
the decision whether to leave the two track or not.
That ‘hurry up’ captured in the YARNELL-GAMBLE
video MAY have come right at the exact moment
when it was time to ‘decide’ which way to go…
and MAY have been a major determining factor
in the decision.
“Hurry up”, right at that moment, may have
made all the difference.
Without having scouted it… and without knowing
what lie ahead… that canyon looked like a
‘shortcut’ to Steed at 1618-1620.
If you also read most/all of the ‘Who were the
Granite Mountain Hotshots’ pages with bios
and memorials… you see a recurring theme.
Most of the ‘rookies’ specifically mention ‘looking
up to Steed’ and ‘wanting to be like him’ and more
than one described his amazing physical
abilities and their admiration for the shape he was in.
There isn’t a whole lot of mention of Marsh in
those same ‘bios’ and ‘memorials’.
You are closer than you think here. There were at least two former GMHS that did NOT return to the Crew after both the 2011 and 2012 fire seasons. And the alleged reasons mentioned by these men to their parents and friends related specifically to ‘bad decisions with prior good outcomes.’
Now that all the material from the
publicly-funded ADOSH investigation
is available… I am looking for those
’emails’ where ADOSH requested
interviews with FIVE former GMH.
I can’t even find the email requests
that their own report said they
sent out… much less the replies
or any interview transcripts…
but I’m still looking. Stay tuned.
Hi WWTKTT. That you stated is very close to the scenario I saw from the start. Somehow it appeared that Jesse Steed had the upper hand in decisions regarding the race to the Helm’s Ranch. Consider that Willis and Sneed are both Semper Fi and Marsh was more what I would consider a “cookie cutter cowboy”. That is not to disparage Marsh, but he was also always some distance from the crew, at least during the time we watched the action. If you have read Josh Eells report in the MENS JOURNAL article you would read that the men compared Steed to a “Greek God”. Hell, he even held off three bears with his chain saw in a night fire jump. Where Eells got his info was from interviews he had with family and friends. Eventually the truth will surface, and whew what a long process.
We always carry a hollow spot in our hearts for the loss of all these men. They were heroic in their efforts; however, it goes to say that there is plenty missing in detail.
We wonder why Marsh’s phones never surfaced, burnt or not. But then mouths seem to be shut by too many.
We are still wondering why were copies of the restriction order for the area where the deaths occurred were dated June 16 (Joy and I both witnessed the document) and quickly deleted from public records of the Arizona Forest Service. Maybe they are only in cyberspace and really there in an office somewhere.
Good work and tidings, and thanks for people like John Dougherty, Bob Powers, xxxFullsailxxx, Gary Olson, RTS, Murray Taylor, Ted Putnam/Johnny/Charley M., John MacLean/Wayne and Holly Neill, just to mention a few that we either hiked with or had occasion to learn from. Those 19 men deserve the best investigation possible–information some firemen in the future will be able to learn and perhaps save their butts. Thanks to all for hanging in there and giving of yourself to resolve the mystery.
Tex (Sonny) Gilligan
on May 19, 2014 at 5:26 pm said:
Hi WWTKTT. That you stated is very close to the scenario I saw from the start. REMEMBER AS PEOPLE READ COMMENTS BY US—HIS PERCEPTION AND MINE ARE DIFFERENT. I DID NOT SEE IT HIS WAY FROM THE START.Somehow it appeared that Jesse Steed had the upper hand in decisions regarding the race to the Helm’s Ranch.HOW DOES TEX KNOW THIS—THIS IS AN ASSUMPTION BY WHAT HE READ BY JOSH EELLS—HE DOES NOT KNOW WILLIS OR STEED SO HE IS OK TO HIS THOUGHTS BUT I DO NOT AGREE TO JUST THROW STUFF OUT THERE UNLESS YOU CAN PROPERLY ASSESS IT WITH DOCUMENTS OR SOMETHING. TEX DOES NOT NOR NEVER MET WILLIS OR STEED SO IT IS HOW HE SAW THE WEEKEND. Consider that Willis and Sneed are both Semper Fi WHAT DOES THAT MATTER UNLESS YOU CAN DOCUMENT MORE ABOUT THAT THEN TO ME IT IS A PERCEPTION NOT BASED ON WHERE YOU GOING WITH IT??? and Marsh was more what I would consider a “cookie cutter cowboy”.SEE, I DID NOT FIND MARSH TO BE THAT WAY. I FOUND HIM TO BE CONFIDENT AND WENT LIKE A BUNNY RABBIT AND WAS FIT FOR THE OUTDOORS. TO ME, A COOKIE CUTTER COWBOY APPEARS TO BE A COWBOY BUT DRESSES THE PART TO LOOK LIKE ONE BUT IS NOT ONE AND MARSH DID NOT FIT THAT DESCRIPTION TO ME— That is not to disparage Marsh, but he was also always some distance from the crewTHAT IS THE FIRST FACT I READ FOR THIS IS FACTS THAT MARSH WHEN WE SAW HIM WAS AWAY FROM THE MEN BUT NOT AT ALL TIMES—THERE WAS TIMES I SAW HIM WITH ANOTHER EVEN HAVE A PHOTO OF IT., at least during the time we watched the action. If you have read Josh Eells report in the MENS JOURNAL article you would read that the men compared Steed to a “Greek God”. Hell, he even held off three bears with his chain saw in a night fire jump. Where Eells got his info was from interviews he had with family and friends. Eventually the truth will surface, and whew what a long process. THAT IS MY HOPE TOO.
We always carry a hollow spot in our hearts for the loss of all these men. AND FOR THE FAMILIES AND FRIENDS TOO.They were heroic in their efforts; however, it goes to say that there is plenty missing in detail. TRUE. TRUE. TRUE. AND I AM SHOCKED THE LACK OF DETAILS THAT HAVE SURFACED TO THIS DATE.
We wonder why Marsh’s phones never surfaced, TEX WONDERS THAT—I NEVER GAVE IT TOO MUCH THOUGHT EXCEPT THAT THERE IS MORE DETAILS NEEDED TO COME OUT TO PROPERLY ASSESS THIS FIRE AND THE FATALITIES. burnt or not. But then mouths seem to be shut by too many. THAT IS FACT. I DON’T KNOW WHY TOO.
WeTEX IS WONDERING. THE ONLY THING I WONDER IS HOW COME THAT LADY IN THE RED CROSS CAME ACROSS OUR PATHS AND SHOWED IT TO US AT ALL—VERY STRANGE—THE DOCTOR IN THE RED CROSS (bb) KNOWS WHAT I MEAN THERE—ODD. are still wondering why were copies of the restriction order for the area where the deaths occurred were dated June 16 (Joy and I both witnessed the document) YES I DID SEE A FEW DOCUMENTS BY A LADY IN THE RED CROSS SHELTER BUT I DO NOT UNDERSTAND WHY IT WAS SHOWN TO ME AND OTHERS-and quickly deleted from public records of the Arizona Forest Service. YES WHEN WE CAME BACK WE SAW IT AGAIN BUT THEN IT DID VANISH AFTER THAT—NEVER WAS FOUND AGAIN BUT A FIRE RESTRICTION PAPER FROM JUNE 16TH BUT NOT WHAT WE WERE SHOWN—TWO DIFFERENT PAPERS/DOCUMENTS.Maybe they are only in cyberspace and really there in an office somewhere.
Good work and tidings, and thanks for people like John Dougherty, Bob Powers, xxxFullsailxxx, Gary Olson, RTS, Murray Taylor, Ted Putnam/Johnny/Charley M., John MacLean/Wayne and Holly Neill, GLAD HE SAID JUST TO MENTION A FEW AND I AM SHORT ON TIME TO SIT AN NAME DROP YOU ALL BUT YOU KNOW WHO YOU ARE- AND DEEP THANK YOU TO YOU FOR ALL YOU HAVE DONE. just to mention a few that we either hiked with or had occasion to learn from. Those 19 men deserve the best investigation possibleAND SO DO THE LOVED ONES; THE DESERVE IT TOO.–information some firemen in the future will be able to learn and perhaps save their butts. Thanks to all for hanging in there and giving of yourself to resolve the mystery.YES, THANK YOU TO ALL HERE. I REALLY AM NOT DOING WELL SO WHO KNOWS BUT I DID LEAVE THE NAVAJO LAKE AREA AND HIT THE HOT SRPINGS SO HOPING FOR BETTER DAYS BUT I AM PRETTY LETHARGIC—
Was the “dozer operator” from 6/30 (Justin Hernandez?) interviewed? Are there any comments available that were 1. Made by him, or 2. Made about him and his whereabouts after the entrapment and burnover of GMIHC?
We now know from Dan Philbun that the dozer was actually immobilized after power lines fell on the dozer IN YARNELL, and that he helped untangle it later in the evening. We also know that during the search and rescue effort, Ranger 58 was searching for 20-22 people (TOL… 22 would have been GMIHC, DIVS, and dozer operator)
Questions.
1. Where was dozer operator (Justin Hernandez?) when the power lines collapsed (presumably an effect from the fire)? Still with the dozer?
2. Why had he been unable to communicate his location and apparent safety to the search party?
3. Where, exactly was the dozer?
4. Had there been a change of command of the dozer? Meaning, was Ball no longer HEQB?
I don’t have exact answers to your questions, but I’ll throw these thoughts out there, anyway.
Regarding #2, it has been stated in various reports that the dozer operator did not have a radio.
Regarding #4, if the dozer had been pulled of the line and then parked (staged) along the highway, the dozer was no longer required to have a dozer boss with it. When this happened, Ball (ALONG WITH HIS RADIO), probably went to re-join with BR.
The electrical wires, quite possibly fell on the dozer as it was parked along the highway.
Another STRONG POSSIBILITY, is that, when someone from the in-coming Team found out that the dozer operator did not have a red card, he was removed from further duty, because working on the line without it is A HUGE NO NO!
>> calvin said…
>>
>> Was the “dozer operator” from 6/30 (Justin Hernandez?)
>> interviewed?
Not that I know of. I just checked both SAIT interview notes
and the newer Blue Ridge Unit logs and he is never even
mentioned, much less actually interviewed.
>> Are there any comments available that were
>> 1. Made by him, or
>> 2. Made about him and his whereabouts after the
>> entrapment and burnover of GMIHC?
None that I can find in the public record.
>> We now know from Dan Philbin that the dozer was actually
>> immobilized after power lines fell on the dozer IN YARNELL,
>> and that he helped untangle it later in the evening.
See below. It’s possible this ‘entanglement’ with the power lines
took place more at the west end of Glen Ilah than in Yarnell
proper… at the point where Lakewood and Manzanita end/intersect
and where ( apparently ) the dozer was last ‘staged’ following the
evacuation notices.
>> We also know that during the search and rescue effort,
>> Ranger 58 was searching for 20-22 people (TOL… 22
>> would have been GMIHC, DIVS, and dozer operator)
Yes. To me… this just proves that following the news of
deployment, all the personell at the Ranch House Restaurant
did start asking each other who was or wasn’t accounted for…
and it seems that no one knew where Hernandez might be so
he was being reported as ‘possibly’ needing an emergency
locate along with GM.
Even Air Attack ( Bravo 33 ) said in their own SAIT interview that
they had NO IDEA that day that the DIVSA person they had been
speaking with was, in fact, the regular Superintendent of Granite
Mountain, so that’s why they though he was one of the ‘extra’
people they needed to locate along with what would be a normal
20 man Hotshot Crew contingent.
It was pretty confusing around that time.
>> calvin also wrote…
>>
>> Questions.
>> 1. Where was dozer operator (Justin Hernandez?)
>> when the power lines collapsed (presumably an effect from
>> the fire)? Still with the dozer?
Power lines will always ‘droop’ when they heat up and the tension
leaves the lines. This even happens on any really hot day in the
summer… and it was ALREADY a very hot day, even without
adding fire temps to it. This is documented as happening in
Yarnell and the Glen Ilah area that afternoon.
Take away enough of the normal ‘tension’ in the lines… and they
will ‘droop’ almost all the way to the ground.
See the last line of this paragraph from Blure Ridge YIN interview
which mentions ‘power lines drooping’…
Page 10 of SAIT Yarnell Investigation Notes ( YIN )…
____________________________________________________
People coming in/out all over. B & T met w/ Ball 2 T6 engines and a WT. they were told to go in and do something. The fire was pushing hard it was passed Ball called Travis and said let no one else in. Propane tanks going off, houses burning, power lines drooping.
____________________________________________________
As far as where Hernandez really was late that afternoon, I can
find no direct evidence in the public record.
See below. He *might* have been with the dozer where it
*might* have been staged at end of Lakewood/Manzanita.
>> 2. Why had he been unable to communicate his location
>> and apparent safety to the search party?
It is actually documented that the dozer operator did NOT
have his own radio that day.
He ONLY had a radio for as long as Ball was ‘with him’
and he had the loan of one from Blue Ridge.
Page 10 from Blue Ridge (redacted) notes and what
appears to be Ball’s own ‘unit log’…
“Blueridge One requested me plus one to travel to fires edge.
I was assigned (xxxxxxx) (xxxxxxxxxxxx) county employee
not IA qualified and did not have a radio. Gave radio from
BRIHC to operator (xxxxxx).”
>> 3. Where, exactly was the dozer?
In the recently released Blue Ridge Unit logs notes there
is suddenly this mysterious entry in one of the crew reports
about the Dozer being staged at the bottom of the Sesame
area, at the same place where the BR truck with the
UTV trailer was staged ( intersection of Lakewood and
Manzanita, where the pavement ends and Sesame
area begins… )
Page 28 of Blue Ridge (redacted) unit logs…
____________________________________________________
1430-1600 ?? – (xxxxxxxx) me walks (xxxx) back to
transport area. Crew moves (xxxx) instructed to gear
up + gets a briefing on weather + their assignment.
BR IHC will prep dozer line to N/NE back to drainage
leading to Boy Scout Camp. Buggies are moved around
to where Dozer was staged at Lakewood/Manzanita
subdivion.
___________________________________________________
This location for the dozer ( staged at intersection of
Lakewood and Manzanita in Glen Ilah ) is actually also
supported at the end of what appear to be Ball’s own
(redacted) unit log.
When it all started hitting the fan ( and AFTER the
evacuations had already been ordered by Cordes )…
apparently Cordes still wanted Ball to see if there was
any chance of the dozer cutting more line to the southwest,
around Glen Ilah… and Ball apparently borrowed the Blue
Ridge UTV Ranger to scout this out ( and, at this same
time, the dozer drives over towards Manzanita/Lakewood at
west end of Glen Ilah and ‘stages’ there? )
Page 11 of Blue Ridge (redacted) notes…
____________________________________________________
1600??: BRIHC disengaging to safety zone.
BRIHC one informs Structure Group One they are pushing
everyone out of subdivision.
(xxxxxxxxxxxxxx)
Structure group one assigns me and one other to locate
possibility of dozer line to southwest of Yarnell.
Acquire ATV: travel into subdivision back to Dozer line.
Multiple structures fully engulfed and multiple
spot fires in subdivision.
Notify structure group one about fire and structures on
corner of manzanita and lakewood (xxxxxxxxx)
Started evacuations of subdivision.
Helitanker drops water near manzanita junction.
Inquiry about helitanker availability. Told there are
other priorities (xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx)
Evacuations for next couple of hours.
Signed: (xxxxxxxxx) 7 / 1 / 2013
____________________________________________________
>> 4. Had there been a change of command of the dozer?
>> Meaning, was Ball no longer HEQB?
Probably so… but even in the newly released (redacted)
Blue Ridge unit logs there is NO mention of the exact
time when Ball actually left the dozer ( and the operator )
and rejoined all the other Blue Ridge crew at the Ranch
House Restaurant.
It sounds like ( from what appear to be Ball’s own
unit log notes ) that this happened just after Ball
borrowed the BR UTV and was ‘scouting’ Glen Ilah
for a possible new dozer push… but found nothing
but already burning structures and bailed out back
to the Ranch House Restaurant on the BR Ranger,
which is where we know it ended up before the
‘ground rescue mission’ began.
And ( see above ) if Ball HAD left him and taken the BR
radio back that he loaned him earlier… then that is why
no one was able to contact Hernandez anymore after
that point that day.
calvin said JANUARY 13, 2016 AT 3:49 AM
Do you have any idea exactly how many aircraft or how many gallons of retardant were dropped on the YHF between the time we hear “Air support down there” and the time of deployment?
As we know, there was no retardant lines placed to protect Glen Isla or Yarnell in that timeframe
———————————————————————————————–
Via the Air Study Videos we have a very good record of the various drops on the fire during all of that time.
I’m writing this off the top of my head, and way past my bedtime, but I think your question is important.
Until the 4;30-ish drop that the SAIR incorrectly (imho) said Eric said ‘that’s where we want it,” the aerial fire-fighting was going on on the northeast and then east flanks of the fire. Firstly defending areas in the Model Creek Road area, and then in the Sickles Road Area.
After that, in the time framework you are speaking of, the aerial fire-fighting then turned it’s attention to the southwest part of the fire. They then managed to put in one line of retardant at around 4:30 (from, I think, about Shrine Road north-eastward), and then while they were lining up the DC-10 for a line continuing that, the Deployment happened.
After the deployment, they continued dropping retardant from the first line they put in all the way towards the northeast, to defend Yarnell.
The line Bravo 3 dropped, earlier in the day, across the bowl was basically in vain.
However, it looks to me that the lines dropped in the Model Creek Road area and across the top of Yarnell were successful, via the aerial photos in this article on this UK-based Daily Mail Website:
—————————————————————————————-
“Devastation left by ‘firestorm’ that killed 19 Arizona firefighters: Shocking aerial images show town burned to the ground by blaze”
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2353353/Arizona-wild-fires-pictures-Shocking-aerial-images-utter-devastation.html
You have to scroll down a bit to come to the actually quite interesting collection of aerial photos that show where the retardant lines stopped the fire. I’ve mapped almost all of these photos, by the way. I have absolutely no clue how they managed to obtain these photos.
So, imho, the story is…………complicated.
OK its more than past my bedtime. Goodnight.
PS. Given what I’ve seen in these aerial photos, it has always disturbed me that they didn’t start that line above Glen Illah. I don’t know why that was the case. I really don’t and it bothers me.
Yikes! San Bernardino!
I spent a bunch of time “there” yesterday reading about the whole WUI thing.
I guess what’s going on right now there might be comparable to Initial Attack on a quickly expanding wildfire in the Wildland Urban Interface?
Ok, for some strange reason I posted this in the wrong place. Will move it to the right place.
I have no idea why or how this happened.
**
** NEW CHAPTER VII ( SEVEN ) STARTED
Here is a direct link to the *new* Chapter VII ( SEVEN ) of this ongoing discussion.
http://www.investigativemedia.com/yarnell-hill-fire-chapter-vii/
Thanks once gain to Mr. John Dougherty for all his support and his
extraordinary patience with ALL of us.
Thanks WTKTT!
I guess I’ll have to repost my comment regarding San Bernardino there.
**
** EXIF METADATA SUMMARY FROM
** ALL OF THE PANEBAKER AIR STUDY VIDEOS
Below is a just a short summary of the EXIF data contained in ALL of the
Panebaker videos sitting in the online Dropbox folder.
You can see clearly below what Marti has been talking about with embedded
time stamps ( and GPS time stamps ) actually bearing no relation to the
time stamp(s) eventually used in the FILENAMES themselves.
The Nikon Coolpix seems to have been set TWO hours ahead of real time
and the filenames used for files coming from the camera were just ‘dialed back’
manually, or something.
The first SEVEN Panebaker videos show below also contain a short NOTE after
the EXIF data that tries to show how both the ‘Creation Dates’ OR the GPS
Time Stamp *may* have been used to come up with the actual time stamp
used in the video filename.
As you can see from these NOTES below… something is very strange about
where the time stamps used for the video titles actually came from. None
of them appear to be an exact match for either the ‘Creation Time’ or
the ‘GPS Time’ embedded in the movie itself.
Also note… MOST of the videos taken with the Nikon Coolpix P520 do, in fact,
have UTC based GPS timestamps… but SOME videos from the (same?)
Nikon do NOT. It is almost as if the GPS was being turned OFF on the Nikon
for only SOME of the videos shot that day.
** PANEBAKER AIR STUDY VIDEOS
File Name: 20130630_143844_EP.MOV
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 16:38:41
Duration: 2.24 s
Make: NIKON COOLPIX P520
File Name: 20130630_144226_VLAT_EP.MOV
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 16:40:52
Duration: 0:01:32
Make: NIKON COOLPIX P520
GPS Time Stamp: 21:40:46.57 UTC ( AZ 14:40:46.57 PM )
GPS Date Stamp: 2013:06:30
GPS Position: 34 deg 16′ 19.85″, 112 deg 43′ 51.89″
NOTE: GPS time stamp of 14:40:46 AZ time plus 1:32
equals 1442.18, but that is still 8 seconds shy of 1442.26.
16:40:52 plus 1:32 equals 1642.24, but subtracting two
hours manually still only gives 1442.24, which is still
two seconds shy of filename time stamp 1442.26.
File Name: 20130630_144508_EP.MOV
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 16:44:27
Duration: 0:00:40
Make: NIKON COOLPIX P520
GPS Time Stamp: 21:44:22.11 UTC ( AZ 14:44:22.11 PM )
GPS Date Stamp: 2013:06:30
GPS Position: 34 deg 16′ 19.85″, 112 deg 43′ 51.94″
NOTE: GPS time stamp of 14:44:22 AZ time plus 40 seconds
gives 1445.02, but that is still 6 seconds shy of 1445.08.
16:44:27 plus 40 seconds equals 1645.7, but subtracting two
hours manually still only gives 1445.7, which is still
ONE second shy of filename time stamp 1445.08.
File Name: 20130630_144756_SEAT_EP.MOV
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 16:45:37
Duration: 0:02:17
Make: NIKON COOLPIX P520
GPS Time Stamp: 21:45:31.97 UTC ( AZ 14:45:31.97 PM )
GPS Date Stamp: 2013:06:30
GPS Position: 34 deg 16′ 19.85″, 112 deg 43′ 51.95″
NOTE: GPS time stamp of 14:45:31 AZ time plus 2:17
gives 1447.48, but that is still 8 seconds shy of 1447.56.
16:45:37 plus 2:30 equals 1647.54, but subtracting two
hours manually still only gives 1447.54, which is still
TWO seconds shy of filename time stamp of 1447.56.
File Name: 20130630_150016_EP.MOV
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 16:59:44
Duration: 0:00:29.66
Make: NIKON COOLPIX P520
GPS Time Stamp: 21:59:39.17 UTC ( AZ 14:59:39.17 PM )
GPS Date Stamp: 2013:06:30
GPS Position: 34 deg 16′ 20.99″, 112 deg 43′ 51.82″
NOTE: GPS time stamp of 14:59:39 AZ time plus 29 seconds
gives 1500.08, but that is still 8 seconds shy of 1500.16.
16:59:44 plus 29 seconds equals 1700.13, but subtracting two
hours manually still only gives 1500.13, which is still
THREE seconds shy of filename time stamp of 1500.16.
File Name: 20130630_150530_fire_behavior_EP.MOV
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 17:05:10
Duration: 0:00:17.55
Make: NIKON COOLPIX P520
GPS Time Stamp: 22:05:05.95 UTC ( AZ 15:05:05.95 PM )
GPS Date Stamp: 2013:06:30
GPS Position: 34 deg 16′ 20.99″, 112 deg 43′ 51.82″
NOTE: GPS time stamp of 15:05:05 AZ time plus 17 seconds
gives 1505.22, but that is still 8 seconds shy of 1505.30.
17:05:10 plus 17 seconds equals 1705.27, but subtracting two
hours manually still only gives 1505.27, which is still
THREE seconds shy of filename time stamp of 1505.30.
File Name: 20130630_150822_VLAT_EP.MOV
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 17:06:28
Duration: 0:01:52
Make: NIKON COOLPIX P520
GPS Time Stamp: 22:06:23.3 UTC ( AZ 15:06:23.3 PM )
GPS Date Stamp: 2013:06:30
GPS Position: 34 deg 16′ 20.99″, 112 deg 43′ 51.82″
NOTE: GPS time stamp of 15:06:23 AZ time plus 1:52
gives 1508.15, but that is still 7 seconds shy of 1508.22.
17:06:20 plus 1:52 equals 1708.12, but subtracting two
hours manuall still only gives 1518.12, which is still
TEN seconds shy of filename time stamp of 1508.22.
File Name: 20130630_151842_fire_behavior_EP.MOV
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 17:16:50
Duration: 0:01:49
Make: NIKON COOLPIX P520
NOTE: 17:16:50 plus 1:49 equals 1718.39, but
subtracting two hours manually still only gives 1518.39,
which is still THREE seconds shy of filename time
stamp of 1518.42.
File Name: 20130630_152406_SEAT_EP.MOV
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 17:21:07
Duration: 0:02:56
Make: NIKON COOLPIX P520
GPS Time Stamp: 22:21:01.4 UTC ( AZ 15:21:01.4 PM )
GPS Date Stamp: 2013:06:30
GPS Position: 34 deg 16′ 20.18″, 112 deg 43′ 51.71″
File Name: 20130630_153014_SEAT_EP.MOV
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 17:29:02
Duration: 0:01:10
Make: NIKON COOLPIX P520
GPS Time Stamp: 22:28:57.45 UTC ( AZ 15:28:57.45 PM )
GPS Date Stamp: 2013:06:30
GPS Position: 34 deg 16′ 20.14″, 112 deg 43′ 51.73″
File Name: 20130630_153414_EP.MOV
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 17:34:01
Duration: 12.38 s
Make: NIKON COOLPIX P520
GPS Time Stamp: 22:33:56.38 UTC ( AZ 15:33:56.38 PM )
GPS Date Stamp: 2013:06:30
GPS Position: 34 deg 16′ 19.98″, 112 deg 43′ 51.79″
File Name: 20130630_153510_EP.MOV
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 17:34:42
Duration: 23.62 s
Make: NIKON COOLPIX P520
GPS Time Stamp: 22:34:37.65 UTC ( AZ 15:34:37.65 PM )
GPS Date Stamp: 2013:06:30
GPS Position: 34 deg 16′ 19.96″, 112 deg 43′ 51.79″
File Name: 20130630_153532_EP.MOV
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 17:35:13
Duration: 1.17 s
Make: NIKON COOLPIX P520
GPS Time Stamp: 22:35:07.87 UTC ( AZ 15:35:07.87 PM )
GPS Date Stamp: 2013:06:30
GPS Position: 34 deg 16′ 19.95″, 112 deg 43′ 51.80″
File Name: 20130630_153622_5KA_EP.MOV
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 17:35:38
Duration: 0:00:43
Make: NIKON COOLPIX P520
GPS Time Stamp: 22:35:33.09 UTC ( AZ 15:35:33.09 PM )
GPS Date Stamp: 2013:06:30
GPS Position: 34 deg 16′ 19.94″, 112 deg 43′ 51.80″
File Name: 20130630_154138_fire_behavior_EP.MOV
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 17:41:06
Duration: 0:00:31
Make: NIKON COOLPIX P520
GPS Time Stamp: 22:41:01.07 UTC ( AZ 15:41:01.07 PM )
GPS Date Stamp: 2013:06:30
GPS Position: 34 deg 16′ 19.84″, 112 deg 43′ 51.83″
File Name: 20130630_154940_SEAT_EP.MOV
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 17:48:21
Duration: 0:01:18
Make: NIKON COOLPIX P520
GPS Time Stamp: 22:48:15.97 UTC ( AZ 15:48:15.97 PM )
GPS Date Stamp: 2013:06:30
GPS Position: 34 deg 16′ 19.76″, 112 deg 43′ 51.84″
File Name: 20130630_161620_VLAT_split_1_EP.MOV
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 18:12:48
Duration: 0:03:31
Make: NIKON COOLPIX P520
GPS Time Stamp: 23:12:43.83 UTC ( AZ 16:12:43.83 PM )
GPS Date Stamp: 2013:06:30
GPS Position: 34 deg 16′ 19.92″, 112 deg 43′ 50.16″
File Name: 20130630_161658_EP.MOV
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 18:16:41
Duration: 15.75 s
Make: NIKON COOLPIX P520
GPS Time Stamp: 23:16:36.24 UTC ( AZ 16:16:36.24 PM )
GPS Date Stamp: 2013:06:30
GPS Position: 34 deg 16′ 19.90″, 112 deg 43′ 50.35″
File Name: 20130630_161858_VLAT_split_2_EP.MOV
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 18:17:07
Duration: 0:01:49
Make: NIKON COOLPIX P520
GPS Time Stamp: 23:17:02.62 UTC ( AZ 16:17:02.62 PM )
GPS Date Stamp: 2013:06:30
GPS Position: 34 deg 16′ 19.88″, 112 deg 43′ 50.40″
File Name: 20130630_162300_SEAT_drop_EP.MOV
Make: Canon EOS REBEL T3i
Lens Type: Canon EF-S 15-85mm f/3.5-5.6 IS USM
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 16:23:34
Internal Serial Number: ZA2261150
Serial Number: 152066061038
Lens Info: 15-85mm f/?
Lens Serial Number: 000013b95c
** WHY IS THIS TIME DIFFERENT FROM 16:23:34?
Create Date: 2013:06:30 16:23:01
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 16:23:01
Duration: 11.78 s
Create Date: 2013:06:30 16:23:34.00
Date/Time Original: 2013:06:30 16:23:34.00
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 16:23:34.00
File Name: 20130630_162508_2SEATS_EP.MOV
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 18:23:17
Duration: 0:01:50
Make: NIKON COOLPIX P520
GPS Time Stamp: 23:23:11.9 UTC ( AZ 16:23:11.9 PM )
GPS Date Stamp: 2013:06:30
GPS Position: 34 deg 16′ 19.82″, 112 deg 43′ 50.86″
File Name: 20130630_163338_fire_behavior_EP.MOV
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 18:31:26
Duration: 0:02:09
Make: NIKON COOLPIX P520
File Name: 20130630_163700_fire_behavior_EP.MOV
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 18:36:17
Duration: 0:00:39
Make: NIKON COOLPIX P520
File Name: 20130630_164544_fire_behavior_EP.MOV
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 18:43:43
Duration: 0:01:59
Make: NIKON COOLPIX P520
GPS Time Stamp: 23:43:38.25 UTC ( AZ 16:43:38.25 PM )
GPS Date Stamp: 2013:06:30
GPS Position: 34 deg 16′ 19.64″, 112 deg 43′ 51.87″
File Name: 20130630_170634_VLAT_EP.MOV
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 19:05:42
Duration: 0:00:49
Make: NIKON COOLPIX P520
GPS Time Stamp: 00:05:37.3 UTC ( AZ 17:05:37.3 PM )
GPS Date Stamp: 2013:07:01
GPS Position: 34 deg 16′ 19.63″, 112 deg 43′ 51.90″
END OF LISTING
Wait, what?? I’m not sure you explained that right.
Panebaker’s Nikon and Canon t3i are one hour ahead of Arizona time, because Arizona time is not Mountain Daylight Savings Time, the time Panebaker set his cameras to.
If anybody working on these files, unless they were in a serious hurry, or didn’t care whether it made sense dealing with an Arizona fire, should have known how to do this. Somebody apparently didn’t.
So first you have to set the camera’s timestamp back one hour, in order to sync to other Arizona-set cameras (like the one used on the Air2Air videos, and just about every other camera used on that fire).
Then you have to translate that to the military time — (the 24 hour clock) format they’re using on these filenames.
It seems crazy complicated, for people who don’t understand it. But it’s not really.
So, for example, a photo or video, taken by Panebaker, who lives in Montana and had set his two cameras to Mountain Daylight Savings Time, should have been re-timestamped, by whoever was preparing these files for this, back one hour. Say from 4:16:24 PM to 3:16:24 PM. Then, in order to accurately translate that into the “military 24-hour” format they chose to use to name these files for this kind of important publication, they would then “add” 12 hours to it (to count from midnight of the beginning of that day), to get to 151624. That’s how you do this. That’s what everybody does when they do this, That’s what I’ve been doing all along. For people hired/payed to do it, I would think it would been a “no-brainer.”
They could have absolutely cleanly and quickly and accurately renamed these files without confusion. I have no clue why they didn’t.
But thank you for doing it!
Marti… yes… this confused me as well when I finally
did an EXIF dump on ALL of Panebaker Apple Quicktime
movies and then looked at the dates coming OUT of
the movie files themselves. ( EXIF metadata ).
You ALREADY said the Nikon Coolpix P250 was set
ONE hour ahead of time… but the ‘Creation Date’ being
stamped into the movies themselves says that it was
TWO hours behind the ‘real Arizona time’ that day.
Let me take just ONE of the EXIF metadata dumps
from above and see if I can show you what I mean…
Let’s take just THIS one ( since it also has GPS data )…
_______________________________________________
File Name: 20130630_144226_VLAT_EP.MOV
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 16:40:52
Duration: 0:01:32
Make: NIKON COOLPIX P520
GPS Time Stamp: 21:40:46.57 UTC ( AZ 14:40:46.57 PM )
GPS Date Stamp: 2013:06:30
GPS Position: 34 deg 16′ 19.85″, 112 deg 43′ 51.89″
NOTE: GPS time stamp of 14:40:46 AZ time plus 1:32
equals 1442.18, but that is still 8 seconds shy of 1442.26.
16:40:52 plus 1:32 equals 1642.24, but subtracting two
hours manually still only gives 1442.24, which is still
two seconds shy of filename time stamp 1442.26.
_______________________________________________
Here’s what I am seeing above…
>> File Name: 20130630_144226_VLAT_EP.MOV
>> Creation Date: 2013:06:30 16:40:52
The FILENAME ended up in the ‘1400’ timerange… but
the ‘Creation Date’ ( according to the Nikon ) was TWO
HOURS ahead of that… in the ‘1600’ hour.
Now there is this…
GPS Time Stamp: 21:40:46.57 UTC ( AZ 14:40:46.57 PM )
That is actually CORRECT.
Timestamp that went into the movie itself was in the
‘1400’ hour ALREADY… and not TWO HOURS ahead
in the ‘1600’ hour as the Nikon’s own timeclock thought.
Well… when I say CORRECT… I mean the HOUR was
correct according to UTC time. ( 1400 hour ).
As explained above, however… I don’t think this is simply
a case where they ended up just taking the GPS time
and using that for the FILENAME itself.
The GPS time stamp of 14:40:46 AZ time plus the
1:32 media duration time embedded in the movie
itself equals 1442.18, but that is still 8 seconds shy of 1442.26 ( which is what they actually NAMED it ).
So ‘eight seconds’ are ‘missing’, even if they were
just referring to the embedded GPS time for filenames…
…but my point is that the HOUR is CORRECT ( according
to the GPS stamp )… and it is TWO hours ahead of the
‘Creation date’ stamped by the Nikon’s own clock setting.
UPDATE: The ‘EXIF metadata’ dump for the Panebaker videos
posted above in this Chapter 6 has been updated and
re-posted at the bottom ( the START ) of the new Chapter 7.
The list above actually has a couple of Panebaker videos
missing. The new list over in Chapter 7 is complete and
has all 31 Panebaker videos listed.
Here is a direct link to the *new* Chapter VII ( SEVEN ) of this ongoing discussion where the *new* EXIF report is posted…
http://www.investigativemedia.com/yarnell-hill-fire-chapter-vii/
**
** USING AN ONLINE EXIF METADATA EXTRACTOR WITH AIR STUDY
** VIDEOS WITHOUT HAVING TO DOWNLOAD THE VIDEOS
The same ‘online’ tool that can be used to easily extract EXIF metatdata from
any photograph can ALSO be used to pull a ton of metadata out of Apple
Quicktime movie format ( MOV ) files… ( like the Panebaker Air Study videos
in the online DropBox )… but it’s a little trickier to do than just analyzing
a ‘photograph’ in Mr. Dougherty’s online Drobox.
That online tool is here…
http://regex.info/exif.cgi
To analyze any PHOTOGRAPH in the online Dropbox… all you have to do
is select the photo… let it appear… then use the ‘View Original’ option by
either right-clicking the image or from the little ‘three dot’ menu option that
is always in the lower right corner when a photo is being displayed.
When the original photo appears… you just ‘cut and paste’ the URL that is now
showing in your browser’s address bar into the ‘View Image at URL’ input
box over in the EXIF online tool page.
You have to do this ‘View Original’ thing because the online Dropbox page
that normally (first) shows a photo to you is just an HTML ‘container’ and
that URL is NOT a ‘direct link’ to the photo itself.
In order for the online EXIF extractor to work… it simply needs a URL that
represents the location of the ACTUAL image ( and not a web page URL ).
Okay… all well and good… but here come the problem with trying to do the
same thing with the online Apple Quicktime movies ( like the Panebaker Air
Study videos ) that are also sitting in the online Dropbox.
When you choose to ‘play a movie’ up there in the Dropbox… right-clicking
the movie player when it appears does NOT give you the same ‘View original’
option as when viewing a still photo. Likewise… when it’s a movie being shown
in the online Dropbox… there is no ‘View original’ menu option if you click the
little ‘three dot’ menu in the lower right corner.
So if you just ‘cut and paste’ the URL of the Dropbox movie player into the
online EXIF extractor tool… it simply comes back and says “Invalid URL. This
is a web page and not a direct link to the item.”
Not to worry. Here is how to essentially do the same ‘View original’ option
for MOVIES up at that Dropbox… even though there is no such menu option.
You have to PRETEND as if you want to DOWNLOAD the movie… but
you still don’t have to actually download it.
When the movie you want to pull the EXIF data from is showing on the screen
with the big RIGHT-ARROW ‘Play’ button already showing… just mouse down
to the bottom right of the panel and LEFT-CLICK that little ‘three dot’ menu icon.
Only one option will be on the popup menu… and it says ‘Download’.
Do NOT LEFT-CLICK that option ( that will start the download ).
Do a RIGHT-CLICK instead.
A RIGHT-CLICK will bring up a ‘System menu’ that should have the
following option on it ( among others )…
“Copy Link Location”
Left-click click that option on this second popup menu.
This will copy the ACTUAL URL of where that original movie
file is really located up there at the Dropbox into your clipboard.
Once you have done the “Copy Link Location” operation… just switch right
over to the online EXIF extractor page and then do a ‘paste’ of that Link
into the ‘Image URL’ input box at the top of the page… then just RIGHT-CLICK
the ‘View Image at URL’ option.
That’s all there is to it.
The online tool now knows exactly where to get its OWN copy of the movie from
the Drobox… and will do so ‘in the background’ at backbone speed… and will then
show you the extracted EXIF data for that MOVIE. If it’s one of the larger movie
files you WILL have to ‘wait’ just a bit while the online server obtains its own
copy of the movie to analyze… but it won’t take long.
NOTE: You may see the online EXIF tool ‘loading’ icon just keep ‘spinning’
even after the EXIF data appears because it is still trying to display frames
from the movie on the same page. Once you are done cutting/pasting the
EXIF data into some other place of your own it’s probably best to CLOSE
that copy of the EXIF tool window so your CPU doesn’t keep spinning.
** GPS TIME STAMPS IN THE PANEBAKER VIDEOS
The Nikon Coolpix P520 camera being used for most of the Panebaker
videos was, in fact, using GPS and MOST of the videos taken with that
camera also have a ‘real time’ GPS time/date stamp. SOME of the same
videos from the same camera do NOT ( almost as if GPS was being
turned OFF at various time ).
If there IS any GPS data in a movie… it WILL be displayed by the online tool
and it will look like this…
Target image: /Panebaker/Video/Video/20130630_161658_EP
Date/Time Original 2013:06:30 18:16:41
GPS Time Stamp: 23:16:36.24 UTC
GPS Date Stamp: 2013:06:30
GPS Version ID: 2.3.0.0
GPS Latitude Ref: North
GPS Latitude: 34.272193 degrees
GPS Longitude Ref: West
GPS Longitude: 112.730652 degrees
GPS Altitude Ref: Above Sea Level
GPS Altitude: 1292.1 m
GPS Img Direction Ref: Unknown ()
GPS Img Direction: undef
GPS Map Datum: WGS84
Arizona is -7 ( minus SEVEN ) hours in relation to GPS UTC time.
That means…
When UTC hour is 2100… it is 1400 ( 2:00 PM ) in Arizona
When UTC hour is 2200… it is 1500 ( 3:00 PM ) in Arizona
When UTC hour is 2300… it is 1600 ( 4:00 PM ) in Arizona.
When UTC hour is 0000… it is 1700 ( 5:00 PM ) in Arizona
etc…
Thank you !
When I’m not brain dead, which I am right now, I’ll experiment with this!
**
** REVISITING THE 1715 PANEBAKER STILL PHOTOS
>> On May 18, 2014 at 4:48 am, calvin said:
>> The Panebaker VLAT pictures labeled 1715′ish are incorrect. These pictures
>> are actually the split drop from the VLAT from 1617. I am not sure if this is
>> relevant, or if it has already been identified.
It’s VERY relevant.
One of those 1715’ish Panebaker still photos ( the one named 20130630_171528-1_EP ) is the one that is a PERFECT match for the Tom
Story photo that was (supposedly) shot at 1639 ( according to the timestamp
on Story’s Canon 1D with the 300mm zoom lens attached ).
So however *wrong* the Panebaker still photos are ( being shot with his
own Canon EOS REBEL T3i camera )… that is ALSO how ‘wrong’ the
Tom Story Canon EOS 1D photo timestamps are.
So there appear to be TWO ‘wrong offsets’ involved here now…
1) How *wrong* was Panebaker’s Canon EOS REBEL T3i that day?
2) Answer to (1) determines how *wrong* Tom Story’s Canon EOS 1D really was.
As much as there is no evidence that there was a VLAT drop at 1639 that
day ( the moment of Steed’s first MAYDAY ) as suggested by Tom Story’s
photos… there is also now actually no real evidence there was a VLAT drop at
exactly 1715, either ( as indicated by Panebaker’s still photos ).
There is no doubt they were BOTH photographing the ‘same VLAT drop’…
but there is still plenty of doubt as to exactly WHEN that was.
So regardless of how the ‘162300 video mystery’ pans out on the other
thread… this thread needs to ‘revisit’ the Panebaker 1715 series and
find out what the ‘wrong time offset’ for THAT camera really was.
More on this later.
Back to looking at video stillframes and comparing them to still photos.
**
** PROBLEM SOLVED?
**
** NEW TIME OFFSETS FOR BOTH…
**
** PANEBAKER’S CANON EOS REBEL T3i
** TOM STORY’S CANON EOS 1D ( WITH 300mm LENS )
As it turns out… thanks to the fact that the audio tracks of the
Panebaker Air Study Videos were capturing ‘shutter clicks’…
this wasn’t all that hard to figure out.
As calvin pointed out… the Panebaker 1715’ish photo series
( regardless of timestamp ) are ACTUALLY photos of the FIRST
VLAT PASS that was part of that ‘VLAT split’ sequence taken
almost an HOUR earlier than 1715.
The Panebaker Air Study video that captures the ACTUAL (correct)
VLAT drop which corresponds to BOTH the Tom Story 7093 photo
( with an incorrect timestamp of 1639.21 ) AND the Panebaker
20130630_171528-1_EP photo ( with an incorrect timestamp of
1715.28 ) is this one…
20130630_161620_VLAT_split_1_EP
This video is 3 minutes and 30 seconds long.
VIDEO 161620 STARTS AT 1612.50 ( 4:12.50 PM )
+2:27 ( 16:15.17 / 4:15.17 PM )
Shutter click that matches Panebaker still photo 20130630_171528-1_EP *and* Tom Story’s 7093 still photo.
VIDEO 161620 ENDS AT 1616.20 ( 4:16.20 PM )
So that means the TIME setting on Panebaker’s Canon EOS
REBEL T3i was actually 1 hour and 11 seconds AHEAD of the
time of the video camera that was recording the 161620 video
that day.
( 1715.28 minus 1615.17 equals 1 hour and 11 seconds ).
So… how does that now affect the ‘time offset’ for Story’s
Canon EOS 1D?
Well… since we NOW know that the actual EVENT being
photographed by Tom Story’s 7093 photo with his Canon
EOS 1D took place at exactly 1615.17 that day… and Story’s
Canon EOS 1D put a *wrong* timestamp of 1639.21 on that
photo… the ‘difference’ between those times would be…
24 minutes and 4 seconds.
( 1639.21 minus 1615.17 equals 24 minutes and 4 seconds ).
So Tom Story’s Canon EOS 1D appears to have been set
24 minutes and 4 seconds AHEAD of the ‘real’ time that day
( if we accept that the video camera on the tripod shooting Air
Study videos was, itself, set close to the ACTUAL time that day ).
SUMMARY…
** Panebaker’s Canon EOS REBEL T3i camera was timestamping
photos 1 hour and 11 second AHEAD of ‘real time’ that day.
** Tom Story’s Canon EOS 1D camera was timestamping
photos 24 minutes and 4 seconds AHEAD of ‘real time’ that day.
See what I wrote below about syncing 152406_SEAT with the 1544 Air2Air video.
Now thinking about that 162300_SEAT_drop video. I couldn’t figure out where it came from. It’s not from any of the cameras we’re seeing most of the video from. It’s totally different. I had been wondering “Where did Panebeker get that video from??”
Now that all makes sense. He was shooting stills with the t3i, with a, as you have found, camera set ahead one hour (which actually would be correct in any Mountain Time place other than Arizona — which doesn’t observe Daylight Savings Time), and he decided to shoot that drop as a video.
So whoever was file-naming Panebeker’s t3i’s photos/video didn’t know that and thus incorrectly named the files.
It really makes me wonder who was naming these files. They made so many mistakes it makes it hard to believe it was someone on “their team.” I think if it was somebody on “their team” they would have been going more for syncing accuracy and would have been more clued in.
Just my somewhat brain dead at this pont opinion.
I think here’s still a lot of timestamp wonkiness on the Nikon videos. Bit I have somewhat of a killer day in front of me, so I don’t know when I’ll be able to get back to it.
We are still putting a lot of ‘trust’ into the existing
filename time/date stamps of the Panebaker
Air Study videos… but I still think it’s OK to do
that ( given exceptions like the 162300 video ).
Example… even for the NEW ‘time offsets’ for
Panebaker’s Canon REBEL and Story’s EOS 1D,
I am obviously ‘trusting’ the fact that the following
Panebaker video is ( at least ) CLOSE to the
REAL time that day…
20130630_161620_VLAT_split_1_EP
As you just pointed out… events in these Panebaker
videos *ARE* ‘traceable’ back into the long-running
Air-To-Air channel videos… and usually ( at least )
these TWO video cameras match up pretty
well, time wise.
So what are the odds that BOTH the camera on
the tripod recording the Panebaker videos *AND*
the camera on the tripod that was recording the
long-running Air-To-Air channel traffic are *BOTH*
set incorrectly… but still within a few seconds
of each other?
I don’t know… but I would say ‘slim to none’.
The fact that the Air-To-Air traffic captures
eventually ‘line up’ ( timewise ) with the actual
MAYDAY calls and the deployment events seems
to indicate that the camera doing the Air-To-Air
channel captures that day was pretty much set to
the ‘right time’ that day… so anything from
Panebaker that ‘matches’ up with dialogue in an
Air-To-Air capture can/should also be considered
‘the right time’ that day.
At one point… I tried to match up an event in either
a Panebaker video OR the Air-To-Air videos with
something from the Blue Ridge GPS unit ( which
was using satellite real-time that day )…
…but that turned out to be pretty much like putting
a square peg into a round hole. I can’t find any
DIRECT correlation between a GPS stamped
event in the Blue Ridge data with an Air-To-Air
channel transmission and/or a Panebaker video
radio capture. Close… but still guesswork.
When I set out on THAT quest… I was hoping to
actually find a TAC channel capture in an Air
Study video that matched the moment when
Frisby told Brown to ‘get some drivers to move
vehicles’. That is still, of course, the EXACT
moment when Brown did his ‘about face’ on
his hike on the Cutover Trail… which was
captured by his GPS unit.
No such luck. None of that ‘rescuing Brendan’ and
the immediate ‘moving vehicles’ radio traffic seems
to have been captured in any Air Study video.
The only line we NOW have to the Blue Ridge GPS
unit and the Panebaker videos is this ‘indirect’ line…
1) Blue Ridge GPS event ( ATV leaving parking lot )
was used to verify that Story’s Canon 3D was
‘accurate’ that day ( within 45 to 50 seconds of
real time ).
2) Story’s photos can be used to ‘match’ events
in Panebaker videos to determine ‘accuracy’
as related to Blue Ridge GPS unit.
So any Tom Story Canon 3D photo that matches
a moment in a Panebaker video almost exactly
is a good ‘indirect’ line of proof back to the
GPS based satellite time that day.
But as we have already discovered… ANYTHING
within 60 seconds or so is going to have to be
considered ‘accurate’ for this day in Yarnell.
Even the GPS unit was only ‘updating’ every
60 seconds that day.
Interestingly, tho, the camera timestamp on the first of those three videos says 6:12:48 PM.
So now I’m thinking the the Panebaker Nikon (source of these videos) is also one hour ahead, just like the Panebaker t3i. And that would make perfect sense, all things considered. The must both be Panebaker’s cameras, and he must live outside of Arizona,with his cameras synced to Mountain Daylight Savings time.
Still, however, I’m seeing quite a few of my representative samples of this videos, in which the File Namer, both not realizing those two cameras were “off” by an hour and getting confused as to how to translate the stamps from “4:30 PM” to “1630” goes back and forth between translating them correctly and translating them incorrectly.
Actually, Eric lives in Jackson, Wyoming, I think.
I think the “Air2Air” Contour +2 videocam is accurate, both in names and timestamps, essentially.
I’m looking at 20130630_1628_EP.MOV. The timestamp says 3:47:58 PM. Which would relatively accurately indicate the video was started at 3:47 PM (1547) and end at 4:28 PM (1628), and it’s a 40-minute video. So that works.
So the person who owns THAT camera probably lives in Arizona.
Reply to Marti Reed post on
May 19, 2014 at 12:06 pm
>> Marti said…
>> I think the “Air2Air” Contour +2
>> videocam is accurate, both in
>> names and timestamps,
>> essentially.
Totally agree… it is ‘consistent’ with
its own timestamps and filenames
*AND* it *ALSO* seems to have
been set pretty close to the ‘real
time’ ( well, as close as anything
was that day, anyway ).
That video is actually 40 minutes and 14 seconds long… but that didn’t
throw anything off as far as the file
naming went.
1547.58 plus 40 minutes and 14
seconds is 1628.12.
Still ‘right on the money’ and still means the ‘1628’ in the filename is
CORRECT.
I think *all* of the Air-To-Air channel
videos are just as ‘tickety-boo’ with
regards to start times, durations, end
times ( and resulting filename stamp ).
The Panebaker videos… well… ( as
you pointed out already )… that’s
a whole ‘nother story.
It’s like ‘follow the bouncing timestamps’ for those puppies.
More later.
PS: A number of the Nikon Panebaker videos DO, in fact, have UTC GPS time and date stamps embedded in them… and I’m currently trying to see how that factors into things here.
Something is ‘strange’ about even these UTC GPS timestamps, however, and there seems to be a ‘pattern’ there but can’t quite explain it yet. They are always about 8 to 10 seconds BEHIND the other timestamps but its not totally consistent from video to video.
OK I’m back from driving, with a swollen sprained foot, clear across town and back in heavy traffic. I had some time to think.
I DON’T think it’s OK to be “putting a lot of ‘trust’ into the filename time/date stamps” on those videos.
I didn’t have time nor drive space to download all those videos, but of the eight I did, they were ALL incorrectly labeled. The five that are kinda sorta right, like 152406 and 150530 is only right because the renamer just read 5:21:07 PM and just stuck a 1 in front of that, not knowing the camera stamp was an hour ahead. So, purely by mistake those ended up with the “right” filenames.
The other three of those eight, are misnamed, because the renamer, while getting the translation right, didn’t now the camera stamp was off by an hour. So anybody that doesn’t know that camera is off by an hour, is gonna either misinterpret or misunderstand what they’re looking at.
If I could download all those files, which I can’t, I could easily and quickly make a list of those videos with correct filenames. I think it would be well worth doing, now that we know what the problem is.
And I think they should be corrected for Arizona time, which Panebeker didn’t, so they can be synced more “trustworthily” with all the other stuff people are comparing them to.
Can you do that with your online file metadata reader?
The (free) online tool won’t pull any
metadata from Apple Quicktime
format MOV files.
Need something like exiftool v.9.61
for that.
…but I hear ya on the filenames.
At some point… they SHOULD all
be ‘correct’ and ‘reflect reality’.
Working on that here as well.
More later.
Great! Thank you!
Just found something. Jeffrey Friedl’s “Online Exif (Image Data) Viewer:
http://regex.info/blog/other-writings/online-exif-image-data-viewer
I’ve used a lot of Jeffrey’s Lightroom Plugin. His stuff is quite good. I think I’m gonna download and try out this, and also his Exif Viewer for Lightroom.
That’s the same ‘online’ tool I’ve been recommending and that I was commenting about above… but this is the URL I’ve been using…
http://regex.info/exif.cgi
It actually SAYS it supports MOV Quicktime… but I haven’t been able to get it to successfully analyze any of the Panebaker videos.
Problem with the online tool and using it with the YFH Dropbox is that you have to do ‘View Original’ on any photo and use THAT URL for the EXIF viewer.
If you just call up an Apple Quicktime movie via the dropbox and try to use that URL… it just says “Invalid URL… this is just a web page”.
There is no ‘View original’ option for the movies in the online Drobox, as there is with photos.
You can also try to analyze any ‘downloaded’ videos… but problem there is that the online tool then has to UPLOAD the entire frickin’ thing before it can ‘analyze’ it. Not workable with some of these Air Study videos.
So a desktop tool like exiftool v9.6 is what I’ve been using to analyze the Apple Quicktime movies.
Marti… hold the phone…
Scratch my comment
above. I just figured out HOW to use that ‘online tool’ to analyze the Apple Quicktime MOV files that are actually sitting in the online YHF Dropbox.
You have to sort of ‘fool’ it and pretend to ‘download’ the video… without actually downloading it.
See a new parent comment up above about how to actually do this.
Ha Ha remember when we spent several days syncing Tom’s D1????
I said I thought it was 22 minutes ahead and you estimated somewhere around 30 minutes ahead?
I had reasons to not want you to be right because of how that would skew my syncing of Tom’s photo of the VLAT after Blue Ridge McCord’s “almost fiasco with the helicopter” video!!
WTKTT: I hate to ask too much of you, and I know we’re all breathlessly waiting/hoping/praying for a Chapter VII, but…
I think it would be enormously useful if you could write up a summary of this whole Panebaker exploration. I can’t do it because I don’t know what all is in your head. I’ve pretty much written/thunk out loud what’s been in mine.
I think it’s really important for folks coming here to understand this, and I don’t think they will by trying to read/comprehend these four days of complicated/convoluted threads.
Thanks!!
John has started a Chapter 7. Put the summary in there. Loading this comment thread is a challenge for some computers.
Yes… a *new* Chapter VII ( SEVEN ) has started.
Here is a direct link to the *new* Chapter VII ( SEVEN )
of this ongoing discussion…
http://www.investigativemedia.com/yarnell-hill-fire-chapter-vii/
Marti… I did a ‘dump’ up above of the EXIF data ( including
GPS time stamps ) from the Panebaker videos… but that
was before I read your comment above.
That ‘dump’ is NOT my idea of a ‘summary’ as to where
we reallly stand with these Panebaker videos.
I will do that additional ‘summary’ and post it as well.
It’s actually looking pretty clear.
I no longer think ( at the moment ) that 162300 video
was ‘replacing’ anything at all. It was just a ‘screw up’.
What amazes me is that these guys were getting PAID
to do this ‘Aerial Firefighting Study’ ( With taxpayer dollars
from USDA? )… but they didn’t even bother to make sure
their equipment was all ‘good to go’ with correct timestamps
and whatnot that day.
**
** UPDATE: MORE ABOUT THE 162300 AIR STUDY VIDEO
**
** MYSTERY SOLVED?
>> Marti wrote…
>> Was the Nikon’s timestamper generally off? I don’t know.
>> Periodically, a photo was taken on that camera. The photos
>> are in the Schultz folder.
>> 20130630_1616_AZ-A1S-000688_T911___7_G_RS.JPG
>> (Please dear Universe, don’t ever compel me to type that out
>> on my iPad ever again…) is of the T11 coming out of one of the
>> split drops and has a time stamp of 4:16:36 PM. Boom!
>> As in that’s pretty accurate, relatively speaking, given that we
>> don’t have any absolute time stamps on any of these files, because
>> it just doesn’t work that way in the real world, unless somebody
>> decides to make it do that.
Marti…
Couple of things.
You are right. There is no doubt that even though they DO capture the same
SINGLE SEAT drop… the 152406 video and the 162300 video were shot with
TWO different video cameras.
The 152406 video was shot with a video camera on a TRIPOD… while the
162300 video was shot with a ‘handheld’ video camera.
So which one has the *REAL* timestamp?
I believe it’s the 152406 video.
The following photo in the Swartz folder DOES, in fact, appear to be a still photo
of the EXACT SAME DROP that we see happening in BOTH the 152406 video
*and* the 162300 video.
/AerialFirefightingstudy/Swartz/Pictures/Nikon/North of Fire/Seat Drop 3/
20130630_1524_AZ-A1S-000688_T874___1_G_RS.JPG
Camera: Nikon COOLPIX P520
Lens: 107 mm (Max aperture f/3)
Exposure: Auto exposure, Program AE, 1/250 sec, f/4.9, ISO 160
Flash: Off, Did not fire
Focus: AF-S, Mid-left
Focus 2: AF Area Mode: Dynamic Area
Date: June 30, 2013 – 3:24:31 PM
Location: Latitude/longitude: 34° 16′ 19.7″ North, 112° 43′ 51.9″ West
Location decimal: ( 34.272152, -112.731085 )
Altitude: 1,375.3 m
File: 3,672 × 4,896 JPEG (18.0 megapixels)
If we are going to trust the timestamps on the Swartz photos… then this simply
CONFIRMS that the drop actually did take place in the 1524 timeframe… and
*NOT*( in the 1623 timeframe as the 162300 video seems to suggest.
Things are *still* just a ‘little wonky’ timewise, however, but ( I believe ) fully
explainable now.
The timestamp on Swartz’s photo showing the actual moment of ‘retardant
dropping’ from this single SEAT is 1524.31.
That does NOT match the actual ‘drop time’ for this single SEAT drop as
shown in the 152406 video… but it may be ‘close enough’.
Here is the actual ‘moment of the drop’ as recorded starting at the +2:05
second mark in the 152406 video…
__________________________________________________________________
+2:05 ( 1523.15 / 3:23.15 PM )
(Foreground person 1 – Panebaker?): Here he comes.
+2:13 ( 1523.23 / 3:23.23 PM )
(AA – Rory Collins): Operations, Air Attack, Air-To-Ground
+2:18 ( 1523.28 / 3:23.28 PM )
(OPS1 Todd Abel): Go ahead.
+2:19 ( 1523.29 / 3:23.29 PM )
( RETARDANT DROP STARTS FROM THE SINGLE SEAT )
+2:19 ( 1523.29 / 3:23.29 PM )
(AA – Rory Collins): Okay… Ahhhh… we’ll probly be around there
in about five. Umm… What’s your plan on the ground?
+2:20 ( 1523.30 / 3:23.30 PM )
( RETARDANT IS NOW FULLY DROPPING FROM THE SINGLE SEAT )
+2:27 ( 1523.37 / 3:23.37 PM )
(OPS1 Todd Abel): What I’d like to do… ah… is… ah… tie into ( that court here? ) where ya
see the whole ??. If we can tag onto the road up here and then just run it… ah… you know…
( transmission breaks up and cuts off ).
FOREGROUND OVERLAP…
+2:27 ( 1523.37 / 3:23.37 PM )
(Tanker 810): Eight one zero OFF… hard right.
(B33 – French): Lookin’ like you already got me in sight…
looks like your drop went in there good. Thank you.
(Tanker 810): ( Back to ?? )
__________________________________________________________________
So… according to the 152406 video… the ‘moment of the drop’ appears to have
been from a START time of +2:19 ( 1523.29 / 3:23.29 PM ) to ‘fully dropping
retardant’ ( as seen in the Swartz photo ) at +2:20 ( 1523.30 / 3:23.30 PM ).
However… the timestamp on Swartz’s photo for that same ‘fully dropping
retardant’ moment is 1524.31 ( 3:24.31 PM ).
That’s pretty much a full 61 seconds different ( ahead of the video )… but it IS
definitely *within* 61 seconds… which we might have to simply accept as
‘accurate enough to be the same moment’.
I believe this Swartz photo IS of the same exact ‘single SEAT drop’ moment
as seen in the 152406 video… but Swartz’s camera was simply *about* 61
seconds AHEAD of that camera on the tripod that day.
The other reason I believe that Swartz’s photo MUST be of the same drop being
shown in the 152406 video is that even if that SEAT was making MULTIPLE drops
at that location… the simple 61 second time difference is NOT enough time for
his photo to have been of a full ‘go around’ and/or ANOTHER drop by the same
SEAT at the same location.
Not only is there no indication of that happening in the audio or the Air-To-Air
channel traffic… 61 seconds is NOT enough time for them to have made a
complete ‘circle around’ for another pass… either BEFORE or AFTER this
drop captured in the 152606 video.
Also note…
At +2:14 in the 152406 video a white SUV passes the camera heading
west on Hays Ranch Road. The same white SUV is also seen in the
162300 video just a few hundred feet further west on Hays Ranch Road.
No big additional revelation there… just more proof that the 152406 video
and the 162300 video are ‘of the same event happening at the same time’.
So what does all this now mean?
I believe it means the following…
1) There is no doubt that the Swartz photo, the +2:18 second mark in the
152406 video, and the contents of the 162300 video are all THE SAME
SINGLE SEAT DROP being photographed/videoed with 1 digital camera
( Swartz’s ) and TWO different video cameras ( one on tripod, one handheld ).
2) The Swartz photo verifies that the drop really did take place right around
1523.30 that day… and NOT in the 1623 timeframe as the mysterious 162300
video seems to suggest. Swartz’s digitial camera was simply +61 seconds
ahead of the time set on the video camera that was on the tripod that day.
3) The 162300 video *could* just simply be a ‘renaming error’ on Panebaker’s
( or someone else’s? ) part and he really did just mean it to have a filename
of 152300 instead ( even though even that timestamp would not be totally
accurate ). It was NOT an ‘extraction’ from the actual 152406 video that was
then ‘saved to disk’ with a wrong filename… it was the 11.7 seconds from the
OTHER handheld video camera that was (somehow) saved/named with
*WRONG* timestamp about 1 hour into the future.
So… mystery solved?
There WAS no *original* 162300 video at all? ( or at least not one that got
‘replaced’ with 11.7 seconds from another video? ).
This was just some kind of RENAMING error on TWO (different) videos from
TWO different cameras that DO show the same SEAT drop event happening
circa 1523.30 that day?
Followup…
In a previous post ( down below ) I wrote…
>> Marti…
>> At exactly +4 seconds in the 11.7 second 162300 video… a
>> shutter click is heard. It comes right after OPS1 Todd Abel
>> says “Go ahead” and then Air Attack Rory Collins starts his
>> “Okay… uh… we’ll probly be around there in about five”
>> response.
>>
>> The ‘shutter click’ also comes at the exact moment that the
>> retardant flow was turned on during this SEAT drop captured
>> in the 162300 video.
>>
>> The SAME EXACT ‘shutter click’ is also heard at the SAME
>> EXACT moment at the +2:20 mark in the 152406 video ( an
>> hour earlier? ) and is part of the same 11 seconds from
>> 152406 ‘duplicated’ as the content of 162300.
>>
>> I can’t seem to find a match for this still photo in ANY of the
>> folders up in the ‘Aerial Firefighting Study’ folder.
>> Not even in Panebaker’s specific ‘SEAT drops’ folder. ( Which
>> is what the 162300 video is showing… a SEAT drop ). Pity.
>> Maybe THAT still camera would have had a correct setting in
>> order to verify 162300 itself.
There DOES appear to be such a ‘photo’ in the folder(s).
Apparently I just ‘missed it’ on a first pass.
I believe the Swartz photo being referenced above IS the one
that corresponds to this ‘shutter click’ heard at the same
exact moment in BOTH the 152406 and 162300 video(s),
and it DOES help verify the TIME when this single SEAT
drop *actually* took place.
Hate to say it but.
That photo filename (thank you swartz for doing this consistently in your photos!!) has the name of the plane in it, It’s T874. The plane being directed in the two videos by Bravo 33 is three-one-zero. You can hear that in 162406.
Unfortunately Swartz doesn’t have any photos of 310 making this drop. That’s because, in my opinion, he’s NOT using a different camera, he’s using the same one and only Nikon Coolpix that they are using to shoot the videos.
Typo. you can hear
French Bravo 33 saying that on 152406.
And I ask myself, what is the importance of this?
It’s because people are using the Panebaker videos to establish when things are being said. IMHO, after today, I don’t believe the “times” being used in the filenames are accurate, for a variety of reasons.
One, because I’m finding that the timestamps on these videos don’t appear accurate and two….
Because whoever was translating them into the filenames seems to have also been confused as to how to translate them.
Reply to Marti Reed post on
May 18, 2014 at 11:36 pm
>> Marti said…
>> And I ask myself, what is the importance
>> of this?
>> It’s because people are using the
>> Panebaker videos to establish when
>> things are being said.
Yes… that’s one BIG reason… but with
regards to this one single ‘mystery’
of the 162300 video… it’s also all about
just establishing if things that are now
permanently in the public evidence record
really ARE what they SAY they are.
*OR*
…whether there is any ‘evidence’ that things
are MISSING which OUGHT to be there.
The 162300 video ‘mystery’ really did look,
at first, as if something that OUGHT to be
there ( an Air Study video capturing events
and/or radio traffic circa 1623 ) *might*
have been ‘replaced’ with something ELSE.
That is looking much less likely now… but
it is still worth verifying as much as possible.
>> Marti also said…
>> IMHO, after today, I don’t believe the
>> “times” being used in the filenames are
>> accurate, for a variety of reasons.
Your ‘points one and two’ up above are
valid… but in *general* I still think MOST
of the Panebaker video timestamps
*CAN* be trusted.
There are a LOT of ‘overlapping’ radio
transmits between these Panebaker
videos and the other ( long running )
Air-To-Air channell videos that DO
sort of prove that at least the timestamps
between those TWO video cameras were
perhaps only SECONDS apart…
…but I agree there appear to be exceptions.
SOME of the Panebaker Air Study video
timestamps ( even other than the
mysterious 162300 one ) appear to still
be a little ‘wonky’.
Reply Marti Reed post on May 18, 2014 at 10:57 pm
>> Marti said…
>>
>> Hate to say it but.
>> That photo filename (thank you swartz for doing
>> this consistently in your photos!!) has the name
>> of the plane in it, It’s T874. The plane being
>> directed in the two videos by Bravo 33 is three-
>> one-zero. You can hear that in 162406.
Actually… it is 810 ( Eight one zero ), not 310, but
you are still RIGHT. It is Tanker 810 making the
drop in BOTH videos and he says so himself as
he finishes that drop and is heard ( in BOTH of
the videos ) completing the drop by announcing…
“Eight one zero OUT… hard RIGHT”.
As far as whether or not the ‘title’ on that Swartz
photo actually matches reality… it’s hard to say.
We now have a situation where either the TIME
on Swartz’s camera was WILDLY wrong… and
could not possibly have been a mere 61 seconds
off… OR… the time on Swartz’s camera really
was ‘reasonably accurate’ ( within, say 60 seconds ),
and he is just totally mistaken about what the
number of the SEAT was that he was photographing
at 1524.
A super-enhancement of that Swartz photo SEEMS
to indicate that the actual number on the TAIL of
that plane making that drop is, in fact, 810.
It’s pretty hard to make out because of the smoke
but I would put money on 810 and not 874. The
last digit of the 3-digit tail number seems to most
definitely be a ZERO and not a FOUR.
Also… even though T874 looks VERY similar to
810 ( same type of plane )… Air Tanker 874 also
has the word FIRE ( in big black letters ) on the tail
under the 874 tail number… which I can almost say
for certain is NOT present under the 3 digit tail
number of that SEAT in Swartz’s 1524 photograph.
Tanker 874 apparently has a registration number of
N174ML.
The registration number for Air Tanker 810 is
apparently N187LA… and here is a ‘close-up’
photo of it ( matches Swartz photo exactly )…
http://highsierraspotters.com/forum/gallery/showimage.php?s=2421e773c8f3bbd7b5d3eeadf75181ba&i=4633&c=6
BTW: The GPS information on that Swartz photo
is actually accurate. That IS exactly where he
was standing when he took this photo of that
SEAT drop.
More on this later.
The KEY will be that regardless of what it says
in Swartz’s photo title… exactly WHERE was
T874 at exactly 1524?
If it was off on a ‘load and return’ at that time, then
Swartz simply was mistaken about which plane
he was taking a picture of at 1524.
Followup…
Here’s a link to a corresponding ‘photo’ of
Tanker 874. Notice the word FIRE in big
black letters on the tail under the ‘874’
tail number.
I can say pretty much for certain that there
is NO such word FIRE under the tail number
of that SEAT in the 1524 Swartz photo.
Just the 3 digit number that DOES, in fact,
appear to at least end with ZERO.
Nothing else UNDER the tail number.
Firefighting Tankers and Support Aircraft…
Tanker 874 – Registration number N174MLK
http://azaerophoto.com/forum/index.php?topic=234.60
OK, WTKTT, I think you’re right.
The sequence which begins with Bravo 33 saying “eight-one-zero how we lookin?” at 00:31 in 152406_SEAT is right there at 5:18 in the 1544 Air2Air video.
Of course, we don’t know how accurate the timestamping is on the Contour +2 videocam, but I’m guessing it at least isn’t as wonky as the Nikon!
Kudos!
I think you’re right about the cameras, also, now. There’s no way that still and that video could have been shot on the same camera. They were both Nikon Coolpix P520’s. What threw me off was the wording in the “Panebeker Photo and Video Information” docx.
It says:
“Photos were taken primarily with a Canon EOS Rebel T3I, a couple were taken with a Nikon P520. Video in the video folder was also taken with the Nikon Coolpix P520.”
Sounds like they’re describing on camera, right?
Lightroom doesn’t show camera metadata, except the timestamp, for videos. So there is no camera name, much less Camera Serial Numbers. So I wasn’t “seeing” anything to tell me those were two different “versions” of the same camera.
So now I can quit wondering how the camera was stamping the stills “accurately” but not the videos.
The Moore folder includes some photos of that drop, too, and they sequence right in that framework, also. Starting with 20130630_Loc1_seat (20).jpg at 3:23.23 PM. Also Swartz shot the scene before the drop on his iPad at 3:20:42 PM.
**
** MORE ABOUT THE MYSTERIOUS 162300 AIR STUDY VIDEO
**
** WHAT WAS *REALLY* HAPPENING CIRCA 1623 ( 4:23 PM )?
Since we don’t know if there ever even WAS an ‘original 162300’ Air Study
Video ( of any length ) that was then ‘replaced’ with the 11.7 clip from another
video taken almost an HOUR earlier… it’s impossible to say how much ‘radio
traffic’ that original 162300 video *might* have captured ( if it existed ).
For the sake of argument… let’s assume that it DID exist and that it WAS much
more than 11.7 seconds… and that it actually ‘covered’ the time period that
stretched all the way back to the Air Study video that immediately preceded it.
All that means is that it couldn’t have been more than FOUR minutes
long, since the Air Study Video that immediately precedes the
20130630_162300_SEAT_drop_EP Air Study video was the 20130630_161858_VLAT_split_2_EP one.
( 162300 minus 161858 equals 4 minutes and 2 seconds )
It is doubtful that even if the original 162300 video was MUCH longer than 11.7
seconds that it would have been this full FOUR minutes long ( since no other
Panebaker video was that long and never really exceeded 3 minutes in length )…
…but again… just for the sake of completeness… here are the full FOUR minutes
of captured Air-To-Air channel traffic that would cover the entire time in-between
the 161858 video and the 162300 one… just to see what was *really*
happening ( on Air-To-Air, anyway ) during that timeframe.
The timeframe that actually covers the 11.7 seconds of the existing 162300
video is marked in the transcript below.
As the transcript below shows… NO ACTUAL DROPS took place during this
1618.58 and 1623.00 time period ( as the 162300 video seems to suggest )…
and B33 Thomas French was simply just still in the planning stages for the
upcoming ‘two seat’ drop with Tankers 874 and 830 ( captured in a completely
separate video from the 162300 one ).
** VIDEO 20130630_1628_EP STARTS AT 1547.46 ( 3:47.46 PM )
Length of video: 40 minutes and 14 seconds.
NOTE: The first 30 minutes and 42 seconds omitted from this posting to save
space. Only the FOUR minutes that covers the gap between the 161858 and
162300 videos is included.
+30:43 ( 1618.29 / 4:18.29 PM )
(Tanker 830): I gotcha… am I comin’ in too, Rusty?
+30:48 ( 1618.34 / 4:18.34 PM )
(Tanker 830): Is eight three zero comin’ in with eight seven four?
+30:51 ( 1618.37 / 4:18.37 PM )
(B33 – French): Afirmative. Eight seven four and eight three zero you’re
both cleared in. Two nine eight zero… come in at fifty-five.
+30:57 ( 1618.43 / 4:18.42 PM )
(Tanker 830): Roger.
+31:00 ( 1618.46 / 4:18.46 PM )
(B33 – French): Nine one one… ya still up?
+31:02 ( 1618.48 / 4:18.48 PM )
(VLAT 911): Yes sir.
+31:03 ( 1618.49 / 4:18.49 PM )
(B33 – French): That was absolutely right on… both drops… thank you.
+31:06 ( 1618.52 / 4:18.52 PM )
(VLAT 911): Thank you. ‘preciate it.
+31:10 ( 1618.56 / 4:18.56 PM )
(5KA): Five Kilo Alpha’s out of the dip.
+31:12 ( 1618.58 / 4:18.58 PM )
(B33 – French): Kilo Alpha you’re clear to the drop.
+31:14 ( 1619.00 / 4:19.00 PM )
(5KA): Kilo Alpha
+31:23 ( 1619.09 / 4:19.09 PM )
(B33 – French): Eight seven four… set me up a coverage level 4… whole load… okay?
+31:26 ( 1619.12 / 4:19.12 PM )
(874): Okay.
( 40 SECOND PAUSE – NO RADIO TRAFFIC )
+32:06 ( 1619.52 / 4:19.52 PM )
(5KA): Five Kilo Alpha’s off the drop
+32:07 ( 1619.53 / 4:19.53 PM )
(B33 – French): Kilo Alpha Bravo 33 copy… Hey… I gotcha in sight
so I’ll be low level on this flight but I DO have you in sight… give me a call off the dip.
+32:14 ( 1620.00 / 4:20.00 PM )
(5KA): Will do.
( 42 SECOND PAUSE – NO RADIO TRAFFIC )
+32:56 ( 1620.42 / 4:20.42 PM )
(Unknown): And Bravo 33 eight ?? comin’ around on the east side…
lookin’ for ya… oh… I gotcha.
+33:00 ( 1620.46 / 4:20.46 PM )
(B33 – French): Follow me around… we’re gonna take ya right to
work… allright?
+33:03 ( 1620.49 / 4:20.49 PM )
(Unknown): Allright.
+33:04 ( 1620.50 / 4:20.50 PM )
(B33 – French): You’re clear down to five… and… uh… I’m gonna start my
turn to the left… I’m outta one sixty for one twenty.
+33:11 ( 1620.57 / 4:20.57 PM )
(Unknown): Okay.
+33:13 ( 1620.59 / 4:20.59 PM )
(B33 – French): Puttin’ on the brakes.
+33:17 ( 1621.03 / 4:21.03 PM )
(5KA): Kilo Alpha’s outta the dip.
+33:20 ( 1621.06 / 4:21.06 PM )
(B33 – French): Kilo Alpha gimme a call off the drop.
+33:22 ( 1621.08 / 4:21.08 PM )
(5KA): Will do.
+33:38 ( 1621.24 / 4:21.24 PM )
(B33 – French): Eight seven four… that’s you in the front of the line, right?
+33:41 ( 1621.27 / 4:21.27 PM )
(Tanker 874): Affirm
+33:42 ( 1621.28 / 4:21.28 PM )
(B33 – French): Okay… what we’re gonna do is… we’re gonna build line
backwards. I need to extend my… uh… pattern just a little bit we’re gonna
get a helicopter in and out… kind of at the… uh… north end of that flank.
Gimmee a good left turn on the exit, okay?
+33:52 ( 1621.38 / 4:21.38 PM )
(Tanker 874): Okay
+34:08 ( 1621.54 / 4:21.54 PM )
(B33 – French): Okay… we ah.. we just put in a whole bunch of retardant in with the DC10 we’re gonna build line backwards… you’re gonna be starting in a light fuel patch taking it TO existing retardant… how copy?
+34:20 ( 1622.06 / 4:22.06 PM )
(Tanker 874): Sounds good.
+34:21 ( 1622.07 / 4:22.07 PM )
(B33 – French): What I’d look to do is… ah… yea… level 4… star… and I’m… I’ll pop smoke at the start… it’s even gonna be before that light… ah… fuel patch.
+34:30 ( 1622.16 / 4:22.16 PM )
(Tanker 874): Allright.
+34:31 ( 1622.17 / 4:22.17 PM )
(B33 – French): Have I got a DC10 holdin’ out there?
+34:37 ( 1622.23 / 4:22.23 PM )
(VLAT 911): That’s nine one… ah… one to the… ah… south.
+34:40 ( 1622.26 / 4:22.26 PM )
(B33 – French): Okay… copy that… ah… looks like you were just motionless… er… okay… thanks a lot… we’ll see ya in bit.
+34:44 ( 1622.30 / 4:22.30 PM )
(VLAT 911): Yea… just stayin’ close but out of the area.
+34:46 ( 1622.32 / 4:22.32 PM )
(B33 – French): Yea… you got it.
+34:48 ( 1622.34 / 4:22.34 PM )
(Helicopter 5KA): Kilo Alpha’s off the drop.
+34:51 ( 1622.37 / 4:22.37 )
(B33 – French): Kilo Alpha’s off the drop… break eight seven four… you ready to go?
+34.54 ( 1622.40 / 4:22.40 PM )
(Tanker 874): I’m ready to go.
+34.56 ( 1622.42 / 4:22.42 PM )
(B33 – French): Allright… I’m gonna start my descent… you’re gonna see the
existing retardant put in by… ah… by nine one one so we’ll be taking retardant
TO that.
*****************************************************************************
** NOTE: 1622.49 is supposedly the START of the 11 second long
** Air Study Video 20130630_162300_SEAT_drop_EP.MOV
*****************************************************************************
+35:05 ( 1622.51 / 4:22.51 PM )
(Tanker 874): Copy
+35:06 ( 16:22.52 / 4:22.52 PM )
(B33 – French): Little bit hard to see here… so basically their retardant
started in the flats. We’re gonna be kind of up in the foothill portion.
I’ll pop smoke at the start. Gimme about a wingspan left for ah… drift
Drop heading’s gonna be about zero eight five.
****************************************************************************
** NOTE: 1623.00 is supposedly the END of the 11 second long
** Air Study Video 20130630_162300_SEAT_drop_EP.MOV
****************************************************************************
VIDEO 20130630_1628_EP ENDS AT 1628.00 ( 4:28.00 PM )
Length of video: 40 minutes and 14 seconds.
The Panebaker VLAT pictures labeled 1715’ish are incorrect. These pictures are actually the split drop from the VLAT from 1617. I am not sure if this is relevant, or if it has already been identified.
Hey, Calvin, which particular photos of the split drop are you referring to? I’m seeing a variety of them in the various folders.
Reply to calvin post on May 18, 2014 at 4:48 am said:
>> calvin said…
>> The Panebaker VLAT pictures labeled 1715′ish are
>> incorrect. These pictures are actually the split drop from
>> the VLAT from 1617. I am not sure if this is relevant,
>> or if it has already been identified.
calvin… yes… it’s very relevant for a number of reasons.
You just pointed out that we have been *assuming* that
the both the filename and EXIF timestamps on the Panakebaker STILL photos are ‘correct’.
You are right… that doesn’t really appear to be the case.
The Panebaker 20130630_171528-1_EP photo in the
‘VLAT drops’ still photos folder is also the one that is a
‘perfect match’ for Tom Story’s 7093 photo of the same
drop… which Story’s Canon 1D said took place at 1639.
So however ‘wrong’ these Panebaker STILL images are is also directly related to how ‘wrong’ Tom Story’s Canon 1D was set that day.
We were assuming a +36 minute error there, but if the Panebaker still photos ALSO have ‘bogus’ timestamps
then that is no longer correct.
So now we need to figure out just how *wrong* BOTH
Panebaker’s Canon EOS REBEL T3i *AND* Story’s Canon EOS 1D were that day.
Geez. what a mess.
Reminder to anyone getting paid to take pictures of a fire in the future… please make sure the time/date settings on the cameras you are using are CORRECT. Thanks in advance.
So……. I downloaded (and am still downloading) a representative smattering of the Panebaker et al photos and videos.
The File-naming of the videos is all over the boards, compared to the time-stamping. A bunch of the mis-file-naming appears to be typos. For example, 143844 has a time stamp of 4:38:41 PM. Ahem. And 150530 is time stamped 5:05:30 PM. Buyer Beware!
Which leads to our favorite mysterious pair. 162300 is stamped 4:23:01 PM. Accurate? Quite possibly, relatively speaking. 152406 is stamped 5:21:07 PM. Think about THEM apples! There is no way, given what’s going on, that what is happening in that video is happening at 5:21:07 PM!!! So I would be more likely to trust 162300 than 152406.
And speaking of these two videos, the short one is not an edit out of the long one. They’re two completely different videos, captured by two different cameras.
152406_SEAT, with a most likely wrong filename and timestamp, and 162300, with its possibly more accurate timestamp and filemame, were both recorded on the Nikon Coolpix P520. It was on a tripod. It can record up to 24 minutes of video at a time.
Which leads me to my theory. Panebaker et al shot the main videos (except for the ones w/air2air capture, which were recorded on a Contour +2 videocam) on the Nikon in much longer chunks than we see here. Then, probably soon after, they had to sit down and split those videos into smaller chunks. Because…that’s what you have to do. As they were splitting them, they were exporting them out, and had to give them names. Some of them they may have been naming correctly. Some of them they clearly weren’t.
And I don’t know, when you split videos like these up, in something like QuickTime, what happens to the time stamps in the course of doing that. I’ve so far never had to pay attention to that, but then, I’m just learning how to shoot video.
Was the Nikon’s timestamper generally off? I don’t know. Periodically, a photo was taken on that camera. The photos are in the Schultz folder. 20130630_1616_AZ-A1S-000688_T911___7_G_RS.JPG (Please dear Universe, don’t ever compel me to type that out on my iPad ever again…) is of the T11 coming out of one of the split drops and has a time stamp of 4:16:36 PM. Boom! As in that’s pretty accurate, relatively speaking, given that we don’t have any absolute time stamps on any of these files, because it just doesn’t work that way in the real world, unless somebody decides to make it do that.
So that’s what I’ve discovered so far. When I first started looking at those files and their metadata in Lightroom, I wrote in my notes, “Marti starts slowly backing out of THIS particular project…….”
So this is a reminder to people analyzing video. Sometimes it helps to watch them while you’re listening to them.
Also. One of my first thoughts as WTKTT (thankfully) starting posting his concerns about these videos was that I have no problem imagining a four-minute lapse in recording. Sometimes, yah know, you have to change out things like batteries and memory cards. And, now that I’ve per used this thing a little bit, maybe we DON’T have a lapse at all. Maybe 162300 WAS shot at that time and so was 152406!!
Marti…
At exactly +4 seconds in the 11.7 second 162300 video… a shutter click is heard. It comes right after OPS1 Todd Abel says “Go ahead” and then Air Attack Rory Collins starts his “Okay… uh… we’ll probly be around there in about five” response.
The ‘shutter click’ also comes at the exact moment that the retardant flow was turned on during this SEAT drop captured in the 162300 video.
The SAME EXACT ‘shutter click’ is also heard at the SAME EXACT moment at the +2:20 mark in the 152406 video ( an hour earlier? ) and is part of the same 11 seconds from 152406 ‘duplicated’ as the content of 162300.
I can’t seem to find a match for this still photo in ANY of the folders up in the ‘Aerial Firefighting Study’ folder. Not even in Panebaker’s specific ‘SEAT drops’ folder. ( Which is what the 162300 video is showing… a SEAT drop ). Pity. Maybe THAT still camera would have had a correct setting in order to verify 162300 itself.
So… just to be clear…
Despite what you said above… I still don’t think there is *ANY* question that the entire 162300 video is not an exact duplicate of the 11.7 seconds seen at the +2:18 mark in the 152406 video. The ‘mystery’ is why this is so…
…but I hear you up above with your ‘potential’ explanation.
Are you saying that it could just possibly be that this same SEAT drop was captured with TWO different video cameras at the same time… but the one that was running longer and captured the full 2+ minutes ( that includes this SEAT DROP ) was simply mis-named into the 152406 timerange and should have ACTUALLY been named 162406 instead?
Okay… bad typo above.
The word ‘not’ slipped in there which
changed the intent of what I was trying
to say, I think.
Should have read like this…
Despite what you said above… I still don’t think there is *ANY* question that the entire 162300 video is, in fact, an exact duplicate of the 11.7 seconds seen at the +2:18 mark in the 152406 video. The ‘mystery’ is why this is so”.
So just to be cystal clear…
I still think that 162300 video IS an EXACT DUPLICATE of the 11 seconds at the +2:18 mark in the 152606 video.
Hmmm… I think I need to scratch this
comment of my own from above…
“Are you saying that it could just possibly be that this same SEAT drop was captured with TWO different video cameras at the same time… but the one that was running longer and captured the full 2+ minutes ( that includes this SEAT DROP ) was simply mis-named into the 152406 timerange and should have ACTUALLY been named 162406 instead?”
Even this isn’t really a possible explanation.
The 1624 timeframe *IS* covered by the
Panebaker video
20130630_162508_2SEATS_EP, which is 1
minute and 49 seconds long, and ( according to THAT filename timestamp ) starts capturing events at 1623.19 ( 4:23.19 PM ) and ENDS at 1625.08 ( 4:25.08 PM ).
So even if someone ‘misnamed’ the
152406 video and really meant it to
say 162406… everything is still ‘wonky’.
The TWO SEAT drop ( 830 following 874 )
is what is really happening at 162406, and
NOT the SINGLE seat drop shown in both
the 152406 and 162300 videos.
Yes, It’s exactly what I’m saying. Those are completely different videos. WATCH THEM!!!!!
And I’m also saying, these videos, recorded on the Nikon Coolpix are a bloody mess that I’m still trying to sort out.So it’s no surprise they tripped,you up.
Fortunately, I’m pretty sure the photos from it (in the Swartz folder — and they are actually quite astonishing) are accurately time stamped. And I have NO IDEA how that could happen.
So I’m currently downloading some more videos to see if the camera (or whatever) started out accurate, and went gonzo, or if it was that way all day (or thru what ever editor they put the videos through).
SOMETHING went wrong.
Reply to Marti Reed post
on May 18, 2014 at 7:53 pm
>> Marti said…
>> Fortunately, I’m pretty sure
>> the photos from it (in the
>> Swartz folder — and they
>> are actually quite
>> astonishing) are accurately
>> time stamped.
Well.. I hope so.
See new post above entiteld…
** MYSTERY SOLVED
I was wrong just above about
saying there didn’t seem to
be a still photo that matches
the ‘shutter click’ heard in
BOTH the 152406 and 162300
videos at the moment that
single SEAT was ‘dropping’.
There IS such a photograph.
I just missed it at first.
It’s in the Swartz folder(s).
I have NO IDEA which of these
Air Study devices actually had
the RIGHT time that day… but
if we assume ( as we have
been doing for a while now )
that the tripod-mounted video
cameras DID have the ‘correct
time’ that day… then Swartz’s
camera still falls into the
‘accurate enough’ category but
still appears to have been
about 61 seconds ahead of
the time on the tripod
mounted camera(s).
I would still call +/- 60 seconds
‘close enough for accuracy’
on a day like this.
Reply to Marti Reed post on
May 18, 2014 at 7:44 pm
>> Marti said…
>> Yes, It’s exactly what I’m saying.
>> Those are completely different
>> videos.
Yes. You are right.
They are simply TWO *different*
video cameras ( one on a tripod and
one handheld ) recording the same
exact ‘event’ ( the same SEAT drop ).
See new posting above entiteld
** MYSTERY SOLVED?
The Swartz photo I found that appears
to also be the EXACT same SEAT
drop seems to prove that ALL of
this did, in fact, happen in the 1524
timeframe and nowhere near 162300.
Somehow… that 162300 Air Study video is just the 11.7 seconds from the ‘handheld’ being used at that time was meant to be named 152300 ( even though that isn’t even totally accurate, timewise ).
So looking more at what’s coming out of that Nikon. Trying to sync to the VLAT split. The photo of it, which I referenced above, and won’t type again, has an accurate timestamp, and the timestamp is shown on the image. The video, however, is time stamped two hours “late — 6:12:48 PM, and somebody renamed the file 161620. I don’t know where and when and how the Nikon video timestamps are going wacky. And it looks like whoever is splitting out or renaming or what those videos is having a big struggle trying to do it. Maybe in a hurry?
And now I’m not sure my earlier theory — that they videos were shot in big chunks and then split — is correct. Swartz’s folder of the photos taken with the Nikon has a lot of photos in it. I’m not sure exactly what he was doing.
Marti… FWIW… that last photo in the Swartz folder…
20130630_1716_AZ
-A1S-000688___FB_1_G_RS.JPG
has an EXIF timestamp of… 5:16:58 PM and shows
them basically ‘packing up and leaving’ that location
by the helibase where they had the tripods set up
most of the afternoon.
This does appear to be accurate.
The final video taken from the tripod actually ENDS
just before we now see him with that tripod in
his hand and about to put it into the truck.
Good catch!!
Have you looked at the Town of Yarnell Folder? YIKES!!
They drove into town. He has photos in the Ranch House Cafe parking lot from 6:38 PM til 6:44 PM. I think the last two include Brian and Trew and their UTV. he wins my gold prize today! He was also shooting on an iPad.
I’m going after 150822_VLAT_EP. It’s the first VLAT drop they shot, both photos and video, of a VLAT drop that day. I didn’t download it right, so I’m waiting. I’ll see if the Nikon was timestamping the video correctly then.
I just don’t know where the screw-up came. I really think 162300 (snot om a different camrea) is both stamped and file named correctly, and 152406, shot on the Nikon, clearly isn’t
The next thing to do would be to go into the Air2Air videos, and see if there’s a match somewhere. But I’m not gonna have time anytime soon to do it…..
Yikes, typing too fast on the iPad again! Sorry for the typos!
Reply to Marti Reed post
on May 18, 2014 at 8:13 pm
>> Marti said…
>> Have you looked at the Town of
>> Yarnell Folder? YIKES!!
Yes. It really was a disaster.
It’s an absolute MIRACLE that more
people were not killed that day.
One of the things I can’t figure out
about that sequence of Swartz
photos is that if you look carefully…
he is approaching the Ranch House
Restaurant ( and taking pictures out
the window of his vehicle ) from the
SOUTH ( not the NORTH, where
he was taking pictures earlier ).
So, somehow Swartz worked his
way further SOUTH than the Ranch
House Restaurant following the
deployment and now we simply
see him coming back NORTH
to it… and pulling into the parking lot.
It would also be nice if someone could
identify all those fire guys in THESE
photos standing in the parking lot,
including the one who is GLARING
at Swartz as he takes photos, even
though the other guy to the right with
the red helmet is obviously freely
shooting photos or video with an
iPhone at that same time.
The guy who is GLARING at Swartz
has a BLUE Helmet… but the Blue
Ridge Hotshots had already
evacuated the Ranch House parking
lot by this time.
Could that be BR Hotshot Ball who
have been ‘left behind’ at the parking
lot that day?
When Frisby and Brown drove out
from the deployment area in the
UTV Ranger… the GPS tracker
shows them going straight up NORTH
towards the ICP command center,
so I don’t think it’s either Frisby
or Brown in that photo.
>> Marti also wrote…
>> They drove into town. He has
>> photos in the Ranch House Cafe
>> parking lot from 6:38 PM til 6:44
>> PM. I think the last two include
>> Brian and Trew and their UTV.
>> he wins my gold prize today!
>> He was also shooting on an iPad.
See above. I believe the BR GPS
tracker shows Frisby and Brown
driving straight up to the ICP after
they came out of the deployment
area… and the rest of BR evacuated
the parking lot shortly after that
in the vehicles. So the guy in the
Blue Helmet seems to have been
a BR Hotshot that was ‘left behind’.
Ball?
>> Marti also said…
>> I just don’t know where the
>> screw-up came. I really think
>> 162300 (shot on a different
>> camera) is both stamped and file
>> named correctly, and 152406,
>> shot on the Nikon, clearly isn’t.
See new post above.
I believe the Swartz photo of the
same SEAT drop puts things the
other way around. That SEAT drop
was in the 1524 timeframe and
NOT the 1623 timeframe.
>> Marti also said…
>> The next thing to do would be to
>> go into the Air2Air videos, and see
>> if there’s a match somewhere. But
>> I’m not gonna have time anytime
>> soon to do it…..
Probably no need.
See new post above with title
** MYSTERY SOLVED?
There IS a Swartz photo that IS most
likely that same exact SEAT drop
seen in BOTH the 152406 and 162300
videos ( shot with different video
cameras ).
Swartz’s digital camera was only
61 seconds ahead of whatever video
camera was sitting on the TRIPOD
that day and capturing drops.
So I believe the ‘proof’ is there that
Swartz’s photo, the 152406 video
( shot on tripod ) and the 162300
video ( handheld video camera )
are all capturing the SAME SEAT
drop… and it was in the 1524
timeframe ( not 1623 ).
Whether that means the handheld
used to shoot the 11.7 seconds was
just a full HOUR off ( timezone error? )
or it was a ‘file renaming’ error is the
only thing that still needs to be
figured out, IMHO.
What I’m kinda sorta generally seeing is that Swartz, who seems to have been in charge of the Nikon (while Panebaker was actually photographing with a Canon t3i ( which is the camera I use)) was taking photos every 10-20-30 minutes.
So I think he was shooting, say, a bit of video, then stopping and shooting some photos, and then switching back to video.
So I no longer think these videos were split out from longer ones. I think the videos were started, recorded, then stopped in camera.
So no-one was splitting them later in QuickTime or such. That means whatever mis-time-stamping was happening must have been happening in camera. Problem is, I’ve never heard of that happening, with a camera correctly stamping its photos and incorrectly stamping its videos. That’s where I’m stumped.
It’s now pretty obvious that in those 11.7 seconds that ended up being ‘named’ the 162300 video… whoever shot that was HURRYING to grab the camera and record that SEAT drop.
The first few seconds show the operator fumbling to point the camera… and then fumbling to ZOOM and catch the SEAT drop in the nick of time… with retardant dropping.
So YES… these 11.7 seconds now just look like a ‘quick opportunity’ to get ADDITIONAL video of the same SEAT drop ( circa 1523.30 ) that was already being captured by the OTHER video camera on the tripod.
How it ended up with a filename of 162300?… that’s still a mystery.
Followup to the original parent comment above that has
the ‘transcript’ in it.
What I should have made clear(er) in the original parent comment
was that the ‘2 SEAT drop’ with 830 following 874 DOES, in fact,
take place very soon after that transcript above ends…
…and that ‘2 SEAT drop’ is fully captured in the Panebaker
video 20130630_162508_2SEATS_EP, which is 1 minute and
49 seconds long, and ( according to the filename timestamp )
starts capturing events at 1623.19 ( 4:23.19 PM ) and ENDS
at 1625.08 ( 4:25.08 PM ).
French, in B33, starts ‘poppin’ smoke right at +21 seconds
( 1623.40 ) in that video ( just as he says he does in the audio )… and then 874 is seen ‘dropping’ at exactly +35 seconds
( 1623.54 ) and 830 then follows him right away dropping
retardant at exactly +57 seconds ( 1624.16 ).
The point here is that this is a TWO SEAT drop and it happens AFTER the 162300 video ENDS… whereas the 11 seconds of the 162300 video (supposedly) shows a completely different SINGLE seat drop with a completely different SEAT happening just a few seconds for the TWO seat drop…
…and BOTH drops (supposedly) being ‘guided’ by the same lead plane. Not possible.
Typo in last sentence above.
I left out the word BEFORE.
Should have read like this…
The point here is that this is a TWO SEAT drop and it happens AFTER the 162300 video ENDS… whereas the 11 seconds of the 162300 video (supposedly) shows a completely different SINGLE seat drop with a completely different SEAT happening just a few seconds BEFORE
the TWO seat drop…
…and BOTH drops (supposedly) being ‘guided’ by the same lead plane. Not possible.
Hmmmmmm I just saw this. Will check it out.
I disagree. Right when whoever (of course we now agree that’s probably Cordes) says “We’ll probably be there about five,” the tanker drops in both videos.
Reply to Marti Reed post on
May 18, 2014 at 9:20 pm
>> Marti said…
>> I disagree. Right when whoever (of
>> course we now agree that’s probably
>> Cordes) says “We’ll probably be there
>> about five,”
The only way it could be SPGS1 Gary Cordes ‘responding’ to Air Attack Rory Collins there is if Cordes was ‘authorized’ to be responding to direct callouts for ‘Operations’.
Just before the ‘Go ahead’ transmit… we hear Air Attack Rory Collins specifically ASK for ‘Operations’ to talk to him over ‘Air to Ground’.
The ‘responder’ to a request for ‘Operations’
( at that point in the day ) *would* have logically been OPS1 Todd Abel… and it even SOUNDS just like Todd Abel, and not Musser or Cordes.
This is all captured in the 152406 video…
____________________________________
+2:13 ( 1523.23 / 3:23.23 PM )
(AA – Rory Collins): Operations, Air Attack, Air-To-Ground
+2:18 ( 1523.28 / 3:23.28 PM )
(OPS1 Todd Abel): Go ahead.
+2:19 ( 1523.29 / 3:23.29 PM )
(AA – Rory Collins): Okay… Ahhhh… we’ll probly be around there in about five. Umm… What’s your plan on the ground?
+2:27 ( 1523.37 / 3:23.37 PM )
(OPS1 Todd Abel): What I’d like to do… ah… is… ah… tie into ( that court here? ) where ya see the whole ??. If we can tag onto the road up here and then just run it… ah… you know… ( transmission breaks up / cuts off ).
____________________________________
>> Marti also said…
>> …the tanker drops in both videos.
Yes… but I believe the proof is now there that this ‘drop’ ( and the audio capture with Air Attack Rory Collins talking to ‘Operations’ ) is definitely in the 1524 timeframe and not the 1623 timeframe.
If that really is a capture of a SINGLE SEAT
drop at 1623… some 1/4 mile off to the
east there of where they were using the
VLAT and the SEATS in most of the other videos…
…then French would have then only had about 25 seconds to completely set up the upcoming TWO SEAT drop with Tanker 874 leading and Tanker 830 following… which is captured in the next Air Study video.
Not possible.
Not enough time for French to have come off that single SEAT drop and then go through all the preparation we hear in the Air-To-Air captures for that upcoming TWO SEAT drop.
Correction for above.
It is NOT anyone from ‘Operations’
at all that says “We’ll probably be
around there in about five.”
That is actually Air Attack Rory Collins himself talking TO ‘Operations’ after someone in Operations ( sounds just like OPS1 Todd Abel ) responded to HIS “Operations, Air Attack, Air To Ground” callout with “Go ahead”.
At this point in time ( 1524 ish )… it is Air Attack Rory Collins himself who wants to know what ‘Operations’ plans to do ‘on the ground’… and he gets a full answer from what appears to be OPS1 Todd Abel regarding what ‘roads’ they want retardant to try and ‘tie into’.
OPS1 Todd Abel is still on the NORTH end of the fire at this point and actually ‘on the ground’ back there with SPGS2 Darrell Willis in the Model Creek Road area and the ‘tying into roads’ response to Air Attack Rory Collins is still all about the NORTH side of the fire.
**
** MORE ABOUT THE 162300 AIR STUDY VIDEO
Here are the ‘transcripts’ from the two Air Study Videos which prove that
the 162300 Panebaker Air Study video is simply 11.7 seconds of video that
was simply ‘extracted’ from the much longer 152406 video ( taken almost an
HOUR earlier ) and was either created as a *new* 162300 video OR was
used to REPLACE the contents of the *original* 162300 video.
Whether or not this 11.7 seconds of video simply replaced a much LONGER
video capture of what was *really* transpiring circa 1623 is still not known.
Only a comparison with the actual original 162300 video ( if it ever even existed )
could prove any difference in time lengths.
Here is the transcript of the 11.7 seconds that is the content of Air Study Video
20130630_162300_SEAT_drop_EP as included in the SAIT FOIA/FOIL release…
** PANEBAKER AIR STUDY VIDEO
** 20130630_162300_SEAT_drop_EP.MOV
Transcript of both the foreground and background radio conversation captured
by Panebaker Air Study Video 20130630_162300_SEAT_drop_EP.MOV.
A public copy of this Air Study video is in Mr. Dougherty’s online Dropbox at…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/y3jy5opssrcvzb3/S3cCXl9pjr/AerialFirefightingstudy/Panebaker/Video/Video#lh:null-20130630_162300_SEAT_drop_EP.MOV
ECITW ( Every Caveat In The World )
This is what I ( me, personally ) believe is being said in the background of this
video. Your mileage may, of course, vary.
This video is 11 seconds long, so given the small note in the README.TXT file
that accompanies these Air Study videos which states that they all use the
VIDEO END time as the timestamp in the TITLE… then that means this
particular video STARTED at 1622.49 ( 4:22.49 PM )
VIDEO 162300 STARTS AT 1622.49 ( 4:22.49 PM )
BACKGROUND
+0:02 ( 1622.51 / 4:22.51 PM )
(OPS1 Todd Abel): Go ahead.
+0:03 ( 1622.52 / 4:22.52 PM )
(AA – Rory Collins): Okay… Ahhhh… we’ll probly be around there
in about five. Umm… What’s your plan on the ground?
FOREGROUND
(Tanker 810): Eight one zero OFF… hard RIGHT.
BACKGROUND
+0:10 ( 1622.59 / 4:22.59 PM )
(OPS1 Todd Abel): What I’d like… ( VIDEO ENDS )
NOTE: Video ends and cuts off right after the word ‘like’.
VIDEO 162300 ENDS AT 1623.00 ( 4:23.00 PM )
*** NOW… Here is the transcript from the 11 seconds of video at the +2:18 mark
*** in the Air Study Video 201300630_152406_SEAT_EP taken an HOUR earlier…
***
*** The KEY part is the duplication of the following exact query from
*** Air Attack Rory Collins to OPS1 Todd Abel… ( which is now in BOTH
*** of these Air Study Videos… but at different TIMES and almost a
*** full HOUR apart from each other…
***
*** (AA – Rory Collins): Okay… Ahhhh… we’ll probly be around there
*** in about five. Umm… What’s your plan on the ground?
This transcript includes both the FOREGROUND radio traffic ( mostly Air-To-Air
channel captures ) and the BACKGROUND ( TAC channels ) captures.
You can see clearly that the audio at the +2:18 second mark in THIS video
is identical to the audio supposedly captured almost an HOUR later
in the 162300 video.
Also… the 11 second clip from this video being used as the content for
the 162300 video only starts with the ‘Go ahead’ response from OPS1 Todd
Abel… but this ‘Go ahead’ from Abel is a direct response from Air Attack
Rory Collins having just called out to HIM with a “Operations, Air Attack on
Air To Ground” radio call at the +2:13 mark in THIS video.
Also… the ‘What I’d like to do’ phrase that also ENDS the 11 second clip used
as the content for the 162300 video is NOT ‘cut off’ in THIS video and we can
hear OPS1 Todd Abel’s full response to Air Attack Rory Collins.
VIDEO 152406 STARTS AT 1521.10 ( 3:21.10 PM )
+1:30 ( 1522.40 / 3:22.40 PM )
(B33 – French): Okay… what we’re gonna do is… uh… it’s kinda…
like I said the farthest north house… and… pretty close to the house, okay?
This one with the red engine. There’s actually two with red engines it’s
the one furthest north. Now I’m online.
+1:44 ( 1522.54 / 3:22.54 PM )
(Tanker 810): Okay. Gotcha… and… and we’re pretty much goin’ for the heavy smoke?
+1:47 ( 1522.57 / 3:22.57 PM )
(B33 – French): Yea… it’s… it’s a bead on the heavy smoke and I’m on line now
poppin’ smoke just so ya can see me. I want your line to start and bring it right
through HERE… right turn on the exit… ya got that?
+1:58 ( 1523.08 / 3:23.08 PM )
(Tanker 810): Got it.
+2:05 ( 1523.15 / 3:23.15 PM )
(Foreground person 1 – Panebaker?): Here he comes.
+2:13 ( 1523.23 / 3:23.23 PM )
(AA – Rory Collins): Operations, Air Attack, Air-To-Ground
** NOTE: Here is the START of the 11.7 seconds from THIS video
** that is duplicated as the content for Air Study Video 162300
_________________________________________________________________
+2:18 ( 1523.28 / 3:23.28 PM )
(OPS1 Todd Abel): Go ahead.
+2:19 ( 1523.29 / 3:23.29 PM )
(AA – Rory Collins): Okay… Ahhhh… we’ll probly be around there
in about five. Umm… What’s your plan on the ground?
+2:27 ( 1523.37 / 3:23.37 PM )
(OPS1 Todd Abel): What I’d like to do… ah… is… ah… tie into ( that court here? ) where ya
see the whole ??. If we can tag onto the road up here and then just run it… ah… you know…
( transmission breaks up and cuts off ).
FOREGROUND OVERLAP…
+2:27 ( 1523.37 / 3:23.37 PM )
(Tanker 810): Eight one zero OFF… hard right.
(B33 – French): Lookin’ like you already got me in sight…
looks like your drop went in there good. Thank you.
(Tanker 810): ( Back to ?? )
_________________________________________________________________
** NOTE: Here is the END of the 11.7 seconds from THIS video
** that is duplicated as the content for Air Study Video 162300
** but 162300 cuts off early up above right after the phrase
** “What I’d like…” in the BACKGROUND capture and the
** phrase “Eight one zero OFF…” in the FOREGROUND capture
**
** The 152406 video simply continues for another half-minute or so
** with a response from Air Attack Rory Collins…
+2:39
(B33 – French): Load and return.
(Tanker 810): Load and return… eight one zero.
+2:43 ( 1523.53 / 3:23.53 PM )
(B33 – French): Five Kilo Alpha… you’re cleared direct to the
helibase if you’re not already headed there.
+2:43 ( 1523.53 / 3:23.53 PM )
(AA – Rory Collins?): Ah.. Okay… I’ll come around once they’re… ah…
( road? )… ahm… on… ahhh… those fire spots (under ?).
+2:53 ( 1524.03 / 3:24.03 PM )
(OPS1 Todd Abel): (Responding to last transmit from AA but words not clear).
VIDEO 152406 ENDS AT 1524.06 ( 3:24.06 PM )
Reply to Bob Powers post on May 12, 2014 at 2:43 pm
>> Mr. Powers wrote…
>>…If the Helicopters were dropping water in the same area trying to hold the fire
>> down, then they definitely would have commented on the tanker drop helping
>> them out at a critical location.
Mr. Powers…
In an effort here to try and figure out what is really going on with that now
known-to-be-bogus 162300 Air Study Video ( and to see if any of these ‘other’
Air Study videos are equally bogus )… I now have full transcripts of ALL of the
other USDA Air Study videos that were on fixed tripods and capturing ALL of
the Air-To-Air channel traffic which ‘overlaps’ with these Panebaker and Moore
Air Study videos.
I will post ALL of these transcripts at some point… but since this Chapter 6
is already bigger than it should be ( and failing to load already on mobile
devices )… I am going to wait a bit and see if a new Chapter 7 starts before
attempting to do that. They are not *small* transcripts.
In the meantime… I just thought I would point out that the helicopters
‘commenting’ on the ‘goodness’ of retardant drops ( if they were in a
position to see it ) appears to be *common practice* in that ‘other world’
of WFF Air Support and this is now perfectly evident in the full transcripts
of the Air-To-Air channel traffic that day.
In just ONE of the USDA Air Study videos capturing the complete Air-To-Air
traffic… EVERY TIME the pilot of Helicopter 5KA ( Five Kilo Alpha ) saw
a retardant drop… he IMMEDIATELY would add his own unsolicited comments
to the conversation like “That was spot on!” and “Right on! Perfect!” and
sometimes even lengthier ‘Attaboy!’ style comments.
And MOST of the time… these ‘confirming goodness’ transmits right after a
retardant drop would take place WITHOUT any ‘call signs’. They would just
come out of ‘nowhere’.
So YES… if ANY of the helicopters operating on the south side of the fire
circa 1633 ( we know there were at least TWO in the air there at that
time ) saw that 1633 SEAT drop that went right between the fireline and
a house… it is VERY likely one ( or both? ) of those helicopter pilots might have
been the ones offering the unsolicited. “That’s exactly what we want” and/or
“That’s exactly right” comment(s) over the radio following that drop and
Burfiend was simply mistaken to think those comments were coming
from DIVSA Eric Marsh.
Two things:
FIRST: In a post below, WTKTT suggests that EP (one of the guys conducting the “air study” on the day of the Yarnell Hill Fire) might somehow be withholding or concealing video. I suppose that it is possible that EP is deliberately participating in a scheme to withhold information, or that the AZ Forestry folks withheld some of EP’s video, or that the SAIT is withholding some of the video, but it is equally (if not more) likely that EP just made a misstep in labeling and keeping straight all of his videos, pictures, etc.
Specifically: On June 30th, three folks (EP, SM, and Sw) were on the fire to take pictures and videos regarding the use of RETARDANT (and general air support with water drops) on fire – this is the “air study” folks keep referencing. These folks set up a main, stationary camera on a tripod that was recording from a stationary position almost non-stop, with audio coming exclusively from the air-to-air frequency (such that you can hear pilots such as Tom French, Rory Collins, “Jack,” “Kevin,” etc. talking to each other on these LONGGGGG main videos). In addition to that main camera, however, there were three people on the ground – EP, SM, and Sw – taking individual video clips and photos with various small hand-held devices. My impression is that at least one of them or maybe two had MULTIPLE hand-held devices that they were using.
Here’s the KEY: My impression is that these three folks were SPECIFICALLY interested in capturing videos/photos of the air drops (water, retardant) in action, such that, before you conclude that they are HIDING a video, consider whether there was an actual DROP from a SEAT or a VLAT during the time window in question. If not, it is entirely possible that there WAS no video from a hand-held device at exactly that moment, and NOTHING is being hidden or withheld.
To wit: At roughly 4:15 and 4:17, VLAT 911 dropped its massive load of retardant (split into two drops), and then there were two SEAT drops (one right after the other – they were in a line) at about 4:24 p.m., and then tanker 413 dropped at roughly 4:33, and then VLAT 910 was lining up for a drop when the shit hit the fan with GM. Which brings me to my second point….
SECOND: For reasons not worth getting into (given that I do not have the time or ability to provide links at this point), allow me to say again that I am pretty sure that Marsh did indeed comment to B33 about where he was hoping for some air support (e.g. a VLAT line), but Marsh made the comment WELL before 16:37. Meaning, I am fairly comfortable believing based on the way that I have been tying together all of the same materials that all of you have access to at this point that the 16:37 comment alleged to have been made by Marsh was indeed made by Marsh, but (a) it was likely uttered well before 16:37 AND (b) the words might have been slightly different than what B33 recalls (although the gist was likely the same).
This, by the way, ties into my previously-articulated view that the SAIT, ADOSH, and Wildland Fire Associate timelines are all wrong. I have no “links” to anything to support this, because my support for this is the timeline that I am slowly piecing together on my laptop and in my notebooks. There is nothing – other than my brain and notes – for me to “link” to…. 🙂
Reply to Elizabeth post on May 15, 2014 at 11:16 am
Elizabeth…
First off… let me say that whatever that noise was down below
about some kind of ‘boycott’ on responding to any more of your
posts… I did not comment on it because that’s not something
I personally believe in on a PUBLIC forum.
Yes… this is a PUBLIC forum.
If a post simply meets the acceptable criteria for ‘allowable’
commentary on the part of the person hosting this PUBLIC
discussion… then whatever someone has to say is OK with me.
But… ( likewise )… since this is a PUBLIC forum… people are then
also allowed to ‘freely comment’ ( and SHOULD ) on what anyone
else has to say… even if that comment was not ‘addressed’ to them.
That’s how this works.
If people don’t like your posts… they don’t have to respond to them.
It’s that simple.
I think folks laid out pretty well down below what they find ‘annoying’ about most of your PUBLIC posts and your ‘style’ of commenting.
You are free to either take whatever ‘advice’ was posted… or
ignore it altogether. Freedom of choice, as they say.
Ok… back to business…
>> Elizabeth said…
>> FIRST: In a post below, WTKTT suggests that EP (one of
>> the guys conducting the “air study” on the day of the Yarnell
>> Hill Fire) might somehow be withholding or concealing video.
>> I suppose that it is possible that EP is deliberately participating
>> in a scheme to withhold information, or that the AZ Forestry
>> folks withheld some of EP’s video, or that the SAIT is
>> withholding some of the video…
Correction: I did NOT say that Eric Panebaker (himself) has
‘withheld’ ( or tampered with ) information/evidence. All I said
was (quote)…
“If the 20130630_162300_SEAT_drop_EP video ( as released by the SAIT in response to FOIA/FOIL requests ) does NOT contain the same content as the original… then HE would certainly know.”
That is simply a TRUE statement.
He would be in the *best* position to know whether or not that video that ended up as part of the FOIA/FOIL package coming from the SAIT actually contains the same things he *gave* them.
He probably still has the *originals*.
I ( me, personally ) do NOT KNOW what the ‘story’ is here.
All I know is that one of these Air Study videos is NOT what it is supposed to be… and that there MUST be SOME kind of *story*
that would explain it.
>> …but it is equally (if not more) likely that EP just made a
>> misstep in labeling and keeping straight all of his videos,
>> pictures, etc.
See my original post. I ( me, personally ) do *NOT* think it
is ‘more likely’ this is the case.
I would be the first to tell you that I have ‘mis-named’ files on a
computer when assembling collections of things… but that is
*NOT* the simple explanation for what is seen in THIS case.
If two of these Air Study videos ended up being just ‘duplicates’
of each other ( completely )… then YES… I would say the likelihood
was high that a copy / naming operation went sideways.
In this case, however, we are talking about a much more
complicated scenario.
Someone ( Repeat: I do NOT know WHO ) took the time to
EXTRACT 11.7 seconds of video from the +2:18 second mark
of a PREVIOUS video… and then SAVE that video back to disk
with a totally differnent TIME on it… just short of an HOUR later
than when it was actually taken.
That’s a little more complicated than just accidentally hitting
the wrong key at some point, or screwing up a drag-and-drop
with a mouse.
>> Elizabeth also said…
>> Here’s the KEY: My impression is that these three folks were
>> SPECIFICALLY interested in capturing videos/photos of the air
>> drops (water, retardant) in action,
That is a valid impression to have. That is what they were
getting PAID to do…
…however… you are WRONG to assume that that is the only
reason they ever shot any VIDEO.
SOME of the Panebaker / Moore videos have nothing to do with
any actual ‘retardant’ drops. The most noticeable of these are
the ones that simply have ‘fire-behavior’ in the video TITLE(S).
>> Elizabeth also said
>> such that, before you conclude that they are HIDING a video,
>> consider whether there was an actual DROP from a SEAT or
>> a VLAT during the time window in question.
See above. There did NOT have to be any kind of ‘drop’ in progress
for Panebaker or Moore to be shooting video that day.
The *mystery* surrounding the particular video in question is
that its title DOES seem to inidicate that it is SUPPOSED to be a
video of a SEAT drop at 1623… but that is NOT what it *REALLY*
is at all.
>> Elizabeth
>> SECOND: For reasons not worth getting into (given that I do
>> not have the time or ability to provide links at this point), allow
>> me to say again that I am pretty sure that Marsh did indeed
>> comment to B33 about where he was hoping for some air
>> support (e.g. a VLAT line), but Marsh made the comment
>> WELL before 16:37.
Please provide evidence if you are going to make these
kinds of statements ( or just re-read the comments below about
what people find most annoying about your posting here ).
I have certainly made some ‘leaps’ myself in an effort to try and
help us ALL decipher some mysteries in this ongoing disscusion
(mostly before there was really no evidence to go on but the stupid
SAIR report and the only thing to DO was ‘guess’ about things )…
but I believe if I have ever gotten even close to saying “I’m pretty
sure this is what happened”… there was ( at least ) extensive
explanation as to WHY I was making such a claim.
I could tell YOU right now that MY *extensive notes* seem to indicate that Darrell Willis left the north side of the fire, drove to Yarnell, borrowed an ATV from the Yarnell Fire Station… and then personally drove all the way out to where Steed and Marsh were and told them face-to-face… “You get your asses over there to town and do something that gets your name in the newspapers because I’ve got a City Council Budget meeting next week”…
…but I would NOT expect ANYONE to believe me unless I showed some ‘evidence’ to back it up.
Point taken?
Not much to add to that. I think the evidence you have gone thru the past 2 days pretty well sums up the discussion.
On another note I will be gone for a week and have a lot to catch up on here so keep on looking.
Will be at my Oak Grove Hot Shot reunion reliving the great old days. Have a good week.
TIME FOR CHAPTER SEVEN?
Signal boost to WTKTT’s earlier request for a new chapter. My mobile device crashes whenever I try to load this page now. Thanks, Mr. Dougherty, for continuing to host this discussion!
**
** WHERE IS THE *REAL* 20130630_162300_SEAT_drop_EP
** AIR STUDY VIDEO?
After checking the Panebaker 163700 Air Study video again for ANY evidence of ANYONE saying anything like “That’s what we want” circa 1637 ( and finding no such evidence )… I started working BACKWARDS from 1637 and re-checking the other Air Study videos.
There is no Panebaker or Moore Air Study Video that actually covers the 1637 to 1639 timeframe… so if there was any chance of finding evidence of this (supposed) “That’s what we want” transmission reported ONLY by John Burfiend of Bravo 33… then I thought perhaps that even if anyone did say any such thing… he might have simply been mistaken that it came (quote) “within 5 minutes of them going into shelters” ( as he said in his SAIT interview ).
1642 ( Marsh’s final transmissions ) minus 5 minutes is 1637 and so that must have been the ‘guesstimate’ the SAIT investigators were applyiing to this ‘recollection’ on Burfiend’s part.
I STILL believe it is MUCH more likey that if ANYONE said anything to Bravo 33 like “That’s exactly what we want”… that it was SOMEONE ( but NOT Marsh ) confirming the ‘goodness’ of the 1633 SEAT drop that was ‘spot on’ ( according to Burfiend and French ) and got laid down RIGHT between a house and the fireline at exactly 1633. If anyone said “That’s exactly what we want”… it MUST have been someone who saw that actual ‘spot-on’ drop right between the house and the fireline… ( like a chopper pilot ) and NOT someone who would have just seen some plane circling around in the air on some kind of ‘line-up’ flight.
It was MOST LIKELY one of the chopper pilots known to have been in the air and also working that same exact area circa 1637. They would have seen that drop be ‘spot on’ and would have immediately been ‘confirming the goodness’ of it.
Anyway… my plan was to work BACKWARDS through the Panebaker videos again listening carefully for ANY evidence of ANYONE saying anything like “That’s what we want” or other ‘confirming goodness’ opinions on the 1633 SEAT drop at ANY time that day.
Well… here comes the new MYSTERY.
The Panebaker video that immediately precedes the 163700 one is named…
20130630_162300_SEAT_drop_EP
That (supposedly) means it ENDED at 1623 and would also mean there was no Panebaker video prior to the 163700 one that covered the time of that 1633 SEAT drop down in Yarnell…
…but what the heck… I re-checked the 162300 Air Study video, anway.
That is when I discovered that this entire 162300 Air Study video is BOGUS.
It is NOT what it says it is ( A video taken by Panebaker that ENDS at 1623 ).
The entire Panebaker video 20130630_162300_SEAT_drop_EP is simply a reproduction of 11.7 seconds from the 2:18 second mark ( near the end ) of a much EARLIER Panebaker video 201300630_152406_SEAT_EP.
Someone just LIFTED 11.7 seconds out of a previous video shot around
1524 ( 3:24 PM ) that day… and is trying to pretend that it is the contents of
an Air Study Video shot an hour later at 1623 ( 4:23 PM ).
Everything from those 11.7 seconds at the +2:18 mark in the 152406 Air
Study Video is a *PERFECT MATCH* for the entire content of the 162300 video.
So where is the *REAL* Panebaker 20130630_162300_SEAT_drop_EP video?
How long was the ORIGINAL video?… before someone just (manually) REPLACED it with an 11.7 second clip from a video taken an HOUR earlier?
There was a LOT of critical stuff going at circa 1623 that day and so the original Panebaker 162300 video may have captured some of that.
Example: It has NOT been completely verified that the YARNELL-GAMBLE video was actually shot at 1627. That APPEARS to be the time as supported by the sirens heard in the Jerry Thompson videos… but I still wouldn’t call that 100 percent verification.
If Jerry Thompson himself was just a few minutes off on the times he reported for HIS videos… then the YARNELL-GAMBLE video *MIGHT* have actually been shot a few minutes earlier… like in the 1622-1624 timeframe.
If that is the case… then that means this ‘missing’ 162300 Panebaker Air Study video had a good chance of ALSO capturing that TAC 1 channel conversation where SOMEONE in fire command *seems* to be urging Marsh to ‘hurry up and get to town’ and Eric Marsh ( totally confirmed ) then immediately reports Granite Mountain’s STATUS as… “They’re comin’ from the heel of the fire” ( as in… on the MOVE and NOT in the ‘safe black’ at all ).
So the ‘missing’ Panebaker 162300 video might have ALSO captured that
YARNELL-GAMBLE conversation on TAC 1… complete with the actual
CALL SIGN of whoever it was that was having that conversation with
Eric Marsh at that time and *seemed* to be urging him to hurry up.
Even if the YARNELL-GAMBLE conversation was NOT also captured in this
Panebaker 162300 video… there might have been *other* radio traffic relevant
to Granite Mountain that WAS captured circa 1623.
It really is not possible this was just a screw-up.
Someone seems to have purposely preserved the 20130630_162300 filename
and timestamp for this video… but then also PURPOSELY made an effort
to replace the content with something else from ANOTHER (earlier) video.
More on this later.
I’m now going back and re-checking ALL the Air Study videos to see if this
kind of ‘money business’ was going on with any OTHER Air Study videos.
Typo in last sentence.
I meant to say ‘monkey business’.
Last sentence should have read…
“I’m now going back and re-checking ALL the Air Study videos to
see if this kind of ‘monkey business’ was going on with any
OTHER Air Study videos.”
Correction for the above post.
The 20130630_162300_SEAT_drop_EP video that is now known
to be BOGUS is just ONE of the Panebaker Air study videos that
‘precedes’ the 163700 one. It does not IMMEDIATELY precede it.
There are actually TWO others that come in-between 162300
and 163700… and they both appear to be exactly what they
say they are.
These are the actual ( Eric ) Panebaker Air Study videos
that cover the crucial 4:00 PM to 5:00 PM timeframe that day…
20130630_161858_VLAT_split_2_EP
20130630_162300_SEAT_drop_EP **** This is the BOGUS one
20130630_162508_2SEATS_EP
20130630_163338_fire_behavior_EP
20130630_163700_fire_behavior_EP
20130630_164544_fire_behavior_EP
20130630_170634_VLAT_EP
NOTE: The 20130630_161858_VLAT_split_2_EP video that precedes the one that is now know to be BOGUS is the one that captured the 4:16 PM “Granite Mountain… what’s your status right now?” query from from someone in fire command and Eric Marsh’s response about Granite Mountain “makin’ their way out the same escape route from this morning” and Marsh’s “just checkin’ it out to see where we gonna jump out at” transmission.
ALSO NOTE: The ‘EP’ initials in these Air Study video filenames all stand for ‘Eric Panebaker’.
If the 20130630_162300_SEAT_drop_EP video ( as released by the SAIT in response to FOIA/FOIL requests ) does NOT contain the same content as the original… then HE would certainly know.
**
** PANEBAKER AIR STUDY VIDEO
** 20130630_163700_fire_behavior_EP.MOV
Reply to calvin post on May 9, 2014 at 3:04 am
>> calvin said…
>> At the 23 second mark of the 1637 Panebaker video there is a background
>> transmission that I cannot make out. This video is only 39 seconds long and
>> would put the 23 second mark near 1637. If you do not mind reviewing,
>> I would appreciate it.
calvin…
I went back and reviewed the 163700 Panebaker video again looking for ANY evidence that ANYONE said anything like “That’s exactly what we want” as reported by the SAIR as Marsh talking to Bravo 33 at that time ( circa 1637 ).
This video (supposedly) ENDS at exactly 1637 and ( as you pointed out )
only covers the 39 seconds prior to that… so if anyone did say anything
of the sort circa 1637… it must have come AFTER 1637 and there is no
Panebaker or Moore Air Study video that covers the 1637-1638 timeframe.
Anyway… after listening carefully again… there is NOTHING in the 163700
video that resembles ANYONE saying anything like “That’s what we want”
or “That’s exactly what we want”.
The mysterious background transmit in the +21 to +23 second mark that you mention APPEARS to be someone saying something about a ‘horse’ that needs to be taken care of. This would match other reports around that time of ‘horses’ being seen running down the middle of Highway 89.
Here is my full transcript of that 163700 Panebaker video…
Transcript of BOTH the foreground AND background radio conversation captured
by Panebaker Air Study Video 20130630_163700_fire_behavior_EP.MOV.
A public copy of this Air Study video is in Mr. Dougherty’s online Dropbox at…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/y3jy5opssrcvzb3/S3cCXl9pjr/AerialFirefightingstudy/Panebaker/Video/Video#lh:null-20130630_163700_fire_behavior_EP.MOV
ECITW ( Every Caveat In The World )
This is what I ( me, personally ) believe is being said in both the foreground AND the background of this video. Your mileage may, of course, vary.
This video is 39 seconds long.
Since the text notes accompanying these videos states that the timestamp in the title represents the END time…that makes the actual START time for this video 1636.21
NOTE: The air-to-air conversation in this video is ALSO captured even MORE
clearly in the corresponding USDA AIR STUDY VIDEO – DISC 4 folder.
VIDEO STARTS AT 1636.21 ( 4:36.21 PM )
BACKGROUND
+0:04 ( 1636.25 / 4:36.25 PM )
(Unknown): (On?) short final…
FOREGROUND
+0:05 ( 1636.26 / 4:36.26 PM )
(Unknown): Five-O-Eleven… you sure of that helibase… in that green circle here?
+0:09 ( 1636.30 / 4:36.30 PM )
(Unknown – Sounds like French in B33?): Okay, copy that… are you gonna drop your bucket and have to lift back somewhere else?
+0:13 ( 1636.34 / 4:36.34 PM )
(Unknown): Yea… I’ll have to drop ( the bucket? ) then I’ll head for Wickenburg for fuel.
+0:16 ( 1636.37 / 4:36.37 PM )
(Unkown – Sounds like French in B33?): Oh… okay… gotcha… okay… gimme a call… uh… ready to lift.
+0:21 ( 1636.42 / 4:36.42 PM )
(Unknown): Will do.
BACKGROUND
+0:22 ( 1636.43 / 4:36.43 PM )
(Unknown): I’ve got a (horse?) left (to take care of?)
+0:25 ( 1636.46 / 4:36.46 PM )
(Unknown): You’re all clued in. No need to act… just write it down on a piece a paper.
FOREGROUND
+0:34 ( 1636.55 / 4:36.55 PM )
(Unknown – Sounds like French in B33?): And I’ve got a project for you.
+0:37 ( 1636.58 / 4:36.58 PM )
(Unknown): When ya have… ???
BACKGROUND
+0:37 ( 1636.58 / 4:36.58 PM )
(Unknown): (Someone’s NAME here is FIRST word? Boleba/Boleeba? Buliba?) What’s goin’ on back there?
VIDEO ENDS AT 1637.00 ( 4:37.00 PM )
Update: Wherever it says ‘Unknown – Sounds like French in B33’ up above should have just said ‘Thomas French in B33’. It is confirmed.
Since this Panebaker video ‘overlaps’ with DVD DISC 4 of the USDA Air Study Videos… the Air-To-Air traffic captured in that USDA video confirms most of the FOREGROUND communications captured in this Panebaker video.
WTKTT
Discussion above—-
Helicopter Pilot talking to French’
Has a water Bucket for drops.
he is going to drop it off at the heliport and go for fuel.
I’ve got a hose lift to take care of — not horse—would have been moving hose to some location. Generally they bag it Nets and drop it at some location for use.
5011 might be the call sign of the Helicopter? Just thoughts.
Reply to Bob Powers post on May 14, 2014 at 7:06 am
>> Mr. Powers wrote…
>> Helicopter Pilot talking to French’
>> Has a water Bucket for drops.
>> he is going to drop it off at the heliport and go for fuel.
Yes. That is definitely French talking to helicopter
5KA ( Five Kilo Alpha ) at that point. 5KA is the one that needed to ‘drop his bucket’ and go refuel, at this time.
The ‘other’ USDA audio captures of Air-To-Ground with
no ‘walk overs’ on the Air-To-Air channel proves that.
5KA would always identify himself using the full
‘Five Kilo Alpha’ but whenever French was hailing him
he would simply abbreviate it as ‘Kilo Alpha’.
>> I’ve got a hose lift to take care of — not horse—
>> would have been moving hose to some location.
>> Generally they bag it Nets and drop it at some location
>> for use.
Perfectly possible. That’s a very hard section to hear
in this particular video. Could be ‘horse’ *OR* ‘hose’.
The KEY thing there was that this transmission is definitely NOT anyone saying anything like “That’s what we want” in response to any line-up flights.
>> 5011 might be the call sign of the Helicopter?
>> Just thoughts.
I listened to it again. This is definitely a capture of Burfiend in Bravo 33 talking on the Air-To-Ground channel… because in the USDA DVD there is more Air-To-Air talk right underneath this transmit from Burfiend… so the capture in THIS Panebaker video MUST have been ‘Air-To-Ground’ instead.
It still definitely sounds like ‘Five-O-Eleven’ there, but since the chopper call signs all tend to be just THREE digits/numbers ( and there is no chopper with call sign 5011 listed as having been in Yarnell ) it’s unclear who Burfiend is really talking to about the ‘Helibase’.
I could believe he really meant to say ‘Nine-Eleven’, but since they were not dropping in Yarnell now, and the DC10 VLAT 911 was still returning from a refuel and wasn’t even really back in the area yet… I’m not sure what sense that would make at this moment.
Again… the KEY takeaway there is that THIS transmission was definitely Burfiend and it was definitely on the Air-To-Ground channel… so that means this Panebaker video WAS capturing ‘Air-To-Ground’ transmissions…
…but there is still nothing in the capture with anyone ever coming onto the A2G channel and saying anything resembling “That’s exactly what we want”.
This capture ENDS exactly at 1637… so if anyone said something like that circa 1637 over A2G channel… then it must have happened AFTER 1637.
Unfortunately… there is no Panebaker or Moore Air Study video that then goes on to capture the A2G traffic in the 1637 to 1639 timeframe.
The only NEXT ‘capture’ ( in the public record, anyway ) of the A2G channel after this Panebaker video is the Helmet-Cam video itself… which starts just prior to 1639 and begins with Burfiend on A2G talking to ?? someone ?? about how it’s going to be hard for them to hit some target being discussed because of the ‘smoke’. A moment later we hear Steed’s first “We are in front of the flaming front” MAYDAY transmit.
Followup…
The real ‘mysterious’ transmit in this video is the
following one…
+0:25 ( 1636.46 / 4:36.46 PM )
(Unknown): You’re all clued in. No need to act… just write it down on a piece a paper.
I wonder what THAT was all about?
WHO was now ‘clued in’… about WHAT?… and why was it something that ‘required no action’… just ‘write it down’?
We are only 120 seconds away from Steed’s first MAYDAY when this (strange?) transmit took place.
Here’s a transcript of what I’m hearing in that video:
Panebaker 1637
VOICE 1 0:05 five-oh-eleven […sh…?] at helibase, in the green circle here.
VOICE 2 Okay, copy that. Are you going to drop your bucket and have to lift back somewhere else?
VOICE 1 Yeah, I’ll have to drop the bucket, then I’ll head [over to …?]
VOICE 2 0:18 Oh, okay, gotcha. Okay. Give me a call, uh, when you’re ready to lift.
VOICE 1 0:20 Will do.
[…]
VOICE ? […] [clued in?] [wanted?] at […]
VOICE 2? 0:29 Affirm.
VOICE 2 0:34 And I’ve got a project for you.
VOICE ? 0:36 [What are you? You’re at?]
VOICE 3 0:37 [what’s going on?] back there?
Sitta… Thank you!
The only reason I might be hearing a little ‘more’ than you
have is that even though this particular video didn’t need
any ‘audio forensics’ or ‘noise filtering’… I STILL found that
I needed to really BOOST THE GAIN on the audio to have
a chance at hearing some of the background.
Does whatever you are using to ‘listen’ to the videos
have that ‘GAIN BOOST’ capability?
“Audio forensics” INCLUDES boosting the gain, WTKTT. When you BOOST the gain, you distort the audio. Sorry if I was not clear on that with you earlier.
( Heavy sigh )
Time to remember our Mark Twain again…
“It’s not what (he/she) doesn’t know that
bothers me… it’s what (he/she) knows fer
sure that just ain’t so.”
*and*
“We are ALL ignorant… just about
different things.”
Heavy sigh right back atcha, kiddo! 🙂 Audio forensics – it is not just for the Zimmerman trial any more!
Elizabeth… fer cryin’ out loud.
The ‘gain boost’ I am talking about
does NOT ( in ANY way ) ‘distort
the audio’.
You have no idea what you are even talking about.
WTKTT – it absolutely CAN distort the audio! If you doubt me, the actual Audacity disclosures make this clear. If in doubt, READ the relevant info. If you have something that suggests otherwise, “post your sources.” (Tongue in cheek, obviously.)
Reply to
Elizabeth post
on May 17,
2014 at 11:59
____________
WTKTT – it absolutely CAN distort the audio!
_____________
Oh… so NOW you are backing
off your carte-blanche “When you BOOST the gain, it distorts the audio” statement and have arrived at simply the ‘possibility’ that can happen.
.
Good for you.
You’re learning.
Yes. If you boost the gain some RIDICULOUS amount and your speakers or headphones are now shaking and your eardrums are getting blown out… or if you exceed the SOFTWARE limits as to ‘maximum volume’ allowed for a track… most software ( including Audacity ) has a ‘safety catch’ where it will then start applying ‘clipping’ to the waveform in order to not destroy your equipment.
What I said above was ‘the kind of gain boost I am talking about does NOT ( in ANY way ) distort that audio.
That is simply a TRUE statement.
Incremental boosts of +3db do NOT cause any loss of the waveform and no DISTORTION is taking place… and certainly nothing that would cause anything that anyone might be SAYING to be changed in any way.
_____________
If in doubt, READ the relevant info.
_____________
I have.
I wish YOU would do the same.
_____________
If you have something that suggests otherwise, “post your sources.” (Tongue in cheek, obviously.)
_____________
Okay.
From Audacity’s own user manual…
****************
The top slider is the gain control – it affects the relative volume of the track. By default it only lets you select multiples of 3 dB, but if you hold down shift you can choose any level. Be careful not to set it too high, or you can exceed the maximum volume of a track, which results in clipping.
****************
By the way… the ‘too high’ being referred to would probably be blowing out your ear drums even before the ‘safety catch’ clipping starts to kick in.
Don’t do that.
Just use low increments and all the GAIN boost does it make it EASIER to hear what is being said.
WTKTT,
I’ve got Audacity (such a sweet program), and can boost the gain in general and specifically boost the 200-400 Hz range. While it tends to lower interference, I still have the same issues on the brain side of the ear (alas!), and don’t seem to parse the language any better. I’ll give it another try, though.
I think you were spot on about the “Wickenberg to fuel” part. I don’t hear “no need to act” or “write it down on a piece of paper.”
It would be interesting to know if EP still has access to the original files, and how they differ from what we have.
Sitta… yes… the (free) Audacity software is amazing. I have sound software here that costs thousands and thousands of dollars… but I still use Audacity for most things.
It is even BETTER at some things than anything money can (currently) buy.
Disclaimer: I am in no way associated with ‘Audacity’ or any of its software products. I am just a ‘user’.
My only other advice to try and ‘hear’ things that are ‘hard to hear’ is to simply set yourself up a ‘loop’ on that specific phrase… and then let it play over and over and over and over.
It’s boring as hell… but it works.
**
** Reply to Bob Powers post on May 11, 2014 at 7:49 am
>> Mr. Powers wrote…
>> When Fires Like this in WUI start running at structures the first thing
>> is to thro Air Tankers at the Fire.
>> The problem most times they don’t do any good except make
>> everybody feel like they at least did something.
>> It looks good to the public at least some one is doing something.
There is no doubt ( and we can now hear it for ourselves ) that the Air Support in Yarnell that day knew that most of the drops they were making weren’t doing much good and that it was just like (quote) “spittin’ at it”.
Just like ‘Hotshots’ ( and any FFs building line ) know about the ‘hauling chart’ which says that if flame-lengths are more than about three and one-hal feet they are basically ‘out of it’ and ‘wasting their time’… the AIR people know full well what their own ‘limitations’ are and when THEY are also, basically ‘out of it’.
But… that being said…
If you look at the AFTERMATH photos ( mostly the aerial ones ) following Sunday, June 30, 2013… there is also no doubt that in SOME places… that line of red stuff on the ground IS what ‘stopped’ or ‘diverted’ the fireline near some pretty critical areas of the town.
So I guess it’s really like that old adage that is often attributed to someone in the advertising industry…
“Half of what we do doesn’t do a damn bit of good.
The problem is knowing WHICH half.”
>> Mr. Powers also said…
>> Helicopters – When Fixed wing plains are on a fire Helicopter pilots
>> Monitor there Freq. And stay out of the way. They fly lower and are
>> assigned to specific areas. They maintain contact Air to Air.
>> That is why I said the 1 Helicopter flying that is mentioned may have
>> had an overhead in it that could have made the comment, and could
>> have over keyed Marsh DIV A call.
Since I don’t believe we have even near fully wrapped up the ‘discussion’ about whether the 1637 “That’s what we want!” transmission ever happened at all… or that if it did… whether it really was DIVSA Eric Marsh saying it…
…then this is a very important point.
It’s pretty much a given that there WAS no YHF fire overhead ‘in the air’ at the time this (supposed) 1637 transmission took place… but it really doesn’t matter if there was any ‘fire command’ in a chopper, or not.
Any chopper pilot could have made that transmission… and we KNOW there were at least TWO in the air right there around Yarnell at both 1633, when that ‘spot-on’ SEAT drop happened… and in the 1637 to 1639 timeframe when Steed’s first MADAY appeared. We can even HEAR these 2 choppers flying overhead in the Helmet-Cam video itself.
The recent ‘sidetrack’ of proving that Tom Story’s Canon EOS 1D was 36 minutes and 7 seconds BEHIND the REAL time that day is actually related to this 1637 transmission discussion… which is why it was good to ‘sidetrack’ and take care of that. Tom Story’s 7093 photos series seemed to show a VLAT drop at exactly 1639… the moment of Steed’s first MAYDAY. It was worth it to go off and verify that for no other reason than to prove that that is NOT the case… and that we CAN trust the Air-To-Air traffic completely for figuring out what Bravo 33 was REALLY doing in the 1637-1639 timeframe.
In the course of basically re-viewing and re-listening to EVERY Panebaker Air-Study video in order to nail down that Tom Story camera time offset… I happened to HEAR some things I hadn’t really heard before regarding HELICOPTERS and RETARDANT DROPS.
If you listen to all of the Panebaker Air Study videos… it is *NOT* unusual at all to hear someone in a helicopter ‘commenting’ on a retardant drop right after it happens.
You actually DO hear a lot of ‘unsolicited’ comments ( over Air-To-Ground channel ) such as “Spot-on!” or “Right on target!” or even one lengthy response from a chopper pilot after one of the VLAT drops on the NORTH end where he jumps in on Air-To-Ground right afterwards and says something like…
“This is 5Q Alpha in the hotbird’s seat with a front row view… and that was right on the money! Nice work!.”
So YES… it is actually MORE than likely that when Burfiend thought he heard DIVSA say “That’s exactly what we want”… that really just might have been one of the chopper pilots already in the air down there jumping in on Air-To-Ground and ‘confirming’ the ‘goodness’ of that spot-on 1633 SEAT drop.
So something like “That’s exactly what we want!” probably WAS actually said on the Air-To-Ground channel ( by SOMEONE who saw the spot-on 1633 SEAT drop )… but Burfiend was simply mis-remembering ( during his SAIT interview ) who said that around that time.
No definite PROOF ( yet )… but we’re getting closer.
I’d still love to know what Clint Clauson ( the THIRD guy onboard that Bravo 33 plane that afternoon ) actually thinks he did ( or didn’t ) hear.
Followup… forgot to mention something…
While it is NOT unusual at ALL to hear these chopper pilots ‘commenting’ on a retardant drop… the KEY seems to always be that these ‘unsolicited’ verifying-goodness comments ONLY come AFTER a REAL DROP.
In other words… if you listen carefully to all of these sorts of ‘unsolicted’ verifying-goodness comments from the chopper pilots in the Panebaker videos… they NEVER comment on a ‘show me’ or on a ‘line up’ drop…
…and there’s a GOOD reason for that.
These guys are flying ‘show me’ and ‘go-around’ and ‘line-up’ flights basically ALL the time… and unless you are totally GLUED to the Air-To-Air channel yourself then you really can’t ever be sure when they are actually going to DROP… or NOT.
So the ONLY thing that warrants an unsolicited “That was spot-on!” or “That’s exactly what we want!” comment is when you have actually just SEEN them drop… and you are verifying the ‘goodness’ of that location for even MORE drops.
So that, I think, is even more ‘indirect’ proof that Marsh would NOT have just jumped onto the radio and come out of nowhere with an unsolicited “That’s exactly what we want!” transmission JUST because he *might* have accidentally saw ANYONE doing a ‘show me’ or a ‘practice run’.
Those kind of ‘unsolicited’ comments over Air-To-Ground usually ONLY happen AFTER a REAL DROP… and are simply meant to encourage ‘more of the same’ at that location.
So ( perhaps? ) just one more reason why if anyone really did say “That’s exactly what we want!” over the Air-To-Ground channel in the 1634 to 1637 timeframe… it really was just a ‘confirming goodness’ comment regarding the spot-on 1633 SEAT drop right there on the outskirts of Yarnell ( which Marsh himself could NOT have seen due to the smoke cloud between him and Yarnell in that timeframe ).
WTKTT I think you are right on with the above.
Also if the Helicopters were dropping water in the same area trying to hold the fire down, then they definitely would have commented on the tanker drop helping them out at a critical location.
The reason I keep referring to the 1633 SEAT drop there right on the outskirts of Yarnell is because that, in fact, seems to be exactly what everyone who saw it seemed to think. Burfiend and French seemed to think so and said so in their SAIT interview.
The drop went ‘right between the ‘fire’ and a ‘home’… which at THAT point is time is what was *really* needed.
This ‘cut’ from Bravo 33’s SAIT interview seems to be describing that exact drop… and the fact that it was just after this 1633 drop when Burfiend then turned his attention to Kevin in the DC10 VLAT and told him to ‘come on in now’ ( circa 1636 )…
__________________________________________
We decided we were going to go here (pointed to Div Z) and go direct. Took the single SEAT. Brand new pilot (830) went right between spot and the home. We brought the DC10 in…
___________________________________________
Sidenote: They obviously had MAPS at these SAIT interviews and there are several references in the interviews where people are said to have been ‘pointing at the map’.
It SURE would have been nice if copies of that maps ( with notations of where people were pointing ) were included in the SAIT FOIA/FOIL releases…
…but they weren’t.
If these ‘Interview notated maps’ even exist… then they are just even more documents that Arizona Forestry either just neglected to include in the FOIA/FOIL requests… or they ( for some reason ) decided to specifically ‘withhold’ them.
The ADOSH investigation did the RIGHT thing.
They had fresh copies of ‘maps’ at each and every interview and they were freely letting the interviewees ‘mark them up’ during their interviews to make locations and movements more clear…
…and ADOSH did INCLUDE those ‘interviewee notated maps’ in their FOIA/FOIL release(s).
You can listen ( or read ) along with the interviewee AND see the exact notes they were making DURING the interview on real maps.
I’d still love to know exactly WHERE Burfiend was pointing when his own SAIT interview notes say he was ‘pointing at a spot in Division Z’ and said “We went HERE”.
Where is HERE?
Whoops. I left the phrase “as SPOT-ON” out of the first paragraph above, which was really intended to be the whole point of the statement.
Here is how paragraph 1 above SHOULD have read…
“The reason I keep referring to the 1633 SEAT drop there right on the outskirts of Yarnell as SPOT-ON is because that, in fact, seems to be exactly what everyone who saw it seemed to think. Burfiend and French seemed to think so and said so in their SAIT interview.”
Glad you caught that. TBH I haven’t had much of a chance to even look at the Panebakers. And I’ve definitely been wondering how the helicopters communicated and with whom.
When I read the Interagency Fire Aviation Manual, it said there was supposed to be a “Helico,” a Helitanker Coordinator, somehow in communication with both Air Attack and Incident Command.
Correction for the above post.
The 20130630_162300_SEAT_drop_EP video that is now known
to be BOGUS is just ONE of the Panebaker Air study videos that
‘precedes’ the 163700 one. It does not IMMEDIATELY precede it.
There are actually TWO others that come in-between 162300
and 163700… and they both appear to be exactly what they
say they are.
These are the actual ( Eric ) Panebaker Air Study videos
that cover the crucial 4:00 PM to 5:00 PM timeframe that day…
20130630_161858_VLAT_split_2_EP
20130630_162300_SEAT_drop_EP **** This is the BOGUS one
20130630_162508_2SEATS_EP
20130630_163338_fire_behavior_EP
20130630_163700_fire_behavior_EP
20130630_164544_fire_behavior_EP
20130630_170634_VLAT_EP
NOTE: The 20130630_161858_VLAT_split_2_EP video that precedes the one that is now know to be BOGUS is the one that captured the 4:16 PM “Granite Mountain… what’s your status right now?” query from from someone in fire command and Eric Marsh’s response about Granite Mountain “makin’ their way out the same escape route from this morning” and Marsh’s “just checkin’ it out to see where we gonna jump out at” transmission.
ALSO NOTE: The ‘EP’ initials in these Air Study video filenames all stand for ‘Eric Panebaker’.
If the 20130630_162300_SEAT_drop_EP video ( as released by the SAIT in response to FOIA/FOIL requests ) does NOT contain the same content as the original… then HE would certainly know.
Yikes… this ‘correction for the above post’ was NOT meant for this thread and somehow posted TWICE.
Once up above with the ‘thread’ it belongs to and again down here where it didn’t belong.
I think maybe this ‘Chapter 6’ is starting to cause WordPress
to suffer brain damage… as is know to happen when the
content gets very large.
I think it’s time for a new ‘Chapter 7’.
The Az Republic ran another piece on the Yarnell evacuations yesterday. Turns out only 1 in 8 persons received an automated call, and most of those involved no human-to-human contact, i.e. just left a message. Also the article says there was a 21 minute delay in sending out the notifications (I am assuming from the time the decision was made sometime after 3:30). May account for why people said they were notified around 4:08. Also there was no one hour notice, just “get out now”. In a disaster nothing ever works as it supposed to, but the evacuations that day seemed particularly bad. I still wonder the extent to which the flawed evacuations that day affected firefighting decisions in the time after 3:30.
I can imagine it might have had something to do with Abel, Cordes, et al, not paying enough attention to what Granite Mountain was doing until it was too late……
Maybe their attention was diverted. But I was asking more in how it might have affected tactical decisions.
One thing struck me recently. GM was aware of the evacuations situation. When the fire started running at Yarnell, I believe it was Scott Norris who texted “the fire is running right at Yarnell”. Yet I also think it was he (I’m pretty sure, maybe it was someone else) who texted “and the evacuations have just started”. Maybe it was a throwaway comment, not something they were making decisions based on. But it shows, that even for an experienced crew member, it was on their minds.
The evacuation situation should not have impacted safety considerations. But human nature being what it is, I wonder if it colored the way people looked at risk that afternoon.
Actually… it was Wade Parker’s final text message sent to his mother with a network timestamp of 4:04 PM that had those references in it.
Wade’s complete text message was…
“This thing is running straight for yarnel. jus starting to evac. you can see fire on the left town on right. DO NOT POST THIS ON FACEBOOK OR ANY OTHER SOCIAL MEDIA DEAL!!!!”
There was some discussion, early on ( even on this forum ) about what Wade really meant when he said “jus starting to evac”.
The discussion(s) were addressing the possibility that Wade’s statement could be taken one of two ways…
1) He was telling his mother that HE ( and the other Granite Mountain fellas ) were ‘just starting’ THEIR ‘evacuation’ of their position. As in… just now leaving the safe black.
2) He was telling his mother that YARNELL was only now starting to evacuate.
I believe the consensus back then was that Wade probably meant number 2… mostly because the people with WFF experience were in agreement that Parker probably wouldn’t even use the word ‘evacuation’ to describe their OWN movements or ‘relocation’ efforts.
So if it really was number 2 above… then YES… that is full proof that even the line crew up there ( and not just management like Marsh/Steed ) were fully aware that ‘get out now’ evacuations had been ordered down there in town… but they were also NOT aware that they had been ‘ordered’ by SPGS1 Gary Cordes some 24 mnutes BEFORE that… at 1540.
With regard to how this ‘knowledge’ affected their own decision making… I’m SURE it had SOMETHING to do with either of the following…
1) Management putting pressure on them to get to town as fast as they could ( Sic: Someone in management appears to actually be telling them to HURRY in the YARNELL-GAMBLE video ).
2) If there was no management pressure at all… then it still probably made them ‘rethink’ their already stated plan to remain in the safe black. They ( Steed and/or Marsh ) just didn’t want to accept the fact that they were ‘out of the game’ and weren’t going to be able to be ‘where the action was’… and this urge on their part made them totally forget that their PRIMARY responsibility was the *SAFETY* of ALL of the employees in their charge.
SIDENOTE: A lot has been discussed about what GOOD anyone might have even thought 19 guys with hand tools and no actual structural firefighting equipment could have even been able to do that day… or what their ‘assignment’ might have been even if they made it down there.
It is perfectly possible that even if management requested them to ‘come down’… that no one really had anything specific in mind for them to do at all… at least not at the time the request was made.
Management might have just ‘wanted them to be there’ and was going to figure out what to do with them AFTER they arrived.
This would actually match OPS1 Todd Abel’s thinking with regards to Type 1 Hotshots.
In his ADOSH interview… the ADOSH investigators went over the situation with the Blue Ridge Hotshots with OPS1 Todd Abel and how they just bounced around most of the morning with nothing to do and only being told to ‘stage’ at 3 different places before anyone even gave them any kind of ‘assignment’.
Todd Abel’s OWN explanation for all of that was that he was ‘busy’ that morning… but knew that he just wanted to have a Type 1 Hotshot crew in (quote) “My back pocket in case I needed them”.
Actual (full) quote from Abel about this in his ADOSH interview was…
__________________________________________
So we went down there, uh, after the briefing ran into, um, Blue Ridge out there, um, and they said hey, what would you like us to do? I said hey, why don’t you guys go stage at the school. I’m not sure exactly where I wanna put you guys yet. But I wanted that hotshot crew in my back pocket.
__________________________________________
Granted… that was ‘start of work day’, pretty much, and Abel really *was* ‘very busy’ at that point. It then took Abel almost an HOUR to get all the various engines and crews that were showing up assigned to various places.
However… I’m sure the ‘evacuation cycle’ was just as busy ( and confusing ) when it hit later on… and there might have been no other reason for asking GM to ‘come down’ ( and to HURRY ) than the same sort of “I just wanted Hotshots in my back pocket” mentality.
I would really hate to think that that is the reason why 19 good men died… just because someone wanted them ‘in their back pocket’ but would have ended up just letting them stand around in a parking lot like they did with the OTHER Type 1 Hotshot crew that was ALREADY THERE… .and totally available.
Mike, I absolutely believe that it does. Absolutely. 100%.
(I made a comment on IM long ago about this point and about the demographics of Yarnell/Glen Ilah, and, not surprisingly, I took a fair amount of pushback. It is clear from at least one ADOSH interview that leaps readily to mind that Dave Larson (or someone…) was on the same wavelength, for whatever that is worth. I’m not suggesting the GM guys SHOULD have tried to go to the BSR or wherever, but I am saying that they strike me as a bunch of men who were likely to want to try (if safely possible) help a vulnerable population. Human nature is what it is, and a lot of guys become wildfire professionals because they CARE.)
Elizabeth… I don’t think there is any question in the world that these were men who were ‘likely to try’ to help people. The pay wasn’t good enough to stick with that kind of work for any other reason…
…but ( as I think we have seen )… it is, in fact, possible to care TOO MUCH… if those urges make you forget the rules of your profession and take unnecessary risks with the very LIVES of the employees you are responsible for.
This applies to MANY professions… and not just firefighting.
Yes… they CARED.
But why did TWO of those men care SO much that they forgot the ‘rules’ of their profession *AND* what their PRIMARY responsibilities were… and it ended up
killing all 19?
This is the primary question that still remains to be answered.
Mike made a point or posed a query, and I agreed with his point/query.
That was the only purpose of my post.
…and I was agreeing with *both* of you. They CARED. A LOT…
…but that still doesn’t (fully) explain what happened in Yarnell on June 30, 2013.
The Republic, which I gather takes a fair amount of grief at times, continues to write on this story. This is at least the second significant piece they have done on the evacuations, both well after the incident. They have never tried to link the evacuations to the deaths of the GMHS, but I do think the delayed evacuation impacted some decision-making.
The Yavapai sheriff’s office basically said the evacuations were not perfect, but were good enough as no residents died or were seriously injured. I have a lot of problems with that thinking. First of all, there were near misses with residents. Second, I think some firefighters were left too long at the head of the fire west of town and there were apparently near misses there too. I think there was some reluctance to pull them out because they were trying to buy time. And finally, we may never know for sure the degree to which knowledge of the tardy evacuations impacted Granite Mountain’s actions. Maybe it played no role, but they knew of it and then they did something inexplicable. The questions about what could they have done, about what actions they thought they could do, are good ones. Maybe though they just felt the need to be “available”, to help if needed. Yes, they needed to say put, but am trying to fathom their thought process.
Anyways, those in charge of evacuations should not conclude the process was “adequate”, just because no residents were killed or injured.
Reply to mike post on
May 12, 2014 at 10:04 pm
>> mike said…
>> The Republic, which I gather
>> takes a fair amount of grief at
>> times, continues to write on
>> this story.
As well they should ( continue to write about this historic, tragic incident ).
>> mike also said…
>> They have never tried to link the
>> evacuations to the deaths of the
>> GMHS, but I do think the delayed
>> evacuation impacted some
>> decision-making.
Of course it did.
Suddenly… EVERYTHING was an EMERGENCY.
That affects EVERYONE involved *and* their decision making.
It ( the total chaos which created this sense of total EMERGENCY in a very short span of time ) could have been AVOIDED. No question.
The moment that thing marched right through that heavy retardant line like it wasn’t even THERE ( hundreds of yards north of even Cordes’ FIRST trigger point )… it didn’t take a genius to figure out there wasn’t much that was going to stop it. The Big Dog was going to just EAT. Get everyone OUT OF THE WAY. Like RIGHT NOW.
>> mike also said…
>> The questions about what could
>> they have done, about what
>> actions they thought they could
>> do, are good ones. Maybe though
>> they just felt the need to be
>> “available”, to help if needed.
Yes. Maybe having some Type 1 Hotshots in Yarnell in/around the time the ONLY thing to be doing was a total evacuation *might* have helped… and maybe that *was* what they were ‘thinking’…
…but just ONE quick call on the radio to discover that there were ALREADY 20 Elite Type 1 Hotshots right there ‘in the middle of the action’… with NO ONE giving them *ANY* assignment(s) whatsoever would have answered that question in their minds… toot-sweet.
That radio call never happened.
IMHO… It should have.
Even if they were half-way there… if they had discovered there wasn’t anything they were even going to be ALLOWED to do if they got all the way there ( just like Blue Ridge wasn’t being allowed to do anything at that time but *be safe* )… they could have TURNED BACK. There would still have been TIME to do that.
>> mike also said…
>> Anyways, those in charge of
>> evacuations should not conclude
>> the process was “adequate”, just
>> because no residents were killed
>> or injured.
No, they most certainly should NOT.
That’s just more ‘establishment of normalcy’ and ‘prior bad decisions with good outcomes’ crap.
Own it. Learn from it.
Find out what OTHER small Arizona towns don’t have a working siren at the fire station because the rats have chewed through the wires….
…then FIX it. ASAP.
Find out what OTHER small Arizona towns have never done a ‘reverse 911’ test to see if it is even going to work when the time comes…
…and do a TEST.
See if it IS going to work.
This is NOT rocket science.
** Regarding INJURIES…
There has ALWAYS been confusion and mis-reporting about that.
The LA Times and USA Today BOTH initially reported that in addition to the 19 fatalities… 22 other ‘firefighters and civilians’ were injured that afternoon.
Their own articles even stated that some of the ‘injured’ had to be flown to burn units because the nearby Congress hospital couldn’t handle them.
2 days later… the AP press was then reporting that there were NO serious injuries other than the 19 fatalities.
To this day, however, the Wikipedia page for the Yarnell Hill Fill is still ‘sticking to the story’ that there were MANY ‘others’ injured that day and they upped the number to 23.
The current ( active ) Wikipedia Page for the Yarnell Hill Fire is basically an absolute JOKE… but this is what their very OFFICIAL looking ‘information box’ about the Yarnell Hill Fire has said from day one and it has NEVER been ‘corrected’ by anyone…
Wikipedia
The Yarnell Hill Fire
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yarnell_Hill_Fire
______________________________
Location: Yarnell, Yavapai County, Arizona, U.S.
Coord: 34°14′54″N, 112°45′29″W
Date(s): June 28, 2013 – July 10, 2013
Burned area: 8,400 acres
Ignition source: Lightning
Land use: Mixed (residential/wildlands)
Buildings destroyed: 129
Fatalities: 19
Injuries (non-fatal): 23
______________________________
There are also (apparently) claims of ‘personal injuries’ in MANY of the 100+ claims that have been filed by property owners… but no one has done an actual ‘tally’ on that number.
Gary Cordes himself ( according to his own ADOSH interview ) was putting people into the backs of ambulances that afternoon… but there was no good followup on any of that, either.
So whether there *really* were any ‘injuries’ other than the 19 fatalities still remains a bit a mystery… but what else is new when it comes to YHF.
Followup 1
** ARTICLE CLAIMS 22
** INJURED IN YARNELL
Arizona: 19 Firefighter’s Dead and 22 Injured Battling the Yarnell Hill Fire
http://guardianlv.com/2013/06/arizona-19-firefighters-dead-and-22-injured-battling-the-yarnell-hill-fire/
From the article…
________________________
Eight of the 22 firefighters injured were taken to Wickenburg Community Hospital, some were airlifted to a burn unit in Pheonix, and others were transported to Yavapai Regional Medical Center, Glover said. The 19 firefighters who perished were part of the Granite Mountain Hot Shot Crew.
_________________________
This article lists ( and has links to ) what they say are their TWO sources for the article…
The LA Times and
USA Today.
Roxie Glover. Wow, have not seen that name for awhile. Fine woman. Amazing mother. Wow. I am looking at the link now:
http://guardianlv.com/2013/06/arizona-19-firefighters-dead-and-22-injured-battling-the-yarnell-hill-fire/
That photo is a picture of Bob Kramer’s place off highway 89 that the only thing that survived in his burnt fridge was a case of beer. You can see Bob on my photo area-
Who was injured in that fire?
Tex and I were just skimming and Joy saw Roxie’s name and that photo of Bob’s place and we are out hiking Zion country- God’s country for a bit and away from civilization but it was nice to see the forum going strong. Tex wondered has anyone looked into the ACTUAL DATE that restricted map was made for state land restriction for that area that is currently restricted (340 acres) beyond the Helm’s spot. Anyone know how to find that out? That lady in the red cross showed us a map that matched the map we got in an email mid July 2013. It is not being looked into much but we are wondering as time went by that Tex (Sonny) awoke at 3am this morning thinking of the 19 and that map and other areas. Has anyone new come out on photos/videos locally to help? I guess I will know when I keep skimming. Short on time. Skim for 10 minutes then off I have to go- Hope all you are well.
~Joy A. Collura
Followup 2…
The original LA Times article…
19 firefighters die in
Arizona wildfire
June 30, 2013 – By Matt Pearce and Cindy Carcamo
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jun/30/nation/la-na-nn-arizona-firefighters-dead-20130630
From the article…
________________________
Roxie Glover, a spokeswoman for Wickenburg Community Hospital, said officials had told her to expect injured firefighters — but then she was told they weren’t coming.
“It became clear that the firefighters had been deceased,” Glover told The LA Times. “We were told that we were not getting firefighters.”
Glover said officials told her that the 19 firefighters who had perished were part of the Granite Mountain Hot Shot Crew.
At least two (other) firefighters were evacuated by helicopter to a burn center in Phoenix, she said.
Glover said homeowners had flooded into the hospital, suffering from smoke inhalation and shock after losing their homes.
________________________
Followup 3…
The original USA Today article
USA Today
Article: 19 firefighters killed battling Arizona blaze
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/06/30/fire-in-arizona-prompts-evacuation-of-120-homes/2477469/
From the article…
________________________
Wickenburg Community Hospital is expecting to treat about eight firefighters who were among about 22 injured battling the fast-moving, 2,000-acre Yarnell Hill Fire that has burned through have the town, officials said Sunday evening.
The spokeswoman for Wickenburg hospital, Roxie Glover, said there are reports of as many as 22 firefighters being injured. About eight from that group were headed to the Wickenberg facility, some were being air lifted to a Phoenix burn unit and others were being transported to Yavapai Regional Medical Center, Glover said.
Jim Tavary, CEO of Wickenburg hospital, said his facility was put on alert to expect several injured firefighters but did not know their conditions or the extent of their injuries.
“We are setting up an incident command,” Tavary said.
Homes have burned and hospitals have reported injuries from the blaze that had reached Yarnell.
_________________________
And the SAIT and some others still think the Type II team did a good job. When a Cluster F*** starts it just acts like a rolling snow ball it gets bigger and bigger.
Poor planning, poor Safety and poor execution total lack of situation awareness.
Also why would any one think they could through a crew at the head of a running fire and do any thing? That includes Marsh and GM. Why would they think they could do something that no other Hand Crew has ever been able to do.
For all of you who have never fought fire….Direct attack starts by flanking the fire not taking it head on and pinching the head off. The running fire that afternoon was just plain get out of the way. To much fire and no place to make a stand, or no defensible space to protect structures. Evidenced by Fire Fighters Injuries (burns).
** TOM STORY’S CANON EOS 1D CAMERA WAS
** 36 MINUTES AND 7 SECONDS BEHIND THE
** REAL TIME ON JUNE 30, 2013.
Tom Story’s ‘Canon EOS 1D Mark II N’ camera had an incorrect time setting on June 30, 2013 that was always 36 minutes and 7 seconds BEHIND the REAL time.
The proof of this comes from comparing the following two images of the same VLAT drop ( One that Tom Story took and one that Panebaker took ) which took place circa 1715.28 on the NORTH side of the fire, along Hays Ranch Road in Peeples Valley.
Tom Story’s 201303_Yarnell_Hill_7093
*and*
Panebaker’s 20130630_171528-1_EP
BOTH of these photos show the same exact VLAT drop and were taken no more than 1 second apart, so the *known* correct timestamp on the Panebaker photo can simply be applied to the Tom Story photo, and used to compute the ‘time offset’ for Story’s ‘Canon EOS 1D’ that day.
Here is a VIDEO CROSSFADE between these two photos which PROVES that they are of the same VLAT drop and taken within 1 second of each other…
Youtube Video Title: Tom-Story-7093
Direct link to this VIDEO…
http://youtu.be/QixH_erZ5cc
YouTube About Information
_________________________________________________________________
This is a video crossfade between the following two photographs…
Tom Story’s 201303_Yarnell_Hill_7093 *and*
Panebaker’s 20130630_171528-1_EP
They are BOTH still photos of the same DC10 VLAT drop that took place circa 1715.27 ( 5:15.27 PM ) up on the NORTH side of the fire along Hays Ranch Road in Peeples Valley.
Tom Story shot his photo with a ‘Canon EOS 1D Mark II N’ camera with a 300mm f/2.8L Lens attached.
Panebaker shot his photo with a ‘Canon EOS REBEL T3i’ camera with a 15-85mm f/3.5-5.6 Lens attached.
The TIME on Tom Story’s ‘Canon EOS 1D’ was set incorrectly that day and it put an EXIF metadata timestamp on his 7093 photo of 4:39.21 PM. The actual time it was taken ( based on this comparison with the correctly-timestamped Panebaker photo ) is 5:15.28 PM.
That means that Story’s ‘Canon EOS 1D’ was always 36 minutes and 7 seconds BEHIND the REAL time on June 30, 2013.
The absolute proof that these are two photos of the same VLAT drop is really in the SMOKE cloud on the left side of both photos. It remains absolutely identical during the ‘crossfade’ between the two photos.
__________________________________________________________________
** MORE DETAIL…
Panebaker wasn’t just shooting videos that day.
Every time there was a VLAT drop… Panebaker also used his ‘Canon EOS REBEL T3i’ digital camera to shoot the drops ( these are all the ‘shutter clicks’ being heard in the Panebaker VIDEOS.
Those photos are in the online Dropbox in this folder…
Photos and Video / AerialFirefightingstudy / Panebaker / Photo / VLAT Drops
ONE of Panebaker’s photos of that 5:15.27 PM VLAT drop on the NORTH side of the fire is an almost perfect match for Tom Story’s 7093 photo.
Filename: 20130630_171528-1_EP
EXIF metadata for this Panebaker still image…
Camera: Canon EOS REBEL T3i
Lens: Canon EF-S 15-85mm f/3.5-5.6 IS USM
Lens 2: Shot at 85 mm
Exposure: Auto exposure, Program AE, 1/128 sec, f/5.6, ISO 320
Flash: Off, Did not fire
Focus: AI Servo AF, with a depth of field of from 59.7 m to 15.84 m.
Focus 2: AF Area Mode: Multi-point AF or AI AF
Date: June 30, 2013 – 5:15:27 PM
File: 3,456 × 5,184 JPEG (17.9 megapixels)
The EXIF timestamp of 5:15.27 PM ( 1715.27 ) matches the filename title of 171528 ( filename title is 1 second ahead of EXIF timestamp ).
Tom Story took 3 photos of this same moment of the same drop with his Canon EOS 1D.
All THREE have the same exact timestamp so he must have had his ‘auto-shutter’ motor on, leaned on the shutter button, and just took three photos as fast as the camera would take them.
NOTE: The 4:39.21 timestamps are according to HIS Canon EOS 1D but that is the issue. We know these timestamps are not correct. The KEY was finding out what the real ‘time offset’ was that day.
NOTE: His Canon EOS 1D was not ‘stuck’ on 4:39.21. His photos of the rest of this VLAT drop are stamped with the correct incremental seconds values like 4:39.22 and 4:39.23, etc. He really did take these 3 photos all in the same ‘second’ at 4:39.21.
201303_Yarnell_Hill_7093 – 4:39:21
201303_Yarnell_Hill_7094 – 4:39:21
201303_Yarnell_Hill_7095 – 4:39.21
The FIRST one ( 7093 ) is the best ‘exact match’ for the same photo in the Panebaker Air Study Video ‘Photos’ folder.
In-between the Panebaker and Tom Story photo, the DC10 has, in fact, advanced about 1 plane length.
That means that while both of these photos were taken at almost the same moment… the Panebaker image was actually shot FIRST.
Given the rate of movement as seen and timestamped in other photos/videos of this VLAT drop… I would say that only 1 second has elapsed between when Panebaker pressed his shutter button and then Tom Story pressed his.
So.. since the actual EXIF timestamp for this photo is 1715.27… that puts a REAL timestamp on Story’s 7093 photo of…
1715.28 ( 5:15.28 PM ).
The difference, then, between the ACTUAL time Tom Story’s 7093 photo was taken and the incorrect 4:39.21 PM that his Canon 1D ‘stamped’ it would be…
+36 minutes and 7 seconds. ( 1715.28 minus 1639.21 ).
BOTTOM LINE: This PROVES that there was NO VLAT DROP on the SOUTH side of the fire at 4:39 PM that day, which is what Tom Story’s photos seemed to suggest. That would have meant there was a DC10 VLAT drop taking place at the exact moment that Captain Jesse Steed was making his first MAYDAY call.
That is why it was IMPORTANT to figure out WHY Tom Story’s photos might have been suggesting such a drop at that time.
It didn’t happen.
He ( Tom Story ) simply had the TIME set WRONG on his Canon EOS 1D.
Heh! Thanks for doing this!!
You sent me to the Google to do a little Canon 1D History!! Shows how much I pay attention to cameras that cost five times more than I can even contemplate affording!
That is NOT a new camera!! The 1D Mark ii n came out in 2005!! It was about $4000 then. Google shows one on ebay today for $790.
HOWEVER the 1D’s have always been considered the fastest cameras on the market. They’re the supreme sports photography cameras. It wasn’t STUCK on a second. It could shoot 8.5 frames per second. The current 1D Mark iv can shoot 10 frames per second. Tom’s 5D Mark ii’s can only shoot 4 frames per second. And the 1D is a 1.3 crop frame, a little smaller than full frame, which gives it more “reach.”
That’s why when you watch the Olympics the 1D is what most of the photographers are using. So when Tom wanted a combination of speed and reach, that’s when he went for the relatively ancient but still awesome 1D.
Actually Tom shot 21 frames of that whole drop. The first being at x:xx:18. The last being at x:xx:29. There are at least nine frames that he shot that he didn’t put into that folder.
So now that means possibly having to go back to McCord’s VLAT-helicopter-almost-fiasco video and seeing if that possibly changes its timing (and thus the rest of his coolpix images). It might and it might not. And it may not matter in the general scheme of things.
So, we have another mystery solved!
Thanks!
And PS. I’ve been using Canon Rebels since 2007. I currently use the t3i. It’s the most popular “non-professional” dslr on the planet. I have a three-day “how to shoot video with your dslr” class beginning today. So I may not be around too much.
Marti… sidenote…
Have you seen the Tom Story photos that DO actually have some GPS information in them?… but that GPS data is totally screwed up?
I find that very unusual. Usually these GPS chipsets in these devices either WORK… or they don’t.
There is always a ‘startup time’ for GPS if you have just turned the device on and sometimes you won’t be getting truly ACCURATE GPS coordinates until you have acquired at least 4 or 5 of the LEO ( Low Earth Orbit ) satellites…
…but Tom Story’s GPS capable device ( I have no idea what camera that really was ) just seems BROKEN.
It’s also VERY unusual that, in the EXIF data for these GPS stamped photos of his, there is no CAMERA or DEVICE information whatsoever.
Very unusual.
Sometimes the CAMERA or DEVICE Model number or ID is one of the ONLY things a cheap camera will add as EXIF data… but I’ve never seen a device that is adding other sophisticated EXIF data ( like GPS )… but also seems to be REFUSING to add any actual CAMERA or DEVICE information.
So it wasn’t a Canon…
and it wasn’t an iPhone or an iPad.
I have NO IDEA what camera he was using for those (incorrectly) stamped GPS photos.
It was some kind of smartphone pic that he was posting to Instagram. I’m such a bozo re smartphones.
But I’ve looked at LOTS of various smartphone pix from this fire, and the way they get tagged and time stamped is all over the boards. And we had a discussion way back when about how the geotagging etc could be easily way off. It takes awhile for that to set itself up.
I’ve seen LOTS of smartphone geotagging from this fire that is also all over the boards. I haven’t come to expect any kind of accuracy on any of this stuff at all.
**
** MORE ON THE TOM STORY CANON EOS 1D PHOTO TIMESTAMPS
** AND THE (SUPPOSED) VLAT DROP AT 1639
Reply to Marti Reed post on May 11, 2014 at 8:54 am said:
>> Marti said…
>> I had downloaded a smattering of photos from both folders, but
>> just kinda randomly. Just downloaded a bunch more,
>> more strategically. Looks like he photographed three VLAT drops.
Yes, it does.
>> Marti also said…
>> I’m starting to think he set up that camera quickly, just setting the
>> date, and not the time. Thus the stamp when first shot a frame on
>> it would have been 00:00:00. I don’t know if I have the time to figure
>> out what to synch on. But if I can pin one of those VLATs, it might
>> be possible to nail it.
>>
>> That being said, I’m currently thinking that drop might be the 1707ish
>> one. I just don’t know where he took it from. I don’t know where that
>> drop was, exactly. Do you?
I’ve been hard working on that here ( the actual LOCATION of that VLAT drop in
the Tom Story Canon EOS 1D photos ) and I can almost say with little doubt
that regardless of he 4:39 timestamp(s)… that is actually EXACTLY where
we see the Air Study people filming those earlier VLAT drops off on that
small ridge at the NORTH end of the fire… up in Peeples Valley.
So YES… regardless of device timestamp… it looks like that 4:39 series
of photos coming from Ton Story’s ‘Canon EOS 1D Mark II N’ are of the
SAME VLAT DROPS captured in the Panebaker videos… much earlier.
Exactly WHICH Panebaker video is a match?
I am on that right now… taking stillframes from Panebaker videos and
comparing them to the Tom Story photo(s).
>> Marti also wrote…
>> If it was visible from the RHR parking lot, he could have caught
>> it w/that 300mm easily.
Yes… but see above. It looks like those photos were taken all the
way up NORTH of the same VLAT drop(s) seen in the Panebaker
Air Study videos.
It even looks like Tom Story might have been standing almost exactly
where the Air Study group was and using his 300mm lens from there.
>> Marti Reed also said ( on May 11, 2014 at 9:19 am )…
>>
>> Hah! I just found what looks like a tight sequence of the same event,
>> using both a Mark D and the 1D! It’s the red and white helicopter
>> picking up a bucket at the helispot and heading into the smoke…
>> Looks good…more later….
Bingo! I agree. That looks like the ‘moment’ when he decided to
actually switch between the 5D and the 1D.
>> Marti also said…
>> OK, if this helicopter sequence shows the 1D is set about 20 minutes
>> late, that would put the problematic VLAT drop at 4:17– the split drop.
Yes. This is starting to fall into place now.
That VLAT drop (supposedly) photographed by Tom Story with his
Canon 1D at 4:39 PM ( the exact minute of Steed’s first MAYDAY )
looks more and more like simply one of the same VLAT drops that
happened much earlier and captured by one of the Panebaker videos.
Still not *EXACTLY* sure it was the 4:17 ‘split drop’ video… but I am
all over that and will have some results of my own soon about that.
I would bet my kittehs on it.
Bcuz, I wrote mistakenly below that he shot the second T 911 sequence (the one Blue Ridge was capturing with the almost helicopter snafu) on on the Mark D II. He actually shot it on the D1. And the first image is stamped 2:00:23. If you pull that stamp back 22 minutes (like I think you need to with the long two-camera helicopter and the third sequence) that puts it at 1:38:23. Right when it would be flying out of that drop. I think we’ve got it. At least good enough for well, what we need. If some overpaid lawyer’s crew wants to get more exact, that’s fine with me!!!!
And thanks for pulling this up out of the weeds!
Oops. It’s the T 910. Haven’t had time to keyword this stuff yet.
Location is *confirmed*.
That Tom Story VLAT sequence which *appears* to have been taken at 4:39 PM ( according to his Canon 1D ) was definitely shot almost exactly where the Panebaker Air Study videos were being taken up on Hays Ranch Road some time earlier and looking WEST at the SEAT / VLAT drops.
** Panebaker Air Study video
** 20130630_161858_VLAT_split_2_EP
The ‘focus’ starts out fine in this video, but at about +7 seconds, when the ZOOM starts to capture the actual VLAT drop, the focus goes blurry, recovers a little, but never really returns to ‘sharp’ focus the whole time it is ZOOMED…
…EXCEPT for a brief moment at exactly +20 seconds. He recovers ‘sharp’ focus while ZOOMED for just a split second, but then loses it again.
A freeze-frame of that split-second when it is both ZOOMED and in ‘sharp focus’ proves that the terrain matches the Tom Story photos exactly… right down to the trees on the ridge in the foreground.
The ‘terrain’ in both the foreground and the background is, in fact, an ‘exact match’ for the Tom Story Canon EOS 1D photo sequence.
Now… is Tom’s photo sequence simply ‘stillframes’ of this same exact VLAT drop shown in this Panebaker video?
Not 100 percent on that yet.
There are similarities… but not seeing an ‘exact match’ yet.
Stay tuned. Tom was apparently in a slightly different spot on the side of Hays Ranch road than the Air Study fellas so the ‘perspective’ on the drop is slightly different. The ‘retardant’ in the Panebaker video seems to fall much farther ‘into the smoke’ than is shown in Tom’s photo sequence…
…but the DC10’s ‘hard left on exit’ is a MATCH in both the video and Tom’s photo sequence.
I’m still comparing stillframes from this Panebaker video to the Tom Story photo(s) to see if we can get this down to an EXACT time offset for Story’s Canon 1D.
The one thing we know for SURE now… is that Story’s Canon 1D photo is *NOT* a photograph of any VLAT drop that was happening at 1639, at the same exact time Steed’s first MAYDAY went out.
That is now *CONFIRMED*.
I actually accidentally downloaded the USDA 1640 Air Study video yesterday, intending to download the later one. So I sat and watched it three times, just to get familiar with the jargon, the planes, the kind of communication going on. It’s a really helpful one to watch, because there is a LOT of stuff going on right in front of the camera. The one after it with the air 2 air of the 1633 drop and the 1647 whatever is not as good, because they don’t zoom in so you can’t really see anything, like the Panebaker does with that 1633 drop.
So, yeah, I watched the VLAT split drop quite handily three times over. So when I went to recheck those photos I instantly recognized the spot. That smoke to the left is over the helicopter “horseshoe dip.”
I think he’s at a different angle from the videos, although I haven’t watched the Panebakers, they’re still……..down…..loading.
With that 300 mm lens, it’s hard to tell, but when the plane lifts, it’s right over his head. And I don’t know whether this is the first or second drop, and i’m not sure it’s possible to tell. The plane was flying the exact same path, just dropping at the “front” end (which is actually called the “tail” because its the last part dropped) and extending it.
You can really get a much better grasp on it by watching the USDA video with the air 2 air. Very detailed conversation going on.
Finding that overlapping helicopter sequence was like a HAPPY Mother’s Day Gift, believe me. Thanks Tom Story!!
It also confirmed that my re-time-stamping of McCord’s camera was not terribly off, which I wasn’t sure of. Things could be several minutes off, but it looks like I’ve got all of this basically synced.
Thanks, Lightroom!
Typo alert: the USDA 1620 Air Study Video
Update: It appears that the VLAT drop captured
in the Panebaker Air Study video titled…
20130630_161858_VLAT_split_2_EP
…is NOT the VLAT drop in Tom Story’s Volume 2
photo sequence.
In Tom’s photo sequence… we see the VLAT in ‘level flight’ at the peak of retardant output.
In the Panebaker 161858 video… pretty much at NO TIME during the drop is the DC10 actually in ‘level flight’. That video basically shows him dropping in a ‘constant curve’ and already heading to his left before the ‘cutoff’ moment.
The VLAT drop Tom Story photographed makes the same kind of ‘hard left on exit’ after drop… but definitely came in straighter ( and lower ) than the drop seen in the Panebaker video.
So on to the USDA videos.
Probably a more likely ‘match’ there…
…but we are still NOT WRONG about LOCATION.
Tom Story definitely photographed a VLAT drop at that same location as these Air Study videos… onto that ridge up there off Hays Ranch Road in Peeples Valley.
Thanks. It has to be one of those drops. Because there aren’t that many VLAT drops, and ONLY drop in that location is the split drop. So it’s the other drop. It has to be.
Yeah, go watch the USDA video. And actually the entire Panebaker 3-part sequence.
Thanks for doing this. I’m too lazy.
Marti… just an FYI… see posts below about helicopters. In the course of watching these Air Study videos all over again I’ve found at least one more ( so far ) very *NEAR MISS* between a fixed-wing and a helicopter.
This one looked even CLOSER than the skycrane versus DC10 one earlier in the day.
It’s in Panebaker Air Study video
20130630_153414_EP at the
+11 second mark.
Lead plane is on a line-up from east to west parallel to Hays Ranch Road… but a chopper with a bucket is coming up on a south to north line on the OTHER side of the smoke cloud.
Chopper crosses RIGHT in front of the lead plane at exact same altitude with only a few seconds to spare.
Thx, will check it out!
That is also why you keep hearing French say “…and I need a HARD LEFT on the exit” whenever they were dropping at that spot up along Hays Ranch Road.
The helicopters were all ‘crossing’ Hays Ranch Road to get to the Helibase as they were doing all that retardant work on that ridge.
I believe French was AWARE of these few close calls and that’s why he then kept emphasizing a ‘hard left turn’ coming out of the drops after that.
Yes, and also the “horseshoe dip was right across from the helibase. Very tight quarters, indeed.
Reply to Marti Reed post
on May 11, 2014 at 9:04 pm
>> Marti said…
>> It has to be one of those drops.
>> Because there aren’t that many
>> VLAT drops, and ONLY drop in
>> that location is the split drop.
>> So it’s the other drop. It has to be.
It is. ( the 5:15 VLAT drop up along Hays Ranch Road on the NORTH side of the fire ).
Totally confirmed.
See new post above including a new
VIDEO CROSSFADE on YouTube
that proves it.
Story’s Canon EOS 1D was always 36 minutes and 7 seconds BEHIND the REAL time that day.
**
** CLINT CLAUSON ( ATS TRAINEE FLYING IN BRAVO 33 )
** RECORDED THE TIME OF STEED’S FIRST MAYDAY?
As long as we are still sort of ‘focused’ on these *VERY* confusing SAIT interview notes with Bravo 33… I think it’s worth pointing out something else.
When the SAIR came out… it was astounding how *LITTLE* information they were providing with regards to ‘sources’ for the narrative timeline and other (supposedly) ‘factual’ statements they were making.
ONE of those things has always been…
How did they arrive at a time of 1639 for Steed’s first MAYDAY call?
They just published that time as FACT… and there wasn’t even a ‘footnote’ to indicate how they arrived at that (specific) time.
Sure… a LOT of people HEARD this call… but no one seemed to be SURE what TIME it really was.
The SAIT also already knew about Aaron Hulburd’s Helmet-Cam video and this is obviously where they were taking a lot of what was then SAID and ‘paraphrasing’ it in their SAIR report…. but they also knew they were NOT going to release that Helmet-Cam video to the public along with the report…
…but ( as we know now )… the TIMESTAMPS on Aaron Hulburd’s Helmet-Cam device were also a little ‘wonky’ that day and not entirely accurate.
So how did the SAIT really ‘nail down’ the 1639 time for Steed’s Mayday?
The answer might be the SECOND SENTENCE of their later-released interview with Bravo 33 in their SAIT Investigation Notes .
__________________________________________________________________
SAIT INTERVIEW WITH BRAVO 33 – July 9, 2013 – 1700
Interviewees: Bravo 33
John Burfiend – ATS Specialist ( Air Attack duties / Monitoring Air-To-Ground )
Clint Clauson – ATS Trainee
Thomas French – AT Specialist ( Pilot, Lead Plane / Monitoring Air-To-Air )
SAIT Interviewers: Dudley, Mayhew, Foley, Kurth, Rocha
We were ordered as lead air attack to relieve Bravo 3.
Clint did record a few times on air tankers departing and
when the frantic call was made.
_________________________________________________________________
This mysterious ‘Clint Clauson’ person is never “quoted” at all in the interview ( or never even asked any questions? )…. but this SECOND sentence in the interview notes DOES establish that he seemed to be ‘writing some TIMES down’ that day… INCLUDING the moment of Steed’s first (frantic) MAYDAY call.
I would also say this one sentence in the SAIT notes also pretty much
establishes all of the following…
1) Clint Clauson was onboard as an ‘ATS Trainee’. Burfiend is listed as ‘ATS’ and French is only listed as ‘AT’… so that means Clauson was most probably ‘mentoring’ with Burfiend that day and NOT French.
2) If Clauson was ‘mentoring’ with only Burfiend… then that means Clauson would probably ALSO have been listening to the same radio channel Burfiend was. That means Clauson was listening exclusively to the ‘Air-To-Ground’ channel and was hearing everything that Burfiend was (including Steed’s first MAYDAY in real time).
3) Clauson apparently WROTE DOWN the TIME they heard Steed’s first MAYDAY call ( described in SAIT notes as ‘the frantic call’ ). As in… on a piece of PAPER.
4) Even though Clauson apparently was never asked anything by the SAIT investigators and there is no record of him ever SAYING anything in the interview… the notes still imply that Clauson might have given them a ‘document’ or a ‘piece of paper’ that had these TIMES that he recorded written on it. If so… that document was NOT included in the SAIT FOIA/FOIL package and ( if it exists ) is just one more document that would seem to have been *withheld* by Arizona Forestry from legitimate ( legal ) FOIA/FOIL requests. We already KNOW that Arizona Forestry *DID* withhold any number of documents. Maybe this ‘piece of paper’ from Clauson is simply one of those ‘withheld’ documents.
So… REGARDLESS of whether there was an actual DOCUMENT ( or copy of
one ) handed by Clauson to the SAIT investigators that had ‘1639’ written down for the time they heard the first ‘frantic call’… SOMEHOW that ‘1639’ time was COMMUNICATED to the SAIT investigators ( but is also never mentioned in the interview notes ).
So THIS *might* be how the SAIT was so SURE that Steed’s first MAYDAY actually took place at 1639, despite poor recollections and a wonky timestamps on the Aaron Hulburd Helmet-Cam video.
They might have been totally trusting what this mysterious ATS Trainee Clint Clauson had actually WRITTEN DOWN ( or, perhaps, just TOLD them verbally during the interview, according to his recollection ) as the TIME for Steed’s first ‘frantic call’… and they ‘adjusted’ all the other times/events based on that.
Great catch! ATS means Air Tactical Supervisor. AT or ATP means Air Tactical Pilot.
I bet that guy knows a whole lot more than he’s letting on to.
PS. Great Resource:
The Interagency Aerial Supervision Guide:
http://www.blm.gov/pgdata/etc/medialib/blm/nifc/aviation/aerial_supervision.Par.58629.File.dat/IASG.pdf
Has quite a bit of stuff (most of which I don’t understand, but might be useful) about radios.
And a bunch of other stuff.
**
** PICKUP TRUCK BURNED INSIDE RANCH ‘SAFETY ZONE’
There has always been a folder in Mr. Dougherty’s online Dropbox that says it contains ‘Pre-Fire images from Boulder Springs Ranch’, but there has also always been a ‘glitch’ in the linking that was sending clicks to another ( different ) folder.
That ‘glitch’ is GONE… and now we can see the full set of pre-fire images taken at the Boulder Springs Ranch ‘safety zone’.
There are even some ‘post-fire’ images included for a ‘before/after’ glimpse of some parts of the compound.
The following link now takes you right to the correct folder…
Folder: Helms Ranch Photos Pre-Fire
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/02ue6bnjp6nazkm/AABhgJJer7PG8OD2IhAwQYZ4a/Photos%20and%20Video/Helm%20Ranch%20Photos%20Pre-Fire#/
There are at least TWO photos there which verify what Joy Collura reported about the FENCING on the western side of the compound ( The direction Granite Mountain was approaching from ). It does, in fact, appear to simply be 3 strands
of barbed wire. Nothing substantial.
There are also TWO photos of an antique pickup truck that was parked well INSIDE the ‘safety zone’ up in the northwest part of the compound.
One photo of the antique pickup truck is pre-fire.
Another is post-fire.
You can see the ‘before/after’ for this vehicle. It got fried.
The entire back-half and wooden bed of the pickup burned
up completely, along with both back tires ( completely melted ).
This ‘antique pickup truck’ was exactly here ( INSIDE ) the ‘safety zone’…
34.219495, -112.771250
It was sitting 98 feet INSIDE the ‘safety zone’ from the fence that established the western edge of the compound and only 46 feet from the northwest corner of the Llama barn next to the house.
The last photo in the set ( with a name of vegetation-on-hills-.jpg ) actually shows how FAR inside the perimeter of the ‘safety zone’ this burned pickup truck was… and how CLOSE it was to the Llama pens and the barn.
NOTE: The actual NAME of the post-fire photo of the burned pickup truck is ‘truck Yarnall 15 June 001.JPG’ but the date indicated in this hand-modified title is INCORRECT.
The post-fire photo of the burned pickup truck was ACTUALLY taken well AFTER the fire on September 14, 2013.
The ACTUAL EXIF data embedded in the ‘after fire’ photo of the
pickup truck is as follows…
Camera: Canon PowerShot A4000 IS
Date: September 14, 2013 – 11:56:39 AM
Lens: 5 – 40 mm – Shot at 15.1 mm (shot wide open)
Exposure: Auto exposure, 1/1,002 sec, f/4, ISO 125
Flash: Auto, Did not fire
Focus: Single, Face Detect, with a depth of field of from 18.2 m to infinity.
Focus 2: AF Area Mode: Multi-point AF or AI AF
File: 3,456 × 4,608 JPEG (15.9 megapixels)
I would say the truck burned because of the straw in the back of it
possibly by direct flame but more likely by sparks that ignited the straw and burnt the truck. Sill interesting….
Reply to Bob Powers post on May 11, 2014 at 10:45 am
>> Mr. Powers said…
>> I would say the truck burned because of the straw in
>> the back of it… possibly by direct flame but more likely
>> by sparks that ignited the straw and burnt the truck.
Agree. That was a LOT of ‘straw’ piled in the back of the thing and you can even see a burned-up gasoline can there in pile in the aftermath photo.
It’s also possible that the ’embers’ ignited that small tree that was near it first… then the ‘open flame’ from the tree nailed the straw.
>> Mr. Powers wrote…
>> Still interesting….
Yes. Definite proof that even though the structures didn’t appear to suffer any damage at all… the ‘open area’ of the ‘safety zone’ was no picnic that afternoon.
It definitely wasn’t one of those ‘sit in the middle in a lawn chair and drink a beer and watch the fire go by’ kind of ‘safety zones’. More like ‘you better be inside one of the bulidings’ kind of ‘safety zone’.
Probably also a good lesson there for anyone trying to ‘fire proof’ their own compounds. These pictures prove that regardless of how far INSIDE your compound there are ‘small trees’ or other ‘combustibles’ ( like bales of hay )… they probably ARE going to IGNITE under similar circumstances… so BEWARE.
Even if you have a 600 foot wide ‘clearing’ around your house… make sure you haven’t kept ‘trees’ right next to your house and make sure all ‘combustibles’ are INSIDE or… at least… out on the PERIMETER and not near a structure.
Confession time. My urban backyard is full of dead stuff. I don’t live in the WUI, but the wind is blowing, we’re in endless drought here in N Mexico, and I’ve spent inordinate amounts of time reading about fire lately. Tomorrow morning I intend to make an appointment to get rid of the dead stuff in my backyard. Now that it’s finally possible to tell the dead stuff from the live stuff.
Every fifth post in my New Mexico Twitter Stream is about Wildfire Preparedness. We shall see……..
I’m dreading this wildfire season in New Mexico……..
I spent eight years living in the forest outside of Flagstaff. You couldn’t pay me enough to live in the forest now, or in the East Sandia Mountains, although I’d love to….
And it’s only gonna get worse….
By the way… that ‘pile of crap’ on the left-hand side of the ‘post-fire’ photo with the fried pickup truck is the burned-up remnants of a wooden wagon that was also there INSIDE the ‘safety zone’.
You can see what that wagon looked like BEFORE it got fried to nothing in the ‘pre-fire’ photo of the pickup truck.
It did NOT have any ‘hay’ or ‘straw’ in it… but it burned to the ground, anyway.
One more followup…
If you look at the last photo on that page ( which shows the pickup truck and the wooden wagon pre-fire ) you will see that there was ALSO actually a STRUCTURE there in-between them pre-fire.
Some kind of storage shed? Looks to be wooden.
That STRUCTURE is TOTALLY GONE in the post-fire pictures and only that 50-gallon drum is left standing there.
Not too surprising. That STRUCTURE appears to have been sitting right BETWEEN the two small trees that were there INSIDE the ‘safety zone’.
When those two trees ‘lit up’… it must have been quite a BLAZE going there INSIDE the ‘safety zone’ and just 46 feet from the Llama barn.
Amazing job on the supposed 16:37 Marsh transmission. That is some impressive collective work! It’s not easy to prove the absence of a thing, yet I think you’ve pretty much wrapped that one up.
I’m still confused about how you are using VHF vs. UHF to refer to radio traffic. Here is how I understand frequencies:
VHF = Very High Frequency = [30 – 300 Mhz]
UHF = Ultra High Frequency = [300 Mhz – 3 Ghz]
Source = http://wiki.radioreference.com/index.php/Spectrum
All(?) radio communications on non-military incidents (including fire, Search and Rescue, police, etc.) take place over VHF. This includes air-to-air, air-to-ground, dispatch, and all ground crews.
Air-to-air tends to span from 121.x Mhz to 123.x Mhz. Fire/police/EMS in my area use frequencies in the range of 154.x – 173.x Mhz. (This may differ in areas near large bodies of water, as this overlaps with Marine VHF). Bendix King handheld and mobile (vehicle) radios used on fire generally transmit and receive in the 136 – 174 Mhz range. Dispatchers and repeater stations transmit and receive larger parts of the spectrum. Airguard and air-to-ground frequencies are in the 160s, so ground crews can monitor and transmit on them. For obvious reasons, transmissions on the airband range are more tightly controlled (non-pilot radio operators get permitted, and base stations are licensed).
In summary, all of these Yarnell radio communications are VHF, though air-to-air and air-to-tower transmissions are on a lower frequency of VHF than air-to-ground and ground-to-ground. Do I have this right?
Reply to Sitta post on May 10, 2014 at 10:44 pm
>> Sitta said…
>> Amazing job on the supposed 16:37 Marsh transmission.
>> That is some impressive collective work!
>> It’s not easy to prove the absence of a thing,
No. It most certainly is NOT ( easy ).
>> Sitta also said…
>> yet I think you’ve pretty much wrapped that one up.
Well… perhaps not yet. Still needs another few passes.
There is some other evidence in the public record that is
relevant. Still ‘looking’ at all that. Stay tuned.
>> Sitta also said…
>> In summary, all of these Yarnell radio communications are
>> VHF, though air-to-air and air-to-tower transmissions are on
>> a lower frequency of VHF than air-to-ground and ground-
>> to-ground. Do I have this right?
Well… YES… you probably do.
Probably should have done this yesterday ( before all the VHF/UHF lingo entered the picture )… but here are the channels that were
actually ‘in use’ that weekend ( along with exact frequencies )…
From PDF page 22 of the Arizona Forestry SAIR report itself…
______________________________________________________
Radio Frequencies
The Yarnell Hill Fire was assigned Group 1 A1S PHX District
channels on June 28. On June 30 at 1022, the communications
plan was as follows:
Channel No., Channel Name, Assignment
1, AZSF1, Command
5, VFIRE21, Optional Tactical, Unassigned
6, AZSFTAC1, Tactical 1, Div A and Div Z
7, AZSFTAC2, Tactical 3, Structure Protection Group 1
8, AZSFTAC3, Tactical 2, Structure Protection Group 2
10, AZSFTAC5, Air-Ground
16, AIRGUARD, Air Guard Channel
Early in the day on June 30, there was limited use of AZSFTAC3
Tactical 3 by Granite Mountain IHC, Blue Ridge IHC, and heavy
equipment boss. Tactical 3 was assigned to Structure Protection
Group 1 at 1200 that day.
___________________________________________________
The exact frequencies assigned to Arizona’s
“Group 1 A1S PHX District Channels” are as follows…
Channel, Function, Frequency, Tone, Mode, Assignment
1, TAC 1, RX: 168.0500, TX: 168.0500, 123.0, N, OPS / DIV
2, TAC 2, RX: 168.2000, TX: 168.2000, 123.0, N, OPS / DIV
3, TAC 3, RX: 168.6000, TX: 168.6000, 123.0, N, OPS / DIV
4, TAC 4, RX: 166.7250, TX: 166.7250, 123.0, N, OPS / DIV
5, TAC 5, RX: 166.7750, TX: 166.7750, 123.0, N, OPS / DIV
6, TAC 6, RX: 168.2500, TX: 168.2500, 123.0, N, Unassigned
7, CMD C-2, RX: 168.1000, TX: 170.4500, 123.0, N, Command
8, CMD C-9, RX: 160.0125, TX: 165.2500, 123.0, N, Command
9, AZ State Fire, RX: 151.4000, TX: 159.4050, 162.2, N, AZ State Fire RPTR
10, Prescott NF Fire Net, RX: 164.3525, TX: 172.6125, 103.5, N, Forest Fire Net RPTR
11, Blank
12, MUTL AID, RX: 154.2800, TX: 154.2800, 0.0, N, Mutual Aid
13, AIR/GND, RX: 169.2000, TX: 169.2000, 0.0, N, Primary A/G
14, AIRGUARD, RX: 168.6250, TX: 168.250, 0.0, N, Air Guard
15, WEATHER, RX: 162.4000, TX: 0.0, 0.0, N, Weather Broadcast
16, AIRGUARD, RX: 168.6250, TX: 168.6250, 110.9, N, Air Guard
ALL of the frequencies assigned to this Arizona
“Group 1 A1S PHX District Channels” are in the
range from ( low/high )…
154.2800 ( Mutual Aid ) up to 170.4500 ( Command 2 )
That matches what you said is used in YOUR area…
>> Sitta said…
>> Fire/police/EMS in my area use frequencies in
>> the range of 154.x – 173.x Mhz.
The most IMPORTANT thing to notice is that there is NO
PUBLISHED ‘Air-To-Air’ channel in this frequency group.
Only an ‘Air-To-Ground’ channel.
Even if you CLONED your radio off of someone else that day… you would still have had to specifically ‘punch in’ an Air-To-Air frequency and add it manually to the bank to talk on the ‘Air-To-Air’ channel.
Good reason for that.
The Air guys will not ( and SHOULD not ) tolerate just anyone
transmitting on whatever Air-To-Air channel they are using.
That would be a nightmare ( for them ).
So you are saying that the Bendix-King radios could not be programed for Air to Air at the lower freq. of 121-123 ?
As I have tough although the newer Radios are different than the ones I used 20 years ago. So there would be a separate radio for
the air to air and special separate Freq.? would certain fire officials and others have those radios in their vehicles? I know we did back when. Like the helitack truck and dispatch both FS & BLM as well as some county and city as well as State rigs.
One of the newer ( and more expensive ) Bendix Kings
on sale (today) at Amazon.
This is what they choose to call their COMMAND VERSION
of even the more basic ( and cheaper ) BK GPH5102… and even this COMMAND version doesn’t have the 121-123 frequency range.
This puppy is $1,325 smackeroos… and it STILL won’t give you an Air-To-Air Channel if it’s down in the 120’s.
http://www.amazon.com/GPH5102X-CMD-Analog-Handheld-Command-Version/dp/B00AA0DIBI
________________________________________________
GPH5102X-CMD Analog Bendix King Handheld
(Command Version)
500 Channels, 25 User Groups, 20 Channels per Group
136-174 MHz Frequency Range
5/1.5 watts RF Power
MIL-STD 810
Programmable Soft Switches
1 new from $1,325.00
_______________________________________________
Maybe there’s a regulation about that?
I can’t quote them at the moment… but I’m SURE there ARE tight regulations about who is ever ‘allowed’ to even be transmitting on ‘Air-To-Air’ channels.
Could you imagine if anyone could just walk out of a Radio Shack and immediately start transmitting on ‘Air-To-Air’ channels.
“Hey!… Delta Airlines!… I see you up there! How’s it goin’!… where ya headed!”
YIKES.
I wrote somewhere else something about this:
Interagency Aerial Supervision Guide:
http://www.blm.gov/pgdata/etc/medialib/blm/nifc/aviation/aerial_supervision.Par.58629.File.dat/IASG.pdf
It has a lot of stuff about radio frequencies. I don’t really understand it because I don’t understand radio frequencies.
But somebody like you might want to peruse it. It’s more complicated than we think. I think there was more going on than we’re currently aware of. And I think you might find it quite useful for getting a finer understanding of what the possibilities/probabilities might be.
Including possible helicopter stuff. And a few other things.
Also I asked somewhere below, “What is Air Guard?” Now I know.
I just what to say to you Sitta, thanks for coming back and helping out. I’ve missed your voice.
I think what we’re doing now is an example of what we can do when we work together at solving problema, even when we disagree/see things differently, respectfully with each other, communicating back and forth, knowing none of us is exactly “right,” we’re all seeing different things at different times, from different perspectives and different knowledge bases. We all have different things/skills/perspectives to offer.
I love it when this happens.
It’s all about respect.
**
** Reply to calvin post on May 10, 2014 at 2:49 am
>> calvin said…
>>
>> WTKTT… The slash across the throat sign has always bothered me.
>> How could he ( John Burfiend ) be so certain that they were dead?
>> Really, how?? How did he know they were dead when he didn’t
>> even know where they were??
>> WTF
calvin…
The SAIT interview notes with Bravo 33 are an absolute MESS… but if you read them *very* carefully it would appear that John Burfiend ( who was the right-seat guy, not flying the airplane, and the one who was monitoring Air-To-Ground channel ) did his ‘slash across his throat’ gesture just AFTER Marsh’s final transmission when Marsh ‘affirmed’ that they were on the ‘SOUTH side of the fire’.
Even if they couldn’t see them… I think Burfiend could tell looking downward at that moment that anyone deploying on the SOUTH side of that exploding fireline was a goner. Hence… ‘slash across the throat’ gesture over to Thomas French.
Here is the exact ‘context’ of that testimony from Thomas French in the SAIT interview notes. It seems to confirm that Burfiend’s ‘slash across his throat’ gesture to French did, in fact, come right after Marsh’s *final* transmission…
__________________________________________________________________
We were right here (pointed at map) when Granite Mountain 7 called screaming in the radio. Ops said “are you getting this? I told Granite Mountain 7 “you need to calm down. I can’t understand you”. Immediately Division A called and said “we are starting a burn out, we are getting in our shelters. I said we got pople in trouble. Tanker called and said I got you in sight. I claimed out – the DC10 swung wide. I looked at John and he did this (slash across the throat). I told Kevin to stand by copy, taking it around. We have a crew in trouble. We are going to go look.
__________________________________________________________________
Let me also say that while I (personally) have always found this ‘slash across the throat’ gesture from Burfiend to be quite ‘uncalled for’… I do *NOT* believe for one second that this obvious assumption on his part that they were ‘goners’, even at that point in time, had *ANY* effect on him then proceeding to do his job.
I can also criticize them ( and, indeed, the WFF radio protocols themselves for apparently NOT having a good, established MAYDAY protocol ) for NOT taking the transmissions from Steed and Caldwell seriously for more than TWO MINUTES… but that still doesn’t mean I think they didn’t do all they possibly could to try and save those men that day… when they finally did realize this was a *REAL* emergency.
As soon as OPS1 Todd Abel contacted French and Burfiend and *TOLD* them to get their heads out of their asses and RESPOND to these men… they did.
And once they did ( finally stop ignoring them )… they obviously kicked into their own highly-rehearsed and professional procedures for such a situation.
I also happen to believe that if there had been *ANY* indication in those final radio exchanges of where they REALLY were ( such as… if Marsh had only taken 2 seconds to say… “we are 600 yards due WEST of Boulder Springs Ranch” )…
…I believe Thomas French in B33 and Kevin in the DC10 VLAT would have actually attempted a retardant drop ( whether they really believed it would do any good or not ) at GREAT risk to their own lives.
To have flown the jet-engine DC10 right through that thick ASH cloud would have been absolute suicide for Kevin… so I don’t think THAT would have happened… but if there was ANY way to get at their location ( if they knew where it was ) OTHER than flying blindly directly THROUGH the smoke/ash cloud…
I think they would have tried it.
For the rest of my life… I will always wonder WHY, when Marsh was directly asked by Burfiend…. “So, you’re on the south side of the fire, then?”…
…all Eric Marsh said was… “Affirm”.
Obtuse communications. Right to the end.
Even if French or Burfiend didn’t know where the heck the ‘Boulder Springs Ranch’ was… there were MANY people listening to the final MAYDAY calls who DID and they would have jumped right into the conversation and TOLD French and Burfiend *EXACTLY* where that was.
If Marsh had just added ANY amount of OTHER information… they at least *MIGHT* have been able to KNOW or GOOD-GUESS their exact location.
He didn’t… and I will ALWAYS wonder WHY he didn’t avail himself of that
one last chance to identify their exact location.
Followup to above…
We ( in this ongoing discussion ) are not the only ones to wonder from day one WHY there was so much ‘confusion’ and ‘delay’ in realizing that the transmissions from Granite Mountain constituted a *REAL* emergency… or to wonder WHY it was that Burfiend in Bravo 33 basically IGNORED them for almost 2 minutes ( and even told them to get OFF the channel ) until OPS1 Todd Abel called him directly and *TOLD* him to stop ignoring these men.
Back in December of 2013 even… Wildfire Today published an article about this specific thing and about the new *YoLo* proposal which was a DIRECT reaction ( coming from the ground level ) to what happened in Yarnell.
Wildfire Today
Published December 23, 2013 by Bill Gabbert
Suggested protocol for firefighters when declaring an emergency
______________________________________________________
After reading about the deaths of the 19 firefighters on the Yarnell Hill Fire, Mr. Joseph Berto ( WFF Helicopter pilot ) had some thoughts about the crucial need for clear, descriptive radio communications when there is a firefighter emergency that requires immediate assistance. Below is his proposal, and following that my initial reaction and his response:
( See original article for full proposal )
______________________________________________________
There has ALSO been this ONGOING forum discussion about
this over at ‘Wildland Fire’.
Wildland Fire
Home of the Wildland Firefighter
Thread: More Yarnell Hill discussion: Mayday, Mayday, Mayday!
http://wlfhotlist.com/threads/38400-More-Yarnell-Hill-discussion-Mayday-Mayday-Mayday!
The first comment that ‘kicked off’ this (ongoing) discussion
over there at ‘Wildland Fire’ is as follows…
______________________________________________________
From Wildland Fire member: D Powers
Join Date: Oct 2013
Location: New Mexico
Mayday, Mayday, Mayday!
I have read the official reports about the Yarnell Hill fire, but the transcription of the radio traffic does not do justice to listening to them.
One thing that stood out to me was the lack of an emergency declaration. B-33 did not pick up on the tone of voice (possibly because he was trying to do three jobs at once), but everyone else did.
In the military, civilian aviation, and the structural fire service that is one of the first things to be drilled into new recruits: recognize when you are in trouble, and call for help. Make sure others know you are calling for help.
I am not saying GM did anything improper (I have never heard of Mayday being used in a wildland setting) but perhaps it is something to be considered for the future?
______________________________________________________
This ‘Wildland Fire’ Forum Thread is heavily commented and goes on with many ‘ideas’ such as just adopting what WFF people use in Australia ( Emergency, Emergency, Emergency ) or other ‘already used’ standards.
Since it still appears that the WFF management in the United States doesn’t intend to DO or RECOMMEND ANYTHING new in this regard… I certainly hope the ‘folks on the ground’ just go ahead and decide on something amongst themselves… ASAP… since whether their own management gives a crap about their safety, or not, it is THEIR LIVES that might depend on such an established protocol in the future.
Marti and WTKTT
A couple of thoughts one I listed below.
1. If the transmission was on air to air Marsh would not have made it.
The portable radios do not Carrie that Freq. because of the Radio Ban it is on.
2. If a OPS or the IC was in the helicopter they could have made that statement over Air to Air. If the Helicopter was in the area then it could have been re-conning the fire with 1 of the overhead.
3. A vehicle with that Radio Ban on a separate radio from the National fire Freq. Ban Radio could have also made the comment. That statement could have come without a call sign.
At this point with out verifiable radio traffic that was copied we are right now chasing shadows. If it was not copied on air to ground it could not have been Marsh. WTKTT if you have a way to check the freq. you could probably show the Problem of different Bans Low and High They should be listed some where.
Reply to Bob Powers post on May 10, 2014 at 10:58 am
>> Mr. Powers said…
>>
>> 1. If the transmission was on air to air Marsh would not
>> have made it.
Yes… and also IAOI ( If And Only If ) it went out on ‘Air-to-Air’…
then WE should be hearing it, too, captured in that video
which was CLEARLY recording the A2A traffic around that time.
It’s not there. Didn’t happen.
>> The portable radios do not Carrie that Freq. because of
>> the Radio Ban it is on.
No, they don’t. Not normally, anyway.
It’s the whole VHF ( Highband ) versus UHF ( LowBand ) thing.
Handhelds that have BOTH capability are VERY expensive.
>> 2. If a OPS or the IC was in the helicopter they could have
>> made that statement over Air to Air. If the Helicopter was in
>> the area then it could have been re-conning the fire with 1
>> of the overhead.
True… but there is certainly NO evidence that any OPS or IC
was flying in anything in Yarnell that late in the day. Everyone
was ‘on the ground’.
>> 3. A vehicle with that Radio Ban on a separate radio from the
>> National fire Freq. Ban Radio could have also made the
>> comment. That statement could have come without a call sign.
Also possible. Heck… we can even hear with our own ears in the video capture(s) that someone way back in Prescott Air Operations was ‘hearing’ all the traffic and was ALSO able to just press TRANSMIT at any moment and ‘insert’ themselves into the Air-To-Air conversations all the way down there in Yarnell.
This is all kind of ‘moot’, however, because with regards to this (supposed) “That’s exactly what we want” retardant-related transmission (supposedly) from DIVSA Marsh… it is John Burfiend ALONE who is testifying he ‘heard that’ and he is also testifying it was over the ‘Air-To-Ground’ ( UHF / LowBand ) channel.
That’s *another* reason the ‘Air-To-Ground’ channel is always one of the most popular and most-listened-to channels on ANY fire. It’s ‘where the action is’ and its accessible to the ‘cheaper’ radios because it is a UHF frequency and not a VHF one.
>> At this point with out verifiable radio traffic that was copied we
>> are right now chasing shadows.
I’m still looking at some ‘other’ things in the public evidence record and I’m not sure more still can’t be ‘figured out’ from it about this (supposed) transmission from Marsh… so I’m not ready to call it ‘shadow chasing’ just yet. Stay tuned.
>> If it was not copied on air to ground it could not have
>> been Marsh.
Agree. It really is a shame that the Air-Study folks didn’t ALSO have another video camera running that day with a direct inline feed on the A2G channel like they had one going with a direct inline feed on the A2A channel. That would have been REALLY helpful here.
>> WTKTT if you have a way to check the freq. you could probably
>> show the Problem of different Bans Low and High They should
>> be listed some where.
I’m sure they are… but I’m not sure it matters.
Air-To-Air was VHF and Air-To-Ground was UHF.
Only a VERY expensive handheld can do both and those are
NOT usually the Bendix Kings carried by WFF ground men.
We also DO have a full VHF A2A channel capture covering
the timeframe in question.
Marsh is nowhere on it.
If that transmission of his happened at all… it had to be on A2G.
Hi Bob! And everybody else!
I actually started this comment way earlier this morning, while doing other stuff and watching an over-my-head class on how to use InDesign, while continuing to read all the comments, and letting things sink in and re-arrange themselves. And then I wandered off to check on some facts and re-read some interviews, and then try to figure out when that VLAT drop was that Blue Ridge Hotshot McCord videod as it dangerously flew right over a helicopter so that maybe if there was any info on that (which there isn’t, but I think it happened about 1:37 PM, which means under Bravo 3’s watch), and now I’m back to finishing/editing this.
OK so now you know why it wasn’t on air 2 air. So I can delete the rest of the paragraphs that I wrote for you about that. I basically agree with all WTKTT has written about that. Including the part about maybe Marsh started to try to contact Air Attack but got overstepped by someone else saying “that’s where we want it” from down below, even the parking lot. That also makes sense, from a possibility level, since Eric Div A had been in earlier contact with Air Attack, and AA had indicated v/A2G uneasiness with where he saw that crew (that he didn’t know who they were).
At this point, who knows? Who even knows if that SAIT interview report was even accurate/truthful about anything either French or Burfiend even said. I agree w/WTK that it’s pretty evident the SAIT pretty heavily massaged that whole process to make it fit their pre-established narrative.
And note to WTKTT here, bcuz it’s easier to do this than scroll down while I’m downloading a bunch more of both sets of Air Study videos, thanks for clarifying the “show me” directions. I confess, when I wrote that question, it was a short-cut, bcuz I hadn’t had time to go try to “translate” the numbers and I was guessing you probably had. I also confess, I’m still a bit “bowl-challenged,” and thus my confusion about that. When somebody says “bowl” I have no idea what they mean. Thus, when Burfiend apparently (or not) spoke of test-flying “the bowl” “from west to east,” it definitely created a certain picture in my head, that apparently didn’t correspond to the facts. And, hey, maybe it didn’t even correspond to what he said!
And, hey, as long as we’re being left to lots of gaps and thus room for speculating, could it be that Burfiend and French didn’t take that Forest Service SAIT interview all that seriously, either? Maybe they had already figured the AFS was gonna, all things considered, bend the “facts to their narrative” based on their at-that-time recently published investigative process model. Which is in fact exactly what they did.
And to TTWARE — and Bob — and WTKTT — etal:
About the ASM thing. As I was on again off again over the past few months, trying to make sense of the Air command structure and terminology, including reading Fire Aviation, the sister site of Wildfire Today, I saw quite a bit of grumpiness about this new Module thing. And it may be one of the Lessons to be Learned from Yarnell.
And somewhat related to the above, I’ve been really thinking about my possible “overly glowing” assessment of French. It may be just that. Or it may be that I’m just translating him a little differently. I’ve been around air and balloon pilots and meteorologists and tornado-chasers a lot. They do what they do because they enjoy it, even when it gets dangerous and difficult — and, hey so do fire/wildfire fighters (who we all know are actually pyromaniacs in disguise!!), so I’m not so offended by what some of you all are upset about. And maybe that gesture across the throat was not in jest. It could have been dead serious. I could envision my dad doing that if he heard a report of a balloon hitting a power line. And he wouldn’t have meant it to be funny.
Bravo 33’s job was (as per the Air Support YouTube video) to get wet stuff on the ground without bending metal along with, when necessary and possible, adding situational awareness, but NOT managing the ground crews (as opposed to what Rory Collins was/wasn’t doing, ahem. I can’t imagine, after watching/listening to French for hours, ever doing what Collins did.). That was somebody else’s job. They were doing just that, and it wasn’t all that easy, and they had lives on their hands, too. Plane crashes on fires are not that uncommon.
So when that SEAT flew through that fire at 4:33, to make that drop that apparently took a few set-ups to get, French essentially thanked him, and the pilot, possibly with some relief, indicated he was happy too, even tho they both knew, it was quite possibly a fool’s errand, but one they were hired to do.
And now that I’ve read what you wrote, WTKTT, about what they would have done, and DID do, after they abandoned that VLAT drop, I really appreciate that. Not only that, but they were running out of fuel, and still managed a 5:07 VLAT drop in the middle of it all. And, as they said, they were just barely able to do it because it was in such heavy smoke and ash they could hardly even see.
That being said, I’m sensing something of a cognitive dissonance. Might it, again, have to do with this thing we have called “Culture”?
Could it be that “Fire Aviation” has something of a different “culture” than on-the-ground “Fire Fighting”? And is that maybe something else that’s adding to the confusion? And furthermore, I definitely see, and have read about, regional differences, especially in the complaints about Collins. As in, in the northwest forests they fight fires differently than in the southwest, and thus the big conflicts between Marsh and Collins.
OK a final thing, before I go on a last-minute quest for Mother’s Day Flowers. Regarding that 1:37ish PM VLAT drop. Once I figured out that that’s when it happened, I went back to Bravo 3’s interview. Collins had had to leave (out of fuel) so Bravo 3 was Air Attack. They say nothing about that drop in their SAIT interview. And that’s what leads me to the next thing.
Helicopters. I have absolutely NO IDEA who was mostly directing helicopters. I was wondering that as I watched the Air-to-Air 1628 video. French WAS paying careful attention to helicopters, but it was all about keeping them out of the way of the fixed wing tankers, because they were dropping really close to the helispot and the “horseshoe dip” location. Since there’s no air-to-air video earlier than 2pm-ish, there’s no record of how Bravo 3 was communicating. I don’t even know if B3 was even aware there was a helicopter right under that VLAT. So I have no clue who was directing the helicopter drops. Maybe just another little unimportant detail in the general scheme of things?
Which leads to my seriously final point. Having those Air Study videos really HAS been critical, given the jumbling of everything else. And yes, it would have been even more helpful if they had set up the same kind of video camera with the Air to Ground channel included. Without all the wind and stuff that the Panebakers have. We’d still be fifty miles behind where we are if somebody hadn’t thought, “Gee, lets go set up some video cameras up on that fire and document the Fire Aviation!!”
Hasta! Thank you all for bearing with me!
Great Job Marti
When Fires Like this in WUI start running at structures
The first thing is to thro Air Tankers at the Fire. The problem most times they don’t do any good except make every body feel like they at least did something. It looks good to the public at least some one is doing something.
Helicopters–When Fixed wing plains are on a fire Helicopter pilots Monitor there Freq. And stay out of the way. They fly lower and are assigned to specific areas.
They maintain contact Air to Air.
That is why I said the 1 Helicopter flying that is mentioned may have had an overhead in it that could have made the comment, and could have over keyed Marsh DIV A call.
From what I am reading there is no radio verification that DIV A broke into any Air conversation except the statement from AA. At this point we have a personnel recollection with no solid proof it actually happened.
Again good work on the info.
Marti—–Yes there are 2 different cultures good catch Ground and air, not sure where those Smoke Jumpers fit? We always liked the Helicopters when they gave us a ride.
Also we all love Fire, Fire Fighting and even starting them like Back Fires Project burns Etc.
If you didn’t you would not stick with it.
So you found us out as well.
Ha Ha, yes I found you out!!
Actually, to be honest, I “go to school” online regarding photography, media, design, business at an online “place” called CreativeLIVE, which is based in Seattle. When we have classes, we also have chatrooms.
One of my pals in the chatrooms is a female firefighter relative/supporter in southern California. She’s actually VERY interested in this fire and is probably reading this site, which I have linked her to regularly.
We chuckle a lot about how people who fight fires and people who pay attention to fires (like me) are actually fascinated by fire. I’ve always been fascinated by fire, loved/miss my 10 years of surviving via wood-stoves in Flagstaff, always have candles burning, and about every 4 years get really intensively interested in a wildfire.
I started tracking/observing wildfires online in about 1996. I was really interested in how communities used the Internet to deal with how a wildfire was impacting them and to connect to each other to deal with it.
That lead to my watching the Los Alamos Cerro Grande Fire online in 2000. Given that a bunch of geeks were affected by it, and I had family/friends ties to it, they really used the Internet to connect, respond, get the word out. I followed that carefully.
I was really interested in the interface between wildfires and the Internet. Why? Because I, too am a lover of fire.
The other big one for me was 2001, the Hayman Fire near Colorado Springs. My daughter was a competitive figure skater, and we were there when that fire was burning. I actually photographed it, and, of course, I followed all of it online.
Oh and then the 2002 Rodeo-Chedeski Fire in Arizona, a HUGE fire. We ate and inhaled the smoke from it for weeks here in Albuquerque. I followed it online. And cried. A lot. I FELT it. And was AWED by it. Because I spent ten years living in the forest in Flagstaff. I felt those trees burning.
Fire. I majored BA in Anthropology/Archaeology from Prescott College. (When we had the crew that gave birth to the Prescott Hotshots that, in turn gave birth to the Granite Mountain Hotshots. And I had a horse, and I rode that horse all over Granite Mountain). The harnessing of fire by humans is considered a benchmark in human evolution. But fire can still overpower us.
So, yes. We love fire!!! And we fear it! And we have to deal with it. And it kills. And it renews. So yeah, I found you out. Because I, and a number of others, are just like you.
Mr. Powers… good point you just made.
There WERE helicopters already down in Yarnell and also doing whatever they could to ‘save things’ in this 4:15 to 4:45 timeframe.
We actually can HEAR at least TWO of them actually ‘fly over’ Aaron Hulburd as he was filming the ‘Helmet-Cam’ video there in the St. Joseph Shrine parking lot… and AS he was capturing those ‘final transmits’ from Steed, Caldwell and Marsh.
It actually could have been ANY helicopter pilot working the fire down there at this time that just jumped onto the Air-To-Ground channel and said…
“That’s exactly what we want”
…right after the 1633 SEAT drop there on the EAST side of the fire. That SEAT drop probably DID hit the same outlying areas that THEY ( the choppers ) were focusing on as well.
Burfiend said this call came ‘5 minutes before they went into shelter’… but given their *general* confusion about TIME throughout their recollections to the SAIT investigators… it’s pretty doubtful they could have been *THAT* sure that *EXACTLY* 5 minutes had transpired between ANY two events that afternoon.
If the “That’s what we want” confirmation ( from someone in/near or ‘flying over’ Yarnell… but not Marsh ) was a direct response to the spot-on 1633 SEAT drop… then it’s possible that Burfiend was simply 4 minutes off on his recollection… and it was really about 9 minutes between when he heard that and when it all started hitting the fan.
Mistaking a 9 minute elapsed time period for 5 minutes would have been perfectly understandable that afternoon… coming from ANYONE.
I still think the most important point about all of this is that the SAIT investigators obviously did *NOT* even lift a finger to try and *VERIFY* the TIME and the SOURCE of this “That’s what we want” recollection on Burfiend’s part.
They just trusted what (only) Burfiend was recalling, didn’t care that no one else seemed to have heard it, called it an ‘absolutely verified communication from Eric Marsh’… and used it was the defacto END of their own self-imposed ‘verifiable communications’ blackout period.
Even Eric’s voice in the YARNELL-GAMBLE video TEN MINUTES earlier ( at 1627 ) is much more ‘verifiable’ than this ‘recollection’ on Burfiend’s part… yet they (apparently) chose to ignore what they were hearing in the YARNELL-GAMBLE video altogether.
Perhaps the SAIT understood that if they were going to pretend there was a ‘blackout’ ( with no verifiable communications )… then they couldn’t END that blackout ‘too early’.
In other words…. it was OK to take a dubious transmission/recollection that happened just 2 minutes before the MAYDAY… because 2 minutes wasn’t enough time for management to be accused of neglecting to do something…
…but TEN MINUTES was too much… hence… they had to IGNORE Eric’s obvious reporting of GM’s ‘status’ ( to someone in command ) at 1627.
Once they decided to officially report that there was a ‘verifiable communications’ BLACKOUT… and that that is why management didn’t know where they were… they could not END it too early before the deployment… so the 1637 ‘recollection’ from Burfiend simply looked like a good place to do that.
The VLAT/helicopter incident I’m describing is not about the in-question call we’re talking about. It happened about 12:35 PM. There was a VLAT drop just northish of where the Blue Ridge hotshots were waiting with their buggies for an asignment. There was one test flight then the VLAT made it’s drop. The BR guys were photographing and video-ing it.
When the VLAT was coming down to make the drop, there was a helicopter right underneath it. Bravo 3 was in charge, as Rory Collins was off getting re-fueled. Unfortunately we don’t have the air 2 air so I don’t know what kind of communication was going on.
Interestingly enough, as I’ve been working on jockeying Tom Story’s photos into submission, it looks like his first VLAT set, which he took on the relatively accurate Mark D II, is of that T 911 coming out of that drop. With, I think, Bravo 3 just ahead of him.
I confess, I’m still a little mystified re helicopter communications. They were on air-to-air, but during the air-to-air video I watched yesterday, from a bit before 4:00 pm to about 4:20, French was just keeping them out of the way of the tankers. That’s all.
I would think the helicopters must have been in communication with some kind of overhead. I haven’t had time to “go there” but I’m sure there must have been some kind of crew organizing them?????? It definitely wasn’t Bravo 33. And I don’t know if Bravo 3 was doing it either. It just seems weird.
Also, that leads me to ask, “What is Air Guard? What is that channel used for?”
Reply to Marti Reed post on
May 11, 2014 at 5:10 pm
>> Marti said…
>> I confess, I’m still a little mystified re
>> helicopter communications. They were
>> on air-to-air, but during the air-to-air
>> video I watched yesterday, from a bit
>> before 4:00 pm to about 4:20, French
>> was just keeping them out of the way
>> of the tankers. That’s all.
Correct. There are never any ‘instructions’ to them from Bravo 33 ( acting as both Lead Plane and Air Attack ) about what they should actually be DOING ( drop-wise ).
The ONLY thing French was concerned about was them staying out of HIS way.
Only conversations are about who is heading to helibase… or who is leaving the fire… and what direction they should take to do that.
This also confuses me from the ‘Air Attack’ standpoint. It is French ( performing Lead Plane duties ) we hear ‘directing’ this Air Traffic around him… even though the SAIT notes say it was French who turned to Burfiend and said “You’re Air Attack!”.
____________________________________
From SAIT interview with Bravo 33…
Paragraph 4…
I knew there was 2 structural groups.
I wrote down 2.
Tom said “hey dude, you are the air attack”.
____________________________________
So it really is very, very confusing.
I’m not even sure the Air people fully understand it all… much less the ground folks.
Anyone on the ground in a command position could obviously ASK the choppers to do things without going through Air Attack… which is what makes it all the more confusing.
In one of the Air Study videos… right after the spot-overs were happening up on Model Creek road… SPGS2 Darrell Willis just tells his subordinate, Gary Moser, to ‘get one of those choopers to take care of that spillover’.
So even line personnel could just make requests of the choppers any time they wanted to?
It’s a wonder there weren’t MORE near-fatal
crashes that day other than the incredible near-miss out over that middle bowl earlier that day.
Another near Fixed-Wing / Chopper
near miss I hadn’t seen before…
In Panebaker Air study video
20130630_153414_EP, at +11 seconds, there is another *NEAR MISS* between a helicopter and the lead plane flying a line-up flight in that same location where the VLATS were dumping up there off Hays Ranch Road.
The lead plane is flying the line-up flight from west to east, parallel to Hays Ranch Road… but a chopper is coming up on a south to north line over in the same location but on the ‘blind’ side of the smoke cloud… and the lead plane seems to have NO IDEA he is there.
Hard to tell how close it was because the ZOOM is active on the camera… but it looks WAAAY too close for comfort as the chopper crosses right in front of the lead plane at what looks like the same altitude.
Looks like a few seconds in time made all the difference here.
Good catch, thanks!
Somebody has to be directing the helicopters, and it’s not really Air Attack/Bravo. That’s just not their responsibility from what i’ve read. Like it’s not also their responsibility to direct the ground crews, basically.
Their responsibility, it seems to me, in general and on this fire, is more about directing the fixed wing tankers and clearing the space around them.
I’m getting pretty brain-dead at this point, but tomorrow I’ll go look.
So, from what I’ve just read, Air Guard is reserved for Air Emergencies, like crashes and such things.
I do find myself wondering about the cost-effectiveness of the whole Fire Aviation thing. I’m hoping maybe the fact that those video cameras were set down that afternoon to do Air Study means something.
There is actually, I think, a TON of stuff to be learned from this fire, including the effectiveness of Fire Aviation. Where, and under what conditions, did it really help, and where did it not, and at what cost.
The problem is, as I have sensed all along, and even more so when I spent some hours today reading the Interagency Aerial Supervision Guide, they said over and over again how Aerial Support has to be integrated with overall Incident Command Strategy and Tactics.
And, as we know, since there was no actual “as-required” thought-out and written-out Plan for this day, there was nothing, strategically speaking, for Fire Aviation to tie into, other than various ad-hoc ongoing “let’s try this” tactics.
How do you effectively evaluate Aerial Fire-fighting on a fire in which there was no coherent over-all strategy/tactics in play in the first place?
So I’m not willing to dump the possible value of intelligent Fire Aviation, all things considered, but I do believe it’s time for a serious analysis of it, all things considered.
First, kudos to WTKTT and Marti, for digging into and getting the “that’s where we want it” conversation as analyzed as can possibly be done without some additional ‘outside’ input. I’m in agreement with Bob that, with all the chaos in the sky and on the ground that day, it would have been easy to mix-up that ‘recollection’ attributed to Marsh with another parties transmission.
The troubling part of the whole deal is that MANY people heard A/G radio traffic during the time in question, but we don’t have any of those ‘other’ recollections.
As has been stated before, A/G is one of the most listened-to channels on the fireground, as the most up-to-date reports on fire activity and other significant events usually comes across that channel in a prompt fashion. While earlier in the day people might have been only paying a cursory listen, later in the afternoon, with the fire getting ready to burn up an entire town, you can bet many, many people were glued to it (as evidenced by the background traffic videos).
On another note regarding possible takeaways, in my opinion two glaring ones seemingly related to BUDGET concerns are:
1) The states calling out a Type II Short Team (which was never even able to assemble all of it’s critical team members) for a fire that was already deemed a threat to a community.
2) The feds determination that they could save money by having less aircraft and personnel on fires by jamming two critical and busy functions inside of one aircraft (ASM). There may be times on slower, less active fires when that could be appropriate, but NEVER on Type I or Type II fires, and NEVER on Type III fires that are deemed to have a strong potential to rapidly escalate and threaten communties. Personally, I think the ASM ‘experiment’ should be ended and the duties returned to the Air Attack and Lead planes, but hey, that’s just me.
Reply to TTWARE on May 10, 2014 at 9:10 am said:
>> TTWARE said…
>> First, kudos to WTKTT and Marti, for digging into and getting
>> the “that’s where we want it” conversation as analyzed as can
>> possibly be done without some additional ‘outside’ input.
Two quick things here…
1) calvin is the one that has been focused like a laser-beam on this 1637 transmission from day one. It has deserved more focus and attention for quite some time… and deserves even MORE. It is ( and will remain ) IMPORTANT to know whether this ‘fact’ being reported by Arizona Forestry ever actually happened at all… and if it did… what the FULL story is on it.
2) I’m looking at some other things in the public evidence record that might shed a little more light on this… so I wouldn’t say that nothing more can be learned *without* some new interviews.
It is, in fact, still perfectly possible there is *GOING* to be ANOTHER official Yarnell Hill Investigation sometime soon.
At this point ( and with everything even WE have proved is totally WRONG with the original SAIT work )… I would think the right thing for Arizona Forestry to do at this point is just admit their mistakes and do it all over again… but THIS time try to get it RIGHT.
The families deserve nothing less ( and have, indeed, been ASKING for a better investigation since day one ).
Indeed… a ‘proper investigation’ is even one of the ‘stipulated’ action items in most of the wrongful death claims… which means that even if ALL the parties involved try to ‘settle out of court’…. the settlement(s) themselves might still REQUIRE a new ( proper ) investigation be done.
>> TTWARE also said…
>> I’m in agreement with Bob that, with all the chaos in the
>> sky and on the ground that day, it would have been easy to
>> mix-up that ‘recollection’ attributed to Marsh with another
>> parties transmission.
It actually could have been a COMPLETE walk-over.
Bravo 33 has already testified that because of the piss-poor handoff from Rory Collins… they basically had NO IDEA who was even ‘working the fire’ down there underneath them… and they also freely admit they had NO IDEA what anyone’s VOICES sounded like as they got all this dumped onto them. They didn’t even know what Field OPS1 Todd Abel’s voice sounded like as they suddenly started doing this Lead Plane / Air Attack double-duty.
So it is ACTUALLY possible that Marsh might have hit ‘transmit’ on the A2G channel… and only got the words “Bravo 33, Division A” out before SOMEONE ELSE totally walked all over him and then said something like “That’s exactly what we want”.
Maybe Marsh WAS trying to ‘say something’ to Bravo 33 at that point… but got totally ‘walked on’ and Burfiend just thought all that was coming from the same person ( since they admit they had
no idea who anyone was down there or what their voices
sounded like ).
Don’t forget that we NOW know that by the time Steed made his FIRST MAYDAY call… that call is NOT ‘filled with over-modulation’
as the SAIR reported. Steed is ACTUALLY YELLING into his microphone at the top of his voice and its because there are ACTUALLY at least two chainsaws running right next to him already. He was YELLING as much to hear himself as to make sure Bravo 33 could hear him over the saw noise right next to him.
That means that they DID realize the trouble they were in some span of time BEFORE Steed’s first MAYDAY. They had ALREADY decided to deploy BEFORE Steed’s first MAYDAY… and had (apparently) ALREADY found the deployment site, pulled the ropes on the saws, and gotten to work.
It could very well be that whatever Marsh was trying to say to Bravo 33 when he then got ‘walked on’ was either related to them suddenly realizing the trouble they were in ( as early as 1637? )… OR it was simply Marsh getting walked on at 1637 but not having the time to RETRY because it was suddenly time to help find the deployment site or just simply ‘run forward’ to catch the men.
All guesswork… but it’s possible.
My feeling is that there were no CALL SIGNS involved here at
all regarding what Burfiend was ‘recalling’.
I believe that Burfiend is just simply MISTAKEN about it being
DIVSA Marsh saying anything ( at any time ) about “That’s exactly what we want”. It was probably someone else who had a VHF radio with them there in Yarnell and they were ‘confirming’ the ‘goodness’ of the 1633 SEAT drop that had just taken place within sight of the Ranch House Restaurant.
>> TTWARE also said…
>> The troubling part of the whole deal is that MANY people heard
>> A/G radio traffic during the time in question, but we don’t have
>> any of those ‘other’ recollections.
Correct. Even the SAIT should have realized this alone was reason to re-interview Burfiend and try to CONFIRM what he reported.
Not only did the SAIT *NOT* do that…. they took as ‘gospel’ Burfiend’s recollection(s)… and even totally trusted his ‘guess’
that it was ‘5 minutes later when they deployed’… so they just
subtracted 5 minutes from 1642 and put a timestamp of 1637
on Burfiend’s “That’s what we want” recollection…
…and they went ‘out the door’ with it
The SAIT just published it as FACT, and even called this
non-verified reported transmission the ‘official’ end of their own
self-imposed ‘non-verifiable communications’ blackout.
Go figure.
>> TTWARE also said…
>>
>> As has been stated before, A/G is one of the most listened-to
>> channels on the fireground, as the most up-to-date reports on
>> fire activity and other significant events usually comes across
>> that channel in a prompt fashion. While earlier in the day people
>> might have been only paying a cursory listen, later in the
>> afternoon, with the fire getting ready to burn up an entire town,
>> you can bet many, many people were glued to it (as evidenced
>> by the background traffic videos).
Totally agree. If there was EVER a time for anyone with a cheap
UHF handheld ( capable of listening to Air-To-Ground UHF ) to be
monitoring that channel for transmissions… it was circa 4 to 5 PM in Yarnell.
Everybody WAS… but only ONE guy up in an airplane who admits he had no idea who was even on the ground or what they sounded like is the one reporting a ‘crucial’ transmission?
It doesn’t ‘add up’.
>> TTWARE also said…
>>
>> On another note regarding possible takeaways, in my opinion
>> two glaring ones seemingly related to BUDGET concerns are:
>>
>> 1) The states calling out a Type II Short Team (which was
>> never even able to assemble all of it’s critical team members)
>> for a fire that was already deemed a threat to a community.
>>
>> 2) The feds determination that they could save money by
>> having less aircraft and personnel on fires by jamming two
>> critical and busy functions inside of one aircraft (ASM). There
>> may be times on slower, less active fires when that could be
>> appropriate, but NEVER on Type I or Type II fires, and NEVER
>> on Type III fires that are deemed to have a strong potential to
>> rapidly escalate and threaten communties. Personally, I think
>> the ASM ‘experiment’ should be ended and the duties returned
>> to the Air Attack and Lead planes, but hey, that’s just me.
Not sure myself about necessary/needed changes to the whole Air Support thing… but with regards to BUDGET…
If ICT4 Russ Shumate had only just spent the money on Saturday for day-long chopper support and bucket drops… that thing would have been dead-as-a-doornail before 4:00 PM on Saturday.
If ‘Arizona Forestry’ just adds up what the cost for that chopper support on Saturday would have been and THEN compares it to
the *other* costs that resulted by NOT spending that money
on Saturday…
…well… you don’t need a whole lot of batteries in your calculator to realize what a ‘budget buster’ that mistake was.
If the whole Yarnell Incident ( and the loss of 19 good men ) isn’t enough to teach Arizona Forestry ( and SWCC ) that using the ‘IA with overwhelming force’ approach isn’t ( ultimately ) the most cost-effective way to fight wildland fires in that region…
…then I don’t know what it will take.
Correction for above.
Accidentally typed ‘VHF’ instead of ‘UHF’.
The (supposed) “That’s what we want” transmission came over the UHF Air-To-Ground channel and NOT the VHF Air-To-Air channel.
Nobody needed an expensive VHF piece of kit to have been the one making that call to Burfiend in B33 on A2G.
It could have been ANYONE on the ground in Yarnell who saw that 1633 SEAT drop and might have been trying to confirm the ‘goodness’ of it.
So that one paragraph above SHOULD have read…
“It was probably someone else who had a UHF radio with them there in Yarnell and they were just ‘confirming’ ( over the A2G channel ) the ‘goodness’ of the 1633 SEAT drop that had just taken place within sight of the Ranch House Restaurant.”
Correction to the correction ( ROFL ).
See Sitta’s post ( and response ) above.
The ACTUAL frequencies in use that weekend all seem to have been in the 154 to 175 mgHZ range.
RE Air Attack Handoff to Bravo 33 at 1558 ish:
So……I’ve been watching and listening to the Air Study 30130630_1628_EP.MOV video three times through. Since I mistakenly downloaded it, instead of the next one that I’m now downloading. I figured I might as well, since it would help me see and hear what was going on. Quite interesting.
This one includes the impressive 4:16-4:18 two-minute VLAT 911 split-drop. Quite interesting and quite educational to watch/hear. Most of it features Tom French as Bravo 33 Lead Plane , leading, instructing the other pilots of both air tankers and helicopters, checking things out, communicating with media planes, really polite, respectful, supportive, calm and cool. Totally impressive all things considered. This video spans from about 1558 til 1628. Forty minutes. I highly recommend watching it. I don’t have the link for it at the moment, unfortunately. But you can find it. Just go to WTKTT’s link for the Air Study video he posts above, and download/watch the 1628 video instead!
What really strikes me is the truly calm, professional, supportive, positive, specific, clear communications happening all around. No sign of stress, pressure, conflict, frustration, anything negative at all. You really get a sense that everybody actually enjoys what they’re doing.
This also includes the communication between Rory Collins, as Air Attack, as he leaves the fire to head to Deer Valley, because his pilot has run out of fly-time, and his, I would say, disappointment that he still hasn’t been able to secure his relif pilot, who is grounded at Stafford because, I would guess, of the same weather that was grounding other planes all around.
I hate to say this, because I have a beef with Rory Collins, but over the course of about fifteen minutes during this, on again off again, he did have something of a leisurely conversation with Tom French. And, as Tom French says towards the end of it, (re Burfiend who would become Air Attack) “my right-seater’s been copying everything.”
Collins told him quite a bit of stuff, about the weather, about IC, about go ahead and finish what you’re doing and then get over to the other side of the fire with the DC 10’s, about Div A being the ground contact ( I guess not forecasting that Div A was about to head out to the bleak unknown, which, to be fair, he didn’t know at that time). He asked for questions, concerns, and French back-and-forthed with him, and didn’t sound the least like this was weird or strange or hectic or insufficient in any way. He sounded confident that they were completely ready to assume the responsibility they were being handed.
And then he kept on doing what he was doing. Being Bravo33 (which is pronounced Bravo Three Three) Lead Plane. Calm and confident and positive in the midst of what we perceive as being chaos.
To be fair and helpful, the later video which covers the Air Support during the time of the burnover is not above, it’s below and it’s https://www.dropbox.com/sh/02ue6bnjp6nazkm/AAA4aB8cuUhL0vwnEy-ja-Ypa/Photos%20and%20Video/AerialFirefightingstudy/Panebaker/Video/Video_with_134175_audio#lh:null-20130630_1643_EP.MOV
Marti
I am confident after every thing I have been reading that you guys have found, that the statement.
That’s where we want it,– is from OPS or a ground person
with the structure protection group in the area of the drop, and has absolutely nothing to do with March.
It has never made science that Marsh would have popped out of no where with that statement.
Based on experience call it a educated guess it was not Marsh. People near the drop site would be much more plausible. They were trying to save structures at that point and that is what they were focused on.
Yes, I’m thinking more and more in line with you (see my comment below in response to yours). I’m still wondering how it could have been that this call from someone (who decreasingly looks like it would have been Marsh) (and I’m trusting Burfiend who says he heard it) wouldn’t have been heard on the AirToGround channel that A WHOLE LOT OF PEOPLE heard at the time, including the crew doing that “Last MInutes” video. That’s what stumps me.
Is there possibly some other channel that Air Attack Burfiend could have been interacting with that could have signaled to him, at 4:37-4:39-ish, as they were circle-ing then flying a test flight “west to east over the bowl” that “that’s exactly what we want”?
I have absolutely no idea.
Marti… not only am I not sure we can really
trust either Burfiend’s or French’s statements
in the SAIT investigations notes about the
“that’s what we want” statement… I think
their recollection in *general* is kinda wonky.
For example…
Here is the exact ‘infamous’ paragraph from
their SAIT interview that has that one and
only reference in the *entire* evidence
record in it about “that’s what we want”…
…but look at the REST of the paragraph
that precedes that ‘recollection’.
It’s all pretty ‘skewed’ unto itself regarding
what ELSE they ‘think’ they heard from
Marsh… and WHEN…
TIME NOW = 1630
:: We needed to go back to the right flank
:: ( 1630 AZ time ).
:: Made 3 practice runs. Painted 2.
:: We came around.
TIME NOW = However long it take to make
‘3 practices runs’ and then ‘come around’.
Let’s call that FIVE minutes, at least.
TIME NOW = 1635
:: Got a call from Division A stating they
:: were going down their escape
:: route to the safety zone.
WTF? At 1635? Not a chance.
:: Didn’t know Division A was the
:: superintendent of the Granite Mountain
:: hot shots. Asked him “is everything OK?”
:: He replied “everything is ok, just heading
:: to the safety zone”.
Again… WTF?? Not possible ( at 1635 ).
There ARE video captures that cover this
timeframe AND were capturing the A2G
radio channel and there are no such
transmissions recorded.
:: We came around,
:: made a practice run through the bowl,
:: west to east.
TIME NOW = ??
We really have no idea. Their testimony
above about hearing from Marsh at ‘this
time’ already proves the SAIT notes are
out in left field already… so there is no
telling WHEN this ‘practice run’ they are
now referring to happened… if it even
happened at all.
:: I was talking to Tom
:: about the rising terrain on exit.
:: Division A clad and said “that is what
:: we are looking for, that is exactly right”.
:: Within 5 minutes of that, they went in
:: shelter.
So this LAST STATEMENT about them ‘going into shelter’ within 5 minutes of the “that is what we are looking for” transmission
( according to their recollection ) MUST be
what the SAIT used to actually come up with the 1637 timestamp for Marsh’s (supposed)
transmission.
French and Burfiend had no frickin’ idea what
time it *really* might have been… but
somehow they also seemed to be SURE
that ‘within 5 minutes’ is when Eric
announced they were ‘deploying’.
So the SAIT just took their ‘recollection’ about
the previous transmission from Marsh being
‘within 5 minutes’… and then they just
counted BACKWARDS from 1642… when
the Helmet Cam captured Marsh’s final
statement(s).
1642 minus 5 minutes = 1637
Voila!… The SAIT was now SURE that 1637
is when Marsh MUST have said “That is what
we are looking for”… and they frickin’ PUBLISHED that in the SAIR as if it was fact.
They were taking these ‘unverified’ random recollections of French / Burfiend as ‘gospel truth’… even though ( as shown above ) they were completely mis-remembering Marsh’s OTHER statements ( on A2G channel ) about
‘going down their escape route’.
So the SAIT didn’t question the FIRST half of
even that one section ( paragraph ) of their
interview ( which is obviously an inaccurate
recollection ) but then the SAIT took the
SECOND half as ‘gospel truth’… and
PUBLISHED the ‘statements’ as FACT…
even though NO ONE ELSE was reporting
that transmission from Marsh on the *VERY*
popular A2G radio channel.
Go figure.
As I have said before… something about
Marsh ‘asking’ for retardant must have
seemed *really* attractive to THEIR ‘version
of events’ and fit nicely with THEIR ‘agenda’
in order for them to not have either
questioned this one statement from them
*OR* made sure it fit the criteria of ‘verified
transmission’ which they seemed to be so picky about for the previous 30+ ‘blackout’
minutes.
Bob:
Do you think this is important, all things considered?
To be honest, I’m less and less thinking it is, all things considered. To be honest, I’m kind of hanging onto it because the SAIT made a big deal of it, using Burfiend, who I really respect, and his narrative of it to further their own narrative, in what I agree with WTKTT to be a really irresponsible manner.
Do you think it’s really all that important, in the general scheme of things on this totally mismanaged fire, that Burfiend says he heard, while they were flying a “show me,” someone tell him (and possibly mistakenly thinking it was Div A Eric Marsh) that ‘this is exactly where we want that” ?
Or is it time for all of us to just admit we can’t figure this out, all things considered, and move on?
I really respect your hard-won experience-based sense of what is truly important in wildland fire-fighting.
I would say with out other identified radio traffic its a guess as to who made the statement. Maybe an assumption after the fact by Burfiend that he recollects something
during a show me run. What is very strange is there was no prior conversation asking for a drop by March. It would be un conceivable for Marsh to think his discussion with OPS about we’ll get a drop down there would have any thing to do with a 30 min. later statement. Where is location and discussion of need?
The only thing this adds to is some how thinking Marsh asked for a drop to save the crew and no one was listening. Which I think is BS. It could have been any one with an Air to Air Freq. on the ground. Thought they said DIV. A. It dose not make science that Marsh would have jumped in and said that with all the smoke at that time he could not have seen air craft and gave no other direction prior.
With out verifiable evidence it will just hang hot there as something to talk about– Had the air tanker dropped where DIV A ask they would have been saved,–Wishful thinking. Where they were dropping had no connection to where Marsh was. I am still of the belief it was not Marsh, I am still betting on the Structure Group. Air to Air would have a very limited number of people on it. That same statement could have been used several times during the day by ?????
Also if it was air to air Marsh would not have had that on his hand held radio. Only air to ground.
Any air to air radios would have been in Vehicles like City or county Engines or Supervisors trucks. If I am not mistaken Air is on a totally different Ban than the Fire freq. Bans. High Ban and Low Ban you cannot run them both on the same radio. Air to ground is in the same ban area as crewnet, and the other fire freq. Another little added info on air attack. 2 different radios in air craft to talk to air and ground.
A air tanker would have Air to air, if they IA a fire some one on the ground would have air to air to talk to them till Air Attack arrived. Clear as mud again ….
Reply to Marti Reed post on May 9, 2014 at 5:20 pm
>> Marti wrote…
>> What really strikes me is the truly calm, professional,
>> supportive, positive, specific, clear communications
>> happening all around. No sign of stress, pressure, conflict,
>> frustration, anything negative at all.
Yes. Right down to Burfiend doing the ‘slash across his throat’
gesture as soon as he knew 19 good men were deploying.
Very positive. Very professional.
>> You really get a sense that everybody actually enjoys
>> what they’re doing.
Yes. Flying airplanes is FUN!
>> This also includes the communication between Rory Collins,
>> as Air Attack. He asked for questions, concerns, and French
>> back-and-forthed with him, and didn’t sound the least like this
>> was weird or strange or hectic or insufficient in any way. He
>> sounded confident that they were completely ready to assume
>> the responsibility they were being handed.
Yes. It all sounds very ‘nicey-nicey’ and polite, doesn’t it?
You would hardly be able to tell that just a few hours earlier,
Collins was dumping retardant all over a Division Supervisor’s
plan of action and not giving a shit whether he liked it or not…
…or that while he was ‘Air Attack’… a helicopter almost crashed
straight into a DC10 and the resulting explosion would have lit
that middle bowl up like a Christmas tree long before wind
change…
…or that while he was ‘Air Attack’… numerous people on the
fire commented how ‘disorganized’ the helicopters were that
day and seemed ‘totally unsupervised’ and ‘doing whatever the
hell they wanted’… to the point where Blue Ridge Hotshots would
later say that the ‘split’ in the fireline was actually caused by
this ‘unsupervised’ helicopter activity that day.
…or that he only gave them 10 minutes notice about having
to leave the fire… and then left Bravo 33 with a laundry list of
‘cluelessness’ that they would then recount to SAIT investigators…
…or that this same guy, following the incident, would refuse to
return phone calls and make it almost impossible for anyone
to interview him.
Sorry, Marti.
Yes… I agree that these guys know how to talk on the radio and
‘get a job done’… but I’m not ready to give any of them the glowing
‘points’ you are granting.
In MANY ways… ( from Friday night through Sunday )… the AIR
operations at Yarnell left a LOT to be desired.
I actually, truly hope the overall ‘picture’ that has emerged
from the Yarnell Hill Fire regarding this ‘Air Support’ stuff ( and the
interaction with ground forces ) is not NORMAL or ‘business as
usual’.
If it really is… all I can say is… YIKES!
WTKTT… The slash across the throat sign has always bothered me. How could he be so certain that they were dead? Really, how?? How did he know they were dead when he didn’t even know where they were??
WTF
calvin… the SAIT interview notes with Bravo 33 are an absolute MESS… but if you read them *very* carefully it would appear that John Burfiend ( who was the right-seat guy, not flying the airplane, and the one who was monitoring Air-To-Ground channel ) did his ‘slash across his throat’ gesture just AFTER Marsh’s final transmission when Marsh ‘affirmed’ that they were on the ‘SOUTH side of the fire’.
Even if they couldn’t see them… I think Burfiend could tell looking downward at that moment that anyone deploying on the SOUTH side of that exploding fireline was a goner. Hence… ‘slash across the throat’ gesture over to Thomas French.
Here is the exact ‘context’ of that testimony from
Thomas French in the SAIT interview notes.
It seems to confirm that Burfiend’s ‘slash across
his throat’ gesture to French did, in fact, come
right after Marsh’s *final* transmission…
_________________________________________
We were right here (pointed at map) when Granite Mountain 7 called screaming in the radio. Ops said “are you getting this? I told Granite Mountain 7 “you need to calm down. I can’t understand you”. Immediately Division A called and said “we are starting a burn out, we are getting in our shelters. I said we got pople in trouble. Tanker called and said I got you in sight. I claimed out – the DC10 swung wide. I looked at John and he did this (slash across the throat). I told Kevin to stand by copy, taking it around. We have a crew in trouble. We are going to go look.
__________________________________________
Let me also say that while I have always found this ‘slash across the throat’ gesture from Burfiend to be quite ‘uncalled for’… I do *NOT* believe for one second that this obvious assumption on his part that they were ‘goners’, even at that point in time, had *ANY* effect on him then proceeding to do his job.
I can also criticize them ( and, indeed, the WFF radio protocols themselves for apparently NOT having a good, established MAYDAY protocol ) for NOT taking the transmissions from Steed and Caldwell seriously for more than TWO MINUTES… but that still doesn’t mean I think they didn’t do all they possibly could to try and save those men that day… when they finally did realize this was a REAL emergency.
As soon as OPS1 Todd Abel contacted French and Burfiend and *TOLD* them to get their heads out of their asses and RESPOND to these men… they did.
And once they did ( finally stop ignoring them )… they obviously kicked into their own highly-rehearsed and professional procedures for such a situation.
I also happen to believe that if there had been *ANY* indication in the next few moments of where they REALLY were ( such as… if Marsh had only taken
2 seconds to tell them… “we are 600 yards due WEST of Boulder Springs Ranch” )…
…I believe Thomas French in B33 and Kevin in the DC10 VLAT would have actually attempted a retardant drop… at GREAT risk to their own lives.
To have flown the jet-engine DC10 through that thick smoke-ass cloud would have been absolute suicide for Kevin… so I don’t think THAT would have happened… but if there was ANY way to get at their location ( if they knew where it was ) OTHER than flying blindly directly THROUGH the smoke/ash cloud…
I think they would have tried it.
For the rest of my life… I will always wonder WHY, when Marsh was directly asked by Burfiend…. “So, you’re on the south side of the fire, then?”…
…all Eric Marsh said was… “Affirm”.
Obtuse communications. Right to the end.
If he had just added ANY amount of OTHER information… they at least *MIGHT* have been able to KNOW or GOOD-GUESS their exact location.
He didn’t… and I will ALWAYS wonder WHY he
didn’t take that one last chance to identify their
exact location.
**
** DID DIVSA ERIC MARSH REALLY CALL BRAVO 33
** AT 1637 ABOUT ‘RETARDANT’?
Reply to calvin post on May 8, 2014 at 2:34 am
>> calvin said…
>> I am not sure exactly where Marsh was when he called Bravo33 and said
>> that is exactly where we want the retardant.
calvin… see below. I am personally ( and honestly ) still not convinced this
1637 radio ‘callout’ from Marsh actually took place… or ( if it did ) that it really
was Eric Marsh that said anything of the sort.
>> But if he was walking downslope toward the canyon floor, I do not think he
>> would have been able to see the flight path.
Assuming this transmission DID take place just as the SAIR reported…
It’s really not possible. He might have been able to HEAR some planes flying
over there on the other side of that smoke column… but it’s really not
credible that he could have SEEN them, at that point. It was almost
‘dark as night’ at that point, as well ( as the Glen Ilah resident video proves ).
>> Because of the short period of time between that call out and the call
>> announcing the entrapment, we know he HAD to be close.
Yes. If it happened at all… and at the TIME it supposedly happened… then
Marsh had to be VERY close to the rest of the men. No question.
>> There is a small mound between the entrapment/ deployment site and BSR
>> that is just north of the dozered road (created to remove GM’s bodies).
>> I think it is possible he was on that mound where he would have had
>> more visibility.
Perhaps… and I know exactly the ‘mound’ you are referring to… but that would create the UNBELIEVABLE scenario that Marsh could see exactly what was happening with the fire out ahead of the men still over in the canyon… and he still let them walk right into a deathtrap, anyway.
There are a LOT of ‘unbelievable’ moments that happened that weekend… ( too many ) but I really can’t get my head around THIS possibility ( that Marsh really might have been ‘out ahead of them’ and in a good ‘forward lookout’ position up on that mound… but he let them all die anyway rather than ‘abort the mission’ ).
>> calvin also wrote…
>> I do not believe the GMH were only counting on their speed to outrun
>> the fire. I do believe they were expecting retardant to be dropped on the
>> south side of the fire. But as far as I can tell (from post burn pictures),
>> that never happened.
I hear ya… but ‘as far as I can tell’… there is still the distinct possibility that this “That’s where we want retardant” transmission from DIVSA Eric Marsh never really happened at all… or that it wasn’t actually Eric that said it.
Stick with me for a moment while I try to ‘document my confusion’ about
this (supposed) callout from Marsh to Bravo 33.
This Air Study video actually covers the 1637 timerame…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/02ue6bnjp6nazkm/AAA4aB8cuUhL0vwnEy-ja-Ypa/Photos%20and%20Video/AerialFirefightingstudy/Panebaker/Video/Video_with_134175_audio#lh:null-20130630_1643_EP.MOV
This video is only recording the Air-To-Air channel but it does provide a CLEAR accounting of *EXACTLY* what Air Attack was doing from 1630 and right up through the deployment ( and beyond ).
There really is nothing in these captured Air Attack conversations that even remotely backs up what the SAIR says was happening at 1637… much less
Marsh making any “that’s where we want retardant” call(s).
Hence my ‘confusion’.
Air Attack ( Bravo 33 ) had the VLAT DC10 910 ( Pilot Kevin ) in a HOLDING
pattern a full SEVEN MILES OUT from the fire and didn’t even ASK Kevin
to start to ‘come into the area’ until 14 seconds before 1637. It took almost
another 2 minutes for the VLAT to even get close to the fire and only then
BEGIN talking to Air Attack about a ‘show me’ run on the EAST side of
the fire… and even this initial conversation about a possible ‘show me’ run
with Air Attack didn’t start until just 24 seconds prior to Steeds first MAYDAY.
The FULL 12 minute and 22 second transcript of this video has already
been posted down below in this ‘Chapter 6’. The following is just a
SUMMARY of that full transcript describing (generally) what Air Attack
was actually DOING during this timeframe…
** USDA AIR STUDY – DISC 4 VIDEO STARTS AT 1630.48 ( 4:30.48 PM )
NOTE: When the video STARTS… we hear Air Attack (B33) actively lining up
a REAL drop ( not a practice run ) with a SEAT from NORTH to SOUTH on
the EAST side of the fire… down near Yarnell. At this point… Air Attack has
the DC10 VLAT 910 ( Pilot Kevin ) in a ‘holding pattern’ SEVEN MILES OUT
and away from the fire… and isn’t even STARTING to deal with him yet.
( 1631.36 4:31.36 PM ) – AA tells SEAT to follow him for DROP.
( 1633.20 4:33.20 PM ) – SEAT drop takes place.
( 1633.24 4:33.24 PM ) – SEAT says “Off the drop now”.
( 1633.26 4:33.26 PM ) – AA tells SEAT to ‘load and return’.
( 1634.11 4:34.11 PM ) – AA tells 910 to set level 4 drop but to still HOLD.
( 1634.12 4:34.12 PM ) – AA tells 910 he’ll get back to him.
( 1634.40 4:34.40 PM ) – AA tells SEAT Wickenburg is out of retardant.
( 1634.42 4:34.42 PM ) – SEAT tells AA he’ll try ‘private club’ for retardant.
( 1635.37 4:35.37 PM ) – Chopper 5Q Alpha reports needing to refuel.
( 1636.10 4:36.10 PM ) – DOZER AND TRANSPORT go by camera.
( 1636.25 4:36.25 PM ) – Chopper 5QA reports landing at Helibase.
( 1636.27 4:36.27 PM ) – AA tells 5QA to let him know when he’s back.
( 1636.46 4:36.46 PM ) – AA only now tells VLAT 910 to ‘come on in’ to the area.
( 1637.05 4:37.05 PM ) – AA tells VLAT 910 target will be flames on EAST side.
( 1638.12 4:38.12 PM ) – Chopper 5QA departs to Wickenburg.
( 1638.15 4:38.15 PM ) – AA asks 5QA to depart on WEST side of fire.
( 1638.42 4:38.42 PM ) – VLAT 910 only now reports ‘approaching area’.
( 1639.03 4:39.03 PM ) – AA only now starts talking to 910 about ‘show me’
( 1639.27 4:39.27 PM ) – Captain Jesse Steed’s first MAYDAY.
( 1639.47 4:39.47 PM ) – Prescott Air Operations (PAO) heard MAYDAY.
( 1639.48 4:39.48 PM ) – PAO tells AA ‘get with OPS… something wrong’.
( 1639.53 4:39.53 PM ) – AA ignores OPS. Sticks with 901 ‘show me’ talk.
( 1641.18 4:41.18 PM ) – AA only now realizes something is happening.
( 1641.20 4:41.20 PM ) – AA tells VLAT 910 ‘folks in trouble… just standby’.
( 1641.25 4:41.25 PM ) – VLAT 910 copies… tells AA he’ll stage out northeast.
( 1641.31 4:41.31 PM ) – AA tells VLAT 910 looks like ‘deployment in progress’.
( 1641.33 4:41.33 PM ) – AA asks VLAT 910 for coverage lvl 6 and to ‘standby’.
( 1641.39 4:41.39 PM ) – VLAT 910 copies… says he’ll watch AA and standby.
( 1643.33 4:43.33 PM ) – USDA AIR STUDY – DISC 4 VIDEO ENDS
So ( from what I can tell ?? )… there is NOTHING there that supports what the
SAIR has reported about Marsh ‘seeing a VLAT drop lineup’ fly OVER him
at 1637 and making ANY kind of radio call like “That’s where we want retardant”.
Unless it’s the SEAT drop at 1633 that the SAIR was talking about ( which DID
actually take place and so the time of 1637 is totally wrong )… but even that was
a SOUTH to NORTH lineup on the EAST side of the fire and never ‘flew over
Marsh’ at all.
The most IMPORTANT thing to remember here is that this one single ‘transmission’ from Marsh is based on just ONE SINGLE person’s recollection,
was NOT captured in any background recordings, and it has not been ‘verified’
by ANYONE else ( even though it supposedly happened on the *very* popular
and well-listened-to Air-To-Ground channel ).
From page 15 of the SAIT Yarnell Investigation Notes ( YIN )…
**************************************************************************************
INTERVIEW WITH BRAVO 33
Interviewees: Bravo 33
John Burfiend-ATS Specialist
Clint Clauson – ATS Trainee
Thomas French – AT Specialist
Interviewers: Mike Dudley, Brad Mayhew, Tim Foley, Jay Kurth, Jimmy Rocha
We needed to go back to the right flank ( 1630 AZ time ).
Made 3 practice runs. Painted 2. We came around.
Got a call from Division A stating they were going down their escape
route to the safety zone. Didn’t know Division A was the superintendent
of the Granite Mountain hot shots. Asked him “is everything OK?” He
replied “everything is ok, just heading to the safety zone”. We came around,
made a practice run through the bowl, west to east. I was talking to Tom
about the rising terrain on exit. Division A clad and said “that is what we are
looking for, that is exactly right”. Within 5 minutes of that, they went in shelter.
************************************************************************************
So there it is.
That is the ONLY reference to this (supposed) transmission by (supposedly)
DIVSA Eric Marsh in the ENTIRE evidence record… and there isn’t even any
specific TIME reported for it at all.
Here are the things to ‘consider’ about this ‘testimony’.
1) This is the ONLY place this transmission from (supposedly) DIVSA
Eric Marsh is EVER mentioned… even though it (supposedly) took place
on the well-listened-to Air-To-Ground channel. TWO completely separate
investigations interviewing MANY people who were constantly monitoring
that Air-To-Ground channel all day… and this quick blurb in the SAIT
investigator’s notes recounting just ONE person’s recollection is still the
ONLY mention of this (supposed) transmission.
2) There is NOTHING (recorded in the SAIT notes) about this (supposed)
transmission taking place at 1637, as published in the SAIR. Zero. Zip. Nada.
It is still a complete mystery how the SAIT actually ‘assigned’ a time of 1637
to this (supposed) transmission from Eric Marsh to B33 on the Air-To-Ground
channel. Bravo 33 was even not really ‘sure’ about any of the actual times…
so how did the SAIT come up with 1637 for this (supposed) transmission?
3) The interview notes DO say that Bravo 33 reports this as ‘Division A called’…
but they also do NOT specifically say whether Bravo 33 ALSO said there were
actual CALL SIGNS involved with this transmission such as “Bravo 33, Division
Alpha’. Other notes from the Bravo 33 interview establish that they were not only
‘unfamiliar’ with who was even working the fire ( because of the piss-poor handoff
from ATGS / ASM1 / Rory Collins )… they were also not familiar with anyone’s
VOICES yet. Bravo 33 specifically says they had no idea what OPS1 Todd Abel
sounded like yet… so UNLESS there were specific CALL SIGNS involved on this
transmission from Marsh it is doubtful they would have been able to tell it was
DIVSA Marsh just from the voice. It is still POSSIBLE that this transmission came
from ‘someone else’ at that time and Bravo 33 is simply mistaken that it was
actually ‘Division A’ ( Marsh ).
4) This one single ‘supposed’ transmission from Marsh played a critical
role in the published SAIR document since they are using this one single
transmission as the defacto END of the (supposed) ‘blackout period’ where
they say they had ‘no direct verifiable transmissions’ from either Marsh
or Granite Mountain… yet it (actually) remains one of the most ‘unverified’
transmissions on record that day.
It is ONLY being ‘recalled’ by one single source ( ONE person ) and even
though others SHOULD have heard this transmission over the well-listened-to
Air-To-Ground channel… NO ONE ELSE in ANY interview or testimony spanning
TWO separate investigations recalls hearing it at all.
I still think it is ‘suspicious’ that the SAIT gave absolute ‘verified transmission’
status to this one (supposed) unrecorded radio callout from Marsh with only
ONE person seeming to ‘recall’ it ( when many others SHOULD have also
heard it… but apparently did NOT ).
There are still MANY other ‘transmissions’ that were actually captured in videos
and in audio tracks that the SAIT chose to call ‘not verifiable’, yet they chose
THIS (unrecorded) moment as so ‘verifiable’ that it ‘officially’ represents the
END of the (supposed) ‘blackout’.
It still almost seems like they were going to great lengths to make sure
this one (supposed) statement about a ‘retardant drop’ made it into the
‘official narrative’ and the ‘official public report’.. regardless of how thin
its ‘verifiableness’ really was.
We can OBVIOUSLY hear ( with our own ears in the Air Study video ) that ‘Air
Attack’ himself NEVER got this transmission at all.
So the ONLY possibility is that the other guy in the plane who was listening to
any ‘Air to Ground’ traffic was the ONLY one who actually heard this.
I am not saying he is WRONG or ‘imagining things’… but our ability to actually
VERIFY this ( as to caller ID and TIME, and what was actually said ) is seriously
non-existent.
I just wish there was an equivalent ADOSH interview transcript with Bravo 33
( French and Burfiend ) to ‘compare’ the SAIT (YIN) notes to and be SURE that
this ONE person’s recollection isn’t flawed, or that he simply was mistaken
about WHO was ‘calling that in’ to him.
There isn’t ( an equivalent ADOSH or other ‘independent’ interview with B33
French/Burfiend ).
Not yet… anyway.
At the 23 second mark of the 1637 Panebaker video there is a background transmission that I cannot make out. This video is only 39 seconds long and would put the 23 second mark near 1637. If you do not mind reviewing, I would appreciate it.
Otherwise, I hear you. I also want to know how the SAIT came up with this “quote.”
How does the 4490 red video that was taken around deployment time fit into all of this?
I know the +23 transmission in the 163700 Panebaker video that you speak of. I checked my Air Study notes and what I have for that is someone simply saying something about a “horse in the road” that they need to “take care of”.
I will re-listen to this 39 second video and get back.
As for the 4490red video… I don’t know.
Makes about as much sense ( time-wise ) as the Tom Story photo showing a full VLAT DC10 dump at exactly the moment of Steed’s first MAYDAY ( which is also not supported by any other evidence for being at that time ).
It could be that the 1633 SEAT DROP ( which definitely happened and is captured in that video ) is what Marsh MAY have seen and was reacting to THAT.
The ‘recollection’ might simply be wrong about what they were doing when they heard the transmission. Maybe Marsh had seen the actualy 1633 drop and THAT is what he meant by “That’s where we want retardant”… and it wasn’t a response to any ‘line up’ flight at all.
More later…
RE Tom’s VLAT photos:
I decided to walk away from that, because the pain of picking my way thru it was greater than desperation to figure it out….
However, now that I found your posting of the list of the drops, I’ve been thinking hmmmmm is it possible he’s photographing the 1706 T910 drop? Of course the problem with that is that at about the same time (I think?) he was photographing the Blue Ridge UTV leaving the Ranch House Parking Lot…..
I don’t have Lightroom open, so I’m not looking at the photos, just doing this off the top of my head…….
The Tom Story camera that we have narrowed the time offset down on ( the one he was using in the Ranch House Restaurant parking lot ) is this one…
Canon EOS-5D Mark II
The ‘big boy’ with the 300mm lens that seems to show a VLAT drop right at 1639 ( and we haven’t determined the time offset for yet ) is this one…
Canon EOS-1D Mark II N
I already checked the obvious ( 1 hour difference because of timezone set incorrectly ) but that doesn’t appear to be the problem.
BOTH of these cameras were ‘stamping’ using a -07:00 offset from GMT that day.
More later…
Actually, Tom was using two Canon 5D Mark IIs.
One with id 552301203 with a 70-200 mm f/2.8 L lens (major everybody’s favorite workhorse zoom lens), and another with id 720306928 with a 16-34 mm f/2.8 L lens for wide angle shots.
They both seem to be accurately time-stamped.
On the 1D Mark II id 401063, his most state-of-the-art camera, with which he shot the VLAT drop that I may be getting closer to time-stamping (he was so far off that I think maybe he hadn’t bothered to set the time, just the date–perhaps it was brand new??), he was using a 300 mm f/2.8 L lens. That’s a pretty big honkin’ lens. And heavy.
Marti… in folder ONE of Tom Story’s online photos ( the folder that does NOT have any Ranch House Restaurant photos )… he shot a LOT of ‘retardant drop’ sequences and they appear to have ALL been shot with this same ‘Canon EOS-1D Mark II N’ camera that was then later used for the (supposed) 1639 VLAT drop.
I suppose if we can just match ANY of these ‘drops’ that he photographed with THAT camera we will know if the that 1639 VLAT drop photo has an accurate timestamp or not.
I’m looking at it from this end as well. There is NO EVIDENCE that ANY VLAT drop took place ANYWHERE on that fire at 1639… when Tom Story’s photo seems to say it did.
I was hoping for just a 1 hour (incorrect) time zone setting… but that doesn’t seem to be the case.
Thx for this, WTK!
I had downloaded a smattering of photos from both folders, but just kinda randomly. Just downloaded a bunch more, more strategically. Looks like he photographed three VLAT drops. Will look at them much more closely after Mothers Day Lunch!
I’m starting to think he set up that camera quickly, just setting the date, and not the time. Thus the stamp when first shot a frame on it would have been 00:00:00. I don’t know if I have the time to figure out what to synch on. But if I can pin one of those VLATs, it might be possible to nail it.
That being said, I’m currently thinking that drop might be the 1707ish one. I just don’t know where he took it from. I don’t know where that drop was, exactly. Do you? If it was visible from the RHR parking lot, he could have caught it w/that 300mm easily.
Plus, I’m not sure that folder just has the 1Ds. But I’ll examine them later today for sure!
Hah! I just found what looks like a tight sequence of the same event, using both a Mark D and the 1D! It’s the red and white helicopter picking up a bucket at the helispot and heading into the smoke…
Looks good…more later….
OK, if this helicopter sequence shows the 1D is set about 20 minutes late, that would put the problematic VLAT drop at 4:17– the split drop.
OK, really got to get going….
A little note on terminology:
The voice in the video is that of French, who is in the role of Lead Plane, not Air Attack. That’s why he is on Air-to-Air. He’s not listening to Air-to-Ground.
When you hear the voice/callout of Air Attack, on Air-to-Ground, that is Burfiend. He’s not listening to Air-to-Air.
The only way each one knows what’s going on on the other’s channel is via their communication with each other.
So the person telling the story of their recollection of the communication with Div A would have been Burfiend.
Other than that, yep, copy. So now that I’ve downloaded that video, I’ll go watch it.
Marti… thank you.
Yes… that is ‘how it was’ in that timeframe.
They were obviously able to just ‘talk’ to each other in
the plane but each one was ONLY listening to the one
frequency, apparently.
Don’t forget that the 163338 Panebaker video actually
SHOWS the ‘real time’ SEAT drop that actually happens
in the other video detailed above.
They come in from the SOUTH ( lined up on that radio tower as the conversation says ) and they drop on the EAST side of the fire.
There is no ‘West to East’ flyover as described in the SAIR and there was no chance of it flying OVER Marsh… but that doesn’t mean he might not have ‘seen it’… and THIS 1633 SEAT drop is what he might have actually been referring to with his “That’s where we want retardant” message.
A public copy of this Air Study video is in Mr. Dougherty’s online Dropbox at…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/y3jy5opssrcvzb3/S3cCXl9pjr/AerialFirefightingstudy/Panebaker/Video/Video#lh:null-20130630_163338_fire_behavior_EP.MOV
I’m thinking you may be onto something here.
LOL I’m still downloading the 20130630_1628_ER.MOV file that I’ve been downloading for the past hour and a half, having slowed it down exponentially by trying to watch a bunch of other videos at the same time…..
But as soon as it finally finishes, I’ll take a look at that one. I still haven’t actually been able to play anythng in any manner that lets me actually SEE what’s going on……
Also WTKTT and Marti
Bothe of the drops on the Video were to far out in front of the fire to do any good. The did not fly into the smoke to hit the flames.
Again it is hard to use air tankers at the front of a running fire. Smoke wind and no visibility reduce accuracy of drops. If GM was under the smoke they would not have seen them to make an accurate drop. Only in the movies. OLD SAYING— Never expect an air drop to save your ass, if they can’t see you they can’t hit you…
Reply to Bob Powers post
on May 9, 2014 at 1:39 pm
>> Mr. Powers said…
>> Both of the drops on the Video
>> were too far out in front of the fire
>> to do any good.
Right after the 1633 SEAT drop…
both the Lead Plane Pilot ( B33
French ) and the SEAT pilot are
LAUGHING and this is what is said…
+2:46 ( 1633.34 / 4:33.34 PM )
(French): Yea… we liked your drop…
I know there was a lotta fire in there… but… ah… (laughter) nicely done
+2:50 ( 1633.38 / 4:33.38 )
(Unknown): Yea (laughter)… it’s…
it’s like spittin’ at it.
They both KNEW it wasn’t doing a damn bit of good… but what the heck… they get paid by the ‘hour’ and not by the ‘results’.
Looking back over the transcript of Bravo Lead Pilot talking to the VLAT 910 while they’re setting up for the drop.
I can’t tell if Bravo is actually flying a “show me” or they’re just circling. It kinda reads like Bravo is actually flying the show me, which would mean he would have been flying over the bowl.
What do you think?
And also I’m asking this of Bob Powers, who seems to be the one of us with the most experience of this stuff……
Yes very likely the fir was not that big to circle and make runs and keep all the plains apart would cover a lot of air space. circling the fire at different altitudes or even locations. as I said earlier the plains could have flown over Marsh and crew at any time
in a 8 mile square area. Setting up to make a run takes a lot of maneuvering. Dose that help?
Thanks. Yes.
Lead plane says to VLAT 910:
“If you need more altitude let me know… you should be okay at sixty five, only other aircraft I’ve seen is a media ship at this time (at) niner-thousand five hundred.”
He had that space cleared out completely.
Right after the 1633 SEAT drop… it was ‘load and return’ time for that SEAT. French didn’t get back to Kevin ( DC10 ) right away because he had to take a moment to inform the now departing SEAT that Wickenburg was ‘out of retardant’. Departing SEAT says he will try a ‘private club’ in Wickenburg. French gives him permission to do that… and only then begins to turn his attention to Kevin… SEVEN miles out and ‘holding’.
As Kevin is ‘coming in’… French tells him “we’re pretty much alone on the fire now”.
So YES… the space was cleared out. The other DC10 was ‘on approach’ to Yarnell but still quite a ways out.
Except for the choppers, that is. They ( apparently ) just continued to do pretty much whatever they wanted to… just as they had been doing all day.
Which would also correspond to Burfiend saying in the interview that they made a practice flight over the bowl west to east….
Marti… yes. Probably so. See my other post about the ‘plan’ apparently being to just try to get ‘in position’ to be in FRONT of Kevin ( DC10 910 ) as he came into the area from the SOUTH and be ready to just ‘angle in front of him’ for a quick ‘show me’ as soon as he entered the area.
This ‘jockeying for position’ while waiting for Kevin to arrive on the fire and ‘acquire a visual’ on them might be the ‘practice runs’ mentioned in the B33 YIN notes.
I think, now, after going over the transcripts, they did fly the show me, but it was exactly when Jesse made the mayday, bcuz the call from Prescott (who heard Jesse’s mayday) came right while Bravo was flying over the bowl west to east.
Chilling.
So, to get out of stun mode and back to analytical mode, if Eric made any call on air to ground about “that’s where we want it,” it had to have been about an earlier flight. So that would mean the actual SEAT drop.
This timeline is a beast to pull together.
On the other hand, continuing to think out loud,
It’s possible Eric is watching the Bravo Lead Plane and VLAT 910 circling around the bowl, which is what they were doing, before the show me, at 3:47, and that’s when he Air2Grounds “that’s it that’s where we want it.” And that’s what Burfiend would have heard.
Is that impossible?
I’m thinking out loud so thanks for your patience, every one…..
Marti… the way I read that transcript in the 1630 to 1643 timeframe… my take is that when French ( Lead Plane Duty ) finally turned his attention to Kevin ( VLAT DC10 910 ) circa 1636.46 ( just 14 seconds before 1637 )… and told him to ‘come on in’ from his ‘holding pattern’ SEVEN MILES away… and said “Have I got a project for you!”… what he wanted to have happen at that point was to be ‘in position’ to do a ‘show me’ for Kevin as soon as he ‘entered the area’.
So YES… there must have been a lot of ‘circling’ going on at that moment as he waited for Kevin to ‘come on in’ and get a VISUAL on him.
We can even hear the two of them struggling to ‘acquire’ that visual as Kevin brought the DC10 in. It isn’t until Kevin says “Okay… I see your beacon” that he actually DID ‘acquire that visual’.
But now we are just seconds BEFORE Steed’s first MAYDAY.
So I guess it is ‘possible’ that as French was ‘circling around’ in anticipation of getting in FRONT of Kevin as he came in from the SOUTH… French could have been
literally ‘all over the place’ down there.
Maybe he did circle WAAAY out over that middle bowl doing some kind of ‘practice run’ to get in front of Kevin as he came in from the SOUTH… and Marsh simply just ‘saw’ French ‘jockeying for position’ as Kevin approached…
…but that still doesn’t warrant Marsh’s (unsolicited) “That’s exactly what we want!” radio call.
That ‘circling around’ to get into position to lead Kevin on a SOUTH to NORTH ‘show me’ on the far EAST side of the fire as Kevin ‘arrived’ in the area would have had nothing to do with where they actually planned to drop any retardant.
So we’re supposed to believe Marsh just saw some small plane wildly circling around up in the air down there and somehow thought that was an indication of where retardant was going to be dropped?
Fer cryin’ out loud.
If Marsh really was all that concerned about ‘helping’ get retardant dropped somewhere… then why isn’t there MORE radio traffic to that effect where we at least hear Marsh trying to CONFIRM where they planned on dropping ANYTHING?
Do I still confused about all this?
You damn betcha.
Typo above…
Meant to say…
Do I still SOUND confused?
You damn betcha.
And yes, I can see you may be right here:
“…but that still doesn’t warrant Marsh’s (unsolicited) “That’s exactly what we want!” radio call.”
What makes you say:
“That ‘circling around’ to get into position to lead Kevin on a SOUTH to NORTH ‘show me’ on the far EAST side of the fire”
When Burfiend says it’s a west to east “over the bowl”?
Marti… I am on a ‘learning curve’ here with all this information myself… but that is simply what it SOUNDS like is happening from the transcript(s) of the audio conversations.
Yes… something about ‘west to east’ practice is runs is mentioned in SAIT interview notes… but I am focused more at the moment on what the AUDIO captures ACTUALLY tell us about what they were REALLY doing.
Even though the ‘show me’ is long past 1637 and just moments before Steed’s first MAYDAY… French has obviously started the ‘show me’ and is explaining what he wants to Kevin in the DC10… and he uses compass headings.
French says “…and my heading starting out was three six zero and ended up about three three five’.
Flying a ‘heading’ of ‘three six zero’ means you are flying DUE NORTH.
There is no ZERO compass heading in aviation. True north is always referred to by pilots as ‘three six zero’.
So flying a heading of ‘three six zero’ for the start of the drop and ending up with a heading of ‘three three five’ means flying a due SOUTH TO NORTH flight path and then banking a little to your LEFT and ending up with a heading of 335 degrees ( sorta north/northwest ).
There are OTHER clues in that transcript such as French specifically asking the chopper that is leaving the area to fly down the WEST side of the fire to stay ‘out of the way’.
Why would he be ASKING the chopper to exit the area to the WEST if that’s where he was planning on flying with Kevin?
Nice work, WTKTT.
Another thing about this AIR ATTACK terminology.
I posted this video a few weeks ago. I don’t know if anybody watched it. It’s REALLY REALLY helpful, about the most helpful thing I’ve come across regarding how Air Attack actually works.
I think there’s a TON of CONFUSION in our discussion about Air Attack. And that’s NOT helping us figure things out or communicate accurately to whomever may be reading this.
In this really well made BLM National Incident Fire Center video, called “Firefighting Airspace (2012 Refresher),” Steve Price, Aerial Supervisor, BLM Boise District, clearly describes and illustrates how Air Attack works. Then, at 6:16, he clearly describes how the Aerial Supervision Module, i.e. BRAVO, works, and, then, how the communications system is organized.
The pilot of the plane (i.e. for Bravo 33 at Yarnell being FRENCH, not Burfiend) functions as a lead plane pilot, and communicates primarily over Air-to-Air with the other pilots. That is his job. That’s why I’m saying to you, WTKTT, that you are incorrect in ascribing that voice/role to Burfiend.
The not-pilot of the plane (i.e. for Bravo 33 at Yarnell being BURFIEND, not French) functions as Air Attack, and communicates primarily over Air-to-Ground with the crews and overhead and whoever else on the ground. Again, WTKTT, when you say that, in the interview, it’s French speaking, that, also, is not accurate.
When one needs to let the other know something, they tell each other. French, as overheard in the Air Study videos, was functioning as lead plane, and being heard in the videos, communicating over air-to-air. He didn’t hear the Steed Mayday. He was trying to line up the VLAT T910 drop, a challenging job in itself, all things considered. How that Prescott notification got picked up in that video I have no idea. I don’t think French probably even heard it.
Burfiend is the one speaking in the interview. He’s the one who would have been busy doing other things when Steed did his Air to Ground “MayDay.” He’s the one who would have been in communication with Div A. I’m guessing he would have heard the Prescott call. Probly about the same time OPS got his attention, also. He’s the one who would have told French, we’ve got a problem on the ground, at which point French notified T910 of the problem and told him to go on standby.
In order to even begin to accurately understand what we are seeing/hearing in these videos, and what we are reading in these reports, interviews, etc., we really need to clear up our confusion about this stuff.
Here’s the link:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9fjF2KQ75TY&index=147&list=PLTErVrHH6uJja-ljtn7z9Q5Sz9WtCPGw1
Also, since I’ve spent the morning reading all your Air Study posts, WTKTT, yes that 4:16/4:18 T-911 pair of videos was a split-drop in which, as the list indicates, the first drop was “at” 1615 and the second was “at” 1617. So, as unbelievable as it may sound, those two drops came two minutes apart.
And thanks for all the heavy lifting you did getting those videos transcribed and analyzed. It wasn’t until I stumbled across that Firefighting Airspace video, that my own confusion started lifting enough for me to even begin to comprehend what we are encountering. Because it really is……..CONFUSING!
And now that I just wrote all that, it also means that whether or not that 4:37 Marsh communication with BURFIEND happened, it WOULDN’T have shown up on the Air Study video, because it wasn’t Air-to-Air. And it wasn’t with FRENCH, who wasn’t AIR ATTACK.
So the only way it will emerge is if it’s via a video that has Air to Ground at that time overheard, or if someone who was listening, as you have said WTKTT, that VERY MUCH listened to Air to Ground frequency overheard it and would like to speak up about that somewhere sometime somehow.
Burfiend’s a pretty awesome guy. I don’t think he would be making something up. I think both of them were doing a SPECTACULAR job, all things considered. Including the fact that they were left clueless about what was happening in the midst of total chaos and had to figure out a whole lot of things on the fly.
Marti as you explained above you rang a bell.
The that’s exactly were we want it came fro the Air attack boss telling the lead plane he was right on.
some times no one answers as he was expecting to hear that or hear he was not in the right place.
Happens all the time between lead and air.
I am saying it never was Marsh.
If it was not Air Attack
It would have been some one close to the drop zone talking on air to ground. have to figure this out. Maybe one of the OPS.
I am still betting it was not Marsh.
If there was to much smoke he may have heard the Plains but never would have seen them. I am in agreement with WTKTT that the smoke was to thick to see the plains at that time. Marsh would have wanted a drop on his head and the crews at that point not dropping on the flames would not even slow that fire down.
I think I’m agreeing with you here. I kind of put this idea out, trying to wrestle the timeline together, this being the last straw.
Watching the Air Study Video of the VLAT split drop some 20 minutes earlier, I could see Bravo33 flying and leading the VLAT 911, but only just barely. And that’s when they were both coming down much lower to actually do the drops.
I think if Eric was watching when Bravo 33 did the practice run from west to east over the bowl, he might have been able to see it, if the smoke wasn’t too thick, or maybe hear it. But, unfortunately, that didn’t happen until 4:39 while Steed was making his mayday call and, alas, it was too late for any meaningful signal from Eric saying “yes that’s where we want it.”
So since I don’t think Burfiend made that up, and he’s saying it happened while they were flying “show me” from west to east over the bowl, in the midst of all that smoke and whatever (which they WERE IN FACT DOING over on the other side of the fire before they came to this side), the only thing I can think of is that somebody else must have said that. It’s really a stumper.
Thanks Bob for helping me think this through!
And if Eric, or anybody else, had said it over AirToGround, at 4:39, while Bravo 33 was flying (I think, but I could be wrong) a “show me” from west to east over the bowl, everybody that was listening to Air to Ground then, which included a WHOLE LOT OF PEOPLE (including us watching/listening to the “Last Minutes” video, would have heard it, also
So at this point, I, personally admit I can’t figure this one out, based on the data we currently have, and am willing to admit defeat, given that I’m not all that sure what difference it ultimately makes in the general scheme of things, anyway.
At this time, “Air Attack” was Burfiend, sitting in Bravo 33 with French, who was flying as Lead Plane. It was fully functioning as an Air Support Module, with both Lead Plane and Air Attack bundled into one vehicle. So what you are saying here doesn’t work.
Reply to Marti Reed post on May 9, 2014 at 11:50 am
>> Marti said…
>> Because it really is……..CONFUSING!
Yes… it is… and the SAIT interview notes with Bravo 33 are
really such a MESS that it just compounds things.
For example…
>> Marti also said…
>> Burfiend is the one speaking in the interview.
No… not exclusively. There are ‘quotes’ in these interview
notes from BOTH of them… but since it is all written as
‘first person perspective’ it is NEVER clear in those SAIT
interview notes ( at any particular moment ) WHO is really
being ‘quoted’ ( Burfiend or French ).
The SAIT interview notes with Bravo 33 contain specific
references for BOTH Burfiend AND French being the ones
‘quoted’… but it keeps CHANGING.
Examples from the YIN interview notes…
( See if you can ‘follow the bouncing ball’ here as to
who is suddenly ‘speaking’ to the SAIT interviewers )…
________________________________________________
Paragraph 4…
I knew there was 2 structural groups. I wrote down 2.
Tom said “hey dude, you are the air attack”.
Paragraph 13…
I was talking to Tom about the rising terrain on exit.
Paragraph 17…
I told Tom “lets fly something further down”.
Same Paragraph (17)… but only 8 sentences later…
I looked at John and he did this (slash across the throat).
I told Kevin to stand by copy, taking it around.
Same Paragraph (17)… just 4 sentences later…
At first KA wanted to get the bucket but John said “no,
we need to find these guys”.
Last paragraph…
Because of the attitude, I was working hard trying to
stay 3 drops in front of Tom.
_______________________________________________
So not only is the TIME all distorted in this ‘interview’ with
them jumping back and forth all over the place…
…one moment it is (apparently) Burfiend speaking in the
‘first person’… then suddenly it’s French speaking in the
‘first person’… then it’s (apparently) back to Burfiend again.
I could almost understand them ‘splitting’ the interview notes into ‘top-half’ and ‘bottom-half’ with one or the other being
French or Burfiend then speaking from the first-person…
…but there’s no indication that’s what they were doing, either. It’s all just a jumbled MESS.
By the way…
There were THREE people in that airplane.
SAIT INTERVIEW WITH BRAVO 33 – July 9, 2013 – 1700
Interviewees: Bravo 33
John Burfiend-ATS Specialist
Clint Clauson – ATS Trainee
Thomas French – AT Specialist
What RADIO CHANNEL does anyone think the 3rd guy
in the plane ( Clauson ) was ‘listening to’ that day?
Since he is listed as an ATS Trainee… and French is
only listed as an ‘AT’… does that automatically mean
this mysterious Clauson guy was only interested in
what Burfiend ( ATS Specialist ) was doing… and so
was only listening to ‘Air-To-Ground’ like Burfiend?
If that is the case… then that means this Clauson guy
would have heard EVERYTHING Burfiend did… including
this (supposed) “That’s what we want” transmission from
DIVSA Eric Marsh.
But ( apparently ) even though the SAIT had this Clauson
guy sitting right there in the interview… they never asked
him anything and he is (apparently?) not quoted anywhere
in that interview. Very strange.
Also… now that I have re-read the SAIT Bravo 33 notes
to grab the ‘follow the bouncing ball’ quotes… I just realized
that this Bravo 33 interview ALSO proves without a
shadow of a doubt that OPS1 Todd Abel was ‘fully engaged’
with Bravo 33 throughout the entire ‘swtich to the south
side of the fire’ Air Operations shift… and right on up
through the deployment.
There are quotes in the B33 YIN interview which indicate
OPS1 Todd Abel was VERY ‘focused’ on the Air-To-Ground
channel and conversing directly with Burfiend right up
to Steed’s first MAYDAY call ( and beyond ).
So that means if Eric Marsh really did suddenly come
onto the Air-To-Ground channel at 1637 with his
( unsolicited ) “That’s what we want” transmission…
…that OPS Todd Abel MUST have heard it right along
with Burfiend ( and the Clauson guy )… along with ALL
the other people who were no-doubt listening to that
‘popular’ Air-To-Ground channel.
But NOWHERE in ANY of his interviews with two separate
investigations does Todd Abel say he ever heard any
such transmission.
It really is important to figure this out.
Not only because the SAIT chose to label this one single
‘transmission’ as ‘totally verified’ and THEN use it as the
defacto ‘end’ of the (supposed) ‘verifiable communications’
blackout period…
…but also because it’s simply important to KNOW if
DIVSA Eric Marsh ever really did say any such thing.
So….. I’ve spent the day downloading and watching and trying to learn from the videos. And trying to be unbiased about it. And still struggling with that Marsh call that Burfiend (who I really respect) notes. And being seriously impressed by French’s behavior, even tho you diss him for the chuckles. I see him as doing a really good job of a really complicated task and the chuckles are to support the pilots, and I think they’re doing a better and more professional job than a whole bunch of other people on that clusterf*ck fiasco of a fire.
But reading what you are writing here, and yeah. The SAIT was a joke. Not an investigation. This is totally unprofessional. But I don’t blame Burfiend and French for it.
I sit here thinking maybe sometime I should head down to Silver City to have a conversation. If I can find the time. Which I maybe can’t. All things considered. Hopefully whoever is in charge of the lawsuits will.
Reply to calvin post on May 8, 2014 at 3:08 am
>> calvin said…
>>
>> Div A tells Rory Collins the other crew is in the black and they were
>> headed back to the rigs.
>>
>> Questions.
>> 1. What other crew? Is he referring to a squad of GMH? No?
>> 2. Who is the “They”, that were headed back to the rigs??
>> 3. Does this indicate that Marsh was not in the black circa 1530?
calvin… I knew you were going to ‘catch’ that.
This statement from Air Attack Rory Collins has always been there ( in his SAIT interview notes ) and has always been sort of just laying there like a turd on the table.
It’s never really been fully discussed.
The elusive Mr. Collins was (apparently) NEVER interviewed by ADOSH but it was not for lack of them trying to.
Once again… here is that ‘cut’ from the SAIT investigators’ NOTES from their ( apparent ) interview with Air Attack Rory Collins…
_________________________________________________________________
** SAIT interview with Rory Collins…
Air Attack – LDF – Roseburg
Interview took place at 11:00 a.m. 7/13/2013
Interviewers: Rocha, Kurth, Mike Dudley, Jim Karels.
15:30 Experienced wind shift and the flank turned and became the
head going SOUTH to Yarnell. I let B(?) know prior to the shift to
move to that side and start drops.
15:30 – 15:45 The fire was headed for Yarnell moving FAST to the SOUTH.
They were getting retardant drops. Contacted Division A to tell them of fire
condition and that they needed to move their rigs to a better location.
Q: Did he say he was in good black?
A: NO, he said the other crew was in a good location in the black and
they were headed back to the rigs.
__________________________________________________________________
As for your questions…
>> 1. What other crew? Is he referring to a squad of GMH? No?
It’s hard to tell… but the way I have always read that confusing note from the SAIT investigator(s) is that Marsh might have been referring to ‘Blue Ridge’ as the ‘other crew’ ( or specifically Frisby and Brendan in the UTV ) and that ‘they’ were ‘headed back to the rigs’ ( Even though the ‘in the black’ part of that statement would then make no sense at all ).
>> 2. Who is the “They”, that were headed back to the rigs??
See above. My mind wants to say it was a reference to Blue Ridge ( or just Frisby and Brendan ) since they really were ‘headed back to the rigs’ at that time… but is it possible that at that moment Marsh talked to Collins Marsh really did think there was time for Granite Mountain to ‘head back to the rigs’?
Is it possible that was the ‘plan’ that Marsh actually was referring to in other documented conversations around this time?
>> 3. Does this indicate that Marsh was not in the black circa 1530?
If Marsh was actually on the VERY top of the ‘Weaver Mountains’… then yes… I don’t think it can be said that he was technically ‘in the black’ at that point. Even now… with Google Maps defaulting to post-fire imagery, there are places up there where Marsh could have been that never really burned at all.
These aren’t the *only* notes from the SAIT’s (supposed) interview with Rory Collins that are totally mystifying and unexplained.
That entire SAIT Investigation Notes page for Collins’ interview is basically a joke.
ADOSH tried and tried to interview the elusive Mr. Collins… but (apparently) never succeeded since there is NOTHING in the ADOSH FOIA/FOIL documentation package that represents either an in-person or a telephone interview with ATGS / ASM1 / Rory Collins.
Strangely enough, however… the ADOSH contracted WFAR report makes DIRECT references to ‘our interview with ATGS / ASM1 / Rory Collins’…
Example 1… page 37 of WFAR.
NOTE: This is where the WFAR is using the known incident of Rory Collins dropping retardant on Marsh’s (planned) burnouts as an example of the MANY ‘mis-communications’ that were happening on that fire pretty much all day long. The WFAR specifically says that it interviewed ATGS / ASM1 / Rory Collins about this and it is QUOTING him…
_________________________________________________________________
A good example of the lack of communication from the briefing that occurred on June 30 was the test fire that GMIHC was igniting. During the morning at the top of the ridge, GMIHC was planning to burnout a small section of line to create the fire perimeter down to a two-track road. While they were igniting the test fire, two SEAT retardant drops extinguished their test fire between 1130 and 1145. The Air Tactical Group Supervisor (ATGS) did not know the purpose of the burning and dropped retardant on it, forcing GMIHC to go to direct attack on the fires perimeter. Planning OSC failed to inform ATGS of the tactics for the fire. During our interview with the ATGS on ASM1, he stated that they did not have a firm understanding of where the division breaks were. He stated that they could see the dozer, but did not understand its mission. The dozer was constructing a contingency line from west to east, which when complete, would allow a firing operation to be conducted when conditions were favorable. If ATGS had known this, they could have reinforced the dozer line with retardant instead of picking a location just to the north.
__________________________________________________________________
Again… there is NO DOCUMENTATION in the ADOSH FOIA/FOIL package that supports these statements in the WFAR report, or establishes ( for sure and certain ) that ADOSH ( or anyone associated with WFA ) was able to ever interview Rory Collins.
There are specific memos in the ADOSH ’emails and correspondence’ part of the FOIA/FOIL release that show ADOSH reminding the Wildland Firefighting Associates contractors that NO INTERVIEWS could take place WITHOUT an ADOSH representative present, so it is unlikely that WFA ever interviewed Collins on their own and that might be why the transcript of such and interview never made it into the ADOSH FOIA/FOIL release.
It’s still a BIG MYSTERY.
ATGS / ASM1 / Rory Collins was/is a KEY PLAYER in what was happening on the Yarnell Hill Fire on BOTH Saturday AND Sunday…
…but he still really doesn’t seem to have been properly interviewed
by any competent investigator(s).
More on this later…
I am confused. Rory Collins was not ASM1, right? ASM1 (Bravo33) was Lenmark, Wartis, right?
You’re correct. The SAIR is not.
This whole air support organization/terminology thing has been some of the most mind-boggling and confusing stuff I’ve been struggling to understand this whole time. Apparently the SAIT didn’t understand it either!
The only two small plains should have been.
Air Attack Boss– Ground to air coordination.
Lead Plane—-Takes orders from Air Attack and leads the Air tankers thru the drops. also may make first run to set up drop and show where to drop.
Some times Air Attack can also serve as Lead plane as needed.
Normally the lead plane is a 1 person contract or employee Pilot, who is dispatched with the Air Tankers. Clear as mud right.
Also the call numbers B33 would have been the numbers on the Plane unless they were assigned call numbers. ASM1 is there working ID. but not use normally as a call sign.
Exactly. (See my post above with the video that explains this stuff).
I think a big part of the confusion is the shifting relationships with Rory Collins being Air Attack when he’s there and Bravo 3 or 33 being Lead Plane, and Bravo 3 or 33 being both Air Attack and Lead Plane when he isn’t.
We-who-are-not-familiar-with-this-stuff are getting really confused by the way we’re encountering it. And it doesn’t help that both SAIT and ADOSH inaccurately communicate it, also. It just gets bewildering.
But I think I’m getting a WHOLE lot clearer about it.
And to make matters worse ( but still
something that is totally relevant to
figuring out what happened THAT
DAY in Yarnell )…
What is the damn ‘procedure’ for ‘notifying OPS and/or ground forces’ when these guys are playing “musical AA, ATGS, LP” all day up above them?
Is there no ‘procedure’ at ALL for this?
One minute you are pressing your microphone button on Channel 10 and/or 16 and you are talking to one guy… and seconds later you can press the microphone button again and you are now talking to a completely different guy who MAY or MAY NOT now even know who the hell YOU are? ( Depending on whether the changeover was piss-poor Collins style or not? )
When ( and HOW? ) were even OPS people like Abel or Musser even being ‘officially notified’ that these guys were changing jobs like tag-team wrestlers up above them that day?
I am not hearing ANYTHING that resembles ‘notifications’ about any of this in ANY of the captured radio traffic from that day.
Is that NORMAL?
WOW.
Elizabeth has been chastised a few times in the past for multiple accusations against several different people who have posted here, that they were all actually one person, using different names. Myself, WTKTT, RTS, RS, Fire20+, and probably some others are included in that group. Despite the chastizing, she has continued to accuse others of this, without a shread of evidence
There is a recent on-going discussion down below, where she once again accused SEVERAL posters of being one person. She was called-out by several people, who said she owed RTS an apology.
She out-snarked everyone with her ridiculous response, stating she would apologize, ‘if only it weren’t true’.
I then called her out again, myself, and since the only person I actually know here IS myself, and I’M NOT WTKTT as she has alleged, I told her that at the very least she owed WTKTT and myself an apology, and if she didn’t, I was done with her, period.
FINALLY, she has revealed what stellar investigative skills she used to expose us all to the light of day.
Elizabeth on May 8, 2014 at 1:48 pm said:
TTWARE, as you might recall, it was “Observer” and I who both noticed the same thing a while ago. Specifically, when a question was asked of YOU, it was WTKTT who replies. Presumably that means that you and he are the same person or are speaking for each other? Or am I missing something?
Sorry Elizabeth, but it was ‘Observer’ who ran with the BULLSHIT that you had previously put out there, quite some time prior. The same WORTHLESS SHIT you have also been repeating about others. AND NOW, in your comment above, we are able to see your stellar investigative skills in action, ALONG WITH YOUR SOUND EVIDENCE.
What’s even more amazing is your obsession with this SHIT, and the fact that you continually put it out there like it’s VERY IMPORTANT, apparently to somehow denegrate the targets.
What you haven’t been able to grasp due to your obsession, is that it doesn’t matter one whit in the grand scheme of things, if someone WERE posting with a hundred different names. IT’S JUST INFORMATION, TO ALWAYS TAKE WITH A GRAIN OF SALT!
In case you haven’t noticed during your obsession, WTKTT POSTS TO EVERYTHING, no matter who the post was directed to. THERE’S NOTHING WRONG WITH THAT, AND I AM NOT HIM!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
As I said in my comment down below, which I posted above your comment copied above, since you choose not to apologize to WTKTT and myself, I am done with you, PERMANENTLY. I hope others on here follow-suit, as well!
Agree. I’m ready for a boycott.
I’ve been trying to take Elizabeth seriously about the weather. But I’m feeling used. And I just don’t have the time or energy. She hasn’t returned the favor. She hasn’t added anything. That doesn’t bother me personally, because I was genuinely interested in the weather at this point, anyway.
There are a number of people here who, I believe, have genuinely given of their time and energy to pick apart the evidence we can find in our own various ways, and share what we find, and question each other, in a relatively respectful way, in order to drill down into this whole mess, in order to discern the truth. I include you in that. And WTK, whose intense work has been so helpful so often, even when I’ve sometimes thought, OK you may be pushing too far….. And Calvin, who just keeps asking hard and challenging questions that I hadn’t even thought of…….. And Bob Powers, with so much hard-learned experience……. And Mike in his honesty…. And SR who sometimes aggravates people but I also think knows way more than he sometimes lets onto…
I hate to say this, Elizabeth, but I don’t trust you. I wish I could. Sometimes it seems like you are really trying to figure things out, and sometimes it seems like you are baiting and switching and using us all. And I don’t know why. We are not here……for your purposes.
And this whole current deal about who is who that you are pushing relentlessly, is pretty much the last straw with me. I refuse to play those kind of games. And I refuse to play with people who do.
Than You Marti what else can I say. Bring us back on subject. I have no problem with those that wish to stay anonymous. I have no reason to and I guess that just me I have always owned every thing I have said win lose or draw.
I’m like you. I’m pretty much “out there” on the Internet. My Facebook says who I am. My Twitter says who I am. My Flickr says who I am. If I ever finally get my website back up, it will, again, say who I am.
On the other hand, there are things I don’t say on the Internet. Because I’m “out there.”
I was once under investigation by the FBI. Not because of what I did, but because of what I knew. It was the most terrifying experience of my life. I had to rethink everybody in my life, as to exactly who they were, and exactly how much I trusted their judgement. I had to re-think TRUST.
And that is why I don’t expect anybody to ipso facto say who they are on the Internet. I am totally fine with Internet anonymity. it’s everybody’s right. I’m totally fine with it.
And I have had absolutely no problem distinguishing people in this forum. I have been perfectly capable of distinguishing the various voices here. I can’t even fathom anybody conflating TTWARE with WTKTT. Or RTS with SR.
This whole thing has been a huge waste of time and energy, IMHO.
Not long ago someone perused that Elizabeth is writing a book about this and using this forum to gather data. At the time I thought that was very far-fetched. Since then, considering how her posts have been worded, it certainly sounds like she might be gathering data for a book and using all of us to do the investigative leg-work.
Well if she writes a book from what she says and what we say its going to go around in circles.
OK I’m going to bare my soul here, after what I just wrote in response to Bob Powers.
Because I think this is a great time to just get real. As I just told my 94-year-old mom over the telephone, we’re ten months into this fiasco and we can still not figure out why they did what they did.
At one time, I thought I admired Elizabeth. I thought she was really concerned about and trying to gather information needed by the families in their quest to know the truth.
This was about the time I decided I was trying “to work” for Amanda Marsh, whether she ever knew it or not, because, at that time I was so seriously seeing how the Prescott Fire Department (as I wrote, “Here’s looking at you Daryll Willis”) was with-holding evidence, about a) the options conversation and what possible pressure was possibly being applied onto the crew, and b) the cellphones and gps units that have never surfaced. To be honest, I’m still asking those questions. That’s my “tin-foil hat conspiracy theory” and today I’ll proudly continue to stand by it. I still don’t know if “overhead” managed to screw over Eric Marsh (with all his foibles and strengths) and his crew or not.
However, as things progressed, even as I announced my retirement, but still kept reading this every day, and thinking every day, I found myself thinking, “Ya know, if I was looking to hire an investigative lawyer to drill down to the bottom of this whole affair, the last one I would hire would be Elizabeth, because of her lack of open-mindedness and, thus, her obtuseness.” Kind of the opposite of Sherlock Holmes.
And now I have to say, in response to your post, the last person I would hire to write a book about this is Elizabeth, because of her lack of respect for her sources. The best writers respect their sources. Which, in this case, Elizabeth hasn’t done. Not to mention her complete inability to communicate herself out of a paper bag. As we have, exasperatingly, all experienced.
Honestly, I have no idea why she is continuing to be here.
Elizabeth, exactly and honestly, why is it that you continue to invest yourself in being here, again?? I truly and honestly would like to know.
One doesn’t have to be hired to write a book. Anyone can do that, and then just peddle the manuscript.
Marti. I totally disagree with you regarding Elizabeth.
Elizabeth has been in this conversation starting September 2013.She has put herself out there. She has secured a lot of the information we have to review. I realize fireman20 (or whom ever) says anyone can request records through the FOIA/FOIL (and that may be true) BUT, no one else has done this (and then shared the records publicly) except ELIZABETH, DOUGHERTY, and GABBERT.
Marti. I am not asking you to agree with everything Elizabeth does or says. But I am asking you to weigh the positive effects Elizabeth has brought to IM and the Yarnell incident before making personal attacks against her.
We all have different backgrounds which makes this discussion interesting and (IMHO) helps explore different angles that may have been overlooked.
I really value and appreciate what you are saying here. And that’s because I really respect and trust your voice here.
In general I mostly avoid making negative comments about other people. I really do. And I’ve mostly done that here. Because I agree with you that various voices, even when I disagree with something they say, are REALLY REALLY valuable.
My beef has to do with two things.
1. I feel that in a number of instances, from recently to back aways, she has been perfectly comfortable interrogating us without expressing any genuine respect for us, or responding to our questions of her. I’ve personally experienced that, and I’ve seen her do that to others.
2. Trashing/distorting other peoples’ identities. This whole thing has been really disturbing to me, and genuinely hurtful to others. I can’t fathom any need to do that and it damages her credibility and I have no idea why she has continued to do it.
I appreciate the many things she has positively offered, but I am no longer willing to just sit back and be OK with the damage she has done.
I just don’t trust her any more.
Reply to SR post on May 8, 2014 at 6:31 am
>> SR said…
>> I hadn’t known about the McDonough statements as regards what Marsh,
>> Steed and he knew and discussed about the weather. I think it’s glaringly
>> clear that they did know that a full 180 windshift, complete with 50 mph
>> gusts, was coming.
Of course it is.
It was ALREADY HAPPENING even by the time Byron Kimball got around
to forwarding the official NWS and SWCC spot forecast over the radio
at 1530. Just moments later… it was so OBVIOUSLY happening that that
is what threatened Brendan McDonough’s safety and was forcing him to
abandon his lookout position circa 1536 or 1537 ( and to have all of those
radio conversations with Steed/Marsh about why he had to leave ).
In the course of just 5 minutes… Marsh thought it was ‘safe’ to ask Brian Frisby to schlep all the way out to the ridge just to have some kind of ‘secret’ conversation that Marsh (somehow) didn’t feel comfortable having over open radio… then moments later ( while Frisby is only halfway out there ) the fireline up right near them has REVERSED DIRECTION and is now threatening Brendan’s life.
So even if Marsh didn’t realize the predicted 180 FULL WIND REVERSAL was just about to happen when he called Frisby out to meet with him… he certainly realized it just minutes later when his own 20th man’s life is now in danger and Frisby himself realized it was ‘too dangerous’ to even still try to fulfill the request for the face-to-face with Marsh… and CALLED OFF THE MEETING for that very reason.
There is actually plenty of ‘other’ evidence that Marsh and Steed were FULLY aware of ( and EXPECTING ) the FULL 180 degreee wind shift such as other statements Brendan ( and others ) have made in public interviews and press
conferences following the incident.
Here’s just another ‘sampling’ of those statements…
__________________________________________________________________
** From the Kyle Dickman ( former Hotshot ) article entitled…
** “19: The True Story of the Yarnell Hill Fire” published September 17, 2013,
** and completely based on face-to-face interviews with Brendan McDonough…
NOTE: This matches Brendan’s ADOSH testimony where Brendan says it was
Steed himself who now reporting the predicted 180 degree wind shift and 50-60
mile per hour wind gusts to HIM, over the radio…
Donut was less than a minute into slinging his 4 P.M. weather when Steed
came back over the radio.
“Donut, you up?”
“Go, Steed.”
“They’re calling for a 180-degree wind shift and gusts of up to 60 miles per hour out of the northeast.”
“Copy that.”
He looked up at the approaching wall of flames and blinked. For the first time that afternoon, the wind was blowing at his face instead of his back. The flank that had been slowly backing down the valley had suddenly jumped to life. Two-foot flames had grown to twelve, and within moments the fire was running up a ridge on the east side of the valley and then south, directly at Donut.
“Steed, Donut. It hit my trigger point.” The fire had crossed the drainage on the valley floor only a quarter of a mile away. “I’m bumping back to the dozer push.”
“Alright, let me know when you get there. We’ve got eyes on you.”
Donut tossed on his pack and grabbed his gear as he started wading down
through the brush field and boulders toward the safety of the clearing the
bulldozer had created that morning
__________________________________________________________________
** From Brendan McDonough’s exclusive ABC news interview with
** Brian Ross, August 7, 2013
“Everything seemed normal, not threatening. Just — a typical day, going direct
on a fire,” he ( Brendan McDonough ) told ABC News.
Around 4:00 in the afternoon, however, everything changed. The winds that had
been driving the fire away from the Hotshots began to turn 180 degrees, propelled
by what some fire officials call a “perfect storm” of gusts up to 50 miles per hour.
Instead of moving NORTH, it started moving SOUTH as the flame front leapt
from 25 to 50 feet high.
McDonough says the team could now see what was happening — contradicting
some accounts that they were unaware the fire was heading toward them.
“From where they were, they could see it picking up. So they kind of relayed to
me, ‘Hey, Donut, we got eyes on it,'” McDonough remembers his captain telling
him. “They said, ‘If you need to get out of there, go ahead and get out of there…
we want you to be safe too,’ you know?”
__________________________________________________________________
** From Darrell Willis’ press conference at the deployment site, July 23, 2013…
( Question From A Reporter ) : Is there a confirmation that they did receive…
uh… information concerning the outflows from the thunderstorms?
( Darell Willis ): Yes. There is confirmation of that.
There’s no question about it.
They saw that the… uh… fire activity was picking up. There was a line of fire
from the ridge top… beyond where they where down lower into the valley
probly a mile or two… mile and a half line of.. uh.. fire… and it’s chaparral
that started to move to the SOUTH.
__________________________________________________________________
>> SR also wrote…
>>
>> It is convenient for those claiming that everything at YHF was perfectly
>> reasonable that, hey, the wind shifted, and no one could see further shifts
>> coming. Crazy outflow boundary, something you couldn’t see and that no
>> one had heard of. Almost as if GM got hit by an asteroid — tragic, but
>> nothing anyone could have done anything to prevent. Of course, that is
>> all completely nonfactual.
Some people never let the FACTS get in the way. It’s just annoying to them.
Something that needs to be remembered here is what any lawyer knows, and
that is what the real ‘legal’ *definition* of NEGLIGENCE is… and how lawyers
go about either proving it… or DEFENDING AGAINST IT, in open court.
Here is the ACTUAL (legal) definition of NEGLIGENCE…
_________________________________________________________________
1) Failure to exercise the care that a reasonably prudent person would
exercise in like circumstances.
2) Lack of normal care or attention
_________________________________________________________________
Two IMPORTANT things to notice about the ‘definition(s)’…
“reasonably prudent person” AND “normal care or attention”.
What lawyers will ALWAYS do to DEFEND against accusations of NEGLIGENCE
is to FIRST simply try to establish that ‘anybody else’ ( Sic: reasonably prudent
person ) would have probably ‘done the same thing’ AND/OR that nothing
regarding the circumstances surrounding the decision making was really
‘out of the normal’ at all.
Sounds close to some recent posts here, doesn’t it?
Don’t forget that Elizabeth is also the one who has now stated at least FOUR
or FIVE times on this public discussion thread that there was ‘nothing out of
the ordinary’ with regards to the piss-poor handoff that Air Attack Rory Collins
had with Bravo 33 before he abruptly left the fire at 1558… EVEN THOUGH
there is signed testimony from Bravo 33 themselves about what a ‘strange
handoff’ Collins performed that day and their own testimony about how
absolutely CLUELESS they were following that piss-poor handoff.
She continues to maintain that it was ‘nothing out of the ordinary’ and that
the next handoff later on was ‘just as quick’. ( I.E. – establish ‘normalcy’ ).
What a lawyer often hopes to establish when trying to defend against
NEGLIGENCE is this exact ‘establishment of normalcy’ and/or ‘establishment
of a pattern of decision making or behavior’ that doesn’t lead to ‘bad outcomes’
which can then be construed as ‘reasonably prudent behavior’… hence…
NO NEGLIGENCE.
Sometimes… it even WORKS.
So…… I’ve just spent 45 minutes trying to get to the weather documents via both Dougherty’s live links and the ones you have to copy and paste and EVERYTHING is landing on a page with a message that says: “Disabled link
Access to this link has been disabled. Please ask the owner of the shared link to send a new link to access the file or the folder.”
Could somebody else please try this and tell me if they’re getting it, too, or am I doing something wrong>
Thanks!
I’m not technical in that way, but the AZ site with the sport forecasts is still up, http://azsf.gov/system/files/documents/files/Spot%20Weather%20Forecast%20063013.0945.pdf .
You could still pull the historic Stanton RAWS data from somewhere, for sure.
But as great that it is that you are looking to do this, since all the data, radar, forecasts, etc. seem to align with contemporaneous accounts, I don’t think there’s any legit question as regards the weather.
Spot forecasts, not sport…
The weather forecast was in documents of the SAIT
if I am not mistaken???
Yes. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qwIB9RQY3zE There are all sorts of other sources, such as this blending of Flagstaff Doppler images. I can’t access from where I am, but for a weather-lite view, people can even go to something like Weather Underground and check the Alamanac for Flagstaff for 6/30/13 just to see that it more or less corresponds to other accounts.
The real story here is that a couple posters are simply floating the proposition that Marsh relied on some unique and personal definition of weather and of the weather forecast he had just heard, and reasonably so, and/or that weather associated with thunderstorms is unheard of in AZ and couldn’t have been expected…even if the forecasts of that weather had been received and were correct.
Sorry, WU for Prescott, not Flagstaff.
Amidst all this sound and fury it seems the GM overhead misread something – weather, fire etc. Even if there was an order (which at the present time appears to be the triumph of hope over facts), Marsh must have misread something in order to comply with it. Otherwise, if he complied knowing how dangerous it was, well I certainly hope that was not the case. He not only had a right, but a responsibility, to turn down an unsafe order. He was responsible for his crew. And if he knew it was unsafe, but relied on the promise of a retardant drop, many WFF have already indicated that would have been firefighting malpractice.
It seems too much effort is going into making sense of Marsh’s decision, when in the end I believe it will not make sense.
Hah! That video is a true brain-challenger!!! I like the sound of the wind and the birds chirping!
But yes.
It definitely shows what a thunderstorm bearing down on a fire that’s burning in high-risk fuels can do. Is it unique? No. Is it radical? Depends on one’s definition. Is it why Chuck Maxwell, the SWCC Meteorologist, was agonizing in Albuquerque about whether to get more pro-active about strategy? You betcha!
Well, I was finally able to access the files, by turning on my Dropbox account and downloading them to there. Spent the day reading and re-reading the weather stuff, and then had turned to the Google for more, then a storm hit and blew out my power. But yay Safari remembers….
So now I know what was reported by whom and when. And now I know what the radar images and the satellite images look like. And I can see how easy it would be for someone like Elizabeth, who doesn’t know how to interpret this stuff, to get bogged down.
And there was an article in USA Today on October 13 (am looking at it on my computer but can’t provide the link cuz I’m typing on my iPad cuz of the storm), that speculated that Granite Mtn may have misinterpreted what they were seeing, thinking that the wind-shift the forecast predicted had peaked when Brendan had to be evacuated, and that they could hence proceed. Thus missing the fact that it hadn’t and the worst was yet to come.
It goes on to say, “But the stronger winds — the outflow boundary from the thunderstorm — moved across the area about 40 minutes later. By then, the crew was in a position it could not escape.”
I actually don’t believe it. What I see in what I’ve seen is more along the lines of what Bob Powers described a few miles down below. The meta-weather cell was slowly turning in a clockwise direction and the lower winds were, also, just in a more erratic terrain-related manner. Maybe GM was fooled by that… and maybe they weren’t. I happen to think they shouldn’t have been.
The other thing Elizabeth keeps saying that I don’t get is that that line of thunderstorms was just sitting there for hours some 60 miles from the fire going nowhere and doing nothing. I haven’t seen ANYTHING that indicates that. If she is looking at the same “above the clouds” images I am (I.e.the gifs which are in fact the satellite images), they show that thunderstorm line bearing right down over the fire and engulfing it, until the pyro-cumulus column forces it’s way up above it. At least, that’s what I see.
And I’d highly recommend reading Chuck Maxwell’s report in the FireBehaviorAndWeather PDF. He was in Albuquerque, watching that whole thing unfold on radar/satellite monitors, very much in touch w/IncidentCommand, and agonizing about whether he should/should not take a more pro-active stance in terms of getting everybody off that fire NOW. Kinda like my dad (who he probably knew) praying when Overhead didn’t listen to him.
OK I’m open to questions.
OK here’s the link to the USA Today article. It’s actually pretty good in many ways, but just not quite there. Relying too much on Wade Ward?
Yarnell fire report explores role of weather:
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/10/04/yarnell-fire-report-explores-role-of-weather/2920549/
And sitting here after reading all this, and your comments, and thinking. The reason I don’t believe this theory is because they were still up above it all, seeing it all happening until 4:20-ish. And it hadn’t quit happening. And it was increasingly heading right where they were increasingly going.
I increasingly agree with WTK, when he wrote a couple of miles below, that the REALLY critical decision was the one to enter the bowl, not the one to leave the black. I think they didn’t know where the two-track actually went, or trust it, and saw the ranch right below them, and maybe were cardinally-directionally-disoriented or something? (That can actually happen even to the best of us) They must have thought they were flanking the fire and not heading right into where it was going. They absolutely should have kept a lookout above them.
WEATHER:
My view (with all due respect) is that the SAIT and Wildland Fire Associates reports do not always most accurately describe or emphasize the relevant facts as they existed between roughly 3:40-ish and 4:22-ish p.m. on June 30th in terms of what GM was likely seeing or perceiving (or mis-perceiving) or relying upon that would make GM believe that it made sense to move when they did down to the Boulder Springs Ranch. With respect to the WEATHER, this is certainly my view.
TTWARE referenced either the radar or satellite images (I cannot remember which parlance he used), and I am pretty sure that I have 30 or more of those images, which, in my view, seem to confirm my understanding of the weather as GM was seeing it or perceiving it or understanding it that day. The SAIT either did not review these images or they did not publish/release them to the media/Dougherty.
Marti seems to suggest below that she views the radar/satellite images as irrelevant to this discussion, which suggests to me that perhaps she is instead focusing on the weather materials in the 147 pages released by the SAIT. (Hopefully everyone who is opining on the weather who does not have the WFF background that folks like Bob Powers or xxfullsailxx seem to have has at least given the 147 pages a read, to get up to speed on some of the raw materials rather than what the SAIR and other reports are saying about the raw materials. The overachievers among you have probably already pulled the *raw* NWS or other data for the past few years to confirm that not a whole lot of WFF work would get done in AZ between mid-June and the end of July if everyone stopped working and stood down in a safety zone the moment a static thunder cell appeared in the sky, even if it was 80 miles away and totally static for hours.) Either way, my tentative conclusions previously suggested remain.
I would be curious to know what those of you who disagree are pinpointing in the 147 pages or with the radar/satellite images (referenced by TTWARE) as the basis for disagreement. It is entirely possible that I am wrong about the weather and what GM was perceiving (or mis-perceiving), and, if so, it would be useful for me to understand what – other than the SAIT’s conclusions – form the basis for disagreement, so that I can do more research and hopefully come to a more accurate conclusion, assuming mine is inaccurate.
Uhh…as WTKTT very helpful laid out, Steed and Marsh heard the forecast and discussed it among themselves, including the fact that S/SW winds would shift 180 to N/NE. They could see the storm front. The forecast weather appeared. Marsh noted squirelly winds.
What possibly remains unclear to you.
SR, if you honestly fail to see the confusion, then perhaps you underestimate the complexity of weather as it pertains to (a) fire behavior and (b) fire behavior in topography of the sort that existed near Yarnell/Glen Ilah. To respond to some of your points:
1. My understanding is that there was conversation AFTER the 3:26/3:30 p.m. forecast about whether any predicted weather changes had actually already occurred or were in the process of occurring. WTKTT seems to be ignoring this fact. If the NWS or FBAN or whatever weather-specific person indicates that the weather change predicted is either already here or has already impacted the fire, why would Marsh and Steed IGNORE this input?
2. When you say “they could see the storm front,” what storm front are you talking about? As I understand it, there had been one particular cell (or more) that had been around for multiple hours and was going NOWHERE. Marti gives a very good explanation below about how the weather in AZ this time of year can often be predicted in one way and play out in entirely another. Bob Powers himself notes that men who are experienced with wildfires and who pay attention can often see things in front of them or feel things or see things manifest in fire behavior that people who are arm-chair quarterbacking or sitting in an NWS office or on another side of the fire do not perceive.
3. “The forecast weather” (whatever that means) seems to have appeared either AFTER the men were dead or fatally compromised. The forecast weather did not CAUSE the shift in the fire that killed the men, as I understand it. So you are saying that the men got trapped and killed by “the forecast weather” (whatever you mean by that) that occurred AFTER they were trapped and likely already dead? Really? REALLY??
4. “Squirrelly winds” – Did *you* hear Marsh say such a thing? Me neither. It was either you or RTS or whomever who pointed out (correctly) that there are multiple things alleged in the SAIR/SAIT materials to have been said that people who are still living seem to indicate were NEVER said. So, it is *not* an established fact that Marsh commented on “squirrelly winds” no more than it is an established fact (as you or RTS or whomever like to allege) that Marsh had a pattern of reckless or needlessly risky/dishonest/covert/whatever behavior. That said, even if Marsh said “squirelly winds,” so what? Squirrelly winds does not equate with “a huge wind gust is about to occur and impact the fire behavior in a way that will trap and then kill you,” at least according to Bob Powers. Bob tells us – correctly, as I understand it – that FLAT air (e.g. no wind) can often be the warning sign of an impending major wind event. Then again, FLAT air (e.g. no wind) can sometimes indicate… no wind and no prospect of wind and there will be no wind for a while such that it is safe to move.
You are quick to criticize me, SR, for my alleged deficiencies in understanding weather as it pertains to fire, but, with all due respect, it appears that perhaps you also have some gaps in your knowledge. I suggest you and I work together to constructively figure out the relevant weather (as opposed to what folks have been alleging about the relevant weather).
I really don’t understand what you are saying here.
On the one hand, you say:
“1. My understanding is that there was conversation AFTER the 3:26/3:30 p.m. forecast about whether any predicted weather changes had actually already occurred or were in the process of occurring. WTKTT seems to be ignoring this fact. If the NWS or FBAN or whatever weather-specific person indicates that the weather change predicted is either already here or has already impacted the fire, why would Marsh and Steed IGNORE this input? …”
What CONVERSATION are you, AGAIN, referring to and among whom? And are you saying you are aware of NWS/FBAN/whatever indicating the predicted change (which was a half-hour prediction, but that doesn’t mean it predicted that weather event would END in a half hour, it was just the start) had already happened and was done at 4 PM??
And on the other hand, you say:
“3. “The forecast weather” (whatever that means) seems to have appeared either AFTER the men were dead or fatally compromised. The forecast weather did not CAUSE the shift in the fire that killed the men, as I understand it. So you are saying that the men got trapped and killed by “the forecast weather” (whatever you mean by that) that occurred AFTER they were trapped and likely already dead? Really? REALLY??”
What in the world are you talking about? How can you say here that the forecast weather happened after the burnover? The weather forecast was for the half an hour after 3:30. (and it was actually a spot forecast, and I’ll bet there were other forecasts/reports put out as the fire blew up, but I don’t feel like going to look for them ATM).
That doesn’t mean it ENDED a half an hour after the forecast. He was forecasting a major weather shift that was beginning at 3:30 and signified the major shift in the “winds aloft” so to speak, and wouldn’t be over until it was over, and the forecast didn’t say when it would be over. And there’s nothing I can see anywhere where anyone said ever that the forecast weather began after the crew was dead.
Do you understand what a forecast is?
Reminder: This is the forecast we are discussing:
WantsToKnowTheTruth
on May 6, 2014 at 9:36 pm said:
“Byron Kimball: Within the half-hour, (pause) EAST winds. (pause) Possibility of as high as 50 miles an hour or likely 25 (pause) definitely 25, 35 gusting 40 (pause) east / northeast within the half hour. Um… the outpoint to outflow line also ( will be ) located…”
These forecasts come from the national or state agency fire centers (Dispatch) offices relayed directly to the Fire. They are not some off the wall forecast.
Also I believe the squarely wind statement by Marsh was recorded on a video phone while taking a video of the fire. Refer back to one of WTKTT info.
Marti, you said the following: “I have not seen the 30 photographs you are referring to, but I can imagine that if they were taken from above the cloud cover, they probably aren’t particularly meaningful as to what is going on below that cloud cover.”
I took your words, Marti, to mean that you did not think the photos were, uhm, “particularly meaningful.” 🙂
Having looked at what I think you are talking about. The images I think you are talking about, if they’re the gifs that are the satellite images. It depends on what you are asking of them.
In re to what I was saying, they’re still not that meaningful, in terms of what was going on on the ground. They’re not going to tell you any more than what GM was photographing, or people were saying, on the ground, in real time.
They are, however, meaningful, in terms of meta. The big system. They show that line of thunderstorms moving southwest and dynamically interacting with the fire. Which is why I can’t understand why you keep saying that that thunderstorm/system was sitting statically 60 miles away doing nothing and going nowhere. Maybe I now take those images more seriously than you do?
And, also, Elizabeth, you haven’t answered my very serious questions.
Even though I have, in the best, most honest way I know how, tried to answer yours.
Elizabeth
Your throwing a can of worms again…..
I do not know where you are getting the stand down theory?
Fire Fighters do not stand down from Weather forecasts.
They adjust to the forecast and continue working.
making sure they are safe and following all the safety procedures.
Including LCES. The Weather Forecast that afternoon was what the people on the Fire were going by and based on our hind site it is what happened. The forecast is right there in front of you word for word. Standard Firefighting Orders #1 and #3, I do not think any body here knows exactly what GM was thinking when they moved. we do know they had NO LCES in place, No identified or scouted escape route and no personal knowledge of the BSR SZ. What worm would you like us to pick up. Your not in a court room quit acting like an Attorney trying to get a statement out of a defendant.
As a Law Enforcement Officer I was trained on Court trials and have been in the chair a lot for testimony and how questions are ask, enough said.
The stand down theory is another logical fallacy.
Elizabeth on May 8, 2014 at 6:18 am said:
“Marti seems to suggest below that she views the radar/satellite images as irrelevant to this discussion, which suggests to me that perhaps she is instead focusing on the weather materials in the 147 pages released by the SAIT.”
There is nothing I wrote that suggested that I view radar/satellite images as irrelevant. Just because I wasn’t referring to them, doesn’t mean I dismiss them.
And it was not based on the weather pages in any of the reports.
I was describing what you, in fact were asking for, i.e. what the crew was experiencing, based on the accurate forecast they had received, the photos they were taking, and what everybody else was saying, as WTKTT laid out so clearly down below, oh and also what we’ve been slowly conversing about for months.
The crew was not looking at radar/satellite images, most likely.
My father (RIP) forecasted/tracked the weather for the Albuquerque International Balloon Fiesta for 16 years. I assisted him for the last ten of them. The lives of thousands of crew depended on his expertise. They loved having him fly with them, because “he could see the winds,” as they said.
At 3:00 every morning, we packed my daughter into the back seat of the car, and headed to the National Weather Service in Albuquerque, and looked at the most current satellite, radar, and wind maps for about an hour. So we knew what, in general, was happening and was going to happen and why. But that’s not the most important thing we did.
We then drove out to the field and started flying and tracking weather balloons. Up until the 6 AM pilot briefing and then until the launch. And then my dad would keep watching what was going on through the whole launch of as many as 1000 balloons, and throughout the hours until they were all safely landed. And he kept communicating to the pilots through “the overhead” the entire time. Situational Awareness, in other words.
And if the winds aloft “in real time” based on our weather balloon observations started running over 15 mph, my dad would warn the “Overhead” that they should shut the whole thing down, because it was too dangerous. And that decision could cost the Balloon Fiesta millions of dollars. So they didn’t like hearing that. And there was absolutely nothing he could do if they decided to launch against his recommendations. Except pray nobody got killed, which sometimes they did.
There’s a dynamic relationship between radar/satellite/weather maps and “in real time” observations. What I was describing was what people “in real time” were observing, and that those observations corresponded to the forecast, which was based on radar/satellite/imagery mapped onto a weather map, and sent out as a forecast at 3:30 PM.
calvin on May 6, 2014 at 3:32 am said:
“It does appear (to me) that after Marsh tells Bravo 33, that is exactly where we want the retardant (1637?), and it wasn’t dropped,; then Marsh didn’t transmit again until he was with the crew. However, I am not convinced he was behind the crew. If so, there is no way (in my opinion) he could have saw Bravo 33 flying through the middle bowl west to east.”
I am really curious, and a bit confused, about what you are saying here. Where do you think Marsh was? And could you clarify, in more detail, why?
Marti. I am not sure exactly where Marsh was when he called Bravo33 and said that is exactly where we want the retardant. But if he was walking downslope toward the canyon floor, I do not think he would have been able to see the flight path.
Because of the short period of time between that call out and the call announcing the entrapment, we know he HAD to be close. There is a small mound between the entrapment/ deployment site and BSR that is just north of the dozered road (created to remove GM’s bodies). I think it is possible he was on that mound where he would have had more visibility.
I do not believe the GMH were only counting on their speed to outrun the fire. I do believe they were expecting retardant to be dropped on the south side of the fire. But as far as I can tell (from post burn pictures), that never happened.
Calvin hopefully to clear up some confusion.
The Lead plain B33 would have been 500 ft. or more above the terrain which would have given the people on the ground in the canyon the ability to see the plain for some distance barring any smoke. I was not there but that is my assumption. The higher the plain was the longer it would have been in view if that helps.
Calvin.
When you say “the middle bowl” are you referring to the bowl GM walked down into, or the big bowl that most of the days activities were taking place in?
I.e. I’m still not sure exactly where the drop path flight happened. And I currently have in my head WTKTT’s analysis of that flight (and I haven’t looked at the video and maybe I should), in which he was saying it shows it happening more on the east side of the smoke column, and thus questions whether Eric could have seen it.
I still think this is a pretty muddy part of the story.
calvin… I am with you. That 1637 transmission from Marsh is still quite a mystery.
See a longer post I just made up above about this and it is
really just an attempt for me to try and ‘document my continuing confusion’ about this ‘transmission’.
The *new* post above is mostly just based on that recent transcript of the USDA Air Study video that DOES, in fact, cover the time period from 1630 to 1643… and gives a CLEAR picture of *exactly* what Air Attack ( B33 ) was *actually* doing during this time… and especially what they were ( or, more importantly, were NOT ) doing at 1637.
I am not seeing the ‘proof’ there, in that Air Study transcript, that this ‘line up flight’ ever took place at all around the time that the SAIR says Marsh ‘saw it’… and ‘responded’ to it.
Something is still ‘wonky’ with this whole 1637 event.
Maybe it’s just the TIME is wrong, or something.
WEATHER: TTWARE, you made a point below about “the timed-stamped radar images of the weather-event progression.” Would you mind explaining more about what you are driving at with your comment?
Specifically, I have copies of all 30 or so relevant images from *above* the cloud cover (not sure what the parlance is), and I am not understanding how your comment ties in with them. My understanding of those images is that they are consistent with the point that xxfullsailxx and I are making, no?
Thank you in advance. (I, personally, think the weather-related take-away from the Yarnell Hill Fire is still grossly under-discussed.)
EN has made multiple claims about the weather, and none of her central claims are supported by the radar or other observations.
The time-stamped radar images I am referring to, are the same ones I referenced from the SAIR report in response to one of your earlier comments about the weather down below a ways.
Specifically, they show that the storm system originated in the Flagstaff area, proceeded to the Yarnell area, and then, became responsible for the outflow boundary.
Nothing more, nothing less.
I think you’re getting too hung-up with the weather aspect. The predictions (long and short term) predicted the weather could go ape-shit (my term), and it actually came to pass. One wind shift does not equate to ‘well, ape-shit’s all over now, we shouldn’t expect any other significant changes.’
TTWARE, any time there are thunder cells, the weather could go ape-shit….
Are you disagreeing with my point and that of xxfullsailxx?
Sorry, but I respectfully and truthfully don’t know what your point is.
Elizabeth on April 20, 2014 at 3:55 pm said:
…”I think I am just seeing the weather differently, in part because there was a CONVERSATION that followed the 3:30 p.m. weather reading, and it seems that folks thought that the winds warned about were already THERE at 3:30 p.m., such that they were well OVER by 4:04 p.m. or later. I hear you, though, Bob. I do.”
I understand that you are trying to get a bead on, not what we know now, but what whoever was making GM’s decisions was seeing and thinking then.
To be honest, as someone born and raised in New Mexico, the daughter of a meteorologist raised in New Mexico (for whom intense conversations about southwest weather were everyday dinner conversations the whole time i was growing up), and a Girl Scout Leader, Camp Counselor, and later as a Group Guide in the Grand Canyon for ten years, I’m in deep agreement with those who say that any kind of thinking on the part of Granite Mountain that the wind change had stabilized by 3:50-ish (which is what I read you and xxfullsailxx saying) would have been insane.
However I also agree with you that IT SEEMS (via the consequences) that that may have exactly been what they decided/thought. Even after the 3:30 severe weather warning which said basically a seriously different thing. And even though, as they gathered there observing that fire and that weather, they were seeing that fire pick up steam and do exactly what that forecast said it was going to do. Why did they hear that, and then see that, and then decide that it had stabilized when it so seriously hadn’t?? Anybody that is from here, that has spent time HUNKERING DOWN during thunderstorms, which is VERY common, knows it ain’t over til it’s OVER.
As a lowly Girl Scout Leader, as a lowly Camp Counselor, as a lowly Grand Canyon Guide, as the lowly daughter of a southwestern meteorologist, I just have to say I would NEVER have done what they did. I am painfully mystified. I really struggle with this one.
Maybe, even in spite of that clear and accurate and severe 3:30 forecast, and in spite of what they must have HAD to have known from years and years of actual experience, something cut across all of that. And the only thing I possibly can think of is Rory Collins telling them at 3:50ish (iirc) that the fire would hit Yarnell in one to two hours.
But I still don’t know. Which is why I am bringing your comment from way below to here. What CONVERSATION are you truly aware of that took place after the 3:30 forecast that was about the weather?? And how is it that you are aware of it? Because, I truly have no idea what you are referring to, and I would really like to know.
And PS. I have not seen the 30 photographs you are referring to, but I can imagine that if they were taken from above the cloud cover, they probably aren’t particularly meaningful as to what is going on below that cloud cover.
Well said Marti —Well said.
Thank you, I appreciate that.
Right on Marti. It’s dangerous for individuals to claim they know something about YHF without being able to back it up. I asked this question regarding the 1526 Wx and GM’s SA of it to EN a while back as well with no response…I would really like to know.
It’s not just dangerous, not to minimize that at all, it gets to be very disrespectful of the issues involved. Part of the game seems to be make whimsical statements, and then continually ask for more and more information (and therefore more time and energy) from people like Marti and WTKTT and TWARE who have just painstakingly laid out why your (EN’s or FullSail’s in this case) inane claims don’t hold water.
I mean, I personally still think GM saw prairie dogs and was concerned about exposure to plague if they remained in the black. I am relying on my notes for that statement. Anyone who disagrees with me, please state with specificity the sources you are relying on to show that there were no prairie dogs in the black and that GM wasn’t concerned about the plague. Have you exhaustively researched the NIH and CDC plague data in reaching your conclusions? I am always open to discussing this further…
Put differently, if EN has any evidence at all that suggests that all the weather forecasts, radar images, contemporaneous accounts, and fire behavior — which all seem quite consistent with on another — are wrong, and that the storm coming out of the N/NE was really expected by Marsh and Steed to be a steady wind straight from CA, then she should do the work and state with specificity what on earth makes her think that. Simply making that type of claim, in the fact of overwhelming evidence to the contrary, without putting forward any proof oneself, only creates confusion.
Agree.
I don’t know shite about reading smoke. Sometimes I wish you would all get into some kind of conversation about what you are seeing in the smoke, so I could learn more about it. But, that being said, I thus don’t say anything about smoke.
What I do know about is camera angles, handling cameras, fixing time-stamps on images, how photographers do stuff, and also weather in the southwest (except smoke).
So I try to use what I do know to fill in gaps and ask questions of others in order to further all of our understanding. That’s what I am here for, and think others are, too. I have no other agenda.
Reply to Elizabeth post on May 7, 2014 at 10:35 am
>> Elizabeth said…
>> My understanding of those images is that they are consistent
>> with the point that xxfullsailxx and I are making, no?
Elizabeth… I am going to echo TTWARE’s comment above and say I, also ( respectfully and truthfully ) have no idea what the ‘point’ is that you ( together with xxfullsailxx? ) think you have somehow *already* (recently) made…
…but let me take a guess at a ‘summary’.
You ( and xxfullsailxx? ) are trying to resurrect the theory that Marsh and Steed were NEVER fully ‘expecting’ or ‘anticipating’ a full 180 degree wind shift ( despite what any carded/qualified FBAN predicted or anything they were told over the radio )… and that they somehow convinced themselves ( without bothering to consult with anyone else ) that the ‘expected wind shift(s)’ were OVER by the time they left the safe black and that they would *always* be traveling on ‘their new mission’ in a direction that was simply ‘parallel’ to the fire.
Well… if that’s the case… let’s ‘break it down’…
1) Marsh and Steed were never really ‘expecting’ or ‘anticipating’ a full 180 degree wind shift.
Horse manure.
See Brendan McDonough’s interview transcript with ADOSH reprinted below.
In short… Brendan CONFIRMS to ADOSH ( multiple times ) that just after Byron Kimball’s 1530 weather broadcast… EVERY conversation he had with GM Captain Jesse Steed contained FULL acknowledgement between them that the winds were GOING to shift a FULL 180 degrees ( Not 45, not 90… a FULL 180 ) and that this TOTAL REVERSAL of wind direction was going to be backed by 40 to 50 mile per hour winds gusts. Brendan said both he and Steed knew that was going to be (quote) “a phenomenal change”. Brendan ALSO confirms that Marsh was also ‘copying’ these conversations about the upcoming FULL 180 degree wind shift.
2) Steed and Marsh somehow convinced themselves ( without bothering to consult with anyone else ) that the ‘expected wind shift(s)’ were OVER by the time they left the safe black and that they would *always* be traveling on ‘their new mission’ in a direction that was simply ‘parallel’ to the fire.
Well… Brendan still won’t talk about anything he might have heard AFTER he left his lookout position… so there is no direct evidence to fully negate such a claim/belief… but based on (1) above and what they BOTH KNEW was coming they would have both had to pretty much have suffered a sudden case of ‘ridge blindness’ and/or both hit their heads on rocks to forget what they knew just moments before and could still *see* happening with their own eyes out there in front of them.
Look carefully at all the photos taken while they were doing nothing but ‘watching the fire’ ( and the recent crossfades between them ).
Forget about the smoke. Look at the FIRE… especially where it was CLOSER to them and mattered the MOST as far as their own decision making.
At NO TIME is the FIRELINE doing anything but continuing to head SOUTH and TOWARDS the mouth of that box canyon just some 4,000 feet away from the fire BEFORE they even started their ‘new mission’.
Also… ( again ) see Brendan’s testimony to ADOSH (reprinted below) where even circa 4:00 PM when the GM vehicles were being moved ( and supposedly before GM even left the safe black ) the FIRE was heading in a direct SOUTHERLY direction and ( according to Brendan ) was ALSO making those ‘easterly’ pushes simply because of a trick of geography with the terrain on the east side.
>> Elizabeth also wrote…
>> Specifically, I have copies of all 30 or so relevant images from
>> *above* the cloud cover (not sure what the parlance is), and I
>> am not understanding how your comment ties in with them.
>> My understanding of those images is that they are consistent
>> with the point that xxfullsailxx and I are making, no?
I really don’t see how you can think that some photos taken from way ABOVE the ‘cloud cover’ are going to tell you what was happening at ground level around that time, under such ‘squirrely’ conditions.
Even in the photos we can see with our own eyes… the winds were doing ‘strange things’ at GROUND LEVEL ( and at various heights ) and just because a wisp of smoke/cloud is suddenly blowing one way as it rose out of the middle bowl and was being hit by ‘crosswinds’ doesn’t automatically mean that’s the way the fire down on the GROUND was actually headed.
Smoke/clouds didn’t kill them. The FIRELINE did.
Again… LOOK AT THE FIRELINE in all the known photos/videos and in the ‘crossfades’ between them.
The FIRELINE was (consistently and steadily ) headed SOUTH
and TOWARDS the mouth of that box canyon from the time Brendan left his lookout post until the time that they all died.
The only thing that really changed during that entire time period is that it just kept picking up SPEED and INTENSITY as it headed to the SOUTH and filled that entire ‘explosive’ area.
>> Elizabeth also said…
>> I, personally, think the weather-related take-away from the
>> Yarnell Hill Fire is still grossly under-discussed.
So do I, actually… but probably for reasons that are as much the polar opposite of yours as that full (predicted) 180 degree wind shift was that day.
Now that we have the ‘video crossfades’ between pretty much ALL of the ‘photos’ taken from up on that ridge that afternoon and we can truly ‘see exactly what they saw’ during that time they were doing nothing BUT ‘watching the fire behavior’…
…it is even more inconceivable than it has ever been that men who were *supposed* to be ‘fire experts’ would have STILL decided to do what they did that afternoon.
As Brendan himself said to the ADOSH investigators regarding
his own impressions circa 4:00 PM that day…
“You knew that it was coming… ‘cause that wind…
a 180 degree wind shift… that’s a phenomenal change.
I’d never seen anything like it.”
** THE LONG STORY
For the sake of completeness… the following has all been posted before ( at least once )… but here is exactly what Brendan McDonough had to say to the ADOSH investigators about all this.
Several times during his ADOSH interview… Brendan confirms that BOTH he and Jesse Steed FULLY understood that the expected wind shift was going to be a FULL 180 degress. ( Not 45 degrees, not 90… a FULL 180 degress )… and was going to be backed with 40-50 mph wind gusts.
Brendan also states that this ‘expected’ 180 degree wind shift BEGAN just moments after Byron Kimball’s 1530 weather update.
Brendan also explains carefully to the ADOSH investigators that by the time they were moving the GM and Blue Ridge vehicles ( circa 3:59 PM and (supposedly) BEFORE Granite Mountain even left the safe black )… the FIRE was ALREADY moving through that middle bowl (quote) “straight up and down as NORTH / SOUTH”.
Brendan also carefully explains that at that point… the winds were definitely (quote) “out of the north, northeast”… but the fire was ALSO moving some to the EAST not as its ‘primary direction’… but simply due to a trick in the geography there and (quote) “primarily due to the terrain of that ridge”.
ADOSH INTERVIEW (1 of 2) WITH BRENDAN MCDONOUGH
August 20, 2013 – 1:00 PM
______________________________________________________
Q = Bruce Hanna
Q1 = Barry Hicks
Q2 = Dave Larsen ( Rest in Peace )
A = Brendan McDonough
A1 = Brendan’s Attorney Emily Dolan
______________________________________________________
Q1: Yeah. Okay. Were you noticing any – did you notice any change in the winds as the day progressed, ah, either direction or strength, um, or?
A: I’d say we had winds between five and ten. Consistently out of south, southwest and they didn’t shift until moments after the weather came over the radio.
…
Q1: So, ah, at the, ah, ah, when you – when your trigger point was reached, did you make that decision or did someone else make that decision?
A: Me and Steed had come to the conclusion.
Q1: Steve?
A: Steed. Jesse Steed.
Q1: Oh Jesse Steed.
A: It was time for me to…
Q1: Gotcha.
A: …to evaluate where I was.
Q1: Okay.
A: ‘Cause they could see – they could see me. They could see.
Q1: They could see you. And they could see that. Okay.
A: They could see the fire and what was going on after we had heard the – the weather transmission.
Q1: Right.
A: Of the storm coming in where — 50 to 60 mile per hour gusts and 180 degree wind shift.
Q1: Right. So you knew things weren’t gonna be good at that point.
A: Mm-hm.
…
Q2: Would you – would you take a minute and tell me about what you heard on the r- radio about the weather? As much of that as you can remember. How – who said it?
…
A: Steed called me and said there’s a radio – weather coming over. Cause’ this was at that time that I needed to spin my – and he said, “Spin your weather. Listen to crew so I can tell you what’s going’ on. I’ll listen to it.” So I did not directly hear…
Q2: Did not hear the – the – the weather transmission?
A: The weather transmission — not directly.
Q2: Okay.
A: That was relayed from my captain to me.
Q2: Okay.
A: That there was a thunderstorm coming in, expect gusts up to 50 to 60 miles per hour.
Q2: That’s what he’s told you while (unintelligible).
A: Yes, sir.
Q2: Could you…
A: No this is right after it came across.
…
Q2: At that time you got a wind shift. The wind is definitely shifted, were you picked up?
A: Yeah the wind has shifted. The wind has shifted but it didn’t make a tremendous push. You knew that it was coming up. Just ‘cause that wind – a 180 degree wind shift…
Q1: Right.
A: …that’s a phenomenal change.
…
Q1: And so you guys moved if I understand right, all four of y’all’s vehicles.
A: Yes, sir.
Q1: Okay. And, ah…
Q2: And can you remember what time that was?
A: No.
Q2: Four? Okay.
A: At this point, the fire is moving straight up and down as north South. It’s moving – it’s starting to come out of the north but it’s really moving east so that my way out is getting cut off sooner than theirs. They had more concern at that point for me and my safety.
Q1: Right.
A: Just because of the direction of the fire.
Q2: Right
A: So it was – the winds were out of the north, northeast but primarily due to the terrain of that ridge, it’s moving to the east.
…
Q1: So the weather was – and the fire activity was changing dramatically?
A: Oh yeah. Very rapid, um, like nothing I’ve ever seen before.
_____________________________________________________
Followup… just a few other ‘quotes’ about the ‘wind shift(s)’
from various other places in the evidence record…
________________________________________________
** From SPGS2 Darrell Willis himself… during his ADOSH interview and also reprinted as a SIDEBAR on page 14 of the official WFAR report…
“…it wasn’t like an outflow. It was pushing the fire in this (southerly) direction. It wasn’t a ten-minute bust and things got back to normal. It was two solid hours…”
________________________________________________
** From Rob Berry ( in his SAIT interview )…
4. Robb said that the fire did a U-turn on that day.
5. He said that the wind turn northerly (outflows) but didn’t know exact time although compared favorably with the Stanton RAWS when he later looked at the data. He said he could feel higher humidity with the outflow wind and actually felt a couple of drops of rain.
6. Robb said that the wind was “ripping” when it hit and remained very constant for awhile. It just didn’t stop. He said the duration of the stronger wind was also consistent with what the RAWS showed.
________________________________________________
** From SAIT interview with Blue Ridge Hotshots Frisby, Trueheart (Trew) Brown, Fueller and Ball…
NOTE: Documents all kinds of ‘crazy’ wind shifts going on at GROUND LEVEL after the 1530 weather update and Captain Brown reports soon after being able to feel the fire itself already PULLING IN THE WINDS ( and apparently already starting to create its OWN ‘weather’ )…
…there’s a wx update. Trew hears T-storms developing over the fire outflow winds up to 50mph. Brian hears NNE outflow winds up to 50mph, Travis hears outflow winds N NW up to 50mph all happening within 30min. Trew calls the 3 guys with the wx update. There’s a shift out of the west fire is going east and the column is starting to develop and then lays over. When the shift out of the west the column collapsed after the wx update only minutes later. When there’s a wind shift from the west, it then goes SW for 10 minutes and the smoke drifts off to the sth, Travis can feel the column PULLING IN THE WINDS. During this time Travis is on the dozer line. That’s when Travis tells Trew, I don’t think this plan is going to work, this is the 3rd wind shift.
Column starts to lay down, smoky, the split the helicopter did earlier, is now evident. Extreme fire behavior spot fire to the NW of them. Winds are howling, embers falling, instant spot fires 10 x 10 in seconds, homes going up, fire leap frogging.
________________________________________________
** SAIT interview with Rory Collins…
Air Attack – LDF – Roseburg
Interview took place at 11:00 a.m. 7/13/2013
Interviewers: Rocha, Kurth, Mike Dudley, Jim Karels.
15:30 Experienced wind shift and the flank turned and became the head going SOUTH to Yarnell. I let B(?) know prior to the shift to move to that side and start drops.
15:30 – 15:45 The fire was headed for Yarnell moving FAST to the SOUTH. They were getting retardant drops. Contacted Division A to tell them of fire condition and that they needed to move their rigs to a better location.
Q: Did he say he was in good black?
A: NO, he said the other crew was in a good location in the black and they were headed back to the rigs.
________________________________________________
** From SAIT interview with SPGS1 Gary Cordes…
1530 ( 3:30 PM )
– Wind event – collapse of column – fire shifted from flanking fire and turned to a head fire going SOUTH.
– Place evacuation order
– Heard of storm to the north
1540 ( 3:40 PM )
– Trigger point was 1 mile north of town. It was 5-7 minutes before the fire the next trigger point to get my people out.
– Spot 1/2 mile.
– Covered a mile in 15 minutes.
– Building a column in front of us.
1600 ( 4:00 PM )
– I watched the wind change directions 5 times.
_______________________________________________
** From SAIT interview with
** SWCC Meteorologist Chuck Maxwell
“I informed them that this was going to be mainly an outflow WIND REVERSAL issue on the Yarnell fire and not a rainfall issue. I pulled up the updated radar images and showed the gust front and explained its implications. Dugger checked in again with the Incident Commander Roy Hall who said they could SEE IT COMING.”
_______________________________________________
** From SAIT interview with Daniel Kight, DPS officer
NOTE: Daniel Kight was the Yavapai County DPS officer that was assigned to Yarnell with the YCSO Emergency Mobile Trailer Unit.
…wind shifted wall of flames headed to Yarnell.
PREDICTED winds, pant legs were Whipping.
1550 call to supt Yarnell was going to burn…
all hell is breaking lose.
Div A tells Rory Collins the other crew is in the black and they were headed back to the rigs.
Questions.
1. What other crew? Is he referring to a squad of GMH? No?
2. Who is the “They”, that were headed back to the rigs??
3. Does this indicate that Marsh was not in the black circa 1530?
WTKTT,
Thanks very much for taking the time to find and assemble all of this. I hadn’t known about the McDonough statements as regards what Marsh, Steed and he knew and discussed about the weather. I think it’s glaringly clear that they did know that a full 180 windshift, complete with 50 mph gusts, was coming.
I also think some of your excerpts help underscore as well that an outflow boundary is not only not a rare or freaky thing that no one could see coming, but that it is also specifically mentioned (referred to both as an outflow and as a gust front).
It is convenient for those claiming that everything at YHF was perfectly reasonable that, hey, the wind shifted, and no one could see further shifts coming. Crazy outflow boundary, something you couldn’t see and that no one had heard of. Almost as if GM got hit by an asteroid — tragic, but nothing anyone could have done anything to prevent. Of course, that is all completely nonfactual.
I hadn’t said this earlier, but thanks for rounding all of this up. it really helps!
Reply to Bob Powers post on May 6, 2014 at 4:47 pm said:
>> Mr. Powers said…
>>
>> As a division boss I reported to the OPSC
>> If things started going to hell I talked to OPS and they talked to me.
>> As a Type 2 OPS or IC I kept track of my resources and made sure they
>> were not in harms way.
>> If the fire started going nuts that is your main responsibility
>> with the plan for the day.
>> The line OPS should have checked with each one of his divisions and
>> discussed options. That did not happen
>> Marsh evidently was OPS only Division Boss.
>> WTF?
No. There really WERE ‘two paid Division Supervisors’ on active payroll
for the SOUTH end of the fire and reporting to Field OPS1 Todd Abel that day.
Rance Marquez was *hired* and *assigned* as ‘Division Z’ that day early
in the morning but simply didn’t arrive on the fire until late in the morning.
He was not sent down to Yarnell to ASK Eric Marsh if he COULD
( pretty please? ) be DIVSZ. He had already ‘checked in’ up at the ICP
and already WAS DIVSZ ( and was now on the clock and getting paid for it ).
DIVSA Eric Marsh got into an *argument* with him right off the bat.
Marquez was having radio problems when he first arrived down there
in Yarnell and so ( according to his own testimony ) he did the only thing
he could at the moment… he called up to AA Rory Collins just to try and
get an ‘update’ on what was happening down there on the south end of
the fire where he was supposed to now be DIVSZ.
Marsh heard this ‘conversation’ between Marquez and Rory Collins and got
pissed off. Marsh thought Marquez and Collins were just trying to ‘take away
real estate’ from him without consulting with him.
So when Marquez finally got through to Marsh ( following that ‘update me’ call
with Rory Collins )… Marsh had already mis-understood what he heard and
what was really going on and was already pre-pissed-off.
Everyone heard these exchanges.
Everyone used various adjectives to describe what they heard like ‘mad’, or
‘angry’, or ‘argument’ but regardless of adjectives… it was obvious that this
‘first meeting’ between DIVSA and DIVSZ did not go well that day.
Things calmed down once Marsh realized Marquez was not ‘dictating terms’
to him or anything of the sort… and all Marquez wanted to know is where the
western end of his (already assigned) ‘Division Z’ was going to be.
They decided on the ‘old-grader’ as the dividing line between Division A and
Division Z… and then Marsh actually calmly ( and constructively ) told Marquez
that it would be good if he could find *another* way to get to the fireline in that
maze of dirt roads and two-tracks down there.
So that is what Marquez did. He left the Sesame area to ‘scout that out’.
Marsh then called OPS1 Todd Abel with ( one of his two? ) cellphones that
Marsh had with him that day… and reported both the ‘argument’ and the
‘results’ to Abel. All OPS1 Todd Abel wanted to know ( according to his own
ADOSH testimony ) is if the issue had been ‘resolved’… and he was told
( by Marsh ) that it HAD.
So now we have OPS1 Todd Abel (supposedly) understanding that he had
TWO active (paid) Division Supervisors working ‘together’ down there on
that south end of the fire… with defined ( and agreed upon ) Division boundaries.
But then DIVSZ Rance Marquez basically DISAPPEARED.
At NO TIME during all of this consternation was DIVSZ Marquez either
RELIEVED of his job OR assigned another one.
Marquez remained ‘on the payroll’ for the rest of the day as the OTHER
official ‘Division Z Supervisor’ under OPS1 Todd Abel… and supposedly
responsible for the entire Yarnell / Glen Ilah side of the south end of
the fire ( with SPGS1 Cordes as a primary DIVSZ resource ).
Problem was… no one knew where he went, or what he was doing, or even
really made any attempts to FIND OUT.
After that (private) cellphone conversation with DIVSA Marsh… OPS1 Abel
didn’t even make any attempt to FIND OUT where his (paid) ‘DIVSZ’
Supervisor was. OPS1 Todd Abel just continued to treat SPGS1 Gary
Cordes as his ‘Division Z Supervisor’ for the rest of the day and really couldn’t
have cared less where his actual (paid) DIVSZ was.
In his ADOSH interview… OPS1 Todd Abel said he never knew where his
DIVSZ Marquez hire was the entire rest of the day until he ran into him
face-to-face at the Ranch House Restaurant… AFTER the deployment.
So OPS1 Todd Abel DID have ‘more than one line DIVS’ under him that
day and actively ‘on the payroll’ all day… but he didn’t seem to care.
OPS1 Todd Abel also didn’t even seem to be the least bit concerned about the
confusion that might be causing down there on the south end of the fire.
Even when the evacuations started… Neither OPS1 Abel or OPS2 Musser
made any attempt to ( as Mr. Powers describes above SHOULD have been
done ) ‘find DIVSZ and make sure all his resources were getting off the fire’.
This is ALL fully documented in the ADOSH reports, including the detail
pages for ‘infractions/fines imposed’ against the employer(s).
This absolute MESS when it came to whether or not there really WERE two
‘defined Divisions’ and two ‘assigned (paid) Division Supervisors’ for the SOUTH
end of the fire that day was a BIG DEAL, according to ADOSH ( from a
workplace management *and* safety control standpoint ) and they said so.
As I said only 1 DIV. Boss The other was not active and it seemed that Frisby was covering that though not assigned.
They had contact both radio and phone Responsibility runs both ways….Right.
And I agree the organization was a total mess.
also without a Safety Officer the job fell to Both of the OPS to cover. Some blame belongs to Overhead in this mess and they should be held accountable in this mess.
Bob, I am thinking that your pal RTS/SR/Fire20+/Robert-the-2nd/whatever-he-is-calling-himself-here-nowadays can vouch for the fact that, with wildfires being dealt with in the WUI these days, it is *not* abnormal or unheard of for a WFF crew to go out to start their assignment WITHOUT a Safety Officer already “clocked-in,” on scene, and fully up-to-speed on the relevant fire and allocation of resources. Obviously, that is not the IDEAL way (or maybe even not the “right way”) to do things, but it seems to happen often enough. Is your position that nobody should be out in the field on a fire UNTIL the Safety Officer is on scene and FULLY up-to-speed on the relevant fire and resource assignments? (I am asking for your honest opinion – not trying to argue with you….)
EN,
I think everyone here can see that I am neither RTS nor Fire20+. You have a tendency to accuse posters whose views you find inconvenient of being other people, having accused TWARE and WTKTT of being one and the same, for instance. Pretty lame, but a good way to disrupt accurate dialog.
Elizabeth,
What’s with your obsession regarding this RTS thing?
ONCE AGAIN, you are negating the value of your commentary by putting forth non-factual, incorrect suppositions about people.
For you to start-off what presumably, is supposed to be serious commentary with this absolute BS, makes a lot of people not want to pay attention to the portion of the commentary that was the purpose of your post.
I presume myself and WTKTT will be getting another turn on your ‘hot-seat’ very soon, as well.
Elizabeth
You ask me about Safety Officers.
Safety officers are assigned to type II Short teams.
WUI has nothing to do with weather a SO is assigned to the fire. Teams are assigned according to complexity and number of resources from short teams to Type I full teams.
If the Type II team is a on call fully organized they come with a SO.
Type I teams also have a SO as part of the team.
Initial Attack fires do not have a SO also unless ordered Type III teams do not normally have a SO.
A SO is for the whole fire and not for an individual crew.
The problem with the Yarnell Hill Fire, the State slapped together a Type II team that was short several members. The entire team should have been fully functional at 0600. They should have had Maps and a written plan. Division Bosses and Safety Officer, Plans, Service and Finance.
The State cut to many corners I assume to save costs.
Again you can fight Fires with out a Safety Officer but the responsibility falls to the IC and to his OPS. SO is a position under direct command of the IC.
If a Type I or Type II fully implemented Team is on duty. They will have a SO. The SO will provide safety to plans for each shift and identify problems during each shift to the IC, and work hand in hand with OPS.
Dose that explain what you asked?
Also RTS’s fire season is in full swing so you probably will not hear mush from him for awhile and he is none of the other above mentioned people. Robert is Robert and I won’t divulge his last name as he requested.
Elizabeth,
Refer to Bob’s comment, “Robert is Robert”.
I rest my case.
He actually went to Robert The Second because when I first started I signed in as……
Robert (Bob) Powers which I changed about the same time RTS came on. He worked for me I know him and we communicate on E-Mail
He goes by no other name on here and he is busy hiring ,training and getting ready for this fire season in R3, He may not be on for awhile and I am sure we will miss his solid input. If someone wants him to jump in for input let me know…….
Still waiting for an apology from Elizabeth for this, all thing considered.
Ms. Marti (or Miss Marti 🙂 ):
What am I supposed to be apologizing to you for? I am happy to give you an apology, but I am unclear about what I need to apologize to you for…. Please advise.
While I can’t speak for Marti, I believe she is refering to this whole RTS fiasco discussed above. If that’s indeed the case, the apology should be going to RTS.
You are right and because I know him I am getting emails accusing me of a cover up of his true name. she will not apologize its not her nature.
Have you ever known a Lawyer to apologize?
After the attacks 2 months ago I gave up on Elizabeth.
I’m not waiting for an apology to me.
I’m waiting for an apology to those whom you, for some reason, decided to publicly (and irresponsibly, and wrongfully, and thus unprofessionally as bespeaks a lawyer) accuse of being deceitful in their identities here.
Ohhhhh, Ms. Marti, if I were wrong, I would absolutely apologize to RTS! 🙂
In unrelated news, I am so glad that you are out of your “retirement” from IM, Marti. When you announced in February that you were leaving, because you could not afford to give up any more lucrative work to instead spent your time here, I was surprised. It is good that your retirement did not stick! 🙂
Elizabeth,
While you have ALMOST NEVER provided any of the proof and documentation that others have repeatedly, over time, asked you for, I’m sure you have the goods on RTS, but as per usual, you won’t be providing any proof!!
I’M ISSUING A CHALLENGE TO YOU RIGHT NOW TO PUBLICLY STATE ONCE MORE, THAT YOU KNOW THAT WTKTT AND MYSELF ARE THE SAME PERSON, AS YOU HAVE DONE BEFORE, WHILE CONTINUALLY BAD-MOUTHING RTS .
Since you aren’t willing to give RTS his well-deserved apology, you can instead give one to WTKTT and myself. If you don’t, I’m done with you, PERMANENTLY!
TTWARE, as you might recall, it was “Observer” and I who both noticed the same thing a while ago. Specifically, when a question was asked of YOU, it was WTKTT who replies. Presumably that means that you and he are the same person or are speaking for each other? Or am I missing something?
I never said my work was “lucrative.” It was purely a matter of survival.
I’m only a photographer, not a lawyer.
Based on what I read from TTWARE and WTKTT they are defiantly 2 different people
TTWARE Is a wild land Fire Fighter or a retired one totally based on his knowledge and statements here. WTKTT is
not a Fire fighter and has learned from us and his research If you have been here awhile you can tell the difference in their stiles.
New ‘Chapter’ needed?
There are now 1,285 ( and counting ) comments contained just in this
one Chapter SIX of this ongoing discussion.
The load time on this ‘Chapter SIX’ page is getting pretty long.
It’s probably time for ‘Chapter SEVEN’ of this ongoing discussion.
Just a suggestion.
since any discussion of weather found down below detracts from mike’s original points i felt the need to start a new comment… i am by no means any sort of weather expert. but like all wff’s worth their salt, weather plays an important part in what we do and it is important to be a “student” of wildfire, and therefore, the weather… and i recently spoke to a couple of NOAA guys about this very thing…
there was a distinct weather event that occurred called an “outflow boundary.” here is a link that describes it pretty well:
http://obsweatherguy.blogspot.com/2011/07/outflow-boundary-storms-footprint.html
the nearest t-cells that day were miles away, and there is a distinction between t-cell “downdrafts” and an “outflow boundary” which can occur miles away from any t-cells and can effect a much greater area than a t-storm downdraft. in fact, a outflow boundary can be picked up by radar (as it was in the case of Yarnell Hill Fire) not unlike a cold front…
there is also a distinction between fire behavior associated with an unstable atmosphere, which is what i feel like Bob Powers is talking about down below. downdrafts, fire whirls, pyro-cumulus, etc. are all very localized events and certainly occurred that day. but what caught GM was the outflow boundary turning the fire 90 degrees from east to south with 40+ mph winds that they didn’t anticipate. and quite possibly, as the SAIR points out, they interpreted the previous windshift that changed fire spread from NE (which they had been watching all day) to due East as the predicted wind shift and then mistakenly thought that it was safe to flank the fire to BSR…
Since FullSail completely got wrong the SZ requirements, doesn’t seem to understand local conditions and vegetation even though he claims to be from AZ, has blown multiple other issues, and now seems to not know that outflow boundaries are not unusual byproducts of thunderstorms…well I have to wonder.
You get thunderstorms during that time of year in the southwest, and winds are likely to shift and be erratic. It is typical. For purposes of thinking about fire behavior, the key is that winds are likely to shift and strong gusts should be anticipated. All of that was known at the time Marsh noted squirrely winds.
I.e., relying on one wind shift as being “the” wind shift given weather conditions that afternoon would be pretty reckless.
As fullsail said fire fighters become students of fire and weather its in your sole. You cant always predict the wind or local changes in the weather by looking at the sky. But if you pay attention to the fire it will tell you a lot. When a fire becomes active and exhibits different flame activity its telling you that weather forces heat, humidity, and wind are changing the normal to increased activity. If the fire starts laying down then it reverses activity. cooling, higher, humidity’s some times less wind or a change in direction. You learn to observe those changes and adjust accordingly. If you are observant you don’t need a weather forecast to let you know what you are already seeing. Its something we learn from many, many days of wild land fire fighting. As fullsail has learned. The little indicators are there we just need to use them in decision making.
Reply to xxfullsailxx post on May 6, 2014 at 8:04 pm
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>>…what caught GM was the outflow boundary turning the fire
>> 90 degrees from east to south with 40+ mph winds that they
>> didn’t anticipate.
Wrong.
They had EVERY REASON to ‘anticipate’ what was GOING to happen and were specifically TOLD that this is what was GOING to happen when Byron Kimball made his 1530 PM ‘weather announcement’. ( See below ).
>> xxfullsailxx also said…
>> and quite possibly, as the SAIR points out, they interpreted the
>> previous windshift that changed fire spread from NE (which
>> they had been watching all day) to due East as the predicted
>> wind shift
Wrong again.
Your description does NOT match the ‘predicted wind shift’ that
actually went from FBAN Byron Kimball on the radio that afternoon.
( See below ).
For whatever amount of time the fire ‘appeared’ to just be heading ‘due east’ was simply the period of time when it was still just ‘rotating around’ due to the wind shifts actually announced by FBAN Byron Kimball circa 1530. ( Again… see below ).
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>> and then mistakenly thought that it was safe to flank
>> the fire to BSR…
Yes… that part of what you are saying seems to be true. They most certainly DID (inexplicably?) think if was ‘safe’ ( or at least acceptable risk ) to go on a cross-country hike through unburned ‘gasoline on a stick’ within 4,600 feet of an actively ROTATING flame front… but that decision cannot be construed to have been based on ‘incorrect weather information’.
The fire/weather did pretty much EXACTLY what FBAN Byron Kimball SAID it would do… in pretty much the EXACT timeframe he said it would happen… and they ( Marsh/Steed ) DID hear this (accurate) weather forecast on the radio circa 1530 ( 3:30 PM ).
Here is a a full reprint from a previously posted message that contains what Fire Behavior Analyst (FBAN) Byron Kimball *actually* announced over the TAC 1 channel that day at exactly 1529.52 ( 3:29.52 PM )…
**
** FULL TRANSCRIPT OF BACKGROUND RADIO TRAFFIC
** IN AIR STUDY VIDEO 20130630_153014_SEAT_EP.MOV
**
** CONTAINS BYRON KIMBALL’S 1529.52 WEATHER REPORT
** GOING OUT ( LOUD AND CLEAR ) ON TAC 1
This Air Study video is 1 minute and 10 seconds long.
Since the text notes that accompanied these Air Study videos say that the timestamps in the filenames actually represents the END times for the videos ( 1530.14 ) then that means this particular video STARTS at…
1529.04 ( 3:29.04 PM )
Since the VIDEO starts at exactly 1529 plus 4 seconds, and Byron’s weather report is at exactly +0:48 seconds into the video… that makes the EXACT time his crucial weather report actually began over the radio…
1529.52 ( 3:29.52 PM )
Here is the actual FULL transcript of the background radio conversation in this AIR STUDY video that captured Byron Kimball’s detailed weather report going out ( loud and clear ) over TAC 1 at 3:29.52 PM.
NOTE: There is no need for any ‘audio forensics’ here. The background conversation in this AIR STUDY video is CLEARLY heard by anyone with even normal hearing… and Byron Kimball himself is speaking especially LOUDLY and CLEARLY as he gives his weather report over the TAC 1 radio channel.
ALSO NOTE: This probably goes without saying… but when someone ( anyone ) says ‘EAST winds’ ( like Byron did )… that always means what direction the winds will be COMING FROM. This is industry standard practice when referring to ‘wind direction’.
Also notice in the transcript below that when Byron was giving his weather report and was CLEARLY warning everyone of the wind change and HIGH wind speeds to be expected… he was ALSO giving detailed information about the expected outpoint to outflow location(s). The video cuts off before we hear the rest of his detailed weather report… but anyone who was hearing it DID hear those specific ‘outpoint to outflow’ details from Byron.
AIR STUDY VIDEO – 20130630_153014_SEAT_EP.MOV
NOTE: This AIR STUDY video has been made public and is still
available in either Mr. Dougherty’s online Dropbox OR at the following YouTube link…
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IP8vglS_PPM
VIDEO STARTS AT 1529.04 ( 3:29.04 PM )
+0.02 ( 1529.06 / 3:29.06 PM )
(Unknown): (?) is gonna be with me (?) has to do and get
(torches?) out.
+0:14 ( 1529.18 / 3:29.18 PM )
(Unknown): Copy
+0:30 ( 1529.34 / 3:29.34 PM )
(Unknown): Task Force (common?) to Task Force Six.
+0:37 ( 1529.41 / 3:29.41 PM )
Byron Kimball: Operations Abel, Fire Behavior, on TAC 1.
NOTE: The responder to this callout sounds more like
OPS2 Paul Musser than OPS1 Todd Abel.
+0:43 ( 1529.47 / 3:29.47 PM )
( OPS1 Todd Abel or OPS2 Paul Musser ): Go ahead, Byron
+0:48 ( 1529.52 / 3:29.52 PM )
Byron Kimball: Within the half-hour, (pause) EAST winds. (pause)
Possibility of as high as 50 miles an hour or likely 25 (pause)
definitely 25, 35 gusting 40 (pause) east / northeast within the half
hour. Um… the outpoint to outflow line also ( will be ) located…
( At this point… both a Helicopter and a fixed-wing make a loud
flyover and the background conversation in the last few seconds
of the video cannot be heard. )
VIDEO ENDS AT 1530.14 ( 3:30.14 PM )
umm, i wasn’t saying that GM wasn’t informed of the weather event… nor was i saying that GM was erroneously MIS-informed of the weather event.
the point is, that there were no direct thunder-cells that influenced the fire behavior with down-drafts that day. nor was it a pyro-cumulus collapse that influenced the fire behavior. what influenced the fire behavior, was an “outflow boundary” which is very different than a t-cell downdraft.
nice ad-lib and speculation based on an incomplete conversation though… nothing you say above really negates my point. just because they “had every reason to anticipate” something, doesn’t mean they actually did anticipate (or interpret it) correctly. my description does not match the predicted wind shift? so… you seem to be indicating that you think weather forecasters are 100% accurate in their predictions? i would rather base my opinions on the resultant fire behavior (as shown on fire progression maps) as to what the winds actually did that day, rather than the “prediction.”
Reply to xxfullsailxx post on May 6, 2014 at 10:10 pm
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>> just because they “had every reason to anticipate”
>> something, doesn’t mean they actually did
>> anticipate (or interpret it) correctly.
Fair enough. You may be right.
Their behavior that afternoon seems to be far
enough ‘off the reservation’ that it appears it really
doesn’t seem to have mattered what ANYONE
thought or what ‘intel’ they received.
They ( Marsh and Steed only ) made up THEIR
minds about what THEY wanted to do… and to hell
with what anyone else might have been telling them.
I just thought I would balance out YOUR ‘ad-libbing’
up above by reminding anyone reading of what was
ACTUALLY said that day by FBAN Bryon Kimball.
He WAS right. Things pretty much happened just
the way he said they would over the open TAC
channels that day.
It’s important to recognize that a couple posters continually try to normalize every aspect of the decision to go through that bowl. Whether claiming they were going to be making good time on switchbacks and game trails, or implying that it’s reasonable to think one shift in wind is THE sole shift in weather with a thunderstorm blowing in.
In the real world, as regards storms, it’s not only not the WFFs think, it’s not the experience of normal people, or the way normal everyday people think. I believe everyone here has been in or near a thunderstorm and not been amazed when winds gusted and changed direction. I actually believe many people here have had storms blow through in places like AZ and experienced wind events more severe than those that occurred during a storm that was expected that day. Whether looking after the safety of your crew, or planning a picnic, betting on one single change of wind direction (even if that change had occurred as FullSail claimed it to have) would be a very unusual thing for people normal exposure those storms.
Likewise, attempts to divert focus onto the specific source of the specific winds encountered at that time can be very misleading. This was not a day with winds forecast for 2-3 mph and gust as high as 6 or 6, that got real breezy through some unanticipated, highly unusual weather event that no one expected or would have reasonably been asked to expect. There was a forecast that more or less showed up as expected. Marsh himself knew and said that the winds were getting “squirrely” up top. He didn’t say “the wind shift seems to have come, and it looks like it is now stable and to the east.”
3 or 4 posts on the web to implying that GM was relying on THE wind shift that already occurred (and implying that this was normal, and that subsequent winds were freaks of nature) can create a false idea that supports the nothing-to-see-here mantra of some. But, not what happened, and if people reflect on what to expect with that type of front coming through, they should ask how surprising it is that winds shifted in that kind of weather.
Hey – xxFullsailxx – thanks. I’ve been beating the weather drum here for a while, but I don’t know nearly enough (while you and Bob Powers obviously know tons). So, thank you – your explanation was incredibly helpful. (In return, here’s some help for you: Don’t rely with 100% confidence on the SAIT fire progression maps (or the SAIT/Wildland-Fire-Associates/ADOSH timeline or other random details (including the SAIT interview notes)). They are just not 100% accurate. I meant to mention this earlier to Bob Powers, but I forgot…. 🙂 )
EN, beating the weather drum doesn’t add anything but confusion if the weather drum you are beating has no basis in fact. The reality is, shifting winds given the forecast weather, that did materialize, are a normal thing.
What would be highly unusual and not founded on either experience or even the ability of short-range forecasts to predict specifics is taking the view that a singular wind shift was expected, and had already occurred, and that no further wind shifts were going to happen. Typing the idea, that GM reasonably relied on A wind shift being the SOLE wind shift, multiple times doesn’t make that idea hold water.
Remember what Marsh said? “Squirrely” winds.
While some of the details in the various investigative reports certainly are questionable, the one thing that is not in question, are the timed-stamped radar images of the weather-event progression.
Yes. The SAIT contains a pretty good weather summary in this regard, starting roughly on p. 70 if I recall, and the ADOSH report does as well.
I also note that both discuss the outflow boundary pretty matter-of-factly, as is appropriate as it was not a rare component of the expected weather for that day. Likewise there is a discussion of plume dynamics and the terrain channeling that Bob mentioned. Thunder cell development was visible from the area of YHF. Other indicators are noted after 1600.
In terms of whether this anticipated weather was a rare event, it’s relevant that on the 28th, two days earlier, there was a thunderstorm that passed through with similar wind speeds. There’s just no “rare” there.
TTWARE, thanks for your reply – I made a new post for this discussion up above. If you don’t yet have all 30 images of the clouds, I can e-mail them to you. In my view, they are misleading if you watch them in a GIF (which is exactly the same with another progression video related to the YHF – it is hard to get a good sense of the relevant progression when you are dealing with a GIF, in my experience).
Whatever the reason behind this directed, purposeful effort, I would encourage anyone with questions about the weather caused by this discussion to do two things. 1) Read the weather discussion in the SAIT and ADSOH reports. 2) Think about the times they watched a front of thunderstorms approach from one direction, and ask whether they would assume a partial wind shift as a front approaches would be the ONLY wind shift, given what their experience has been with past fronts blowing in.
Actually, I should have added a 3) ask themselves, if they’d been told 30 minutes before that N/NE front arrived that the front would bring E/NE winds, would they assume that a partial shift to W winds was going to be the final change in wind brought by that storm front that was itself blow in from N/NE?
I completely agree.
From Darrell Willis himself…
During his ADOSH interview
and also reprinted as a
SIDEBAR on page 14 of
the official WFAR report…
“…it wasn’t like an outflow. It was pushing the fire in this (southerly) direction. It wasn’t a ten-minute bust and things got back to normal. It was two solid hours…”
Moved this up here as I can’t type 1 letter to a line.
Bob,
I agree with the delayed evacuations being part of the story and that they could have been handled better. I really wonder how different the Yarnell evacuations were from the usual case, reading about other fires leaves the impression that late evacuations are not rare. Others could probably add input on this. I do think it was part of the general theme, they underestimated the fire and played catch-up all day. However, their underestimating the fire still should not have resulted in the GMHS getting killed. The firefighters most in danger from this were the ones on the edge of Glen Ilah, at the head of the fire that afternoon. GM was out in left field – in the black – and walked into the path of the fire. Yes they could have pulled out GM earlier, feeling that their work was futile, but was there any urgency to do so? In the black, they should have been safe.
SR –
My questions are not meant to be either tricky or even argumentative. You have been looking at this fire for months. Catch phrases from the report such as lack of risk management or operational oversight really do not add understanding. In your own words, what did the fire command do that they should not have done or what did they not do that they should have done? If you believe their decisions were a major factor in the deaths of the GMHS (as ADOSH does) you should be able to answer those questions. I do believe there has been a tendency to say fire command should have made sure that the GMHS were safe. But who was better able to assess the safety implications of any actions on the part of the crew – the GM overhead or the fire command?
what some people in this commentary don’t seem to understand (and especially those with no first hand experience of wildland fire operations over the last ten years in and around WUI) is that the Yarnell Fire was the perfect shit-storm of complicating factors…
-extremely dry fuel conditions with heavy fuel loading…
-a lightning start fire within close proximity to three communities…
-three communities who hadn’t prepared for the inevitable…
-a weather event that occurred (as was expected) in the middle of the burn period…
-an incoming IMT trying to transition…
…all happening within a 12 hour period. i am not saying that this event was unprecedented, but it is a situation that is nearly impossible to manage well. and easy, in hindsight, to hyper-analyze what could have been done better.
what is ironic about the ADOSH fines (and i think this is what mike is saying) is that the very people it says were actually put in harms way will in no way be “compensated” (nor do i think they should be. they were just doing their jobs and had the same choice GM did to refuse risk, i am just explaining one example of why the ADOSH report is out of touch with reality)… GM was in the safest position of anyone that day. as mike said, they made the conscious decision to leave their assignment and try to walk out. i think the ADOSH fines are simply an attempt to “right the wrong” for the City of Prescott, who failed to properly cover their employees with appropriate death benefits.
xxFullsailxx – one small point: You make reference above to “a weather event that occurred (as was expected) in the middle of the burn period…”
My understanding is that the weather event that was “expected… in the middle of the burn period” did not actually occur “as was expected.” My current-and-still-grossly-incomplete impression (based on the research I am currently doing) is that GM got screwed by fire induced weather far more than any predicted outflow from the thunder cells (that, according to the IMET, fell apart). This weather business is difficult for me to research, so anyone who knows anything about fire-induced-weather is welcome to e-mail me at [email protected]. That said, I have done enough research to date to feel comfortable sharing my above comment.
(In case WTKTT or whomever wants “links” or sources, allow me to state up-front that my sources are my pages and pages and pages of notes, largely hand-written.)
EN, you again would do well to get competent sources instead of the ones you seem to be relying on. Unless there is something I don’t full understand. GM themselves noted squirelly winds. Wind shifts and gust during forecast thunderstorms are a fact of life. 50 mph gusts in the southwest that time of year aren’t particularly newsworthy.
On top of that the fire had fire swirls or wind devils which are directly related to down draft winds and heat. It takes a good sized area of fire to create its own weather. Around 10,000 acres plus igniting rapidly to create fire induced weather or wind. It may have happened in the canyon the crew was in based on the way the fire hit it and spread rapidly with extreme heat like a blow torch.
There was a natural chimney, heavy fuels, a large fire head pushed by wind, with a upslope condition. Any fire above the crew would be sucked down to the fire at the mouth of the canyon causing area combustion. A large combination of factors fell into place where they were. At that point similar to the Loope Fire in 1966 in California. The Chimney effect can be devastating. It also is predictable if you pay attention.
Bob, I am with you. Are you saying, Bob, that if the fire ran up the two-track to the saddle and reached the “descent point” on the ridge, that *THAT* fire could then PULL a spot up through the valley, essentially like a funnel or chimney? (I am sure I am articulating this poorly, but hopefully you can envision what I am saying.)
Not sure what you meant by valley. The canyon the crew was caught in if the fire actually was above them as the fire spread map showed it would have been affected by the fire at the mouth of the canyon that the crew was faced with. Thus creating its own force pulling the fire from both directions. It is a possible scenario based on the way the fire burned. The map showed fire above the crew before the fire below them exploded into the canyon it did not run around them and up to the saddle first
if that was what you were asking. Take a look at the progression charts if they can be believed or are accurate the fire was also burning above them near the heal of the fire while the fire covered the mouth of the canyon. It is like a backfire being pulled to the main fire. Make science?
I have to agree with you on the above, My only concern was the lack of direction by the OPS in not talking to Marsh About the situation and make a clearer decision on staying in the black. I do think the Overhead had some blame in supervision how much is debatable. The Fire had 2 OPS that seemed to cause some confusion as to who was working for who. When the fire broke loose and compromised GM line at around 1530 the crew should have been pulled from there assignment by the OPS or IC. Some one should have been talking to them, They were safe in the Black no dought about that. So simply tell them to stay until we can get you off the mountain. We being the fire command. No less responsible were the crew leaders, and communication with the overhead before moving off the fire.
As in the past and for years the problem with compensation for seasonal’s is terrible. $25,000 is not going to sustain a wife and 4 kids, so you will see lawsuits in this day and age.
The above was for fullsail.
Bob- the reason why IHC’s are ordered for a situation like Yarnell Hill Fire is because they are expected to make smart decisions, independently, without having to be “looked upon” when shit goes wonky.
the OSC’s had their bases covered by assigning Marsh as Div. Sup. OSC’s don’t provide for LCES, the line overhead does… in this case, Div Sup Marsh. the whole point of the ICS system is that Command positions don’t have to account for every single resource on the fire… because that would be unreasonable.
I totally agree with you except OSC and Division Boss’s should always be in direct contact with those under them to discuss changes and set up new plans if the original plan is failing. Superintendents like to work closely with good Div. Boss’s and OPS always likes to keep updated with their Divisions. At least it worked that way in my time, It never hurt to double check on safety when things started going south, you made sure your guys were good and aware.
xxfullsalexx
The OSC position under Incident Command System Is in fact the old Line boss position he is in fact responsible for and part of the line overhead and is as responsible for LCES as any one on the line and without a SO he is directly responsible for safety to the IC or Old Fire Boss There job descriptions have never changed just there names. IHC’s still answer to there supervisors, Division and OPS’s if there is 1 or 3 crews on a Division they answer to their line overhead.
Chain of command dose not go away because you are a Hot Shot Crew.
Mike,
Risk management is not a catch-phrase. If you have read the report accompanying the ADOSH findings, you have already seen a detailed discussion of risk management. Basically, if it’s clear all day that the tactics you started the day with will not be successful given fire behavior, and you never reevaluate those tactics and continue to expose people to risk, it’s a problem. With poor risk management, you leave everyone more susceptible to stupid things happening.
Part of management is understanding that everyone underneath you will not always make perfect decisions. It is almost a given that if managers don’t stay mindful of what their resources are up to, or worse commit them in ways bound to not work, and then don’t pay much attention after that, that sooner or later bad things will happen. GM’s lookout is a good example of this that happened before the burnover, though fortunately with a happy ending.
I’d suggest you go back and re-read the report and state with specificity which part of the risk management discussion and discussions of operational oversight and communications you feel are in error. For instance, I note for communications that management has the ability to cause communication to happen. The fact that GM may have had a history of being close-mouthed as to crew movements and did not specifically reach out to disclose what they were doing clearly was an issue, but operations could have stepped in and asked for communication. If you get only partial communication, as a manager you’re fully able to ask for full communication.
This actually is a good example of what Putnam talks about in saying the 10 are used to put all blame on crews. Yes, GM could have communicated better. And should have. But, it’s a two-way street.
Managers get fired in business all the time for mistakes made by employees that the manager didn’t know about, if the manager didn’t show sufficient oversight.
Mike,
In regards to your comment ot SR above, one management specific I can point to is the (State budget influenced?) call for a Type II Short Team after the fire had already been deemed a threat to Yarnell.
The negative effects of that decision were immediately compounded by the Short Team’s inability to bring to the table the necessary critical components of a ‘Short Team’, which included no Safety Officer or Planning Chief (who were both scheduled to arrived long after the fire had gone Type I).
It can certainly be argued as to whether or not having these key indivduals on-scene might have changed the outcome of the tragedy. One thing is certain though, having a full team there in a timely manner, would have produced a more positive impact on the firefight that day.
One further example along these lines is taking the time — about 30 seconds — to discuss with each crew whether they have LCES in place. Saying “we’ll escape by bushwhacking down the unscouted bowl to the BSR” likely wouldn’t have been viewed as acceptable. But that conversation never happened, either earlier when it should have, or when people heard that GM was moving and some became concerned that where they were made no sense.
Likewise, TWARE accurately pointed out that the BSR was a fail as an SZ. It seems no one, throughout the day, had a conversation with GM where they formally discussed the black qualifying as a SZ. It did, and they should have stayed committed to it. Failure to have that conversation earlier may not have been a central cause of what happened next. But, when a crew says it’s abandoning its SZ and proceeding down its escape route to another SZ, that would have been a logical moment for 15 seconds of mindful conversation as to the what and why and where implied by that statement. As in, Why did the black become unsafe? Why are you moving? Where is your escape route? Which SZ are you moving to, and do you know it’s a good SZ?
Again the crew is responsible for there safety.
If they are ask to do something that is unsafe they have the right to refuse. When Crew fail to use the 10 SO then they don’t follow the rules so yes as Putnam says the crews are blamed which they should be.
We go back and back again the crews safety is the responsibility of ????? “their crew supervisors.”
Accountability goes up and down the line.
Let’s suppose there HAD been a clear statement by GM that they were going to bushwhack down to the BSR, for instance.
Should ops be off the hook in that case, because, well, GM is responsible for their safety, so people are free to sit back and let them do something they clearly shouldn’t be doing? To be clear, this is a hypothetical. What happened seems on evidence more to be a failure to supervise include a failure to force communication that wasn’t really sought by GM. But, it is part of management and a failure that management can and should be accountable for.
Agree totally…
Again this is the perspective of a non-WFF. Much of what is suggested above could have been done in theory, but just does not sound real world to me. With the fire blowing up and fire command worrying about citizens in Yarnell, moving resources. coordinating firefighting efforts (including air) and worrying about getting additional resources to Yarnell, the idea that fire command would be asking any group of hotshots if they have a lookout or any escape route seems to be a little hard to expect. Maybe this would have been the role of a safety officer (my lack of knowledge) and if so would argue that the Type 2 short crew was an issue. But I have to believe it is generally assumed that hotshot crews take care of those matters. They are highly trained and Granite Mountain’s overhead was not green (at least Marsh and Steed). I do not think that fire command really sees its role as a mother hen.
Yes managers do get fired AT TIMES for the actions of their employees. But the fire command – hotshot crew relationship is not a typical employer-employee relationship. They are thrown together for a few hours or days on a fire, each with specific, defined roles. The fire command is not responsible for the crew’s training, providing their equipment etc – all the things that exist in a normal manager-employee relationship. Most importantly, hotshot crews are taught and expected to accept that their safety is THEIR responsibility. They choose their SZ’s, they choose their escape routes, they can turn down risk etc. Fire command does not have the “eyes” to make those decisions for a hotshot crew, which is why safety is a crew responsibility. So while it may seem that “blaming the crew” is what fire managers do to escape responsibility, it really just flows from the nature of the job. It sucks, but it is what it is.
The responsibility rests solely with the crew line is just that, a line. Not the way it works. FWIW many people can and do require crews to report on LCES, which is a helpful and reasonable thing to do. And, not a meaningful time intrusion. It does force mindfulness of LCES.
Let’s look at part of the hidden aspect of “blame the crew.” Lowly paid seasonal employees are a dime a dozen — they may be integral parts of their communities, and great people, but it’s easy to hire more. And, they tend to not be that influential. Kind of like ski patrollers in the winter. If an accident happens to one of them, to take the view the responsibility must stay at the crew level, and not go up the line the way it always does in quality organizations, is very convenient. More-senior people do have decent salaries, other perks, and a good number of social and professional chits that they’ve accumulated. Are they really supposed to enjoy all those perks, and then if they don’t perform well in a management role, bear none of the responsibility for accidents that result? That seems to be what people are asserting.
Steed and Marsh were not seasonal -they were full time. Management should be held accountable if they are at fault, not because they get “perks”. Management clearly could have done things better on this fire, that is why you go back and review what you did. But the case to blame fire command as the primary cause for the deaths of the GMHS I think is really quite weak. They did not pull them out (could have, but not necessary for safety). They did not tell them to stay put (actually Abel did it appears). No safety officer (yes they serve a role, but should the GMHS have needed a safety officer to tell them not to go into the canyon).
Simple fact is the GMHS made a mistake. If they had announced to the world their plan, including the route, yes fire command should have aborted it. But it appears that even if fire command was aware of their movement (and this remains very uncertain), they were not aware of the route. I suspect they never dreamed they would go through the canyon. So really were they obligated to tell them not to do so?
13 of the GM dead were seasonal. 6 in total were full-time. It is a tad convenient to say all responsibility stops at the crew level. Many of the crew were not even in a position, necessarily, to know that some things weren’t in place safety-wise that needed to be. You have a medical background it seems, would you put it solely on a junior nurse to stand up to a surgeon who was doing something unsafe, or would you ask hospital administrators to also have a few check and balances in place? Including bearing some responsibility if a major case of malpractice happens?
Lax management creates an environment that allows safety violations. Again, had someone asked Marsh in the morning what his escape route and SZ were, the whole bushwhack and burnover may have been avoided. Lax management was not a sufficient cause for the burnover, for sure, but that simple conversation could have nipped it in the bud.
As a division boss I reported to the OPSC if things started going to hell I talked to OPS and they talked to me As a Type 2 OPS or IC I kept track of my resources and made sure they were not in harms way if the fire started going nuts that is your main responsibility with the plan for the day. the line OPS should have checked with each one of his divisions and discussed options. That did not happen
Marsh evidently was OPS only Division Boss. WTF
SR –
Not going to make light of communication, it is usually a good thing. But the leap about having a conversation about a SZ and escape route in the morning and preventing the burnover in the afternoon is mighty large. The walk through the canyon apparently was adlibbed, so how in the heck would the morning talk changed that. Even ADOSH does not suggest fire command knew anything about the walk through the canyon, we have no idea if Marsh had even thought about that route in the morning.
Marsh said he was going down his escape route. It’s possible he had id’d it earlier, and yes it is possible he was ad-libbing. Whichever the answer, if he’d committed to another escape route in the morning, he would have been less likely to identify another route as an escape route, as it would’ve then been an outright dishonest statement to do so. If he truly thought that a bushwhack of that nature was a legit escape route (which he may well have thought) ops could either have cosigned on that, or, more likely, suggested to Marsh another escape route.
None of the mistakes here are something like sexual harassment where someone may from the get-go have known they were doing something wrong and taken intentional steps to be deceptive. It is troubling to here that Marsh was big on crew secrecy, so he may have been aware that his tactics were often at best unorthodox, but that doesn’t mean he would have actively distorted information if a conversation were to have been pressed. That’s one good reason for people to manage by asking questions until they feel they are reasonably getting straight answers back.
For instance, if someone says they are abandoning an SZ, in essence, and going down an escape route to another SZ, a reasonable set of questions is 1) why abandon the first SZ at a time of escalating fire behavior, and 2) what’s your escape route, and 3) what’s your next SZ, and why is it preferable? None of those questions seem to have been asked. Not malice, but not reasonable care of a concerned manager, either.
While ‘everybody is responsible for their own safety’ is a true statement, enough is known about human nature to require having Safety Officers on IMT fires.
Safety Officers certainly can, and do, perform a certain amount of mother-henning when it comes to 10/18, LCES, and other proper safety practices.
If you ask, most fire managers would admit that they’re among the most important people out there.
Checks and balances help minimize the effects of human error.
TTWARE. You’re comments are always point on, no BS, and well stated. Thank You
Yep, another in a long line of excellent comments from TWARE.
mike- your perspective is a worthy one. i am sorry you’ve fallen into this futile argument with the yappy-dog.
the ADOSH report and associated fines are out of touch with reality. had the IMT evacuated all the personnel off of YHF at 1530 as it suggests, and allowed the fire to roll through Glen Illah, or whichever community it was pointed toward, with all the folks there who had refused to evacuate, there would be ten times as many lawsuits.
the only reason more homes weren’t lost, and civilian causalities didn’t transpire, is because of the efforts of the wff’s. again, as far as GM goes, they had the safest assignment of nearly any other resource on the fire that day. anchor, flank and pinch from the black.
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>> as far as GM goes, they had the safest
>> assignment of nearly any other resource
>> on the fire that day.
Until they didn’t.
The anchor point ‘assignment’ isn’t what killed them.
It was the ‘next assignment’.
Whether that was a *totally* self-imposed ‘new assignment’ or a response to the requests/urgings/directives of management is what remains to be fully discovered and documented.
again, even if there was another request for GM… they had every right, reason and justification to turn it down.
unless you’re an internet conspiracy theorist with nothing better to do, you understand that very basic fact.
Well, we know that there was a request for GM to come down, so TOTALLY self-imposed seems an unlikely scenario. There’s no sign yet that there was an order or veiled order for them to come down. Regardless, at multiple points during the day but certainly around the time GM made the decision to move and for a few minutes after, 30 seconds of communication that didn’t happen could have resulted in GM ultimately making different decisions. There are obviously large vested interests (financial but also professional) that are strongly committed to saying that all responsibility rests on people who aren’t here anymore. But, if the transition from IA and thereafter had been handled better — in line with what standards would suggest — there is a reasonable likelihood that the bushwhack never would have happened.
I still think critical evidence is being with-held. It could be that that evidence is not so critical. It could be that Granite Mountain made the decision completely internally, wanting to push their odds on their own, as they sometimes had done in the past. But there are chunks of that that still don’t make sense to me.
But if that were the case, if there is “nothing to hide,” if it is just them making a truly stupid and dangerous decision on their own, why was a camera that contained a critical conversation hidden from the chain of evidence, why are cellphones still missing, why are gps units still missing, and why are the critical conversations GM had over their crew radio frequency–obviously listened to by Brendan, and likely listened to by various Blue Ridge Hotshots, and maybe listened to by Daryll Willis, still missing?
WTKTT
Just reread your post on the 3rd.
the extra 9 or 10 min. could be attributed to the crew waiting for Marsh to drop off the top and catching up with the crew. Just another possibility. No evidence for proof but very plausible.
Reply to Bob Powers post on May 5, 2014 at 5:39 pm
>> Mr. Powers wrote…
>> WTKTT… Just reread your post on the 3rd.
>> The extra 9 or 10 min. could be attributed to the crew waiting for
>> Marsh to drop off the top and catching up with the crew. Just
>> another possibility. No evidence for proof but very plausible.
Yes. Still perfectly possible.
It’s GOOD to have an accurate timeline now for all the photographic evidence from up on that ridge that afternoon… but it DOES throw some new mysteries into the works.
When everyone ( SAIT included ) just thought that Wade Parker’s photo that he texted to his mother was *actually* taken from that ‘Rest Location’ at 4:04 PM ( and that that could be assumed to be the LAST photo taken at that location ) it seemed to nail down a time when they MUST have left that location to head SOUTH ( SAIR ended up saying 4:05 PM ).
The SAIT must have just done some kind of ‘test walk’ from that ‘Rest Location’ to the ‘Descent Point’ ( they never said HOW they arrived at ANY of their time estimates ) and it came out around 15 minutes, so 4:20 PM then just became their logical ‘guesstimate’ as to when Steed/Crew (plus Marsh?) made it to the ‘Descent Point’… and that is the time they ‘published’ in the SAIR.
Now that the ONLY *actual* proof as to the what TIME they were STILL at that ‘Rest Location’ and taking all those photos/videos is Christopher’s final cellphone image ( IMG_2738 taken at exactly 3:55.31 PM )… there are now 9 to 10 minutes ‘unaccounted for’ and we really have no proof WHAT was happening during that time.
Personally?… I think if they HAD just sat there at that ‘Rest Location’ for 9 or 10 more minutes just waiting for Marsh to ‘arrive’ there BEFORE heading SOUTH…
…I simply think we would be seeing MORE PHOTOS with timestamps in the 3:55 to 4:04 PM timeframe.
They would have had nothing else to do for those extra 9 or 10 minutes ( waiting for Marsh ) than to just keep doing exactly what they had been doing ( taking lots of pictures of the fire ).
Somehow… I believe the fact that all the ‘picture taking’ abruptly ENDS with Christopher’s IMG_2738 at exactly 3:55.31 PM means something.
I believe it *means* ( at the very least ) that 3:56 PM is then about the time Steed ‘announced’ something like “gaggle up, boys… we’re leaving”… and they did, in fact, leave that ‘Rest Location’ then.
Now… whether they just moved those few hundred feet to the
southwest to the ‘two-track’ and began ‘assembling’ there on the two-track ( but still ended up waiting THERE for Marsh to catch up from behind )… we simply don’t know.
But the ‘picture taking’ DID abruptly ended at 3:55.31 PM, and I think that means something.
I still think Marsh was at the ‘end of the line’ of 19 men, even if they did wait for him… and that still has to be the ultimate explanation for Steed being the one to come on the radio FIRST with the initial MAYDAY… and only 3 minutes later do we then hear Marsh ( out of breath from running ) come on the radio saying “This is DIVSA… and I’m here NOW with Granite Mountain”…
…but when they actually left to head SOUTH ( and at what point Marsh really was finally ‘with them’ ) we still don’t know.
WTKTT… I agree with the point that it appears GM left the location where all the pictures and videos were taken circa 1556. And it appears that the SAIT was basing their timeline on the text sent by Parker and the incorrect timestamp (thanks ASAIT) on the power shot camera.
Could it be that the SAIT used the GPS information from Caldwell to determine not only the times, but also the route GM chose?
It does appear (to me) that after Marsh tells Bravo 33, that is exactly where we want the retardant (1637?), and it wasn’t dropped,; then Marsh didn’t transmit again until he was with the crew. However, I am not convinced he was behind the crew. If so, there is no way (in my opinion) he could have saw Bravo 33 flying through the middle bowl west to east.
BTW… Blue Ridge YIN says the first radio traffic they heard regarding GM in trouble came on Tac1, not A/G (tac 5)
YIN P 44 David Morgan Pilot 215KA….. he heard GM trying to contact AA prior to deployment.
Regarding the link to the Facebook comment. I hope the person that actually made the comment will speak up and share the information.
Calvin, I don’t know a lot about Hotshots, but I would bet my LEFT arm based on what I have learned over the past many months that Wade Parker was *NOT* texting and moving at the same time. Therefore, regardless of the time that he TOOK his picture, we can assume with some relative level of certainty that he SENT it at 4:04 p.m., such that the GM guys were NOT on the move at 4:04 p.m. They left AFTER 4:04 p.m. No?
Elizabeth. I agree, most people do not text while hiking on uneven terrain. And I agree, with a fair amount of certainty that Wade Parker did send the text at 1604
You know what doesn’t make sense? To accept as fact that GMH took a minimum of 10 photos and 3 videos between 1549 and 1556 and suddenly turned off their cameras while continuing to sit for another 8 or nine minutes and then suddenly Wade Parker pulls up a picture that is approaching 20 minutes old and texts it, when he could have easily snapped a current photo and sent it.
I think it is much more likely that Wade Parker actually sent the photo after leaving the spot where the picture was taken.
Regarding the facebook comment I have referenced (and the one YOU liked). It *seems* that there was a pause by GM (before descending) and a photo was taken. Wade Parker could have texted his picture at this point. No?
Elizabeth, follow up. It hasn’t been discussed (yet), but I would put the Parker Photo as happening before any Mackenzie picture. And also before the CALDWELL video.
In the very bottom right corner of the Parker picture, you can see a small portion of black helmet. I believe this is the helmet of Robert Caldwell, and he is moving down to the location where he takes his video.
Reply to calvin post
on May 6, 2014 at 1:52 pm
>> calvin said…
>> It hasn’t been discussed
>> (yet), but I would put the
>> Parker Photo as happening
>> before any Mackenzie
>> picture. And also before
>> the CALDWELL video.
calvin… it HAS been discussed, even recently, and there is a video that pretty much PROVES that Parker actually *took* his ‘texted photo’ just BEFORE Caldwell shot his video.
That ‘video crossfade’ between Parker’s photo and a stillframe from the start of Caldwell’s video is here…
Youtube Video Title is…
‘Parker-and-Caldwell’
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B9emH4nY_zs
This ‘video crossfade’ clearly shows that the fireline has progressed some to the SOUTH in-between Parker’s photo and the start of Caldwell’s video.
Sorry WTKTT. Thanks for correcting me.
The only thing that has NOT been resolved about the TIME on the Parker photo ( texted out some 14 minutes AFTER he took it ) is exactly HOW MUCH sooner he took it before Caldwell started shooting his video there.
It’s hard to venture a guess just from looking at the ‘crossfade’… but I would say it had to be no sooner than about 60 seconds before the video… but not anything less than 15 or 20 seconds.
Do you see any better way to nail that down other than ‘guessing’ about the fire progression seen in the ‘crossfade’?
Reply to Elizabeth post on
May 6, 2014 at 10:56 am said:
>> Elizabeth said…
>> I would bet my LEFT arm based on what
>> I have learned over the past many months
>> that Wade Parker was *NOT* texting and
>> moving at the same time.
Elizabeth… I don’t know if the loss of any extremities depends on it… but that is a
fair assumption to make.
You are RIGHT to point out that the 4:04 PM
network timestamp on Wade Parker’s ‘transmission’ DOES exist… and will always need to be ‘factored in’.
I agree with you.
It is NOT LIKELY that Wade Parker was ‘sneaking in a text transmit’ while he was
ACTUALLY ‘hiking’ in-line with the rest of the men. It was not the ‘policy’ of this Granite Mountain organization for ANYONE to be using their electronic devices WHILE they were hiking.
Indeed… except for the odd ‘opportunistic’ shot like a retardant drop happening ( everyone gets their cameras out for those ) the ‘policy’ seems to have been ‘no picture taking, texting, or phone calls unless on a break’.
So is the 4:04 PM network timestamp on the text message enough PROOF that they didn’t actually DEPART that ‘Rest Location’ and head SOUTH until 4:04 PM?
Maybe. Maybe not.
As I said above… it is GOOD to (finally) have an accurate timeline for ALL of that photographic evidence from out on that ridge that afternoon… but the new *accuracy* calls into question previous *assumptions* like when they actually did LEAVE that area.
It is perfectly possible they DID *leave* that photo-taking location right at 1556 ( when the picture taking stops )… but it was not possible to ‘form a line’ in those ROCKS.
Their next ‘move’ would have been over to the two-track to start ‘assembling’ into a single file line… and I’m sure that’s what they did next.
It’s possible they THEN just waited THERE on the two-track for another 8-9 minutes for Marsh to ‘catch up’ to where they were.
Whether he ( Marsh ) did or not… or whether they got tired of waiting for him and took off SOUTH without him is still unknown…
…but it is possible that if that is what they were doing ( waiting for Marsh while lined up on the two-track ) that they would have still been in ‘break mode’ and it would have been OK for Parker to still be fooling with his smartphone and sending his text message at 4:04 PM… BEFORE starting the ‘hike’ SOUTH.
I’m afraid it is going to remain debatable, however.
Parker COULD have ‘snuck in a text transmit’ as they were hiking south… even if he wasn’t supposed to.
Regarding the time issue, the more I think about it as I try to put myself in their shoes, I think there must have been a brief period at the top of the bowl (1-5 minutes) where they were contemplating the “Now what?” moment.
As they trudged along the 2-track, they had no idea what the direct route to the ranch was going to look like from the top of the bowl. All of a sudden, they were facing a transition from an open path, to a brush-choked bowl. There had to have been some ‘oh shit, now what?’ thoughts and comments as they contemplated their next move.
My speculation is that they discussed it, and thought about it for a brief period of time as noted above, before actually committing themselves, which may account for some of the ‘travel minutes’.
Reply to TTWARE post on May 6, 2014 at 9:36 am
>> TTWARE said…
>> Regarding the time issue, the more I think about it as
>> I try to put myself in their shoes, I think there must have
>> been a brief period at the top of the bowl (1-5 minutes)
>> where they were contemplating the “Now what?”
>> moment.
Yes. It’s hard to picture that ‘decision’ happening any other way. There have been times when it seems like Steed might have just put his ‘left blinker on’ and down they went… but given the circumstances that afternoon that would almost surely represent some kind of ‘heat stroke’ moment.
I’m sure, when Steed humped over that final rise in the two-track and the Ranch actually came into view ( and the rest of the two-track heading SOUTH essentially ‘disappeared from view’ )… he was probably shocked.
>> TTWARE also said…
>> As they trudged along the 2-track, they had no idea
>> what the direct route to the ranch was going to look like
>> from the top of the bowl. All of a sudden, they were
>> facing a transition from an open path, to a brush-choked
>> bowl. There had to have been some ‘oh shit, now what?’
>> thoughts and comments as they contemplated their
>> next move.
Most likely. I would even say the “oh shit, now what?” moment was (briefly) preceded by a few seconds of
“Are you f**king KIDDING ME?”.
Whether or not Steed actually got right on the radio and expressed either of those sentiments to his boss ( Eric Marsh )… we do not know.
>> TTWARE also said…
>> My speculation is that they discussed it, and thought
>> about it for a brief period of time as noted above, before
>> actually committing themselves, which may account for
>> some of the ‘travel minutes.
Your ‘they’ and ‘themselves’ obviously just refers to Steed and Marsh. The other 17 were just ‘along for the ride’ at that point.
If Marsh was not physically with Steed at this point… then ANY conversations about this ‘decision’ pretty much MUST have taken place on the intra-crew channel… and anyone who was listening to that channel at that time ( like Brendan McDonough, Darrell Willis, and perhaps up to 3 Blue Ridge Hot Shots sitting in the other 3 GM vehicles ) probably heard some/all of this ‘decision making’.
There is still one background radio capture right around this exact time that APPEARS to be Marsh telling someone ( like Steed? ) to ‘not be upset’ and Marsh then seems to say he’s ‘coming off the slope’ in an effort to get ‘catch up’ quicker…
…but that background capture has NOT been verified yet.
Even if that background capture ends up being verified it is obvious it was taking place on one of the open TAC channels, which itself would then be another mystery.
If Steed really was ‘upset’ about the decision that now lay in front of him and was expressing that to Eric Marsh… WHY would he be doing that on an open TAC 1 or 2 channel and NOT on the GM intra-crew?
Reply to Elizabeth post on April 30, 2014 at 7:53 pm
>> Elizabeth said…
>> There absolutely 100% *are* text messages and photos
>> ( from GM Hotshots ) that the SAIT was never given. The
>> SAIT never ASKED for them (to this day).
>>
>> WantsToKnowTheTruth on April 30, 2014 at 8:40 pm said:
>> I honestly hadn’t heard that.
>> My turn to ask…
>> What are YOU basing THAT statement on?
>>
>> calvin on May 1, 2014 at 3:17 am said:
>> Elizabeth. How many? Did the ADOSH investigators ask for
>> other pictures and texts that were sent?
>> ScottNorrisPhotoAndText.pdf says……(in an email from Randy
>> Okon to Richa Wilson)on August 8 2013……..
>> I believe we have received all text and photos from the families that
>> we are going to see.
>>
>> Marti Reed on May 1, 2014 at 8:43 pm said:
>> So….. evidence? Links? How do you KNOW that??
Elizabeth…
We are ALL still waiting for an answer here.
Did you just ‘make that up’… or do you *actually* have evidence to support your statement that there are other texts and/or emails from the Granite Mountain Hotshots on Sunday, June 30, 2013 that have never seen the light of day?
WTKTT. I believe Elizabeth is correct, but it would be nice if she could be more specific , or give examples. Thanks
calvin… what makes YOU think she is correct? I honestly hadn’t heard anything about this so just wondering what makes you think she even *might* be correct?
Did someone say something in a media article?
Rumors?
…OR… just ( perhaps ) a *feeling* and/or *assuming* that
some family members *might* have had things they didn’t
want to share with investigators?
I don’t actually have that *feeling* or *assumption* myself.
I would find it very hard to believe that any family member
might have been *refusing* to cooperate with investigators,
which is why I’m simply wondering what this *claim* is
really based on.
Facebook comment is what I am referencing.
Link?
Reply to Elizabeth post on May 5, 2014 at 10:35 am
NOTE: This is a ‘continuation’ of a discussion that was taking place down below
regarding Rory Collins ‘abruptly’ leaving the fire at 1558… but the ‘reply’ comment
space got filled up to the right-side. New parent comment started to make
room for more comment.
>> Elizabeth asked…
>> What makes you think the briefing Rory gave (as compared to the one
>> Bravo3 gave, for example) was NOT a proper briefing?
I can’t believe we are going over this one again.
You, yourself, have already asked for ‘opinions’ about this a number of times
before and below is simply a ‘reprint’ of ONE of the answers from March 12…
>> WantsToKnowTheTruth on March 12, 2014 at 6:52 pm said:
>> Reply to Elizabeth post on March 12, 2014 at 4:29 pm
>>
>> Elizabeth said…
>> Rory left the fire at 3:59 p.m. because the PILOT who was
>> FLYING the plane for him RAN out of time and had to return
>> to Deer Creek (or Deer Valley or whatever it was). That pilot
>> could NO longer be in the air, according to the relevant
>> regulations/rules.
>>
>> WTKTT responded…
Correct. ( Deer Valley is where the airstrip was ).
I also agree with your opinion that the ‘official’ reports ( the SAIR in particular ) did Rory Collins a huge disservice by not making it clear that it was not HIS decision to ‘abrupty leave the fire’ at 1558 ( timestamp according to SAIR report ).
That being said… there is STILL the following documented testimony from Bravo 33 regarding the ‘briefing’ ( or lack thereof ) from Mr. Collins that day.
Does THIS sound like Mr. Rory Collins gave them any kind of “proper briefing”?
SAIT Interview Notes ( page 15 )…
_____________________________________________________
INTERVIEW WITH BRAVO 33
July 9, 2013 – 1700
Interviewees:
John Burfiend-ATS Specialist
Clint Clauson – ATS Trainee
Thomas French – AT Specialist
Interviewers:
Mike Dudley, Brad Mayhew, Tim Foley, Jay Kurth, Jimmy Rocha
__________________________________________________________________
We had been there about 1 ½ hours when air attack on the scene told us he had
to leave. (1700 NM time). It was a strange change out. He just said “you have the
fire, I’m leaving”. Not sure if I was talking to structure group 1 or 2. I remember
looking up. Talking to ops structural group 1, 2 and ops.
I knew there was 2 structural groups. I wrote down 2. Tom said “hey dude, you
are the air attack”.
Didn’t know Division A was the superintendent of the Granite Mountain hot shots.
Air attack didn’t tell me there were resources in the area.
I never got divisions from the briefing. Didn’t know there were divisions. Thought it
was a Type 3 incident. I didn’t recognize Todd’s voice. I didn’t know anybody was
taking any action on the fire.
I didn’t know that Blue Ridge was there until we were home watching the news.
__________________________________________________________________
So, given these statements from Bravo 33, how can ANYONE say that
Rory Collins did a ‘proper transition briefing’ with these guys before just
bailing off the fire? Even B33 testified it was (quote) “a strange changeout”.
Bravo 33 ended up essentially CLUELESS.
If that is actually ‘standard practice’… then guess what (else) needs to
CHANGE (toot-sweet) in the WFF business.
fire20+
I hear what you were saying and you picked up on mine.
My problem with Putnam is that he did not spend time explaining his theory.
In other words many Fire Fighters not talking to him directly have formed the opinion that the 10 Standard Orders are old and not current for todays fires.
Like his question which one of the Orders is the most important or number one?
As I have said and trained for years no one by its self stands out they are all interactive and have a place at different times on a Fire.
Fight Fire aggressively but provide for safety first—The other 9 are the Safety Rules. That seems to have got lost somewhere with Putnam, at least that’s my take. LCES is good but it is only 3 of the 10 you should always be aware and use the other 7. I hope that makes science. Because of human nature I dought we will ever eliminate Fire Fatalities. Most Fire Fighters will learn and use the rules and that is a good thing.
Reference WTKTT’s 4/30/14 comment regarding Google Earth images, all previous satelite images are still available on Google Earth simply by clicking on the ‘historic images’ (1997) button under the picture. Any placemarks you had imprinted previously, will show up on each of the ‘historic’ images there as well, beginning in 1997.
Thank You and Calvin! I figured they would do that, but haven’t gone there yet.
Followup… ONLY ‘Google Earth’ ( the desktop application ) has the
ability to use ‘previous satellite image sets’. ‘Google Maps’ will still
just ‘default’ to using the ‘latest’ production set of satellite images
which are now ‘post-fire’ ( Dated January 4, 2014 ).
‘Google Earth’ is FREE!
There IS a ‘professional’ ( paid ) version available that has more
capability than the FREE version… but ALL versions of ‘Google
Earth’ can, in fact, show ‘previous satellite images set’ if that’s
what you need to see.
If you still need the pre-fire images… just download/install
the FREE version of ‘Google Earth’.
Just returned from 10 days in Arizona (mainly for a medical conference). Was able to spend a couple of days in Prescott and drive up from Phoenix to Yarnell one afternoon. Also did some hiking in a # of spots.
Couple of observations from Yarnell. First, any suggestion that the men could have dropped packs and “run like hell” is completely nuts. You do not “run” up those steep rock formations. A hike up Camelback Mountain in Phoenix will give you a good idea what climbing up a steep pile of rocks is like. There was no outrunning that fire. Second, driving up to Yarnell, even at the base of the hill, the vegetation did not seem particularly dense. But when you got near the town, it was much denser, even on the Congress side of the ridge. Finally, it has been mentioned that running off to the Congress side was an option. It clearly was, but the rock walls lining Rte 89 were so steep, it did not seem you could have gotten to the highway without going all the way to the bottom of the hill, which is 5 miles down the road (not as the crow flies). Maybe 89 could have been reached higher up in places, maybe Joy or Sonny can shed light on this. Still preferable to dying, but maybe that was why they did not want to fall off to the Congress side.
Yarnell just seemed grim and sad (made worse by the weather, it was cloudy and in the 40s). I did not spend much time there. There really needs to be a proper memorial there (the state is working on this).
Hi Mike,
Agreed on escape all the way back uphill. GM quickly crossed a line where this became a non-option, as going back uphill would have been even slower than their painfully slow pace down through the bowl. Steep slope, difficult soil, and brush were all issues. This is part of why I’ve urged some posters not familiar with local conditions to get that familiarity.
As regards options once entrapment and burnover seemed imminent, GM still had the choice to drop packs and try to escape to at least a better place to hunker down and deploy, among other possibilities. Unfortunately, burning out, which is the option they chose, would have required light fuels which they didn’t have. It should be stressed that none of the options in front of them at that point were good options. But, in terms of making good decisions, Putnam among others has looked at fatality fires and concluded that many would have been survivable had better decisions, and earlier decisions, been made. Given the terrain trap, GM may not have been one of those cases, but given their lookout’s seeming acceptance of deployment earlier, maybe GM had undue emphasis on deployment ingrained. The next crew in a position similar to theirs, where there is not a survivable deployment site, hopefully will be thinking about other options and seeking them.
Plan to never get into a deployment situation. Once your there you have few options and must depend on a fire shelter 50/50.
Reply to SR post on May 3, 2014 at 7:40 am
>> SR said…
>> It should be stressed that none of the options in front
>> of them at that point were good options.
No, they weren’t. The only *real* cure was prevention ( to not have gotten themselves into that situation at all ).
That being said…
>> SR also said…
>> As regards options once entrapment and burnover
>> seemed imminent, GM still had the choice to drop
>> packs and try to escape to at least a better place to
>> hunker down and deploy, among other possibilities.
In general… it should be noted that to this day… NONE of the actual ‘fire progression’ charts produced by any investigative body ( SAIT or ADOSH ) actually shows that even a full minute after Steed’s first MAYDAY ( circa 1640 )… that their path FORWARD had actually been fully ‘cut off’ when Steed’s first MAYDAY went out at 1639.
To the contrary. All the ‘official’ fireline progression charts show that while the fireline was certainly advancing rapidly at 1640… it had *not yet* actually ‘cut them off’ from making more forward progress in an ‘eastward’ direction either in a mad attempt to reach the ranch OR try to cut more to the south across the floor of the canyon and make it into that draw south of the Ranch which exits out towards the Candy Cane Lane.
We also know now that at 1639… some time had ALREADY transpired between the time when they first realized the trouble they were in… then took the time to find a deployment site… and only THEN did Steed make his first MAYDAY call at 1639.
We know now that isn’t ‘over-modulation’ on Steed’s first 1639 MAYDAY call. Steed is actually YELLING into the microphone because there are ( at least ) TWO chainsaws fully running right there near him and he was ‘yellling’ as much to be able to hear himself talking as to make sure Bravo 33 could hear him over the saws.
So that really does mean a certain amount of time ( several minutes, even? ) had ALREADY passed between making all the decisions to deploy, find a good place, and pull ropes on saws to improve the site BEFORE there was any attempt to contact Bravo 33.
The electricity didn’t go off at the Boulder Springs Ranch until 1653 ( Page 70 of SAIR ) and that timeframe for the fireline actually ‘reaching’ the Boulder Springs Ranch is now supported by the Security Camera Videos.
Steed only said ( at 1639 ) “We are in front of the flaming front”… but even at 1640 none of the ‘official’ fireline progression charts show that to actually have been the case.
It would Marsh who would then say ( almost 3 minutes later circa 1642 ) that their “escape route has been cut-off”.
Again… even at 1642… no officially published fire progression chart shows that to *actually* be fully the case.
It was now (probably) DARK AS NIGHT at that location… and the smoke would have been reducing visibility in ANY direction to almost ZERO… so I’m not saying they could actually ‘see’ that they might have had other ‘chances’ at that point… but it’s still curious to note that the officially published fireline progressions do not fully support their own (recorded) perceptions of the situation circa 1639 / 1640.
>> SR also wrote…
>> given their lookout’s seeming acceptance of deployment
>> earlier, maybe GM had undue emphasis on deployment
>> ingrained.
If Frisby had not ‘accidentally’ come across Brendan when he did… OR whoever he had called on the radio to come get him blew two tires halfway there… then YES… it appears that Brendan is saying he would have ‘deployed’ as a ‘first choice’.
If he had then died… we would simply be here now scratching out heads about ‘situational awareness’ again but this time it would be about why Brendan didn’t really ‘consider his other options’. Just 1 or 2 hundred yards east on that trail was an ‘intersection’ with a Jeep trail that heads directly SOUTH to the Boulder Springs Ranch itself. Brendan could have easily ‘dropped packs and run’ to that intersection and then headed SOUTH and AWAY from the fire…
…but ( even according to his own interviews ) Brendan was totally unaware of that ‘option’. He had NO MAP… and no full ‘situational awareness’ of even his own location that day.
When your own ‘Wildland Division Chief’ ( Darrell Willis ) stands in front of cameras at the same deployment site where he just lost (almost) ALL of his men and says he has no idea what the ‘upper limit’ is for a fire shelter… you DO have to wonder if ANYONE in this organization really had a full understanding of the capabilities of their own equipment or ( worse yet ) were actually ‘teaching’ people to rely on it under totally inappropriate circumstances.
>> SR also said…
>> The next crew in a position similar to theirs, where
>> there is not a survivable deployment site, hopefully
>> will be thinking about other options and seeking them.
It is still worth discussing ( what the other options *might* have been ) and the ‘training’ should focus on that.
SR, your reference to Dr. Putnam is spot on. Fighting fire is easy, its the human factors that can get you in trouble. Better decisions & earlier decisions–BY HUMANS–should/could/would save lives. Unfortunately fatality investigations look at the ‘science’ (sorry FBA’s), 10&18 (essentially blame FF’s themselves), and continue to downplay managements role (go pick an entrapment lessons learned & read for yourselves) more intently than the human side of things. If you haven’t read Dr. Putnam’s essay ‘Up In Smoke’ from 2000–do!
Fire 20+
While I understand what Putnam is trying to put forth he is causing havoc in the Safety rules.
First there are the 10 standard orders. They are to give directions for safety. If you do not follow them then evidently you will asses fault according to each one that was not used that caused fatalities.
It is like any Industry accident there are safety rules trained and posted. If you put your body or extremities where they don’t belong and Die then the finding will be that you violated one or more of the rules. So the 10 Standard FFO keep you safe they also show what went wrong. To list the orders that weren’t followed will make fire fighters aware of the need to follow the Orders. Wild Fire burn over fatalities are not that common, that’s because Fire Fighters follow and use the rules. Accidents happen because humans cut corners and forget or ignore the rules. Train– Situation Awareness and use the 10 and 18 and you will stay safe like thousands who are and have gone before you.
If you read Putnam’s piece on the 10 orders, including his listing of the “Real,” i.e. unspoken, fire orders, together with his “Up in Smoke,” I think what he is getting at makes sense. Basically, recognizing that there needs to be some priority, and actual accountability. Certainly many symptoms of the “real orders” seemed to be on display at the YHF.
Key to me is Putnam really does want accountability. Some of his points are used by some people to argue for no accountability. Bob I think in part is saying he want there to be accountability as well. Some of the “nothing-to-see-here” comments in this forum reflect the no-accountability (and above all no financial liability) viewpoint, both as regards the obvious problems with GM but also issues like SZs.
Bob (and wtktt below),
I understand what you are saying about the 10 SFFO (which if they aren’t met–NO engagement) and not EVER getting into a situation where a shelter is needed/used, please know this, including researching and learning from other’s mistakes.
What I grabbed ahold of in your post was your Putnam reference and ‘survivable with better decisions’ — decisions being a human factor…Putnam’s essay’s are applicable from 2000 to now, no? And your reply ‘Accidents happen because humans cut corners and forget or ignore the rules.’…HUMANS..that’s all I’m saying, and again, the 10 SFFO, when followed, saves lives.
Also look at Putnam’s reference to Management when questioned regarding the 10 SFFO…when do we break them and when do we bend them? Could it be there is a possible disconnect between Management and real, attainable goals accomplished by FF’s in the current fire environment, particularly T1 FF’s? Absolutely, and/but please prove me wrong. Accountability is where it’s at, and Management doesn’t care for that word, trust me.
The 10 SFFO, are mentally checked by the Supt/Asst Supt, mitigated, followed, and the 18 are different, more flexible. Perhaps a flaw w/i the 10 SFFO are people’s (w/ different experience levels) perceptions of what they mean at extremely different situations/circumstances?
It’s a scary time…yes, like you said SA, train, talk, and don’t be afraid to speak up.
If you don’t mind, please expand on Putnam causing havoc in safety rules? All I have read isn’t current…and have you been on an IHC that has practiced mindfulness?
—-Reference to WTKTT reply—-
I’m sorry, I have read all YHF evidence…what I was speaking of was historical entrapment lessons learned, not YHF. You are right, Management’s failings ARE scathing, if only they’d of told the truth from the beginning…
I do think there were problems with the management of this fire, especially as related to failure to evacuate citizens, as well as the firefighters in close to town in a timely matter, coming from not appreciating how fast this fire was moving. There may also have been some mixed messages. But, specifically as relates to the GMHS ON THAT DAY (not discussing Willis’ relationship with Marsh or their feelings about structure protection), tell me what was fire management’s great sin? Fire management obviously cannot know exactly what is happening with the fire everywhere at all times. So was asking for possible assistance a real sin? If it is judged to be so, worthy of a giant fine, how will fire commands operate in the future? Will they be afraid to make requests, if they can be punished for doing so? Whereas the SAIT was unwilling to explicitly point out errors, I think ADOSH was an overreaction. I think they went in with the idea of hanging the fire command, no matter what the facts were. They criticized and fined fire command for not pulling the GMHS out. But they were safe were they were, so why was not pulling them out worthy of condemnation? But ADOSH took the view that 19 men died, so someone was going to take the hit and it was not going to be the crew. As I have said, ADOSH did contribute by helping to understand the timeline better, but I do not think their conclusions were any more supported by the facts than those of the SAIT.
Did you read the actual ADOSH report? They lay out the multiple balls that got dropped pretty clearly. Not all of those dropped balls even related to GM.
Given what happened that day, the fine wasn’t that big, btw. $25k per death, for instance, doesn’t pay for much these days.
I read the report. I also acknowledged above the problems not related directly to the GMHS. The main finding of the report as relates to the GMHS was they were not pulled out. As I asked above, given that the GMHS were safe in place, why is this criticism valid? Yes, the fire command failed to appreciate the speed of the fire that afternoon and they were lucky people did not die in Yarnell. But that should not have killed the GMHS. The critical failing there was that the crew did not ensure its own safety. Don’t refer back to the report. In your own words, tell me what was the “sin” of the fire command as relates to the GMHS that day – i.e. don’t say the IA was inadequate – that is said about every big fire.
I think it was Musser who once asked in an interview – given the situation that afternoon with people still in Yarnell, what were they supposed to do? Were they supposed to pull out and leave people to whatever fate befell them? We probably could argue a long time about that, but that was the dilemma fire command was facing late that day.
Mike a good team in place can make good decisions.
1. OPS could have been more aggressive with GM, Realized they were hung out to dry and pulled them out early. As there line supervisor specificly told them to pull back into the old black and Waite until it was clear to move that is his job.
2. Also a evack plan should have been in place and implemented earlier working with local Sheriff’s office Overhead cut that way to close or not at all a real plan.
I have said before this was a overhead nightmare that never got better. The type 2 team was never organized or really in control.
Failure to pull GM out early is far from the only issue in the report relating to GM. Serious shortcomings in risk management, and serious problems with operational oversight, are some of the standout issues.
Reply to FIRE20+ post on May 4, 2014 at 6:16 am
>> FIRE20+ wrote…
>> Unfortunately fatality investigations look at the
>> ‘science’ (sorry FBA’s), 10&18 (essentially
>> blame FF’s themselves), and continue to
>> downplay managements role
Only if you (apparently) let ‘Forestry’ people do it.
The ADOSH investigation *VERY* much found that ‘management’ was ‘at fault’ here. No question.
The ‘summaries’ state that… but if you actually read the full ADOSH release and the ‘detail pages’ behind each and every ‘assigned infraction’… the opinions about management’s ‘failings’ are scathing… all the way through Friday night, Saturday, and all day Sunday.
It was not ADOSH’s job to ‘name names’. From their perspective… it was a ‘workplace environment’ that was SUPPOSED to be run ‘according to the rules’ by the EMPLOYER(S)… to provide ( and ENSURE ) *safety* for the EMPLOYEES in that workplace… but ADOSH found that was simply ‘way off the charts’.
mike- i continue to appreciate the fact that you try to gain more perspective, both by remaining open minded and relatively non-judgmental and not to mention the fact that you traveled to the site to gain first hand insights…
that’s worth ten-fold more than all the pages of judgmental speculation from the non-experts on this commentary. and much more meaningful and respectful to the deceased and their loved ones.
Sonny: From where we dropped off, yes, you could have continued to highway 89 without much difficulty. We could have reached hwy 89 as quickly or sooner than we reached Foothill Dr. where my car was parked. We did a hike right off the plateau that has a rocky and steep drop off for about appx. 200 yards so that could have been an option for sure.
Joy: Shed light. Hmmm. I am the one that wanted to go to remain on the 2 track ridge road towards the cattle pond near the Helm’s spot that was nearer to the car’s location so I never really gave the Congress side much thought until Sonny came back for me and stated this was a situation we had to get the hell outta—In knowing Sonny as my hiking partner and I am the desert walker—one true lesson in this is the value in his expertise and raw knowledge in knowing the terrain even if he had not hiked it or lived that area as long as I did. That man has a rare quality that you either get by “living” it all your life that you never learn in any school. I wonder what they have as part of the training for wildland firefighters because I am always going to be bewildered as to WHY 19 men stuck together to die while we SURVIVED that fire and WHY they went down the very area Sonny/I disagreed early that morning on the hike up. The area they died is the same gps coordinates to where we argued because I was not going up that steep terrain when it was still dark out knowing that tight maze like manzanita terrain in snake country and I was not going to crawl at dark time under it so he appeased me and went my way that morning scaling boulders around the base to the old grader road but it saddens me that there is no reason 19 men should have perished. I had the sheriff dept find me with their great gps program yet 19 men died and it is labeled due to heavy smoke and not able to fly in the area or we heard it was a chaotic afternoon and a bad thing happened. Sure did. A very bad thing! I hope clarity is reached in this mystery—that is all. As far as shedding light on the topic—what Sonny says is GOLD! enough said.
WTKTT….Can you take a look at image p0260 and help me find the Rest spot #2?
We do know that the group of GMH in image 0885,0886 and 0887 made it to the rest spot #2, however, at this point it doesn’t make sense to me that they are walking away from the Black, walking away from rest spot #2. It also doesn’t make sense that they would have stopped only a couple minutes away from rest spot #2 if that was the destination, at that point. And, if they didn’t access the two track to achieve the move to rest spot #2, they would have been moving through brush, right?
And I think it should be noted again, that all 19 GMH are not accounted for in any of the images taken from the rest spot #2. But I think it is now certain that Neil and Maclean got it wrong when they say a group of sawyers left the black at 1553 (referencing 0885,0886,0887), we now know Ashcraft, Norris and another hotshot/ sawyer (seen in movie 0888 holding a chainsaw) are at rest are #2 circa 1555.
Reply to calvin post on May 2, 2014 at 3:36 am
>> calvin said…
>> WTKTT….Can you take a look at image p0260 and help
>> me find the Rest spot #2?
Yes. I will do so. Actually… I’m working on a VIDEO that explains
all this complete with maps and crossfades of relevant photos.
Stay tuned.
In the meantime…
>> calvin also said…
>> We do know that the group of GMH in image 0885,0886 and
>> 0887 made it to the rest spot #2,
Yes. Confirmed.
>> calvin also said…
>> however, at this point it doesn’t make sense to me that they
>> are walking away from the Black, walking away from rest
>> spot #2.
They are not walking AWAY from ‘rest spot #2’. That’s where
they are GOING. It was a steep slope… and there were other
rock formations to their LEFT that would have been blocking
a direct walk directly UP the slope to where the others were
gathering. It makes perfect sense that they just walked to
RIGHT at first and exited the camera frame to the RIGHT.
They were simply circling AROUND the point where
MacKenzie was standing there shooting pictures.
Pre-fire Google images show there was a ‘better’ walking
path UP the slope there BEHIND that point where Christopher
was standing.
>> calvin also wrote…
>> It also doesn’t make sense that they would have stopped
>> only a couple minutes away from rest spot #2 if that was
>> the destination, at that point.
You make it sound like you think they were somewhere
else when the ‘tools up’ order came just minutes before
that ( when Brendan left his lookout post ).
I believe that place where we see them in the MacKenzine
0085, 0086 photos IS the place where they were ‘working’
when that ‘tools up’ order came… but they were told to
‘standby’ because Marsh/Steed were busy with conversations
with Frisby about the vehicles… so it just became a “smoke ’em
if ya got ’em” moment… which these translates to “Photo time!”.
As soon as Marsh finished talking to OPS2 Paul Musser circa
1542 to 1543… that’s when ‘breaktime’ was over and then
Steed told them to ‘come up the slope now’ and join the others.
Steed didn’t even need a radio to do that at that point since
there were so close by.
If Steed was already right above them there at ‘Rest Spot 2’
he could have just waved his arm and called them up the slope
or he could have just shouted down to then, sans radio.
>> calvin also asked
>> And, if they didn’t access the two track to achieve the move
>> to rest spot #2, they would have been moving through
>> brush, right?
Yes. Probably… but the BLACK was right there and it extended
straight UP the slope and encompassed ‘Rest Spot 2’ itself.
It appears they just basically ‘walked the retardant line’ up
the slope a ways and ( in this case, almost literally ) had
‘one foot in the black’.
>> calvin also said…
>> And I think it should be noted again, that all 19 GMH are not
>> accounted for in any of the images taken from the rest spot #2.
Correct. There are a LOT of fella missing from all of these
photos ( and they always have been ).
Now that we know that Christopher’s last cellphone image
IMG_2738.JPG ( taken at 3:55.31 PM ) is the LAST photo taken
by any Hotshot that day from that ‘Rest spot 2’… we still have
to answer these questions…
1) Why did the picture taking STOP at 3:55? Is that when Steed
turned to them all and suddenly said something like ‘gaggle up,
boys, we’re leaving’?
2) If the picture taking session just STOPPED of its own accord,
and they DID, in fact, just stay there until 4:04 or 4:05 before
heading SOUTH… then why did they even wait those 9 minutes
before leaving? Could it be they were simply waiting for the
OTHER fellas ( not seen in any photos ) to arrive there from
wherever THEY has been working ( 1 or even 2 squads
from other ‘work spots’, or something? ).
3) Did Steed and the fellas we CAN see at the ‘Rest Spot 2’
actually take off SOUTH at 3:55 or 3:56 ( and that really is
why the photo taking session ends abruptly at 3:55 )… and
the OTHER ‘squads’ that weren’t even there yet were told
to simply ‘catch up’… and it really didn’t become a full line
of 19 men headed SOUTH until they actually did ‘catch them’?
>> calvin also said…
>> But I think it is now certain that Neil and Maclean got it
>> wrong when they say a group of sawyers left the black at
>> 1553 (referencing 0885,0886,0887), we now know Ashcraft,
>> Norris and another hotshot/ sawyer (seen in movie 0888
>> holding a chainsaw) are at rest are #2 circa 1555.
If Maclean is actually writing a book about all this… I certainly
hope he does his homework better in the long run than he
did regarding THAT “Marsh was at the ranch!” fiasco.
I would hope so to. Some times he stretches the facts or dose not use them.
**
** THE ‘CUTOUT’ ROCK IN MACKENZIE IMAGES
** IMG_0085, IMG_0086 and IMG_0087 IS ONLY
** 80 FEET IN FRONT OF ‘REST LOCATION 2’
For all intents and purposes… what has long been referred to as ‘Rest Location 1’ and ‘Rest Location 2’ with regards to the MacKenzie Canon Powershot images are, essentially, the same place.
** THE SHORT STORY
The basic ‘center’ of that ‘Rest Location 2’ area where MacKenzie shot his two 9 seconds videos ( and his other photos ) has been confirmed to be here…
34.227515, -112.789960
The ‘confirmation’ of that comes from the absolute on-site verification of where Wade Parker took his photo and the fact that the ‘same cactus’ seen in all the photos is right there where it should be. That ‘cactus’ actually survived the firestorm that afternoon and can STILL be seen in even the current post-fire Google Maps imagery. MacKenzie was only standing a few feet to the right of this ‘Wade Parker Photo’ GPS coordinate when he shot his videos. Not even enough to cause a ‘bump’ in these GPS coordinates.
That ‘cutout’ rock seen in the MacKenzie 0885, 0886 and 0887 images ( taken in the 3:44-3:45 PM timeframe ) seems to be right here…
34.227698, -112.789829
That is just 80 feet ‘down the slope’ from the ‘Rest Location 2’ spot where Christopher MacKenzie shot his Canon VIDEOS.
So the Hotshots seen in the 0885, 0886 and 0887 images really did just have a ‘short walk up the hill’ when they left that ‘Rest Location 1’ to simply join the others a little farther up the slope at ‘Rest Location 2’.
Apparently… the only reason we see them exiting the camera to the RIGHT ( and seeming to head DOWN the slope and AWAY from ‘Rest Location 2’ ) is that was the way to go back UP because of the steep slope there and some other rock formations that are out-of-frame to Christopher’s LEFT.
They basically just exited to Christopher’s RIGHT… but then just ‘circled around’ where he was standing and headed to Christopher’s LEFT the few hundred feet it took to go UP the slope, around those rocks, and join the others at the ‘Rest 2′ location’.
** THE LONG STORY
Calvin… you are right about ALL of the photos you have cited already that contain images of this ‘cutout rock’ seen in the MacKenzie Canon 0885, 0886 and 0887 images.
There are also many others like 8 or 9 in Joy Collura’s Folder… the Dean Fernandez aerial photos, etc. etc. Many other Folders.
You are ALSO right that that ‘cutout’ rock is the same one seen in the ‘dead center’ of MacKenzie’s 8090 images taken from the ‘Rest 2’ location.
The following ADOSH photo proves that.
NOTE: It is NOT in the ADOSH GPS stamped folder… it’s in the OTHER one.
* ADOSH PHOTO P9180060
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/20inrene9tcx74a/EC2oDLR41K/ADOSH%20Yarnell%20Hill%20Investigation/Photos%20and%20Video/ADOSH%20Hiking%20Yarnell%20Hill%209%2018%2013#lh:null-P9180060.JPG
The ‘cutout rock’ is seen in this photo face-on at the top-center of the photograph… along with those 2 other ‘unique’ (large) rocks to the LEFT of it.
There is NO QUESTION that those are the same 3 rocks in BOTH the P9180060 photo *AND* Christopher’s IMG_0890 photo.
In the P9180060 photo… look at the top left side of the ‘chunked rock’ that is facing the camera. There is what almost looks like a man-made ‘chisled out’ indentation about 2 inches deep that when viewed in P9180060 almost looks like the little ’round balloon coming to a point’ that you see in Google Maps. The inside of this ‘balloon coming to a point’ shape also has a different COLOR than the rest of the surface of that ‘chunked rock’.
Now look at that ‘pointy rock’ in the exact center of MacKenzie’s IMG_0890 ( the one you mentioned ).
It’s the same rock.
We can’t actually SEE the ‘chunkout’ in the IMG_0890 image of it because of the new angle on it. The side of that rock with the ‘chunkout’ is now facing AWAY from the camera… BUT!… that same ‘balloon coming to a point’ chiseled out indentation is also clearly visibile on the side of that ‘pointy rock’ that we CAN still see in IMG_0890.
It’s also obvious in IMG_0890 that the side that is now facing away from the camera ( that has the chunkout ) is perfectly flat-faced… and this matches all other images of that rock perfectly.
* THE OTHER TWO TALL ROCKS THERE…
Now also look at P9180060 again and notice the OTHER two ‘tall rocks’ to the LEFT of the ‘chunked rock’.
The one just to the left of it has its own ‘notch’ on end facing the camera. That ‘cutout’ makes the east facing side of the rock sort of look like a ‘dog’s head’ in profile ( a dog with a flat snout facing the camera, anyway )… and that ‘crack’ that runs in that rock from top left to bottom right ALSO makes that top half of the EAST rock face look lke a ‘dog’s ear’…
…so I’ve been calling THIS rock ‘Dog’s Head Rock’.
In IMG_0890 the other two ‘pointy rocks’ to the left of the one in the center are those SAME ‘other two tall rocks’ seen in P9180060, just viewed from that different angle farther up the hill where they were taking their photos.
In IMG_0890… the other ‘pointy’ rock just to the left of the ‘cutout’ rock with the ‘ballon shaped indentation’ is simply another angle on ‘Dog’s Head Rock’… and the one to the left of THAT is simply the more ‘dome’ shaped rock ( also with a distinct crack ) that is also seen to the left of ‘Dog’s Head Rock’ in the P9180060 photo.
Those THREE rocks seen in P9180060 are just close enough in front of that ‘rest area 2’ location… and just TALL ENOUGH… that that is why they are seen ‘peeking up’ in the foreground in MOST of the photos and videos taken from that ‘Rest Area 2’ location ( including IMG_0890 ).
Many thanks. Are the group of GMH (seen in 0885,0886,0887) returning to the two track to move to rest area 2?
Reply to calvin post on May 1, 2014 at 3:25 am
>> calvin asked…
>> Many thanks. Are the group of GMH (seen in
>> 0885,0886,0887) returning to the two track to
>> move to rest area 2?
They COULD have… but they didn’t have to.
All they were doing was ‘coming up the slope’ to reach
that ‘Rest Location 2’.
Look at the satellite photos ( or the Dean Fernandez
aerial shots ).
They MAY have just circled around behind Christopher
after exiting the camera to his RIGHT… and then just
walked up the slope directly AT the ‘Rest 2 Location’
and entered it that way…
…or they may have gone straight up the slope, caught
the two-track NORTH for only about 100 feet, and
then cut over to the ‘Rest Location 2’ area and entered
it from the BACK.
My guess would be the former. they just came up the
slope a little… cut over to where the others were
already gathering… and never set foot on the two-track
at all.
The interesting part of all of this is not really that they
were all still very close together circa 1543… it’s that
they were already ‘at rest’ and taking photos… and
the sawyers already had their SHEATHS on their
saws… as if they ALREADY knew ( at 1543 ) that the
work was over there.
That means the ‘tools up’ moment for ALL of them
probably came circa 1536 or 1537… when Brendan
left his lookout position.
The same ‘advancing fireline’ that drove Brendan off
his lookout mound and caused Steed to tell Brendan…
“Yeah… I know Brendan… I can see what’s happening
down there” appears to be the same moment Steed
knew to tell his OWN crew ‘tools up’ and that there
was no point in continuing that ‘anchor point’ work.
Thanks!
That’s where I had located them.
Followup… I’m still ‘checking it out’ and trying to verify… but I believe that particular ADOSH photo linked above might actually show the ‘orange rock’ that MacKenzie shows Ashcraft actually SITTING on in his 0085, 0086 photos.
If it’s not one of those ‘retardant covered’ rocks in the ADOSH photo… then it’s probably one just out-of-frame to the LEFT.
Here is that ADOSH photo link again…
* ADOSH PHOTO P9180060
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/20inrene9tcx74a/EC2oDLR41K/ADOSH%20Yarnell%20Hill%20Investigation/Photos%20and%20Video/ADOSH%20Hiking%20Yarnell%20Hill%209%2018%2013#lh:null-P9180060.JPG
More later…
Actually… it’s pretty much verified ( for MacKenzie image 0086, anyway ).
Most of the ‘retardant covered rocks’ in the
fore-to-middle ground of MacKenzie’s 0086
Canon Powershot image are, in fact, sitting
right there in the same fore-middle ground
in the ADOSH photo.
Actually… whoever took that ADOSH photo
was pretty much just about 20 feet to the
right ( and a little farther down the slope ) of where MacKenzie took his 0086 Canon photo.
More later…
**
** GOOGLE EARTH AND GOOGLE MAPS NOW USING
** JANUARY 1, 2014 SATELLITE IMAGERY FOR YARNELL
This is just a ‘heads up’. It was bound to happen sooner or later… and a few
days ago Google switched to now using ‘post-fire’ satellite imagery for the
entire Yarnell area. The ‘pre-fire’ ground images are no longer available and
all you see now is the post-fire ‘moonscape’ with just some vegetation returning.
If you have any ‘Google Earth’ tours recorded… they will still show the same
waypoints and whatnot but the 3D imagery is now ‘post-fire’.
Actually… if you have a paid/professional Google Earth account there IS a
way to ‘dial back’ to previous sets of images… but it is complicated and
requires communicating with Google.
So if anyone has any sets of pre-fire screen snapshots from Google Maps
in ‘satellite view’ or any Google Earth tours recorded as movies using pre-fire
imagery… you should hang on to those for posterity’s sake since they are now
pretty valuable.
The DOWN side is that it is now basically impossible to ‘match up’ any
pre-fire ( or weekend of ) photos with satellite images based on anything
involving the vegetation.
The UP side is that it is also *now* easier to actually match up *some*
images based on the ‘rocks’ that might be showing. The rock formations
are now clearly visible in both Google Maps and Google Earth… whereas
some of them were being ‘hidden’ from the satellite views because of
the vegetation in the pre-fire aerial imagery.
The new January 1, 2014 set of satellite images also show something
very interesting. They were taken very LATE in the afternoon on a sunny
day ( almost near sundown? ) and this means the SHADOWS on the
ground are VERY prominent and can easily be used to tell the HEIGHT of
certain objects on the ground.
Example: There are some ROCK formations that can now be easily identified
because of these SHADOWS. If a rock was standing about 6-10 feet tall then
the new imagery shows a shadow on the ground of up to 20 feet out from
that object. So just by looking at the SHADOWS near some of these rock
formations it is easier to tell if they match the ‘height’ and ‘shape’ of a lot
of things seen in the photo collections(s) from Yarnell.
In Google Earth ( in 3D mode ) these new ‘shadows’ also supply a dramatic
effect showing just how DEEP those ‘blind canyons’ really were down there
to the SOUTH towards the Boulder Springs ranch.
There are actually THREE ‘canyons’ down there.
The one they died in, another one just SOUTH of that ( which appears to ALSO
have had its own sort of ‘hiking trail’ down inside it )… and then the final
one that actually contains the now-famous ‘alternate escape route’.
The TRAILS ( two-track / one-track / hiking path, etc. ) are also now actually
much more clearly visible than they were in the pre-fire imagery.
It is now EASY to see that the ‘alternate escape’ route WAS clearly ‘contiguous’
and visible at ground level all the way EAST to where it then actually turned
SOUTH towards the Candy-Cany Lane area.
There was a WAY to then turn NORTH and get to the Boulder Springs Ranch
through that ‘draw’ at the end of the EASTWARD leg of the alternate escape
route… but it is NOT ( nor ever was? ) nearly as clearly defined as the other
trail that simply headed SOUTH towards Candy Cane Lane after that
EASTWARD leg of the alternate escape route met that large clearing.
Correction for ABOVE… the *new* Google Satellite imagery being
used for Yarnell is dated January 4, 2014… and not January 1.
I almost can’t bear to go look.
**
** UPDATE
** ONLY GOOGLE HAS SWITCHED TO POST-FIRE
** SATELLITE IMAGERY OF YARNELL
Forgot to mention this up above. As of today… ONLY Google has
switched to using post-fire satellite imagery for Yarnell.
Other popular ‘maps’ services with optional ‘satellite’ views
are STILL using the pre-fire satellite imagery sets for Yarnell.
Those would include…
Microsoft Virtual Earth ( Just go to bing.com and click Maps ).
Yahoo Maps ( Same deal. Go to yahoo.com and click Maps ).
So if anyone was working on anything that really could use more
of the pre-fire imagery from Yarnell complete with vegetation…
I would be sure to take your own ‘screen shots’ that you need
before these other services roll over to the latest satellite
imagery.
All of these NAVSAT satellite images for public use basically
come from the same company… so sooner or later all these
online services ‘get around’ to updating their production-level
data sets with the latest data…
…so the clock is ticking. Google has done their ‘roll over’ first
but the other online services probably will as well in short order.
As is the case with ‘Google Earth’… if you are using Microsoft’s
Virtual Earth and you have created any files that use ‘waypoints’…
unless you do the option of ‘playing the waypoints’ and recording
the whole thing as an actual ‘video’… then you won’t lose your
valid waypoints but you WILL lose the pre-fire background(s)
unless you SAVE everything as an actual VIDEO sometime soon.
The Google Earth view also now illustrates a bit more starkly why staying high also would have preserved several other options. Claims that staying on the 2-track would have inevitably led to the same result in the end are big reaches at best.
Yes. You can also see even *more* clearly now that if they had simply kept heading SOUTH after reaching that point where it would have been time to decide whether or not to take the EASTBOUND leg of the ‘alternate escape route’… there IS, in fact, a ‘hiking trail’ coming down off the other (Congress) side of the ridge that then ‘cuts over’ to the EAST where you would then eventually pick up the ‘continuation’ of the ‘alternate escape route’ trail as it heads over to the Candy Cane Lane area.
This is exactly the way the hikers Joy Collura and Tex (Sonny) Gilligan got out of there safely that afternoon.
Situational awareness.
It’s important.
Sometimes… it’s the difference between life or death.
WTKTT—
If some of you have learned nothing else that is the one thing that always stands out on every fire where lives are lost—-Situation awareness
Its the main ingredient of the 18 STSWO…..
It also illustrates more clearly that the idea that there were switchbacks and game trails that GM was going to be making good time on is patently false. As anyone familiar with local conditions would know already. GM’s decision to drop down into that bowl would have involved, for anyone reasonably familiar with conditions at the time GM made the decision, assuming they were in for a slow slog through that bowl.
Agree. We also know now that Christopher MacKenzie’s last cellphone photo IMG_2738 ( which he took at exactly 3:55.31 PM ) is the LAST KNOWN solid proof of when they were still at the ‘Rest Location 2’ point prior to embarking on ‘the mission’.
It can no longer be assumed that they ‘left’ that location at 4:05 PM, as the SAIR ‘suggested’ they did.
Unless the SAIT knows something that has never been made public, or unless Brendan McDonough ( or anyone else listening to the intra-crew around that time ) knows something different… we have to now assume they *might* have left on ‘the mission’ as early as 3:56 PM or so.
So if they really did leave that area circa 3:55.50 or 3:56.xx ( which is why the photo taking abruptly ends )… then that simply ADDS 9 to 10 minutes to the ‘assumed’ travel time and DECREASES their overall ‘rate of travel’ significantly.
The SAIT has never said how in the heck they came up with those 4:05 ( departure time ) and the 4:20 ‘estimated’ time for reaching the ‘Descent Point’ and then dropping into the fuel-filled box canyon.
We have to ‘assume’ two things, I guess.
1) They really did think that Wade Parker actually took his ‘photo’ that he texted to his mother at 4:04 PM… and/or that there was no possibility he HAD taken it ‘earlier’ and simply ‘texted’ it out to her while they were ALREADY hiking south.
2) They must have done some kind of ‘timed walk’ themselves from where they THOUGHT they left from to that ‘Descent Point’… and THEIR ‘guesstimate’ came out to be 15 minutes ( hence, the 4:20 PM arrival time at the ‘Descent Point’ ). If they ‘timed’ that walk from the other known ‘lunch spot’… then even that ‘test walk’ was totally WRONG.
Maybe they did ‘get that part right’.
Maybe they did a good ‘test walk’ from the right departure point to the right ‘Descent Point’.
If that is the case… then the ‘extra 9 to 10’ minutes that now *might* need to be added to the overall ‘travel time’ all had to be wasted either pausing at the ‘Descent Point’ and taking a long time to decide what to do… OR just add those 9-10 minutes to the ‘Descent Time’ itself.
If we add those 9 or 10 minutes to the ‘Descent Time’… then not only were they ‘bogged down’… they were literally ‘crawling’ their way down to the bottom of that canyon… excruciatingly slowly.
Maybe someone actually got HURT on the way down… and they had to STOP, or something. Very few people have ever seen the actual autopsy reports. I wonder if there was, in fact, any evidence that one ( or more? ) of the men had sprained, twisted, or even (perhaps) broken an ankle during that ‘descent’.
I think that has been ‘discussed’ before and IIRC the ‘consensus’ was something like…
1) Not likely. Good boots. Trained hikers.
2) If it was a serious injury ( enought to STOP them )… there would (should?) probably have been some radio traffic about it.
3) Even if autopsy reports showed such an injury… the SAIT would/should have know about it ( since they had access to the autopsy reports ) and why would they be hesitant, in ANY way, to publish that information, or include it in their report narrative? They didn’t… so I guess we can *assume* there is no evidence there was any hiking injury during that descent.
So even adding 9 or 10 minutes to the ‘travel time’ and trying to account for it just comes down to either ‘more hesitation’ and/or even a SLOWER rate of descent and ‘bog down’ than was previously thought.
**
** CROSSFADE BETWEEN
** MACKENZIE IMAGES
** CELLPHONE IMG_2737 @ 3:55.20 PM
** CELLPHONE IMG_2738 @ 3:55.31 PM ( +11 seconds )
This is the last in the recent series of ‘crossfades’ for ALL of Christopher MacKenzie’s cellphone pictures plus his 4 Canon photos and videos that were taken in-between cellphone images 2737 and 2737.
This final MacKenzie cellphone photo ( IMG_2738 ) is now the LAST KNOWN photograph from anyone up on that ridge that afternoon.
The Wade Parker photo that he texted to his mother has never actually been the ‘last GM photo’. It has a network timestamp of 4:04 PM for when he finally got around to ‘texting’ that photo… but it has ALWAYS been the case that he actually took that photo long before that… even BEFORE Robert Caldwell shot his 3:50 PM video.
As for this last crossfade in this particular series…
Cellphone IMG_2737 was taken in ‘Portrait’ mode.
Cellphone IMG_2738 was taken in ‘Landscape’ mode.
11 seconds after Christopher took his IMG_2377 he turned to his RIGHT and faced more EAST than in any prior cellphone photo, so IMG_2738 doesn’t show much of the close-to-them fireline like all the other cellphone photos… but it DOES show what the rest of the smoke column looked like at that point. The full ‘panorama’ shot from their location with both images ‘blended’ together is striking. The small (apparent) ‘spot ahead’ of the fireline seen in IMG_2737 also remains visible in about the center of the fade.
YouTube Video Title: IMG-2737-and-IMG-2738
http://youtu.be/lP4te0ingGc
YouTube About Information
__________________________________________________________________
This is the last in the series of terrain-aligned crossfades covering ALL of
Christopher MacKenzie’s cellphone photos AND the four Canon Powershot
items ( 1 video, then 2 still shots, then his second video ) that he took during the
3 minute and 22 second time ‘window’ in-between cellphone photos 2736 and
2737. This last crossfade in this particular series is between his final two
cellphone photos IMG_2737 ( taken at 3:55.20 PM ) and IMG_2738 ( taken 11
seconds later 3:55.31 PM ).
Christopher turned to his RIGHT after taking IMG_2737 so this final IMG_2738
is more of a ‘panorama’ when terrain-aligned with the previous image 2737 from
11 seconds earlier… but there is still ‘some’ terrain overlap between the images
as seen in the ‘crossfade’. The (apparent) ‘spot ahead’ flame seen in the previous
IMG_2737 also remains visible during the crossfade.
IMG_2738 represents the last known photograph taken by any of the Hotshots at
this location before they left the safe black and headed south on the two-track
road. The Wade Parker photo was NOT taken at 4:04 PM, as the initial
investigation(s) seemed to believe. That was only the network timestamp for
when it was ‘texted’ by Wade Parker. The actual Wade Parker photo was taken
much earlier than 4:04 PM and either right before or right around the time that
Robert Caldwell was shooting his second ( of only two ) videos that day circa
3:50 PM.
__________________________________________________________________
So that’s it for this “You can see what they saw” series of crossfades, and sinc we now know that Christopher’s Canon Powershot was at least 9 minutes AHEAD of the real time that day… we are left with some NEW mysteries.
This final cellphone photo of Christpher’s, taken at exactly 3:55.31 PM, now represents the LAST KNOWN photo from this last ‘rest’ location before they left the safe black and started heading SOUTH on the two track.
There appears to be some ‘movement’ in the final IMG_2738 photo as compared to 11 seconds earlier in the IMG_2737 photo… but that could have just been the men ‘moving around’ at that location as we see them doing throughout this series of photographs and videos.
IMG_2738 does NOT offer any real proof that 3:55 or 3:56 PM would be the time they actually did ‘gaggle up’ from that resting location and leave the safe black.
The SAIT investigators put the ‘departure’ time at 4:05 PM… but that seemed to be solely based on the network timestamp for Wade Parker’s 4:04 PM ‘textout’ to his mother, with picture attached. We know now that the picture he ‘texted’ was NOT actually taken at 4:04 PM and he also could have easily sent that text message AFTER they had left that location and were already walking SOUTH.
So… unless the SAIT investigators had some OTHER reason or evidence to put the departure time at 4:05 PM… such as testimony from Brendan McDonough,
or someone else who was listening to the Crew intra-net frequency… there is no reason to believe anymore that Steed and the Crew actually DID wait until 4:05 PM to leave that location.
They could have left any time after Christopher’s final cellphone photo IMG_2738, taken at exactly 3:55.31 PM.
Maybe they spent 9 to 10 *more* minutes at that location ‘making up their minds’ before finally ‘gaggling up’ and leaving circa 4:05 PM… but maybe NOT.
If the ‘deicison to leave’ had, in fact, already been made by 3:55 or 3:56 PM, and the men left the safe black just shortly after Christopher took his final IMG_2738 cellphone photo… then that does NOT bode well for their ‘travel time estimates’.
It adds another 9 ( or even 10 minutes ) to their ‘hiking’ time and SLOWS DOWN their estimated ‘rate of travel’ that afternoon considerably.
If they did leave that much earlier… but still maintained the same ‘brisk’ hiking pace from this last photo location to the ‘Descent Point’ in about the same amount of time the SAIT investigators ‘calculated’… then now there is a 9 to 10 minute ‘gap’ to account for at the ‘Descent Point’ itself before they finally decided to drop into that fuel-filled box canyon.
It means Steed and the Crew might have reached that second critical ‘Descent Point’ 9 or 10 minutes earlier than 4:20 PM ( as the SAIT investigators seemed to think )… and then they just ‘stood there’ wondering what to do next for as much as 9 or 10 minutes… or making ‘consultation’ calls with someone ( presumably DIVSA Eric Marsh? ) about what they should do at that point.
More about all this later…
Typo in the first paragraph above.
Christopher MacKenzie took his 48 second contiguous sequence of Canon Powershot videos and still photos in-between cellphone images IMG_2736 and IMG_2737.
The first paragraph above should have read…
This is the last in the recent series of ‘crossfades’ for ALL of Christopher MacKenzie’s cellphone pictures plus his 4 Canon photos and videos that were taken in-between cellphone images 2736 and 2737.
Thanks for all the follow up and it appears we finally have an accurate timeline for all the Mackenzie photos/ videos, as well as the Parker picture and the Caldwell video.
In the period of time between 1550 and 1555 there are up to 9 photos and 3 videos (and possibly more?) that were captured by the GMIHC. It would seem that if they were still in the same location, there would be more pictures after 2738 on Mackenzie’s cell phone. Right?
So now we know. 1. The GMIHC moved out of the Discussing options sometime soon/ possibly immediately after the promise of air support “down there”, and, 2.It appears that Rory Collins abruptly/unexpectedly leaves the fire about the same time GM started moving from their last known location that can be confirmed from photos. Someone (not Elizabeth) called Collin’s actions COWARDLY and the same person described the retardant drop that Collins used to extinguish the GM burnout as SOP from Collins. The comment was something to the effect of Collins and his fellow state foresters do not use indirect line building and prefer direct attack.
So, IF, GMIHC and DIV A were, in fact, repositioning to try to create another indirect line, burnout operation in the timeframe of 1555ish. Maybe Rory Collins showed his disapproval by leaving the fire.
BTW, I think it is getting harder and harder to deny the theory that the air support ASAP comment is pertinent to the discussion when trying to understand what made GMIHC think they were safe in their attempt to reposition.
WTKTT… Can you assign a time to images 0885, 0886 and 0887?
I believe that I have properly described these images as showing this group of GMIHC actually leaving the black prior to returning to the black for the final pictures/videos currently being discussed.
Collins left the fire because his pilot was out of flight time.
No big tory here————-
Mr Powers. I agree based on what I have read. I am just applying the comments from a commenter and trying to figure out why he/she (not Elizabeth) would have called Collins actions cowardly?
I believe that ‘moment’ happened ( people applying adjectives to Collins’ decision to abruptly leave the fire ) just BEFORE any evidence was discovered that it was his PILOT who was supposedly ‘needing to leave’ because he was hitting some ‘hours’ limit.
Before there was any evidence to the effect… it was a total mystery why Collins just ‘disappeared’ from the fire at a very critical time.
That being said… there are still ‘mysteries’ regarding this Mr. Collins.
The WFAR report contracted by ADOSH has a footnote in it that says something in the report was ‘based on ADOSH interview with Rory Collins’.
There is NO SUCH INTERVIEW in any of the FOIA/FOIL documents released by ADOSH… so either WFAR/ ADOSH never really did interview Rory Collins… or the DID… but then did NOT include any kind of transcript of telephone interview notes with him in their FOIA/FOIL release.
A LOT of people heard the ‘arguments’ between Marsh and Collins over the morning retardant drops over the TAC channels… and have testified as such.
What we still don’t know is what OTHER ‘interactions’ either Marsh/Steed had with Rory Collins that day ( if any )… or whether there were even MORE ‘arguments’ that afternoon after the morning retardant drop
snafu.
Pilots aren’t notified at the last minute that they’ve just timed-out, “gotta go, see ya!!”
The aircraft crew knew throughout the entire day how much time they had left. Knowing that detail, gives them PLENTY of time to interact and brief their replacements properly. That radio briefing could (and should) have occurred, continuing on for as long as necessary while Collins and pilot flew back to their base.
THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO EXCUSE for what happened at the transition that day!
TTWARE – I have said this before and I will say it again: The transition between Air Attack (as run by Rory Collins) and Bravo33 was consistent with the way that the transitions were being conducted throughout that day (e.g. when Bravo3 left, when Bravo33 left, when Air Attack left earlier in the day). Rory *DID* give Bravo33 the heads-up in advance that he was leaving. The SAIR misrepresented it, and the Wildland Fire Associates report then “cut-and-pasted” from the SAIR, rather than doing their own research.
If you are going to criticize Collins, then you need to criticize Bravo3 and Bravo33 as well, because they ALL did their exits the same way on June 30th. The reality is that all three leadership teams in the air (Collins/AA, Bravo3, and Bravo33) had their hands full for every single minute that they were in the sky, such that leisurely briefings and exits were going to be a pipe dream that day. Poor Rory Collins. I have to believe that this is part of the reason why he never returned phone calls from ADOSH…. I am not blaming you, Mike, but my view is that we need to be cautious about criticizing folks who were on the YHF without first researching in FULL (rather than relying on the SAIT, ADOSH, Holly Neill, John Maclean, or the Wildland Fire Associates) what the relevant facts actually show….
Whoops – meant “TTWARE,” not “Mike.” Sorry. And, FYI, it was Robert-the-Second (RTS), who is now posting here under multiple other anonymous names, who called Rory Collins a “coward” or “cowardly” or some such nonsense.
Elizabeth,
“leisurely briefings”, huh? Get a clue. It’s called doing your job.
Wildland firefighters get paid to perform under difficult and stressful conditions. The higher up the food chain one gets, the higher the expectations of performance.
If they can’t perform their jobs properly under those conditions, then they should get new jobs. This wasn’t their first rodeo, and it certainly wasn’t the first one that had gone to crap.
You allude that they were just ‘too busy’ to attempt a proper briefing with the incoming forces. So I guess what you’re saying is that since they gave the incoming forces a ‘heads-up, we’re leaving’, that excuses them from leaving the incoming forces with the critical information on who, was where, on the fire, and what the aerial and ground forces current tactics and strategies were, along with not supplying current fire and weather conditions.
Come to think of it, all of that information could have easily been passed-on as they flew off to their base, but it sounds as you are expounding the theory that if someone gets a bad briefing, they are then justified in doing the same to others.
Do unto others as they have done unto you! I’m not buying into that one!
Certainly, since you have cautioned me, infering that I don’t have all the facts here, you will be able to provide me with specific references to the ‘relevant facts’ you say I am lacking. I’m anxiously awaiting that info. Thank you.
WOW, TTWARE, I did not intend for my post to be so provocative. Sorry.
What makes you think the briefing Rory gave (as compared to the one Bravo3 gave, for example) was NOT a proper briefing? You are mis-reading me – they DID more than just leave the fire. Rory gave notice as soon as he knew his relief pilot had bailed!!
OK, I’ll stop and take a breath here and admit, not for the first time, that I haven’t got the time to dig as deep as some others here. Having said that, the things I can recall right now off of the top of my head from some of the interviews are, “didn’t know where the division breaks were or who was working where,” “didn’t get critical weather updates,”AND, “poor briefing”. The reason I asked for references for the relevant facts is that I would rather know the truth and admit I was wrong than not. So, if you have info that the air hand-offs were proper, then please put it out there so I can refer to it and shut my trap. Thank you.
See
NEW
parent
comment
above
that
extends
this
thread.
Bravo 33
did NOT
receive
a proper
briefing
from
Rory
Collins.
“BTW, I think it is getting harder and harder to deny the theory that the air support ASAP comment is pertinent to the discussion when trying to understand what made GMIHC think they were safe in their attempt to reposition.”
I doubt this very much, simply because of the great limitations here. It isn’t like infantry close air support, and for that matter hand crews don’t have the capabilities relative to fire that our infantry has relative to enemy soldiers. Namely, even if air support could have gotten that fire to stand still (it couldn’t) GM wouldn’t have been able to do anything with the fire. GM relying on air to do something that given conditions wasn’t possible would have been unconventional in the extreme.
Regarding Air Attack/Air Support:
I found two youtube videos this weekend that I wish I had found a lot sooner. They’re on the Bureau of Land Management Incident Fire Center channel.
The most useful one is called “Firefighting Airspace (2012 Refresher). “An Air Attack describes how the aircraft above your fire are organized. How they can help you, and how you can help them, with effective communication for a smooth operation.
(HD update, 8/6/2013).”
It really helped me understand better how this all works. Interestingly, the Air Attack guy in the video, Steve Price from BLM Boise District, says, “I’m not dictating tactics at all, and I don’t like to do that unless they ask…It’s not my job to run the fire…It’s my job to put red stuff and wet stuff on the ground and give them situational awareness.”
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9fjF2KQ75TY&feature=share&list=PLTErVrHH6uJja-ljtn7z9Q5Sz9WtCPGw1&index=142
The second video is called “Communication With Aviattion Resources.” It really illustrates how complicated the communications can get for Air Attack over an active fire.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GXvP66fCfo0&feature=share&list=PLTErVrHH6uJja-ljtn7z9Q5Sz9WtCPGw1&index=149
Also these two videos very helpfully describe the relationships between the whole Air Attack, Lead Plane, and ASM Aerial Supervision Module, i.e. Bravo, which is a combination of Air Attack and Lead Plane.
Also, another related item I found is “The DC-10 Air Tanker.”
“The DC-10 Air Tanker is an American wide-body jet air tanker, which has been in service as an aerial firefighting unit since 2006. The aircraft, operated by the joint technical venture 10 Tanker Air Carrier, is a converted McDonnell Douglas DC-10 airliner, and is primarily used to fight wildfires, typically in rural areas. The turbofan-powered aircraft carries up to 12,000 US gallons (45,000 liters) of water or fire retardant in an exterior belly-mounted tank, the contents of which can be released in eight seconds. Two air tankers are currently in operation, with the call-signs Tanker 910 and Tanker 911.”
And now those two DC-10s are stationed in Albuquerque, so……
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WG06xAbBf3Q&list=PLTErVrHH6uJja-ljtn7z9Q5Sz9WtCPGw1&feature=share&index=130
John could you delete this comment? I’m going to repost it in three parts so it won’t stay “stuck in customs” Thank you!
Reply to calvin post on April 29, 2014 at 3:17 am
>> calvin said…
>> Thanks for all the follow up and appears we finally
>> have an accurate timeline for all the Mackenzie
>> photos/ videos, as well as the Parker picture and the
>> Caldwell video.
Yes. I think so.
One of the reasons I just did that whole ‘crossfade’ series
was to try to see if these ‘crossfades’ would indicate
clearly exactly WHEN ( inside that 3 minute and 22 second
gap between 2736 and 2737 ) Christopher began his 48
second ‘session’ with the Canon Powershot.
Alas… while very revealing and informative ( the fire was
ALWAYS progressing SOUTH during and in-between
all of these photos/videos )… I don’t see any definitive
proof that MacKenzie’s 48 second Canon Powershot
session in-between 2736 and 2737 was ‘leaning’ more
towards 2736 or 2737… or vice-versa.
Indeed… the ‘crossfades’ prove that the 48 second session
with the Canon probably *WAS* about right in the middle
of the 3 minute and 22 second ‘window’.
I also have been factoring in your (important) observations
about the gloves… but I don’t see that helping to narrow
down the exact time either ( unless you are seeing
something else that I haven’t seen there ).
So if we just accept that Christopher *probably* did take
the same amount of time to switch from using the cellphone
to the Canon as he then did to switch BACK from using
the canon to the cellphone… we still have this…
1 minute 17 seconds – Switch from cellphone to Canon.
48 seconds – The 4 item session with the Canon.
1 minute 17 seconds – Switch from Canon to cellphone.
Total time = Exactly 3 minutes and 22 seconds.
That’s the exact ‘gap’ between IMG_2736 and IMG_2737.
So that means we have a ‘workable/accurate’ OFFSET
for ALL of MacKenzie’s Canon Powershot images.
Even if there is more evidence to prove that 48 second
‘session’ can be ‘left’ or ‘right’ shifted away from that
center point and more towards either the 2736 or 2737
cellphone images… then that just means the ‘center
point’ assumption is still only off by however many
seconds you ‘left’ or ‘right’ shift it. I still don’t think he
could have ‘switched’ from one device to another in
less than 30 seconds or so… so the ‘center point’
assumption still remains accurate to within +/- 30 sec.
+/- 30 seconds for ANY timestamp for ANY event on
a day like this can be considered ‘pretty damn accurate’.
So, using the ‘center point’ assumption… just take ONE of
Christopher’s Canon images, like IMG_0889…
His Canon Powershot put this timestamp on it…
1601:52 ( 4:01.53 PM )
But it now seems to have been taken at ( exactly? )…
1553.36 ( 3:53.36 PM )
That is a TIME DIFFERENCE of 8 minutes 13 seconds.
The TIME on Christopher’s Canon Powershot was
8 minutes and 13 seconds AHEAD of ‘real time’ that day.
>> calvin also said…
>> WTKTT… Can you assign a time to images
>> 0885, 0886 and 0887?
Yep.
Since Christopher’s Canon Powershot was 8 minutes
and 13 seconds AHEAD of the ‘real time’ that day…
* IMG_0885
Canon says…
EXIF File Number: 110-0885
EXIF Date: June 30, 2013, 1552.07 ( 3:52:07 PM )
EXIF Camera: Canon PowerShot SD1400 IS
EXIF Screen Capture Type: Landscape
EXIF Camera Temperature: 34 C ( 93 F )
Actual time taken = 1543.54 ( 3:43.54 PM )
* IMG_0886
Canon says…
EXIF File Number: 110-0886
EXIF Date: June 30, 2013, 1552.18 ( 3:52:18 PM )
EXIF Camera: Canon PowerShot SD1400 IS
EXIF Camera Orientation: Portrait
EXIF Camera Temperature: 35 C ( 95 F )
Actual time taken = 1544.05 ( 3:44.05 PM )
* IMG_0887
Canon says…
EXIF File Number: 110-0887
EXIF Date: June 30, 2013, 1552.24 ( 3:52:24 PM )
EXIF Camera: Canon PowerShot SD1400 IS
EXIF Camera Orientation: Portrait
EXIF Camera Temperature: 35 C ( 95 F )
Actual time taken = 1544.11 ( 3:44.11 PM )
>> calvin also said…
>> I believe that I have properly described these images
>> as showing this group of GMIHC actually leaving
>> the black prior to returning to the black for the final
>> pictures/videos currently being discussed.
I’m not sure that ‘small move’ from the one ‘resting’
spot to the next can/should be described as ‘leaving
the black’… but the photos definitely show them
entering ‘unburned fuel’ to get to that next rest stop.
What is interesting to note is that since the *NEW*
( real ) times for 0885, 0886 and 0887 seem to be…
IMG_0885 = 1543.54 ( 3:43.54 PM )
IMG_0886 = 1544.05 ( 3:44.05 PM )
IMG_0887 = 1544.11 ( 3:44.11 PM )
That means this ‘move out’ moment from that previous
location came just moments AFTER Marsh had his
1542 – 1543 conversation with OPS2 Paul Musser.
Musser ‘called’ Marsh at 1542… but as we can hear in
the radio capture… Marsh did not respond to him right
away. We have already determined the reason Marsh
did not answer Musser ‘right away’ is because Marsh
was still ‘finishing’ his conversation(s) with Brian Frisby
over the GM intra-crew frequency at that time.
So circa 1542 to 1543…. Marsh finishes his documented
conversations about moving the vehicles with Firsby,
then Marsh must have ‘answered’ OPS2 Musser and
they had the ‘availability check’ conversation…
…and IMMEDIATELY after that conversation ended
with Musser ( circa 1543 )… they MOVED OUT ( from
this first location to the next one ).
WTKTT said….I’m not sure that ‘small move’ from the one ‘resting’
spot to the next can/should be described as ‘leaving
the black’… but the photos definitely show them
entering ‘unburned fuel’ to get to that next rest stop.
1. Where is the one “resting” spot?
2. I do not think they were en route to the Second resting spot in image 0885, 0886, 0887. It appears to me that they are leaving the black and crossing the retardant line (as they left the black) that was dropped on GM bournout operation from earlier in the day that was also photographed by Mackenzie. There is a odd shaped rock that looks like it is missing a chunk (in image 0880 0881 0882 005 0886 0887) that seems to assign the location for 0885, 0886, and 0887 that is south/east of Discussing options spot. This same rock and area can be seen in ADOSH post burn photos. So it appears (to me) that after 0885- 0887 were taken, these men (Ashcraft, Parker, Norris) actually changed course, and returned to a safe location in the black before leaving.
Regarding Air Attack/Air Support: I found two youtube videos this weekend that I wish I had found a lot sooner. They’re on the Bureau of Land Management Incident Fire Center channel.
The most useful one is called “Firefighting Airspace (2012 Refresher). “An Air Attack describes how the aircraft above your fire are organized. How they can help you, and how you can help them, with effective communication for a smooth operation. (HD update, 8/6/2013).”
It really helped me understand better how this all works. Interestingly, the Air Attack guy in the video, Steve Price from BLM Boise District, says, “I’m not dictating tactics at all, and I don’t like to do that unless they ask…It’s not my job to run the fire…It’s my job to put red stuff and wet stuff on the ground and give them situational awareness.”
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9fjF2KQ75TY&feature=share&list=PLTErVrHH6uJja-ljtn7z9Q5Sz9WtCPGw1&index=142
The second video is called “Communication With Aviattion Resources.” It really illustrates how complicated the communications can get for Air Attack over an active fire.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GXvP66fCfo0&feature=share&list=PLTErVrHH6uJja-ljtn7z9Q5Sz9WtCPGw1&index=149
Also these two videos very helpfully describe the relationships between the whole Air Attack, Lead Plane, and ASM Aerial Supervision Module, i.e. Bravo, which is a combination of Air Attack and Lead Plane.
That link didn’t go in right. Here it is again:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GXvP66fCfo0&feature=share&list=PLTErVrHH6uJja-ljtn7z9Q5Sz9WtCPGw1&index=149
Also, another related item I found is “The DC-10 Air Tanker.”
“The DC-10 Air Tanker is an American wide-body jet air tanker, which has been in service as an aerial firefighting unit since 2006. The aircraft, operated by the joint technical venture 10 Tanker Air Carrier, is a converted McDonnell Douglas DC-10 airliner, and is primarily used to fight wildfires, typically in rural areas. The turbofan-powered aircraft carries up to 12,000 US gallons (45,000 liters) of water or fire retardant in an exterior belly-mounted tank, the contents of which can be released in eight seconds. Two air tankers are currently in operation, with the call-signs Tanker 910 and Tanker 911.” And now those two DC-10s are stationed in Albuquerque, so……
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WG06xAbBf3Q&list=PLTErVrHH6uJja-ljtn7z9Q5Sz9WtCPGw1&feature=share&index=130
To put some of those limitations in perspective, 12,000 gallons is only a modest backyard pool.
Agree. But it’s a LOT more than the other tankers on that fire could drop.
Which goes to show that, as others have said, air support/suppression is a tool (if used properly and smartly), not an end game.
**
** CROSSFADE BETWEEN
** MACKENZIE IMAGES
** CANON MVI_0891 @ 3:54.03 PM ?
** PHONE IMG_2737 @ 3:55.20 PM ( +1 minute 17 seconds )
This is a crossfade between that stillframe from the very end of Christopher’s
MacKenzie’s SECOND video that he took with his Canon Powershot and the
next photo he would take ( approximately 1 minute and 17 seconds later )
with his cellphone… which is IMG_2737 with a KNOWN timestamp of 3:55.20 PM.
The ‘smoke curtain’ right along the fireline has increased ( and thickened )
dramatically and there appears to be a distinct ‘spot ahead’ appearing in about
the right-center of the crossfade where the two-track trail leads away from
the old-grader location.
YouTube Video Title: MVI-0891-and-IMG-2737
http://youtu.be/0_6Mc2Cz_KU
YouTube About Information
__________________________________________________________________
This is a crossfade between a stillframe from Christopher MacKenzie’s second
video that he took with his Canon Powershot ( MVI_0891 circa 3:54.03 ) and the
next image he took approximately 1 minute and 17 seconds later, at 3:55.20.
After Christopher finished shooting his second video with the Canon he switched
back to using his cellphone and then he took the next sequential image on that
device ( IMG_2737 at exactly 3:55.20 PM ). As the crossfade shows… the ‘smoke
curtain’ right at the fireline has increased ( and thickened ) dramatically during the
estimated 1 minute and 17 seconds between these two images and there also
appears to be a distinct ‘spotting event’ taking place about right-center in the fade
at the point where the two-track road leading away from the old-grader location
approaches the fireline.
__________________________________________________________________
**
** CROSSFADE BETWEEN
** MACKENZIE IMAGES
** CANON IMG_0890 @ 3:53.44 PM ?
** CANON MVI_0891 @ 3:54.03 PM ? ( +19 seconds )
10 seconds after Christopher MacKenzie took his second ( of only two ) still
photos in-between videos… he shot his second video. That second video
was only 9 seconds long, just like his first video.
This is a crossfade between that second Canon still image and a captured frame
from the END of his second movie ( with Canon filename MVI_0891 )… so that
makes the time between images in this crossfade 19 seconds.
The reason a stillframe from the END of the second MVI_0891 movie is used for
comparison here is because that is the point in the 9 second video that provides
the best ‘terrain match’ with the previous still photo… AND using an image from
the END of the second movie also provides the best comparison for the next
(upcoming) cellphone image comparison after the second movie was shot with
the Canon Powershot.
IMG_0890 from the Canon was taken in ‘Portrait’ mode by Christopher so that
he could ( apparently ) be sure to capture that enormous smoke column
building up into the sky prior to shooting his second video. The MV_0891 video
was shot in ‘Landscape’ mode.
Once again ( even though only 19 seconds have elapsed between images )
even MORE visible progression of the fireline to the SOUTH can be observed
in the crossfade.
This frame taken from movie MVI_0891 is also the exact moment when Captain
Jesse Steed had just finished telling Eric Marsh… “I copy… and it’s almost made
it to that two-track road we walked in on.”
YouTube Video Title: IMG-0890-and-MVI-0891
http://youtu.be/TkEp7tYy0ew
YouTube About Information
__________________________________________________________________
This is a crossfade between the second still image that Christopher MacKenzie
took with his Canon Powershot in-between his two movie clips ( IMG_0890 circa
3:53.44 PM ) and a stillframe from the next thing he would shoot just 10 seconds
later… which was his second VIDEO from that location ( MVI_0891 circa 3:53.54
PM ). The stillframe from the VIDEO was taken from the very END of that second
video so that means there are 19 seconds expiring in this crossfade. Even with
just these 19 seconds of time expiring in the crossfade there still seem to be
clear indications of the fireline pushing more to the SOUTH with each passing
moment.
__________________________________________________________________
Thanks for these, WTK!
As I have pondered, various times, why Chris did what he did here, capturing more stills than video, when we all would wish he would have kept doing the video because of the conversations captured with it, I have sensed that he was more interested in capturing the fire behavior than anything else.
I keep struggling to intuit/reason why he was switching back and forth so much between his cellphone and his Powershot. I still haven’t gotten there. Maybe he was having some kind of trouble with his cellphone for capturing video. So he switched to the Powershot. But the quick switch from video to stills to video hints to me that what he was really trying to capture was not so much the conversations we hear from the radios as the visuals of the fire progression.
Does that make sense?
Reply to Marti Reed post on April 28, 2014 at 10:25 pm
>> Marti said…
>> As I have pondered, various times, why Chris did what
>> he did here, capturing more stills than video, when we
>> all would wish he would have kept doing the video
>> because of the conversations captured with it, I have
>> sensed that he was more interested in capturing the
>> fire behavior than anything else.
Yes. Probably so. I just now noticed myself the times
when he ( quickly ) took BOTH a ‘Landscape’ shot and
then quickly ( in no more time than it takes to turn the
camera ) took another shot in ‘Portrait’ mode… and also
tilted the camera UP for the ‘Portrait’ shot.
He did this with BOTH his cellphone and his Powershot.
He was trying to make sure he captured the enormous
( and dramatic ) smoke column that was building overhead.
He just wanted to be SURE he ‘caught all that’… from
ground up into the sky.
It truly was DRAMATIC… and worth capturing (fully).
>> Marti also said…
>> I keep struggling to intuit/reason why he was switching
>> back and forth so much between his cellphone and his
>> Powershot. I still haven’t gotten there.
Have you considered ‘battery levels’?
Maybe one ( or both ) devices were ‘flashing’ at him that
they were BOTH low on battery so it was time to
switch between the two just to make sure he was
capturing all of the dramatic scene that was unfolding
down there in front of him. He didn’t want to miss
any of it.
>> Marti also said…
>> Maybe he was having some kind of trouble with his
>> cellphone for capturing video. So he switched to the
>> Powershot.
See above. He might have made a move to just start
shooting video with the cellphone, noticed that his
battery indicator was about out… and knew that nothing
kills a smartphone battery like shooting video.
So he went for the Canon… only to discover ( after 2
videos and 2 still shots )… that now his Canon was
bitching at him about battery level(s) as well… so he
went BACK to the cellphone for 2 more quick shots
( which, as my last crossfade shows, seem to have
purposely been a final ‘panorama’ of the entire scene
out there in front of him ).
>> Marti also said…
>> But the quick switch from video to stills to video hints
>> to me that what he was really trying to capture was not
>> so much the conversations we hear from the radios
>> as the visuals of the fire progression.
I agree. There was a time when it almost *seemed* like
Christopher was ‘trying to tell us something’ because of
the exact time he suddenly decided to start shooting
video ( with AUDIO )… but I don’t believe that anymore.
It was all just ‘management chit-chat’ at that point.
The scene unfolding BEFORE him down in that valley
was so dramatic… as a photographer he just wanted
to be SURE he got enough good pictures of it ( and
a little motion video, too, to show that dramatic smoke
development ).
I think it was a complete accident that he happened to
capture Marsh and Steed talking about ‘comfort levels’
and ‘discussing their options’ and other management
chit-chat.
That’s also why I don’t believe the actual DECISION to
leave the safe black came until AFTER Christopher
finished shooting his Canon videos.
I don’t think Christopher had a CLUE ( at that point ) that
within a minute or two… Steed was going to say
‘gaggle up boys… we’re leaving’.
I don’t think ANY of them knew that was going to happen,
when you really look at them in ALL of these photos.
It just suddenly happened.
One moment they’re resting… taking photos.
The next moment… Steed says ‘gaggle up’… and
they were leaving. Simple as that.
I’m not even sure any of them had ANY frickin’ idea
WHERE the hell they were going ( or even WHY )
when Steed suddenly told them to ‘gaggle up’.
Steed said ‘jump’… and they all said ‘How HIGH!!’.
Who told Steed and/or Marsh to JUMP? That is the question!
Calvin, do you, personally, think that somebody told Steed/Marsh to “jump” as opposed to Steed/GM simply wanting to get to the east-ish side of the fire to re-engage and misjudging how quickly they could get there as compared to how quickly the fire was moving? If so, why is that your view? (I am not suggesting that you are WRONG – I just want to understand your thinking, because I have not yet found any evidence that would suggest that that is why they moved, but it is certainly an option….)
Elizabeth. Yes, I personally believe that.
Mankenzie pictures 0885, 0886, and 0887 show Ashcraft, Norris and Parker (and others) leaving the black and heading away from the discussing options location (and toward Helms Ranch) and into the green. SOMETHING HAPPENED, they returned to the black before moving out a second time. This delay in leave time could account for Cordes saying, BS they had plenty of time (following his hearing of the deployment)
Cordes was deploying resources in and around Glen Isla and Helms Ranch after 1630.
Justin Hernandez and his bulldozer were somewhere around Glen Isla and Cory Ball was somewhere (in Glen Isla) looking for a place to build indirect line at Cordes request.
I think if Granite Mountain were intending to go very far beyond Helms Ranch, they would have had transportation lined up.
I have seen no evidence that any retardant was placed between the Fireline shown in Mackenzie, Norris, and Ashcraft photos and the community of Glen Isla. Have you?
Calvin~
Do you have a google map/earth geotag for that place they were in? I put them in a different place, but that had to do with what I thought was going on and the inaccurate timestamps I was using. I think you have located it more carefully. I’d really appreciate it if I could correct it in my Google Earth. Thanks!
Marti, I cannot. I would appreciate it if you or WTK could.
I think a couple other pictures that help are the ADOSH 7/18 photos with gps p0250, p0253, p0257, p0260, and p0262. (they all show the rock I mentioned before, and you can see the remnants of the retardant line)
I also believe the rock is visible in Mackenzie image 0890. Dead center of the picture, below the group.
>> Marti asked…
>> Calvin… Do
>> you have a
>> google
>> map/earth
>> geotag for
>> that place
>> they were
>> in?
>>
>> Calving said
>> Marti, I
>> cannot. I
>> would
>> appreciate it
>> if you or
>> WTK could.
Standy-by.
Coming tonight.
I’ve been on this since yesterday and since the new Google satellite images came online which make it much easier to ‘find that rock’ there on that slope.
Calvin… YES… this ROCK is in MANY photos including 8 or 9 taken by hiker Joy Collura that morning.
It was NOT very
far away from
the ‘second’
rest spot at all
where all the
other photos
and videos
were shot 10
minutes later.
Appears to have been just a few hundred yards DOWN the slope ( and due EAST ) from that ‘second’ rest spot.
All they did after leaving that spot was come UP the slope to join the others at the HIGHER location.
And PS thank you for your open-minded always respectful honesty. It really helps.
Calvin, my impression was the the sawyers (e.g. Ashcraft et al) were coming OFF of the line that they were building, and THAT is why we see them moving in those pictures with their saws. No?
Remember, Steed told Blue Ridge somewhere in this time frame (I don’t have my notes in front of me) that GM had at least another HOUR of cutting/line work left. However, shortly thereafter, it became clear that they were going to lose the retardant line, which was part of their tying-in plan, such that it no longer made sense to keep the sawyers trying to build line. Hence, Steed presumably instructed them to stop, and we see them coming OFF the line they were building. No? Otherwise, why would Steed have told Blue Ridge that GM had at least another hour of work left (with their SAWS)?
By the way, I do NOT have my notes in front of me, so WTKTT should NOT parse every single word that I am typing. If you want exact words, go back to the raw sources (e.g. unit logs, audio-recorded interviews).
Elizabeth, in short. Images 0885, 0886, and 0887 show the guys walking away from the Discussing options location. Not toward it.
That is what I am saying.
Calvin… see a report coming later this evening on EXACTLY where that ‘cut rock’ was located. I’ve been on this since yesterday when the new Google post-fire satellite imagery came online.
It is now much easier to find that ‘cut rock’ there on that slope.
That location appears to have simply been DOWN the slope and due EAST of the ‘second rest spot’ where all the other photos were taken.
It may APPEAR they were headed ‘away’ from the others since they are exiting the camera to the right… but the reality appears to be that all they were doing was making their way due WEST and UP the slope to join the others at the ‘second rest spot’ where all the other photos/videos would be taken.
I’m thinking you may be right on the limitations Chris may have been sensing regarding battery levels. Maybe. OTOH he hadn’t taken all that many photos on his Powershot that day. I keep a pretty good eye on my batteries and have always carried a spare. But maybe he didn’t and found himself running out of steam. So he switched back to his cellphone. Which may have been running low, too.
Or maybe, as soon as he finished this sequence, he was told it was time to hustle and go.
Texting or e-mailing pictures – if you intend to text or e-mail your pictures FROM the fire, you are likely to take them WITH your smartphone. However, if you want better-quality shots, and you don’t care about texting or e-mailing them right that minute, you take them with your CAMERA (and not your smartphone), and you download them to your computer (and then e-mail them to whereever you want or print them or upload them to Facebook or whatever) when you get home.
I’m assuming that that is the obvious explanation for why Chris was working with both his smartphone and his camera, no? What am I missing, Marti?
What you’re missing is that Chris never sent out, as far as we know, anything from his cellphone.
Based on what are you saying that, Marti?
Elizabeth… sometimes assumptions *CAN* be made not because of the existence of evidence…
…but because of the LACK of it.
There is NO EVIDENCE ( that ANYONE seems to be aware of ) that Christopher ever sent ANY text messages with attached photos to ANYONE on June 30, 2013.
The only ‘assumption’ that can be made, then, is that that is because he didn’t actually DO it.
Elizabeth…
Christopher’s Canon Powershot was
simply a *better* camera. It was the ‘professional’ piece of kit he had with him versus the ‘amateur’ iPhone 4s.
His iPhone 4s only had an 8 megapixel maximum resolution.
The Canon Powershot went all the way up to 14.1 megapixels ( almost TWICE the resolution ) with MUCH better ZOOM and focal length options.
Even on the Doce fire… Christopher was ‘switching back and forth’ and the common denominator seems to be that he would do that when he sensed ( as a photographer ) that something very DRAMATIC was happening.
On the Doce fire… it was VLAT Air Drops ( when they happened ). At Yarnell… same interest in VLATS and I’m sure he realized ( as a photographer ) what a DRAMATIC scene was unfolding before him there circa 3:55 PM. He just wanted to be sure he got some ultra-highres shots with the Canon as well as the cellphone.
It might have had nothing to do with ‘battery levels’ at all, really. That is just one possibility.
I now think it just had more to do with Christopher’s sense ( as a photographer ) of when something IMPORTANT was happening… like that dramatic fire behavior and smoke cloud developing right in front of his eyes circa 3:55 PM on June 30, 2013.
He wanted to be SURE he ‘captured it all’… which also explains the multiple switching from ‘Landscape’ to ‘Portrait’ mode. That smoke column was getting HUGE ( even before their decision to leave the safe black ) and he also wanted to be sure he captured that as well.
He succeeded.
That was my point, friend.
Also, there absolutely 100% *are* text messages and photos that the SAIT was never given. The SAIT never ASKED for them (to this day).
I honestly hadn’t heard that.
My turn to ask…
What are YOU basing THAT statement on?
Elizabeth. How many? Did the ADOSH investigators ask for other pictures and texts that were sent?
ScottNorrisPhotoAndText.pdf says……(in an email from Randy Okon to Richa Wilson)on August 8 2013……..
I believe we have received all text and photos from the families that we are going to see.
Another related question. Immediately following the Yarnell incident, Wade Ward, from PFD said something to the effect of. Marsh reported they were in a tight spot and everyone knew this was going to be a bitch, were deploying.
I have always wondered where this statement came from? Did Eric Marsh say something to that effect to someone? Or did Wade Ward make that up?
So….. evidence? Links? How do you KNOW that??
**
** CROSSFADE BETWEEN
** MACKENZIE IMAGES
** CANON IMG_0889 @ 3:53.36 PM ?
** CANON IMG_0890 @ 3:53.44 PM ? ( + 8 seconds )
This is a crossfade between the two ‘still photos’ that Christopher Mackenzie
shot with his Canon Powershot in-between his two 9 second videos.
IMG_0889 was taken in ‘Landscape’ mode.
IMG_0890 was taken 8 seconds later in ‘Portrait’ mode and shows more of the
immense smoke column building in the sky. It would appear the reason Christopher quickly switched to ‘Portrait’ mode at this point was to be SURE
he captured that moment and more of that HUGE ‘smoke cloud building’ than
he did in his previous ‘Landscape’ photo, 8 seconds earlier.
There are places where ( even in just 8 seconds ) the fireline itself seems to
have made some quick ‘pushouts’ to the SOUTH as compared to the photo
taken just 8 seconds earlier.
YouTube Video Title: IMG-0889-and-IMG-0890
http://youtu.be/unz_fTnW8zc
YouTube About Information…
_________________________________________________________________
This is a crossfade between the two ‘still’ images that Christopher MacKenzie
took circa 3:53 PM with his Canon Powershot. BOTH of these ‘still’ images were
taken in-between his two 9 second videos that day. IMG_0889 was taken circa
3:53.36 PM and IMG_0890 was taken just 8 seconds later circa 3:53.44.
IMG_0889 was taken in ‘Landscape’ mode and then Christopher apparently
just flipped the camera to ‘Portrait’ mode in order to capture MORE of the
DRAMATIC smoke column buildup than he did in the ‘Landscape’ shot just 8
seconds before that. Even though only 8 seconds transpire between these two
photos the FIRELINE seems to show places where it has sudden ‘pushouts’ to
the SOUTH, especially around the area where Brendan’s lookout mound can
be seen in the distance.
__________________________________________________________________
**
** CROSSFADE BETWEEN
** MACKENZIE IMAGES
** CANON MVI_0888 @ 3:53.19 PM ?
** CANON IMG_0889 @ 3:53.36 PM ? ( + 17 seconds )
Continuing on with this ‘see what they say’ crossfade series…
This is a crossfade between the stillframe from +4 seconds into Christopher
MacKenzie’s first 9 second video ( MVI_0888 ) and the NEXT (still) image he
took with his Canon Powershot 17 seconds later.
Canon Powershot image IMG_0889 was taken just 12 seconds after the END of
the 9 second long Canon Movie MVI_0888. Since the still frame used for the MVI_0888 image above was from the +4 second mark into that video… then we
add 5 seconds to get an ‘elapsed’ time between these two images of 17 seconds
and an approximate ‘real’ time for IMG_0889 of 3:53.36 PM.
After these 17 seconds… the FIRELINE can now be seen becoming clearly
visible again after that big ‘smoke push’ to the SOUTH that was seen in the
previous crossfade between cellphone image 2736 and the stillframe from
the 0888 movie.
YouTube Video Title: MVI-0888-and-IMG-0889
http://youtu.be/ua1Wrx6cj3E
YouTube About Information
_________________________________________________________________
This is a crossfade between a stillframe from +4 seconds into Christopher
MacKenzie’s first Canon Powershot movie MVI_0888 ( circa 3:53.19 PM ) and
a still photo he took 17 seconds after that with the same Canon Powershot
camera ( Image IMG_0889 circa 3:53.36 PM ). The fireline has now become
visible again after the significant smoke ‘push’ SOUTH that was seen between
cellphone IMG_2736 and the stillframe from MVI_0888.
_________________________________________________________________
As a reminder… here are the original Canon Powershot timestamps ( which are
NOW known to be WRONG and at least 9 minutes AHEAD of the ‘real time’
that day ) showing the 4 items that Christopher shot with his Canon for a total
of a 48 second ‘session’ with that camera which we NOW know took place
in-between his cellphone image(s) IMG_2736 and IMG_2735…
1601:31 – 110-0888 – First VIDEO – Duration: 9.24 sec.
1601:52 – 110-0889 – First still photo 12 seconds after video
1602:00 – 110-0890 – Second still photo 8 seconds later.
1602:10 – 110-0891 – Second VIDEO, 10 seconds later – Duration: 9.14 sec
THIS crossfade is between those first TWO items above.
**
** CROSSFADE BETWEEN
** MACKENZIE IMAGES
** PHONE IMG_2736 @ 3:51.58 PM
** CANON MVI_0888 @ 3:53.19 PM ( +1 minute 21 seconds )
The next ‘photographic’ evidence in this 3:49 to 4:00 PM sequence after
MacKenzie’s cellphone image IMG_2736 at 3:51.58 would be the first frame(s)
of MacKenzie’s first VIDEO… MVI_0888.
We still do NOT know exactly how long it took MacKenzie to switch from using his
cellphone to take IMG_2736 to when he first started recording his first MVI_0888
movie with the Canon Powershot… but the best estimate at this time seems
to be approximately 1 minute and 17 seconds, based on a 3 minute and 22
second ‘window’, with a 48 second Canon Powershot sequence, and the
assumption that it took him just as long to switch from the cellphone to the
Canon as it then did for him to switch BACK from the Canon to using the
cellphone again ( 1 minute 17 seconds… both times ).
NOTE: One of the reasons for this particular ‘crossfade’ is to simply establish
with a ‘visual’ how much time MIGHT have transpired… based on fireline
and smoke cloud movements during the time MacKenzie was switching from
his cellphone to his Canon Powershot.
The still frame from MVI_0888 used for this ‘crossfade’ was taken from the 4
second mark into that first movie because anything earlier would have created
too much distortion for a crossfade due to ‘camera angle’… so if we add those 4
seconds to the estimated 1 minute and 17 seconds then this crossfade comes 1
minute and 21 seconds after IMG_2736 was taken.
IMG_2736 was taken in ‘Landscape’ mode with the cellphone.
MVI_0888 was also taken in ‘Landscape ‘ mode and the still frame from +4
seconds had to be rotated a few degrees clockwise in order for the terrain to
match as the images crossfade.
YouTube Video Title: IMG-2736-and-MVI-0888-4
http://youtu.be/pIpsnQf9oQE
YouTube About Information
__________________________________________________________________
This is a crossfade between Christopher MacKenzie’s cellphone image
IMG_2736 ( taken at 3:51.58 PM ) and a stillframe from the very next
photographic moment that MacKenzie performed after that… which was
to shoot his first 9 second video at that location using his Canon Powershot.
This first movie was only 9 seconds long and had a Canon filename
of MVI_0888. It is still not known exactly how long it took Christopher
to switch from using his cellphone to the Canon… but the best estimate
at this time is that this first VIDEO was shot approximately 1 minute
and 17 seconds after cellphone image IMG_2736. This crossfade
shows that during that time delay following IMG_2736, while he switched
from his cellphone to the Canon Powershot, the SMOKE has moved
dramatically SOUTH and towards their location to the extent that it is
now ‘blocking’ their view of the fireline itself.
_________________________________________________________________
NOTE: If a better way is found to establish the exact time offset between
cellphone image IMG_2736 and the start of MVI_0888 then the timestamps
used above will obviously change.
Looking at the progression of the SMOKE cloud, however, I would say there
had to be at *least* 60 seconds between IMG_2736 and the start of MVI_0888.
WTKTT could you please email me – [email protected]. I have a couple of questions for you that I do not want on a discussion thread. Thank you.
**
** CROSSFADE BETWEEN
** MACKENZIE CELL PHONE IMAGES
** IMG_2735 @ 3:50.19 PM
** IMG_2736 @ 3:51.58 PM ( +1 minute 39 seconds )
A full 1 minute and 39 seconds transpire between these two MacKenzie
cell phone images.
IMG_2735 was taken in ‘Landscape’ mode.
IMG_2736 was also taken in ‘Landscape ‘ mode and had to be rotated 1 degree
counter-clockwise in order for the terrain to match as the images crossfade.
YouTube Video Title: IMG-2735-and-IMG-2736
http://youtu.be/p1IX_NTuhhs
YouTube About Information
__________________________________________________________________
This is a crossfade between Christopher MacKenzie’s cellphone photo IMG_2735
( taken at 3:50.19 PM ) and the very next photo he took with his cellphone 1 minute
and 39 seconds later ( IMG_2736 at 3:51.58 PM ). The crossfade shows a pretty
significant advancement of the fireline to the SOUTH during those 99 seconds and
a dramatic change in the smoke cloud(s).
__________________________________________________________________
NOTE: Right after Christopher took this IMG_2736 with his cellphone is when he
then switched to using his Canon Powershot. Somewhere during the next 3
minutes and 22 seconds is when he used the Canon to shoot his first 9 second
video, then he took 2 still pictures with the Canon… and then he finished this 4
item sequence with the Canon by shooting the second 9 second video.
After shooting these 4 items with the Canon ( in a 48 second contiguous
timespan somewhere in the 3 minute and 22 second window )… Christopher
then switched back to his cellphone to take his next IMG_2737 cellphone image
at 3:55.20.
It has yet to be determined EXACTLY when, in this 3 minute and 22 second
‘window’ between cellphone images 2736 and 2737 Christopher actually
began his 48 second ‘session’ with the Canon Powershot, but if he took the
same amount of time to switch from using his cellphone to using the Canon
as he did to then switch BACK from the Canon to the cellphone… then it
would appear that the first Canon Powershot video ( and the first item in
the 48 second Canon session ) came 1 minute and 17 seconds after
he took cellphone image IMG_2736.
That would put the ‘start’ time for MacKenzie’s FIRST video at 3:51.36 PM.
This represents an approximate 11 minute time difference between what his
Canon Powershot device *thought* the time was that day versus what it
really was. His Canon Powershot was ( apparently ) set about 11 minutes
AHEAD of what the real time was that day.
CORRECTION for the post above…
I added the 1 minute and 17 seconds to the time for IMG_2735
instead of IMG_2736.
That last part of the original post above *SHOULD* have read
like this…
That would put the ‘start’ time for MacKenzie’s FIRST video
at 3:53.15 PM.
This represents an approximate 9 (NINE) minute time difference
between what his Canon Powershot device *thought* the time
was that day versus what it really was. His Canon Powershot
was ( apparently ) set about 9 (NINE) minutes AHEAD of what
the real time was that day.
**
** CROSSFADE BETWEEN
** MACKENZIE CELL PHONE IMAGES
** IMG_2734 @ 3:50.06 PM
** IMG_2735 @ 3:50.19 PM ( +13 SECONDS )
Only 13 seconds elapse between these two MacKenzie cell phone images.
IMG_2734 was taken in ‘Portrait’ mode and shows more of the sky and
smoke cloud.
IMG_2735 was taken in ‘Landscape’ mode had to be rotated a few degrees
clockwise in order for the terrain to match as the images crossfade.
NOTE: In-between these two images is when Christopher changed his position
and moved from standing directly behind Captain Jesse Steed to a point a little
further back on the rocks and to the LEFT of where Steed was sitting. Steed’s
knee can still be seen on the right side of IMG_2735.
YouTube Video Title: IMG-2734-and-IMG-2735
http://youtu.be/1aL4aK_pgJs
YouTube About Information…
__________________________________________________________________
This is a crossfade between Christopher MacKenzie’s cellphone image
IMG_2734 ( taken at 3:50.06 ) and the very next one that he took 13 seconds
later ( IMG_2735 at 3:50.19 ) AFTER changing positions from standing directly
behind Captain Jesse Steed ( with the red helmet on ) to a position further to the
left and back up on the rocks slightly.
Even though only 13 seconds elapse between the images… the crossfade still
shows a slight increase in the fireline to the SOUTH… and a significant change
in the smoke cloud(s).
__________________________________________________________________
**
** CROSSFADE BETWEEN
** MACKENZIE CELL PHONE IMAGES
** IMG_2733 @ 3:49.59 PM
** IMG_2734 @ 3:50.06 PM ( +7 SECONDS )
Only 7 seconds transpire between these two MacKenzie cell phone images
but the crossfade still shows some noticeable fireline advancement to the
SOUTH… AND ( considering only 7 seconds elapse ) there is a DRAMATIC
difference in the SMOKE cloud(s).
IMG_2733 was taken in ‘Landscape’ mode.
IMG_2734 was taken in ‘Portrait’ mode and shows more of the sky and the
smoke column. It had to be rotated a few degrees counter-clockwise in order
for the terrain to match as the images crossfade.
YouTube Video Title: IMG_2733-and-IMG_2734
http://youtu.be/mGwZNyPvBZg
YouTube About Information…
__________________________________________________________________
This is a terrain-aligned crossfade between Christopher MacKenzie’s cellphone
image IMG_2733 ( taken at 3:49.59 PM ) and the very next image he took with
his cellphone just 7 seconds later… IMG_2734 ( taken at 3:50.06 PM ).
Even though only 7 seconds have transpired between the two images the
crossfade still shows there has been some advancement of the fireline to the
SOUTH… and the difference between the SMOKE cloud(s) is DRAMATIC.
__________________________________________________________________
ALSO NOTE: At the time Christopher MacKenzie was taking these two
cellphone images… Brendan McDonough had already been dropped off
by Brian Frisby where the GM Superintendent and GM Chase truck(s) were
located… and Brendan was, at this same moment, taking his own cellphone
photos of the fire/smoke whirl he was seeing down where the trucks were parked.
Also… IMG_2734 ( taken at 3:50.06 ) also appears to be the photo that captures
Robert Caldwell shooting his second of (only) two videos that day which captured
the following background radio conversation going on at this exact moment…
__________________________________________________________________
Eric Marsh (DIVS A): Yea… I’m tryin’ to work my way off the top.
Todd Abel ( OPS1 ): Okay… I copy… ah… just keep me updated…
ah… ya know… you guys hunker and be safe and then… ah…
we’ll get some air support down there ASAP.
_________________________________________________________________
WTKTT and xxFullsailxx: Regarding your recent exchange about where Todd Abel was located at the time of the deployment and burn-over…. Presumably, if Todd Abel had made it over to the east side of the fire by the time of the 4:27 “Yarnell Gamble” video (which I doubt that he had), we would see him in the Tom Story photos where some of the guys are congregating around the white pick-up trucks in the Ranch Restaurant parking lot immediately after hearing that GM was in trouble. WTKTT, do you see Abel there?
There appear to be two Central Yavapai trucks in several of the Tom Story photos. Able and Cordes? One truck actually heads into the adjacent street and is also seen coming back toward the ranch house. Cordes, right?
Sorry to butt in. Just wondering myself?
ultimately it doesn’t really matter where Abel was… the fact is, that there is no substantive evidence that it is Abel’s voice…AND, there is no substantive evidence that the conversation is addressing Marsh.
what IS substantive, is that WTKTT continues to peddle the nefarious mystery person ordering-GM-off-the-hill (oh, and hurry up doing it) conspiracy theory. what else is substantive, is that WTKTT continues to ad-lib conversations, and then call it “evidence” from which to speculate further.
noone had reason to “order” GM anywhere, let alone tell them to “hurry up.”
as WTKTT has already acknowledged… there was an IHC within arms reach of that end of the fire already… so if there was a specific task for an IHC then Blue Ridge could have just as well been utilized.
xxfullsailxx
I will have to agree with you that I have not seen substantial evidence to indicate GM was ordered or told to hurry up that has not been tied together in my assessment.
Something you said down below dose bother me.
As a Lookout and I was talking a highly qualified lookout.
A Foreman on a crew. I ask you would that person concerned about there crew not have got in the Superintendents truck. Driven to any location necessary to get eyes on their crew and the fire and continue to inform them of the fire activity, even if the crew could see the Fire?
We still do not fully know if McDonough actually knew what the crew was doing or where they were going.
Absent that a qualified Foreman (lookout) would have been in contact and asking for the information on the crew and giving their advice on fire spread. Do you not agree with that? I think on this fire there were places for a while that person could have been useful. I do not think that is BS. McDonough was seeing fire activity as he drove out and took pictures that he could have relayed to the crew if he had been more qualified. That was what I was trying to get across, maybe you misread my intent.
bob, while i completely agree with you about the competencies and experience level of a lookout in general, i do not agree that McDonough had any obligation or reason to go try to post up else where, unless Steed or Marsh asked him to…
a. i don’t think there was any where else to get a vantage on the crew and their relation to fire behavior…
b. Marsh & Steed both had the best vantage point point of EVERYTHING going on with the fire… if anything (and again, this is total hindsight bias) what they should have done, was post a new lookout at that exact spot where they were before they hike toward BSR…
the lookout qualification thing is something that we seem to have to revisit every fire years or so. it’s been addressed in multiple fire refreshers. i think that in general, and especially with IHC’s, that the lookout position is taken seriously… and even if you’re sending a squad boss trainee up to be lookout, you should also be sending up a qualified individual to train them up on the importance of the task.
but again, i don’t believe that ANYONE knew or understood the route that GM was taking… if they knew that GM was travelling around the fire to the south, through the green, SOMEONE (probably ops. Musser or Blue Ridge overhead) would have told them about the second wind shift that ultimately got them entrapped.
holy typos…
*before they HIKED to BSR*
*every FIVE years or so*
I got that well said it is just something I would have done. as asst. I was always LO.
I completely agree re the lookout not just cranking up the AC and effectively quitting work. But, the same is true about not putting your lookout where they put him, and not simply letting him hang out and nearly get burned over. Both to me are symptomatic of broader issues. Everything from an undue tolerance for risk, to an undue tolerance of no real communication.
There is a catch-22 involved, though. If you don’t want people to know where you are going, it’s tough to ask McDonough to keep working as a lookout in a way that’s likely to be useful.
I believe looking at pictures that some one could have gone out of town on the highway and been able to look back up the ridge to the heal of the fire where the crew was. If they had binoculars they may have been able to see them start down the ridge before the smoke layed over and covered the area. Again a well qualified lookout attached to the crew would have at least tried to maintain contact. after the trucks were safe they had there crew freq. to talk on all they wanted with out interference from other traffic. It is a within 2 to 4 mile line of site personal radio channel.
Yes actually not that different from glassing deer in some ways. But you’ve got to know to try to do it, and/or have someone direct you to do it. One of many opportunities where both the intended route could have been disclosed, and they could have gotten better information on fire and weather in turn. I strongly suspect that most people would have been asking their lookout to do this, but that again gets back to disclosing their route.
Yap ?????
Reply to Bob Powers post
on April 27, 2014 at 3:14 pm
>> Mr. Powers said…
>> I believe looking at pictures that
>> some one could have gone out of
>> town on the highway and been
>> able to look back up the ridge to
>> the heal of the fire where the crew
>> was.
You didn’t need to go ‘out of town’
at all. There were any number of
places where that ‘anchor spot’
could be clearly seen from in
town itself. The Yarnell Fire Station
was up on its own ‘hill’ and had an
absolute CLEAR ( and direct )
view of that area. That’s where
OPS1 Todd Abel and Eric Marsh
first had their ‘chat’ that morning,
with a CLEAR view of that anchor
point location… and both agreed to
send GM up there in the first place.
>> Mr. Powers also wrote…
>> If they had binoculars they may
>> have been able to see them start
>> down the ridge before the smoke
>> layed over and covered the area.
Yes…. and there was (apparently)
no shortage of binocluars that day.
In his ADOSH interview…
SPGS1 Gary Cordes said he ‘glassed
them up ‘ any number of times that
day ( from various locations in town )
and was able to see exactly what they
were doing up on the ridge.
Page 45 of Cordes’ ADOSH interview
Q = Bruce Hanna
A = SPGS1 Gary Cordes
______________________________
Q: Okay.
A: …and I did glass them up throughout the day and they were up on the switchback right in here. They had…
Q: Mm-hmm.
A: …a squad uh, just staged out over here and then they had been, they had some doing some work in here.
( Points to map ).
______________________________
Also… in his first ADOSH interview…
Brendan McDonough was asked if
HE had his own binoculars that day
while serving as lookout… and
he said YES…
Page 27…
Q1 = Barry Hicks
A = Brendan McDonough
______________________________
Q1: Did you have any binoculars
with you?
A: Yeah.
Q1: You did?
A: Mm-hm.
______________________________
Seems reasonable with the right person trained in fuels, weather, and responsibilities as a lookout. Could have made a huge difference. One of those learning things that need discussed.
Reply to Elizabeth post on April 27, 2014 at 8:31 am said:
>> Elizabeth wrote
>> WTKTT and xxFullsailxx: Regarding your recent exchange
>> about where Todd Abel was located at the time of the
>> deployment and burn-over…. Presumably, if Todd Abel had
>> made it over to the east side of the fire by the time of the 4:27
>> “Yarnell Gamble” video (which I doubt that he had), we would
>> see him in the Tom Story photos where some of the guys are
>> congregating around the white pick-up trucks in the Ranch
>> Restaurant parking lot immediately after hearing that GM
>> was in trouble. WTKTT, do you see Abel there?
The first Tom Story photo available in the public folder that
shows anything from the Ranch House Restaurant parking
lot ( his image number 1677 ) has a timestamp of 5:06.10 PM.
It was taken with his Canon EOS, which has already been
determined to be ‘accurate’ with timestamping that day to
within 45 to 50 seconds of ‘true’ time.
His ‘previous’ sequential image ( 1676 ) was taken up near the
helibase on Hays Ranch Road ( with the same Canon EOS )
and has a timestamp of 3:18.48 PM.
So, apparently, Tom Story himself was ‘moving around’ a lot
that day and didn’t take any picutures with his Canon EOS
at all between 3:18 and 5:06 PM ( Almost a 2 hour gap ).
So even the Tom Story photos from the RHR were not taken
( as you suggested ) “immediately after hearing GM was
in trouble”. His first photo from that location seems to be
almost a half-hour AFTER the ‘deployment’ message(s).
We KNOW that Todd Abel WAS at the Ranch House
Restaurant sometime after the deployment… because Paul
Musser says ( in his ADOSH interview ) that that is where
he suggested to Abel ( face to face ) that Abel become the
IC for the ‘Incident within an Incident’ and that Musser would
continue on as ‘Field OPS’ for the fire itself.
But I’m glad you brought this up… because even as xxfullsailxx
and I were having that exchange I remembered that there really
has never seemed to be any definite proof of WHEN Field OPS1
Todd Abel really worked his way down to Yarnell that day.
So, again… we KNOW that pretty much ‘everyone’ ended up
at the Ranch House Restaurant, at some point ( Musser, Cordes,
Willis, Abel, etc. )… but EXACTLY when they all arrived there
has never been fully researched or documented, AFAIK.
Musser says ( in his ADOSH interview ) that after he dropped
the ‘Planning OPS’ duties and jumped in as the second fully
functional ‘Field OPS’ on the fire that afternoon… he pulled
some resources to himself and then first tackled the problem
that had developed in the Sickles Road area. After he dealt
with that… he worked his way down towards Yarnell.
Apparently… he FIRST met up with SPGS1 Gary Cordes at
that ‘other’ staging area up by the Shrine Road ( I believe
it was referred to as ‘the gas station’ ). Whether he made his
1542 ‘availability check’ out to DIVSA Marsh just BEFORE
he arrived there or not has still not been definitely determined,
but that ‘near the Shrine road’ staging point IS where he
first met Cordes face-to-face and got ‘briefed’ on the situation
as Cordes knew it at that time. ( Evacuations already in progress ).
So we know when Musser got to Yarnell… and where he first
‘staged’ ( up near Shrine road and 89 )… but we still don’t know
when either he or Cordes went down to the RHR.
Likewise… we can (*apparently) hear Field OPS1 Todd Abel telling
SOMEONE in an Air Study video circa 4:10 or so that he thought he
was going to ‘be down there’ ( in Yarnell ) in (quote) “About FIVE”
( minutes )… but I also realized in that recent exchange that there
doesn’t seem to be any real proof that he actually did that ( made it
down there in 5 minutes ).
So I went digging.
I agree with xxfullsailxx that it “doesn’t really matter where
Abel was” with regards to radio transmissions that day… but
I was just curious myself whether there really is any documented
evidence of WHERE Field OPS1 Todd Abel actually WAS when
we hear him breaking into Steed’s MAYDAY sequence and
telling Air Attack “Granite Mountain is trying to get a hold of you,
let’s see what we’ve got goin’ on.”
Wherever he was at the time of the MAYDAYS… it is obvious
he was hearing that MAYDAY traffic in real time and HE was
the one trying to get Bravo 33 to ‘wake up and pay attention’
and RESPOND to these men… ( recorded in the Helmet-Cam
video ) which they (eventually) did.
I’ve checked all the Tom Story photos and the Michelle Lee
photos and the Blue Ridge photos from the Ranch House
Restaurant. I really don’t see either Musser OR Abel there in
pretty much ANY timeframe ( even though we know they were ).
I don’t see Darrell Willis in any of the photos either.. and we ALSO
know fer sure he was there at some point ( unless that
is him just sitting in that white pickup truck listening to radio ),
so I guess it’s possible ANY of these guys could have been there
at just about any time but just never got caught in a photo.
So I went back to Todd Abel’s own ADOSH interview.
Sure enough… there DOES seem to be a quick moment there
in that interview when they are looking at maps and Abel is
pointing to where he was out workinig on the NORTH end
of the fire.
As he was doing that… he happened to mention something.
On page 50 of his ADOSH interview… OPS1 Todd Abel
actually DOES describe how it was he got down to Yarnell,
and WHEN he did that.
It starts with them trying to work through the ‘unit log’ that Abel
supplied to the SAIT investigators… with him (Abel) pointing at the
map they were working with during the interview and him pointing
at the spot where he was working up on the north end. Then he
starts ‘pointing’ at ‘other spots’ and adding some explanation…
Q1 = Dave Larsen ( Rest in Peace )
A = Field OPS1 Todd Abel
______________________________________________________
Q1: Um, do you remember the timeframe? Do you remember
when you heard the word deploy?
A: I remember looking at my watching and thinking it was probably
around, uh, 1645ish.
Q1: Okay that seems to be – okay. All right. Uh, structures are
burning in Yarnell, heavy smoke, fire crosses 89, propane tanks
exploding, all-out search began for Granite Mountain, that’s the
next entry ( in Abel’s log ).
A: All right. Uh, I’m gonna – let me, uh – I’ll – let me back up a little
bit with you guys just to make sure we got the full picture here.
Q1: Please.
A: So I’m still upon this north end when all this happens down
here. Um, we had the wind – the wind had shifted, structures
weren’t threatened anymore. Um, I – about the time this happens,
Darrell Willis calls me and – just to update me on how they were
doing over there. I say are you copying this on air on to ground?
And he says no. I said Granite Mountain just deployed. And he’s
like well okay. You know and we hung up the phone – uh, it was
either phone or radio, I can’t remember, ‘cause I had talked to him
a couple of times on the phone. But, um, I called – Todd Foster
said hold up any burning, we didn’t need to do it anymore because
the wind had shifted. I moved myself back around to the – to Yarnell.
All right? Um, and – and I know Darrell did too and I know he made
arrangements to leave his chunk with the task force leader there.
So I come back around here to the – there’s a restaurant that sits,
uh – it’s gotta be right in here somewhere. A restaurant sits right in
there. Um, I came back around there. In transit over here I called
our alarm room here, started ordering Medevac helicopters and
ambulances, ‘cause I didn’t know what we were dealing with.
…
Q1: Okay.
A: So I come down to here. Paul Musser comes up to me and
says I’m gonna – we need to make you the IC of the incident within
the incident. I said I copy that. He goes I’m gonna keep on – I’m
gonna hold on to tactical – I’ll take tactical ops for the fire, so we
can still try to save some of this stuff in Yarnell.
______________________________________________________
So ( according to Abel himself ) he did NOT ‘make it down
there in FIVE minutes’ as he seemed to say he was going to
do in an Air Study video circa 4:10. According to Abel’s testimony
to ADOSH… he was still up on the north end even when the
MAYDAY calls first appeared on the radio at 1639… and he
jumped on the Air-to-ground channel to tell Bravo 33 to stop ignoring them from UP THERE… which is also where he
then had that cellphone call with Darrell Willis. Willis has always
said he got that cellphone call FROM Todd Abel to notify Willis
about the deployment ( and that it WAS, in fact, a phone call
and not a radio transmission ) but now Abel says it was the
other way around ( that Willis called HIM right after deployment).
So we still don’t have an exact TIME for when OPS1 Todd Abel
made it down to Yarnell… but it does SOUND like he only
headed down there because of the deployment situation and
that he DID go straight to the Ranch House Restaurant…
…and whenever he DID finally get there… that is when Musser
asked him to be IC for the ‘Incident within an Incident’.
hmm, so even less credibility to the voice in the “Yarnell Gamble” video being attributed to Abel… interesting.
Reply to xxfullsailxx on April 27, 2014 at 3:26 pm
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>> hmm, so even less credibility to the voice in the
>> “Yarnell Gamble” video being attributed to Abel…
>> interesting.
How so?
>> xxfullsailxx also said…
>> ultimately it doesn’t really matter where Abel was
I agree. IAOI ( If And Only If ) that really is him
speaking to Marsh in the YARNELL-GAMBLE
video and IAOI Marsh is actually responding
directly to whoever that is saying ‘appreciate if
you could get to town a little faster’…
…then YOU are right. It truly doesn’t matter where
Field OPS1 Todd Abel was. Radios are an
amazing tool.
You can maintain all you want that Marsh is
NOT ‘finishing’ an ongoing conversation with
speaker 1 in the YARNELL-GAMBLE video…
…but it is not possible to maintain that Eric Marsh
was NOT reporting Granite Mountain’s ‘status’
and/or ‘progress’ to SOMEONE at exactly that
moment in time… just 15 minutes before
deployment.
So WHO do YOU think Marsh was ‘reporting’ to,
at that moment, if not speaker 1 in the video?
It’s a finite (short) list of names, don’t you think?
Go re-read the interviews and the alleged interview notes/unit logs. Make a chart of who says they heard from or spoke with GM, regarding *what.* Presumably that chart will answer your questions (or at least point you in the right direction), no?
Elizabeth… it sounds like you might
have already done that yourself.
So same question goes out to YOU.
Regardless of the apparent ‘context’
of the YARNELL-GAMBLE video… and
the *apparent* response of Marsh to
what speaker 1 says… just take the
4:27 PM ‘report’ by Marsh all by itself.
WHO do YOU think he was ‘reporting
Granite Mountain’s status/progress
to at that moment… just 15 minutes
before deployment?
WTKTT, thanks for continuing to do good work here.
The YIN are confusing, which is partially why I asked….
What’s the other part of
your ‘partially’?
Do YOU, in fact, have some idea of WHO Marsh was obviously ‘reporting’ Granite Mountain’s status/progress to at 4:27 PM?
I have already stated a number of times what I believe is actually happening in the YARNELL-GAMBLE video and WHO Marsh
*seems* to be answering/reporting to.
I am seeking other opinions.
He was ‘reporting’ to SOMEONE ( with only 15 minutes to go before deployment ) and it’s a ‘short list’ of names.
**
** THE CONVOY THAT LEFT THE SESAME AREA…
>> Reply to Marti Reed post on April 25, 2014 at 6:52 pm
>>
>> Marti said…
>> I still haven’t managed to ever figure out Brendan’s trail.
>> I find it still REALLY confusing.
It’s not you, Marti. It really is quite confusing what ACTUALLY
happened there with that CONVOY circa 1600 ( 4:00 PM ).
>> WTKTT on April 26, 2014 at 12:22 am replied…
>>
>> Since the additional unit logs surfaced in February… it’s pretty clear that
>> Brendan DID just ‘convoy’ out with the Blue Ridge guys and they all drove
>> south through the Sesame area, then through Glen Ilah, then turned north
>> on Highway 89 at 4:02 PM ( when Brendan shot those pics out the window
>> of the Sup truck )… and then they all headed over to the Youth Camp at end
>> of Shrine road.
>>
>> So even if the new TIME for the ‘discussing their options’ conversations
>> moves BACK to the 3:53 PM timeframe… Brendan was ( supposedly ) still in
>> the GM Supervisor truck with ( in his own testimony ) the intra-crew radio
>> volume ‘cranked up’
>>
>> Marti Reed on April 26, 2014 at 7:07 am replied…
>>
>> But what does that do to the photos he took from Hiway 89 in
>> Yarnell at 4:05ish?
Nothing, really. The new TIME for the MacKenzie videos doesn’t change
that event. It just means that he had heard them ‘discussing their options’
BEFORE those photos were taken… and not (perhaps) DURING, as
was previously thought might be the case when it *seemed* that the
MacKenzie videos were also being shot at that same (4:02) moment.
If the time on Brendan’s own device was ‘right’ ( and it seemed to be
a network-connected smartphone so we ARE assuming that )… the
exact TIME for his 4 photos was 4:02 PM. He took all four of them
out the driver window just 2 seconds apart from each other.
>> Did he drive down Sesame to 89 and then up Shrine to where Blue Ridge
>> was and then help “bump” the rest of the trucks, which is what it looks like
>> to me?
I don’t believe Brendan did anything but sit in the GM Supervisor Truck from
the time he got in it after Frisby dropped him off until it finally reached the
Ranch House Restaurant circa 1639. That was now his only ‘job’.
The Blue Ridge guys had been told where all the ‘keys’ were in the trucks
long before they even tried to move them and back during the time when
Frisby was evacuating Brendan… so they did not NEED Brendan to help
them ‘bump’ anything.
Brendan’s JOB was simple… at that point…
Drive that GM Supervisor truck… keep track of ALL the GM vehicles…
and listen closely to that intra-crew frequency for instructions that
could come at ANY moment.
After 1549 and all the way to 1639, when all the vehicles were finally
arriving at the Ranch House Restaurant… I actually don’t think Brendan
even exited the GM Supervisor Truck at all…. not even once… unless
he had to take a piss, or something.
>> Marti also said…
>> When I read the Unit Logs, I find them very confusing as to who went
>> where and when.
It’s not you, Marti. It IS, in fact, very confusing.
When reading some of the unit logs… it even seems like some of the people who
were actually DRIVING the vehicles aren’t even sure exactly which way they
went that day.
The generally accepted theory is that ALL of the vehicles that were leaving
that Sesame Area that day ( GM Sup Truck, GM Chase, GM Crew Carriers,
1 or more Blue Ridge support vehicles, etc. ) ALL exited the Sesame area
the way they all came in that morning.
South through the Sesame area, onto the pavement where Lakewood and
Manazanita end in west Glen Ilah… EAST on Lakewood to Highway 89,
then NORTH on Highway 89 to Shrine Road, then WEST / NORTHWEST
on Shrine Road to where the pavement ends at the parking lot of the
St. Joseph Shrine itself ( where Aarron Hulburd shot the Helmet Cam
video along with Jason Clawson and KC (Bucky) Yowell later on )…
then WEST on Shrine road some more to that Youth Camp clearing.
I really don’t think that any ‘vehicle’ other than the BR ATV ever ‘cut across’
that ‘cutover trail’ between the Sesame area and the Youth Camp, even after
the dozer was done improving it. It was still a nasty, winding sandy-soft-dirt
road with a downhill descent through that rock pile just before reaching the
Youth Camp area.
I think all the ‘real vehicles’ just stayed with legit ROADS that day and
‘going all the way around’ through Yarnell was the safe bet… so that’s
what they all did.
It was NOT the time to get any expensive vehicle STUCK out there on one of
those dirt roads. That would have been a BIG problem, at that time.
One of the things to remember is that Brendan McDonough, himself, had
NO IDEA where this ‘Shrine Road’ was, much less that obscure Youth Camp
off by itself after the pavement of Shrine Road ends.
GM never went down Shrine Road that morning… or anywhere near it.
Cordes took GM out to the Sesame area that morning via that known
Lakewood Drive access route… and Brendan wasn’t even driving that
morning.
So Brendan, himself, MUST have ‘followed’ someone from the Blue Ridge Crew
out of that area to even know how to get out of there, much less all the way over
to this ‘Youth Camp’ at that time.
If Brendan had turned his camera just a little farther north for one of those
four photos he took looking west from Highway 89 at 4:02 PM, I am sure we
would have seen one of the Blue Ridge vehicles in front of him ‘showing him
where to go’.
>> Marti also wrote…
>> Whatever whenever, I think it may have been quite difficult for him to
>> have been paying complete attention to what was coming over the
>> radio, given all that was going on.
I’m going to disagree there, Marti.
On the contrary… it was now ( more than ever that day ) Brendan’s
‘prime directive’ to be ‘listening to the intra-crew radio’.
He had already TOLD his Captain ( Steed ) as he left his assigned lookout
position and was being ‘picked up’ by another Hotshot supervisor ( Frisby )
that that is EXACTLY what he would be doing while he was absent from them.
Brendan was now the one who was responsible for ALL of the GM vehicles
and, at some point, seeing to it that they were re-united with the rest of
HIS team.
At any moment… he could be receiving instructions… and he BETTER
be listening to the intra-crew and not MISS those instructions… and
he knew that.
If Brendan had MISSED a callout from Steed or Marsh ( at any moment )
with ‘instructions’ about where to try and rotate the GM vehicles… there
would have been hell to pay… and I think Brendan knew THAT, too.
Brendan has said in his ADOSH interviews that his own handheld had
the GM intra-crew set as his PRIORITY channel all day that day… which
means that even if you are in general *scan* mode… any transmissions
that begin to take place on that pre-set PRIORITY channel will ‘break through’
to the top and now be the active conversation coming over the radio so
that no important conversations on the PRIORITY channel are ‘missed’.
The onboard radios in the GM Superintendent and GM Chase truck
probably also had this PRIORITY channel preference set to GM’s own
intra-crew frequency.
So… because of the circumstances… it was IMPERATIVE that Brendan
be listening closely to the intra-crew while he was separated from the
others… and I believe that is exactly what he was doing.
Besides… despite any consternation about all of this… the FACT remains
that ALL of the ‘official’ reports about this incident all state (unequivocally)
that Brendan McDonough DID hear them ‘discussing their options’,
whenever that actually took place.
Brendan has never denied ( or even qualified ) these statements.
The only thing we do NOT know is WHAT he might have heard.
THAT is what he has always ( and still ) refuses to talk about.
Yeah, now I think you’re right. Thanks for helping clear this up.
The other thing this scenario implies, is that as soon as someone from Blue Ridge was driving Jesse Steed’s chase truck, they could have listened in on that channel, also. At least if, in fact, it had an on-board radio, and if it was set to that channel as Priority.
Reply to Marti Reed post on April 28, 2014 at 8:55 am
>> Marti said…
>> The other thing this scenario implies, is that as
>> soon as someone from Blue Ridge was driving
>> Jesse Steed’s chase truck, they could have listened
>> in on that channel, also. At least if, in fact, it had an
>> on-board radio, and if it was set to that channel
>> as Priority.
Exactly.
That has actually *always* been a possibility even when
we thought the MacKenzie videos were shot at 4:02 PM.
There is even *some* evidence in those (redacted)
unit logs that one ( or more? ) of the THREE Blue
Ridge personnel who ended up driving those THREE
other GM vehicles actually USED the onboard radio(s)
to speak with Marsh and/or Steed WHILE they were
driving the GM vehicles ( reporting progress and
whatnot ).
So there might actually be THREE Blue Ridge Hotshots
who had a good chance of hearing Marsh and Steed
talking to each other at any time after 3:49 or 3:50 PM.
It all depends when everyone actually got into those
trucks… and when all of these ‘comfort level’ and
‘discussing their options’ conversations actually took
place.
ADOSH was never able to interview ANY of the
Blue Ridge Hotshots. Zero. Zip. Nada.
Thanks. I’m gonna go back and read those logs again. I’ve been wondering if the buggies had this built-in radios, too.
**
** MACKENZIE CELL PHONE PHOTOS CAPTURE CONVOY PROGRESSION?
Reply to calvin post on April 26, 2014 at 3:38 pm
>> calvin said…
>>
>> Mcdonough 154944 image.
>> How does this image align with the Mackenzie, Parker photos?
>> Where is the anchor point on the ridge?
>> Where is the Mackenzie, Parker, Norris photo spot?
>>
>> It appears that the ridge is clearly visible on the south side of the fire.
>> Possibly photographing the area GM were taking pictures from at
>> the same time?
Close… but no cigar.
The actual point where all these photos were being taken up on that ridge appears
to be *just* ‘out of frame’ on the left side of McDonough’s 1549 image(s).
That small ‘knob’ seen up on the ridge at the very left edge of 154944 appears
to be the north part of the actual ‘helispot’… where the entire DOC Lewis crew
was ‘airlifted’ out of that location just hours earlier that day…
…but even that ‘helispot’ was some hundreds of yards NORTH of where those
late-day ‘resting spots’ and the spot where the MacKenzie cellphone and Canon
photos/videos were taken.
However… looking back in the OTHER direction…
* IMG_2736.JPG – 3:51.58 PM
This MacKenzie cellphone image ( taken just 2 minutes and 14 seconds AFTER McDonough’s 154844 image ) has a clear view back from the ridge to the ‘Sesame area’… but the view to that EXACT spot where BOTH the GM Supervisor Truck AND the CM Chase truck had been parked that day is blocked by a ‘ridge’ in the distance.
That spot where they were ACTUALLY parked was a few hundred yards west of the point where that east/west two-track actually meets the more open ‘Sesame area’.
HOWEVER… in this photo… you CAN see that exact ‘intersection’ of the east/west two-track leading out to the ridge and where it meets the Sesame area… and there DO appear to be a group of vehicles captured there in this 3:51.58 PM photo.
I count at least TWO vehicles there.
They appear as small WHITE dots against the tan background of the
clearing at that point.
This is, in fact, known to be point where Blue Ridge had left at least ONE of their vehicles that day… which also needed to be evacuated along with the GM vehicles around this time.
So it looks like it is POSSIBLE that this cellphone photo of MacKenzie’s ( at 3:51.58 ) has captured the moment when that ‘evacuation’ convoy was assembling and actually heading out of the Sesame area.
It could very well be that moments after Brendan shot his 1549 photos… the ‘extra driver’ for the GM Chase Truck arrived at his location and then they both drove these WHITE vehicles the few hundred yards east to the Sesame area… and now Christopher’s 3:51.58 cellphone photo is capturing them ‘pausing’ at that intersection to pick up the other Blue Ridge vehicle that also needed to be evacuated.
* IMG_2738.JPG – 3:55.31 PM
3 minutes and 33 seconds later… those WHITE DOTS are GONE from that intersection where the east/west two-track meets the Sesame area… but NOW we see what appears to be an even LARGER group of vehicles in the distance at the exact point where the two GM Crew Carriers had been parked all day.
The 2 GM Crew Carriers had actually been visible there as 2 ‘white dots’ in various other photos taken throughout the day, but NOW ( at 3:55.31 PM ) there appear to be MORE than just the 2 Crew Carriers assembled at that location.
So THIS MacKenzie cellphone photo could now be showing the actual ‘progression’ of the evacuation convoy as it stopped where the GM Crew Carriers were to ‘fire them up’ and add them to the convoy…
…which was then going to keep heading SOUTH in the Sesame area and exit out to Highway 89 via Lakewood Drive in Glen Ilah ( the way they all came in that day in the first place ).
That ‘convoy’ would, of course, then head all the way around on Highway 89 and Shrine road to ‘re-stage’ out at the Youth Camp at the west end of Shrine road.
The timing pretty much matches here.
Christopher’s cellphone photos might actually have been capturing the ‘progess’ of this vehicle evacuation down there in the Sesame Area clearings.
** THE MACKENZIE VIDEOS AND ‘THE CONVOY’…
The only chance of seeing this same ‘activity’ in the distance in the MacKenzie videos comes after the 4 or 5 second mark in Chrisopher’s FIRST video… when he pans the camera to the right and we first see Jesse Steed sitting there.
In the distance… over Steed’s red helmet… you CAN see the same ‘clearing’ where the GM Crew Carriers were parked.
However… at this moment in the first MacKenzie video… there does NOT appear to be the same large ‘group of vehicles’ at that spot as can be seen in the (upcoming) 2738 cellphone photo. You can still ( apparently ) only see the two GM Crew Carriers there.
Since we NOW know that these MacKenzie videos HAD to have been taken
in-between MacKenzie cellphone photos 2736 and 2737… this would still make sense.
That means the ‘convoy’ may have still been working its way down south from the northern end of the Sesame area at that moment in the first video… but is still hidden behind that ridge in the distance.
It would only be a few minutes later ( when MacKenzie would return to shooting photos with his cellphone ( with image 2738 at 3:55.31 ) that we NOW see the convoy ‘arriving’ where the GM Crew Carriers are.
More on this later…
Followup… cellphone photo 2737 is the FIRST one that MacKenzie
took AFTER using his Canon Powershot to shoot the videos…
but that 2737 photo is of the fireline and is NOT pointed EAST
where we could see any ‘convoy’ activity.
It is only 11 seconds AFTER 2737 when Christopher then
turned more to the EAST and took his next 2738 photo which
DOES show the Sesame area in the distance.
WTKTT. So you are saying the Discussing options spot is more to the south or left of the 154944 image? Do I understand you correctly that the helispot/ anchor point is visible in this photo? Meaning that if Marsh was north of the discussing options spot, he would have had a clear line of sight to where Mcdonough was in this picture?
Reply to calvin post on April 27, 2014 at 3:48 am
>> calvin said…
>> WTKTT. So you are saying the Discussing options
>> spot is more to the south or left of the 154944 image?
Yes. That is what Google Earth ‘ground level’ lookbacks
from Brendan’s location seem to indicate. If Brendan
has just pointed the camera a *little* more to HIS
left before taking that picture… it would have PROBABLY
captured that spot where the men were at 1549 up
in the ridge at the very left edge of his photo.
Now… whether we could have ACTUALLY ‘seen’ them
up there on the ridge or not is still debatable. The
resolution on Brendan’s camera was not so hot.
>> calvin also said…
>> Do I understand you correctly that the helispot/ anchor
>> point is visible in this photo?
Yes. It seems to be. That ‘knob’ on the ridge at the
extreme left of the photo seems to be the NORTHERN
edge of that area where the helispot was… and the spot
where the entire Lewis DOC Crew had been evacuated
from that same ‘anchor point’ location via helicopter
just hours earlier that day.
>> calvin also wrote…
>> Meaning that if Marsh was north of the discussing
>> options spot,
There is no ‘if’ about it. He was ‘north’ of that spot,
at that point. Probably still almost all the way on the
top of Weaver Mountain itself and ( as he had just
told OPS1 Todd Abel )… “Workin’ my way off the top.”
>> calvin also wrote…
>> he (Marsh) would have had a clear line of sight to
>> where Mcdonough was in this picture?
Well… I don’t know about a CLEAR line of sigth… but
YES… Marsh probably could have seen this area where
the GM Supervisor AND the GM Chase Trucks were
parked from where he was at that time.
It all depends on the ‘smoke curtain’… and what it looked
like from the ‘other side’. I still ascribe to your theory that
the reason Steed felt the need to tell Marsh ( in the
second MacKenzie video ) that the fire had “Almost made
it to that two-track road we walked in on” is because
Steed KNEW Marsh was pretty far NORTH of where
they were… and would now have been looking BACK
‘through’ the south-headed ‘smoke curtain’… and Steed
was just telling Marsh what HE was seeing in case
Marsh couldn’t really see through that ‘smoke curtain’
too well at that point.
There are also various other reported ‘comments’ from
Eric Marsh in this timeframe about him saying he could
‘see’ certain things… but those reports are spotty ( and
not even verified? ) so it’s really hard to say what Marsh
could ACTUALLY see from up there on the Weaver
Mountain, in this general timeframe ( after wind shift ).
**
** TOM STORY CANON EOS 5D MARK II CAMERA
** WAS 1 TO 2 MINUTES OFF THE CORRECT TIME THAT DAY?
This is the Tom Story photograph that show the Blue Ridge ATV actually
LEAVING the Ranch House Restaurant parking lot…
Tom Story photo: 201303_Yarnell_Hill_1682
It is ‘leaving’ the lot via the southern driveway opening and its hard to see… but if
you zoom in over the open driver-side door of the white pickup with the red stripe
on the LEFT SIDE of the photo… you can see the Blue Ridge ATV there ‘pausing’
at the driveway just before pulling out onto Highway 89.
Here is that photo…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/y3jy5opssrcvzb3/x6Vsx-JIw_/Tom%20Story%20Photos/201303_Yarnell_Hill_02#lh:null-201303_Yarnell_Hill_1682.jpg
And here is the EXIF metadata for this particular Tom Story photo…
_________________________________________________________________
Caption: A thunderstorm to the north of Peeples (cq) Valley during the
Yarnell Hill Fire caused the blaze to reverse directions and burn through the
town of Yarnell.
Artist: TOM STORY
Address: Post Office Box 7936, Tempe, AZ, 85281, USA
Copyright: Copyright Tom Story – All Rights Reserved
Camera: Canon EOS 5D Mark II
Lens: Canon EF 16-35mm f/2.8L – Shot at 35 mm
Exposure: Auto exposure, Shutter priority AE, 1/166 sec, f/4.5, ISO 800, Compensation: -1
Flash: Off, Did not fire
Focus: One-shot AF, with a depth of field of from inf to 2.14 m.
Focus 2: AF Area Mode: Multi-point AF or AI AF
Keywords: Airtankers, VLAT, SEATS, Type II helicopters, Type 1 Helicopters. Structures lost.
Date: June 30, 2013 – 5:08:18 PM
Location: Peeples Valley, AZ, USA
File: 2,720 × 4,080 JPEG (11.1 megapixels)
__________________________________________________________________
So, according to the timestamp on Tom Story’s Canon EOS 5D Mark II camera,
the Blue Ridge ATV was leaving the Ranch House Restaurant parking lot at
exactly 1708.18 ( 5:08.18 PM ).
This does NOT match the Blue Ridge GPS tracking data, which was taking
the TIME value directly from information contained in packets coming from
the satellites themselves.
At about +6:05 in the Blue Ridge GPS tracking video itself is the 1707 to 1710
GPS tracking data… which looks like this…
__________________________________________________________________
1707 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary at the Ranch House Restaurant
1708 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1709 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary ( slight movement south in the Ranch House Restaurant parking lot )
1710 – 34.216118, -112.758758 – 1839.480 – 20.90 – Heading northwest through Glen Ilah on Lakewood Drive
1711 – 34.218611, -112.760239 – 1000.710 – 11.37 – At intersection of Westward/Lakewood and Manzanita Drive
__________________________________________________________________
At 1709 ( 48 seconds AFTER Tom Story’s photo 1708.18 timestamp ),
the Blue Ridge GPS tracker shows that it has, in fact, moved just slightly
SOUTH in the parking lot ( which would match the move shown in the Tom
Story photo towards the southern driveway entrance/exit ) but it STILL has
NOT actually LEFT the Ranch House Restaurant parking lot yet.
60 seconds LATER… at 1710… the GPS tracking DOES show the ATV having
left the parking lot and is now heading west on Lakwood Drive in the
Glen Ilah sub-division.
It has ( by 1710 ) traveled 1,839 feet which represents a speed of 20.90 mph
in relation to its previous 1709 location, still back in the RHR parking lot.
Since the GPS unit was ONLY updating every 60 seconds… it is not telling us
the EXACT MOMENT when the Ranger did leave the parking lot… but it IS
telling us that at 1709… it had not YET left the lot.
So Tom Story’s Canon EOS could NOT have been more than about 2 minutes
off the ‘actual’ clock time that day… but it DOES look it MIGHT have been
anywhere from a minimum of 48 seconds up to 1 minute off.
** BLUE RIDGE TRACKING DATA FOR THIS TIMEFRAME
Here is the actual Blue Ridge GPS tracking data that covers the time period from
the tracker ( in Captain Brown’s possession ) actually evacuating the Shrine
Road Youth Camp.. through the time at the Ranch House Restaurant and then
the start of the ‘ground rescue mission’.
It also shows their exact movements on that ‘rescue mission’ as they first scouted
various roads in Glen Ilah, then moved north to the Shrine road where they would
then ‘break through’ and head west out to the ridge…
1635 – 34.228414, -112.754134 – 0644.378 – 07.32 – Heading EAST out the driveway of the Youth Camp (YC)
1636 – 34.227183, -112.752758 – 0624.010 – 07.09 – At the St. Joseph Shrine (SJS) parking lot now
1637 – 34.227183, -112.752758 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary at SJS parking lot
1638 – 34.227183, -112.752758 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary at SJS parking lot
1639 – 34.224803, -112.749746 – 1342.030 – 15.25 – Suddenly all the way EAST on Shrine Rd, almost to Highway 89
1640 – 34.222603, -112.746935 – 1188.170 – 13.50 – At the intersection of Shrine road and Highway 89 now
1641 – 34.217985, -112.750025 – 1966.140 – 22.34 – Heading SOUTH on Highway 89 to the Ranch House Restaurant
1642 – 34.213532, -112.755497 – 2468.580 – 28.05 – Heading SOUTH on Highway 89 to the Ranch House Restaurant
1643 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0167.099 – 01.90 – Arrival at the Ranch House Restaurant
NOTE: 1643 is one of the estimated times of the burnover in the box canyon.
1644 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary in parking lot
1645 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1646 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1647 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary ( slight movement west )
1648 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1649 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1650 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1651 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1652 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1653 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1654 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary ( slight movement east )
1655 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary ( slight movement west )
1656 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1657 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary ( slight movement east )
1658 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1659 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1700 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1701 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary ( slight movement west )
1702 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1703 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1704 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1705 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1706 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1707 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1708 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1709 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary ( slight movement south in the parking lot )
1710 – 34.216118, -112.758758 – 1839.480 – 20.90 – Heading northwest through Glen Ilah on Lakewood Drive
1711 – 34.218611, -112.760239 – 1000.710 – 11.37 – At intersection of Westward/Lakewood and Manzanita Drive
1712 – 34.215772, -112.758640 – 1183.450 – 13.45 – Back east on Lakewood Drive
1713 – 34.218611, -112.760239 – 1183.550 – 13.45 – Back west again to same 1711 spot. Intersection of Westward/Lakewood and Manzanita
1714 – 34.215471, -112.758082 – 1352.120 – 15.36 – Back east on Lakewood again. To intersection of Lakewood and Mountainaire Drive
1715 – 34.215471, -112.758082 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1716 – 34.215471, -112.758082 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1717 – 34.215304, -112.759219 – 0405.336 – 04.61 – Southwest on Mountainaire, then west on Foothill Drive
1718 – 34.216544, -112.762223 – 1043.210 – 11.85 – Heading west on Foothill Drive
1719 – 34.215746, -112.760561 – 0612.670 – 06.96 – Heading back east on Foothill Drive to Mountainaire Drive
1720 – 34.212534, -112.760646 – 1646.220 – 18.71 – South on Mountainaire Drive
1721 – 34.210502, -112.762266 – 1149.650 – 13.06 – South on Mountainaire, west on Las Tiendas Dr., then south on Candy Cane Ln.
1722 – 34.215346, -112.758458 – 2457.170 – 27.82 – All the way back north (fast) to intersection of Mountainaire and Lakewood
1723 – 34.215967, -112.754134 – 2607.150 – 29.63 – Exited Glen Ilah via Lakewood east, now heading north on Highway 89 (fast)
1724 – 34.222581, -112.746828 – 3413.380 – 38.79 – North (fast) on Highway 89, now at intersection of 89 and Shrine Road
1725 – 34.223610, -112.748051 – 0542.768 – 06.17 – West on Shrine Road. Now at intersection of Shrine Road and Willow Lane
1726 – 34.228307, -112.753844 – 2538.890 – 28.85 – West on Shrine Road all the way to Youth Camp entrance
1727 – 34.227225, -112.752782 – 0544.510 – 06.19 – Back east on Shrine Road to St. Joseph Shrine parking lot
1728 – 34.228502, -112.754166 – 0650.764 – 07.39 – Back west to near Youth Camp entrance again
1729 – 34.228502, -112.754166 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1730 – 34.228502, -112.754166 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
A few moments later… they would ( according to the Blue Ridge notes )
decide to (quote) “F**k it… let’s go for it”… and break through the Shrine
area and then head west out to the ridge where GM had been working.
Awesome catch, thanks! I was disappointed Tom didn’t catch the UTV after it “disappeared” from it’s spot, but thanks to your keen eye seeing that, he apparently did!
So that would mean, given that this camera was, if not EXACTLY correct (which is understandable), quite realistically reliably time-stamped, either the Canon EOS-1D Mark II N (the best, most state-of-the-art and expensive camera he had that day, with the most expensive telephohoto lens, with which he shot the “4:39” VLAT drop was seriously not synced to it (which becomes, to me, harder to imagine, all things considered, but then who knows for sure), or……….
As a photographer, I’m sitting here having a really hard time conceiving of going out to a shoot with three cameras (one of them being the current state-of-the-art), a bunch of top quality glass, I.e. thousands of dollars worth of equipment, to professionally shoot a major event, with one lesser camera being basically accurately set time-wise and the best one not even remotely.
But then, I’m also still not really grasping why Chris did what he did.
I’m partly tempted to write to Tom Story, whose PO Box is in his metadata. But I retired from this at the beginning of February………
And also his email addresses are there, too……
Reply to Marti Reed post on April 26, 2014 at 7:31 pm
>> Marti said…
>> So that would mean, given that this camera was, if not
>> EXACTLY correct (which is understandable), quite
>> realistically reliably time-stamped,
Yes. I goofed with the math above and ADDED 3
seconds instead of subtracting… so instead of his
Caonon EOS timestamp of 1708.18 ( 5:08.18 PM ).
being 48 seconds ‘away’ from the 1709… it was
really only 42 seconds ‘off’.
In order for them to have traveled 1,839 west by the time
the 1710 GPS update recorded… then that really does
mean they HAD to have ‘launched’ away from the Ranch
House Restaurant just a few seconds after the 1709
update showed them still sitting there.
So just add those few seconds to the 43 seconds and
it really means Story’s Canon EOS was off by only
45 to 50 seconds ( under a minute off ).
On a day like this… when it seems that NO ONE knew
what frickin’ time it was all day… and people’s devices
all wildly inaccurate… I’d say we have to call this
( now proven ) ‘less than a minute’ offset pretty darn
accurate.
So at least that takes care of ONE of Story’s cameras.
It can be said that ANY picture coming from his
Canon EOS was never more than 45 or 50 seconds
away from an atomic timestamp that was coming
from orbiting satellites that day. Not too shabby.
Yes, that’s by all normal standards “pretty damn accurate.”
Just to be clear, though… what I believe we
just proved is that while *accurate*… any
Tom Story photo taken with his Canon EOS
must be considered to be 45 to 50 seconds
BEHIND the *real* atomic time ( and not
AHEAD of it ).
If a Tom Story Canon EOS photo has a
timestamp of, say, 1508.10… then the
REAL (atomic) clock time is about 50
seconds AHEAD of that and it might
already actually be 1509.00.
For anybody that doesn’t know what the relevance of this conversation might be, it shows that Tom Story’s photos from one of his cameras, capturing images from the Ranch House Restaurant after news of the deployment had been reported to everybody but, seemingly him, are basically accurate time wise, but his images of a VLAT drop, from another camera, at the time of Jesse Steed’s Mayday radio call, are problematic, because we have no other evidence that drop happened when his state-of-the-art camera seems to have recorded it. So we are wondering “what happened here and when??”
So I’m gonna email him tomorrow about this because I think this is very important.
Marti, I would bet Tom Story is monitoring this website. It would be nice if he joined the conversation.
**
** TOM STORY CANON EOS 5D MARK II CAMERA
** WAS 1 TO 2 MINUTES OFF THE CORRECT TIME THAT DAY?
This is the Tom Story photograph that show the Blue Ridge ATV actually
LEAVING the Ranch House Restaurant parking lot…
Tom Story photo: 201303_Yarnell_Hill_1682
It is ‘leaving’ the lot via the southern driveway opening and its hard to see… but if
you zoom in over the open driver-side door of the white pickup with the red stripe
on the LEFT SIDE of the photo… you can see the Blue Ridge ATV there ‘pausing’
at the driveway just before pulling out onto Highway 89.
Here is that photo…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/y3jy5opssrcvzb3/x6Vsx-JIw_/Tom%20Story%20Photos/201303_Yarnell_Hill_02#lh:null-201303_Yarnell_Hill_1682.jpg
And here is the EXIF metadata for this particular Tom Story photo…
_________________________________________________________________
Caption: A thunderstorm to the north of Peeples (cq) Valley during the
Yarnell Hill Fire caused the blaze to reverse directions and burn through the
town of Yarnell.
Artist: TOM STORY
Address: Post Office Box 7936, Tempe, AZ, 85281, USA
Contact: [email protected] [email protected], 480 966 6134 602 549 4094, tomstory.com
Copyright: Copyright Tom Story – All Rights Reserved
Camera: Canon EOS 5D Mark II
Lens: Canon EF 16-35mm f/2.8L – Shot at 35 mm
Exposure: Auto exposure, Shutter priority AE, 1/166 sec, f/4.5, ISO 800, Compensation: -1
Flash: Off, Did not fire
Focus: One-shot AF, with a depth of field of from inf to 2.14 m.
Focus 2: AF Area Mode: Multi-point AF or AI AF
Keywords: Airtankers, VLAT, SEATS, Type II helicopters, Type 1 Helicopters. Structures lost.
Date: June 30, 2013 – 5:08:18 PM
Location: Peeples Valley, AZ, USA
File: 2,720 × 4,080 JPEG (11.1 megapixels)
__________________________________________________________________
So, according to the timestamp on Tom Story’s Canon EOS 5D Mark II camera,
the Blue Ridge ATV was leaving the Ranch House Restaurant parking lot at
exactly 1708.18 ( 5:08.18 PM ).
This does NOT match the Blue Ridge GPS tracking data, which was taking
the TIME value directly from information contained in packets coming from
the satellites themselves.
At about +6:05 in the Blue Ridge GPS tracking video itself is the 1707 to 1710
GPS tracking data… which looks like this…
__________________________________________________________________
1707 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary at the Ranch House Restaurant
1708 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1709 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary ( slight movement south in the Ranch House Restaurant parking lot )
1710 – 34.216118, -112.758758 – 1839.480 – 20.90 – Heading northwest through Glen Ilah on Lakewood Drive
1711 – 34.218611, -112.760239 – 1000.710 – 11.37 – At intersection of Westward/Lakewood and Manzanita Drive
__________________________________________________________________
At 1709 ( 48 seconds AFTER Tom Story’s photo 1708.18 timestamp ),
the Blue Ridge GPS tracker shows that it has, in fact, moved just slightly
SOUTH in the parking lot ( which would match the move shown in the Tom
Story photo towards the southern driveway entrance/exit ) but it STILL has
NOT actually LEFT the Ranch House Restaurant parking lot yet.
60 seconds LATER… at 1710… the GPS tracking DOES show the ATV having
left the parking lot and is now heading west on Lakwood Drive in the
Glen Ilah sub-division.
It has ( by 1710 ) traveled 1,839 feet which represents a speed of 20.90 mph
in relation to its previous 1709 location, still back in the RHR parking lot.
Since the GPS unit was ONLY updating every 60 seconds… it is not telling us
the EXACT MOMENT when the Ranger did leave the parking lot… but it IS
telling us that at 1709… it had not YET left the lot.
So Tom Story’s Canon EOS could NOT have been more than about 2 minutes
off the ‘actual’ clock time that day… but it DOES look it MIGHT have been
anywhere from a minimum of 48 seconds up to 1 minute off.
** BLUE RIDGE TRACKING DATA FOR THIS TIMEFRAME
Here is the actual Blue Ridge GPS tracking data that covers the time period from
the tracker ( in Captain Brown’s possession ) actually evacuating the Shrine
Road Youth Camp.. through the time at the Ranch House Restaurant and then
the start of the ‘ground rescue mission’.
It also shows their exact movements on that ‘rescue mission’ as they first scouted
various roads in Glen Ilah, then moved north to the Shrine road where they would
then ‘break through’ and head west out to the ridge…
1635 – 34.228414, -112.754134 – 0644.378 – 07.32 – Heading EAST out the driveway of the Youth Camp (YC)
1636 – 34.227183, -112.752758 – 0624.010 – 07.09 – At the St. Joseph Shrine (SJS) parking lot now
1637 – 34.227183, -112.752758 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary at SJS parking lot
1638 – 34.227183, -112.752758 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary at SJS parking lot
1639 – 34.224803, -112.749746 – 1342.030 – 15.25 – Suddenly all the way EAST on Shrine Rd, almost to Highway 89
1640 – 34.222603, -112.746935 – 1188.170 – 13.50 – At the intersection of Shrine road and Highway 89 now
1641 – 34.217985, -112.750025 – 1966.140 – 22.34 – Heading SOUTH on Highway 89 to the Ranch House Restaurant
1642 – 34.213532, -112.755497 – 2468.580 – 28.05 – Heading SOUTH on Highway 89 to the Ranch House Restaurant
1643 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0167.099 – 01.90 – Arrival at the Ranch House Restaurant
NOTE: 1643 is one of the estimated times of the burnover in the box canyon.
1644 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary in parking lot
1645 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1646 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1647 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary ( slight movement west )
1648 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1649 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1650 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1651 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1652 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1653 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1654 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary ( slight movement east )
1655 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary ( slight movement west )
1656 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1657 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary ( slight movement east )
1658 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1659 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1700 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1701 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary ( slight movement west )
1702 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1703 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1704 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1705 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1706 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1707 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1708 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1709 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary ( slight movement south in the parking lot )
1710 – 34.216118, -112.758758 – 1839.480 – 20.90 – Heading northwest through Glen Ilah on Lakewood Drive
1711 – 34.218611, -112.760239 – 1000.710 – 11.37 – At intersection of Westward/Lakewood and Manzanita Drive
1712 – 34.215772, -112.758640 – 1183.450 – 13.45 – Back east on Lakewood Drive
1713 – 34.218611, -112.760239 – 1183.550 – 13.45 – Back west again to same 1711 spot. Intersection of Westward/Lakewood and Manzanita
1714 – 34.215471, -112.758082 – 1352.120 – 15.36 – Back east on Lakewood again. To intersection of Lakewood and Mountainaire Drive
1715 – 34.215471, -112.758082 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1716 – 34.215471, -112.758082 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1717 – 34.215304, -112.759219 – 0405.336 – 04.61 – Southwest on Mountainaire, then west on Foothill Drive
1718 – 34.216544, -112.762223 – 1043.210 – 11.85 – Heading west on Foothill Drive
1719 – 34.215746, -112.760561 – 0612.670 – 06.96 – Heading back east on Foothill Drive to Mountainaire Drive
1720 – 34.212534, -112.760646 – 1646.220 – 18.71 – South on Mountainaire Drive
1721 – 34.210502, -112.762266 – 1149.650 – 13.06 – South on Mountainaire, west on Las Tiendas Dr., then south on Candy Cane Ln.
1722 – 34.215346, -112.758458 – 2457.170 – 27.82 – All the way back north (fast) to intersection of Mountainaire and Lakewood
1723 – 34.215967, -112.754134 – 2607.150 – 29.63 – Exited Glen Ilah via Lakewood east, now heading north on Highway 89 (fast)
1724 – 34.222581, -112.746828 – 3413.380 – 38.79 – North (fast) on Highway 89, now at intersection of 89 and Shrine Road
1725 – 34.223610, -112.748051 – 0542.768 – 06.17 – West on Shrine Road. Now at intersection of Shrine Road and Willow Lane
1726 – 34.228307, -112.753844 – 2538.890 – 28.85 – West on Shrine Road all the way to Youth Camp entrance
1727 – 34.227225, -112.752782 – 0544.510 – 06.19 – Back east on Shrine Road to St. Joseph Shrine parking lot
1728 – 34.228502, -112.754166 – 0650.764 – 07.39 – Back west to near Youth Camp entrance again
1729 – 34.228502, -112.754166 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1730 – 34.228502, -112.754166 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
A few moments later… they would ( according to the Blue Ridge notes )
decide to (quote) “F**k it… let’s go for it”… and break through the Shrine
area and then head west out to the ridge where GM had been working.
Mr. Dougherty… this entire comment can just be DELETED.
It ‘fell into moderation’ because of the multiple email addresses
for Tom Story that were hidden inside the EXIF metadata for
his photograph.
Those email addresses have been DELETED and this entire
comment has already been reposted (successfully).
Reply to Marti Reed post on April 24, 2014 at 12:45 pm
>> Marti said…
>>
>> Well. I just picked my way thru Tom’s photos. At first I wrote, up above,
>> that I never trust camera time stamps becuz most ppl don’t need to pay
>> attention to them.
>>
>> But Tom was using three cameras that day, switching back and forth
>> depending on which lens he needed.
Yes.. he was… and he was *most probably* using that beast with the large
telephoto lens when he was shooting the distant DC10 VLAT drops.
>> Marti also wrote…
>> So that would lead me to think he probably must have had to sync them,
>> thus at least vaguely getting them accurate.
>> So the 3:49 photos are mystifying.
Yes, they are… but see above. Maybe *ONLY* that beast with the telephoto
lens had an ‘inaccurate’ time stamp and seemed to be showing that VLAT
drop at 4:39… exactly when Captain Jesse Steed was actually MAKING
his first MAYDAY call.
>> Marti also said…
>> I think his photos at the Ranch House Parking Lot seem about right, though.
Yes, they do. Some of them even seem to match exactly with the
Michelle Lee photos from the parking lot… but SOME of them still seem
a little ‘wonky’ as to timestamp(s).
>> They would definitely have been later than McCord’s.
>> I think McCord jumped out of the Blue Ridge Buggy and started shooting
>> relatively immediately.
Agree. Despite some of the unit log notes… it would definitely seem that
that they were aware of the MAYDAY tracking either just BEFORE or
AS they were pulling into the RHR parking lot itself.
>> Tom’s photos start with the Blue Ridge ATV near the trucks, and then
>> the ATV vanishes, and I think that happening around 5 seems reasonable.
In one of Tom’s photos… he captures the moment when the BR ATV was
actually *leaving* the lot. It’s hidden behind one of the white pickups… but
you can see it there just pulling OUT of the RHR and onto Highway 89 for
that first trip that would take them down Lakewood Drive and to the west
end of the Glen Ilah subdivision.
>> And, yes, the fire has gotten much closer by then as the parking lot,
>> itself would eventually no longer be considered a “safe zone.”
>> So I’m stumped. It would be helpful if there was a timed list of the
>> VLAT drops, for sure.
There is still no captured “Air-to-Air” traffic in the USDA Air Study videos
that would support *any* DC10 VLAT actually ‘dropping’ at 1639 itself.
Yes… Air Attack can be heard ‘discussing’ a drop with VLAT pilot ‘Kevin
at that exact time… but that drop they are discussing was still in the
planning stage and they hadn’t even done the ‘show me’ run yet.
Almost more than 40 minutes earlier… SPGS1 Gary Cordes had directly
requested that the Air resources start ‘dropping at will’ and to try and
‘save whatever town they could’… but I don’t think for one minute that
actually meant the airplanes started doing whatever the hell they wanted.
It still all had to go through ‘Air Attack’… or there would have just been
complete and utter chaos ( and perhaps more fatal incidents that day ).
More later…
I wanted to go back a minuet to the April 25 @4:43 posting of Marti Reed.
Scott Noris Photo
This picture alone says a thousand words to a knowledgeable Fire Fighter.
Fuels and weather before GM left the black.
Note the flame lengths from that location 20 to 40 Ft. based on est. 10 to 15 FT. Brush.
There are at least 3 or maybe 4 fire swirls (wind educed).
This is an extreme indicator of unpredictable fire behavior.
GM was looking right at that, What or who could have possibly convinced them to move out of the black and into the unburned and head to BSR?
That was one of the biggest indicators, they were looking right at it and taking pictures of the flame front. They ignored it and moved down into unburned fuel.
Its hard for me to believe. But then I just read over on WFToday a fire fighter saying they do not train in the 10 and 18 or use it on fires a statement on redoing the 10 & 18. WTF I would like to have used the entire F-word.
Mir. Powers… yes… that’s really quite a frightening picture… given
that ‘green carpet’ of ‘gasoline on a stick’ sitting right in front of
it ( and continuing for over 4,000 yards… right to the mouth of
that box canyon they decided to drop into.
Ditto for the MacKenzie Canon high-res photos. Huge wind-bent
flame lengths clearly seen.
Something to keep in mind, however, is what Calvin astutely
observed in the evidence some time ago… and that is what
Jesse Steed is captured saying back to Marsh in the second
MacKenzie video.
Steed reports… ( back to Marsh )… “I copy… and it’s almost
made it to the two-track road we walked in on.”
As Calvin originally asked… you have to wonder WHY Steed
felt the need to report that ‘visual’ back to Marsh.
It is VERY possible that Eric Marsh was so far north on that
two-track road and all the way up on the top of Weaver
Mountain that he was now BEHIND the smoke curtain and
unable to see what was actually happening in FRONT of it.
So Steed was reporting to Marsh what HE ( and now WE ) can
see in the videos… but the actual reality of the flame front
( size, speed, direction(s) ) was now hidden from view from
Marsh because of his distance north, and the now southern
direction of the flame front.
So it very well could be that ( for whatever reasons… radio call,
cell phone call, his own DIVSA initiative ) Marsh just WANTED
to try ‘the mission’… but was now relying solely on Steed to
tell him his ‘comfort level’ since Marsh couldn’t really see
the south-headed flamefront at the time he wanted them to
start ‘the mission’.
So maybe it really was just Captain Jesse Steed reporting back
to Marsh something like…
“Yea… what the hell… I think we can make it… but if there’s
any chance we need to leave RIGHT NOW.”
Mcdonough 154944 image. How does this image align with the Mackenzie, Parker photos? Where is the anchor point on the ridge? Where is the Mackenzie, Parker, Norris photo spot?
It appears that the ridge is clearly visible on the south side of the fire. Possibly photographing the area GM were taking pictures from at the same time?
Thanks, WTKTT.
calvin… see a new ‘parent’ comment about this
just above. It looks like the exact spot where the
‘men’ were up on the ridge is *just* out-of-frame
to the left in McDonough’s 1549 image(s)…
…However… it also now appears that MacKenzie
cellphone photos and his Canon videos ( now known
to ALL be in the 3:50 to 3:55 timerange ) appear
to show the ‘progress’ of the possible vehicle
convoy off in the distance as the GM and Blue
Ridge trucks were being ‘driven out’.
**
** SCOTT NORRIS’ SMARTPHONE ( FOUND? )
>> Reply to Marti Reed post on April 25, 2014 at 4:43 pm
>>
>> Marti said…
>> Another important visual for this sequence (that I had forgotten about until
>> going back to redo it) is Scott Norris’. That’s Scott standing up on that rock
>> taking his photo in most of these Caldwell photos and videos.
Yes. It most certainly IS… and you are RIGHT. That photo texted at 3:54 PM by Scott Norris ( along with Calvin’s observations concerning the gloves ) could help nail down the exact TIME where that 48 second time block for the 4 MacKenzie Canon items fits into that 3 minute and 22 second ‘window’ where we now know it belongs.
>> Marti also wrote…
>> PS I think you can see Scott shooting that photo 1 second into Chris’
>> second video, MVI_0891
Yes. It’s possible. I did a preliminary SUPER enhancement on the fireline at that
point in the 0891 video and compared it with the Scott Norris photo and I’m not
really seeing a match at this point… but more work needs to be done there.
There MIGHT be a better ‘fireline/smoke’ match somewhere else in that
video or even in the FIRST video. More about that later.
>> Marti also wrote…
>> And, by the way, looking at my ancient notes regarding the whereabouts of the
>> cellphones, I have no indication of Scott’s cellphone ever entering into the
>> chain of evidence.
It would, of course, be nice to have a copy of that original photo Norris took, complete with EXIF metadata and timestamp… but alas… I think you are right.
The reason that Scott Norris photo that was supplied to the SAIT investigators has basically NO EXIF information at all is because that’s what usually happens these days when you elect to ‘attach’ a photo to a TEXT message on one of these Smartphones.
The Smartphone doesn’t even send the ‘original’ ( which could be up to 8 megapixels on an iPhone 4 ). It makes a ‘cropped’ sort of ‘square’ copy of the photo you want to TEXT out and also reduces the resolution. It does NOT preserve the original metadata when it does this. Likewise for the RECEIVER. Depending on what software RECEIVES it… sometimes it is reformatted on reception even AGAIN and whatever metadata was in it can then be even FURTHER lost.
So the REAL question is ( as you said )…
Whatever happened to Scott Norris’ Smartphone?
Well… I think I just FOUND it.
**************************************************************************************
WARNING – GRAPHIC CONTENT AHEAD
**************************************************************************************
The REST of this message has descriptions and LINKS to some of the original YCSO Police reports and photographs of the personal items and the clothing of some of the Granite Mountain firefighters. If you do not wish to read about such things or accidentally view the (graphic) photos… do NOT continue reading this message. END OF WARNING.
**************************************************************************************
From the YCSO Yarnell Hill Case Report…
Document Name: 13 021744 Yarnell Hill Case Rpt
By YCSO Detective J. McDormett.
Page 7…
——————————————————————————————————
The following day, 7/02/13, I, along with ET ( Evidence Technician ) Waldock,
went to the medical examiner’s office in Phoenix, arriving at about 0800.
Lt. Boelts was there when we arrived. Honor guards were also in place.
Honor guards had also been in place throughout the night. All the firefighters
were identified on this day largely through either dental records by forensic
odontologist Dr. John Piakis or through distinguishing tattoos or other identifiers
that left no doubt as to the individual identity of each man. Photographs were
taken by the ME staff. I was advised that a disk of the photos would not be
ready for a few days. I was later advised that the cause of death was accidental
and that the manner of death was a combination of thermal injuries and smoke
and carbon monoxide inhalation. As of the writing of this report I have not
received the autopsy reports.
Personal property and shelters were separated into a corresponding body bag
and were transported to the YCSO evidence unit.
What follows is an accounting of the numbers assigned to the decedents while
on the hill, the Maricopa Medical Examiner number, and the name of the
firefighter associated with each:
1 / 13-04442 / Wade Parker
2 / 13-04425 / Sean Misner
3 / 13-04443 / Travis Turbyfill
4 / 13-04428 / Kevin Justin Woyjeck
5 / 13-04427 / Clayton Whitted
6 / 13-04426 / Christopher MacKenzie
7 / 13-04431 / Dustin DeFord
8 / 13-04430 / William Warneke
9 / 13-04435 / Eric Marsh
10 / 13-04429 / John Percin Jr
11 / 13-04434 / Andrew Ashcraft
12 / 13-04433 / Travis Carter
13 / 13-04438 / Anthony Rose
14 / 13-04432 / Joe Thurston
15 / 13-04436 / Jesse Steed
16 / 13-04437 / Grant McKee
17 / 13-04441 / Scott Norris
18 / 13-04440 / Garret Zuppiger
19 / 13-04439 / Robert Caldwell
—————————————————————————————————-
From the YCOS report above…
“Personal property and shelters were separated into a corresponding body bag and were transported to the YCSO evidence unit.”
What that also means is that any clothing that was removed by the Medical Examiner was ALSO added back to the orange ‘transport’ bags, along with personal effects, and then these bags were transported to the YCSO evidence unit for safekeeping and further examination.
The YCSO took pictures of the contents of these bags once they got them over to their own YCSO evidence unit ( clothing included ).
Those pictures are in THIS public online folder…
ANOTHER WARNING: These can be construed as GRAPHIC images.
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/fg416vjqt14afu3/zaTuOp4Plu#/
As they examined the contents of each ( ORANGE ) bag… they left the bag in the top of the photo(s) so the NUMBERS on the bag ( as per the YCSO list above ) could still be seen in the photo(s) in order to associate the contents with certain firefighters.
In the FIRST FOUR photos in that folder… the number on the bag whose contents are being photographed was written with a black Sharpie and it says 17.
Bag 17 corresponds to Scott Norris ( according to YCSO list above ).
The Microsoft Word Doc file that is also present in this folder indicates which photos belong to which firefighter. This is the actual document that the SAIR used when they inserted their own report about the ‘damage’ to shelters in the their own SAIR report.
The following ‘cut’ from that document concerning these first FOUR images
in the folder also confirms that they are of the personal effects ( and clothing )
of Scott Norris…
——————————————————————————————————–
Bag 17 – Medical Examiner Number 13-4441 ( FF Scott Norris )
DSCN0002 – Fire shelter exterior – 98 percent of Aluminum foil burned away.
DSCN0003 – Fire shelter interior – 75 percent of fiberglass burned away.
DSCN0004 – PPE – shirt (front) and pants.
DSCN0005 – Pants (back)
———————————————————————————————————
The BLACK writing on the ORANGE bag in these photos also says the following and the Medical Examiner number 13-4441 also matches the number in the list above that the ME assigned to firefighter Scott Norris…
13-4441 ( Large black magic marker )
17 ( Smaller black sharpie )
NOTE:
They
PI ON MON
Still Accurate
And Working
( With Personal Affects )
The first two images in the folder are of the mostly intact fire shelter that came out of bag 17. Photo 1 is topside. Photo 2 is bottom side.
The SECOND two photos are of the CLOTHING that was also in that bag 17.
The shirt and pants were laid out and photographed first lying face up… and then flipped over and the backs of the shirt and pants were photographed.
The name of that FOURTH photo in the folder showing the BACK of the pants that came out of bag 17 ( Scott Norris ) is DSCN0005.
This photo seems to CLEARLY show that there is STILL an ELECTRONIC DEVICE in the bottom of the right-pants side pocket. It has the CLEAR shape of an iPhone or one of the Android smartphones that also has ’rounded corners’… or any smartphone that has one of the durable rubber ’rounded corner’ casings on it.
NOTE: When I say CLEARLY… I really mean it. You can’t miss it sitting there pressed against the material of the side pants pocket.
In this BACK view of the pants… the RIGHT pants leg is at the TOP of the photo and the ELECTRONIC DEVICE ( in the right side pocket ) can be seen in the top-center of the photograph.
This SAME DEVICE also appears to be seen almost as clearly in that right-side pants pocket in the FRONT photo of the pants which is the THIRD photo in the first row named DSCN0004.
In BOTH of these photos… the DEVICE itself seems to be totally undamaged. The pants pocket is burned ABOVE the DEVICE, but not around the bottom of the side pocket where the device is located.
I would say the SIZE of that ELECTRONIC DEVICE appears to be just a little bit large for an iPhone… unless it has one of those large rubber protective cases on it.
It is also actually possible that this could be a handheld GPS unit.
It also has the right ‘size’ for some of the newer, smaller Garmin GPS portable units ( which also have rounded corners ).
So… obviously the MYSTERY is…
WHAT HAPPENED to whatever it is that seems to be sitting there in
Scott Norris’ side pants pocket?
Was it ever REMOVED from the pants and entered into evidence?…
or was it just ‘left in the pants’ and just became another ‘personal
effect’ that never entered the ‘evidence chain’ at all and just ended up
being returned to the family?
More later…
Thanks!
To be honest, when those photos came out, I was so sick of all things related to the deployment site (which I had spent the entire Christmas-New Year Holidays examining), that I just skimmed through them.
I also don’t remember what you came up with awhile back regarding whether the time-stamp of a video gets attached to the beginning or the end of it, and couldn’t find that info via the Google Tool yesterday.
Tom Story’s two cellphone images that he also Instagrammed don’t have any metadata left in them except the originals are geo-coded. It really gets quite random!
Come to think of it (I’m just waking up), since Scott’s mother generously sent that photo to the investigative team, I’m thinking if she had access to the cellphone, she might have sent more images in, along with a different note than the one she did send,
Reply to Marti Reed post on April 26, 2014 at 6:52 am
>> Marti said…
>> To be honest, when those photos came out, I was so
>> sick of all things related to the deployment site (which I
>> had spent the entire Christmas-New Year Holidays
>> examining), that I just skimmed through them.
I hear ya. Ditto on this end. I DO remember looking at ALL
of those photos… but I still missed seeing that (possible)
electronic device in Norris’ side pants pocket, at first.
I also started re-examining every other photo, to see if
there are similar ‘shapes’ showing in other pairs of
pants ( like Eric Marsh’s )… but only got about halfway
through the ‘extreme closeup’ phase of that last night.
They are really, really tough to look at.
Some of the burn marks and patterns are, well, quite
disturbing to view and/or contemplate.
>> Marti also said…
>> I also don’t remember what you came up with awhile
>> back regarding whether the time-stamp of a video gets
>> attached to the beginning or the end of it, and couldn’t
>> find that info via the Google Tool yesterday.
Marti… keep in mind…
The Panebaker Air Study videos are *unique* in that
the titles that someone chose for them include the
ENDING time of the video and not the START time.
That is *NOT* normal and I still really don’t understand
why they chose to actually NAME the videos that way.
For any of these digital devices using either a FAT or
an HPFS file system ( those really are the only two
choices these days )… the actual recorded filename
date/timestamp will ALWAYS be the ‘creation date’
( the START ) of that digital recording… whether its
a photo or a movie. If you have access to the original
HPFS or FAT file system… you can see these stamps
clearing just doing a directory listing on the files.
As far was what actually gets *embedded* in the images
themselves… the whole EXIF metadata standard really
only applies to JPEG images. There actually are no real
‘standards’, even now, for metadata getting *embedded*
into either MP4 or Apple Quicktime MOV movie files.
The only ‘standard’ that has evolved there ( for smartphones ) is that in both the MP4 and the MOV cases… a THUMBNAIL
image will be created using the FIRST FRAME of the
movie… and it will be saved to the file system with the
same name as the MOVIE itself but with a .THM file
extension. ( THM = THUMBNAIL image ).
That THM image of the first frame of the movie is what
shows up on your device when you are looking at the
folder that contains your photos / movies.
This THM thumbnail has, in fact, been somewhat
standardized and is actually just a JPEG image and,
therefore, can contain all the same standard EXIF
JPEG metadata already standardized for JPEGS.
NOTE: A THM thumbnail image is, in fact, just a JPEG
image with THM as a file extension insted of JPG. If
you RENAME any THM file and give it a filename extension
of JPG instead… then Voila!… you can ‘view’ that JPEG
thumbnail in ANY standard JPEG image viewer.
So that THM thumbnail image of the first frame of the
movie is what ACTUALLY contains all the IMPORTANT
metadata about that movie such as creation date/time,
modification date/time ( if any ), GPS data ( if any ),
frames per second, total frames in movie, etc. etc.
This is why we STILL do NOT know the exact TIME for
the YARNELL-GAMBLE video shot by Blue Ridge
Hotshot McCord. McCord EDITED his original movie
and renamed whatever the original filename from the
device was to YARNELL-GAMBLE.MOV… and then he
gave that edited copy of the movie to the SAIT investigators,
but he did NOT give them the corresponding THM thumbnail
file from his device that had all the metadata for that
YARNELL-GAMBLE movie… and the SAIT investigators
never bothered to follow up with him and obtain it.
McCord might still actually have that ORIGINAL (unedited)
Apple Quicktime MOV file AND the corresponding THM
thumbnail ( JPEG) from whatever he was using that
day to shoot that YARNELL-GAMBLE video. It was
probably an iPhone… but we are still also not sure
about that, either.
>> Marti also wrote…
>> Tom Story’s two cellphone images that he also
>> Instagrammed don’t have any metadata left in them
>> except the originals are geo-coded. It really gets quite
>> random!
Yes, it is. Android based Google phones will usually
ALWAYS try to keep GPS data in photos because
Google uses that information ( unbeknownst to you and
*without* your permission ) to update its own ‘Street View’
databases. Flickr, Facebook, Twitter and others…
same deal. It’s pretty much SOP these days so beware.
>> Marti also said…
>> Come to think of it (I’m just waking up), since Scott’s
>> mother generously sent that photo to the investigative
>> team, I’m thinking if she had access to the cellphone,
>> she might have sent more images in, along with a
>> different note than the one she did send,
Possible. I would also believe that even if Scott’s mother
DID receive a fully functioning device back… that
she would have no idea how to even check and see
if there WAS anything else ‘on it’.
Unless you actually USE one of these puppies these
days… it’s like voodoo and people have no idea how
to look at the actual ‘file system’ and/or walk through
all the FOLDERS on the device.
Followup…
The reason we DO have the exact TIME/DATE
stamps (according to the Canon device, anyway)
and frame length count and frames per second
values… etc… for Christopher MacKenzie’s
two Canon Powershot VIDEOS is because
we DO also have the corresponding THM
(JPEG) thumbnail images for those two Apple
Quicktime format MOV movie files.
Those two THM files WERE included on the
CD that mysteriously made its way to the SAIT
investigators and they ARE sitting in Mr.
Dougherty’s public online Dropbox along with
Christopher’s movie files.
I just wish the SAIT investigators had had the
brain cells to get the same THM thumbnails
from Blue Ridge Hotshot McCord ( and everyone
else who was handing them ‘movies’ ).
Thank you!
**
** VIDEO FADE BETWEEN…
** MACKENZIE 3:51.58 PM CELLPHONE PHOTO IMG_2836.JPG AND
** MACKENZIE VIDEO MVI_0888.MOV AT +6 SECONDS
Well… here is the ‘other piece of the puzzle’ as far as confirming that the
MacKenzie MVI_0888.MOV video MUST have been taken during that 3 minute
and 22 second ‘time gap’ between MacKenzie cellphone photos IMG_2836
( taken at 3:51.58 ) and IMG_2837 ( taken at 3:55.20 ).
It’s another ‘video-fade’ that uses the exact same ‘stillframe’ from +6 seconds into the MVI_0888 video… but this time it compares it to the ‘earlier’ IMG_2836 cellphone photo.
Just as there is really no doubt that the MVI_0888 video had to have been shot
BEFORE cellphone photos IMG_2837 and IMG_2838… THIS ‘crossfade’ proves
that it ALSO had to have been shot AFTER cellphone photo IMG_2836.
In other words… somewhere in that known 3 minute and 22 second ‘time gap’ between cellphone photos IMG_2636 and IMG_2637.
Here is that new ‘crossfade’ video…
YouTube Video Title: IMG-2736-and-MVI-0888
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bolQm3uYx2E
YouTube About Information for this video…
__________________________________________________________________
This video is a ‘comparison’ between MacKenzie cellphone photo IMG_2736.JPG, taken at 3:51.58 PM… and a still frame from +6 seconds into MacKenzie’s first Canon Powershot video MVI_0888.MOV shot at the same location as the cellphone photo.
As the images ‘fade in/out’… it is clear that the MVI_0888.MOV video was shot AFTER the IMG_2736.JPG ( 3:51.58 PM ) cellphone photo. There is a significant ‘forward push’ of the smoke cloud in a due SOUTH direction into the ‘middle bowl’ which is not seen in the cellphone photo.
So this is the ‘other half’ to the proof that MacKenzie’s first 9 second long MVI_0888.MOV video was shot sometime between MacKenzie cellphone photos IMG_2736 ( taken at 3:51.58 PM ) and IMG_2737 ( taken at 3:55.20 PM ).
__________________________________________________________________
OTHER NOTES ABOUT THIS ‘VIDEO FADE’…
This time… instead of ‘clockwise’ as with IMG_2738, this IMG_2736 cellphone image had to be rotated a few degrees COUNTER-CLOCKWISE in order for the terrain to match up exactly as the images fade in and out of each other.
Notice the old-grader location in the distance in about the center of the ‘collage’.
It remains stationary as the images fade in and out.
Also.. as with the other IMG_0888 ‘video fade’ comparison with IMG_2738, this ‘panorama’ also has the rock outcrop on the RIGHT side of the frame which is where the northern ridge of the fuel-filled box canyon actually meets the floor of the middle bowl.
You can see clearly how CLOSE that advancing fireline really was ( even at 3:51 PM ), to the mouth of that box canyon. The fireline is only about 4600 feet away with nothing but explosive (manzanita, etc.) fuel in-between it and the mouth of the box canyon.
** THE ‘WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY’ FOR CANON VIDEOS / PHOTOS
So we have now nailed down a 3 minute and 22 second ‘window of opportunity’ between 3:51.58 and 3:55.20 in which MacKenzie must have put his iPhone away for a moment… and then shot the following FOUR things with his Canon…
__________________________________________________________________
MVI_0888.MOV – The first 9 second video which contains…
(Eric Marsh): Ah… I jus… I was just sayin’ I knew this was comin’ when I called ya
and asked how… what your comfort level was. I could just feel it… ya know.
(FF (Misner?) standing next to Ashcraft): We’ve been feelin’ it all day.
( Ashcraft laughs in response and then FF (Misner?) spits on the ground ).
IMG_0889 – First of two still photos taken in-between the 2 videos
IMG_0890 – Second of two still photos taken between the 2 videos
MVI_0891 – The second 9 second video which contains…
(Eric Marsh): …strange, ya know.
(Unknown 3rd person OR Marsh finishing his previous statement): You bet.
(Jesse Steed): I copy… and it’s almost made it to that two-track road we
walked in on.
__________________________________________________________________
To get the ‘total time’ it took to take these 4 items all we have to do is look at the original Canon timestamps for these items and ( even though we know the time offset is wrong ) we still get the ‘duration’ for all four items…
1601:31 – 110-0888 – First VIDEO – Duration: 9.24 sec.
1601:52 – 110-0889 – First still photo 12 seconds after video
1602:00 – 110-0890 – Second still photo 8 seconds later.
1602:10 – 110-0891 – Second VIDEO, 10 seconds later – Duration: 9.14 sec.
SIDENOTE: The ‘numbers’ just above still also mean for certain that the TOTAL time ( and possible maximum total missing conversation length ) BETWEEN the two videos is exactly 30 seconds… since the first video ended at 1601:40 and the second one actually started at 16:02:10 ( according to the Canon Powershot’s own timestamps ). That means that whatever ‘conversation’ MacKenzie FAILED to catch… it wasn’t much. It took Marsh and Steed a total of 18 seconds to say just the few things they did… so there was only time for less than twice as much similar ‘conversation’ in-between the two videos. No more than a few quick sentences can be ‘missing’ in-between the two videos.
So… based on the Canon’s own timestamps shown above… the TOTAL time it took for these four shots to have happened ( start to finish ) equals…
48 seconds. ( 1602:19 minus 1601:31 ).
Take 48 seconds ‘away’ from our ‘known’ 3 minute and 22 second ‘window of opportunity’ and that leaves…
2 minutes and 34 seconds.
Divide that right in half and we get the following…
1 minute and 17 seconds for MacKenzie to switch from using his iPhone to
take cellphone photo IMG_2736 to the start of the first Canon Powershot VIDEO.
Then 48 seconds to take all FOUR Canon Powershot items in a row.
Then another 1 minute and 17 seconds for MacKenzie to switch BACK from
using his Canon to his iPhone again to take cellphone photo IMG_2737.
Perfectly possible.
So the only thing left to determine is to which END of this 3 minute and 22 second ‘sliding window’ those 48 seconds of Canon activity belong… and we have the exact TIME OFFSET for ALL of the Canon powershot images that day.
I think that can be accomplished with just a few more COMPARISONS of
stillframes from the absolute START of video 1 and the absolute END of
video 2… and see whether this 48 second contiguous sequence is closer to
the 3:51.58 window START time… or has to be more towards
the 3:55.20 window END time.
More later…
Followup: Obviously some ‘number’ related typos up above.
The MacKenzie cellphone photos being talked about above
are, in all cases, in the ‘2700’ series.
IMG_2736.JPG
IMG_2737.JPG
IMG_2738.JPG
Anywhere it accidentally says ‘IMG_26xx’ or ‘IMG_28xx’
above is just a typo.
Maybe I am just a crazy old fire fighter—-But
with out all the fading that is what I saw way back when we started this and my brain went click.
Why would they move out of the black and walk down in front of that?
The Fire its self should be telling them that’s a really bad idea.
My education of brush fires tells me that fire front is getting ready to romp and eat up the landscape.
The laying down of the column on to the brush is actually sucking the fire to it as the winds lay the smoke over it is like a giant vacuum pulling oxygen in to the burning process. That kind of burning can get so radical as to sound like a jet flying low over the fire.
The only conclusion I have is they felt they could beat the fire to the BSR. Calculated risk? They wanted off the mountain before they got stuck up there until the fire laid down. Again my thoughts with out proof.
Reply to Bob Powers post on April 25, 2014 at 7:39 am
Mr. Powers…
Yes. I believe THIS one ( the dramatic difference
between the two photos ) is EASY to see… even
without all the digital gymnastics… but I did the
‘crossfade’ video anyway just to show how
DRAMATIC the difference really is in just that
short passage of time.
Tex (Sonny) Gilligan had never taken a WFF course
in his life… and even HE knew it was time to
‘get the hell out of there’ more than an HOUR
before these moments.
That ‘green carpet’ spread out in front of that
thing is mostly bone-dry manzanita.
‘Gasoline on a stick’… as some call it.
As we know now… there was about to be a
very large EXPLOSION.
It really is inconceivable that Marsh and Steed
would *NOT* have anticipated what was about
to happen down there… or that any of the other
(supposedly) trained men wouldn’t have said…
“Walk out in front of that?… are you nuts?”
What I wrote below, but wanted to repeat it in response to your comment, Bob:
The biggest reason, ala Bob Powers and his student RTS, for making sure there is a recognized and supported “what if” person on every crew!!
“What if” someone on this crew had said, looking at the fire behavior and the wind and knowing how wacky this can all get underneath a typical southwestern thunderstorm cell, and seeing how close this fire was moving toward that bowl-canyon’s entrance, “I don’t think we should go there. What if that fire turns and starts burning up that bowl?”
I learned that from you two, and I think it’s really Importent.
Mr. Powers – I am thankful that you are an OLD fire fighter. BUT GMIHS did not leave the black because they were ignorant of what was around them. They were ordered off the ridge -period. What needs to be discussed is who would have the power to insist they leave the black. Who would call them and require this movement? What are the human factors that these men worked under (City of Prescott & Forest Service)? They knew the last time they turned a directive down they were punished. They had eyes on the fire (Eric). They were told by someone that they had enough time to get to the ranch. Who possibly started a back burn that whipped up the canyon? Who is not talking that knows the truth? Who is being haunted by the memories of knowing a mistake was made? Who will finally step up and talk – standing up for the Granite Mountain Hotshots – finally stopping those voices that say it was them being cowboys? These men may have been young wildland firefighters but they knew the rules, they knew fire, they knew the fuels, they had their eyes on the fire, they would not take risks with their lives. I think a lot of good conversations are happening here – but – pressure needs to be placed on the so called leaders who do not accept the responsibility of leadership: “honesty”, “strength”,”courage”.
Only as an Old WFF and my past will I go here and it is not to assign Blame as much as responsibility.
The safety of the crew was Steed and Marsh’s they had that responsibility as all of us in the past have had.
Safety out weighs orders. One Foreman on that crew could have voiced a concern none evidently did but we don’t know that.
The real problem is simple–
No evaluation of the 10 Standard Orders…..
No LCES when they moved……
No scouted escape route…..
Those are the basics no matter who orders you to move……..
Some would say the entire crew is also responsible for their safety…..
Or each individual. I believed that my whole carrier SAFETY IS EVERYBODYS RESPONSIBILITY.
Deborah and Bob~
I agree with both of you. And thank you so much, Deborah, for contributing to this quest for the truth.
Where to begin.
I first joined this in December because, as a photographer, I saw Chris’ camera sitting in the middle of the deployment site, when no-one else did. I wanted to know what happened to it.
After a great deal of analysis, research, and connecting-the-dots, I discovered that it, and a bunch of cellphones had been with-held by the Prescott Fire Department from the “chain of evidence.” I discovered that that didn’t “matter” because, once the Yavapai County Sheriff signed off on a piece of paper that “no foul play” was involved, there would be no legally accountable investigation. I discovered that Darryl Willis was twisting his story into all kinds of pretzels to make sure nobody knew what actually happened to Chris’ camera. “Why would he do that?” I wondered.
I believe things are being withheld. I believe that is for a reason. Otherwise, why would that still be the case, now, nine months later. Somebody is being “protected,” I believe, and I still have no clue who that somebody is.
My brother, when he was a 15-year old Eagle Scout, got himself killed and almost got some other people killed, when he was ordered to get his patrol down off a ridge as quickly as possible. He was only fifteen. I always wondered why he did what he did. I could never figure it out, except that he was responding to that voice of authority. All I could do was decide to never do what he did. No matter what. No matter what pressure I felt was on me to do it.
This “incident” has not been seriously investigated. All we have done is try to pick away at what we are being ALLOWED to see. That’s not good enough.
I wish my very very best to you, Deborah. What happened to your son, and all these fine young men, has broken my heart over and over again. I’m a graduate of Prescott College, by the way. With all that that entails.
Based on the way things are being don now the only answers will come from a court hearing which may or may not happen, based on settlements. No body else will identify mistakes, decisions or orders made. Its a new world out there and has nothing to do with preventing the next one. Say a prayer and be safe….
SFFO # 10 should be #1……..
Mr. Powers… if you read ALL of the ‘wrongful death’ claims that have been filed so far… it is perfectly clear that as far at the families are concerned… ANY possible ‘settlement’ must ALSO include what are called ‘action items’ that have NOTHING to do with MONEY.
The families WANT the TRUTH to come out… and they WANT to know that the WFF industry is taking steps to make sure ( as MUCH as they possible can ) that something like this can be prevented from happening again ).
So even a ‘settlement’ might *REQUIRE* another investigation be held… and/or public admissions about what they ALREADY might know… but are refusing to release publicly.
Civil lawsuits CAN require that the defendant(s) take certain ACTIONS as part of any ‘settlement offer’… and these claims do just that.
Exactly.
WTKTT. The two firefighters you referenced above (from video0888), Ashcraft and possibly Misner is not correct. Ashcraft is sitting between Parker and Deford. I think the FF standing beside Mackenzie in 0888 (the one who spits) could possibly be Joe Thurston. This appears to be the same FF in image 0878, 0879, 0883, 0884. The same person is in Ashcraft’s photo.
At the 7-8 second mark of the 0888 video (Thurston’s?) red chainsaw chaps come into view.
The other FF standing to the right of (Thurston?), I believe, could be Anthony Rose, but not very certain about that.
I disagree. I think, from looking at lots of images and other stuff, that sawyer is Clayton Whitted.
On the other hand, I agree that the one standing to the right of him is Anthony Rose, the youngest of the GM Hotshots.
Andrew Ashcraft is sitting – his shirt has a circle stain on the (R) shoulder. Yes he is between Wade Parker and Dustin DeFord. I had the opportunity to sit on the that same rock (thank you to the one who took me there). The view was panoramic – plus aggravating. They worked hard all morning to have it all for not because of a retardant drop – nice work put out the back burn. This is why they re-positioned.
Again, thanks for doing this, WTK and Calvin. I think it’s really important to have tightened this image sequence up in order to see what they were seeing, and when.
Another important visual for this sequence (that I had forgotten about until going back to redo it) is Scott Norris’. That’s Scott standing up on that rock taking his photo in most of these Caldwell photos and videos. The link is: https://www.dropbox.com/sh/p78do502dflii7b/fhrel76c3A#/ .
According to the ReadMe that accompanies the photo:
“Karen Norris, Scott Norris’s mother, provided this photo to Randy Okon, a member of the accident investigation team. In her email, she wrote “The following text, along with this photo was sent from Granite Mtn Hot shot, Scott Norris to me, his mother, on June 30 at 3:54 pm : ‘This fire is running at Yarnell!!!’ This was the last text I received from him. Thank you, Karen Norris.”
PS I think you can see Scott shooting that photo 1 second into Chris’ second video, MVI_0891.MOV.
In IMG_2735, while Caldwell is shooting his video, Scott has what looks like his cellphone to his ear. In 2736 he seems to be looking down onto it. In MVI_0888, he is still holding it, in IMG_IMG_0889 he is holding it and looking out over the fire, and in MVI_0891 you see him shoot it, then lower it, and then then look down onto it! By IMG_2737, he is sitting down on that rock he was standing on.
So. depending on how accurate that 3:54 stamp on that message he sent to his mother is, this would pin that second video pretty closely to 3:54 PM, and also underpin this re-ordering of the whole sequence.
Since I’m still the last photographer on the planet without a smartphone, I’m not sure how all these details I just described translate.
And, by the way, looking at my ancient notes regarding The whereabouts of the cellphones, I have no indication of Scott’s cellphone ever entering into the chain of evidence.
PS All typos are courtesy my iPad.
See below (I think–I can never quite tell where comments in threads land before I post them) for why/how I have (based on Scott Norris’ photo) currently placed the beginning of Chris’ second vide at 3:54 PM.
LOL!!! I guess it’s above!
**
** VIDEO FADE BETWEEN…
** MACKENZIE 3:55.31 PM CELL PHOTO IMG_2837.JPG AND
** MACKENZIE VIDEO MVI_0888.MOV AT +6 SECONDS
Reply to calvin post on April 24, 2014 at 3:54 am
>> calvin wrote…
>> I believe another comparison can be made between image
>> 2738 and the 7-8 second mark in video 0388.
Here you go…
YouTube Video Title: IMG-2837-and-MVI-0888
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-MC2RQwroQo
The MacKenzie IMG_2837.JPG photo had to be ‘rotated’ clockwise a few degrees
in order for the terrain to match as it ‘overlays’ the MVI_0888.MOV video stillframe.
I used the +6 second mark for the ‘still frame’ from the MacKenzie video instead of
the +7 second mark just because that retains just a ‘bit’ of the fireline in the bottom
left corner of the photo ( similar to the Wade Parker texted photo ).
If we are going to now ASSUME that Christopher MacKenzie’s iPhone photo
timestamps are true and accurate ( and there really is no reason to NOT believe
that, at this point )… then I believe this ‘video fade’ between these two photos
PROVES that the first MacKenzie MVI_0888.MOV video was shot BEFORE the
3:55.31 PM IMG_2837.JPG cell phone photo was taken.
If you look at the CENTER of the video as these images fade in and out of each
other you will see that there is MUCH more SMOKE in the 3:55.31 PM cell phone
photo than can be seen in the 0888 video… AND the smoke has traveled much
farther SOUTH in the cell phone photo than is seen in the video stillframe.
You can clearly see that the smoke column ( and the fireline ) was still in the
process of ‘rotating around’ to the SOUTH at this point in time… and ( as we now
know ) would continue to do so for the next 30 to 40 minutes
Other interesting things to notice in this ‘video fade’…
1) Obviously Jesse Steed ‘disappears’ from where he was captured sitting
on that rock in the MacKenzie video and by 3:55.31, when the cell phone
photo was taken. ( Well… at least his red-helmet disappears but I believe if he
had still been sitting there it would ALSO be in the cell phone photo. )
2) Look to the RIGHT SIDE of BOTH of the photographs. That little ‘rock
outcrop’ that appears in the lower right is, in fact, the northern ridge of
the fuel-filled box canyon as it meets the floor of the middle bowl.
So you can see ( from left to right ) in this photos how SHORT the
distance really was from the fireline to the mouth of the box canyon
before they even left the safe black. The fireline was only about 4,600
feet from the mouth of the box canyon at the time the 3:55.31 PM
cell phone photo was taken.
OK, here’s what I’ve ferreted out so far:
2735 Second of Chris’s cellphone pix of Robert Caldwell shooting his video down below where Chris is. 3:50:19
2736 Chris shoots the fire on his cellphone with Caldwell right in front of him. 3:51:58. Pretty much just barely time enuff for Caldwell to get there.
2737 Chris shoots the fire on his cellphone: 3:55:20. About 3 1/2 minutes after shooting 2736.
2738 Chris shoots the fire on his cellphone again. 3:55:31. 11 seconds after shooting 2737. This is the photo WTK is comparing to the look of the fire in the 0888 video, saying that in the 2737 photo the the fire looks more intense and more turning to the south, and thus later than the 0888 video.
If the 0888 video was shot before the 2738 cellphone photo, it would have had to be taken between the 2736 and 2737 photos, in order for there to have been time to do that, and definitely not before 2736.
And even then there would have just been barely time for him to have done that.
I’m now remembering this was where we began to get hung up when we last tried to sequence this. It was hard to imagine then, and still hard to imagine now, Chris switching back and forth so quickly between all of this in this short frame of time. Unless he passed off either his camera or his cellphone to somebody else. Which is not impossible.
If indeed the fire progression seems to you and Calvin to indicate that the video + two photos + video quick sequence happened before IMG_2738, which was taken on Chris’s cellphone at 3:55:31 (and most likely at least a vaguely accurate timestamp), it had to have happened during that 3 1/2 minute gap between 2736 and 2737.
Does that seem reasonable?
The more I think about this, the more I don’t find it reasonable unless someone other than Chris was shooting either with his canon powershot camera or his cellphone. As a photographer, switching back and forth like this doesn’t make physical or mental sense.
On the other hand, if there were two people doing this, it would, but they would have to have been very close together given the angles seen in the images.
Marti. You are exactly right. The 088 (and probably the 0891) video was taken between images 2736 and 2737
As I stated before. The proof is in the pair of safety glasses Dustin Deford has in his hand in image 2735 and appear inside his work gloves in image 2737. I believe that Dustin Deford can be seen in video 0888 tucking the safety glasses inside his work glove.
Typo… video 0888 not video 088
Yes, I remember that conversation between us.
And it makes sense.
But, dang, it’s hard to fathom Chris switching back and forth so quickly between the powershot and the cellphone unless he had a reason (maybe I’m just too lazy as a photographer to feel my way into this?) .
So apparently he took several photos with the powershot of the sawyers shooting a photo and then heading up to the “convo” site, then shot several photos via his cellphone of Caldwell capturing his video–which also captured Abel saying “hunker down and be safe”– then shot Caldwell after he landed in front of him with his cellphone, then switched to his canon powershot to capture the first video of the “discussing the options” video, then switched to capturing two photos, then switched to capturing his second video of that conversation, and then switched to his cellphone to shoot two more photos of the fire advancing rapidly toward the fuel-filled bowl they were about to descend into.
This is all making about as much highly refined sense to me as a photographer as Tom Story’s 4:39 photos of a VLAT drop over the fire.
But then I maybe a seriously lazy photographer compared to Chris MacKenzie
And a massively whole-hearted thank you to Chris MacKenzie for working his butt off as both a fire-fighter and a photographer/videographer for capturing all of this so we can, after his death (RIP) try to figure out what the Granite Mountain Hotshots were seeing and, thus, trying to figure out what to do. Love to you Chris and your powershot which I saw on that deployment site when nobody else did!
And now that we have refined all of this (even tho, as a photographer,
Chris’s choice of ways to get his images don’t totally make sense to me), I am wondering. Can anybody tell me what difference/significance all of this makes?
Reply to Marti Reed post on April 24, 2014 at 6:28 pm
>> Marti said…
>> If indeed the fire progression seems to you and
>> Calvin to indicate that the video + two photos + video
>> quick sequence happened before IMG_2738, which was
>> taken on Chris’s cellphone at 3:55:31 (and most likely at
>> least a vaguely accurate timestamp), it had to have
>> happened during that 3 1/2 minute gap between 2736
>> and 2737.
>>
>> Does that seem reasonable?
Certainly does, Marti. Thank you.
See a new ‘crossfade’ video link post above that pretty
much supplies the ‘other piece’ to this puzzle and
PROVES that the MVI_0888 video HAD to have been
taken inside this 3 minute and 22 second ‘window’
you have identified.
And yes, I see that very short distance. At 3:55 PM. And I want to say to those awesome beautiful firefighters, whose memorial videos I have had to watch in order to identify them in all those photos and videos, please don’t go there.
I hear ya… but remember… 17 of those men didn’t make
the decision to ‘go there’ at all. Only 2 of them did.
The other 17 were just ‘along for the ride’.
Sad… but true.
The biggest reason, ala Bob Powers and his student RTS, for making sure there is a recognized and supported “what if” person on every crew!!
“What if” someone on this crew had said, looking at the fire behavior and the wind and knowing how wacky this can all get underneath a typical southwestern thunderstorm cell, and seeing how close this fire was moving toward that bowl-canyon’s entrance, “I don’t think we should go there. What if that fire turns and starts burning up that bowl?”
Maybe Brendan McDonough just reflected
the view of ALL of those 17 men with
regards to why no one said anything.
In his mainstream media ABC interview,
filmed with him sitting in a chair inside
Granite Mountain Station 7 and in front of
the team’s tool bench… Brendan said
was describing his moments of decision
to leave his lookout and summarized
those decisions saying…
“I knew fer sure it was time to get out of there”.
The interviewer then deftly asked…
“And what about them? Couldn’t they see
what you were seeing? Should THEY have
been ‘getting out of there’ at that same
moment?”
Brendan was caught off guard… leaned
back and put his hands behind his head
and obviously thinking carefully about
what to say next. All he finally said was…
“I’d never questioned any of their decisions
before… so why should I question them now?”
I might be paraphrasing some above… but
that was the ‘gist’ of the ABC interview at
that point. Brendan says he NEVER
questioned ANY of ‘their’ decisions
( Marsh and Steed ).
That probably generally applied to the rest of
that crew as well.
There were 17 other men up there
(supposedly) experts in fire behavior… and
not one of them seemed to say… “This
is NOT a good idea.”
Great catch, thanks.
Hopefully this might just become a Lesson Learned worthy of the sacrifice required to learn it.
WTKTT
I doubt that I would say all 17 were supposedly experts in fire behavior. 2, 3, 4 and maybe even 5 year WFF are not experts in fire behavior.
that is why most Superintendents and Asst. have 10 to 15 years experience in wild land fire. However they were or should have been trained every year with refreshers in the 10 and 18, fire weather, and fuels. It takes a lot of fires and a lot of different fires to understand fire behavior. The other foreman below Steed should have had some grasp of FB.
Way back I said a crewmen with 21/2 years was not the person to put as a lookout. Before I left California SAFTY FIRST had been signed off on which required a minimum Sector Boss or now Strike Team Leader for look out. It is very important to understand FB, Fuels and weather to give accurate reports to the crew. The safety of the entire crew depends on the Lookout. The ability to stay ahead of any threats and the complete trust of his supervisor.
A good lookout never stops McDonough could have and should have continued to notify the crew of the fire changes and what was happening after he got in the truck. He should have found a vantage point and continued to look out for the crew. A foreman or higher would have done just that until they could not be of service.
“McDonough could have and should have continued to notify the crew of the fire changes and what was happening after he got in the truck. He should have found a vantage point and continued to look out for the crew. A foreman or higher would have done just that until they could not be of service.”
I never would have known enough to have thought of that. Thank you.
It seems that McDonough was there be cause he was sick and all he did was take weather. Another lack of training and what a true Lookout dose? He was just hanging out taking weather not advising of the increased fire activity. So lackadaisical that the fire almost got him.
Sorry but that has always bothered me.
i’m calling BS about McDonough continuing to be lookout for GM…
there was no better vantage point than what GM had. there was no where else he could have gone to be an effective lookout.
besides the fact, he was assisting in the movement of vehicles…
i think the fact that neither BR nor McDonough seemingly felt the need to report the windshift to GM lends credibility to the fact that NONE of them thought GM was moving through the green. they all thought GM was “picking their way through the black” down the two track they had been trying to tie together and that they had originally walked up.
xxfullsailxx, as I am understanding the Blue Ridge unit logs, they KNEW GM was *not* doing that b/c the trail was close to burning over….
Thanks WTKTT. It appears that the 0888 video was taken between the 2736 and 2737 video (to me). If this is the case, this would mean the discussing options conversation heard in the 0888 video comes only moments after the promise of air support, down there, ASAP by Todd Able. BTW, I do not think for a minute that the IMT were planning to use an expensive load of retardant to facilitate a safe passage of GMIHC. It would , however, seem realistic that retardant would be placed on the south side of the active fire front, hopefully delaying the fires advance into Yarnell and Glen Isla. And could have influenced the decision to move toward Yarnell. And if the combination of fire retardant, increasing RH, decreasing temperature at the end of the burn period slowed the fire progression. Maybe, just maybe, GM (and others) could have worked with the dozer to create a line to burn out from before the next burn period.
Reply to calvin post on April 24, 2014 at 7:27 pm
>> calvin said…
>> Thanks WTKTT. It appears that the 0888 video was
>> taken between the 2736 and 2737 video (to me).
There is no ‘appears’ about it (anymore), calvin.
It’s a fact.
See the new ‘crossfade’ video between IMG_2736
and the stillframe from MVI_0888 ( posted as a new
parent comment above ) and there is no doubt about it.
>> calvin also wrote…
>> If this is the case, this would mean the discussing
>> options conversation heard in the 0888 video comes
>> only moments after the promise of air support, down
>> there, ASAP by Todd Able.
That is exactly what it means… and it means a number
of other things, too… such as…
1) This ‘discussing their options’ and/or ‘comfort level’
discussion took place up to 5 minutes BEFORE ASM2
Rory Collins left the fire at 1558.
2) Something made them WAIT at least 10 minutes
AFTER this video-captured ‘comfort level’ discussion
before actually ‘leaving’ at 4:04 ( unless it can be
established that the carrier network timestamp on
Parker’s text message is now also WRONG… OR
that Parker somehow texted that message out
WHILE they were already walking south. )
3) It puts Brendan McDonough in a completely different
place in time when he might have been ‘overhearing’
these conversations other than the moment he was
taking his own 4:02 photos over on Highway 89.
Etc… etc. A LOT of things need to be ‘re-evaluated’.
I still haven’t managed to ever figure out Brendan’s trail. I find it still REALLY confusing.
Since the additional unit logs surfaced in
February… it’s pretty clear that Brendan
DID just ‘convoy’ out with the Blue Ridge
guys and they all drove south through
the Sesame area, then through Glen Ilah,
then turned north on Highway 89 at
4:02 PM ( when Brendan shot those pics
out the window of the Sup truck )… and
then they all headed over to the Youth
Camp at end of Shrine road.
So even if the TIME for the ‘discussing their options’ conversations moves BACK to the
3:53 PM timeframe… Brendan was
( supposedly ) still in the GM Supervisor
truck with ( in his own testimony ) the
intra-crew radio volume ‘cranked up’.
But what does that do to the photos he took from Hiway 89 in Yarnell at 4:05ish? Did he drive down Sesame to 89 and then up Shrine to where Blue Ridge was and then help “bump” the rest of the trucks, which is what it looks like to me?
When I read the Unit Logs, I find them very confusing as to who went where and when.
Whatever whenever, I think it may have been quite difficult for him to have been paying complete attention to what was coming over the radio, given all that was going on.
Sorry, I misread what you wrote. What I’m finding confusing is exactly that “bumping” route. Some make it sound like they just drove across that newly scraped dozer line directly from Sesame to Shrine Road (which makes sense time-wise) and others sound like they went all the way down Sesame and back up Shrine just to get to the Youth Camp which, to me, doesn’t seem to make sense. But maybe that’s what they had to do. But I find the notes and logs are kind of jumbled about this.
Just thinking “out loud.”
Sorry folks to take away from YHF information sharing, but I posted this last night, reconsidered and reposted.
EN wrote:
“Fire20+ who leapt on ME for things that *I* did not say (and do not believe) while he simultaneously IGNORED the fact that it was BOB and WTKTT who said the things that Fire20+ is accusing ME of saying. This utter BULLSHIT has gone on for MONTHS, and it continues…”
—OK, so you were quoting somebody else, why not just quote them then? Folks would then understand the idiotic words you (you statements are appropriate here) DID put in that list weren’t yours, which raises another question. Why would you put things on a blog entry that appears to be coming out of your mouth then when your ‘jumped on’ you just can’t handle it and blame other people?—
“I had to WASTE my time defending myself on that, rather than doing the things that are far more valuable and unique, such as getting public records to guys like Gabbert or JD, who can then post them. Why am I not surprised that now Fire20+ has done the SAME fucking thing, in terms of accusing me of stuff that I NEVER said…”
—Don’t waste your time on my account, stop writing what you didn’t say or know about then you wouldn’t have to defend yourself Elizabeth and work yourself into a tissy. As far as what you say about ‘getting public records to guys…’ well, there you go again. ANYBODY can get public records by doing a records request, it is not special or generous or important, it is something ANYONE can do. You behave as if your “role” is exclusive and proprietary, your generous public service efforts, your selfless generosity to “give” this information to JD and Gabbert. They could have clearly gotten it themselves or gotten it from any other number of people who have the records also. I sure hope nobody has pointed this out to you before me, I’d hate to upset you.—
Oh, one more thing, I’m curious how the families like seeing F-bombs all over the place accompanied by victimized, crazy talk? Do you care about that at all? I cuss like a logger, but not here.
Reply ↓
I’d encourage people to also scroll down maybe 70 or so comments to see Fire20+ original comments. All he did is substantively engage a post by EN — no curse words, no personal invective beyond noting that on a substantive level EN clearly doesn’t understand very basic WFF issues. Trying to marginalize substantive responses by using emotional language including curse words, “conspiracy theorist” and the like can be effective for people not following the substantive dialogue, but is actually very harmful to advancing substantive understanding.
On a substantive level, unless and until EN first grasps some basics relating to wildland fire, and also some basics of local conditions, and begins making comments based on those facts of life, pointing out when she is speaking without support is a classic and useful function of this type of comment forum. A while back, we had a similar exchange involving another poster who, though claiming to be a WFF, was talking rot about SZ guidelines in a very misleading way. We were able to show with specificity what those guidelines actually are, and the underlying reasons for them, and for people who care to read the full exchange who didn’t have that info before, this is useful. Interestingly, the guy who was making the very odd SZ statements is one EN now seems to rely on as a supporter. It is helpful to clear up some of these misstatements.
Every now and then… it’s also useful to remember
our ‘Mark Twain’…
“We are ALL ignorant…
…just about DIFFERENT things.”
I have no problem with either people not having a background in something, or simply making either misstatement or differences in opinion. People claiming that others voicing their informed views represents an attack or trolling or stalking should be a big red flag, though.
I’ve disagreed with most people here, including you, WTKTT, just this morning, yet you aren’t dropping F-bombs and blaming me for wasting your time. I’m going to respectfully disagree with you on GPS and air, for instance, which for fire behavior like that the afternoon of the YHF is extremely limited in what it can do. That’s all good. Differing points of view are good, and frankly truly “smart” delivery might in future be able to make what’s pretty ineffective now work better.
Reply to SR post on April 24, 2014 at 1:11 pm
>> SR said…
>> I have no problem with either people not
>> having a background in something, or
>> simply making either misstatement or
>> differences in opinion. People claiming
>> that others voicing their informed views
>> represents an attack or trolling or stalking
>> should be a big red flag, though.
Yes. Agreed. I wasn’t trying to soften your
original message/intent. Civil (public)
discussion pretty much *requires* tolerance
for disagreement and not automatically
assuming someone is ‘attacking’ or all
the other adverbs you quoted.
Totally agree.
>> SR also wrote…
>> I’ve disagreed with most people here,
>> including you, WTKTT, just this morning,
>> yet you aren’t dropping F-bombs and
>> blaming me for wasting your time.
Nope. Not my style.
I am someone who WELCOMES debate.
It’s always the chance to learn something.
>> SR also wrote…
>> I’m going to respectfully disagree with
>> you on GPS and air, for instance,
And I respectfully *accept* your opinion.
It’s a ‘touchy’ ( and complicated ) subject.
>> which for fire behavior like that the
>> afternoon of the YHF is extremely limited
>> in what it can do.
Yes. Most likely. Marsh could have had a
Navy-Seal style laser-location receptor
on his helmet and Air Attack could have
had the corresponding equipment onboard…
…that still doesn’t mean they would have
ACTUALLY been able to fly to that spot
to dump any retardant. It could still have
been a suicide mission for the Air Resources
and they would have been hauling pieces of
airplanes out of the canyon as well as well
as bodies.
>> SR also wrote…
>> That’s all good. Differing points of view
>> are good, and frankly truly “smart” delivery
>> might in future be able to make what’s
>> pretty ineffective now work better.
Yes. There is a LOT that technology can
contribute to the WFF effort in the future.
Someday… Hotshots themselves will
probably just be replaced with robots for
just pure ‘line building’… but certainly not
in OUR lifetime(s).
wait, what? SR, you’re going to try to drag me into this BS?
SR, you’re like one of those little yappy ankle-biter dogs (like a chihuahua or miniature doberman pincer…) you just yap-yap-yap and don’t really have a clue what you’re yapping at but you just can’t seem to control yourself.
but let’s go ahead and have another talk, because you seem to like to portray yourself as some sort of expert about wff’ing, but i’ll bet you have little to *0* actual on the ground experience… did you want to qualify your experience level? no, i didn’t think so.
regarding your continually ridiculous assertion that distance and time traveled should be measured on a straight line, or, as the crow flies, or, as your “back to the future” hover-board seems to work for you:
so, when you’re at a TSA turn-style security check, do you measure the time you spend walking around the maze in terms of the 50 foot straight line distance from the security inspector?
when you’re walking down a switchback trail, and the actual “as the crow flies distance” down the hill is less than a mile, but you have three miles worth of switch backs, do you time yourself based on the mile?
why don’t you walk down to your local fire department, and tell them that from now on, you’re going to measure their response time in terms of straight lines on google earth instead of the actual roads system they have to travel.
more related yet, you seem to put a lot of value in the speculation about the two track that GM could have utilized all the way to the ranch… but by your math, if you measure a straight line from lunch spot (or descent point) to the BSR… then their rate of travel would still be something closer to your previous ill-conceived logic after they walked around the very indirect two-track route.
regarding SZ’s: i don’t think you’ve ever even dealt with having to size up a safety zone, let alone take account for the safety of a squad or crew. so i would suggest you stop trying to make yourself sound like the expert you’re not.
I.e., FullSail is trying to shout to distract attention from the fact that he was speaking in complete ignorance of what SZ guidelines actually are. This is very relevant in assessing his overall credibility, and likewise relevant when EN uses references to FullSail to try to buttress her own (often quite fanciful) assertions.
FWIW, while I wasn’t following the comments actively at the time, apparently FullSail had some real doozies that were perhaps even worse earlier on. If he is a real person in the vocation he claims to have, I would strongly advise him to recognize that, since he doesn’t seem to know what he is talking about when it comes to nuts and bolts, he should go back starting at basics and re-train himself.
As regards rate of travel, yes, absolute time in terms of exposure to risk is the key variable. Just as with SZ guidelines, this is real basic stuff. There is no “A” for effort. You can have a crew running 6 minute miles and, if the course they are running is a loop in the middle of dense, dry, unburned brush, and they get burned over, there is no extra credit for the fact that as regard the loop they were making good speed, though not good time as regards forward progress.
Basically, FullSail often seems, well, not quite up to speed. The SZ guidelines are a good example, but only one of many. Since technically he is so consistently wrong, readers should bear this in mind as regards any of his posts. What technical details is he blowing? should be the main question.
SR:
how much practical experience do you have applying the 10 & 18?
how much practical experience do you have assessing safety zones?
simple questions really. and very applicable, since you seem so prepared to judge my technical expertise.
me? i’ve worked for both the FS and NPS for the last 13 years. i’ve worked on IHC’s, Helitack Rappel crews, Engines, Fuels Crew… i’ve worked in Region 3, Region 2, Region 4…
so please, continue trying to talk yourself up by attempting to belittle others. i’ll just roll your little yappy ass over and scratch your belly till your hind leg starts twitching.
You are killing me here. You’ve worked here, there, and everywhere…but still don’t know what a SZ is, still don’t know local conditions, still don’t know basically anything else in terms of the actual nuts and bolts of the realities of wildland fire? And, seem to be trying to distract attention from those awkward, to you, facts.
In my case? Well, I was the first person to call you directly on the SZ bs you were stating (to be fair, another poster initially raised the general issue, and gave fuller and more comprehensive responses that were far better than mine), the first poster to call you as to local conditions…basically, none of that is that meaningful insofar as this is real basic stuff to most people. But, it’s real basic stuff that you’ve been persistently been getting wrong. It is what it is. If you are what you claim to be, get more educated. In the practical sense.
way to avoid answering the question… you just keep yap! yap! yapping!
**
** THE WADE PARKER PHOTO WAS NOT TAKEN AT 1604 ( 4:04 PM )
Reply to calvin post on April 22, 2014 at 4:49 pm
>> calvin said…
>>
>> I suggest everyone compare (for themselves) the smoke progression from
>> the Wade Parker Picture with image 2738 from Mackenzie’s cell and decide
>> for yourself which is taken first.
There is now a VIDEO sitting up at YouTube that pretty much proves that the
Wade Parker photo ( the one he texted out ) was NOT taken at 4:04 PM that day.
That is simply the time when he actually TEXTED the photo, and NOT when the
photo was actually taken.
The Wade Parker photo that was given to the SAIT investigators had ALL of the
EXIF metadata removed and was simply a copy of the cropped version of the
original photo that accompanied the ‘text’ message from Parker’s iPhone
at 4:04 PM.
There is still little doubt that 4:04 PM is the moment when Wade Parker actually
DID accomplish the ‘text’ sendout ( give or take some seconds of latency on the
CARRIER network ). That still appears to be the actual CARRIER network
timestamp applied to the text message, and so that still means the men were
not quite ‘gaggled up’ and heading south on the first leg of their ‘mission’ yet circa
4:04 PM… but it’s still important to note that 4:04 PM is NOT the time for the
texted photo itself. It was taken much earlier than that.
So EXACTLY when WAS the Wade Parker photo taken?
It’s still hard to say… but, as Calvin says, it CAN be compared to other photos
to see if it was taken BEFORE or AFTER something else.
This new VIDEO is, in fact, a COMPARISON between that Wade Parker photo
and a ‘still frame’ from +6 seconds into the Robert Caldwell video.
There has only ever been a small amount of ‘flame’ visible at the extreme left
edge of the Wade Parker photo… but it’s just enough to COMPARE with other
photos or ( as in this case ) ‘still frames’ from one of the videos.
At +6 seconds into the Robert Caldwell video… the view and perspective into the
distance is ( at that moment ) almost identical to the Wade Parker photo so a
‘still frame’ from the Caldwell video at that point makes a good comparison view
for the Parker photo.
It is pretty clear, when comparing THESE two photos, that the Wade Parker photo
MUST have been taken some minutes BEFORE Robert Caldwell shot his video.
In the ‘still frame’ from the Caldwell video… the FLAMES can clearly see to have
ADVANCED to the SOUTH versus where they are seen in the Wade Parker photo.
I would say the flames have advanced at least 20+ feet (south) from where they
are seen in the Parker photo to where they are then seen at +6 seconds into
Robert Caldwell’s video. One part of the flamefront seems to have advanced
much further SOUTH than the other parts, at that point. It is not an ‘even’
advance of the flames… but a *general* advancement is clearly seen.
That (new) VIDEO is here…
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B9emH4nY_zs
YouTube Video Title: parker-and-caldwell
YouTube ABOUT text for this video…
________________________________________________________________
This video FADES between the Wade Parker texted photo and a
still frame from +6 seconds into the Robert Caldwell video. Notice
the FLAMES on the left hand side of the video as it fades between
the two photos. The FLAMES ADVANCE in the Caldwell video
photo and would appear to prove that the Wade Parker photo was
taken BEFORE Robert Caldwell shot his video.
__________________________________________________________________
More about all this later.
Calvin is right… there is STILL an unresolved problem with the Christopher
MacKenzie Canon Powershot timestamps ( ALL of them ). People cannot be
in two places at the same time and it is VERY unlikely that the timestamps on
Christopher’s iPhone photos are NOT accurate. It would be MUCH more likely
the time on his Canon Powershot ( used to take the two 9 second videos ) was
simply set WRONG that day.
How wrong? Still unknown.
I still believe that the timestamp on the Wade Parker ‘textout’ at 4:04 is valid
proof ( because it is an external CARRIER network timestamp ) that the men did
NOT leave that rest area and head south until circa 4:05 ( as even the SAIR
originally suggested ), but ALL of the other ‘accepted’ times for things like the
Christopher MacKenzie videos are still very much in doubt.
Thanks WTKTT… I believe another comparison can be made between image 2738 and the 7-8 second mark in video 0388.
Calvin… I can easily do another ‘fade video’ for these
two things just like I did above with the Parker photo and
the +6 second mark in the Caldwell video…
…but just to be clear ( since you have typos above )…
You are talking about…
MacKenzie cell phone photo IMG_2738.JPG
and…
+7/8 second mark in MacKenzie video MVI_0888.MOV
Correct?
Are you SURE you want to use cell phone image
IMG_2738.JPG?
The ‘fireline’ is NOT visible on the left edge of that
photo as it is with the Wade Parker photo. IMG_2738
has no fireline visible at all. It is being BLOCKED
by a firefighter’s pack in the bottom left corner.
Reply to calvin post on April 24, 2014 at 3:54 am
>> calvin said…
>> Thanks WTKTT… I believe another comparison can be
>> made between image 2738 and the 7-8 second mark in
>> video 0388
See new post above.
I went ahead and did a new ‘video fade’ on the following…
MacKenzie 3:55.31 PM cell phone photo IMG_2837
and
MacKenzie MVI_0888.MOV video at +6/7 second mark.
I believe this new ‘video fade’ proves that the first
MacKenzie video HAD to have been taken prior to
3:55.31 PM, when the IMG_2837 photo was taken.
How MUCH earlier?
Still hard to say… but we’re getting close.
Sitting here remembering the four days Calvin and I spent working on that timeline at the end of January. I kept saying the only people (including professionals) who bother checking the time settings on their cameras are mostly wedding photographers who often have to sync images from multiple cameras all the time.
Chris’s powershot was not only +/- 20 minutes off, it was a full MONTH off. That’s why I struggled to find a cellphone image or video to sync his powershot stuff with. We wrestled this timeline down enough to prove that what was being written about Chris’s pix of the sawyers “leaving” after the conversation was incorrect and those images were taken before the conversation.
We were still having some questions about fine-tuning this sequence, and Calvin was looking more at the fire-behavior than I was, and then, because it was approaching my “retirement” date, I didn’t do any more with them.
I was looking at those images last night again. Here are the timestamps I ended up with in January:
0887 – 3:52:24 PM
0888 – 4:01: 31
0889 – 4:01:52
0890 – 4:01:00
0891 – 4:02:10
I don’t remember, at this point in time exactly what I synched Chris’s powershot videos/photos with, but I’m thinking I synched them to a combination of his cellphone images and Caldwell’s video. We were also conversing at the time that even cellphone timestamps and gps data can be off a bit under those circumstances.
So……a reminder, I would NEVER expect a not-connected-to-the-internet-or-a-network camera’s timestamps to even remotely be accurate. People just don’t pay attention to them unless they have a serious reason to.
So, now I’ll go look at Tom Story’s images and see if I can figure out what’s going on with them. I again have no reason to believe even he paid that much attention to the camera timestamps. But I’ll see what I can find.
I do think trying to get a more refined timeline of these images is important at this point in order to see what GM was seeing in the fire progression. So thank you!
I may have to eat my words regarding Tom Story paying attention to his time stamps. He was shooting with three cameras and a cellphone, so…..he probably was paying attention.
But I’m still downloading so……..
OK I’ve just taken a look. I’ll put my comments down below where they belong.
LOL!… messages crossing on the wires.
I was in the act of pointing that out to you just
as you were seeing that photo he took of his
own ‘pieces of kit’ lying on the ground.
I still would find it hard to believe he wouldn’t have
those puppies SYNCED so he could make sure
and get chronological order later… but maybe
he just knows himself what the ‘offsets/difference’
are and can do it that way if he ever needs to.
Reply to Marti Reed post on April 24, 2014 at 9:50 am said:
>> Marti said…
>> We were still having some questions about fine-tuning
>> this sequence, and Calvin was looking more at the
>> fire-behavior than I was, and then, because it was
>> approaching my “retirement” date, I didn’t do any more
>> with them.
It was quite some time before the MacKenzie cell phone
photos finally emerged on a public link… and at the same
time a TON of other information came online… so the
discovery about MacKenzie’s cell phone photos proving
his Canon Powershot time was wonky sort of got lost
in the noise. I remember, myself, just letting you and
Calvin hash that out because my ears were falling off
just listening to the hours of video/audio that also
came online at the same time.
So yes… this issue has been ‘laying on the table’ since
the MacKenzie cell phone photos were finally available.
>> Marti also said…
>> Chris’s powershot was not only +/- 20 minutes off,
>> it was a full MONTH off.
Yes, it’s possible. I would believe +20 minutes easily.
If you look at ALL of the Christopher MacKenzie photos
( both Canon Powershot and iPhone ) you will see that
he had the same ‘timestamp’ problem(s) even on
Doce fire just a week or so before on June 19, 2013.
He was doing the same thing on the Doce fire.
He would take some pictures with his iPhone, and
then take some pictures with his Canon Powershot.
In one sequence from the Doce fire… he takes pictures
of a Non-VLAT retardant drop with his iPhone, and then
( according to the Canon Powershot timestamps ) he
is taking ANOTHER sequence of photos of a full DC10
VLAT Air Drop in the EXACT same location… and
according to the Canon timestamps this SECOND
DC10 VLAT drop was only 1 minutes 45 seconds
after the drop he captured with his iPhone.
Not possible. Look at the SMOKE filling the entire valley
in the background of both photos. It is NOT POSSIBLE
there could have only been 1 minute 45 seconds between
those 2 retardant drops. It really does look ( just from
the dramatic smoke difference at Doce ) that there had
to be a LEAST 20 minutes of separation… perhaps
much more.
The most ‘dramatic’ shift in understanding about what
these men did when that afternoon is going to come from
the change in the actual TIMES for the 2 MacKenzie
videos.
It could turn out that this particular ‘discussing their options’
conversation ( one of several? ) captured in the MacKenzie
videos actually took place MUCH earlier than everyone
( the SAIT and ADOSH investigators included )
has been assuming.
It actually doesn’t bode well for their ( Marsh’s and Steed’s )
‘decision making’, either.
If the ‘fire progression’ captured in the MacKenzie
photos videos actually represents the situation up
to 20+ minutes PRIOR to them actually leaving on
their ‘mission’ circa 4:05 PM… then that means the fire
HAD to have progressed much farther than seen in those
photos before they ACTUALLY left the safe black… but
they STILL decided to leave, anyway.
>> Marti also said…
>> So, now I’ll go look at Tom Story’s images and see if
>> I can figure out what’s going on with them. I again have
>> no reason to believe even he paid that much attention
>> to the camera timestamps. But I’ll see what I can find.
Thanks, Marti!
One of the Tom Story photographs shows him
photographing his OWN cameras that he had with
him that day. There are THREE serious pieces of
kit on the ground at his feet ( which means he had
at least FOUR cameras ) with him that day.
As you said… if you are using MULTIPLE cameras
to document and event ( like a wedding ), it only stands
to reason you would make SURE that ALL the times
are correct on all the devices or you might have a
helluva time later ‘organizing’ all the photos into exact
chronological order…
…but then again… (as you said)… never ASSUME anything.
Maybe even professional photographer/reporter
Tom Story wasn’t even bothering to do that.
If ANY of the Tom Story cameras had incorrect time
settings… I don’t think they were very far off. His sequence
of photos at the Ranch House Restaurant before, during,
and after the deployment look pretty *close*… it’s just
that SOME of them don’t seem to be ‘jiving’ with other
known photos ( as calvin said ) like Blue Ridge
photos, the Russ Reason video, etc.
Is there a time given anywhere for Caldwell’s video? It’s showing, in Lightroom, a stamp of 8/13/13 at 11:05:46. Do you know of anything more accurate?
I think I vaguely remember wishing I could sync Chris’s photos to that video, but I couldn’t. I think.
Also, what I’m noticing looking at this stuff is that, in some of Chris’s pix (the ones taken with his cellphone), Caldwell is down below the rest of the group when he is taking the video. Then, in the rest of the pix and the video that Chris took on the canon powershot, Caldwell is up with the group, just right in front of Chris. So I’m not sure when Caldwell was in which position.
I currently have Chris’s two cellphone pics of Caldwell taking the video at 2734 – 3:50:06 and 2735 – 3:50:19. But I don’t know whether Caldwell took that video either before or after Chris’s powershot sequence which shows Caldwell up withe group instead of just below it. I know this is just another nagging detail, but it might help get these images in a better sequence to help see the fire movement etc.
I’m getting closer. Caldwell was down a bit below the group when he took the video and Chris took pics of him doing that. Then, about a minute and a half after he finished, he was in front of Chris when Chris took one more pic with his cellphone, and then started his two videos with the two photos in between them on the powershot. I’m gonna resequence these, tying them to Chris’s cellphone pix a bit better than I did before.
Marti… I haven’t uploaded it yet… but I’ve done a
‘video fade’ of the two items Calvin seemed to
be requesting be ‘compared’ up above…
MacKenzie cell phone photo IMG_2738
and a still frame from +7 seconds in the
9 second long MacKenzie video MVI_0888.MOV.
The time stamp on that IMG_2738 iPhone image
is 3:55.31 PM… and it now *definitely* looks like
that first MacKenzie MVI_0888.MOV video was
taken BEFORE that 3:55.31 IMG_2738. Looks
like it might have been even 3-4 minutes BEFORE.
There is MUCH more ‘smoke’ evident in the
3:55.31 PM cell phone photo than in the
MVI_0888 video… and the smoke is definitely
farther SOUTH and still ‘coming around’ as the
storm was still ‘rotating’ to the SOUTH at
that point.
Followup… so we are definitely looking at
at least an +8-9 minute error in the MacKenzie
Powershot timestamps.
That’s a minimum, it would seem.
WTKTT on April 24, 2014 at 3:03 pm said:
>> Marti… I haven’t uploaded it yet…
>> but I’ve done a ‘video fade’ of the two
>> items Calvin seemed to be requesting
>> be ‘compared’ up above…
>>
>> MacKenzie cell phone photo IMG_2738
>> and a still frame from +7 seconds in the
>> 9 second long MacKenzie video
>> MVI_0888.MOV.
Upload completed. It is HERE…
YouTube Video Title…
IMG-2837-and-MVI-0888
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-MC2RQwroQ
Seems to be PROOF that the first
MacKenzie video HAD to have been
shot BEFORE the 3:55.31 PM cell phone
photo IMG_2837.JPG.
How much time ‘before’?
Still hard to say. If we can’t trust the times
in the original MacKenzine Canon Powershot
items ( until we find the absolute real
‘offset’ and can apply that to all the items ),
then a lot of this is going to come down to
‘smoke/fireline analysis’…
…but we’re getting close.
Whoops… the link in the comment
just above didn’t survive the
cut-and-paste and seems to be
broken. See the full ‘posting’ above
or try this link instead…
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-MC2RQwroQo
Sorry to put this “down in the weeds” but if I put this at the top somewhere, I’d have to scroll miles on my iPad. I’m looking Chris’s first video. Wade Parker is scrolling on his cellphone at the very start. I now think this first video is around 3:52. This is after Caldwell comes up to join the group after shooting his video. I was thinking there was something capturing Wade shooting that photo, but I guess not. But it would make sense that he could have shot it (and maybe a couple of others) before this and was now looking to see what he wanted to send out.
Reply to Marti Reed post on April 25, 2014 at 7:22 pm
>> Marti said…
>> I’m looking Chris’s first video. Wade Parker is scrolling
>> on his cellphone at the very start.
Yes. All of these ‘child comments’ right here are actually
attached to the ‘parent’ comment I posted which pretty
much proves that even though Parker apparently didn’t
get around to actually ‘texting’ that photo to his mother
until 4:04 PM… that photo he actually sent out HAD to
have been taken BEFORE Robert Caldwell shot his
video in the 3:50-ish timeframe.
It would only make sense that he shot himself some
photos, then sat down and was NOT using this ‘break’
time to select the one he was going to text to his mother.
>> I now think this first video is around 3:52.
Very well could be. We KNOW it was shot right
AFTER his 2736 cellphone image at 3:51.58
( 2 seconds before 3:52 PM )… so depending on how
FAST Christopher was able to stow the iPhone and
start shooting with the Canon… the first video COULD
be starting within 1 minute of IMG_2736 and in the
3:52 timeframe.
>> Marti also wrote…
>> This is after Caldwell comes up to join the group after
>> shooting his video.
Yes. Caldwell’s video ( and his capture of OP1 Todd
Abel telliing Marsh to ‘hunker and be safe’ ) was ‘in the can’
at this point.
>> I was thinking there was something capturing Wade
>> shooting that photo, but I guess not.
Apparently not. Parker shot the photo he would eventually
text out to his mother at 4:04 BEFORE Caldwell shot
his video. MacKenzie captured Caldwell shooting that
video ( with his cellphone ) but apparently didn’t shoot
Parker taking HIS photo just before that.
>> But it would make sense that he could have shot it
>> (and maybe a couple of others) before this and was
>> now looking to see what he wanted to send out.
Yes. Makes perfect sense.
What is still a little ‘mysterious’ is the actual 4:04 PM
‘sendout’ time for Parker’s text + photo.
Either they all sat there for another 10 minutes or so
WITHOUT really taking any other pictures… and Parker
hit ‘send’ on his final ‘assembled’ text message + photo
at 4:04 just as they WERE about to leave…
…or they really did ‘gaggle up’ and leave BEFORE
4:04 and Parker accomplished the text sendout
WHILE they were already hiking south.
By the way… here is that link to that video again that
compares the Parker photo with the Caldwell video…
so you don’t even have to ‘scroll up’ to find it…
Video ‘crossfade’ comparison between Parker photo
and a stillframe from Caldwell’s movie…
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B9emH4nY_zs
Typo above. I said ‘NOT’ instead of ‘NOW’.
Paragraph above SHOULD have read like this…
“It would only make sense that he shot himself
some photos, then sat down and was NOW using
this ‘break’ time to select the one he was going to
text to his mother.”
**
** ACTUAL TIMESTAMP FOR YARNELL-GAMBLE VIDEO?
As it turns out… the IMG_1134 VIDEO in the ‘Jerry Thompson’ Dropbox folder
does, in fact, contain the same exact SIREN ‘cutoff’ that is heard coming from
one of Tyson Esquibel’s engines in the YARNELL-GAMBLE video.
That Thompson IMG_1134 video is publicly available HERE…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/y3jy5opssrcvzb3/lDTdC5y0-k/Jerry%20Thompson%20Photos%20Videos#/
Jerry Thompson was assigned to a brush truck working under SPGS1
Gary Cordes and they were working just several hundred yards to the
due south of the Shrine area… so when Tyson Esquibel started using
one of the engine sirens to ‘recall’ his men from Harper Canyon area
back to the Shrine Youth Camp so they could evacuate… Jerry Thompson’s
video captured those same sirens heard in the YARNELL-GAMBLE video.
There are actually TWO sirens going at the start of the YARNELL-GAMBLE
video and the ‘cutoff’ sequence for both is unique and identifiable.
The Jerry Thompson video starts at exactly 4:27 PM ( according to
documentation supplied by Thompson to the SAIT investigators when
he gave them his photos and videos ).
In the Thompson video… this first ‘siren’ heard coming from the Youth Camp
‘cuts off’ abruptly at exactly +30 seconds. The SECOND siren then simply
‘trails off’ on a 6 second countdown right after that before it, too, goes silent.
This same exact siren 1 ‘cutoff’ and siren 2 ‘6 second trailoff’ happens
in the YARNELL-GAMBLE video at exactly +4 seconds.
So ( assuming Jerry Thompson’s timestamp is correct for his video )…
here are the actual timestamps for the YARNELL-GAMBLE video and the transmission(s) captured inside of it…
_________________________________________________________________
YARNELL-GAMBLE VIDEO STARTS AT 1627.26 ( 4:27.26 PM )
+0:01 ( 1627.27 / 4:27.27 PM )
(OPS1 Todd Abel?): Copy… uh… uh… come down and appreciate if ya could
come a little faster but (you’ll) figure it out.
+0:12 ( 1627.38 / 4:27.38 PM )
(Eric Marsh): Ah… they’re comin’ from the heel of the fire.
+0:15 ( 1627.41 / 4:27.41 PM )
(Brian Frisby): Structue Group core, Blue Ridge Hotshots, on TAC 1.
YARNELL-GAMBLE VIDEO ENDS AT 1627.44 ( 4:27.44 PM )
_________________________________________________________________
It was once assumed that the YARNELL-GAMBLE video was actually shot circa
4:19 or 4:20 ( which would have been the exact moment the SAIR says that GM
was ‘deciding’ to drop down into the fuel-filled box canyon ) but if the information
above is correct then the person ( OPS1 Todd Abel? ) telling Eric Marsh he would
‘appreciate it if he could get to town a little faster’ didn’t make that request until
4:27, when ( supposedly ) Steed and the crew had ALREADY decided to drop
into the canyon and, indeed, were already +7 minutes into their descent.
So it no longer appears as if this ‘request’ for them to ‘hurry up’ actually
influenced their decision to take the shortcut through the fuel-filled box canyon.
Steed/Crew had already decided to do that before this ‘can you hurry?’
request from someone in fire command (OPS1 Todd Abel? ) even took place.
Could someone please let me know who was at this GPS location: 13.579′ W 11245.839′. Thank you for your help.
Reply to Deborah Pfingston post
on April 23, 2014 at 7:27 am
>> Deborah said…
>>
>> Could someone please let me know who was at this
>> GPS location: 13.579′ W 11245.839′.
>> Thank you for your help.
Deborah…
Not quite sure about the first ‘Latitude’ component there.
You seem to be missing the ‘Degrees WEST’ part at
the front… but since pretty much ALL of Yarnell is at
the 34 degree latitude… when I interpret those
coordinates as…
34 degrees, 13 minutes, 5.79 seconds NORTH Latitude
112 degrees, 45 minutes, 8.39 seconds WEST Longitude
…I get the following DECIMAL Lat/Long location…
34.218275, -112.752331
That point is EXACTLY the area just WEST of Highway 89
where Jerry Thompson’s BRUSH truck was working that
day to ‘prep’ those outlying homes back in there, due
south of the St. Joseph Shrine area.
To check this for yourself…
1) Call up Google Maps in your Browser
2) Then just ‘cut-and-paste’ the following line ( comma
included ) into the ‘search bar’ of Google Maps…
34.218275, -112.752331
3) Now just hit ENTER and Google Maps will display
a map of Yarnell with a large GREEN ARROW pointing
at that exact location, just WEST of Highway 89 and
NORTHWEST of the Ranch House Restaurant.
Does this point match your expectations?
By the way… this ‘Jerry Thompson’ location is the same
exact one referenced above in the ‘YARNELL-GAMBLE’
video timestamp update. Mr. Thompson’s full folder of
pictures and videos he took while working at this location
is online publicly at the following link… so maybe these
photos/videos might help you match what you are
looking for?
Jerry Thompson Photos and Videos…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/zghqmidyjqbgp1e/7tts4WSLQ1
Thank you for your help. Do you know if there were any other trucks or crew along this line/road?
Reply to Deborah Pfingston post
on April 24, 2014 at 10:35 am
>> Deborah said…
>> Thank you for your help. Do you know if
>> there were any other trucks or crew along
>> this line/road?
Deborah…
Didn’t want you to think this was missed.
Offhand… no… I haven’t seen that
information since there was no IAP
( Incident Action Plan ) ever recorded
for June 30, 2013… but I am looking into it.
At one point in one of the Jerry Thompson
videos he calls out to a co-worker whose
first name is ‘Matt’. I’m trying to identify
HIM and see if he was running another
brush truck or was part of Thompson’s.
More later…
Thank you this is very important. I cannot say exactly why at this point.
WTKTT, how are you figuring out that that is Jerry Thompson’s location? I’m not finding that in the metadata – am I missing something?
Thank you.
It matches Thompson’s own description of
where they were working that accompanies
his photos/videos… and a Google Earth
comparison of his photos/videos and the
location coordinates above seems to confirm.
They were doing ‘prep’ work on those houses
that you can see back there to the west
of Highway 89 and northwest of the
Ranch House Restaurant.
WTKTT, don’t his pictures match the OTHER side of 89 (the side closer to the fire when it hits the Shrine area) better? Why are you thinking that he was not on the OTHER side of 89, helping clear over there?
Thanks.
I am not following you. I DO believe Thompson and others were working that area WEST of 89 and the coordinates are pretty accurate… so what are you talking about?
Are you sure you are not mistaking the Google Maps red balloon for the GPS point? It’s not. It’s the GREEN ARROW.
that is some pretty serious bullshit ad-lib’ing you have going on there.
If you are talking about the references to OPS1 Todd
Abel most likely being the one who is ‘urging’ them
to ‘come to town faster’… please notice the question
mark by all the references.
It has NOT been *absolutely* confirmed that it is him…
but at the same time… it pretty much HAS been
absolutely confirmed who it is NOT.
It is NOT Darrell Willis urging GM to ‘hurry up’.
It is NOT OPS2 Paul Musser.
It is NOT SPGS1 Gary Cordes.
It is NOT Tony Sciacca ( Safety officer who arrived late )
So who does that leave that would be talking to Marsh
on the TAC 1 frequency that day, at that exact time, in
such an authoritative/supervisory way?
I will bet money that the one who is ‘urging’ them to
‘come to town a little’ faster is, in fact, OPS1 Todd Abel.
It really does sound just like his voice.
BTW: Both of the other voices in this video HAVE been
absolutely confirmed to be Eric Marsh and Brian
Frisby, by people who KNOW them ( RTS, etc. ).
#1. no one is saying, “appreciate if you could come a little faster…”
they’re saying, “come down and help us get this {whatever} a little faster…”
#2. there is no reason to think that person is talking to E. Marsh… obviously shit is hitting the fan and radio traffic is chaos… (hence BR walking on [presumably] GM’s traffic)
#3. you have no frame of reference for what “help” is being asked for or for what or who it is or the full context of the sentence, etc. etc. etc.
#4. it’s not “Structure Group *core*” it’s Structure Group *Cordes* who BR is asking for…
really? you can’t even get that right?
Reply to xxfullsailxx post
on April 24, 2014 at 4:32 pm
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>> #1. no one is saying, “appreciate if you
>> could come a little faster…”
>>
>> they’re saying, “come down and help us
>> get this {whatever} a little faster…”
Disagree. ( See my transcript up above ).
Either way… even your own ‘interpretation’
doesn’t change the meaning or the intent
of the transmission. Someone ( I believe
it is OPS1 Todd Abel ) was urging
Marsh and Granite Mountain to ‘hurry’.
>> xxfullsailxx also said…
>> #2. there is no reason to think that
>> person is talking to E. Marsh…
>> obviously shit is hitting the fan and
>> radio traffic is chaos… (hence BR
>> walking on [presumably] GM’s traffic)
It’s possible… but I really, really, really
doubt it. Not in this case, at this time.
Again… even YOUR interpretation ( even it
happens to be true ) doesn’t change what is
*actually* happening. Marsh is responding to
SOMEONE who just asked him either where
Granite Mountain *really* is at 4:27 PM ( just
15 minutes before deployment ) *OR*
someone who just asked for some kind of
explanation why it’s taking them so long
to ‘get to town’.
The most important part of this still remains
WHO that SOMEONE is… how much ‘else’
did they know about this ‘mission’ GM was
on… and why the SAIR said there were no
‘verified direct communications with Marsh
or GM’ in this time period.
>> xxfullsailxx also said…
>> #3. you have no frame of reference for
>> what “help” is being asked for or for what
>> or who it is or the full context of the
>> sentence, etc. etc. etc.
See above. Even if it was a ‘walkover’
Marsh is telling SOMEONE what GM’s
status is… and providing an explanation
for someone who didn’t seem to understand
how far they had to travel and/or why they
haven’t arrived somewhere yet. There is no
other explanation for Marsh’s response to
WHOEVER he was talking to.
>> xxfullsailxx also said…
>> #4. it’s not “Structure Group *core*” it’s
>> Structure Group *Cordes* who BR is
>> asking for…
>> really? you can’t even get that right?
Listen to the video again ( or get someone
with better ears to help you out ).
Frisby himself does appear to simply say
‘core’ instead of ‘corDES’.
I am sure that he meant ‘Cordes’… but
for accuracy I only included in my
transcript what seems to ACTUALLY
be in the captured recording.
WantsToKnowTheTruth
on April 24, 2014 at 5:51 pm said:
“See above. Even if it was a ‘walkover’
Marsh is telling SOMEONE what GM’s
status is… and providing an explanation for someone who didn’t seem to understand how far they had to travel and/or why they haven’t arrived somewhere yet. There is no other explanation for Marsh’s response to WHOEVER he was talking to.”
THAT’S your bullshit ad-libbing… again, there is no reason to think those two pieces of conversation are related. there were a hundred resources working in and around the fire on a few different tac channels. you have no evidence to substantiate any connection and MORE reason to doubt there was one…
as most of us recognize, even once GM had made it to BSR it would have taken a long time for BR to bump GM’s rigs around to them at BSR. no one was expecting them to “hurry up” anywhere. and they weren’t going to walk to Yarnell.
also, Todd Abel wasn’t even down at that end of the fire, right? Musser was dealing with things down there because Abel was busy on the north end… why would Abel be asking GM to “hurry up” to get to an area he had no idea what was going on in?
the fact is, your ad-libbing always seems to point in the same direction… in support of some nefarious, unidentifiable person who is ordering GM off the hill. i think this fact is more telling about you than the Yarnell Hill tragedy.
Reply to xxfullsailxx post
on April 26, 2014 at 8:40 am
“See above. Even if it was a ‘walkover’
Marsh is telling SOMEONE what GM’s
status is… and providing an explanation for someone who didn’t seem to understand how far they had to travel and/or why they haven’t arrived somewhere yet. There is no other explanation for Marsh’s response to WHOEVER he was talking to.”
>> xxfullsailxx wrote…
>>
>> WTKTT said…
>> Marsh is telling SOMEONE
>> what GM’s status is…
>>
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>> THAT’S your bullshit
>> ad-libbing… again.
You are deluding yourself.
It *is* Marsh speaking (verified).
He is telling SOMEONE ( who obviously wanted to know ) what is happening with Granite Mountain circa 4:27 PM, just 15 minutes before deployment.
It is a RESPONSE to SOMEONE and a continuation/end of an existing ‘conversation’ with SOMEONE.
Who do YOU think that
SOMEONE was?
>> xxfullsailxx also said…
>> there is no reason to think
>> those two pieces of
>> conversation are related.
Again… more self delusion
on your part. There is EVERY
*reason* in the world to think
that they ARE… give the time,
the context, and the circumstances.
It is POSSIBLE that Marsh’s
response is not directly
related to the person talking
at the start of the capture… but
the chances are very, very,
slim, in this case.
>> xxfullsailxx also said…
>> you have no evidence to
>> substantiate connection
Yes. I (we) do.
It’s an actual captured
recording… and the LOGICAL
explanation is that caller 2
was finishing his conversation
with caller 1.
YOU are the one who is
‘groping’ for reasons to
NOT believe it.
>> and MORE reason to
>> doubt there was one…
No, I don’t ( have MORE
reasons to doubt the 2
captures are related than
to accept that they ARE ).
See above.
YOU are the one peddling
‘doubt’… because… well…
that’s what YOU do because
you don’t even want any of
this examination of the
evidence to even be taking
place.
>> xxfullsailxx said
>> no one was expecting them
>> to “hurry up” anywhere.
Disagree.
I ( me, personally ) think the
YARNELL-GAMBLE video is
just one piece of positive
proof that someone WAS
doing EXACTLY THAT.
Your mileage may vary.
>> xxfullsailxx also said…
>> also, Todd Abel wasn’t
>> even down at that end of
>> the fire, right?
At 4:27… YES… he most
probably WAS… and this would
be further explanation why
he WAS making that radio
call we hear in the video.
It is perfectly possible that
Able HAD just actually
‘arrived’ in Yarnell… now seeing
the situation for himself… and
THAT is EXACTLY why he was
on the radio urging GM to
‘hurry’.
Todd Able WAS ‘busy on the
north end’ circa 1542 ( almost an hour earlier ) when Musser
made his ‘availability check’ radio call ( on Abel’s behalf? ),
but even by 4:10 PM things were ‘under control’ on the north end because of the complete wind reversal and
Able was then ‘free’ to get
down to Yarnell.
See the Air Study video
capture circa 4:10 PM when
Todd Abel is clearly heard
saying he will be ‘down there’
in about 5 minutes ( 4:15 ).
>> Musser was dealing with
>> things down there because
>> Abel was busy on the north
>> end.
See above. You are wrong.
You are thinking of a time
circa 1542… at least 45
minutes BEFORE the
YARNELL-GAMBLE video.
>> xxfullsailxx said
>> why would Abel be asking
>> GM to “hurry up” to get to
>> an area he had no idea
>> what was going on in?
See above.
Because it is *MORE* than
likely he *WAS* now ‘in that
area’ and *DID* have an
exact picture of what was
*going on*.
If that is the case… then it is
even *MORE* reason to
believe that *IS* Todd Abel
on the radio telling Marsh he
would ‘appreciate it if you
could get to town a little faster’.
all horseshit… but good luck proving your conspiracy theories!
i think you just figure if you say it enough times it will magically become true…
Reply to xxfullsailxx post on April 26, 2014 at 3:58 pm
>> xxfullsailxx
>> said…
>> all
>> horseshit…
>> but good
>> luck proving
>> your
>> conspiracy >> theories!
Nice try up
above, BTW.
>> i think you
>> just figure if
>> you say it
>> enough
>> times it will
>> magically
>> become
>> true…
Yes.. that is
what YOU would
‘figure’.
So what are we doing looking for the why GM-Marsh-Steed violated the 10 and 18? We can identify those that they did violate+ or – some, not the why unless some one heard something or advised something we currently have no proof of
As with this fire no survivors causes a lot of guessing. The $100.00 question is dose any one know what and why the decisions were made. I will tell you that as a Hot Shot we would always protect our crew as I believe McDonough will always do no matter what he knows no one else will ever here it from him…
Just my thoughts if they were my brothers, my crew and I am the only one that knows what ever. IT IS WHAT IT IS….
Reply to Bob Powers post on April 22, 2014 at 4:31 pm
>> Mr. Powers wrote…
>> The $100.00 question is does any one know what and why the
>> decisions were made.
Remains to be seen. All the evidence is (still) actually pointing to
the good chance that there are *more* than just a few people still
alive who know a LOT more about those very questions and
what the answers might be ( and I’m not talking about just
people who were actually in Yarnell that weekend ).
>> Mr. Powers also wrote…
>> I will tell you that as a Hot Shot we would always protect our
>> crew as I believe McDonough will always do no matter what
>> he knows no one else will ever hear it from him.
Even if it means some of his ‘other’ fire brothers could be
at risk ( even THIS fire season ) of dying?
So how far does this ‘fire brother’ thing go?
It is only your OWN crew that you are supposed to worry about
or be ‘loyal’ to? The hell with everyone else?
Is it REALLY that ‘tribal’?
We DO NOT KNOW if McDonough knows anything at all other
than what he has already talked about either in interviews or in
public.
For all we know… Brendan might have ‘missed’ one of the
first ‘discussing their options’ conversations while he was
standing on the gunwale of the GM Supervisor Truck at
1549 and was taking those pictures across the roof… or
even missed the ‘second’ or ‘third’ ( or however many iterations
there were on the same topic ) because of similar distractions.
Regardless… what hasn’t seem to fully sunk in to Mr. McDonough
himself is that ALL of the ‘official reports SAY ( unequivocally )
that he DID ‘hear them discussing their options’.
It’s a PUBLISHED fact.
So either it is TRUE… or it’s not.
Mr. McDonough has had every opportunity to DENY that claim
that appears in (all) the official reports… and to say that they are
‘mistaken’… but ( AFAIK ) he has declined every opportunity
to do that.
So if Mr. McDonough himself is willing to let ‘official’ reports
claim he knows things he’s not talking about… and is willing
to let THOSE statements stand… then he’s got a hard road
ahead of him.
Forget (for a moment) about the adults who have suffered great
loss and really do want to know all they can about ‘what happened’…
There are (many) CHILDREN of these dead men who are going
to grow up and STILL want to know what he knows ( if anything )
and they will be ASKING him every chance they get… for the
rest of HIS life.
Mr. Powers… you learned a lot about what really happened to
YOUR father from a well-written book… but what if that book
never had (complete) answers BUT you also knew ( from official
reports ) that someone who was THERE that day freely admitted
to ‘knowing more’ but simply ‘didn’t want to talk about it’?
How would you feel about that?
Would YOU still have wanted to know what he knows
and ‘fill in some truths’ about why YOUR father died?
I sure would.
Bottom line: If Mr. McDonough really doesn’t know anything or
didn’t HEAR anything other than what he has already told
investigators… and they were badly MISTAKEN to publish the
(unequivocal) statement that he DID ‘hear them discussing their
options with regards to leaving the safe black’…
…then I wish ( for his own’s sake ) he would issue a press
release to that effect, and just get it over with.
If he CANNOT issue a ‘press release’ to that effect because he
thinks that would be lying ( because he knows the statements in
ALL the official reports IS actually TRUE )… then I also wish he
would just find a way (somehow) to tell what he knows and be
‘done with it’ that (alternative) way.
I really worry about this ‘haunting’ him for the rest of his life…
unless he exercises one of the two options mentioned above.
There’s no need for it ( to haunt him ).
But perhaps he really is still just too young to realize that.
First there was no cover-up of the Rattle Snake fire because there were 9 survivors all pickup fire fighters.
only a brotherhood in the science they were from the same church camp. The fire that caught them was a back fire that got caught in a down canyon wind which was local and actually blows every night during the summer. Not hard to figure out what happened. 9 survived 15 died, In 1953 no portable radios, no fire shelters, no 10 &13, The only escape route was back up the trail they cut to the spot fire, which was the way the head of the fire was coming. Easy to figure what happened.
A Hot Shot Crew is a brother hood not just a crew. Would what McDonough says make any difference? Only in their discussion the decisions that violated Rules are easy to see. They were the responsible party any outside influence should never have dictated there safety. I dought that McDonough actually knows why they made the decision they did or if it was safe or not. His Bosses made the decision he believes they were right, in his mind he will never say they were wrong or make them look bad at least not for along time. I can say with out dought this years training will discuss the facts the 10 and 18 and move on. All the training facts are there the rest is a curiosity to know WHY. Am I wrong?
For McDonough himself, given what he’s been through he shouldn’t be expected to be able to say a whole lot, anyway. Not just a traumatic event, but then all sorts of inevitable social pressure afterwards. And, then the new job that I am sure may in some ways be viewed as a good thing now, but quickly can become isolating and lock him in to an identity with this one event as opposed to getting him back in the saddle, or in another vocation altogether. Basically I don’t think the PC response of creating an identity around these things serves anyone well.
Reply to SR on April 23, 2014 at 7:07 am
>> SR
>>
>> For McDonough himself, given what he’s
>> been through he shouldn’t be expected to
>> be able to say a whole lot, anyway.
Something tells me you haven’t read the
transcript for McDonough’s SECOND
interview with the ADOSH investigators.
They basically ‘recalled’ him for some
specific ‘followup’ questions… and they
actually played the MacKenzie video(s)
in his presence and asked him to ‘identify’
the voices. ( Oddly enough, though, even
in that second interview, they still NEVER
asked what ‘else’ he might have heard ).
McDonough’s ‘attitude’ during this second
ADOSH interview was COMPLETELY
different than his first ADOSH interview.
All of a sudden… he’s a motor-mouth.
He actually launches into his OWN
(usolicited) ‘evaluations’ of what happened
that day but places the emphasis on
‘change for the future’ towards tech stuff
like ‘linking GPS units’ together and having
fire command be able to SEE where
people are at all times, and whatnot.
That’s when McDonough goes into great
detail about Granite Mountain having at
least FOUR handheld GPS units with
them that day… but complaining that
while you could exchange coordinates
with ‘each other’… that somehow fire
command still doesn’t know where
anyone is in real time.
NOTE: Not even the Garmin Oregon 450
GPS that we can see on Caldwell’s pack
strap, and (possibly) lying face-down
right there in the dirt in the YCSO site
photos was ever actually ‘found’ or
entered the official evidence chain…
much less the other THREE that
McDonough says were ‘onboard’ that day.
Even Eric Marsh had a ‘GPS rating’ and
had taken special ‘GPS classes’… according
to his personnel file… so it seems highly
likely that even Eric Marsh had one of the
FOUR GPS unit that McDonough is now
talking about with HIM that day.
I digress…
You really should read that SECOND
ADOSH interview with Brendan McDonough.
He even talks about what a ‘good place’
he was in and didn’t seem reluctant to talk
about any aspect of the incident for that
SECOND interview. He even said to
the investigators… “Someone needs to
hear this stuff”.
Problem is… even with his willingness to
talk for the SECOND interview… no one
even ASKED him any important/lingering
questions.
WTKTT,
I think the point is, whatever his memories and recollections are now, they may well be very different from what they were the day after the event. We are all susceptible to this, even for events that aren’t highly stressful and emotional. Even beliefs that he may hold very strongly, like GPS somehow being important, may not hold up at all when looked at. (Re: GPS, leaving to one side the shortcomings and strengths of GPS vs. telemetry, simply use of the radio by Marsh and Steed could have let people know exactly their route and exactly their intentions, had there been a desire to keep people in the loop — and within the crew, they all knew where each other were — so why even mention GPS? A: Because someone else got his ear and told him it was important — perfectly natural, anyone in his situation would experience much the same.) So, by this point, he shouldn’t be expected to say much and, to the extent he does add more info, you have to assume that it may have been hugely influenced by events and pressures that occurred after the day of the fire.
Re: GPS, or of course maybe he researched and himself concluded it was important — only issue being GPS wasn’t needed that day.
I am not going to ‘discount’ Brendan’s comments in his second interview about the WFF industry thinking harder about coming into the ’21st century’. I think everything Brendan was suggesting be ‘done’ are valid points.
But if you actually LISTEN to the audio of that entire interview, I think it’s possible that what Brendan was really trying to say there was that regardless of whether Marsh and Steed were practicing some kind of ‘planned obtuseness’ with their BK radio communications… Brendan seems to be holding onto the thought that if fire command had simply been able to AUTOMATICALLY know exactly where they were… then maybe the Air resources COULD have dumped on them in time to save them.
He actually might not be wrong about that.
It MIGHT have been possible… if the following two things had been true…
1) They didn’t waste 2 minutes and 20 seconds even realzing the first radio call from Steed was an actual MAYDAY call and an actual EMERGENCY.
2) Air Attack had known EXACTLY where they were ( or could glance at a screen on-demand and know instantly ) and then Kevin in the VLAT could have just followed him right to that exact spot.
Maybe someday in the future… something like the scenario(s) Brendan is talking about in his interview WILL be possible.
The technology to do exactly what Brendan was ‘imagineering’ inn his ADOSH interview already exists, and can be accomplished RIGHT NOW even with FREE public domain software.
The only thing preventing it is cooperation and the establishment of the correct standards and adoption of the correct protocols.
Mr. Powers. Thanks for the thoughtful reply.
You are right… your own situation/experience with
this sort of thing ( while different circumstances )
seems to indicate that even if the ‘example’ I was
making was true ( 1 survivor who didn’t want to
talk about it )… the actual ‘factual’ evidence pretty
much explained what happened, once known.
Yarnell is pretty much the same.
We DO ‘know what happened’.
We really do.
Just look at all the evidence that has emerged
and it really is pretty clear what happened.
So to answer your question about ‘would anything
McDonough still knows make any difference?’…
I think we all know the answer there.
Probably not. It would (most likely) only CONFIRM
what is already known. They *decided* to disregard
the rules of engagement in favor of ‘the mission’,
and as far as ‘training takeways’ goes… well…
what else needs to be said?
The rules are there for a reason.
Break the rules… and you can (easily) DIE.
>> Mr. Powers also wrote…
>> I doubt that McDonough actually knows why
>> they made the decision they did
You might be exactly right.
For all we know… even though ALL the officially
published reports seem to CONFIRM that he
did overhear them ‘discussing their options’… the
actual conversation on the RADIO ( which is all
McDonough had any chance of hearing ) might
have been just as ‘obtuse’ as pretty much all
the other radio conversations we can now hear.
McDonough might have ONLY heard scant ‘pieces’
of the ‘why’ part or the actual ‘decision making’.
We simply don’t know ( what he did or didn’t hear ).
What bothers me ( and the point I was simply
trying to make above ) is that Mr. McDonough
seems content to let those statements in
ALL the published report about him DEFINITELY
hearing them ‘discussing their options’ stand, with
no rebuttal ( if the statements are wrong ) or
clarification ( if the statements are correct ).
That just leaves a significant ‘mystery’ hanging
out there that might follow him around for the
rest of his life… with a lot of people still/always
wanting to ‘know what he knows’…
…and there is NO NEED for that.
My only real thought here is simple if you think about it.
He dose not want to say something that might hurt one of his (Brothers) family members by assigning some kind of guilt to one of his Bosses. If that makes him happy and content with that choice then he will stay in that realm so to speak. Dose that make science?
Another thought on brotherhood protection.
My Steap dad was on the fire that my dad died on he was on an Engine. He never told me or any one else that my dad had made a mistake by not putting a lookout at the top of the trail to let the crew know if the fire started there way. My dad was his friend and they worked together. It is hard to admit that a friend made a mistake or even tell your friends son that happened after he became my father and even after I went to work for the Forest Service. McDonough will only talk if he choses to, I think he is OK with were he is at.
>> Mr. Powers wrote…
>> McDonough will only talk
>> if he choses to.
OR… if he is called to testify.
He can’t take the 5th on this.
I think he should just ‘chose’
to say what he knows… OR
( at the very least ) issue a
press statement that rebuts
what all the official PUBLIC
reports are saying about him.
That he ‘knows more than he
will say’. If that really isn’t
true then it was totally
irresponsible ( and unfair to
Brendan ) for the Arizona
Forestry department to EVER
make those statements they
did about him ‘hearing them
discussing their options’.
If Brendan simply has ‘more
of the story’ from that day,
I think he should just
CHOOSE to talk about it…
and I don’t just mean about
the ‘their decision to leave the
black’, either.
For all we know… if Brian
Frisby hadn’t either suggested
( or demanded ) there be
a ‘lookout’ in place up there
that day… Brendan would
have simply DIED right along
with the rest of them.
That’s a ‘part of the story’
that hasn’t been told yet, either.
Is that what happened?
Did Brian Frisby himself
pretty much save Brendan’s
life TWICE that day?
Yes… it makes sense in the context
of the immediate aftermath of such
a horrific event ( and the grieving
process that follows )…
…but even at the press conference
when the SAIR was first released it
was perfectly obvious that a LOT of
‘family members’ just want to know
the TRUTH ( ALL of it ).
They had had a chance to read
the SAIR report BEFORE the press
conference.
A lot of them were ANGRY that
it was such a namby-pamby report
about the incident that took their
loved ones away from them…
and said so. LOUDLY.
In the ‘wrongful death’ lawsuits… it
is CLEAR that what is MOST
IMPORTANT to these family members
is knowing as much as possible
about what happened that day so at
least they can be sure the WFF
industry is RESPONDING to this
historic event and at least TRYING
to make sure it doesn’t happen
again… as much as possible.
So for Brendan to still believe that he
is ‘protecting the families’ ( if that’s
what he thinks he’s doing ) just
means he really, really hasn’t
been paying attention.
The families have spoken.
They WANT to know as much as
possible about what happened that
day ( and still intend to FIND OUT ).
Brendan has maintained ( at all times )
that it was just an ‘accident’… that
‘no one did anything wrong’… yet
he has also maintained ( at all times )
that there are some things about
what happened that day that he will
not talk about.
He simply doesn’t realize that those
two ‘stances’ are incompatible, and
just further the sense of ‘mystery’
surrounding this incident.
If he really, truly believes it was just
an ‘accident’… then there should be
NOTHING that he is ‘reluctant’ to
talk about.
WTKTT
I just do not think you understand. so I will leave it here.
Yes, Mr. Powers.
I do understand.
He thinks he’s helping..
just like your step-dad
thought HE was (helping).
I just wish he (Brendan)
would realize that he
*might* be mistaken
about what ‘helping’
really means.
The families want
to know. They have
said so. They are
ready to hear the
TRUTH, as much
as it can be known.
Its not about helping its about love.
That too.
That’s what
makes the
families
of those
men who
were lost
too soon
want to
KNOW.
Subjective motivation is always hard to assess accurately, anyway. Even self-reported motivations can be very unreliable, for obvious reasons in some cases, but also because we’re not good at perceiving things. We know that, at YHF, there was a pattern even that day of being a bit fast and loose with the 10 and 18. This was on display before GM ever dropped off the 2-track.
Particularly for emotionally highly charged events, even discussing subjective motivations can be problematic. But, whatever the motivations, we do know that persistently being in situations where the 10 aren’t taken seriously and lots of Watch Outs are present is not a good practice. You can look at the 10 and 18 applied to the lookout, and stop the clock there, and say, whatever the motivation or even simple lack of attention, not best practice.
Likewise for a culture of secrecy about something like crew movements. Whatever the motivations for not wanting someone to discuss those, it is not a healthy thing.
TTWARE – thanks for your comment about the weather (and thanks also to Bob Powers for explaining in more detail what he was thinking regarding the weather). I will respond to both of you hopefully later today, after I finish a project with a deadline of today. Sorry for the delay – I just want you to know that I am not ignoring you, after you took the time to respond to me.
(Yet again, rather than using my LIMITED free time to respond productively to both of you this morning, and thereby advancing this discussion (hopefully), I ended up yet again wasting TWO HOURS drafting a reply to Fire20+ who leapt on ME for things that *I* did not say (and do not believe) while he simultaneously IGNORED the fact that it was BOB and WTKTT who said the things that Fire20+ is accusing ME of saying. This utter BULLSHIT has gone on for MONTHS, and it continues to make me want to throw up my hands and walk away from these efforts, despite people like Gabbert and JD making clear my important role in these discussions. For example, does anyone ELSE remember folks accusing ME of calling Rory Collins a coward when it was actually FRED who did it? I had to WASTE my time defending myself on that, rather than doing the things that are far more valuable and unique, such as getting public records to guys like Gabbert or JD, who can then post them. Why am I not surprised that now Fire20+ has done the SAME fucking thing, in terms of accusing me of stuff that I NEVER said, such that I have to WASTE my limited time defending myself? Huge fucking pain in the ass, but the worse option, in my mind, is my leaving IM and letting conspiracy theorist WTKTT and SR and whomever remain here unchecked, such that people actually BELIEVE all of the things that WTKTT says and states (incorrectly) as fact. I suppose that now that xxfullsailxx is back, there will be less unchecked, inaccurate rambling, but, at some point, xxfullsailxx has to leave IM and go start…fighting fires. He, unlike Fire20+ and Bob Powers and Fred and others, is presumably STILL working forty-plus-hour weeks on the fire front lines (presumably like WFF, who also seems to now be on here less and less, presumably in anticipation of the start of fire season in a week or so).)
Looks like Fire20+, with his reasonable and informed post, got someone riled up. He didn’t feel the need to drop F-bombs or to play the victim, though.
EN wrote:
“Fire20+ who leapt on ME for things that *I* did not say (and do not believe) while he simultaneously IGNORED the fact that it was BOB and WTKTT who said the things that Fire20+ is accusing ME of saying. This utter BULLSHIT has gone on for MONTHS, and it continues…”
—OK, so you were quoting somebody else, why not just quote them then? Folks would then understand the idiotic words you (you statements are appropriate here) DID put in that list weren’t yours, which raises another question. Why would you put things on a blog entry that appears to be coming out of your mouth then when your ‘jumped on’ you just can’t handle it and blame other people?—
“I had to WASTE my time defending myself on that, rather than doing the things that are far more valuable and unique, such as getting public records to guys like Gabbert or JD, who can then post them. Why am I not surprised that now Fire20+ has done the SAME fucking thing, in terms of accusing me of stuff that I NEVER said…”
—Don’t waste your time on my account, stop writing what you didn’t say or know about then you wouldn’t have to defend yourself Elizabeth and work yourself into a tissy. As far as what you say about ‘getting public records to guys…’ well, there you go again. ANYBODY can get public records by doing a records request, it is not special or generous or important, it is something ANYONE can do. You behave as if your “role” is exclusive and proprietary, your generous public service efforts, your selfless generosity to “give” this information to JD and Gabbert. They could have clearly gotten it themselves or gotten it from any other number of people who have the records also. I sure hope nobody has pointed this out to you before me, I’d hate to upset you.—
Oh, one more thing, I’m curious how the families like seeing F-bombs all over the place accompanied by victimized, crazy talk? Do you care about that at all? I cuss like a logger, but not here.
**
** THE JERRY THOMPSON PHOTOS / VIDEOS
Not a lot has been said about these.
They were all taken by Jerry Thompson, who was working with a Structure
Protection Group under SPGS1 Gary Cordes on Sunday, June 30, 2013.
That ‘crew’ was working right there in Yarnell, about 1/2 to 3/4 mile due
south of the Shrine Youth Camp, to the west of Yarnell where some ‘outlying’
homes were. As one of the videos proves… they were close enough to
the Shrine Youth Camp to actually capture the siren going off on Tyson
Esquibel’s lead engine that was parked there as he was using it to ‘recall’
the fellas working in Harper Canyon.
This is the SAME SIREN heard in the YARNELL-GAMBLE video.
There are actually FOUR videos in this folder… and some of them have
some pretty interesting ‘background radio’ traffic.
Those Jerry Thompson photos/videos are publicly available HERE…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/zghqmidyjqbgp1e/7tts4WSLQ1#/
* IMG_1101 – 1524 – 3:24 PM
A pretty interesting ‘background radio’ exchange captured in this
one right at the start. There is little doubt that this is OPS1 Todd Abel
talking to OPS2 Paul Musser at exactly 1524 ( 3:24 PM ).
(OPS1 Todd Abel): I think they’ll probly be a mess in or out.
(OPS2 Paul Musser): What can I tell ’em, then?
NOTE: I have no idea what that exchange means. Any guesses?
* IMG_1134 – 1630 – 4:30 PM
This is the one that captures the siren going off on Tyson Esquibel’s
lead engine as he was using it to ‘recall’ his crew from down in the
Harper Canyon west of the Shrine Youth Camp.
Jerry Thompson’s crew was close enough to they Shrine area to
capture this siren clearly. It is a ‘steady’ tone with no Doppler effect
so that means it was, in fact, a siren being sounded on a stationary
vehicle over at the Shrine Youth Camp.
It is the SAME SIREN being heard in the background of Blue Ridge
Hotshot McCord’s YARNELL-GAMBLE video which contains the
background capture of someone in fire command ( Musser?,
Abel?, Cordes? ) speaking directly to Eric Marsh and saying
they would ‘appreciate it if they could get to town a little faster’
and Eric Marsh responding “They’re comin’ from the heel of the fire”.
This might help narrow down ( even further ) the exact time of that
YARNELL-GAMBLE video since that still hasn’t been exactly determined.
We already KNOW it was no earlier than about 4:20 and no later than 4:32 PM.
* IMG_1136 – Also 1530 4:30 ( plus 45 seconds ).
Taken right after the previous one… but the siren has STOPPED, which
helps to even further narrow down the time for the YARNELL-GAMBLE video.
This one has another interesting radio capture that also appears to
be OPS1 Todd Able ( with little doubt ).
(OPS1 Todd Abel): Ah… down in Yarnell… ah… it should be pushin’ hard
right now into Yarnell… and south of Yarnell.
It is not known who OPS1 Todd Abel is talking to at that point.
This video ends with a firefighter in the foreground saying pretty excitedly…
“We got a LOTTA ASH!… It’s comin’ RIGHT AT US!… We gotta…”
The video cuts off his last few words.
Even MORE firefighters that almost waited too long that day to evacuate
and almost got ‘caught’?
I would like to hear your thoughts on the Tom Story photos.
Which ones?
Any, of course. But definitely the ones from the Ranch House. And his statement that he had left the Ranch House before he heard of deployment. I had always assumed that he was aware of the circumstances when he took the photos. I remember Tom Story commented over at Wildfire Today many months ago.
I haven’t compared them against the Russ Reason video yet. But it appears (to me) that the McCord photo 106 was taken before the Tom Story 1677. photo. Also, The McCord photo 106 seems to show some clear sky in the southern (or left) part of the pic. I mention that as it could relate to the mysterious quote by Marsh saying “that is exactly where we want the retardant”. Meaning, the sky looks more clear in this photo than in ones taken later by Tom Story.
calvin… I hear you.
If you were asking for my *general* opinion
of the Tom Story photos I would say that
I actually *do* have some similar concerns
about the TIMESTAMPS.
It is almost inconceivable that a professional
reporter/photographer might not have the
TIME set exactly correctly on his cameras
and/or devices… but I am still scratching
my head about the TIMESTAMPS on
some of his photos.
Example: He has a full sequence of pictures
of an extensive DC10 VLAT drop right there
down around Yarnell. ALL of the these photos
seem to have a timestamp of 1639.
Yet… NOWHERE in any of the Air Study
videos ( especially the USDA folder ones
that ONLY capture the actual Air to Air
conversations ) is there ANY radio traffic
that would support that this VLAT drop was
taking place at THAT exact time ( 1639 ).
1639 is the minute Steed’s first MAYDAY
supposedly took place as well… and here
is this DC10 VLAT (supposedly) dropping
TONS of retardant right near Yarnell at
the same moment Steed is sending his
MAYDAY.
Something just isn’t quite right about all
that… and I have to suspect that however
improbable it might seem… this professional
photographer did NOT have the TIME
set correctly on one ( or more ) of his
digital cameras.
More later.
Well. I just picked my way thru Tom’s photos. At first I wrote, up above, that I never trust camera time stamps becuz most ppl don’t need to pay attention to them.
But Tom was using three cameras that day, switching back and forth depending on which lens he needed. So that would lead me to think he probably must have had to sync them, thus at least vaguely getting them accurate. So the 3:49 photos are mystifying.
I think his photos at the Ranch House Parking Lot seem about right, though. They would definitely have been later than McCord’s. I think McCord jumped out of the Blue Ridge Buggy and started shooting relatively immediately. Tom’s photos start with the Blue Ridge ATV near the trucks, and then the ATV vanishes, and I think that happening around 5 seems reasonable. And, yes, the fire has gotten much closer by then as the parking lot, itself would eventually no longer be considered a “safe zone.”
So I’m stumped. It would be helpful if there was a timed list of the VLAT drops, for sure.
**
** DID OPS1 TODD ABEL REALLY SAY “HUNKER AND BE SAFE”?
>> On April 18, 2014 at 4:47 pm, Elizabeth said:
>>
>> 6. Just because the SAIT claims that somebody said
>> something does NOT actually mean that the things at issue
>> were actually said. For example, do I believe that the Blue Ridge
>> guys said exactly some of the things that the SAIT claims they
>> said? Nope. Abel did not recall saying “hunker,” presumably b/c
>> he never SAID “hunker,” even though the SAIT said he said “hunker.”
>> Do I think Marsh said the winds were “squirrely”? Well, I wouldn’t
>> bet my first child on it.
This is just another response to one more ‘point’ from Elizabeth’s recent
bullet-list of what she chose to call ‘clarifications’.
Since she keeps obsessing about the Todd Abel ‘hunker’ quote and seems to
keep asking us all not to believe our OWN EARS…
…I thought I’d do just (hopefully) one more ’round up’ on this.
Every time she brings this up… I have asked Elizabeth to please supply an
‘alternative word’ ( other than the word ‘hunker’ ) for that sentence clearly heard
in the Caldwell video… but there’s never an answer.
* The Robert Caldwell VIDEO…
First and foremost… here is the radio traffic that is CLEARLY heard in the
Robert Caldwell video…
__________________________________________________________________
Eric Marsh (DIVS A): Yea… I’m tryin’ to work my way off the top.
Todd Abel ( OPS1 ): Okay… I copy… ah… just keep me updated…
ah… ya know… you guys hunker and be safe and then… ah…
we’ll get some air support down there ASAP.
_________________________________________________________________
And ( once again ) here is the ’roundup’ on how that clear conversation went through the investigation process and ended up in PUBLISHED report(s)…
* The Arizona Forestry SAIT investigators heard ‘hunker’ and
* were sure enough about it to PUBLISH it in their official report…
From the OFFICIAL SAIR Document – Page 22
OPS1 is listening on the radio to make sure everyone received the most recent
weather announcement. At about 1550, he radios DIVS A directly to ask if he got
the weather update and if he is “in a good spot.” DIVS A affirms that he received
the update, and he tells OPS1 the winds are starting to get “squirrely” up on the
ridge. He says he is working his way off the top and OPS1 closes by advising
DIVS A to hunker and be safe.
* Lead SAIT investigator Jim Karels is sure he heard ‘hunker’…
Page 1 of the SAIT Yarnell Investigation Notes (YIN)
Interview with OPS1 Todd Abel by Jim Karels (alone) on 8/14/13
NOTE: OPS1 Todd Abel told the SAIT investigator Jim Karels that he doesn’t
recall this ENTIRE conversation with Marsh… much less any particular words
or sentences he might have used like ‘hunker and be safe’. That is really still
hard to believe… but Jim Karels had already heard the Caldwell video prior to
the interview and he was SURE that he had heard Abel tell Marsh to “hunker”.
Karels made a note to himself to be sure and ask Abel about it during the
interview… and he did. We see both Karels’ ‘note to himself’ AND a note
about Abel’s response in the investigation document(s)…
– (Ask Abel about) the ~1555 radio conversation that we have on the
(Caldwell) video, (which includes the phrase okay, you hunker down in
the black) – Abel did not recal having this conversation with marsh.
* OPS1 Todd Able uses the same ‘hunkered’ word in his ADOSH interview…
Oddly enough… even though OPS1 Todd Abel told Lead SAIT investigator Jim
Karels that he ‘doesn’t recall’ any/all of his conversation with Marsh captured by
the Caldwell video… all of a sudden he ( Abel ) seems to be recalling it pretty
well in his ADOSH interview. He gets the TIME right… recalls Eric’s ‘squirrely
winds’ statement… and while the ADOSH investigators do not specifically even
ask Abel about the Caldwell video ( even though they knew it existed )… Abel
even uses the same word ‘hunkered’ while talking to THEM and describing that
conversation with Marsh…
Page 43 of OPS1 Todd Abel’s ADOSH interview…
Q1 = Dave Larsen ( Rest in Peace )
A = OPS1 Todd Abel
__________________________________________________________________
Q1: 3:45. This all was about in the same timeframe of wind shifts, the
conversation with Eric. He was the first one to feel those squirrely winds
start, right?
A: Yeah.
Q1: And he’s talking to you about he’s got wind issues?
A: Mm-hm.
Q1: Let me ask you this, you say you’re nervous, um, because of this…
A: This cell building over here.
Q1: …this cell – what does that mean to you?
A: That means outflows, possible lightning strikes, all that stuff.
Q1: Okay.
A: So that’s why I wanted to make sure that he had eyes on it to make sure he
watches that thing and make sure that if it’s getting too – if he gets to really
start feeling those winds changing and everything that they can get hunkered
in that black – that 250 acres of safety zone there.
Q1: Mm-hm.
A: And – and stay out of harm’s way. You know they could even drop down off
the ridge for lightning purposes if they had to.
Q1: Sure.
A: Was my thought process.
_________________________________________________________________
So Abel proves ( all on his own during the interview ) that he is someone who
DOES use the words ‘hunker’ and ‘hunkered’ as part of his usual/regular
vocabulary.
So for anyone to really doubt that OPS1 Todd Abel was NOT captured saying
“hunker and be safe” to Eric Marsh in the Caldwell video… the only real
question would be…
What OTHER word is being said?
Just because you might think he didn’t actually use the word ‘hunker’ to start
that one sentence doesn’t mean the sentence itself doesn’t exist.
So for anyone who does NOT think the first word of that sentence is ‘hunker’
( from a man known to use that word freely )…then please ‘fill in the blank’ below.
What OTHER word could possibly be used that would match the full CONTEXT
of this conversation and would start a sentence/statement that is KNOWN
to be this…
“_______ and be safe.”
Remember… it has to at least SOUND like ‘hunker’… because this entire
statement ( and context ) IS, in fact, captured in the video.
Amen WTKTT. I hope EN answers you because I am curious. She hasn’t answered me either about her doubts of the use ‘hunker’ in WFF. I can tell you WTKTT, we use this word on the regular to describe taking shelter, getting down off a ridge, literally sitting on your butts and watching Wx, fire behavior, etc. from a safe spot.
WTKTT, you think maybe Able read the SAIT report before his interview with ADOSH and just filled in the blanks in his ‘memory’? I do. The thing is, when your fighting fire they weren’t thinking ‘oh, maybe I’m being recorded’…It was perhaps after the audio/video recordings came out when some OH started worrying about statements they had previously made.
Also, just a point, Dave Larsen (RIP) uses the word squirrely and he was a T1IC, and it didn’t throw him off. Squirrely is as common a description for Wx as unstable is for FF’s on the ground.
WTKTT– You also have statements here of 2 very clear things.
1. there was a forecast on winds and a concern that they were going to get worse and the statement of squarely winds.
2. the discussion of a cell at around 1545. the fact that they had 250 plus acres of black SZ and they could hunker there and incase of lighting drop off the ridge in to safe areas.
No mention by Todd Able of going down to the bomb proof SZ.
so every thing we have been discussing is simply stated here, with or with out any pictures of support which we also Identified yesterday and which I am sure there are more.
Why is there a question about the cell and winds? Before 1600 Ops Able was concerned about the cells affect on the winds.
Why was marsh then not concerned about the same thing?
Did Marsh see something that no one else saw?
Did Marsh decide to do something that no one else thought he would do?
Your above Able interview says a lot the fire was in fact being influenced buy a cell with winds and OPS was concerned about the 1 crew on the mountain. Marsh ignored that warning sign and move the entire crew into a brush field in front of a volatile situation and did not heed the warning signs.
I could say more but I do not wish to hurt or be insensitive to any one the decisions made were not founded on Safety.
Bob, am I correct that it is not RARE to have thunder cells in the area of an Arizona wildfire between mid-June and the end of July, and that the mere presence of these cells does not suggest that everything should stop and everyone should sit in the black until every possible thunder cell (regardless of its distance away) is gone?
I am NOT trying to defend anyone or make things up or whatever nonsense you often accuse me of. I am trying to figure out if you HONESTLY take the position that the fact that someone can see a thunder cell (even as far away as Prescott with respect to the Yarnell Hill Fire) means that everyone needs to retreat to the black immediately.
Thunder cells are common through out the west.
there are safe places to work on a fire. If Lighting moves over you then you find a safe place till it passes. Depending on the location on the fire and the wind you may continue to work or back off and sit it out. It is hard to make a general statement here. If your line is containing the fire then it might be safe to continue work. If the fire has escaped containment then a lot depends on where you are on the fire. Quitting work has a great deal to do with your safety and location, every cell that passes over a fire dose not Carry the same threats for each different fire. Complicated YES.
The Yarnell Hill Fire had escaped containment or it was not fully contained because of open line. The cell created that. Where GM was they had no place to build line because all of there line was compromised due to the fire below and to the left of their break site. so they could not continue to build line back to the fire as it would move under them and burn back up to there line. Becoming unsafe and unproductive.
To state the obvious: Elizabeth is pushing yet another “false dichotomy.” There is not necessarily a binary choice between 1) quit at the first sign of a thunderstorm, and 2) take a long, slow bushwhack with the fire getting blown towards you. It does not normalize GM’s decision to say, well, depending on conditions you may or may not keep working. There is a huge range of possibility that falls under “keeping working,” and virtually none of those possible actions have killing your whole crew as a likely outcome if the timing is just a bit off.
People don’t “do these things all the time.”
SR,
You really don’t get it. Elizabeth is not approving of or trying to justify GMs decisions, she is trying to come up with what they might have been thinking that leads them to make the critical errors that they did.
Stop spending all your effort trying to discredit her and try and really read what she is saying.
No, I do get it. She’s starting with the premise that GM acted reasonably. And floating various theories that she thinks explain why the decisions made were reasonable. Her theories may contradict each other — GM could have been scared down by lightning, or, alternatively, could have reasonably concluded in EN’s view that bushwhacking through dense fuel down into a terrain trap with the fire being blown towards you in the midst of a thunderstorm was a reasonable thing to do — because, hey, if you stop fighting fire every time there’s a thunderstorm on the horizon, you’ll stop work a lot. There is basically zero support for any of these theories, many of which show no regard for the realities of either the southwest, or wildland fire.
We have heard from RTS that, not only were others aware that GM was using unconventional tactics and sticking their necks out while doing it, but they had spoken to GM about it. And, that there had been a culture of secrecy over crew movements. So, EN is making a few logical errors when she supposes that GM had to think that what they were doing was reasonable and safe from a conventional perspective.
Maybe they did. But, maybe a crew that doesn’t want others to know where they are and what they are doing realizes that some of their tactics may be viewed as unconventional, even risky. Maybe they were well aware that they were taking a risk. The reality is that when insular groups deviate from accepted safety norms, there often is an escalating pattern of risk-taking. And often at least some of the group is aware of that fact.
EN’s approach, which takes the fact that GM thought that their actions were reasonable and prudent at the time as a given, simply assumes away many possible realities. And so is a lousy way to conduct an inquiry, unless you decided from the get-go that the answer to that inquiry will always be that all safety norms were followed, this was a reasonable and ordinary day with simply a fluke outcome.
I’m pretty sure EN never said GM acted reasonably, if I’m wrong, show me. Same could be said for “bushwhacking into a terrain trap”.
Why is it a “logical error” to suppose that GM thought what they were doing was reasonable and safe? Why the hell would they have done it? Do you think they wanted to die?
People take outsized risks all the time. There is a difference between a suicide attempt and assuming risks that carry a high likelihood over time of resulting in death. People climb rock cliffs unroped, go boating without life jackets, fill gas cans without lifting them out of truck beds, and do all sorts of things that they may be aware aren’t great ideas. When looking at an accident, it’s a real bad idea to prejudge it as “safe people, just one of those things.”
In this case, given what we have heard in terms of the possibility of prior risk-taking, it is all the less wise to start with the assumption that there was no awareness of risk.
BTW, EN did say she thought it looked reasonable to GM when they started their bushwhack. So, yeah, she’s saying she thought based on information in front of them that they acted reasonably, without seeing undue risk. Or, alternatively, that a reasonable person would have seen undue risk, but GM didn’t and simply not competent to see those risks. But, somehow I don’t think that 2d idea is the one EN is trying to plant the seeds of when she say they thought it was reasonable to drop down.
So you say that GM stood there ready to drop into the bowl and said” this is not reasonable but lets go”
I disagree, I think they said” their is some risk, but I think its reasonable lets go”.
I think EN agrees with me and she is trying to put together what info they had that lead them to decide this way.
You both are some what right.
when answering Elisabeth’s questions I try to tie all the lose ends as the general questions have several answers. I hope I was clear enough its not always black and white on larger fires some areas are safe some are not.
I agree Jeff. I for one think Elizabeth has as much or more than anyone to add to this conversation. And she is the one who has procured much of the material we have available to review. Thank you Elizabeth
I would ask Jeff to review the 18 situations and especialy 11, 12, 15, and 17. Also 10 Standard orders 2,3,4,5,7,and always 10. I keep banging on this is any body out there referring to these when making statements about decisions made.
You can not understand fire safety if you do not use the rules and understand them. There are fire fighters here who know what I am saying.
I made every Hot shot that worked for me memorize the 10 and 13-(18) my crew bosses reviewed them at the start of every shift. I was a hard ass and trained RTS who took it with him. They are safety tools not just some thing to read and forget. They are not there to find guilt when someone dies they are there to keep you from dyeing or severely injuring you or your crew. I’ll get off my soap box.
It is a needed message, thank you for focusing attention back to it. The number of violations/Watch Outs present out of the 10 and 18 wasn’t reasonable. Serious accidents generally will have multiple violation present, and there certainly were here.
Likewise, a culture of secrecy as to crew movements in general and at best coyness as to the specific actions at YHF suggests awareness of risk.
Also, nearly getting your lookout burned over earlier in the afternoon shows that risks were being taken at multiple points throughout the day.
With all of that, simply assuming away the chance that there was awareness of risk — e.g., Although we might get entrapped if we run out of time, I think we can pull off getting to town ahead of the front — well, it makes no sense not to consider that there may have been conscious assumption of risk.
SR & Bob, you are both correct above, GM made a conscious assumption to ignore/minimize the 10 &18. the question is why, and this is what EN is trying to get to.
Nobody here has ever said that they complied with the 10&18, Why they didn’t is the answer to this fatal puzzle.
I agree, the word has got to be hunker. What I think is highly important is that Chris Mackenzie’s cell phone captures Robert Caldwell taking his video which verifies the correct timestamp for the series of pictures taken from the Discussing options spot on Mackenzies cell phone which in return makes it impossible for Andrew Ashcraft to be in two places at one time. Or, in short, the timestamp on the Mackenzie Camera circa 1600 is WRONG!
And by the way, I would bet that is why none of the pictures from the camera were used in the SAIR and no timestamps were used with the Mackenzie Camera photos in the WAFR. And I suggest everyone compare (for themselves) the smoke progression from the Wade Parker Picture with image 2738 from Mackenzies cell and decide for yourself which is taken first. It also seems to me that the first Mackenzie video is taken at nearly the same time (as both pictures above) based the smoke movement to the south.
Calvin, yet again, you are the man with the answers (or at least the right questions). The smoke issue is something a friend raised recently to me. My tentative view has always been that the wind DID push the smoke back (but I admittedly have always needed to do more research on this), but HIS view was that the time is wrong. What’s your view?
Elizabeth. Andrew Ashcraft can be seen sitting at the discussing options location in images 2535, 2536, and 2537. Only his boots are visible in two of the pics.
At almost the exact same time (per timestamp) Andrew Ashcraft can be seen leaving the black with Parker, Norris and a couple other GMH in photos 0885, 0886,and 0887 from the Mackenzie camera.
BTW..photos 0885, 0886 and 0887 are taken from the same general location as photo 0882 from earlier in the day. 0882 is the picture that shows Rory Collins dropping retardant on GM burnout operation. This drop established the southern perimeter of the burnout that can be seen in image 0885, 0886 and 0887. So I am asserting that images 0885,0886 and 0887 indeed show GM leaving the black BEFORE they returned to the discussing options location.
Oh, boy. I just spent the past hour trying to make sense of those photos. Good for you. I’m going to have to try again another day…..
Elizabeth. Image p0262 from ADOSH 7/18 phto with GPS shows this same location from a different perspective. The retardant line is still visible (barely) and so is the rock that is in photo 0882, 0885, 0886, and 0887. I also think the discussing options location is in this picture, or if not it is in the previous picture p0261, that is taken from the same location, just higher up the hill. The rock I mentioned above is not in photo p0261.
Hope that is not too confusing.
Reply to Elizabeth post on April 21, 2014 at 7:15 am said:
>> Elizabeth wrote…
>> WTKTT, I take it that you do NOT think that it is Gary Cordes’s voice
>> IMMEDIATELY before and AFTER Musser’s on the “Division Alpha,
>> Operation Musser” video (see the link below)? Why is that?
Why is that?… because I ( me, personally ) simply don’t believe it.
I listened (again) to this video clip you posted ( your link below where it
originally was in your comment ).
In the first place… you are definitely WRONG to assume that the voice(s)
BEFORE and AFTER Musser’s callout are the ‘same person’.
I would say that is definitely NOT the case.
Whoever that is speaking when the video starts… the “Thank you” that
comes after Musser’s callout to DIVSA is simply in response to that
‘report’ that was being given as the video starts.
I already posted a ‘transcript’ for the CLEARLY heard background
transmissions in this video ( in this very Chapter 6 of this ongoing public
discussion ) but it is reprinted below so you don’t have to go searching for it.
See my transcript below. I believe ( me, personally ) that “Thank you”
is more than a likely match for Darrell Willis. Sounds JUST like his voice.
Someone is also saying “Uh… You’re Welcome” in the very last second
of the video but that also doesn’t sound like speaker 1 or 2. That
“You’re welcome” definitely sounds like OPS2 Paul Musser.
As for the statements heard at the START of this 24 second video… I still believe
that the conversation being captured there at the start can be interpreted in
a number of ways. Here is what is actually said… ( clearly heard )…
VIDEO STARTS
+0:00 ( 1542.08 – 3:42.08 PM )
(Eric Marsh? Gary Cordes?): …towards the structures… uh… (pause)
southern… uh… (pause) into Yarnell.
So here are what I believe are the ‘possibilities’ there…
1) It is Eric Marsh giving someone ( Darrell Willis says ‘Thank You’? ) a
report on the FIRE BEHAVIOR he is now seeing from the ridge.
2) It is Eric Marsh giving someone ( Darrell Willis says ‘Thank You’? ) a
report on what the plans are for Granite Mountain. ( To move into the
southern part of Yarnell towards the structures ). It’s a little early (1542)
for that to be the fully formed plan for GM so if that really is Eric I would
say he is simply reporting about the FIRE BEHAVIOR he is seeing.
3) It is SPGS1 Gary Cordes giving someone ( Darrell Willis says ‘Thank You’? )
a report on what is happening ( and expected to happen ) with the fire
down on the Yarnell end.
So yes… it COULD be Gary Cordes in those opening statements just
giving a ‘report’ to someone. I could easily believe SPGS2 Darrell Willis
had just ‘called’ SPGS1 Gary Cordes and asked for an ‘update’ on the
fire behavior ‘down there’… but there is nothing specific in there about
‘needing any help’ and certainly nothing there to tie what he is saying
into some kind of ‘request for Granite Mountain’. He’s just telling someone
what the fire is doing on the south side at that moment, and then that
someone says “Thank You”.
However… I still do NOT believe that initial voice is Gary Cordes. Doesn’t quite
match other recordings of his voice. I believe it is a *MUCH* closer match to
Eric Marsh’s voice.
So ( see transcript below ) that is what I think.
I believe this video captures a moment when Eric Marsh is actually talking
directly to Darrell Willis and Marsh is updating Willis on the fire behavior he
is witnessing from out on the ridge in the 1542 timeframe… and Willis then
says “Thank You” to Marsh.
In-between Marsh’s fire behavior report and Willis’ “Thank You”… we
suddenly hear OPS2 Paul Musser trying to contact Marsh. There is no
response from Marsh to OPS2 Musser’s callout before the video ends.
BTW: If that really is Darrell Willis saying “Thank you” to Marsh ( and not
Cordes ), then this goes directly against Willis’ other statements that he
‘never talked to Marsh’ that day after the 0600 AM phone call when Willis
told Marsh “We’ve got to get an anchor on this thing”.
>> Elizabeth also wrote…
>> One would think that it makes SENSE that that voice is Cordes’s – having
>> ASKED Musser to reach out to Division Alpha (since Cordes’s radio is being
>> wonky, not transmitting well but obviously allowing him to HEAR things),
There you go again.
What PROOF do you have for this statement that SPGS1 Gary Cordes
SPECIFICALLY *ASKED* OPS2 Paul Musser to ‘reach out to Division Alpha’
on his ( Cordes’ ) behalf.
Gary Cordes says nothing of the kind in his own ADOSH interview and
( likewise ) neither does OPS2 Paul Musser in HIS ADOSH interview.
There is NO DOUBT that Gary Cordes expressed his ‘needs’ to OPS2 Paul
Musser that he needed more STRUCTURE PROTECTION equipment/resources
if there was any chance of him ‘saving some town’. That conversation IS
detailed in the ADOSH interviews… but there is still NO direct proof that Cordes
made any specific request to ANYONE concerning needing some guys with just
Pulaski tools and chainsaws who were two miles away and ‘out of the game’ at
that point.
Cordes knew how FAR away they were, and that they had no way to get
out of there but suffer a long 2+ mile hike. Cordes KNEW that GM was
‘out of the game’ at that point. The only thing that would NOT make SENSE
is if Cordes really did think they were still ‘in the game’ or that they could
make any significant dent in his IMMEDIATE needs at that point, or for
the next 2 hours.
>> Elizabeth also wrote…
>> and then Cordes says “thank you” immediately after Musser reaches
>> out to Division Alpha
Nope. That’s not what I am hearing. Whoever says “Thank You” is definitely
not the person that was speaking first in this video… and ( see below ) my
best guess at who says “Thank You” would SPGS2 Darrell Willis. It sounds
just like him.
>> Elizabeth also said…
>>
>> …but I take it that you are not going with the that interpretation of the
>> conversations in the below-linked video?
>>
>> http://youtu.be/y07WjZGdJQ4
You ‘take’ it correctly.
>> Elizabeth also wrote…
>>
>> Why not?
Because I think you are wrong.
Here is still MY ( me, personally, caveat, caveat, caveat ) original
transcription of that Panebaker 154232 Air Study video, complete with
notes about who I ( me, personally ) think *could* be speaking.
** On March 23, 2014 at 10:13 pm, WantsToKnowTheTruth posted…
**
** FULL TRANSCRIPT OF BACKGROUND RADIO CONVERSATIONS
** CAPTURED IN AIR STUDY VIDEO 20130630_154232_fire_behavior_EP
This is the AIR STUDY video that has always been reported to have the ‘callout’
from OPS2 Paul Musser to DIVSA Eric Marsh in it, but a public copy of that video
has not been available until today ( March 23, 2014 ).
We also now discover ( as the ADOSH investigation notes suggested ) that the
video BEGINS with what appears to be Eric Marsh ‘finishing’ a conversation with
some other (unknown) person.
AIR STUDY VIDEO…
20130630_154232_fire_behavior_EP.MOV
Length: This video is only 24 seconds long.
The video has a filename/timestamp of 154232 but this is now assumed to be
the END time for the video, so the actual START time for this video would be
154208 ( 3:42 PM plus 8 seconds ).
FULL TRANSCRIPT OF BACKGROUND RADIO CONVERSATIONS…
NOTE: No ‘audio forensics’ required here. All the background radio conversation
captured in this AIR STUDY video can be clearly heard by anyone with normal
hearing. Regardless… usual ‘caveats’ apply. This transcript is what
I ( me personally ) am hearing in this video. Your mileage may vary.
ALSO NOTE: This video BEGINS at 1542.08 ( 3:42 PM plus 8 seconds ).
That is about 2 minutes and 8 seconds AFTER Gary Cordes had officially
requested the full evacuation of Yarnell and Glen Ilah at 1540.00.
ALSO NOTE: When the video starts… someone is already answering
someone else’s previous radio call in the background and the voice that
is heard responding *seems* to be either SPGS1 Gary Cordes OR
DIVSA Eric Marsh. I ( me, personally ) believe the voice is a much closer
match to Eric Marsh than Gary Cordes. The ADOSH investigators
themselves took NOTES on this video and their own notes seem to
indicate they believe it is Eric Marsh we first hear speaking.
VIDEO STARTS
+0:00 ( 1542.08 – 3:42.08 PM )
(Eric Marsh?): …towards the structures… uh… (pause) southern… uh…
(pause) into Yarnell.
NOTE: As soon as (Marsh?) finished answering whoever he
was talking to… OPS2 Paul Musser calls him directly…
+0:06 ( 1542.14 – 3:42.14 PM )
(Paul Musser): Division Alpha, Operations Musser.
NOTE: Silence for a moment, then someone comes on and simply says “Thank
you” to (Marsh?) for his previous response which included the phrase “towards
the structures”. It’s hard to say… but this “Thank You” definitely sounds like
Darrell Willis.
+0:13 ( 1542.21 – 3:42.21 PM )
(Unknown – but definitely SOUNDS like Darrell Willis’ voice): Thank you.
NOTE: Other than someone saying “Uh… You’re Welcome” in the
last second of the video… There is no other background traffic in the
remaining 11 seconds. DIVSA Marsh does not respond to OPS2 Musser
by the time the video ends at 1542.32
+0:23 ( 1542.31 – 3:42.31 PM )
( Unknown – Sounds like OPS2 Paul Musser? ): Uh… You’re welcome.
+0:24
VIDEO ENDS
So the exact ‘clock’ time for this clear attempt on OPS2 Musser’s part to
engage in conversation directly with DIVSA Eric Marsh is now known to be…
1542.14 ( 3:42 PM plus 14 seconds ).
That is about TWO minutes after the moment when SPGS1 Gary Cordes
officially called for full the full evacuation of Yarnell, and more than 1 minute
after Brian Frisby had already ‘called off’ the face-to-face meeting with
Marsh, picked up Brendan, told Brown to get all the vehicles the hell out
of the Sesame area and to start ‘evacuating’ because the fire is now coming
in towards town like a freight train. All of that happened circa 1541.
Is it possible that the “thank you” came from Brian Frisby? Frisby calls Marsh to tell him the Face to Face is not going to happen (after picking up Mcdonough). Marsh informs Frisby of the plan….…towards the structures… uh… (pause) southern… uh…
(pause) into Yarnell. Musser breaks in with DIV Alpha. And Frisby replies with a thank you.
calvin… yes… it’s possible.
But here would be my own ‘probably not’ explanation…
1) I simply think the “Uh… You’re Welcome” at the VERY
end of the video SOUNDS just like Musser. Paul Musser
has a very distinct voice placement. It’s pretty high
pitched and ‘nasally’. Brian Frisby’s voice is also pretty
unique. It’s more ‘baritone’ and he whenever Frisby
presses that micophone button he speaks forcefully,
clearly, and loudly ( everyone should learn from Frisby ).
2) I really don’t believe Eric Marsh or Jesse Steed had
a frickin’ CLUE what their plans were even GOING
to be at 1542. I think that’s just way too early for them
to have already ‘discussed their options’ and have
ALREADY decided they were going to do ‘the mission’.
1542 was simply the moment when it was still dawning
on them that everything is now fully SIDEWAYS and
their all-day work assignment was now USELESS.
The ‘comfort level’ conversations were still at least
10 minutes away. ( From 1550 through 1602 ).
3) At 1542… Frisby would have been actually driving
the ATV on that dirt two-track to drop Brendan off
at the vehicles. I actually don’t think he was having
any radio conversations WHILE he was ‘driving’.
Frisby tended to *only* talk on the radio when he
was stationary and *not* actually driving the Ranger.
4) The actual conversation that Frisby had with Marsh
in this timeframe ( after picking up Brendan ) is known
to have taken place on the ‘private’ GM intra-crew
frequency. Brendan had handed his own radio to Frisby
when Frisby picked him up for that exact purpose.
So we wouldn’t be hearing Frisby talking to Marsh at
all on this TAC 1 channel in this particular timeframe.
Okay… ALL that being said… you are still absolutely
CORRECT that ‘all of this was happening at the same
time’ and there could have been OVERLAP.
Example: I also truly believe that the reason DIVSA
doesn’t even ANSWER OPS2 Musser for at least
the duration of this video is that he *MAY* have been
‘finishing’ that conversation with Frisby over on the
GM Intra-crew frequency… and only when THAT
( known ) conversation was over did Marsh jump
back to TAC 1 and respond to OPS2 Musser.
A LOT of things began to happen at once in this
1541 to 1555 timeframe. LOTS of documented radio
exchanges and conversations and a LOT of ‘overlap’.
WTKTT: Where did you establish an “exemplar” for Frisby’s voice? Where do you claim to be hearing him, such that you know for sure what he sounds like? (I am not trying to be a wise-ass. I never knew that there was a documented example of his voice…. )
Elizabeth…
The best capture of Frisby’s voice over
the radio is at the end of the
YARNELL-GAMBLE video and the verification
on that happened way back in January
in this ongoing (public) discussion.
It is Brian Frisby heard at the END of the
video calling SPGS1 Gary Cordes…
“Structure group, Cordes, Blue Ridge Hotshots, on TAC 1”
Robert the Second (RTS) knows Brian
Frisby, and absolutely verified his voice there.
From Chapter 3 of this ongoing discussion…
____________________________________
WTKTT on Jan 16, 2014 at 9:19 pm said:
RTS… thank you.
Just to be clear, though… are you saying
you absolutely recognize that voice on the
last transmission as Frisby ( since I think
you know, him, right? )…
…or are you just assuming it’s Frisby.
If that really is him… that would be the first
known capture of his voice that we have
heard so far and that would be good to know.
Robert the Second replied on
January 17, 2014 at 10:28 am…
WTKTT,
Since you posted this, I listened to the
(YARNELL-GAMBLE) video clip several
more times.
In my mind, it’s ABSOLUTELY Marsh talking
about the “heel of the fire” and ABSOLUTELY
Frisby talking about “BRHS on Tac 1.”
____________________________________
Elizabeth, WTKTT has determined that Mcdonough was picked up by Frisby at 1541. Do you agree with WTKTT about the pick up time?
Calvin, I do not have my notes in front of me, but I THINK I would peg the time slightly later than 3:41 – maybe 3:44? As I recall, Brendan took a picture at the sup/chase trucks at 3:49, which suggests that maybe he arrived at the trucks at 3:48. I think it took roughly three or four minutes to drive the UTV from the grader to the sup/chase trucks, which means Frisby and Brendan left the grader at 3:44-ish, maybe…..
Thanks Elizabeth. If Frisby arrived at the Grader at 1541 then it could have been a couple or three minutes before they drove away. I think Mcdonough said something about they were not in a big hurry once Frisby picked him up. Thanks for answering.
calvin… ( and EN )…
Remember… the 1541
time is absolutely the
moment when Captain
Trueheart Brown did his
‘about face’ on his hike
back east on the cutover trail. This was
recorded on the GPS
unit… which takes its
time directly from
orbiting satellites and
that time information is
included in the data
packets coming from
the satellite.
So, since the REASON
Brown did his ‘about
face’ is because that is the moment Frisby told
him to round up drivers
to evac vehicles…
…it is IMPOSSIBLE
for Frisby to NOT have
come across Brendan,
and had that initial
conversation with
Marsh about moving
the vehicles any
LATER than 1541.
There is only a 60
second ‘window’ there
for ‘fudge’ since the
GPS unit was only
updating every 60
seconds… but since
Brown had already
advanced 265 linear
feet back west between
the 1541 and 1542
satellite update… that
really does put the
‘turnaround’ moment
back to within a few
seconds after 1541,
or exactly at 1541.
Also… in McDonough’s
SECOND ADOSH
interview they actually
revisited this moment
and asked Brendan
specifically how long
it had taken him to
‘come down’ from his
lookout location and
arrive at the old-grader.
Brendan first corrects
them and then says
he did NOT ’emerge’
at the old-grader. He
actually ’emerged’
right there at the ‘T’
section of the roads
east of the grader and
that is where he met
Frisby coming down
the two-track.
Brendan puts his travel
time down from the top
of the mound to that
‘T’ section at exactly
3 minutes.
So if it only took Frisby
1 minute after finding
Brendan to call Brown
at 1541 and request
the drivers… and
Brendan was only
waiting at the ‘T’
section for 1 minute
before Frisby arrived
that puts the events
as follows…
1536 – Brendan starts
his 3 minute walk
down from lookout spot.
1539 – Brendan finishes
his walk down and
emerges at ‘T’ section.
1539.30 – Brendan
considers deployment
options and then gets
ready to call Frisby
1540 – Frisby
accidentally comes
across Brendan at
the ‘T’ section.
1540.30 – Frisby
talks with Marsh over
intra-crew using radio
Brendan handed him.
1541 – Frisby calls
Brown and tells him
to get drivers to move
vehicles.
1549 – Brendan has
already been dropped
off at vehicles, got in
SUP truck, fired up
air-conditioner and
turned up the onboard
intra-crew radio. Only
now he gets OUT of
the SUP truck to take
pictures of what
appears to be a
fire/smoke devil/whirl
right there to the north
on the fast-advancing
fireline.
calvin… Correction / Update
You were talking about the “Thank you” and I referenced
the “Your Welcome” transmission capture instead.
Most of the comments above stand, however, about whether
that could be Frisby speaking at either place in that video.
He was actively driving Brendan east in the UTV at that
moment AND he had been talking over the GM intra-crew
frequency since Brendan handed him his radio to do that.
As for the “Thank You”…
I still ( personally, only me, caveat, caveat ) believe it is
Darrell Willis’ voice saying “Thank you”.
Sounds just like him.
The critical question on that video is whether it is, in
fact Eric Marsh giving that ‘report’ when the video
starts ( the ADOSH investigators seemed to think so
in their notes about this video )…
…or is it someone else… like Gary Cordes?
I do think it is Marsh at the beginning. I do agree that the delayed in the response, to Musser, is possibly related to the prior (unfinished) conversation.
Do you think the “Thank You” is Darrell Willis?
It sure sounds like him.
If that really is Willis saying “Thank You” to
Marsh… then everything Willis has ever said
about never talking to Marsh that day after
the 0600 AM cell phone conversation is
pure bullshit.
WTKTT…. I cannot take a guess at the thank you. But after listening to the (sounds like) “your welcome”, more. It sounds like the your welcome was being transmitted from inside an aircraft (helicopter maybe). The background high pitched sound coming through the radio during the “your welcome”. But I could be totally off.
oh wow, more innuendo based on false evidence… how cute.
you’re so desperate and so pathetic.
WTKTT: Thanks for sharing your thoughts. Forgive me for clarifying one point, however: You have accidentally attributed to me views/opinions/statements that I have never articulated, that I do not hold (or did not make), or that are flatly not mine. Specifically, your response above to me was offered in response to my asking you QUESTIONS about why you did not think that the voice immediately before and after the one that said “Division Alpha, Operations Musser” was the voice of Gary Cordes. I was asking you QUESTIONS – not making statements or trying to indirectly offer opinions/conclusions/whatever. Your response makes it sound as though I stated that MY conclusion or opinion is that the voice is Gary Cordes’s. Particularly given the dicey state of audio forensics when dealing with a background voice, I would hate for there to be confusion on this point. Remember the George Zimmerman trial, in which a “who’s-who” of audio forensic experts were pulled in. Despite that, and despite the fact that BOTH Zimmerman’s own family *and* Trayvon Martin’s own family testified about their polar opposite views of the identity of the lone voice, there STILL, to this day, is no clarity about whose voice (Martin or Zimmerman, Latino adult or black juvenile) was the background voice in the recorded communications presented at trial. Several of the world’s top experts opined in that context that it was a fool’s errand for other experts to even TRY to opine about the identity of the background voice (which did not “self-identify” by stating, for example, “HELP, this is Trayvon Martin”).
Thank you, though, WTKTT, for sharing YOUR views. I am grateful for your response.
Reply to Elizabeth post on April 25, 2014 at 8:42 am
>> Elizabeth wrote…
>> WTKTT: Thanks for sharing your thoughts. Forgive me
>> for clarifying one point, however: You have accidentally
>> attributed to me views/opinions/statements that I have
>> never articulated, that I do not hold (or did not make), or
>> that are flatly not mine. Specifically, your response
>> above to me was offered in response to my asking you
>> QUESTIONS about why you did not think that the voice
>> immediately before and after the one that said “Division
>> Alpha, Operations Musser” was the voice of Gary
>> Cordes. I was asking you QUESTIONS – not making
>> statements or trying to indirectly offer opinions /
>> conclusions / whatever.
>>
>> Your response makes it sound as though I stated that
>> MY conclusion or opinion is that the voice is Gary
>> Cordes’s.
Yes. That is exactly what I thought YOU were trying
to establish… and the fault for making such an assumption
is NOT mine. The WAY you ‘wrote’ your comment… it
was the logical conclusion to make.
C’mon… counselor… here is EXACTLY what you said…
>> Elizabeth wrote…
>> WTKTT, I take it that you do NOT think that it is Gary
>> Cordes’s voice IMMEDIATELY before and AFTER
>> Musser’s on the “Division Alpha, Operation Musser”
>> video (see the link below)? Why is that?
If you did NOT mean to establish that you ( yourself )
DID think those voices belonged to Gary Cordes and
you wanted to know why I did NOT… then you worded
your ‘simple questions’ very, very badly.
I had already published *MY* transcript of who I thought
was speaking… and you come back with “Why don’t
you think both voices are Gary Cordes?”. The only thing
to conclude with a comeback like what you wrote is
that you DID think that was the case and wanted to
debate that point.
So let me reword the response…
If you were, somehow, only asking me *IF* I thought
BOTH the before and after voices belong to Gary Cordes,
( when I had already told you who I thought they DID
belong to ) then the answer is ( again ) NO, I ( me,
personally, only me, caveat, caveat, caveat )
do NOT think BOTH those voices belong to even the
same person… much less the same Cordes person.
Question asked. Question answered.
If you ask a similar question in the future… please either
say what you really DO believe, yourself, and that you
are looking for ‘opinions’… or at least make it clear that
you don’t think anything one way or the other and you
are just ( actually ) ‘asking simple questions’.
If you ask a question again in the same way you did
above… I probably AM going to (naturally) assume you
are stating what YOU think and you are now asking why
I don’t think your assumption(s) are correct.
>> Elizabeth also said…
>> Particularly given the dicey state of audio forensics
>> when dealing with a background voice, I would hate
>> for there to be confusion on this point. Remember
>> the George Zimmerman trial…
Please… not again.
That’s about the fourth time you’ve tried to play the
‘George Zimmeran’ card and it has as little to do with
some of what’s happening here as it did the first time.
The voice(s) being analyzed in the Zimmerman case
were SCREAMING… and of very, very POOR quality
and captured from quite a distance from the microphone.
In this case… not only are people speaking clearly and
calmly in their NORMAL voice and pitch and cadence…
MANY of the background captures are HIGH (enough)
quality that other than just simply identifying the speaker’s
voice via someone who is familiar with it… there are NO
OTHER BARRIERS to ‘identification’ from an ‘audio
forensics’ standpoint.
Example: The YARNELL-GAMBLE video.
There is NO QUESTION that those voices CAN be
positively identified. 2 of them already have been.
I ( me, personally, only me, caveat, caveat ) believe the
one asking GM to ‘hurry’ ( circa 4:27 PM ) is OPS1 Todd
Abel. It sounds JUST like him, based on the plethora of
other absolutely verified captures of his voice over the
radio.
This can ALL be absolutely VERIFIED without much
trouble at all ( along with many other ‘captures’ ).
The REALITY is that the SAIT investigators simply
REFUSED to do so… when THEY had the chance.
>> Thank you, though, WTKTT, for sharing YOUR views.
>> I am grateful for your response.
You are welcome.
BOB Powers: Regarding the weather, you said (on April 20, 2014 at 3:45 pm ) “I know what I saw in one picture .” What picture are you referencing, Bob?
I am working diligently at understanding the weather, so, if you, as an expert, have one particular picture that you favor over all of the others or that you feel is particularly telling, could you please tell us which one it is? Maybe then I can figure out where the disconnect between you and me is coming from. Part of the timeline that I am trying to put together (which is different than ADOSH’s, the SAIT’s, the WFA’s, Maclean’s, etc.) includes pictures that have verified time-stamps showing how the fire behavior existed and evolved in the hour leading up to the guys moving, and, while I do not know how to post that series here, I can hopefully find the picture to which you are referring in the series. Or maybe I have pictures in the series that you have not yet considered, and, if so, I can post them or point you to them in JD’s materials (or e-mail them to JD, as I have with other materials, for him to post).
I know very little about weather as it relates to fire, and I know that fire can create its own weather, which obviously complicates the weather discussion even further. I can assure you that I am trying to learn as best I can, and I hope you exercise patience as I try to align your disagreement with me with what I think I am seeing in my picture series, to try to see where there is a disconnect.
P.S. For MIKE: I have said repeatedly that my goal is in part to figure out what the GM guys were SEEING and perceiving before heading off to the Boulder Springs Ranch some time after roughly 4:05 p.m. that could have convinced THEM that heading to the BSR was not a death march.
Elizabeth,
It has been stated many times by myself and others, that the 4:05pm movement, in and of itself, was NOT a ‘death march’, as you put it.
As they proceeded south, they could see the fire, see the weather, and had fairly quick access to down and out escape off of the backside. It seems the only main thing they DIDN’T have covered at that point, was succinct communication with their superiors and adjoining forces.
More importantly, having not previously ever been able to visualize the lay of the land from the top of the bowl, they had no idea when they started their journey, how the last portion would actually present itself on the ground. Once they stood there observing it, AT THAT POINT there had to have been some sort of brief decision making process, before heading down.
I think that moment is more critical than any other as far as decision making goes. Unfortunately, there is no record, or portion of conversation, or anything else, that will give us additional insight into that moment, at that place.
TTWARE, that wasn’t the point of my post. I was asking about the weather.
Elizabeth,
I was responding to your comment to Mike at the end of your post, where you said:
“I have said repeatedly that my goal is in part to figure out what the GM guys were SEEING and perceiving before heading off to the Boulder Springs Ranch some time after roughly 4:05 p.m. that could have convinced THEM that heading to the BSR was not a death march.”
I think we can all get a pretty good sense of what they were seeing and perceiving at 4:05pm, based on the published pictures and radio traffic.
My comment was simply alluding to the fact that, while we practically all agree the best option was to stay in the black, that decision point wasn’t nearly as dangerous and critical as the one that occurred at the top of the bowl.
I know you are focusing on the weather during that time period, but all WFF will tell you that as long as storm cells are active in the area, expect wind shifts, to include velocity and direction, until the system abates itself. So, the thought that GM might have perceived that the ‘major wind event’ had already happened, did not excuse them from expecting further weather effects, as the weather system was still dominating the fire.
TTWARE: You reference “the weather system” that was “still dominating the fire.”
What weather system exactly are you referencing? Or what do you mean by “the weather system” in your comment to me?
The weather system that had caused ALL of the changes in wind direction and speed that afternoon, to include the ‘outflow boundary’ push, which continued on until the southward (or SE) push of the fire abated post deployment.
TTWARE, where are you getting that from? There was no one “weather system,” as best I can tell. I am looking at the materials in the weather portion of the SAIT materials (Section “G”, I think). What are you looking at? Thanks.
SAIT page 69, Figure 6, was the system (line of thunderstorms) that moved SW from the Flagstaff area into Yarnell. In Figure 7, the actual line of storms has broken up a bit, but the severe weather is showing just ENE of Prescott, and continues tracking toward Yarnell. Figure 8, lightning activity up until 1530, as the storms continue tracking WSW. From 1500 to 1530, FAA radar detects an outflow boundary “from the thunderstorms to the northeast” of the fire. Figures 9 & 10, the outflow boundary pushes out ahead of the storm.
i think you give too much aspiration to the two-track.
first of all, it’s completely speculation on your part… all of it. there is no telling what would have happened had they continued down it.
secondly, fire progression maps (both SAIR and WFAR) showed that the fire would have been upon them with the exact same ferocity and speed… just a few minutes later.
thirdly, you have no idea what their vantage to the main fire would have been. they still had the ridgeline in between them and they would have eventually ended up behind a second ridge line.
so, by continuing along the two track, MIGHT they have been better off? maybe. but they still would have been scrambling to find a deployment site.
Yes and that is similar to what I said awhile back.
They would have had some additional options but you are right they would have been scrambling to deploy and may not have survived any way.
Hence my use of the word “death march.” It does not appear that they would have been any better off there, unless TTWARE knows something about the timing of when the guys realized there was a problem than we do. Maybe TTWARE does…
My comment above was specifically referring to the ‘time and movement’ between their 4:05pm departure, and the decision point at the top of the bowl where they began their decent. Nothing more.
During THAT period, with the fire and weather vantage point they had, and the easily accessible down and out escape, THAT PORTION was anything but, a ‘death march’. When they began at 4:05, they did not know what they were going to be faced with when they reached the top of the bowl. The “Now What??????” thought, that must have run through quite a few minds.
It seems like much more was ascribed to my comment than was actually there. I am in agreement, that once they turned east, whether into the bowl, or further down on the single-track, the out-come would have not likely have been much different. But, they didn’t HAVE TO make either of those left turns.
Well, staying in the black was clearly the best option. TWARE highlights well why staying on the two-track for at the least a while longer was better then what GM chose.
I would note that, given fire progression, it is possible GM could have beat the fire if they had moved quickly on the two-track. Even though it becomes a trail, not a two-track, it would have allowed a much better rate of travel than what they chose. That’s leaving out other important variables such as deployment options.
The point is, based on the information in front of them at the time they chose to drop down, they chose the worst possible option. And in my view it was bad enough — they had to know they were in for a long, slow slog through that brush — that it’s not a close decision relative to staying on the two-track.
Post-fire pictures show VERY LITTLE fire progression in the sparse fuels on the west side of the ridgeline. As long as they were on the the portion of the two-track that paralleled the ridgeline, they could have walked down the backside and hiked out without having to deploy.
Yes they had other options that may have made a difference depending on there location when the fire would have made its run to far into the second canyon may have had the same out come, Had there primary objective been to drop off the back side at the saddle we would not be here today.
pure hindsight speculation.
Elizabeth
The picture I was speaking of was about fire activity. the crew sitting at the rest spot at1550 and looking at the 2 mile flaming front. That is fire activity that flaming front is the one that chased McDonough off the lookout spot. it was moving at a steady pace when it did that. The crew was sending text about the fire being pushed into Yarnell. At that time you could start to see heavy smoke column black from some of the pictures in Yarnell as you watch you can see the smoke column start changing directions and laying over towards BSR that is the affect of a storm moving thru the fire area. Some of the Pictures McDonough took as he left the Parking spot with the truck. Based on the weather forecast and those videos and pictures it gives a perty good example of the affect of thunder storm clouds moving over a fire area. How do I say it ? it is like a small microsystem of a front moving thru that is wind driven. The wind is blowing out from the front as the front moves over you the wind starts changing directions and as it passes the wind is blowing in the opposite direction than it started. Wen they said down draft winds that takes the winds aloft and pushes them to the ground. Very erratic (Squarely) and will blow an active fire all to hell and in all directions with spotting. It had an open fuel area to run in late in the day with extreme burning conditions. Those are the conditions that also produce fire whirls or wind devils which spread fire rapidly. When you can see a 2 mile fire front that could spread at any time across the land scape that you plan to walk thru and in highly flammable brush with no break between you and the fire. GM was not planning far enough ahead. That one picture of the crew looking at that fire front with the crewman with the red beard, that first impression by me was stay where you are in the black. Evidently that image did not register with them. Nor did several of the watchouts which a simply there to tell you something is wrong pay attention and adjust you safety needs. Evaluate your situation. worst part of the day, the fire is active and running winds predicted don’t assume they are done.
look at the fuel you are in and remember what the potential is you have seen it before ( Marsh and Steed had a good background and they were in there back yard). Although there back yard had not burned in some time maybe they were complacent? There were enough of the situations that shout watch out to have stopped them. If they had only paid attention. The new one to me is #17 its a good one but it was common since back in my day.
Reply to Bob Powers on April 21, 2014 at 9:11 am said:
>> Mr. Powers said…
>> Those are the conditions that also produce fire whirls or
>> wind devils which spread fire rapidly.
Indeed. If you look closely at the very Brendan McDonough
photos you reference above… you will see exactly that.
That appears to be WHY Brendan came OUT of the
GM Supervisor truck ( where he had, by his own
statements, already turned on the air-conditioner and
cranked up the radio ), stood on the gunwale of the
truck… and was taking those pictures across the
roof of the truck.
There is a ‘fire whirl/devil’ right there in the photos and
that appears to be what he was trying to get a picture of.
So conditions were ALREADY right for that to be
happening at 1549… even before GM had finished
their ‘tools down’ operation and assembled at the
first rest spot at 1550.
In addition… in Brendan’s SECOND interview with
ADOSH they focused on ‘weather’ and ‘conditions’.
In that SECOND interview… Brendan swears that by
THAT time ( 1549 )… the fire had almost totally finished
‘rotating around 180 degrees’ and was NOW heading
pretty much due north/south. Brendan himself says
the only reason it still LOOKED like it was heading
‘east’ at some points is because of the topography
and the way it was ‘skirting around’ the ridges and
mounds over towards the Shrine area.
Yes… there are times ( in some of the photos taken in
the 1530 to 1404 timeframe ) that the fire LOOKS like
it is heading east/southeast…
…but what was REALLY happening is that it was still
simply in the act of ‘rotating around’ and it wasn’t
finished yet. Even Air Attack knew this is what was
really happening at that time.
Fires don’t ‘turn on a dime’. They ‘rotate around’ when
changing direction like that.
At NO time should anyone ASSUME it is finished
‘rotating’… until it HAS ( finished ).
I’m still not sure they were evaluating the ‘current and
expected behavior’ of the fire at all much as they made
their first decision to go on ‘a mission’.
I still believe it’s possible they were just trusting what
ASM2 Rory Collins had told them just before he left
the fire at 1558.
The guy up in the airplane ( who supposedly can see
what the fire is doing better than anyone ) had just told
them it was at least 1 hour from ‘town’ ( Yarnell, not
Glen Ilah )… and perhaps as much as 2 hours.
He was wrong.
At the moment they made their decision to go on their
‘mission’… the fireline was only 4,694 feet ( about 8/10
of a mile ) from where it is seen in the MacKenzie photos
to the mouth of the box canyon… where it would then
curl around and kill them.
And they only had 34 minutes before that was
going to happen to them ( 1604 to 1639 ).
That’s only HALF the time they THOUGHT the guy in the
airplane was telling them they had.
Correction… SAIR best estimate was that they
left on ‘the mission’ at 1605 and first MAYDAY
came at 1639.
That is, in fact, only 34 minutes… but I accidentally
type 1604 as the ‘departure time’ up above.
That is why you always trust your own eyes.
Also less than a mile run across the brush field. I just don’t believe they were thinking situation awareness. They ran out of luck with bad decisions with good outcomes. Thanks for the info on what I was referring to.
See my other post from today about
remembering we might be totally
‘over-complicating’ the entire decision
making process ( as even the SAIR
suggested might be the case here ).
There are all kinds of things they
SHOULD have been thinking and
SHOULD have been doing and
SHOULD have taken into account…
…but they truth may be that they
really just didn’t give a shit.
They were hot, they were tired,
they were *generally* exhausted
from their recent work schedule.
It was their day off. Everything
they had done all day was useless.
They saw a way back to town.
They took it.
They trusted other people’s intel.
They didn’t give a shit about the rules.
By ‘they’… I mean the two employees
of the City of Prescott ( AND the
State of Arizona at that moment )
who led the other 17 to their deaths.
I don’t think there were any
‘consultations’ involved here.
Two men made all the critical
decisions that day… regardless
of any secret phone calls or
job security concerns or Hero
complexes. The other 17 were just
‘along for the ride’.
EXACTLY ?????
you sound like an 8 year old whose scoop of ice cream just landed on the sidewalk.
i picture you pooching your lower lip and whimpering…
Reply to Elizabeth post on April 18, 2014 at 4:47 pm
>> Elizabeth said…
>> I would like to clarify some of the relevant facts regarding the conditions
>> under which GM decided to leave the 4:04 p.m. photo spot (near the black)
>> and head toward the Boulder Springs Ranch. It appears that not everyone
>> is reviewing every single piece of data in SAIT and ADOSH packages:
I believe you just might need to include *yourself* in that ‘group’.
Read on.
>> Elizabeth also wrote…
>> 1. Hotshots increasingly have been called upon to work within the WUI. This
>> means that, when the overhead checked at roughly 15:42 to see if DivsA had
>> resources available to bump over to the east side of the fire,
You keep using that phrase as if that is actually what someone ever said.
“resources available to bump over to the east side of the fire”.
Now that we can all see what your ‘secret sources’ were that you kept
(inexplicably) refusing to discuss for so long (The ADOSH FOIA/FOIL material)…
I am assuming you are basing you entire theory that ‘Musser and Cordes’ were
acting ‘together’ to request ‘resources’ from GM on the following paragraph
from Gary Cordes’ ADOSH interview.
Let’s see what Mr. Gary Cordes ACTUALLY said ( and then break it down )…
Page 31 of Gary Cordes’ ADOSH interview…
Q2 = Dave Larsen ( Rest in Peace )
A = Gary Cordes
_________________________________________________________________
Q2: Okay. Uh, did you um, I wanted to go back to 1545, Ops Musser and you
discussed options. Uh, what were the options?
A: Basically we just discussed where we thought this was going and how, how
we needed to play it and I told him I didn’t have the resources, we were gonna
need to start you know, pulsing some resources over to us to support this.
Um, also I was gonna need some, obviously need some uh, air support to start,
start working that. Uh, we knew once it hit that ridge line that we’re gonna be
in trouble, ‘cause there was a lot of homes that were speckled all around in
that, in that area. So it was basically, you know, uh, assist with the evacuation
uh, try to get this thing painted up a little bit with some air, air support and uh,
start pulsing us some, some resources down.
_________________________________________________________________
So let’s ‘break this down’…
>> Gary Cordes said…
>> Basically we just discussed where we thought this was going and how,
>> how we needed to play it and I told him I didn’t have the resources, we were
>> gonna need to start you know, pulsing some resources over to us to
>> support this.
There is absolutely *NO* mention of what Gary Cordes himself *meant* by
‘resources’. He is SPGS1 and he is looking at a fire charging into the TOWN
that he has been charged with ‘defending’ and THAT is what his concern is,
at this moment in time. There is *NO* mention ( on his part ) of needing any
Type 1 Wildland Hotshot Crews to do ANYTHING for him. Zero. Zip. Nada.
If we have to *guess* ( and we do, since he doesn’t say )… it is *MUCH*
more likely the ‘resources’ that Gary Cordes is talking about ‘lacking’ in order to
defend the STRUCTURES he has been charged with defending ( as SPGS1 )
are Engines with Hose Crews, Water tenders, Sprinkler systems, yada, yada, yada.
You know… serious STRUCTURE defense equipment.
Not a bunch of guys with just some Pulaski tools.
It is also *MORE* than likely that whenever SPGS1 Gary Cordes used the
word ‘pulsing resources OVER to us’… he didn’t mean guys on foot that
are TWO miles away who weren’t going to be able to be much good to
him even if they were THERE already… He meant ‘moving real, no-shit
STRUCTURE DEFENSE equipment and ‘resources’ DOWN from the
NORTH side of the fire into Yarnell… like RIGHT NOW.
Also see below… a few seconds later… instead of saying ‘OVER’, Cordes
actually does use the word ‘DOWN’ instead… meaning ‘DOWN from
up north in the Model Creek / Peeples Valley area’ where the resources
he was *REALLY* interested in having were currently becoming ‘free’
since the fire had changed direction some time earlier.
>> Gary Cordes also said…
>> Um, also I was gonna need some, obviously need some uh, air support
>> to start, start working that.
Goes without saying… and he ( Cordes ) GOT that… just minutes later.
The USDA Air Study videos show Air Attack ‘shifting focus’ to the SOUTH
side of the fire almost exactly the same time Todd Abel told Eric Marsh
( at 1550 ) “1) Keep ME informed 2) Hunker and be safe ( in the black )
3) We’lll get some Air Support down there ASAP.
There is no actual audio captured of the ‘focus shift’ coming from fire
command to Air Attack… but it’s perfectly obvious now from the USDA
Air Study traffic that *WAS* captured that pretty much the minute OPS1
Todd Abel got off the radio with Marsh… he also ‘requested’ the ‘focus shift’
with Air Attack… and he responded.
Also… Cordes ( in his own unit logs AND in his ADOSH interview ) verifies
that he, himself is the one who issued the ‘request’ to the Air Tankers to
just start ‘dropping at will’. He didn’t need Musser for that, apparently.
From page 39 of Cordes’ ADOSH interview…
Q1 = Barry Hicks
A = Gary Cordes
__________________________________________________________________
Q1: Okay. Um, so there was no, there was no question in your mind though that
when, when Eric indicated he was going to the safety zone, he wasn’t talking
about the black, he was talking about the, the Helm Ranch?
A: Yes, that would, that was my interpretation, yes.
Q1: Alright. Okay, um, and um, you know, um, you know uh, I had heard a while
back that you had um, requested um, to the air tankers to drop at will, was,
was any of that uh, happening in and right around Yarnell as all of this um, is
going on that you just described to us?
A: Um, it was prior to my entry in doing the rescues, it was before it actually, it
was as it was, it was marching very fast at town.
__________________________________________________________________
>> Gary Cordes also said…
>> Uh, we knew once it hit that ridge line that we’re gonna be in trouble, ‘cause
>> there was a lot of homes that were speckled all around in that, in that area.
Again… pure STRUCTURE PROTECTION thoughts in Gary Cordes’ mind.
He was SPGS1. That was what he was SUPPOSED to be thinking about.
The fire had ALREADY ‘hit the ridge’ before Cordes is having this ‘conversation’
with Musser. He ( they ) were ALREADY ‘in trouble’ ( DEEP trouble ).
His concerns ( and NEEDS ) were now IMMEDIATE… and not in the
‘1 HOUR from now’ timeframe.
>> Gary Cordes also said…
>> So it was basically, you know, uh, assist with the evacuation uh, try to get
>> this thing painted up a little bit with some air, air support and uh, start pulsing
>> us some, some resources down.
So there is the ‘E’ word ( evacuations ), but what Cordes meant was that
whatever assistance he could use with that he needed RIGHT NOW… not
an HOUR from now, or however long it might take 19 guys to hike 2 miles.
YCSO police already had FULL CHARGE of the ‘evacuation’ of Yarnell and Glen
Ilah, but at 1542 Cordes just seemed to unsure of even how many people YCSO
had to do that… or was unaware of the ‘jeep squads’ that had ALREADY
been forming to help with that.
He also uses his ‘pulsing’ phrase again… but this time says DOWN instead
of OVER. See above. In BOTH cases I believe it CLEAR that he meant
‘DOWN from the north side of the fire’ and his PRIMARY request to Musser
was for SERIOUS STRUCTURE PROTECTION EQUIPMENT… RIGHT NOW.
So back to what Elizabeth was saying again…
>> Elizabeth also wrote…
>> it goes without saying that the overhead had tasks in mind that would
>> be appropriate.
It most certainly does *NOT* ( go without saying ).
‘Appropriate’ for what?
REAL Structure Protection Equipment / Resources?
or 19 guys with just Pulaski tools and no real equipment?
Remember ( please? )… even BEFORE Cordes is having this ‘conversation’
with Musser is when Frisby is calling off his face-to-face with Marsh, picking
up Brendan because the fire is charging his position, and making radio
calls to his Captain Brown to get all the vehicles ( theirs and GM’s ) the
hell out of where they are because the fire is comin’ in like a freight train.
Frisby ALREADY knows the ‘dozer line’ thing is now a total waste of time.
That all happened right at 1541… BEFORE Musser even made the radio call.
Moments after this conversation with Musser… Gary Cordes is ALSO
made aware of that fact ( that the dozer line burnout is never going to happen ).
So now there is an ENTIRE 20-man elite Type 1 Hotshot Crew becoming
‘totally available’ for a ‘new assignment’ just a few blocks away from Cordes
was having this conversation with Musser.
Blue Ridge was given no new ‘assignment’ whatsoever.
By either Cordes OR Musser.
Their ONLY *new* assignment was to keep evacuating down to
the Ranch House Restaurant… and then just STAY THERE and BE SAFE.
Gary Cordes recalls the ‘3 point plan’ he gave Musser as…
1) Could use assistance with evacuations (RIGHT NOW… not 1 HR from now).
2) Paint it up with Air Support. ( RIGHT NOW… not 1 HR from now ).
3) Pulse some ( REAL STRUCTURE PROTECTION ) resources DOWN
from the NORTH end of the fire. ( RIGHT NOW… not 1 HR from now ).
So if ( as you said )… ” it goes without saying that the overhead had tasks
in mind that would be appropriate.”…
…then where were the ‘appropriate tasks’ that ‘overhead had in mind’ for
a Type 1 Hotshot crew, at that point, if they ( both Cordes and Musser )
didn’t even bother to assign any ‘tasks’ to the Type 1 Hotshot crew
that was right there with them and becoming a ‘totally free resource’?
The reason they didn’t give Blue Ridge anything to do at that point is
because they did *NOT* have any real tasks in mind for Wildland Hotshots
at that point. That was *NOT* the kind ‘help’ that Cordes was expressing
he needed to Musser at THAT time… with fire ALREADY coming into TOWN.
>> Elizabeth also said…
>> Nobody was asking GM to magically morph into a structure crew,
Nope… and they weren’t asking Blue Ridge to do so, either… even though
THEY were basically right there ALREADY in town and ( within minutes )
would have ‘no current assignment(s)’.
Why?… because ‘Hotshot’ time and ‘line building’ was now OVER that day.
It was NOW time for SERIOUS STRUCTURE PROTECTION with
some REAL EQUIPMENT.
THAT is most likely the ‘help’ and the ‘resources’ Cordes was asking for.
>> Elizabeth also said…
>> but, as folks here who are currently Hotshots have said, there is work a
>> Hotshot crew could have done, which is why the overhead made the query.
I forget what the ‘list’ is you are referring to… but whatever is on it… HOW
do you explain the same ‘work a Hotshot crew could have done’ not ALSO
being assigned to Blue Ridge?
THEY ( Blue Ridge ) were ALREADY THERE… and about to have absolutely
nothing to do. No one ASKED them to do ANY of these things you seem
to say ‘overhead’ was hot-to-trot to use some guys with Pulaskis to do.
>> Elizabeth also wrote…
>> (By the way, WTKTT seems to think that Musser and ABEL were working
>> together to call the shots in terms of details on this. Not true – it was Musser
>> and CORDES. Yet another example of WTKTT stating things as fact that
>> are not actually fact.)
See above. It is *YOU* who seem to be basing *YOUR* theory on just one
paragraph of Cordes’ ADOSH interview… without closely examining the
‘other’ evidence that is applicable.
Yes… Cordes expressed HIS ‘needs’ to Musser. ( Try and save some TOWN ).
At *NO TIME* does he specifically ask for ‘Type 1 Hotshots’ OR did he
seem to make *ANY* request that Musser ‘call Granite Mountain on his behalf’.
To the contrary…
Musser himself ( in HIS AODSH ) interview, seems to suggest that HE
made that specific call out to Granite Mountain either completely on his
own initiative ( BEFORE talking with Cordes at all ) or on Todd Abel’s
behalf because Abel was too busy to make that call himself.
Once again… here is exactly how OPS2 Paul Musser himself describes
this ‘availability check’ he made to DIVSA ( while still mistakenly believing
that BOTH GM and Blue Ridge were all the way out ‘on the ridge’ )…
From Paul Musser’s ADOSH interview…
__________________________________________________________________
A: Uh, got on the 89 to a vantage point and met with Gary Cordes. Face to face with Gary. As far as – oh at that point, I’d also called Granite on their radio. Because Todd was still tied up with Model Creek. I called Granite on the radio and asked if them and Blue Ridge were still committed on the ridge? They said that they were committed on the ridge. But Blue Ridge was on the bottom and may, may be available. I talked with Gary, he said no their committed to, uh, hold – to prepping and hold the dozer line.
__________________________________________________________________
A few things about this first statement in Musser’s ADOSH interview…
1) A few moments later, they would refine this statement and Musser would
admit that he mis-spoke about WHO he called. He says he is sure he called
DIVSA and NOT ‘Granite Mountain’. He says he would NOT have called them
( Granite Mountain ) directly.
2) It is NOT clear what Musser means when he refers to Todd Abel being ‘busy’.
Musser seems to ‘imply’ that he was making that ‘availability check’ either
completely on his own initiative ( before even talking to Cordes ) or on
Todd Abel’s behalf…because Abel was busy at that moment on the north
end of the fire at that point.
3) It would seem that even though Musser had just met up with Cordes there on
Highway 89, he made this radio call BEFORE he had a chance to really talk with
him. Musser uses the past tense ‘called’ before he starts referring to any
conversation with Cordes. Musser was also ‘confused’ when he made the call
and still thought that Blue Ridge was ALSO way out on the ridge along with
Granite Mountain. Blue Ridge was actually only a few blocks away from him,
at the time he made the radio call. The fact that Musser didn’t even know
where they (BR) were, or that Cordes simply *thought* they were still going to
have a chance to try and burn that dozer line ( not true at this point, but
Cordes seems to have been ‘behind the ball’ here ) tends to indicate that
Musser did, in fact, make this radio callout to DIVSA BEFORE talking at
any length with SPGS1 Gary Cordes. If he had… he probably would not
have exhibited the confusion he did on that radio call.
4) Now that we know the real time of this radio call ( 1542 )… Gary Cordes
himself was mistaken ( at that point ) believing that Blue Ridge was still
‘committed’ to the dozer line. They were NOT. Brian Frisby had just picked up
Brendan and knew that the fire was coming in FAST and there was now going
to be NO TIME to attempt any kind of ‘burnout’ along that dozer line. There was
nothing left to do ( for Blue Ridge ) but evacuate… which is what they began to do.
Musser goes off on another topic in his interview for a moment, but then
Q2 ( Barry Hicks ) returns to Musser’s ‘availability check’ radio call…
__________________________________________________________________
Q2: Okay. When you, uh – let me back up to when you made contact with Granite Mountain, who – who did you talk to – Eric?
A: I think so.
Q2: But you can’t remember for sure if that
was Eric or…
A: I – I – ‘cause I – I think I called division Alpha, not
Granite, no.
Q2: Oh, okay.
A: That’s who I would have called.
Q2: Uh, so it would have…
A: Yeah, I wouldn’t have called Granite direct.
Q2: Okay.
A: I would have called – gone through their supervisor.
Q2: Okay.
A: Which at that point was division Alpha.
Q2: Okay. And, uh, so, uh, that conversation was
you’re in the black and you need to stay in the black?
A: No, no that conversation was are you still committed on top of the ridge. And they said yes we
are committed on top of the ridge.
Q2: Okay. And so you’re assumption was they were
in the black?
A: If – if they were committed on top of the ridge,
they would have one foot in the black.
Q2: Okay.
A: Because that was their assignment, yes.
__________________________________________________________________
So nowhere in there is there the actual request ‘can you spare resources?’
or ‘we need to bump resources’ or ANY actual statement in response that they
were ‘committed to the BLACK’. The ACTUAL response ( according to Musser )
was ‘committed to the RIDGE’.
A subtle ( but perhaps important ) difference.
Musser himself even curiously adds the (unsolicited) opinion….
“because that was their (WORK) assignment”.
A response like “We are committed to the RIDGE” could be construed as
meaning “We are still committed to the WORK we’ve been doing and we
haven’t been told ( or realized ) yet that it’s all just a useless exercise now.”
If Marsh had ACTUALLY said “We are committed to the BLACK”…. that would
be more of an indication that they had, in fact, ALREADY realized the work
was now USELESS and had ALREADY decided they were just going to
have to ‘wait out’ the approaching firestorm in the ‘safe black’.
It is possible that the 1542 ‘availability check’ from OPS2 Paul Musser simply
caught Marsh at that confusing moment when Frisby had just cancelled Marsh’s
requested face-to-face about 60 seconds before Musser’s call… and Marsh
simply hadn’t quite realized yet that ( together with Brendan’s evacuation )
it all meant that everything had already gone sideways and this
‘anchor point’ thing they had been working on all day was now totally USELESS.
Remember.. it would still be 8-9 minutes AFTER Musser’s ‘availability check’
radio call at 1542 that we would see the first set of ‘at rest’ pictures from the
GM crew ( circa 1550 ). That means that when Marsh talked to Musser…
Marsh might have still actually been thinking that they were supposed to
‘stick to their assignment’ and that’s what he really meant when he
said they were still “committed to the RIDGE”.
It might have only been right after Musser’s call that the realization came
that their work day was now OVER… and Steed gave the ‘Tools Up’ order
and the men (only) then began to assemble in that first 1550 ‘rest’ area and
started taking photos/videos.
More about some of Elizabeth’s other recent ‘clarifications’ ( like her bizarre
repeated insistence that OPS1 Todd Abel never said ‘hunker and be safe’ )
in another post.
WTKTT, I take it that you do NOT think that it is Gary Cordes’s voice IMMEDIATELY before and AFTER Musser’s on the “Division Alpha, Operation Musser” video (see the link below)? Why is that? One would think that it makes SENSE that that voice is Cordes’s – having ASKED Musser to reach out to Division Alpha (since Cordes’s radio is being wonky, not transmitting well but obviously allowing him to HEAR things), and then Cordes says “thank you” immediately after Musser reaches out to Division Alpha, but I take it that you are not going with the that interpretation of the conversations in the below-linked video? Why not?
http://youtu.be/y07WjZGdJQ4
Wow… are you kidding me?
You are the one who has been carrying the ‘state of audio
forensics’ banner around like a flag and disagreeing with
EVERYTHING I believe I have found in background audio…
…and now YOU are asking ME why I don’t think something
you seem to hear isn’t true?
Let me stop and pick my jaw up off the floor.
There. Jaw replaced.
As to your question… it’s my turn to say “No… I am not
SURE that is Cordes’ voice”. I AM sure it is him just
shortly after that saying “The intel I’m getting from Blue
Ridge is that they have lost that dozer line”…
…but I am NOT sure about the ones you reference.
Elizabeth… the crux of our disagreement on this is, I
believe, going to remain simple. YOU believe that
Gary Cordes SPECIFICALLY asked OPS2 Paul Musser
to call and ask for Granite Mountain’s ‘help’.
I do not.
Yes… Gary Cordes was telling Paul Musser what he
thought he needed to even have a chance of ‘saving
some town’… but I see no direct evidence that he had
any real plans for any Type 1 Hotshots with some
Pulaskis. He needed REAL EQUIPMENT like the stuff
that was currently on the NORTH end of the fire and
THAT is what he was asking Musser to ‘pulse DOWN
to him’ around that time.
I also believe ( based on the evidence I’m seeing ) that
Musser made this 1542 ‘callout’ to DIVSA Marsh
BEFORE he actually had that extended discussion
with Cordes about ‘what he might need’. If Musser
really had spoken at length to Cordes about the
‘situation down there’ before he made that radio call,
then why would he not have ALREADY known ( before
making the call ) that Blue Ridge was NOT ‘out there
on the ridge’ with GM and that Cordes still ( mistakenly )
believed that Blue Ridge had time to finish the
dozer line or that there was any chance in hell they
had time to ‘burn that out’.
Musser used the ‘past tense’ “called” GM in his testimony
before he begins to describe what Cordes told him.
That indicates he made that radio call BEFORE actually
having a good ‘update’ talk with Cordes.
I believe it is still a mystery why ANYONE would have
thought that 19 guys 2 miles away were still even
‘in the game’ at that point.
I believe Musser made that ‘availability check’ either
under his own initiative ( and general confusion about
exactly where people really where since he had only
been PLANNING OPS all day )… OR he actually made
that ‘availability check’ on OPS1 Todd Abel’s behalf,
which is what he seems to suggest in his interview.
Yes… Cordes was either NEAR him at that time or
even standing right next to him… but I still have no
reason to believe that SPGS1 Gary Cordes
SPECIFICALLY asked anyone to try and get
Granite Mountain to pull off a 2 mile hike for HIM.
I think Gary Cordes knew very well ( better than anyone? )
exactly where Granite Mountain was ( he says in his
own interview he had watched them with binoculars
from time to time that day )… and how FAR away that
was… and Gary Cordes himself KNEW that they
were ‘out of the game’ at that point in time.
Followup…
Here is a ‘cut’ from SPGS1 Gary Cordes’ ADOSH
interview where he confirms that not only did
HE know EXACTLY where they were ( in relation
to Yarnell ) and EXACTLY how FAR away that
anchor point was… that Cordes had been
‘watching’ them working with binoculars from
time to time that day.
So no one in town circa 1542 that day ( except for
Frisby and Brown who had actually been up there )
knew better than Cordes how FAR away GM was
as that fire started charging into town… and no one
knew better that GM was ‘out of the game’ at that
point in time.
From page 45 of Cordes’ ADOSH interview…
They are now actively looking at, and pointing
to, the MAPS they had at the interview and
discussing how FAR away they really were…
_________________________________________
A: No, I put, I put a ring around, I put a ring around
uh, Eric and Jessie’s truck. I – ‘cause they were on
the other side now, but that was obviously the north
side was gonna be our, our, you know, this was our
control line and that the north side was gonna be in
the, in the burn. I rang their trucks…
Q: Oh, okay.
A: …in case they didn’t get down in time, if you know,
they pushed in. Obviously the dozer line wasn’t
stopping what was happening with this event.
Q: So did they walk up this jeep trail and up…
A: Yes.
Q: Oh, okay. That’s how…
A: Yep. Yep.
Q: …they – how long of a walk is that you think?
A: Uh, it was about a mile and a half is what I figured.
Q: Mile and a half, okay.
A: Yeah, mile and a half to two miles. Um…
Q: Okay.
A: …and I did glass them up throughout the day and
they were up on the switchback right in here.
They had…
Q: Mm-hmm.
A: …a squad uh, just staged out over here and then
they had been, they had some doing some work
in here. ( Points to map ).
Q: Okay.
__________________________________________
Also note up above that Gary Cordes admits
he just ‘put a ring around their trucks’ with
the actual thought that that might serve
as a ‘safety zone’ in case they decided
to head back to down but ‘didn’t get down
in time’.
So in the same interview… we hear from
Cordes that the Boulder Springs Ranch
was a 20-30 acre safety zone ( when it
was EIGHT to TWELVE times SMALLER
than that )… and now we hear Gary Cordes
himself thinking that a one-blade wide dozer
‘ring’ around two vehicles sitting on a
two-track road might ALSO have come in
handy as a ‘safety zone’ if GM had decided
to ‘push in’ towards town but ‘didn’t get down
in time’ that day.
Is there an actual WFF class that covers
safety zones, specifically? What ‘rating’
does one need to have to be sure they
have actually ‘taken that course’?
this is a really hilarious exchange… it’s the blind leading the blind. it’s wheelchair jousting… it’s two monkeys throwing poop at each other… it’s a county fair demolition derby! love it.
actually, as Musser surely knows… the last hope for any indefensible structures in immediate threat from wildfire is an IHC squad with a savvy firing boss. firing around structures ahead of an oncoming fire front is about the only thing you can do as a last ditch effort.
they weren’t going to park an engine in front of any of those structures because there wasn’t enough water in all of Yarnell to protect them with an engine, structure or otherwise.
and before you ask Cpt. Hindsight… the reason he didn’t ask BR to go burn is probably because he asked about their “status” BEFORE he sized up the situation and saw how dire it really was.
Reply to xxfullsailxx post on April 21, 2014 at 6:59 pm
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>> …the reason he didn’t ask BR to go burn is probably
>> because he asked about their “status” BEFORE
>> he sized up the situation and saw how dire it really was.
Thanks for reinforcing one of the exact points I WAS making.
Yes… I believe that is EXACTLY what happened.
Musser had just come off his own ‘structure protection’
gig over on Sickles Road and was headed to Yarnell.
He really had NO IDEA what the situation was down
there in Yarnell. He hadn’t been there since the 0700
briefing at the Yarnell Fire Station… which is where
he turned to Todd Abel and said… “Why don’t YOU
be Field OPS today and I’ll stick with the Planning
stuff since that’s what I’m already doing, anyway.”
All he wanted to ‘figure out’ first was who was where,
doing what, and who might be ‘available’… since he
was pretty clueless about that circa 1530 when he
was up on Sickles Road.
So ( from his own ADOSH interview ) it SOUNDS like
he was just making shotgun-blast ‘availability’ queries
BEFORE he ever really ‘briefed’ with Cordes there
on the side of the road… right near the point where
Shrine Road meets Highway 89.
And then ( as you say )… things got ‘sized up’.
The actual reality of how ‘dire’ things already were sank in.
Cordes ‘completed the picture’ for him as they finally
‘briefed’ there on the side of the road.
Musser did NOT call ‘Granite Mountain’ BACK and say
anything like “forget the request… there’s no time”…
because he did not NEED to. DIVSA Marsh had
ALREADY told him they were, in fact, ‘committed to
the RIDGE’ and that was the end of that.
Question was asked. Question was answered.
End of story.
The conundrum is that ( as we now know )… that was
NOT the ‘end of the story’.
It SHOULD have been. They should have just stayed
where they were and where fire command thought
they were… but they didn’t.
So how we get from “We are committed to the RIDGE”
at 1542 to them ‘gaggling up’ and leaving the black at
1605 is still the ‘story’ that has not yet been fully told.
huh, i didn’t think it was a contest…
my main point is that YOU ARE WRONG to think that what musser wanted was a bunch of structure engines sitting in front of homes… but you are too obstinate to understand that.
“So how we get from “We are committed to the RIDGE” at 1542 to them ‘gaggling up’ and leaving the black at 1605 is still the ‘story’ that has not yet been fully told.”
i suggest you reference what Darrell Willis had to say about this… i think the story has been told.
Reply to xxfullsailxx post
on April 22, 2014 at 6:11 am
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>> huh, i didn’t think it was a contest…
It’s not. Never has been.
>> my main point is that YOU ARE WRONG
>> to think that what musser wanted was a
>> bunch of structure engines sitting in front
>> of homes… but you are too obstinate to
>> understand that.
YOU seem to be missing the entire point of
this particular exchange. See parent
comment AND child comments.
It is not about what what OPS2 Musser
*wanted* at all. Elizabeth is trying to
maintain that Musser was just acting as
‘relay’ at 1542 and was, somehow, just
passing on a SPECIFIC request from
SPGS1 Gary Cordes. She is trying to
say that whatever request Musser made
was because Cordes ASKED him to.
I don’t believe it.
There is *NO EVIDENCE* to support that,
nor is there any evidence that if Musser
made that call BEFORE even talking
to Cordes… that Musser himself had
any idea what ‘assignments’ to give out (yet).
Musser was just doing ‘availability’ checks
at 1542. He didn’t know WHAT was or
wasn’t needed ( or even possible ) yet.
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>> “So how we get from “We are committed
>> to the RIDGE” at 1542 to them ‘gaggling
>> up’ and leaving the black at 1605 is still
>> the ‘story’ that has not yet been fully told.”
>>
>> i suggest you reference what Darrell
>> Willis had to say about this… i think
>> the story has been told.
Yes. We all know that is what YOU think.
“Nothing to see here…
move along… move along.”
**
** WAS MARSH ACTING AS LOOKOUT?
Reply to Elizabeth post on April 20, 2014 at 5:59 pm
>> Elizabeth said ( replying to Mr. Bob Powers )…
>>
>> Bob, one of my thoughts had always been that MARSH was acting as the
>> lookout, staying up behind on the ridge (which would explain why his was
>> not the first voice on the helmet camera), but I have never articulated that
>> thought here, for obvious reasons (e.g. the trolls would leap on me, accuse
>> me of trying to defend the overhead, make legal references to my
>> career, etc.).
Elizabeth… the *idea* that (perhaps) Eric Marsh *was* trying to fulfill some
kind of ‘lookout’ duty for Steed and the crew as he made his way up from
behind that day is not *new*. It has been discussed (calmly) any number
of times in this ongoing (public) discussion thread.
I believe the first time it was proposed was by Mr. Powers himself, who
you just replied to.
It was back in January of this year… the night after the YARNELL-GAMBLE
video was first reported ( on this forum ) to contain the voice of Eric Marsh
saying “They’re comin’ from the heel of the fire” in response to someone
( Abel? Musser? Cordes? ) saying he would “appreciate it” if he/they
could “get to town a little faster” in the 1620-1625 ( 4:20 – 4:25 PM ) timeframe.
Mr. Powers pointed out right away that this *new* YARNELL-GAMBLE video/audio
evidence established with even more certainly that Marsh must have been some
distance BEHIND Steed and the Crew as they made their way south on the
two-track ( and hadn’t even caught up to them yet by the time this
YARNELL-GAMBLE radio capture took place circa 4:20 PM ) but he also pointed
out the following…
>> Bob Powers on January 16, 2014 at 11:17 am said:
>>
>> 1. The lookout discussion. ( from last night’s YARNELL-GAMBLE discussion )
>> After every thing we have learned something jumped out at me.
>> First I do not believe they wanted to leave a lookout separated from them
>> as they left the Black area they were headed out.
>> However the comfort level discussion in a new scenario.
>> Could Marsh have asked Steed About his comfort level of going down into the
>> unburned paralleling the fire if he Marsh held back acted as Lookout and kept
>> an eye on the fire as they dropped to the ranch. If they determined they were
>> taking a risk to get off the mountain ASAP. This would make sense and why
>> Marsh came down behind them. Not a good LO option but plausible. At some
>> point he lost tract of the fire when he followed them into the bowl. And again I >> say they were in contact on inter-crew freq. the whole time.
The general consensus was that it is perfectly possible this might have
been part of what happened that afternoon.
If Eric Marsh really was ‘far behind’ Steed and the crew and was struggling
to ‘catch up’ to them… it would only make ( as Mr. Powers said ) SENSE that
Marsh was also looking out into the middle bowl and ‘watching the fire’ as he,
also, moved south.
If he was NOT ( doing that simple thing )… then add just one more
ASTOUNDING / UNBELIEVABLE action / non-action event to this story.
But one thing is certain…
Even if Marsh *WAS* trying to fulfill some kind of ‘lookout’ duty as he made
his way up from behind… he (most certainly) failed miserably.
Even if he (somehow?) failed to see the fast-developing danger before even HE
‘lost sight of the fire’ and they were all back to “no eyes on the fire at all”…
…the moment he lost his own ‘eyes on the fire’ is when the situation (again)
returned to…
L = Seriously non-existent.
C = Seriously bad.
E = Fatal.
S = Questionable.
WTKTT I really believe that when they dropped into the canyon Marsh was at the back of the crew the 19th man. He could not have been far behind them when they started the deployment site. when they went into the canyon there rate of progress slowed and he would have been on there tails by then, following them down. A moving lookout that loses site of the fire is not really a lookout.
Copy that. He *MAY* not have actually been with them
the moment that crucial ‘take the shortcut’ decision
was made at 4:20… but I think you are right… he MUST
have been ‘tail man’ shortly after that as they totally
bogged down on the descent.
Marsh had a little less than 120 seconds between Steed’s
first MAYDAY to suddenly appear on the radio with his…
“Bravo 33… This is DIVSA and I’m here now with
Granite Mountain” transmission.
Marsh was ‘out of breath’ on that transmission… but
given the ‘maze’ they were in at that point he could
not have been very far away at all to cover the final
distance from the BACK to the FRONT in just
120 seconds.
As I believe even the SAIR suggested at some point…
we may be totally ‘over-complicating’ the entire decision
making process here. The things we might even think
they *SHOULD* have cared about or paying attention
to that day… they really didn’t give a crap.
Yes… Marsh *might* have been ‘looking out into the bowl’
himself as he ‘came up from behind’ ( who wouldn’t? )…
but that still doesn’t mean GM had a ‘lookout in place’.
It probably was never even discussed or mentioned in
any way as they decided to undertake ‘the mission’.
Which brings up another point.
We still do NOT know… with regards to ‘prior bad
decisions with good outcomes’… how seriously Marsh
or Steed EVER really took the whole ‘lookout’ thing.
I’ve seen no real evidence that there were actually in
the habit of setting proper ‘lookouts’ at all no matter
where they went or what they were doing.
Unfortunately… that’s one of the IMPORTANT questions
that no set of investigators ( SAIT or ADOSH ) even
bothered to ask Brendan McDonough.
Was GM really in the habit of ALWAYS setting ‘lookouts’,
or did they really just give Brendan that ( fairly useless
given his chosen location ) assignment that day because
he still wasn’t feeling all that well?
How often had this particular outfit just ‘blown off the
whole lookout thing’ before… but nothing bad happened?
We still don’t really know.
Remember it was Frisby that suggested the lookout then they picked a location. Interesting question.
Yes. Interesting question. For all we know…
When Frisby and Brown finally arrived up
there around NOON… one of the first
conversations may have been…
Frisby: Where’s your lookout?
Steed? Marsh?: We don’t have one.
Frisby: You’re supposed to have one.
Steed? Marsh?: Ok, whatever. We’ve got
a guy who’s not feeling too well so why don’t
we just use him.
There is still VERY little known about that
entire 30 minute conversation that took
place up on that ridge that day other than
everyone agreeing that the briefings
were for shit ( or even totally non-existent,
in Blue Ridge’s case ) that morning.
Other than some simple lightning strike stuff,
the Doce fire was the one GM worked most
recently before Yarnell. I wonder if there is
any documentation about them EVER using
any ‘lookouts’ at all during that engagement?
Followup…
Again… not much is said about
that entire 30 minute ‘visit’ by Frisby
and Brown up at that anchor
point… but here are at least 3
entries that confirm one of the topics
of conversation was everyone
agreeing that the morning briefings
were either non-existent or BAD…
** Blue Ridge (redacted) notes…
** Page 2 – Trueheart Brown’s notes…
We tie in the (xxxxxxxxxxxxxx). I notice
that they have about 100 yard of line
secured. We talk to them about the
situation and comments are made
about how neither crew received a
briefing. We also discuss the issue about the radios. We give them all the
extra water and Gatorade that we had
in the Ranger and told them what we
saw from below and we all noticed
that the activity to the north was
picking up.
** SAIT Investigation Notes\
** Page 7 – Blue Ridge Interview…
B & T ( Brian Frisby and Trueheart
Brown ) went on the razor to meet up
with Eric (Marsh) and Jesse (Steed)
in the saddle at 1045. They mentioned
they too had a bad briefing, bad radios.
Eric asked for cubies, Gatorade and
BR says ok and gives it to them.
** ADOSH Inspection Narrative
** Page 17
AT approximately 1150 hours, Frisby
( BRIHC Superintendent ) drives a
utility vehicle up to the ridge and met
with Marsh ( Division A Supervisor )…
Frisby reported to Marsh that he
attended a poor morning briefing and
that radio communications
problems were experienced by the
dozer operator, the Operations
Section Chief Todd Abel, and aviation
resources.
WTKTT –
Wondering if GM ever set lookouts just isn’t called for. Maybe they made a mistake, maybe they did push the envelope at times. They were still serious men who took their job seriously. The above “conversation” makes them look like clowns, and is frankly insulting. Their decisions that day can be criticized without resorting to this.
It is still a good question that a good investigator would follow up on. Why no lookout this time? it was a situation that demanded it for safety.
mike… with all due respect…
I think you are over-reacting.
The greatest ‘insult’ happened
circa 1643 on Sunday, June 30,
2013… when 19 fine men
perished.
One of the REASONS that
happened is because the
2 employees of the City of
Prescott ( and the State of
Arizona at that time ) didn’t
consider the safety of the
other 17 men in their charge
important enough to follow
the rules of engagement.
Whether that kind of ‘disregard’
for ‘following the rules’ was
a one-off mistake… or the
result of a ‘pattern’ of
disregard is very much
relevant to understanding
how and why this tragic event
took place…
…AND for (perhaps) taking
steps to make SURE it never
happens again.
It remains a ‘simple’ question.
Was the leadership of this
organization in the (good)
habit of following LCES and
*usually* setting lookouts?…
…or were they not?
I would like to clarify some of the relevant facts regarding the conditions under which GM decided to leave the 4:04 p.m. photo spot (near the black) and head toward the Boulder Springs Ranch. It appears that not everyone is reviewing every single piece of data in SAIT and ADOSH packages:
1. Hotshots increasingly have been called upon to work within the WUI. This means that, when the overhead checked at roughly 15:42 to see if DivsA had resources available to bump over to the east side of the fire, it goes without saying that the overhead had tasks in mind that would be appropriate. Nobody was asking GM to magically morph into a structure crew, but, as folks here who are currently Hotshots have said, there is work a Hotshot crew could have done, which is why the overhead made the query. (By the way, WTKTT seems to think that Musser and ABEL were working together to call the shots in terms of details on this. Not true – it was Musser and CORDES. Yet another example of WTKTT stating things as fact that are not actually fact.)
2. GM had observed and tracked the fire behavior prior to leaving the area where they were sitting at 4:04 p.m. They checked and discussed the weather, and it is clear that Jesse Steed – then the acting leader of the GM Hotshots (given that Marsh was off scouting as DivsA) – was actually sitting on the hill carefully WATCHING the fire behavior and weather in the minutes leading up to the decision to leave that spot and head down to the Boulder Springs Ranch. At its worst at this point, the fire was moving less than ½ mile per hour, and it was moving far more to the EAST than to the southeast at that point.
3. Before moving, the GM crew discussed it amongst themselves, and they alerted others to their plans. Everyone seems to agree to having heard GM stating that they were moving. The ONLY reason GM could not be found lickety-split when they deployed is because there was an INPENETRABLE cloud of smoke in the valley. The notion that nobody knew where they were is not, uhm, particularly likely or accurate. Go back and re-read Eric Tarr’s and his colleague’s recitations of how they found GM. It is because Tarr had HEARD GM/DIVSA advising over the radio of where they were going. There was communication. Not everyone hears everything on a radio, by the way. And it is well-documented that there were radio transmission problems on the Yarnell Hill Fire that day, PARTICULARLY in the area where GM died. (Remember, Tarr was having trouble communicating, BR was having trouble communicating, etc?) We KNOW that GM/DivsA communicated where they were headed because folks ADMIT hearing it. Why Neill, Maclean, and others keep missing this point is beyond me – it is documented in multiple unrelated INTERVIEWS, unit logs, notes, etc.
4. According to available living sources, it seems that GM reasonably thought that any expected wind shifts had ALREADY occurred prior to their leaving their spot (some time after 4:04 p.m.), and it appears that the weather expert on the fire at that point (there was no IMET) believed the same. Therefore, when GM tracked the ROS and calculated that they could easily beat the fire to the ranch, they were calculating such based on what they believed to be the worst ROS of the day – the ROS that occurred when the predicted winds passed through the prior hour.
5. When dealing with fires in mid-June through late July in Arizona (particularly on or near the Mogollon Rim), it is not ABNORMAL to see lingering or looming thunder cells or thunderstorms in the sky that ULTIMATELY produce nothing of import that unexpectedly, materially impacts fire behavior. If every Hotshot working a fire in mid-June through late July in Arizona sat down and “hunkered” in appropriately-sized black whenever a thunder cell or a looming storm was spotted, not a whole lot of Hotshot work would get done in those many weeks. Phrased differently: There are TONS of thunder cells or thunderstorms looming that amount to diddley-squat for those fighting big fires in Arizona. Go back and re-read every single page of the SAIT/ADOSH documents, and perhaps you will see that the weather expert does NOT think that the weather event that killed GM was actually the cell to the north or the east that Bob Powers and others seem to be considering. There WAS no pyrocumulous cloud visible when GM left the 4:04 p.m. photo spot. There WERE no looming, extraordinary weather events predicted at that point.
6. Just because the SAIT claims that somebody said something does NOT actually mean that the things at issue were actually said. For example, do I believe that the Blue Ridge guys said exactly some of the things that the SAIT claims they said? Nope. Abel did not recall saying “hunker,” presumably b/c he never SAID “hunker,” even though the SAIT said he said “hunker.” Do I think Marsh said the winds were “squirrely”? Well, I wouldn’t bet my first child on it. I spoke with two lawyers today. If you asked me to tell you EXACTLY which words they used in our conversations, I’d be hard-pressed. And such details become even more fuzzy when a conversation is under or following stress/stressors. I would urge folks like Bob Powers (and everyone!) to be very careful about ascribing direct quotes to GM or DivsA unless more than one person corroborates the direct quote (and even then it might still be inaccurate).
(FYI, my sources for the above comments are the documents and materials in the SAIT and ADOSH packages. In order to keep them all straight, I have taken roughly 100 pages (likely more) of notes. You can feel free to e-mail me at [email protected] if you want to compare notes or grill me on mine.)
Elizabeth –
People might write pages and pages on how reasonable it was for GM to move, but that will not change 1 simple fact – they moved and they died. Now you might want to chalk it up to a one in a million act of God, but I think you are fooling yourself. What happened with the weather that day might have been unusual, but in no way shape or form was it unheard of. WFF have to be prepared for the unusual, otherwise there would be a lot more of these events. When they moved, it was NOT in accord with the principles of good wildland firefighting. And they paid the price for their mistake. They banked on things staying as they were, did not prepare to deal with a changing situation and got caught.
Mike,
Agreed. I’d add that the weather that day was not, in fact, in any way unusual.
I am struck by a disconnect again. Elizabeth, just a week or two ago, was saying that GM may have decided to abandon the black because they were afraid of lightning from a violent thunderstorm. Now we hear that it’s perfectly reasonable to bet an entire crew on the winds not altering during a typical thunderstorm with winds that rotate and, well, alter in the normal course.
BTW, Elizabeth, Tarr didn’t hear GM say where they were. He heard them saying they were headed towards a ranch they had in sight. Big difference between saying that, and saying that “we’re about to drop into the unburned bowl to try to bushwhack directly to the BSR.”
As far as Elizabeth’s assertion that “it goes without saying that that the overhead had tasks in mind that would be appropriate.” No, this is not logical. It does not go without saying that overheard was thinking through what GM was going to do if they did make it to Yarnell. That entire day, decisions were made without taking into account fuel type, fire behavior and the limitations of available resources.
Saying that “it goes without saying” is a way of saying “of course, overhead made no mistakes of any sort.” It is the type of thing a defense attorney might say. But, defense attorneys are tasked with defending clients who pay them money, not drilling down to the truth of whether GM would have been able to do anything if they did make it to town. Elizabeth had, a couple days ago, suggested that GM would have been able to proactively protect structures that did not have sufficient defensible space, and of course given fire behavior this is false. We need to keep this grounded in fact.
Mike and SR you pretty well covered it.
I can only say that Elizabeth opens a can of worms and throws it on the ground to see which one we will pick up to fish with. I don’t think any body is fishing any more.
Elizabeth you have totally shown with the above statements that you do not understand Wild Land Fire Fighting. Weather Fuels Topography or what and why the 10 and 18 exist. It all comes together in staying one step ahead of a bad outcome. It takes years to learn Fire behavior on the ground and in school. It is a hazardous occupation and is unforgiving if you don’t follow the rules of engagement.
What bugs me about Elizabeth’s point #3, her claim that GM did alert people to their plans, is that, not only is it not what happened, but what would normally happen if someone did attempt something as unusual as what GM did do is so different.
I really can’t think of a good scenario when you might want to undertake the bushwhack that GM did given those conditions. It’s sort of like getting into a fistfight by yourself against three guys. But, if there were to have been, in their minds, justification for it, then they had the means to ask for help and didn’t use those means.
Unfortunately, it’s not a lack of understanding Wild Land Fire Fighting that accounts for this … what we’ve been seeing for some time here is a remarkably diligent effort directed towards the goal of creating an illusion of legitimacy for certain decisions and actions that ultimately did lead to the deaths of 19 people.
That these diligent efforts are most often not grounded in fact … it’s not an accident, it’s not a bug, it’s a feature. One that, sorry to say, will no doubt continue from this point on.
Mike, what are you responding to that I said? My only point on the weather was that they seem to have WAITED out the impending weather uncertainty.
Not credible. Disingenuous.
Solely imo, of course.
SR,
Burying the truth and replacing it with falsehoods (by means of every trick in the book) is exactly what the legal team assisting the City of Prescott and the PFD intends to do in regards to the matter of the Yarnell Hill Fire.
The tactics we’ve seen from a certain attorney from New York provide a preview of what’s to come on the part of Prescott’s legal team in the event the YHF matter does reach a courtroom.
SR, I sincerely hope that you and your fellow WFF’s do not tire of pushing back against what you know to be false. What’s happening here is too important. And the people determined to bury the truth are NOT going to get tired — there’s too much at stake for them.
You are the SME’s that can call them out every time the truth is taking a beating by them.
There is not much else available for a reader like me except to hope that you do.
SHAME on you, J.Stout. You sound just like FRED, with your nonsense. (You remember Fred, my prior stalker on this website, right?) Your post does not even make sense. WTF is the Prescott Legal Team (whomever the FUCK you are intending to reference)? And who are they suing?? And for WHAT?
I stand by my comments.
But what do they MEAN?
I am sorry you do not have an ability to understand my comments to SR.
Elizabeth –
If you are saying that was their thought process (the fire was not going to affect them), I agree – that must have been their thinking. I will even concede that it was probable that they would get away with it – more times than not they would have reached the BSR. What was NOT REASONABLE (and what I thought you were implying – sorry if I was wrong) was assuming that the fire would keep on as is and thinking they could safely enter that box canyon as a result. By not following the rules, they lost any ability to identify and respond to changes in fire behavior. They assumed what they thought was probable and did not account for the less probable. Given the time constraints, there was no way to follow the rules when they entered that box canyon. Thus, they absolutely should not have done it.
What they should have done is crystal clear – they should have stayed in the black. That should not be controversial. I know you (and many others) want to understand why they did what they did – i.e. what were they thinking. Sadly I think that will remain mostly speculative. I think we could learn everything that Brendan as well as the fire overhead heard and knew, and I think we will still have unanswered questions about “why?”. It is what it is.
Mike, thanks for the response – I actually think that you and I are largely on the same page, although it seems that I remain slightly more optimistic than you are that we (I? someone?) might be able to come up with at least a minimally more detailed or accurate accurate picture of what GM knew and saw that informed their belief that they could move safely than we have been able to get thus far from the SAIR, the ADOSH report, the Wildland Fire Associates report, etc. I could ultimately be proven totally wrong on that, of course, but hope springs eternal, and I’ll keep researching for now. Anyway, thanks for your above response.
I know what I saw in one picture . I know what I read in the Weather report read over the radio to the entire fire. I know the watchouts 11, 12, 15 and yes 17–terrain and fuels make escape to safety zones difficult.
Putting all of that aside would be foolish but they did. A total failure to follow the 10 Standard Orders, and moved without LCES.
THERE BELEAFE THAT THEY COULD MOVE SAFLEY WAS FOUNDED ON WHAT?
As you said earlier in your 6 statements they felt they had time to beat the fire to the BSR.
Elisabeth that’s not moving under any safe rules I ever professed, trained or used. They ignored all the evidence staring them in the face, ignored all the safety rules, and with no LCES headed off the mountain. I see no plan, no safety and a total lack of situational awareness.
I hear you, Bob. I promise that I do. I think I am just seeing the weather differently, in part because there was a CONVERSATION that followed the 3:30 p.m. weather reading, and it seems that folks thought that the winds warned about were already THERE at 3:30 p.m., such that they were well OVER by 4:04 p.m. or later. I hear you, though, Bob. I do.
Maybe we have been misreading Elizabeth (easy to do as her writing can be a bit obtuse). I do not think she is actually saying that GM was correct in its thinking (at least I hope not), but just trying to flesh out exactly what they were thinking prior to moving. Bob – yours is the million dollar question. What made them believe they could do that??? Maybe there was a deliberative process carried out on the crew radio and Brendan McDonough heard it. Maybe it was nothing more than Marsh asking Steed his comfort level, not getting any pushback, and then just going. If the latter, we will never really understand it. I suspect a lot of what Marsh was thinking was never verbalized.
The thing I do not see is the winds subsiding they are pushing the fire all over Yarnell squarely winds and some times a lull before the change direction a eye of the storm so to speak seen it many times as thunder cells even high thunder cells pass over a fire. weather forecasts are not always perfect but you should always plan accordingly and not get caught with you pants down so to speak. Again a good lookout would have made a huge difference. When ever you have watchouts plan to mitigate them with the rules LOOKOUTS are primary as I have said over and over. GM had alternatives that they just did not use. Again we are back to why? Bad decisions with good outcomes it just may be that simple.
I always said in training you forget the 10 standard orders and you have a good chance of dying.
Bob, one of my thoughts had always been that MARSH was acting as the lookout, staying up behind on the ridge (which would explain why his was not the first voice on the helmet camera), but I have never articulated that thought here, for obvious reasons (e.g. the trolls would leap on me, accuse me of trying to defend the overhead, make legal references to my career, etc.). I hear your point on the weather, loud and clear, and I am doing more weather research to this day. Over Easter brunch today, actually, I discussed actually hiring a weather consultant. To that end, Happy EASTER!
Now that we can ALL see ( thanks to Mr. John Dougherty ) the
same ‘evidence’ that Elizabeth was ‘secretly’ referring to for
so long for a lot of the same claims she is still making above…
…a better conversation/debate can be had.
There is actually SOOOO much that seems just plain ‘wrong’
about the things Elizabeth is trying to ‘clarify’ up above that
I don’t really know where to start…
…but I’m workin’ on it.
Stay tuned for a more detailed response (soon).
Unlike Elizabeth… if I am going to ‘debate’ any of her claims
I will ( as usual ) supply specific references to specific things
in the evidence record.
It won’t be some kind of ‘everything I’m claiming is based on
the totality of the documents in the public record’.
You finally drew me in EN.
“EN wrote:”
“1. Hotshots increasingly have been called upon to work within the WUI. This means that, when the overhead checked at roughly 15:42 to see if DivsA had resources available to bump over to the east side of the fire, it goes without saying that the overhead had tasks in mind that would be appropriate. Nobody was asking GM to magically morph into a structure crew,…”
—-‘It goes without saying’ that all wild land firefighting resources are increasingly called to the WUI, not jut IHC, and have been for some time. Hotshots also increasingly are the only crews there to engage, know how to burn and do it around structures with fire typically coming at them, and have Command presence.
“Morphing into a structure crew”, I just don’t like your tone. Had GM reached to where OPS requested them, they would’ve been doing the same tactics as the other resources engaged on the YHF: triage, construct small chunks of handling if needed, peel out with their truck tires for instant line, meanwhile looking to burn out and doing so. Look at Page 12 of the IRPG and check out S-215.—
“3. Before moving, the GM crew discussed it amongst themselves, and they alerted others to their plans. Everyone seems to agree to having heard GM stating that they were moving. The ONLY reason GM could not be found lickety-split when they deployed is because there was an INPENETRABLE cloud of smoke in the valley. The notion that nobody knew where they were is not, uhm, particularly likely or accurate. Go back and re-read Eric Tarr’s and his colleague’s recitations..
Not everyone hears everything on a radio, by the way. And it is well-documented that there were radio transmission problems on the Yarnell Hill Fire that day, PARTICULARLY in the area where GM died. (Remember, Tarr was having trouble communicating, BR was having trouble communicating, etc?) We KNOW that GM/DivsA communicated where they were headed because folks ADMIT hearing it. Why Neill, Maclean, and others keep missing this point is beyond me – it is documented in multiple unrelated INTERVIEWS, unit logs, notes, etc.”
—Not sure where to begin. Contradictory statement you make “Everyone seems to agree to having heard GM stating that they were moving” to “Why Neill, Maclean, and others keep missing this point is beyond me..”. Do you remember a time ago when Maclean/Neill were some of the first individuals to share with the rest of us on hearing GM in recorded audio during the supposed 33 minute commo gap? During EM’s descent, thus him reporting to SOMEONE on movement? How the hell can you say they keep missing this point? Nobodies missing this point. And why make it personal? Aren’t we all here to try and figure this out together without innuendo, ignorance and contradictions?
As far as your radio comments, well I find it hard to believe that a lawyer would even feel comfortable commenting, with or without sources. Wildland firefighters well know that radio issues are a normal occurrence, including tone issues, repeater issues, bleed over, bad clones, the list goes on and on.—
“4. According to available living sources,…”
—I’ll stop right there. Who’s talking to you about presuming what GM knew or didn’t know about Wx?—
“5. When dealing with fires in mid-June through late July in Arizona (particularly on or near the Mogollon Rim), it is not ABNORMAL to see lingering or looming thunder cells or thunderstorms in the sky that ULTIMATELY produce nothing of import that unexpectedly, materially impacts fire behavior. If every Hotshot working a fire in mid-June through late July in Arizona sat down and “hunkered” in appropriately-sized black whenever a thunder cell or a looming storm was spotted, not a whole lot of Hotshot work would get done in those many we…
—Again a lawyer speaking of firefighting Wx knowledge… What’s your angle? Have you been to S-290? It actually is common to hunker and wait out a cell to pass. Sometimes that’s all a firefighter can do.—
“6. Just because the SAIT claims that somebody said something does NOT actually mean that the things at issue were actually said.
Abel did not recall saying “hunker,” presumably b/c he never SAID “hunker,” even though the SAIT said he said “hunker.” Do I think Marsh said the winds were “squirrely”? Well, I wouldn’t bet my first child on it. I would urge folks like Bob Powers (and everyone!) to be very careful about ascribing direct quotes to GM or DivsA unless more than one person corroborates the direct quote (and even then it might still be inaccurate). (FYI, my sources for the above comments are the documents and materials in the SAIT and ADOSH packages.”
—Doozy…is this a word? How about WTF? Not only do you contradict yourself AGAIN here, the glare of not understanding basic firefighting is blinding me. Hunker… have you heard Caldwell’s audio? Sure sounds like Able saying the word “hunker” to me. Squirrely…hmm extremely common description for a wind with no true direction. Not a scientific description by any means but if I had a first born I would bet on that he used this word. Back to your contradictions. Throughout your list you quote the SAIT/ADOSH, then at the end your warn your followers to not trust what it says but then follow up with again using sources in the SAIT/ADOSH. Huh?
Fire20+, thanks for joining. The more straight talk we can get on here, the better. Particularly since some people seem intent on burying the truth, and leaving false and dangerous politically correct lessons for the living.
I would like to put a few things into perspective about when GM decided to leave the black. That some have said was safe at that time.
INDICATORS
1. The Lookout had to abandon his spot because the Fire front over ran it.
2. The same Fire Front could be seen from a picture the crew took .
3. The Flaming front was moving at 1600 both east and south the south movement was at the crew although not fast it was in a continuous brush field and an almost 2 mile flaming front.
4. Marsh stated at the top of the ridge he was experiencing squirrely winds.
5. The Fire weather forecast was for high winds with the thunderstorm in the area. Critical Fire Weather Conditions.
With all those indicators GM chose to leave the black. When they were on the move Frizby called and asked “your in the black right?” Marsh were making our way thru the black. With out trying to tell Marsh what to do I think Frizby was saying don’t leave the black. Was Frizby concerned Marsh would leave the black? I think so based on previous experiences with Marsh?
All the above says Marsh and GM should have stayed in the black. Yet they did not head all those warning signs. Had they waited to make the decision for just 30 more minuets they would have never moved. 30 minuets of doing nothing sitting in the black or moving to reengage, 19 Men alive or gone over a 30 minuet decision. The indicators were there to take pause and wait and see what the Fire would do. No body needed them that bad no body would have blamed them for siting it out. They could justify staying right there to any one based on the 10 and 18 and the current and expected fire behavior.
Well said.
I think simply applying the 10 and 18, you can look at what they had in the black, versus any other option, and then also see that unfortunately they chose the worst, or at least second-worst, possible option.
I had asked Elizabeth two days ago to state who or what she was relying on to state that it was reasonable for GM to take the route they did, when they did. Likewise, for sources (in general terms, not names) of people saying that GM’s bushwhack was a better option than staying on the 2-track. I think it’s important to distinguish between what IS, based on facts, and what might sound good or feel good.
In this case, not only were the choices made the least-good options, but there was no offsetting “good” to come if the chance they were taking had not resulted in an entrapment. Simply, given fuels and fire behavior, it GM had made it to town, they would have been 19 more people needing to get out of the way of the fire — unless they were going to take on even more risk. What they would not have been able to do is successfully “re-engage” that fire at that time.
**
** On April 9, 2014 at 2:23 pm, Deborah Pfingston wrote…
>> 1) Do you know if Andrew’s cellphone/smartphone was ever returned to
>> anyone in his family when the Arizona Forestry SAIT and Arizona ADOSH
>> investigations ended?
>>
>> Deborah said…
>> Yes Juliann did get Andrew’s cell phone back.
>> But no report that they were able to receive anything off it.
>> Some families did receive a report. This in itself is unsettling.
>> 2) If it was NOT… was any explanation given as to WHY?
>>
>> Deborah said…
>> They explain nothing to the families. The only time they
>> talk is when we insist on it.
>> 3) Related to the above… do you know if ALL of the families received the
>> cellphones/smartphones back? Particularly Amanda Marsh? Eric Marsh’s
>> cellphone seems to have ‘disappeared’ from the deployment site and doesn’t
>> seem to have ever been entered into evidence as were ALL the other
>> cellphones/smartphones found at the deployment site. I am just wondering if,
>> even despite that lack of any official documentation regarding Eric’s
>> cellphone… if it ever actually made it back to HIS family… or if it is still simply
>> ‘missing’. Do YOU ( or anyone in this ’12 families’ group you mention )
>> know anything about it?
>>
>> Deborah said…
>> I will let Amanda Marsh answer this question.
>> Eric always carried two phones.
>> I do think this is an important vein of investigation that needs
>> to be insisted upon.
Keyphrase: ‘Eric always carried TWO phones.’
Deborah…
I don’t believe ANY of the investigators ( SAIT or ADOSH ) were actually aware of this possibility that Eric Marsh might have had TWO cell/smartphones with him that day. They certainly knew he had at least ONE… and that he was freely using it that day to talk ‘off the radio’ with fire command personnel such as OPS1 Todd Abel ( and others? ).
We DO know now that while Darrell Willis’ cell/smartphone was, in fact, OWNED ( and fully paid for ) by the City of Prescott… Eric was simply receiving a $25 a month ‘stipend’ from the City of Prescott to help offset the costs for using ONE of his own personal cell/smartphones for City related business purposes. We also know that ONE of Eric’s phones ( the cell number Eric himself has posted publicly on the National Interagency Hotshot Crew contact page ) was a Nextel account registered locally in Prescott.
The ADOSH investigators were ‘assuming’ that both Willis’ and Marsh’s phones were OWNED by the City of Prescott and so they made a direct request to the City of Prescott for the actual ‘call records’ for BOTH of those phones.
The assumption about Willis’ phone was correct, and ADOSH DID receive a FULL copy of ALL of Willis’ call records for that day ( and the entire month of June ) from the Prescott Legal department… but the response they got concerning Eric’s phone was simply an admission that the City of Prescott was paying Eric $25 a month for ONE of them… but ( according to Prescott Legal department ) that meant they were not obligated to supply his call records as there were with Willis’ cell/smartphone.
This is actually a very debatable legal point.
Legally speaking… if the City of Prescott was *paying* for the ( business related ) use of that personal cell/smarphone, then they DO, in fact, have some ‘ownership’ rights with regards to requesting/accessing call records for that phone. There are MANY documented cases out there where this has proved to be the case…
…but if the City of Prescott did not have a specific contract in place with Eric Marsh regarding this ‘stipend’ for the ‘job related’ use of his cell/smartphone… then pursuing those legal employer rights to the phone’s call records could, in fact, be problematic. So maybe that’s why they didn’t even try to fulfill that part of request from ADOSH.
A copy of Eric Marsh’s complete personnel file was requested by ADOSH and was (supposedly) supplied. It is in this folder in the the online copies of the ADOSH documents. I have looked through the whole thing.
I don’t see ANY copy of any ‘contract’ or ‘agreement’ in Marsh’s personnel file with regards to this ’employee benefit’ of a monthly ‘stipend’ to (help) pay for his personal cell/smartphone. Other ’employee benefit’ documents are present in the personnel file… but there is nothing about this $25 month ‘stipend’ for his cell/smartphone.
Likewise…there is no standard CUPS ( Cellphone Usage Policy Statement ) in his personnel file detailing the rights of the employer to any/all business related usage of the cellphone for which the stipend is being paid.
When an employer simply OWNS the cell/smartphone itself and it is simply ‘on loan’ to an employee… the employer retains all rights to obtain any/all of the call records for that phone at ANY time from the carrier. This is/was the case with Darrell Willis’ City supplied cell/smartphone.
When a simple ‘stipend’ is being paid to the employee for ‘business related’ use of their own personal cellphone… the employers rights are USUALLY the same as if they ‘owned’ the phone when it comes to requesting call records to/from that phone ( business related )… but it’s a bit more complicated, legally speaking, than if they were the ‘owner of record’ for the phone with the CARRIER itself.
The exact ‘terms’ of the agreement, and the employer’s rights to request/access phone records for that phone at any time, are usually clearly spelled out in a signed CUPS contract ( or some other legal agreement ) with the employee… but I see no such document anywhere in Eric Marsh’s personnel file.
ALL of those ’emails’ between ADOSH and the City of Prescott legal department are included in the recent released ADOSH investigation document(s)… EXCEPT for the ’email’ attachment which actually contained Willis’ call records. That ’email’ attachment was withheld from the FOIA/FOIL request(s). No (documented) reason was given. They didn’t even bother to cite any of the permissible ‘privacy’ exceptions. The document was ( and is ) simply MISSING from the FOIA/FOIL release.
The actual NAME of the file that was ‘attached’ to the email from the City of Prescott and contained ALL of Darrell Willis’ cell phone call records was…
‘Darrell’s Cell Phone Records June 2-30’ ( An Adobe PDF file ).
It should be noted ( in the emails reprinted below ) that EVERY OTHER email ‘attachment’ shown coming from the City of Prescott DOES appear in the ADOSH FOIA/FOIL package EXCEPT for this one specific email attachment. It is simply ‘missing’ from that FOIA/FOIL release package from ADOSH, and no explanation is given as to why ONLY that email attachment was excluded from the release.
It should also be noted that while there are MANY *entries* in the ADOSH investigator’s own ‘notes’ about obtaining these cell phone records… and being sure they *pursued* this to a conclusion… once that email arrived from the City of Prescott with Willis’ full call records attached… there is then not one single *note* or any further mention of this anywhere in the ADOSH investigator’s own *note* files or email records. There is no evidence that, once they finally received Willis’ call records, the content of that file was ever examined or discussed in any way.
There is also absolutely no evidence that, once being told by the City of Prescott that they were, in fact, paying Eric Marsh a ‘stipend’ for his cell/smartphone… but that ADOSH would have to make call history requests directly to his widow… that ADOSH ever made any attempt to do that.
Those ADOSH / City of Prescott emails were posted here in this ongoing discussion about a month ago and have been sort of ‘lost in the noise’.
Here is a reprint of that that original posting from March 28 ( including the relevant ADOSH / City of Prescott emails ) so you don’t have to go ‘searching’ for it…
** ADOSH OBTAINED ALL OF DARRELL WILLIS’ CELL PHONE RECORDS
** AND
** ERIC MARSH’S CELL PHONE WAS PAID FOR BY CITY OF PRESCOTT
Circa September 4, 2013, ADOSH investigators already knew for sure that
both Darrell Willis and Eric Marsh had cell phones on June 30… but they
weren’t quite sure yet if BOTH of them were supplied/owned by the City of
Prescott or not.
So they requested that the City of Prescott supply all cell phone records
for BOTH Willis and Marsh to see what would happen.
Turns out Willis’ cell phone is/was ( owned by the City of Prescott ), but Eric
Marsh was using his own personal cell phone ( but was receiving a stipend to
pay for it from the City of Prescott ).
The City of Prescott was then obligated to obtain/turnover Willis’ cell phone
records… but because they were only paying Marsh a ‘stipend’ for his phone…
they said that ADOSH would have to make that request through his widow…
Amanda Marsh. ( Marsh’s cell phone is already known via public reverse lookup
on his published number to have been a ‘Nextel’ account in Prescott ).
The City of Prescott DID supply ALL of Willis’ cell phone records to ADOSH,
but there is no evidence in the recently released ADOSH information package
that indicates they ever followed up with a similar request to Amanda Marsh.
ALSO NOTE: ADOSH investigators had already learned by September 4
that Brendan’s original Weather reports had already been ‘discarded’
by the City of Prescott. Marsha Collier of Prescott Fire had already said in
a separate email that Brendan said that he had cleaned out his car and now
couldn’t any of the original documents )… but ADOSH still made another
attempt on September 4 to obtain Brendan’s original weather reports.
There are THREE emails reprinted below…
The FIRST one is the ADOSH request for both Willis’ and Marsh’s
cell phone records to Lori Burkeen of Prescott Legal Department.
The SECOND one is her reply ( 13 days later ) with ‘inline’ comments
about all the documents ADOSH requested.
The THIRD was sent by Lori Burkeen just 4 hours after the second one and
had an attached file containing ALL of Darrell Willis’ cell phone records for
the month of June, 2013
That attached file was named…
“Darrell’s Cell Phone Records June 2-30.pdf”
EVERY document being requested below is present in the recently released
ADOSH investigation materials folder… EXCEPT for the file containing Willis’
cell phone records. It was not released.
Not too surprising. I’m sure this entire document is being withheld
from FOIA/FOIL requests due to privacy laws and the ‘exceptions’ allowed
under FOIA/FOIL… but it’s still interesting to FINALLY learn that at least
SOMEONE obtained ( and HAS ) Willis’ cell phone records from June 30, 2013.
** THE EMAILS
** From page(s) 16-20 of ADOSH document: “Emails L3419 12-30-13.pdf”
This is the first email that ADOSH sent requesting the cell phone records
( and other documents like Brendan’s original weather reports / field logs,
and any documentation about the Wesley fire GM was ‘sent home from’ )…
________________________________________________________________
From: Hanna, Bruce – OSHA State (AZ-SP)
Sent: Wednesday, September 04, 2013 1:20 PM
To: Burkeen, Lori ( Risk Management Technician, Prescott Legal Department )
Subject: Additional documentation requested.
Good afternoon, Lori,
Our consultants two of which you have met have requested the following
documentation from the City of Prescott Human Resources Department
and the City of Prescott Fire Department:
– Brendan McDonough’s Field Notes from Yarnell Hill Fire (Copies previously
provided to SAIT).
– Darrell Willis – City supplied cell phone call history for June 29 and 30, 2013
and cell phone number, service provider, and account number.
– Eric Marsh – City supplied cell phone call history for June 29 and 30, 2013
and cell phone number, service provider, and account number.
– Eric Marsh personnel and medical file provided for review by ADOSH at
City of Prescott
– Eric Marsh payroll records for 2013
– Jesse Steed payroll records for 2013
– Granite Mountain IHC assigned work schedule for 2013
– Granite Mountain IHC “Standards for Interagency Hotshot Crew Operations
Annual IHC Preparedness Review for 2013, 2012 and 2011 (Appendix B).
– Granite Mountain IHC “Standards for Interagency Hotshot Crew Operations
Annual IHC Mobilization Checklist for 2013, 2012 and 2011 (Appendix C).
Chief Willis mentioned in his interview that Granite Mountain refused two
assignments and got unfavorable reviews. The Chief stated that he may
have copies of those particular incidences. We would like those reports if
they are available.
Again, thank you for your cooperation and assistance in this difficult time.
Bruce B. Hanna
State Industrial Hygiensit II
Arizona Division of Occupational Safety and Health
800 W Washington St
Phoenix, AZ 85007
__________________________________________________________________
It took 13 days for Lori Burkeen to REPLY to ADOSH… but when she did
she provided a full ‘status’ report on all the documents requested with
‘inline comments’ inserted into the original request…
__________________________________________________________________
From: Burkeen, Lori
Sent: Tuesday, September 17, 2013 11:07 AM
To: Hanna, Bruce – OSHA State (AZ-SP)
Subject: FW: Additional documentation request.
Attachments: OSAH-ERIC MARSH 2013 hours (3).docx;
OSHA-JESSE STEED 2013 hours.docx
Mr. Hanna:
I apologize for the delay. I was hoping to gather ALL documents before replying to
you. However, I am delayed on a few items. Here is the status of the documents
thus far:
– Brendan McDonough’s Field Notes from Yarnell Hill Fire (Copies previously provided to SAIT)
Lori: Per Marsha Collier at Fire, Brendan McDonough has advised her that he
no longer has these documents. They will need to be requested from SAIT. If
you wish to speak with Mr. McDonough to question why he no longer has them
available, please let me know if we can assist you in speaking with Mr. McDonough.
– Darrell Willis – City supplied cell phone call history for June 29 and 30, 2013
and cell phone number, service provider, and account number.
Lori: Darrell Willis does have a City supplied Cell phone Verizon provider
( cell phone number redacted ). I’m still working on getting the call history.
– Eric Marsh – City supplied cell phone call history for June 29 and 30, 2013
and cell phone number, service provider, and account number.
Lori: Eric Marsh did NOT have a City supplied cell phone. He received $25/month
stipend for his personal cell phone. You would need to request that information
from his widow, Amanda Marsh.
– Eric Marsh personnel and medical file provided for review by ADOSH
at City of Prescott
Lori: Personnel file is available. I have it copied and is available for release. It is
too large to scan. Please let me know if you wish to pick it up or would like
me to mail it to you. Per our City Attorney, we cannot release Marsh’s medical
documents without a subpeona or written release from his widow.
– Eric Marsh payroll records for 2013
Lori: Attached
– Jesse Steed payroll records for 2013
Lori: Attached
– Granite Mountain IHC assigned work schedule for 2013
Lori: Granite Mountain IHC assigned work schedule for 2013 was 01/01/2013
Mon-Thur 0700-1730 10 hrs per day four days a week with a 1/2 hr lunch break.
04/09/2013 Tues-Sat 0800-1630 8 hrs per day 8 days a week with 1/2 hr lunch
break. Their work schedule would have remained Tues-Sat until the end of fire
season, in past years they would switch back to 4 10′s sometime in October.
– Granite Mountain IHC “Standards for Interagency Hotshot Crew Operations
Annual IHC Preparedness Review for 2013, 2012 and 2011 (Appendix B).
Lori: Will send via separate email ( documents too big for one email )
– Granite Mountain IHC “Standards for Interagency Hotshot Crew Operations
Annual IHC Mobilization Checklist for 2013, 2012 and 2011 (Appendix C).
Lori: Will send via separate email ( documents too big for one email )
Chief Willis mentioned in his interview that Granite Mountain refused two
assignments and got unfavorable reviews. The Chief stated that he may have
copies of those particular incidences. We would like those reports if they are
available.
Lori: I have one log from Eric Marsh. I will send via separate email.
Document too big for one email.
Lori Burkeen
Risk Management Technician
City of Prescott Legal Department – Risk Mgt Division
( Phone number redacted )
__________________________________________________________________
About 4 hours later ( same day ), Lori Burkeen sends ADOSH another email
with Darrell Willis’ complete cell phone records as a file attachment…
__________________________________________________________________
From: Burkeen, Lori
Sent: Tuesday, September 17, 2013 2:51 PM
To: Hanna, Bruce – OSHA State (AZ-SP)
Cc: Ripley, Linda
Subject: RE: Marsh personnel and medical file/Tom Cooley
Attachments: Darrell’s Cell Phone Records June 2-30.pdf
Yes, Mr. Cooley works for the Prescott Fire Department – Fire Suppression
Division.
Also, I have received the cell phone records for Darrell Willis. They are attached.
I believe we have made available or have produced everything to date that
you have requested. Please let me know if we are still missing anything.
As always, please let me know if we can be of additional help.
Lori Burkeen
Risk Management Technician
City of Prescott Legal Department – Risk Mgt Division
( Phone number redacted )
__________________________________________________________________
Followup… I forgot to include the link to Marsh’s personnel file.
As stated above… I can find no copy of any document related
to the City of Prescott paying Eric a ‘stipend’ for his phone, or
any copy of any kind of CUPS ( Cellphone Usage Policy Statement )
in his personnel file…
…but here is the link to the PUBLIC folder where that document
resides, anyway…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/20inrene9tcx74a/YdEUVtovCB/ADOSH%20Yarnell%20Hill%20Investigation/City%20of%20Prescott%20Fire%20–%20GMHS
Elizabeth
Let me first say that I do not know where you got the Idea that Hot Shots fight Structure Fires, they are not trained or outfitted to do that.
Granit Mountain was a Hot Shot Crew some of there members may have served as Structure firemen. But again they were not outfitted to engage in structure fires.
Point protection- he fire blew up there was no point protection.
Assist in evacuation- The Sheriff and Police departments were responsible for evacuation not fire crews.
Blue Ridge and the other crews left the fire and were at the restaurant the overhead all knew that the crews were there and could have gotten them at any time.
Winds- when a Thunder storm passes over an area the winds rotate around the directions E,S,W,N with high velocities and return back to the original direction. Fire weather 101. There should never be an unexpected wind gusts if you have thunder storms over your fire always expect them.
Radio traffic- Base on all the traffic due to the Fire going nuts GM should have been pre-warned by that. The Fire was totally out of control and you are headed into a brush field with out a lookout. Get back in the black and HUNKER DOWN.
I do not know how much plainer I can say it. They could not help any body they could only take care of them selves.
If this is the case, then why were they asked to provide assistance, resources etc at 15:42. I find this frustrating. Here we are wondering what GM was trying to do, when there are people alive who apparently asked them to move, but have never, clearly and unequivocally, said why. Clearly GM should have not moved and stayed in the black. The mystery that likely died with them is why they thought they could help, why they thought they could make it. But what they were attempting to do should not be a mystery – that appeared to come from a request from fire command. If it was so obvious that there was nothing that GM could do in Yarnell, then why were they asked for help? I just wish someone from that day would answer this question.
Absolutely–But Mike they said they could not help.
So why did they move has haunted us science we started. They told no one they were moving to redeploy.
They told no one they were moving or why.
There is a lot of guessing but there is no solid fact as to why they left the black and why they chose the route they took.
Reply to mike post on April 17, 2014 at 3:12 pm
>> mike said…
>> If this is the case, then why were they asked to provide
>> assistance, resources etc at 15:42.
Well ( as Elizabeth herself likes to say )… it’s important
to remember what PROOF exists for statements like
the above before it starts to become ‘established fact’.
The ONLY thing being reported in the ADOSH material
about this moment when OPS2 Paul Musser says he
called DIVSA ( and not GM ) is that Musser was making
the call on OPS1 Todd Abel’s ‘behalf’ ( because Abel
was quite busy on the north end at that moment )…
…and the ONLY thing OPS2 Paul Musser was calling DIVSA
to find out was if BOTH the ‘Granite Mountain’ AND the
‘Blue Ridge’ Hotshot crews were still (quote) “committed
to the ridge”. He (mistakenly) thought that BOTH Hotshot
crews were ‘together’ all the way out there and that they
BOTH ‘belonged’ to DIVSA… so that’s why he called DIVSA.
There is NO evidence that Musser ever used the exact
phrase “can you spare resources to help down here?”
as reported in final ADOSH ‘Inspection Narrative’. They
were simply ‘paraphrasing’ what Musser said he said.
At the time he made that call… OPS2 Paul Musser
*mistakenly* believed that BOTH Granite Mountain
AND Blue Ridge Hotshots were somewhere ‘out on
that ridge’. Musser had no idea, when he made that
radio call, that the Blue Ridge Hotshots were only a
few blocks away from him at the end of the Shrine
Road ( and actively evacuating that area ) and already
had become a ‘free resource’ that he could easily use for
whatever he had in mind for a group of Type 1 Hotshots
at that time.
Even AFTER that radio call… when Musser became aware
he was mistaken and that he had a full type 1 Hotshot
crew already ‘free’ and just blocks away… there is no
evidence he ( or anyone else ) asked THEM do do anything
at all. He (Musser) just let that Type 1 Hotshot crew pass right
by him on Highway 89 as they exited from the Shrine road
area and go on down to the Ranch House Restaurant with no
‘assignment’ at all other than to ‘be safe’ down at that
‘safety zone’.
>> mike also said…
>> I find this frustrating. Here we are wondering what GM
>> was trying to do, when there are people alive who
>> apparently asked them to move, but have never, clearly
>> and unequivocally, said why.
I hear ya. It’s still a bona-fide mystery.
Even though *some* of those background radio captures
during the (supposed) ’30 minute blackout’ where someone
is urging Marsh/GM to ‘hurry to town’ ( YARNELL-GAMBLE
video ) and some of the Panebaker Air Study videos that
capture the ‘Granite Mountain… what’s your’s status’
exchange APPEAR to contain the voice of OPS1
Todd Abel…
Todd Abel absolutely denies ( in his ADOSH interview )
ever having spoken to them after we hear him telling them
to 1) Keep ME informed and 2) Hunker and be safe in the
1550 Caldwell video.
Those ‘voices’ in the YARNELL GAMBLE video also do
NOT sound like either OPS2 Paul Musser OR SPGS1
Gary Cordes.
So it that really isn’t Abel, Musser OR Cordes urging Marsh
to ‘get to town a little quicker’ circa 1620… and it’s not
any of them asking GM what their ‘status’ is around 1616
in the Panebaker video(s)…
…then who the hell ARE those people having those
(apparent) conversations with Eric Marsh AND Jesse
Steed… during this (supposed) ‘blackout’ period?
Either Abel ( or Musser, or Cordes ) are just plain LYING
about ‘having no conversations with Marsh’ in that timeframe,
or there is some ‘other’ mysterious person ( or persons )
involved that had a vested interest in knowing what
GM’s progress was and if they could ‘please hurry up’
that day.
>> mike also said…
>> Clearly GM should have not moved and stayed in the
>> black.
All too clearly… yes.
>> The mystery that likely died with them is why they
>> thought they could help, why they thought they could make
>> it. But what they were attempting to do should not be a
>> mystery – that appeared to come from a request from fire
>> command.
Yes. Regardless of what he ACTUALLY said… without
the call from Musser asking if they were ‘committed to
the ridge’… everything might have been different. That is
the radio call that put the (perhaps) all-important
*expectations of management* component into the decision
making process up there that afternoon…
…and the people who can fully explain that (apparent)
*management expectation* that day are all still very much
alive and well.
>> mike also said…
>> If it was so obvious that there was nothing that GM could
>> do in Yarnell, then why were they asked for help?
Again… there is no actual evidence the words ‘we need
your help’ or ‘can you spare resources?’ were EVER
used by anyone… but there is no doubt that Musser’s
‘availability check’ took place on the radio.
That itself was enough to set up the *management
expectation* in Marsh and/or Steed’s mind(s) and,
as such, still needs to be further documented and
explained.
>> I just wish someone from that day would answer
>> this question.
I think ( even if Brendan McDonugh ever talks about
what else he might have heard that day ) the answer to
“What did they even expect them to do?” is going to
turn out to be “They had no frickin’ idea”.
Again… remember that moments after Musser even did
his ‘availability’ check radio call… he only then discovered
he had a full Type 1 Hotshot crew totally ‘free’ and available
for him to use just blocks away from where he made that
radio call on Highway 89 right by the point where Shrine
road meets 89…
…but even then… he had no ‘assignment’ for them.
He just let them ‘evacuate’ down to the Ranch House
Restaurant where they all stood taking pictures of the
fire and doing nothing at all. After the deployment
situation was fully known… it was Brian Frisby himself
who went around to them and told them all to STOP
playing ‘tourist’ and STOP taking pictures ( from the
Blue Ridge redacted unit logs ).
Frisby, Brown, Ball and some other BR Hotshots got
directly involved in the ‘ground rescue mission’ at that
point… but the other 16 or 17 Blue Ridge Hotshots STILL
ended up doing ‘nothing at all’ and just ‘standing around
in that parking lot’ even as the fire was burning into town
and people were still being evacuated.
Even at THAT point… if anyone thought there was anything
some Hotshots with Pulaskis could have been doing to
help… no one ASKED them to.
perpetuation of a conspiracy…
that is your only value to this conversation.
oh, AND your hindsight “superpowers”…
let’s not forget those.
http://www.southparkstudios.com/clips/360430/captain-hindsight
Followup… here (again) is EXACTLY how OPS2
Paul Musser described that ‘availability check’
with DIVSA Eric Marsh in his 1542 ( 3:42 PM )
radio call…
From Paul Musser’s ADOSH interview…
___________________________________________
A: Uh, got on the 89 to a vantage point and met with Gary Cordes. Face to face with Gary. As far as – oh at that point, I’d also called Granite on their radio. Because Todd was still tied up with Model Creek. I called Granite on the radio and asked if them and Blue Ridge were still committed on the ridge? They said that they were committed on the ridge. But Blue Ridge was on the bottom and may, may be available. I talked with Gary, he said no their committed to, uh, hold – to prepping and hold the dozer line.
__________________________________________
A few things about this first statement…
1) A few moments later, they would refine this
statement and Musser would admit that he
mis-spoke about WHO he called. He says he
is sure he called DIVSA and NOT ‘Granite Mountain’. He says he would NOT have called them directly.
2) It is NOT clear what Musser means when he
refers to Todd Abel being ‘busy’. Musser seems
to ‘imply’ that he was making that ‘availability
check’ on Abel’s behalf… ( because Abel was
busy at that moment on the north end of the fire )… but Musser does not specifically say that was really the case.
3) It would seem that even though Musser had
just met up with Cordes there on Highway 89,
he made this radio call BEFORE he had a chance to
really talk with him. Musser uses the past tense ‘called’ before he starts referring to any conversation with Cordes. Musser was also ‘confused’ when he made the call and still thought that Blue Ridge was ALSO way out on the ridge along with Granite Mountain. Blue Ridge was actually only a few blocks away from him, at the time he made the radio call.
4) Now that we know the real time of this radio
call ( 1542 )… Gary Cordes himself was mistaken
( at that point ) believing that Blue Ridge was
still ‘committed’ to the dozer line. They were NOT.
Brian Frisby had just picked up Brendan and
knew that the fire was coming in FAST and there
was now NO TIME to attempt any kind of ‘burnout’
along that dozer line. There was nothing left to do
but evacuate… which is what they began to do.
Musser goes off on another topic in his interview
for a moment, but then Q2 ( Barry Hicks ) returns
to Musser’s ‘availability check’ radio call…
__________________________________________
Q2: Okay. When you, uh – let me back up to when you made contact with Granite Mountain, who – who did you talk to – Eric?
A: I think so.
Q2: But you can’t remember for sure if that
was Eric or…
A: I – I – ‘cause I – I think I called division Alpha, not
Granite, no.
Q2: Oh, okay.
A: That’s who I would have called.
Q2: Uh, so it would have…
A: Yeah, I wouldn’t have called Granite direct.
Q2: Okay.
A: I would have called – gone through their supervisor.
Q2: Okay.
A: Which at that point was division Alpha.
Q2: Okay. And, uh, so, uh, that conversation was
you’re in the black and you need to stay in the black?
A: No, no that conversation was are you still committed on top of the ridge. And they said yes we
are committed on top of the ridge.
Q2: Okay. And so you’re assumption was they were
in the black?
A: If – if they were committed on top of the ridge,
they would have one foot in the black.
Q2: Okay.
A: Because that was their assignment, yes.
__________________________________________
So nowhere in there is there the actual request
‘can you spare resources?’ or any actual
statement in response that they were ‘committed
to the black’. The ACTUAL response ( according
to Musser ) was ‘committed to the RIDGE’.
A subtle ( but perhaps important ) difference.
Reply to Bob Powers post on April 17, 2014 at 2:06 pm said:
>> Mr. Powers said…
>> Let me first say that I do not know where you got the Idea that
>> Hot Shots fight Structure Fires, they are not trained or outfitted
>> to do that.
They certainly are NOT. They don’t even carry ‘quick breathers’
for quick structure entry/exit.
>> Mr. Powers also wrote…
>> Granite Mountain was a Hot Shot Crew some of there members
>> may have served as Structure firemen. But again they were not
>> outfitted to engage in structure fires.
TWO points ( also posted below but directly relevant here, as well )
** GARY CORDES DID *NOT* HAVE A STRUCTURE GROUP
** SPECIALIST RATING, EVEN THOUGH HE WAS ASSIGNED
** ‘SPGS1’ DUTIES THAT WEEKEND.
Gary Cordes was NOT a ‘structure group specialist’.
He didn’t even have that ‘rating’… even though they made him
SPGS1 that weekend and directly responsible for the entire
protection of both Yarnell and Glen Ilah.
From the very start of Gary Cordes’ ADOSH interview… when they
were going over his ‘qualifications’…
Q2 = Dave Larsen ( Rest in Peace )
_____________________________________________________
Q2: Hey Gary, I was just wondering you – I’m gonna presume that you have a structure uh, group specialist or however you got that on your red track?
A: No, I’m not a structure group specialist.
However, most of the division work I do is as a structured group, um, doing structure protection. But I’m not a specialist.
_____________________________________________________
** FIELD OPS1 TODD ABEL SAYS THAT EVEN IF GM
** HAD MADE IT TO TOWN THEY WOULD HAVE SIMPLY
** JUST BECOME ‘PART OF THE PROBLEM’ THAT DAY.
The actual FIELD OPS1 Todd Abel on the fire that day ( and the man
actually directly responsible for running the extended attack for most
of the day ) agreed with ADOSH in his own interview with them that
there wouldn’t have been much good GM could have done in town that
day, even if they had made it there, and that they would, in fact, have
just become ‘part of the problem’.
This is the point near the end of OPS1 Tod Abel’s interview where
they are simply trying to fathom, themselves, what good Marsh/Steed
might have possibly thought they could do even if they had made it to
town.
OPS1 Todd Abel AGREES with Dave Larsen (Rest in Peace) that some guys with nothing more than a (quote) “shiny little hard hat and a Pulaski” weren’t going to be able to do much good at all.
Page 67 of ADOSH interview with Field OPS1 Todd Abel…
Q1: = Dave Larsen ( Rest in Peace )
A: = OPS1 Todd Abel
____________________________________________________
A: Well yeah, you’re – you’re right. You know our priorities are life safety, property conservation, and – and incident stabilization that’s what we – we reach for. But, if I know I can’t get down there or get my crew down there safely, what good am I gonna do? I ain’t gonna do no good. I’m gonna add to the problem.
Q1: Do you know the hauling chart?
A: Mm-hm.
Q1: Familiar with it?
A: Yes.
Q1: People with – we’re talking about hand crews being relatively ineffective if – if the flame lengths are higher than three and a half feet, you’re kind of out of it?
A: Yeah.
Q1: You’ve heard that?
A: I have heard that.
Q1: That’s common knowledge?
A: Yes.
Q1: That we, uh…
A: Yes, the hauling chart, yeah.
Q1: So we, uh – what are you thinking we’re gonna do with your shiny little hardhat and a
Pulaski?
A: Yeah.
_____________________________________________________
Todd Abel is saying that after the fact, when everything is known. However, there has been recent suggestion that Abel knew of the request to help, so in real time, he might not have thought that way. But it is possible he wants people to think that was what he was thinking at the time.
I know not knowing what happened in that famous “14 minutes” is very frustrating. That time period has been subject to great speculation. Some of that speculation might seem to make a lot of sense on the face of it, yet be totally wrong. However, some of the other, later communications do suggest there were people in Yarnell expecting them. This would be consistent with the idea they were moving to help.
Reply to mike post on April 17, 2014 at 3:55 pm
>> mike said…
>> There has been recent suggestion that Abel knew
>> of the request to help
Actually… the ‘mystery’ is even deeper than that.
According to OPS2 Paul Musser… the only reason
HE was making that ‘availability check’ radio call
at 1542 was because Todd Abel ASKED him
to… because he was so busy up on the north end
of the fire at that moment.
We NOW know that ‘availability check’ came a
full 8 or 9 minutes before we ACTUALLY hear
OPS1 Todd Abel (himself) speaking to DIVSA
Eric Marsh. So at 1550 the situation was this…
– OPS2 Paul Musser had just done an ‘availability’
check radio call to DIVSA at 1542. The answer
was that they were, in fact, “committed to the
ridge” and OPS2 should look to Blue Ridge if
he felt he needed any Type 1 Hotshots for anything.
That ‘availability’ check was SUPPOSEDLY done
by Musser on BEHALF ( at the request of? ) OPS1
Todd Abel who was too busy that moment to make
that radio call himself.
– We can only assume Musser passed on the
response he got to OPS1 Todd Abel, since he
supposedly was just playing ‘relay’ at that point
and only made the call because Abel was too
busy to do it himself.
– 8 or 9 minutes later… OPS1 Todd Abel himself
is clearly heard telling Marsh…
1) Keep me informed ( of your situation )
2) Hunker and be safe ( in the black )
3) We’ll get some Air Support down there ASAP.
There is *NO* further request for *ANY* assistance
in this conversation. That all got settled 9 minutes
earlier when Musser did his ‘availabilty’ check.
( I am now going to ‘leave out’ the ongoing part of
this mystery where suddenly, less than 15 minutes
later… we are (apparently) hearing all kinds of
radio conversations with Marsh/Steed asking them
what their ‘status’ is and ‘can they please hurry up’ ).
>> mike also said….
>> so in real time, he have thought that way. But it is
>> possible he wants people to think that was what he
>> was thinking at the time.
Yes. It is. There are some very *odd* moments in
Todd Abel’s ADOSH interview. There are times
when he CLEARLY recalls certain radio conversations
but then ( in the SAIT investigation ) he says he
doesn’t even recall EVER having that clear
‘hunker and be safe’ conversation with Marsh
fully captured in the Caldwell video.
In BOTH interview situations… he is (apparently)
being very *selective* about what he remembers
and what he does not.
>> mike also said…
>> I know not knowing what happened in that famous
>> “14 minutes” is very frustrating. That time period
>> has been subject to great speculation. Some of
>> that speculation might seem to make a lot of sense
>> on the face of it, yet be totally wrong. However,
>> some of the other, later communications do
>> suggest there were people in Yarnell expecting
>> them. This would be consistent with the idea they
>> were moving to help.
Yes. I believe the YARNELL-GAMBLE video all
by itself is one mystery that NEEDS to be solved…
not only for why Blue Ridge Hotshot McCord would
have chosen that exact (telling?) NAME for his
video… but what else McCord MAY have heard
like the actual CALL SIGN of the person who
was contacting Marsh and asking if they could
please ‘try to get there a little faster’.
That conversation EXISTS… and it still needs to
be discovered WHO was urging them to ‘hurry’.
If that caller was NOT Abel, Musser or Cordes…
…then WHO WAS IT?
you guys are re-hashing old conversations… but i think it’s an opportunity to revisit what RTS had brought up long ago… there does seem to be a prevailing idea (call it speculation if you want) that GM did indeed, view themselves as the “structure protection specialists” among IHC crews… i believe this is evident on a number of levels:
-there primary mission prior to being an IHC was fuels mitigation in and around structures in the greater Prescott area.
-a number of their employees were enticed to join GM by the promise of structure quals and experience with the potential to move from wildland to structure department.
-they had just come off the Doce fire where they were heralded as heroes for saving structures.
-they’re primary management and oversight, Darrell Willis, seemed to have a prevailing attitude of “action at all costs” with regard to structure protection.
-GM’s determination to leave the cold-safe black in order to get to a place where they might be of more use.
there is no doubt that the mission of wildland resources, including IHC’s, has evolved over the last 10-20 years, both as a by-product of increased WUI and a changing culture. if you couple that with an agency and crew who view it as their primary “specialty” to save structures in the WUI, and ESPECIALLY in their own backyard… then you get an overzealous call of duty.
Right on– but in that blowup they could have done little
and would have arrived late based on the travel time.
do wild land fire fighters continue to try to fight structure fires or do they re evaluate that part of the expected suppression use? I believe it needs more clarity for hand crews, as there is more and more urban interface. Fullsail is that happening at all or being discussed?
bob- again, when they started their “walk” the fire was still moving in an easterly direction… and it was just starting to “blow up” but it was moving away from them. they didn’t view it as a threat to their “route” obviously, or they wouldn’t have taken their fatal hike.
and once again, no matter how hard WTKTT tries to insinuate some sort of ineptitude on behalf of Musser or Able being “mistaken” about crew locations, ANY request by ANY overhead, could have easily been turned down.
AND IN HINDSIGHT, after that fire spread had shifted to the south and “blown up” and destroyed hundreds of homes in Yarnell, GM would have been sitting on top of that ridge talking to Musser/Able over the radio saying, “God Damn! good thing we didn’t try going down there!…” and Musser/Able would have responded, “yeah, we’re sure glad you guys decided to stay on that ridgeline in the black…”
NO. QUESTIONS. ASKED.
with regard to your other question, about what’s being addressed currently…
i think that local agencies are trying to improve relationships with cooperators, trying to define rolls between agencies and improv commo and attempting inter-agency training, but there’s no getting rid of the problem… we’re still going to be rolling up on WUI incidents in many places across the country on a regular basis. as a local Forest Service IA resource, i think we have an advantage over IHC’s in that we do a lot of cross training with local cooperators… but IHC’s generally don’t have that exposure, and still have a high expectation to perform.
i don’t think the “problem” with regard to GM possibly being over-eager to engage in structure protection is widespread among federal IHC’s. i think, just as RTS has said, that it was unique to that crew, because of the aforementioned reasons: their history, leadership and culture.
One more thing: Bob Powers always reminds us that, in order to be safe, “one foot in the black” is needed. But obviously that rule does not work if there is not *ENOUGH* black, correct? And presumably that rule only pertains to situations in which you are working on the fire, rather than leaving it, correct? Or no? Part of the reason why I ask is because, as I go back through all the videos and photos from the YHF, I am seeing guys all OVER who did not have “one foot in the black” if, by “black,” we mean “an appropriately-sized safety zone.” So, WTF does “one foot in the black” mean, and, more importantly, when does it APPLY versus when DOESN’T it apply? If it is easier for someone who actually knows some stuff to e-mail me, please do. I am at [email protected].
One Foot In The Black—Hand crews working on line construction safest place to be Direct line 1 foot in the black. If not near the black build and ID safety zones as you progress. With Cats Hand tools or find large open areas. Cat lines always build SZ as they go to fall back to. Small Fires do not make large runs at you so a small area of black may be good. As the fire grows in size the black grows in size. Engine crews ID areas to retreat to or in some cases drive into the black for safety.
The black is always the safest location. Even on IA a small fire will not have a larger fire run at it small spots and escapes will not cause large flame lengths.
Indirect line construction safety zones are built in in the best identified locations and flagged. One foot in the black means exactly that you are building line on the burned area. If you are not on the burned area then you need to be ID safety zones that are close and accessible and you ID or build new ones as you move. A 1 acre fire is the size of a football field It dose not take much to create a safe burned area.
On the YHF there were engines and crews, and a Cat building indirect line and improving that line. I would hope and assume they had SZ and locations they could retreat to as BR and the Cat did. Engines will ID defensible space on Houses or will not stay in those locations if the Fire is to severe.
The bottom line the safest place to be is next to or in the black. If 1 out of a 1000 times that’s not good find another SZ location.
Always Scout, Identify, and mark escape routes and SZ and move them as you move.
If you are going to leave the fire for any reason. First follow the black line back to where you started. Find the safest route off the fire and make sure you let your over head know where you are going. If you have to go thru unburned fuel have a lookout and communications. On a going fire never put your self or crew in unburned fuel when leaving the fire. Watch out situation #11 Unburned fuel between you and the fire. This one situation has killed and trapped more fire fighters than any other situation in the history of Wild Land Fire. If you have to put your self in that situation LCES is absolutely MANDENTORY.
“one foot in the black” is just ONE type of safety zone… there are many…
another would be: a large cleared area, say 2-3 acres, with some well constructed buildings on it…
yet another would be: a grassy green pasture…
yet another would be: a large dirt area cleared of fuels by a dozer…
yet another would be: get back in the truck and drive away…
(this is most likely what 90% of the resources on Yarnell Hill Fire (including BR) were using as their “primary” escape route and safety zone.)
“one foot in the black” just means you are constructing direct fireline with easy egress back to the cold black.
Thanks, xxfullsailxx.
“Alternate” Route to the Boulder Springs Ranch
Three points merit mention, at least two of which reflect info again articulated recently by the hikers:
1. If GM had stayed on the two-track rather than descending off of it down into the valley where the GM guys died, it appears that the two-track might have ultimately led to the BSR (as TTWARE’s acquaintance suggested), but it would have dwindled down into a likely overgrown, hard-to-see one-ish track the closer it got to the BSR, and it would have been a time-consuming trip. Meaning, GM still would have been burned over, just in a different spot.
2. The route the hikers took back to Candy Cane Lane SPLITS off from the route referenced above. Had GM taken the Candy Cane Lane route that the hikers took, it seems obvious (particularly given the recent hiker comments) that the GM guys would have perished… just in a different spot.
3. As corroborated in at least one of the ADOSH overhead interviews, staying on the two-track (which dwindled to a one-ish track) was not “feasible” – the GM guys still would have died – it was NOT an easy hike – it seems that it took the hikers a good long time, and they weren’t travelling in a pack of 18, with 40 pounds on their back, with big chainsaws. This notion that the GM guys should have taken the two-track because then they just could have jumped over the ridge down to Congress does NOT work with the timeline and the burn photos. The hikers started moving down that two-track in the very early afternoon, and, according to their most recent post, they still only beat the fire by 40 minutes. GM did start moving until some time AFTER 4:04 p.m. Also, at some point on that two-track qua one-track, GM would have lost sight of the fire unless they kept a lookout in the two-track while the others dropped down to either Candy Cane Lane or the BSR.
I continue to believe that the unexpected wind gust is what fucked everything up. For that reason, I sure wish someone who is not me was posting long, informative posts about the weather here on IM. As best I can tell, GM thought the potential weather change had ALREADY come when they left for the BSR, which is why they thought it was reasonable to leave for the BSR when they did. But that is a discussion for another day (at least with respect to me). For now, I have to get busy trying to make sense of Wildland Fire Associates’s footnote 6 on page 15….
Again, something is not processing.
What GM should have done is stayed put in the black.
Out of a range of less-good alternatives relative to staying put, staying on the 2-track would have been less-bad. Among other things, due to keeping elevation for longer, they would have both kept options open and had other benefits. Of all their options, they chose the worst possible one, namely dropping off of the 2-track, with certainty of losing sight of the fire, escape back uphill rapidly becoming lost due to the time it would take, and with a slow rate of travel assured by vegetation and other conditions in the steep rocky bowl they chose to descend. And, their rate of travel in fact was what they should have expected with knowledge of local conditions.
You are suggesting they bet everything on weather staying more or less constant during a thunderstorm? It is hard to address that proposition entirely seriously. Having been in similar storms a time or two, winds among other things change.
There is nothing certain about GM experiencing an entrapment if they had stayed on the 2-track, nor is it a given that, were they in whole or in part to have been caught, that the result would have been the same number of fatalities. You seem to be making some very illogical assumptions when you claim that it is “obvious” that the result would have been the same.
Simply by keeping elevation for a few minutes more, they may well have been able to see enough, also, to take other options that would have been better.
If I want to walk to a destination in town, and note that one route would take me by one street corner with a reputation for some gang violence and drug dealing, it does not follow that I should decide, Well, that could be dangerous, I should go straight through the worst neighborhood in town instead, with no regard to the clothes I am wearing, and count on the thunderstorm in the distance keeping any trouble inside.
SR—Absolutely correct and having not scouted any of the options and lack of LCES they should have stayed in the BLACK. I believe our discussion on the 2 track was only that they had some other options if they stayed on it not that it was better than staying in the black only that it was better than going into a brush field canyon. Eyes on the fire other open areas to retreat to. Or drop off the back side of the ridge where there were several more larger open areas. None better than staying put.
SR, if it were MY sibling, child, or spouse that died on June 30th, it would be useful for me to know that at least *someone* who has carefully compared and tracked the relevant data, photos, and videos does NOT believe that, if the 19 men had just stayed on the two/one-track on June 30th, they would still be here, easy-peasy.
If you disagree with me, please identify the relevant photos or videos from either the SAIT or the ADOSH package that refute my position (as opposed to defaulting to your normal rebuttal, which involves you simply deeming me “disingenuous,” which, by the way, does not mean what it seems you think it means). Gracias. 🙂
Again Elizabeth we were only stating that once they decided to go down the 2 track/ trail staying on it gave them more options than dropping into a brush field canyon. Eather way the time it took was to long and they would not have made it . How ever if you look at the post WTKTT did with the Google earth on the trail you will see some alternatives the crew would have had staying on the trail/2 track/1 track what ever. There are clearings and open areas that would have made better deployment sites off the back side of the ridge. Would they have survived? maybe, way better than the brush field canyon they went into.
Again the major mistake by GM overhead they did not scout the route or ER to where ever they were going, and there fore lost LCES. That is fact beyond any dought. Weather or wind was not the main cause, it was a factor only that was not considered by GM overhead. There were so many reasons not to walk off that mountain out of the black but they did.
I still believe ( based on many hours looking
at that alternate escape route in Google
Earth )… that by the time they reached
that point where they would have THEN
had to decide whether to even continue
on the EASTBOUND leg of that ‘trail’…
…they would have been standing on pretty
much the highest ground of the entire
SOUTHBOUND leg of the trip… and they
would have had a CLEAR view ( by then )
of where the fire really was, how fast it
had moved towards their intended
destination… and given that CLEAR view
from that high ridge… they would have had
to have been INSANE to then even decide
to continue their ‘mission’ and then
head EASTWARD into that ‘other blind
canyon’.
I have to believe ( at that point ) they would
have simply done exactly what Joy Collura
and Sonny (Tex) Gilligan did that day.
They would have simply KEPT heading
SOUTH, dropped off onto the Congress
side of the ridge… and simply worked
their way over towards the Candy Cane
Lane area… well below the ridge and
away from any fire that was about to
‘crest’ up there.
Even if the fire did come over the ridge
at that point… they would have had a
clear ‘drop packs and run’ all the way
down to Highway 89 ( or even on to
Wickenburg, if they felt like it ).
So yes… it wasn’t that the ‘alternate escape
route’ represented any kind of automatic
‘safe’ way to get to the Boulder Springs
Ranch that afternoon.
It *ONLY* represented an ‘option’ that, given
the dynamic circumstances they had
chosen to put themselves in… *MIGHT*
have afforded them more options to stay
alive that afternoon.
Reply to Elizabeth post on April 16, 2014 at 2:31 pm
Elizabeth… with all due respect… I don’t seem to
recall ANYONE involved in this particular ongoing
discussion at this particular website EVER
suggesting that taking the ‘alternate escape route’
would have been, in any way, ‘easy-peasy’ and/or
some sort of *automatically* SAFE escape route.
Only the Arizona Forestry SAIR report itself seemed
to suggest that… or at least… didn’t include the
right data or narrative to make it clear that it was
NOT some kind of ‘automatic safe route’.
I believe almost right off the bat ( in this very
discussion )… the math was done ( based on
the SAIR report… which was the only information
available and *assumed* to be accurate ) regarding
that ‘alternate escape route’ and it was based on
the SAIR’s own published ‘rate of travel’ for the men
on the initial ‘full two track’ leg of their journey from the anchor point to where the SAIR said the
‘Descent Point’ was. ( again… assumed to be
accurate at that time ).
Based on the ‘math’, and the SAIR’s own ‘fire
progression’ charts and times… it was perfectly
obviously from the get-go that taking the alternate
escape route was *JUST* as *RISKY* as going
the way they went.
Those initial estimates ( based on even the SAIR’s
own published distances and travel times ) proved
that even if they had taken the ‘alternate escape
route’… they would have *HAD* to maintain the
same ‘rate of travel’ established by the SAIR for
the first leg of the trip ALL THE WAY to the
Boulder Springs Ranch… or they would *STILL*
have probably been in deep trouble somewhere
over there in that ‘other’ blind canyon that the
alternate escape route passed through.
Even if they *HAD* been able to maintain that
same ‘brisk’ rate of travel ALL THE WAY… the
best math and estimates ( at that time ) were
showing they might have only made it into the
southern perimeter of the Boulder Springs Ranch
perhaps just 2 or 3 minutes before the fireline
reached the north perimeter of the Ranch and
then started burning around it.
It would have been a ‘close call’, no matter what.
ANY reduction in the same travel rate the SAIR
itself had established for the first leg of their
journey… and they might have been ‘trapped’
at various locations ( depending on how much
travel rate reduction ) anywhere over there in
that other *blind canyon*.
They shouldn’t have been out there even trying
to do what they were doing, at the time they
were trying to do it. They should have stayed
where they were… and then just walked the
safe *new* black back to town.
Feeling the need to *qualify* something I
said just above…
>> WTKTT said…
>> Based on the ‘math’, and the SAIR’s
>> own ‘fire progression’ charts and
>> times… it was perfectly obvious from
>> the get-go that taking the alternate
>> escape route was *JUST* as *RISKY*
>> as going the way they went.
I did *NOT* mean to imply, for one second,
that ‘alternate escape route’ would have
been, in any way, ‘obviously just as risky’
to THEM, that day.
Indeed… I still maintain that whoever stood
at that ‘Descent Point’ and decided to drop
into the fuel-filled box canyon ( Steed
alone? Marsh and Steed together? ) was
TOTALLY UNAWARE that the two-track
road heading DUE SOUTH at that point
would, in fact, eventually end up near the
Boulder Springs Ranch at all… much less
how ‘tricky’ it might have been OR the
fact that EASTWARD leg dropped into its
OWN ‘fuel-filled box canyon’.
When I said it was ‘perfectly obvious’ that
the ‘alternate escape route’ really was
‘just as risky’ that day… I was talking about
what we know NOW… and being able to
do the math for both distances involved
and fire progression rates.
So I didn’t mean to imply that someone out
there made some kind of “what the hell”
move and decided that, given both options,
the shortcut through the canyon was
‘just as risky’ as the alternate route.
THEY did NOT KNOW THAT ( whether the
other route was risky or not ).
It had NOT been scouted… not by Gary
Cordes who (apparently) pointed to that
road on a Google map and called it an
‘escape route’… or by Marsh or Steed
thesleves who were, ultimately, responsible
for doing that as well.
Any time the ‘alternate escape route’ is
discussed it is always good to frame those
discussions with the caveat that there is
no real proof they really even KNEW it
was ‘option’ that day… much less what
it looked like, where it really went, or
what ‘rate of travel’ they might have been
able to maintain on it.
It is much more likely that they attempted
the route they did because they really had
no frickin’ idea where that two-track went…
or that there was any other way to get to the
Ranch that day.
Even if Gary Cordes did point to that
‘trail leading to the Ranch’ on that Google
iPad that morning… there is no proof that
it even registered in Marsh’s brain or that
he was even paying that much attention
to be able to remember what he saw
that morning later in the afternoon.
WTKTT, your very last point disconnects from the underlying motivating of the GM guys moving when they did. Most Hotshots who have been willing to speak on the record have indicated that they believe GM did NOT stay in the black because GM wanted to re-engage and be of use on the east side of the fire, which was on the way to being threatened by the fire. If the GM guys had WAITED until after the fire had passed by in order to then head over to the BSR by using the newly-created black, that would have limited how useful they could have been, in terms of structure protection, point protection, assisting in evacuations, or whatever it is that the overhead was envisioning GM might be able to do when the overhead reached out to GM at roughly 3:42 p.m. It seems that everyone knew that the populations on the east side of the fire were vulnerable (in terms of elderly, not particularly wealthy, not a whole lot of defensive space created around all of the houses) – it seems obvious to me (as a non-Hotshot) that the GM guys would have wanted to be able to engage and help (hopefully in a preventative way) on the front end, rather than sitting in the black, watching the town burn, and then later going in to mop up spot fires that have destroyed homes or even lives. I’m not saying it is “RIGHT” – whatever that means. I am just saying that your last sentence disconnects from what it seems most of us are correctly concluding was GM’s underlying motivation for not just parking in the black to begin with….
Elizabeth
If they moved to reengage it was the worst mistake or justification they ever considered.
No one else was reengaging they were getting the hell out of the way.
The only people that said any thing about reengaging was Willis that was quoted in the SAIR.
They are wild land fire fighters not structure fire fighters.
My opinion after all this– They simply wanted off the fire. There assignment was over, get off the mountain and go home.
It is just pure fantasy to think or project that they were going to help all those poor people losing there homes (Hero think) They had at least an hour or more walk just to get to Glen Allah n hour to hour and a half would have been to late any way.
Or we go back to the un provable theory that someone ordered them.
No place have we seen where the crew said they were moving to reengage.
Many, Many crews have sat on a hill in the burn, in a safety zone, on a road in there vehicles and watched a fire blow up and run all over the place It happens all the time. When that happens you get out of the way let the fire lay down then reengage. Line construction or Engine work. As said before you watch and let the big dog eat until it is safe to go back to line building. Crews have watched fires blow up in the afternoons for ever, Because you can do nothing until it lays down GM knew that or should have known that. They could not reengage and no one else could either.
Very well said.
The fuel type is again very relevant here. The whole day, decisions were made that did not take into account fuel type and fire behavior.
I do believe that GM wanted to get to town to “help,” but re-engaging the fire by the time they got to town given fuel type and fire behavior is a notion that doesn’t make much sense. The reality, were they to have gotten to town, is you would have had 19 more people who needed to get out of the way of the fire.
What were they gonna do to protect homes built with no defensible space? In a “preventative” way, on the front end, as Elizabeth says? Does not compute. Were they planning on running into burning buildings to see if residents were left inside? Did they have any training in this? They obviously had no structural gear, and by the time they were done with their bushwhack they also would have been physically exhausted and at least a few also would have been suffering from some heat stress. To ask them to then take on tasks they weren’t trained or equipped to do, facing a fuel type and fire behavior that even as WFFs they were undermanned and underequipped against, would have been extremely reckless.
Bob, my understanding is that Paul Musser (Operations Musser) and Gary Cordes (Structure Protection 1) are INCREDIBLY experienced guys. My understanding is that Musser is an equivalent of RTS (or better). *THESE* were the guys asking DivsA if he had resources (e.g. GM or BR) to “bump” to the east side of the fire. Are you and SR saying that Musser *AND* Cordes were complete and utter idiots, too? Where I come from, you don’t ASK your colleagues to do something if you do not think that there is … something for them to DO. If they wanted to get home, presumably they would have asked Brendan to bump their buggies to the BSR. But they did not.
Gary Cordes was NOT
a ‘structure group
specialist’.
He didn’t even have that
‘rating’… even though
they made him SPGS1.
From the very start of
Gary Cordes’ ADOSH
interview… when they
were going over his
‘qualifications’…
Q2 = Dave Larsen
( Rest in Peace )
__________________
Q2: Hey Gary, I was just wondering you – I’m gonna presume that you have a structure uh, group specialist or however you got that on your red track?
A: No, I’m not a structure group specialist.
However, most of the division work I do is as a structured group, um, doing structure protection.
But I’m not a specialist.
__________________
Reply to Elizabeth post
April 17, 2014 – 1:32 pm
Another relevant point
here. The actual FIELD
OPS1 Todd Abel on
the fire that day ( and
the man actually running
the extended attack for
most of the day ) agreed
with ADOSH in his
own interview with them
that there wouldn’t have
been much good GM
could have done in
town that day, even if
they had made it there,
and that they would, in fact, have just become ‘part of the problem’.
This is the point near the end of OPS1 Tod Abel’s interview where they are simply trying to fathom, themselves, what good Marsh/Steed might have possibly thought they could do even if they had made it to town.
OPS1 Todd Abel AGREES with Dave Larsen (Rest in Peace) that some guys with nothing more than a (quote) “shiny little hard hat and a Pulaski” weren’t going to be able to do much good at all.
Page 67 of ADOSH interview with Field OPS1 Todd Abel…
Q1: = Dave Larsen (RIP)
A: = OPS1 Todd Abel
__________________
A: Well yeah, you’re – you’re right. You know our priorities are life safety, property conservation, and – and incident stabilization that’s what we – we reach for. But, if I know I can’t get down there or get my crew down there safely, what good am I gonna do? I ain’t gonna do no good. I’m gonna add to the problem.
Q1: Do you know the hauling chart?
A: Mm-hm.
Q1: Familiar with it?
A: Yes.
Q1: People with – we’re talking about hand crews being relatively ineffective if – if the flame lengths are higher than three and a half feet, you’re kind of
out of it?
A: Yeah.
Q1: You’ve heard that?
A: I have heard that.
Q1: That’s common knowledge?
A: Yes.
Q1: That we, uh…
A: Yes, the hauling chart, yeah.
Q1: So we, uh – what are you thinking we’re gonna do with your shiny little hardhat and a
Pulaski?
A: Yeah.
__________________
Elizabeth I guess I would say that they were not what I would call qualified. After witnessing the total Chinese fire drilll for the day some of them had there head up there south bound extremity. That’s my opinion and I have believed that for a long time.
Reply to Elizabeth post on
April 17, 2014 at 11:14 am
Elizabeth… I am not going to disagree
with your last response at all as to
the WHY they decided to leave the
safe black that day. I think you are
correctly reporting what *most*
people are now *concluding*…
…but I would still have removed the
adjective “correctly” from your
“correctly concluding” phrase.
I think it’s still a little early to add
that adjective.
Yes… it is pretty obvious now that 2
employees of the City of Prescott,
( also functioning as Arizona State
employees on a state run fire ) made
a decision to lead 17 other men on
a ‘mission’ that put the ‘safety’ of
everyone ‘at risk’ that day… for
reasons that are still not fully
understood.
If the *SAFETY* of the crew had been
their paramount ( and ONLY ) concern
circa 4:00 PM… then none of this
would have happened. They would
have stayed ‘in the safe black’ and
let the fire pass by ( just as they
appeared to have first told OPS
they were planning to do and were
‘committed’ to doing that day circa
1550 ).
So (again)… yes… SOMETHING
made those 2 employees of the
City of Prescott reconsider the
absolute *SAFE* scenario for
the entire crew in a short 14 minute
time period from 1550 to 1604.
I don’t think we will be able to use
the “correctly” adjective in conjunction
with that decision making process
until someone who HEARD those
‘discussing their options’ conversations
comes forward and confirms their
actual thought process and all the
motivating factors… OR we hear more
from all of these people we seem to
be hearing on the radio ‘asking them
to hurry up’ and ‘asking them for status’
as they made their way towards town.
Mr. Powers ( and others ) *might*
still be right.
Maybe they didn’t relish the idea of
just ‘sitting there’ and dealing with
the fire ‘passing by’ and ( even though
they knew they would survive ) dealing
with all the smoke and whatnot and
then a nasty, hot, soot-filled hike for 2
miles afterwards.
Maybe they just wanted to get the
hell out of there before all that went
down and took off on the only route
they thought they had ( since they
probably still had no idea where that
two-track track eventually went ).
Maybe there was no “Hero” crap
involved at all.
Brendan McDonough ( and anyone
else like Willis who seemed to be
listening to the ‘discussing their options’
conversation ) still probably have the
real answer(s) to those question(s).
Bottom line: Yes. It certainly does look
like those 2 employees of the City of
Prescott decided to abandon the only
plan that *guaranteed* the crew’s
safety that day for a ‘mission’ that
involved “doing some good” back
in town. The FULL range of *reasons*
why those 2 employees would BOTH
agree to such a ‘mission’ and risk the
safety of the 17 other employees in
their charge are the things that are still
being explored ( job security?,
reputation?, reluctance to disappoint
and/or confront superiors?, prior bad
decisions with good outcomes?,
runaway hubris?, overdeveloped
hero complex?, exhaustion
leading to poor decisions?,
actual heatstroke affecting decision
making?, trying to have a very BAD
day turn out good in the end?, all of
the above?, etc. etc. etc. )
Correction…
“correctly” would be an ‘adverb’
as used above… not an ‘adjective’.
ROFL
AS you said its another one of those alternatives that we can’t prove or disprove. gest as plausible as the others.
Not real sure where on earth, Elizabeth, with Bob Powers, RTS, TWARE, WTKTT, Gary Olson, me, and various and sundry other people (in no particular order) saying that GM should have stayed in the black, that you get from that that we are saying staying on the 2-track would have been “easy peasy.” I think in fact you read well enough to know that we have said GM should have stayed in the black. Following the 2-track was a less-good option than “hunkering down,” but though less-good simply better for numerous reasons than the route they did take.
If you, Elizabeth, believe, instead, that GM was better off taking what they would have known was an exposed, committing bushwhack through dense unburned fuel at a crawl’s with fire below, and staying with that bushwhack until escape back uphill became impossible, please state what sources you are relying on. For any sources who are people as opposed to public material, of course feel free to simply say “a WFF with X years experience” or some such, rather than stating their name. I am sure as an attorney you are used to indicating what you got info-wise without disclosing all specifics.
Here’s what I think: you have nothing. No credible thing that suggests that GM’s bushwhack through dense fuel was a BETTER option in the eyes of people with relevant experience than staying on the 2-track would have been. In which case, whatever your motives for blowing smoke and creating confusion, that’s all you are doing.
I suspect your experience hiking two tracks is rather limited, as is your experience hiking through chaparral. You’d probably get irritated if I tried to continually insist something that made no sense to someone with legal training, just based on a “feeling” that I have as a lay-person as to what seems right to me. Let’s say, insisting that WFF’s being able, or not, on the job to spout their own opinions about stand replacement fires often being good things, that don’t prevent conifer regeneration, is a 1st amendment issue, when it ain’t. I’m happy letting the college minds decide what you can and can’t say on the job. You should let the people who know inform you as to the hierarchy of choices available to GM. You should also avail yourself of the opportunity to travel to AZ and get a first-hand glimpse of some of the physical realities that we are discussing.
Now, I see Elizabeth has not stated any sources suggesting that the bushwhack GM took was a BETTER option than staying on the 2-track.
Putting words in people’s mouths, and then shooting down words that someone didn’t actually say, is not a good way to bring clarity to a topic.
In terms of hierarchy of options, I am very confident that, had GM stayed in the black, they would have all been perfectly fine. It is very reasonable to note that, of a range of less-good or more-risky options that they did have, some carried more risk than others. Because Elizabeth brings up the feelings of the families of the deceased, I don’t think it does them any favors to speak falsely to them and say I think GM chose the best option available to it. It clearly didn’t. GM wasn’t faced with a range of equal-risk options, either. If you add the 10 and 18, the option they chose had roughly 18 or so checked, and there are only 28 of them. Staying on the 2-track, even by that measure, would have looked better on several counts. Obviously staying in the black would have been better yet.
**
** SHUTTLE / CREW TRANSPORT HELICOPTER N14HX WAS
** STAGED AT THE HELIBASE LATE AFTERNOON SUNDAY, JUNE 30, 2013
It has always been a bit of a mystery whatever happened to the Yellow and White
N14HX Transport Helicopter on Sunday, June 30, 2013 after it was used in
the morning to ‘ferry’ the entire Lewis DOC Crew OFF of the same anchor
point where Granite Mountain would then be working the rest of the day.
The Yellow/White N14HX was captured by hiker Joy Collura that morning
making numerous ‘landings’ up at the helispot near the anchor point as
it finished the ‘dust off’ of the entire DOC Lewis Crew and also hoisted some
equipment away from the same anchor point where Granite Mountain was
now working.
As it turns out… when the ‘helibase’ was finally established up near those
large green crop circles up on Hays Ranch Road in Peeples Valley…
N14HX simply flew from the Yarnell Fire Station Helipad ( where it had
been delivering the entire DOC Lewis Crew that morning ) up to that
‘helibase’… and that is ( apparently ) where it sat (idle) for the rest of the day.
The photograph ‘linked’ below shows N14HX just ‘staging’ in the field up there
and right next to the place where the Ranger 58 DPS Helicopter was
also ‘staged’ that afternoon.
NOTE: It MAY have been used for one or two of the recon flights that OPS1 Abel
and OPS2 Musser made that day ( once in the morning and then again in the
early afternoon ) but this is still not certain. Other choppers ( like Ranger 58 )
might have been utilized for those ‘recon’ flights.
N14HX was a ‘Transport’ chopper and could seat 7 ( plus 2 pilots ).
It was never ‘converted’ that day to help with, or participate in any ‘bucket drops’,
and there is no record of it being ‘put to work’ to move any other crews after it
finished moving the Lewis DOC crew off the anchor point that morning.
The photo shows N14HX just ‘sitting’ idle in the field at 1520 ( 3:20 PM )
that afternoon… just 10 minutes before Byron Kimball would issue his
weather report about the winds changing drastically and just 20 minutes
before all of the following happened ( circa 1540 )…
– Brendan abandons his lookout because of fire threat and Brian Frisby
abandons the planned face-to-face with Marsh and, instead, picks Brendan
up at 1541 and then tells Marsh they will ‘evacuate’ both Brendan AND the
GM vehicles.
– The fire had reached SPGS1 Gary Cordes’ ‘trigger’ point for the full
evacuation of Yarnell.
– SPGS1 Gary Cordes requests the full evacuation of Yarnell ( at 1540 ).
So just 20 minutes after this photo was taken… Marsh and Steed became
fully aware that their ‘work assignment’ up at that anchor spot was now
a useless exercise and was OVER, but they had also (now) lost the opportunity
to return the way they came that day ( for at least the next hour or two until
they could just walk the *new* black back to town ).
There has always been some question about whether or not Marsh and
Steed considered a ‘dust off’ with a chopper as ‘one of their options’
in that timeframe… and during their ‘discussing their options’ conversations…
just like they had witnessed happening with the entire DOC Lewis Crew just
a few hours earlier from that same exact location.
I believe it has been assumed that the N14HX Transport Chopper had
somehow ‘left the scene’ that morning after evacuating the Lewis DOC Crew
and was, somehow, no longer available or ‘an option’ for Marsh and Steed to
get back to Yarnell.
This photo proves that was NOT the case.
The Transport chopper was THERE… just waiting for something to do ( such
as fly Granite Mountain off the ridge and to the Yarnell Fire Station, if they
really were perceived as ‘needed’ in Yarnell ).
Here is that photo of N14HX just sitting ‘idle’ at 1520 ( 3:20 PM )…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/y3jy5opssrcvzb3/skImsXUoXH/AerialFirefightingstudy/Swartz/Pictures/Nikon/North%20of%20Fire/Helicopters#lh:null-DSCN0065.JPG
Followup…
There is actually proof that it was ONLY the ‘Ranger 58’ helicopter
that was used for the only TWO recon flights flown that day
by ‘Operations’ ( Abel and/or Musser )… and that the Yellow/White
N14HX Transport Chopper was never even used for that
purpose at all that day.
The first of two ‘recon’ flights that day took place at 0945.
This is the one where both OPS1 Todd Abel AND OP2 Paul
Musser took a ‘tour of the fire’.
It was, in fact, DPS Helicopter Ranger 58 that took Abel and Musser
up for that first recon flight.
At 0945 that morning ( the time of the FIRST recon flight ) the
Yellow/White Crew Transport Chopper N14HX was still actively
removing the entire Lewis DOC Crew from the ‘anchor point’ that
was to be the same ‘work spot’ for Granite Mountain that day.
N14HX was ‘delivering’ the entire Lewis DOC Crew to the Helipad
at the Yarnell Fire Station. The Blue Ridge Hotshots were already
staged there at that time that morning and witnessing this ‘dust off’
of the entire Lewis crew. Members of the BR Hotshots actually
spoke to members of the Lewis Crew as they came off the N14HX
helicopter ( documented in the redacted BR notes and logs ).
This FIRST recon flight ( with both Abel and Musser onboard ) was
actually the first thing Ranger 58 did that day after ‘arriving’ in
Peeples Valley.
The SECOND recon flight ( crica 1345 ) was just OPS1 Todd Abel
by himself and ‘Ranger 58’ flew that second recon flight as well.
From page 3 of the Ranger 58 report document entitled…
M-Law-Enforcement-no-redactions ( PDF file in the SAIT release ).
_____________________________________________________
*FIRST RECON FLIGHT – 0945 – OP1 ABEL AND OP2 MUSSER
The (fire) command personnel advised us to land in the field near
the windmill and prepare for a recon flight of the area for 2
members of the incident management team. Ranger landed at
LZ1 ( see attached map ), at approximately 0852 hours and
removed all the gear from the aircraft and prepped the Bambi
Bucket so we would be ready to start water drops upon
completion of the recon flight.
At approximately 0945 hours, the 2 Firefighters ( OPS1 Todd
Abel and OPS2 Paul Musser ) arrived at LZ 1 and were cold
loaded aboard the aircraft. Ranger 58 departed for this recon
flight at approximately 0950 hours. The Firefighters on the recon
flight returned to LZ 1 and were hot off-loaded at approximately
1010 hours. Ranger (58) was advised that we would be used for
recon, search and rescue, and medical with a Type 1 helicopter
and a Type 2 helicopter doing the majority of the Bambi Bucket
work.
* SECOND RECON FLIGHT – 1345 – ONLY OPS1 ABEL
At approximately 1345 hours ( 1:45 PM ), Operations ( OPS1 Abel )
from the Incident Management arrived at LZ 2 and requested that
we take him on a recon flight over the fire perimeter. Heli-base
contacted Air Attack for permission to launch and we were asked
to delay for about 10 minutes while air tankers dropped. Air Attack
gave us permission to launch at approximately 1400 hours ( 2:00
PM ) and we completed the recon mission as requested. For this
flight, Operations (Abel) sat in the left front seat for a better view of
the fire. This flight was completed without incident and ended with
us landing back at LZ 2 at approximately 1430 hours ( 2:30 PM ).
______________________________________________________
So the Yellow/White Crew Transport Helicopter N14HX was NOT
used for either of the two recon flights that day, nor was it used for
‘bucket drops’ that day.
Apparently… after it finished flying the entire Lewis DOC Crew
off the ridge from the same anchor point where Granite Mountain
would then be working the rest of the day… N14HX (apparently)
wasn’t doing anything but ‘staging’ up at the helibase the rest of
the day and was a ‘free resource’ all day… even up through the
time it COULD have (possibly) been used to evacuate Granite
Mountain from the same exact place it had already evacuated the
entire Lewis DOC Crew that morning.
Eric Marsh had reported that the ‘winds’ were getting ‘squirrely’
up on the ridge in the 1540 timeframe… but by the time we
hear/see both the Caldwell ( 1550 ) and MacKenzie ( 1602 )
video(s)… there doesn’t appear to be any kind of big wind
event going on up there in that specific area near the helispot.
There is no ‘wind in the microphone’ noises or much visible
evidence of a ‘wind event’ in the videos themselves that would
have necessarily prevented a helicopter ‘dust off’ up there
around that timeframe.
Whether this ‘option’ was even considered that day is still not
known… but there is no doubt now that the N14HX Crew
Transport Helicopter was totally ‘free’ and available at that
time to attempt it… if requested.
Followup to the followup…
Q: Who REALLY flew on the first Ranger 58 recon mission?
A: It REALLY was OPS1 Todd Abel AND OPS2 Paul Musser.
This is just to ‘clear up’ some confusion in the official
YHF documentation about who was actually onboard Ranger
58 for that first recon flight that morning.
In the ‘M-Law-Enforcement-no-redactions’ YCSO document,
DPS medic Eric Tarr just says it was ‘two firefighters’
that they took on the first recon. He doesn’t identify them
by name or position.
In that same document, however, Ranger 58 pilot Clifford
Brunsting identifies the ‘passengers’ for that first recon flight
specifically.
He says it was the ‘Incident Commander’ and ‘Operations’.
From the YCSO document…
_______________________________________________
Officer Tarr and I ( Clifford Brunsting ) flew to the fire area
where we were directed to land to await the Yarnell Hill
Incident Command officers for a fire recon. At this time (0900)
we stripped the aircraft and prepared the Bambi Bucket in
anticipation of our future assignment. As I was conducting
the perimeter recon with the Incident Commander and
Operations, the fuel trailer arrived at the landing zone. We
were then instructed to move to a new heli-base. At 1016
hours after completing my recon, I dropped the Incident
Commander and Operations at the original landing zone,
picked up Officer Tarr, and relocated to the new landing
zone. Of note, I observed and flew over the Granite Mountain
Hotshots deploying on the ridgeline on the southeast edge
of the fire on this flight.
_______________________________________________
So DPS Pilot Clifford Brunsting would appear to be stating
that he thought it was IC Roy Hall and OPS1 Todd Abel
making that first recon flight that day in Ranger 58.
In the ‘Ranger 58’ interview with the SAIT… the same
suggestion is made by the SAIT investigators in their
‘interview notes’… and they seem to say that the first recon
was with (quote) “IC and Abel”…
Page 24 of the YIN…
Interview with Ranger 58…
______________________________________________
The ship arrived and called AA made contact on command
A/G channel 16. They were the 1st helo on scene and told to
stand by because they wanted to do recon. They landed
at 0854 near the windmill. They set the bambi bucket up
and command was busy doing briefings, there was no
helibase set up at this time. 1 hr later they called and said,
it was the IC and Abel they loaded them and flew the
perimeter of the fire. The SE corner in the saddle was GM
and they mentioned that. Off @ 0950 landed @ 1016.
24 min flight. The concern was people’s valley. NW of fire
was the hottest
______________________________________________
NEITHER of these statements/suggestions seems to be true.
It seems that DPS Pilot Brunsting was simply mistaken about
either one of his passengers for the first recon actually being
the ‘IC’ ( Incident Commander ) that day.
Here’s the real proof of who flew that first recon mission…
In the ‘Combined Unit Logs’ document that wasn’t provided
by the SAIT until February 27, 2014… the ‘unit log’ for both
OPS1 Todd Abel and OPS2 Paul Musser definitely says
it was Abel and Musser onboard Ranger 58 for that first
1045 – 1100 AM recon flight.
Page 15 of those ‘combined unit logs’…
_______________________________________________
At about 10:20 am team assumed command of the fire.
OSC Abel and Musser flew fire at 1045-1100 am and at
that time fire moving to the N-NE. SEATS were working
on fire. Around 1200 first VLAT arrived.
T. Abel flew fire for the second time around 1230-1300.
At that time, fire was active on east flank and head of fire
was pushing to the north with a horseshoe shape. Fire was
pushing towards Model Creek and threatening structures.
_______________________________________________
In OPS1 Todd Abel’s ADOSH interview… he mentions
both of these recon flights but makes no mention of Musser
flying the first one WITH him. He makes it sound in his
ADOSH interview as if he was alone for both recon flights
instead of just the second one.
However… In OPS2 Paul Musser’s ADOSH interview,
Musser himself CONFIRMS that it was, in fact, he and Todd
Abel that took that first recon flight in Ranger 58, and IC
Roy Hall was NOT involved…
Page 11 of Paul Musser’s ADOSH interview…
_______________________________________________
Uh, the DPS helicopter, uh, was showing up right about that
time for a recon flight for Todd and myself. So we had them
set down. We did the briefing. Uh, we talked about the
notification and from what I’ve read it said the notification
went out at 10:21. I don’t know exactly, didn’t look at my
watch. Uh, so anyhow notification of the briefing went out.
Uh, talked to some of the resources there, kind of explained
what was going on afterwards and that we’d get back to
them as soon as we could get everything straight. Todd
and I went down, uh, got in the helicopter. Uh, started up
to the fire. Got to the north end, which by now was already
active and starting to burn.
_______________________________________________
hurray! Captain Hindsight saves the day again!!!!!!!!
http://www.southparkstudios.com/clips/360430/captain-hindsight
no really, you should watch it…
also- how long do you think it would have taken 4HX to shuttle GM off the hill? i am just curious what a layman thinks…
3 trips at 10 minutes a piece = 30 minutes max?
**
** USDA AIR STUDY VIDEOS
** TRANSCRIPT OF DVD DISC 4 – FILENAME: VTS_01_1
**
** CAPTURES AIR-TO-AIR CHANNEL TRAFFIC DURING DEPLOYMENT
**
** ALSO CAPTURES DOZER AND ITS TRANSPORT VEHICLE
** GOING BY THE CAMERA AT +5:22 ( 1636.10 / 4:36.10 PM )
In addition to the Panebaker and Moore Air Study videos… there is also a folder
named USDA VIDEOS and it also contains Air Study videos. They are copies of
DVD discs and there are FOUR of them.
This is just a transcript of the main video contained in DVD DISC 4.
NOTE: These USDA Air Study DVD videos are ALL FOREGROUND
conversation and easily heard. For these videos… the specific Air-To-Air
channel (only) was apparently hard-lined right into the microphone jack of the
camera so there is no wind noise, traffic noise, or any other conversation
captured but the actual line traffic.
Very easy to hear (clearly). No audio ‘forensics’ required.
The only thing that blocks any conversation are the occasional TONES
heard over the in-lined Air-To-Air radio channel.
This USDA DISC 4 VIDEO is 12 minutes and 45 seconds long.
At the time this video was made… ‘Bravo 33’ ( Thomas French and John
Burfiend ) were performing both ‘Lead Plane’ AND ‘Air Attack’ duties since
‘Bravo 3’ ( Rory Collins ) had abruptly left the fire circa 1558 ( because his
pilot ran out of flying time ).
What Burfiend and French were apparently doing at the time this video was made
was that John Burfiend was ‘handling’ the ‘Air to Air’ traffic ( heard in this video )
and leading the drops… while Thomas French was handling the ‘Air to Ground’
traffic ( not heard directly in this video but referenced in real time by Burfiend ).
So the (AA) designation in the transcript below would appear to be the voice of
John Burfiend as he was performing Barvo 33’s ‘Lead Plane’ duties.
The video begins at exactly 1630.48 ( 4:30.48 PM ) and it covers the exact time
of the ‘Helmet-Cam’ radio captures and Steed’s MAYDAY call at 1639, Caldwell’s
further attempts to contact ‘Bravo 33’… and then Marsh’s eventual deployment
message(s).
When I say it ‘covers’ these other transmissions… it does not actually capture
them since since they took place on the ‘Air-To-Ground’ channel and only the
‘Air-To-Air’ channel itself was piped into this video recording… but you CAN
hear the moment when French was obviously informing Burfiend of what
he was hearing over the ‘Air to Ground’ channel and Burfiend informs ‘Kevin’
( in the DC10 VLAT ) what appears to be happening and puts him into a holding
pattern while they try to find out where GM is.
There is no TIMESTAMP in the titles of these USDA Air Study videos, ( as there
are with the Panebaker Air Study videos )… but the reason we can know the
exact time for the USDA videos is BECAUSE of those title-timestamps in the
Panebaker videos.
The USDA Air Study videos and the other Panebaker / Moore Air Study videos
OVERLAP and were being recorded at the SAME TIME.
The SAME RADIO TRAFFIC being heard in the ‘background’ in the fully
time-stamped Panebaker Air Study videos is also EXACTLY what can be
heard clearly in the ‘foreground’ these USDA Air-Study videos.
So we can easily determine the EXACT TIME for any of these USDA videos
by simply finding the places in the fully-timestamped Panebaker / Moore videos
where the same radio conversations are heard in the background… and then
just do the simple math required to get the actual STARTING time for any of
the USDA Air Study videos.
This partcular USDA DISC 4 Air Study video actually overlaps with TWO
of the other Panebaker Air Study videos… and the places where that happens
are indicated in the transcript below.
The LOCATION where this video was shot is the SAME location as the
Panebaker Air Study videos. They were parked on the north side of
Hays Ranch Road… up near the the ICP at the Model Creek Elementary
School in Peeples Valley… and just about even with the center of that
large green crop field that was being used as the ‘helibase’ that day.
The exact location (where the video was shot) is… 34.272128, -112.731040
A public copy of this DISC 4 USDA Air Study video is here…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/20inrene9tcx74a/aDdr_4rx1s/ADOSH%20Yarnell%20Hill%20Investigation/Photos%20and%20Video/USDA%20Videos/Disc%204/Disc%204/VIDEO_TS#lh:null-VTS_01_1.VOB
*** USDA DISC 4 VIDEO STARTS AT 1630.48 ( 4:30.48 PM )
+0:13 ( 1631.01 / 4:31.01 PM )
TONE
(AA): Go ahead and… uh… hold at the dip.
(Unknown): Holding at the dip.
+0:24 ( 1631.12 / 4:31.12 PM )
NOTE: Tripod is set down in front of camera and camera is then panned to
the left so it is looking SOUTH from Hays Ranch Road at the huge smoke
column. In the left side of the frame we now see the back of a trailer that
belongs to one of persons in the Air Study group and the right rear tire of
a UTV that is strapped into that trailer.
+0:45 ( 1631.33 / 4:31.33 PM )
TONE
(AA): Got me in sight off your right side?
__________________________________________________________________
NOTE: This is where the SAME conversation is now being captured at the start
of the fully timestamped Panebaker video 20130630_163338_fire_behavior_EP.
Since the following “Allright I’m gonna get it as low as I can” transmission
(shared between both videos) is heard at exactly 7 seconds into the Panebaker
video…then that means the actual TIMESTAMP for this transmission would be
1631.29 ( the start of the Panebaker video ) plus 7 seconds… which is…
1631.36 ( 4:31.36 PM ).
This SAME transmission comes at exactly +48 seconds into this USDA
Disc 4 video…so that means the actual START time for this USDA video
is 1631.36 minus 48 seconds… which is…
1630.48 ( 4:30.48 PM )
From this point on ( until the Panebaker 163338 video ends ), the radio
transmissions are SYNCHRONIZED… and what is CLEARLY heard in this
USDA video is the exact background Air-to-Air traffic being heard in the
Panebaker 163338 video.
__________________________________________________________________
+0:48 ( 1631.36 / 4:31.36 PM )
(AA): Allright I’m gonna get it as low as I can… start your turn in… we’re gonna…
we’re gonna cross that ridge to left of the big white antenna.
+1:00 ( 1631.48 / 4:31.48 PM )
(Unknown): Which way are you turning?
(AA): I’m turnin’ right… my heading is through 300… I’m gonna roll out at about
three four… ah… zero
(Unknown): Roger that
(AA): I’m at 110.
+1:18 ( 1632.06 / 4:32.06 PM )
(AA): Your target’s gonna be at… uh… kinda the far end here… kind of up on
a little hill… some open flame… ok… I’m actually on a long final.
(Unknown): Ok… ah… you’re still far ahead of me… uh… I’ll just do what I can.
(AA): Ok.. ah… just kinda follow me… I’m passin’ the white antennas now.
+1:38 ( 1632.26 / 4:32.26 PM )
(AA): You’re gonna be kind of a gentle right turn on the exit.
+2:00 ( 1632.48 / 4:32.48 PM )
TONE
(AA): got me in sight… what I’d like to do is pretty much anywhere in here where
it’s heavy open flame is in the fuel… right through here…have ya got that?
(Unknown): Yea… is it like starting up the… ah… on the ridgetop or anything?
(AA): Affirmative.
(Unknown): Ok… do what I can
(AA): Then give me a gentle right turn on the exit
(Unknown): You got it.
__________________________________________________________________
NOTE: The OPS1 Todd Abel and SPGS1 Darrell Willis conversation captured
in one of the overlapping Panebaker 163338 video starts right here at this same
moment in time. That conversation snippet from Panebaker video
20130630_163338 is inserted here for reference…
( 1633.09 / 4:33.09 PM
(OPS1 Todd Abel): Structure Group 2, Operations Abel
( 1633.14 / 4:33.14 PM )
(SPGS2 Darrell Willis): Any real progress?
( 1633.19 / 4:33.19 PM )
(SPGS2 Darrell Willis): Try again.
1633.23 / 4:33.23 PM )
(Unknown – Could be OPS1 Todd Abel answering Willis’ question): Yup.
END OF INSERT FROM PANEBAKER VIDEO 163338
__________________________________________________________________
+2:36 ( 1633.24 / 4:33.24 PM )
(Unknown): Off the drop.
+2:38 ( 1633.26 / 4:33.26 PM )
(AA): Okay follow me around in the right hand and then… ah… load and
return, okay?
+2: 43 ( 1633.31 / 4:33.31 PM )
(Unknown): Roger that. Load and return.
+2:46 ( 1633.34 / 4:33.34 PM )
(AA): Yea… we liked your drop… I know there was a lotta fire in there… but…
ah… (laughter) nicely done
+2:50 ( 1633.38 / 4:33.38 )
(Unknown): Yea (laughter)… it’s… it’s like spittin’ at it.
__________________________________________________________________
NOTE: Panebaker video 163338 ENDS exactly on the line above but only
captures the ‘Yea’ word before it ends. This USDA video shows the rest of
that sentence captured at the very end of the Panebaker 163338 video.
__________________________________________________________________
+2:54 ( 1633.42 / 4:33.42 PM )
(AA): Yea… you bet… and, uh… be on the lookout for the DC10, there kinda
holdin’ seven miles out for… ah… 413, okay?
(Unknown): Yea… should I go out pretty low… like 5,000?
(AA): Yea… affirmative… that’ll work out just fine.
(Unknown): Okay… just whatever takes me through the ridges up here?
(AA): That’s affirmative… I think… I think you (TONE) should clear ’em.
(Unknown) Roger that. See ya on the way back.
(AA): Allright, thanks a lot, good work… and… ah…
(LONG TONE)
Just… ah… can you hold for just a minute?
+3:23 ( 1634.11 / 4:34.11 PM )
(AA): Perfect. Set… set me up a level… ah… 4 for now… whole load, and I’ll
get back with ya.
+3:32 ( 1634.20 / 4:34.20 PM )
(LONG TONE)
(Unknown 2 ): Go to half way back at the head of the fire.
(AA): Okay, copy that.
We’re gonna continue into the drop… did you want me up that valley
or do you want me to stay clear of them for now?
(AA): Uh… Keep workin’ where you were workin’ and you are clear to the drop.
TONE
(Unkown 2): ( Ten four? )
+3:48 ( 1634.36 / 4:34.36 PM )
LONG TONE
(Unkown 1): Go ahead
TONE
+3:52 ( 1634.40 / 4:34.40 PM )
(AA): Looks like Wickenburg is out of retardant… uh… can you make it
back to Gateway… load and return?
(Unknown): I can… uh… I might check into a private (club?).
Uh… uh… I might do the private (club?) in Wickenburg before I head over.
(AA): Approved.
(Unknown): Thank you. I’ll check and see what they want.
+4:43 ( 1635.31 / 4:35.31 PM )
(TONE)
+4:47 ( 1635.35 / 4:35.35 PM )
(Unknown): Copy.
+4:49 ( 1635.37 / 4:35.37 )
(AA): And hey… I’m also gonna bring the… uh.. the 10… uh… back in we
got.. uh… (TONE) him out there may just hold you at your… uh… hold on the
ground… are you… you kinda need to fuel by now?
(Unknown): Yea… why don’t I just drop the bucket and go for fuel.
(AA): Perfect, thank you.
(Unknown): Okay.
(AA): And let me know when you’re… uh… on the ground, helibase.
(Unknown): Will do.
+5:22 ( 1636.10 / 4:36.10 PM )
__________________________________________________________________
NOTE: DOZER AND ITS TRANSPORT GO BY THE CAMERA
At this exact +5:22 moment in this USDA video is when the camera captures
the DOZER and its TRANSPORT passing by headed WEST on Hays Ranch
Road, towards the ICP at the Model Creek Elementary School in Peeples Valley.
The DOZER on the trailer exactly matches the one in the photos taken by Blue
Ridge Hotshot Ball that morning while it was working on the ‘Cutover Road’
between the Sesame and Shrine area(s). The actual CLOCK time for this
moment when the DOZER passes the camera is 1636.10 ( 4:36.10 PM ),
only about 3 minutes before Captain Jesse Steed’s first MAYDAY call.
__________________________________________________________________
+5:37 ( 1636.25 / 4:36.25 PM )
(TONE)
(Unknown): Short final… landing just short of that helibase… in the green
circle here.
(AA): Okay copy that… are you gonna drop your bucket and
have to lift back somewhere else?
(Unknown): Yea… I’ll have to drop the bucket and then I’ll head for Wickenburg
for fuel.
(AA): Oh… okay… gotcha… okay… give me a call ready to lift.
(Unknown): Will do.
+5:58 ( 1636.46 / 4:36.46 PM )
TONE
(AA): You are cleared in… come on in at… 6,500 with nine eight zero.
_________________________________________________________________
NOTE: The following “And I’ve got a project for you” quote is ALSO captured in
Panebaker video 20130630_163700_fire_behavior_EP. at exactly +34 seconds
into THAT video. The “It’s all good” followup quote is ‘covered’ in that video by
the “What’s goin’ on back there?” radio transmission in THAT Panebaker video.
_________________________________________________________________
+6:08 ( 1636.56 / 4:36.56 PM )
(AA): And I’ve got a project for you.
+6:12 ( 1637.00 / 4:37.00 PM )
(AA): It’s all good, though.
+6:17 ( 1637.05 / 4:37.05 PM )
(AA): That’s affirmative… uh… on the east side… uh… we can’t really get in
where we really need it we’ll be a little bit further to the north… there’s just
a lot of open flame… that’s your target.
(Unknown): ?? Uh… ?? smoke ??
(AA): If you need more altitude let me know… you should be okay at sixty five,
only other aircraft I’ve seen is a media ship at this time (at) niner-thousand
five hundred.
+6:47: ( 1637.35 / 4:37.35 PM )
(Unknown): How far you want me to… ?? towards the white smoke…
or… ?? (black?) smoke?
(AA): Kind of in the middle.
(Unknown): Okay.
+7:24 ( 1638.12 / 4:38.12 PM )
TONE
(Unknown): …for Wickenburg.
+7:27 ( 1638.15 / 4:38.15 PM )
(AA): You’re clear to lift (TONE) but hey… can you just fly direct west and go
around the west side of the fire?
(Unknown): I sure can. Here we go.
(AA): Yea… that would really help me out. You’re cleared… uh… west
departure back to Wickenburg… and hey… thanks for all the good
work… we’ll see ya in bit.
(Unknown): You bet.
+7:54 ( 1638.42 / 4:38.42 PM )
(Unknown? – Kevin?): Yep… (TONE)… just comin’ up over the ridge seein’ all
the open flame.
(AA): Okay, copy that. I’m a little bit out of position… but… I’ll try to sneak in
front of ya… I’m actually at your… oh… about… one o’clock.
(Unknown? – Kevin?): Okay… and we’re lookin’…
+8:15 ( 1639.03 / 4:39.03 PM )
(AA): And I’m at… uh… six thousand, Kevin, kinda low out your one o’clock
moving twelve.
(Unknown? – Kevin?): Yea… I got a beacon there… yea… I got your lights.
(AA): Okay copy that… It… ya know… it’s gonna be a little rough for the show
me ‘cus I’ve actually gotta angle back left… I do have you in sight.
Basically that… that open flame and the heavy fuel out your left si… correct…
yea… your left side… that’s what we’re gonna hit.
I’ll try to turn this into a show me. Ya still got me?
(Unkown? – Kevin?): I do and I’ll try to keep ya… I may end up going back
a one-eighty but, uh… yea… I’ll keep ya in sight.
(AA): Okay copy that… so… let’s do what we wanna do…
There’s a little bit of a… kinda of fuel break that snakes through here…
that’s gonna be your start point… I’m rollin’ in on short final now.
(Unknown? – Kevin?) Yea… I still got ya there.
__________________________________________________________________
NOTE: This is the moment when Captain Jesse Steed is making his first
“We are in the front of the flaming front” MAYDAY call, followed by
Robert Caldwell making repeated attempts to get “Air Attack” to respond
to them. The NEXT transmission captured in THIS USDA video is coming
from Prescott Air Operations… who heard this same radio traffic captured
in the Helmet-Cam video… and Prescott is trying to advise (AA) that
‘Operations’ is trying to get hold of him and that something is ‘going on’.
(AA) does not acknowledge the transmission OR respond to it… and just
continues focusing on the planned drop with ‘Kevin’ in the DC10 VLAT.
__________________________________________________________________
+8:59 ( 1639.47 / 4:39.47 PM )
TONE
(Uknown): Prescott Operations calling Air to Ground…
sounds like they got somethin’ for ya.
+9:05 ( 1639.53 / 4:39.53 PM )
(AA): Okay… if you’ve still got me in sight… basically we wanna start here…
and just kinda contour. I was at 49 at the start. 48 here… and we’ll just bring it
around level 4. If ya get to this… this point… just go straight towards the
meadow here.
(Unknown? – Kevin?): Okay… run it all the way out to the meadow
if we’ve got enough.
(AA): You betcha… and I kinda started at three six zero on the heading
and ended up at about three three five.
(Unknown? – Kevin?) Very good… I’ve gotcha down now… I’ll letcha come
out my right side.
(AA): Yep… that’s what I’ll do… and I’m gonna climb up to sixty five… I’m gonna
give ya a nice long final and… uh… uh… we might have to do a little bit of adjusting
on final… but expect your beginning drop to be about three three five or so.
(Unknown? – Kevin?) Perfect.
(AA): Okay… uh… I may dial it back a little bit… standby… keep it at coverage
level 4.
(Unknown? – Kevin?): Okay.
(AA): And you’ve got… we’re kind of alone on the fire now… you just got a nice
gentle right turn out… I’ll be a hard right… I’m comin’ up on your four o’clock.
(Unknown? – Kevin?): Very good. I’m just gonna keep your ??… and we”ll see ya.
+10:10 ( 1640.58 / 4:40.58 PM )
TONE
(Unknown 3): This is…
TONE
+10:12 ( 1641.00 / 4:41.00 PM )
(AA): Go ahead sir.
(Unknown 3): Yes sir. Uh… we’re complete. We’re heading back to Scottsdale.
Thank you very much… uh… (got a little) work down there… and… ah… I’ll
see ya tomorrow morning.
(AA): Okay… ah… (LONG TONE) …uh… thanks a lot… appreciate the…
uh… good como.
(Unknown 3): Thank you sir. Good night.
_________________________________________________________________
NOTE: This is now the moment when (AA) finally realizes that Granite Mountain
is in serious trouble… and the situation/plan changes. He calls ‘Kevin’ in the
DC10 to tell him this, cancel the drop they were just about to do… and he asks
him (Kevin) to go into a holding pattern while they try to locate Granite Mountain.
_________________________________________________________________
+10:30 ( 1641.18 / 4:41.18 PM )
(AA): Hey… uh… (TONE)… uh… we got… situation’s changed and we got some
folks in trouble and I don’t know where they’re at yet… uh… just… uh… standby.
+10:37 ( 1641.25 / 4:41.25 PM )
(Unknown? – Kevin?): Roger. I’ll just stay out here to the north and (the) east.
+10:43 ( 1641.31 / 4:41.31 PM )
(AA): Looks like we may have a deployment in progress so… uh… dial me up a
level six for now and I don’t know what the… ah… drop sequence is gonna be yet.
+10:51 ( 1641.39 / 4:41.39 PM )
(Unknown? – Kevin?): I’m just gonna tag in behind ya and follow ya, then.
+11:09 ( 1641.57 / 4:41.57 PM )
(AA): Come on back.
+11:12 ( 1642.00 / 4:42.00 PM )
(AA): Go get some water.
+11:17 ( 1642.05 / 4:42.05 PM )
(Unknown): Affirmative.
+11:20 ( 1642.08 / 4:42.08 PM )
(AA): I’m up at 6,000 and above.
+11:27 ( 1642.15 / 4:42.15 PM )
LONG TONE
+11:30 ( 1642.18 / 4:42.18 PM )
TONE
(AA): Go.
(Unknown): Yea… we’re ?? miles out… and… uh… ??
(AA): You’re clear direct to your dip. Call me at.. uh… 5 miles.
(Unknown): Copy.
(AA): What direction ya comin’ in from?
(Unknown): (North?)
(AA): Copy.
NOTE: No other radio communications are heard in this video during
the 60+ seconds left before the video ends.
+12:45 ( 1643.33 / 4:43.33 PM )
USDA AIR STUDY – DISC 4 VIDEO ENDS
WTKTT…. That dozer is NOT the one in the Ball photos. The proof is in the Caterpillar signage behind and below the cabin.
Ball photo (taken from behind) shows only a CAT sign with no connecting black and white stripes
USDA video (referenced above by WTKTT) shows what appears to be the word CATERPILLAR spelled out with black and white stripes extending from the sides all the way around to the back with the word CATERPILLAR between them.
WTKTT… ongoing thanks for all of your diligent work. There are some other subtle differences in the two dozers but the sign below the rear of the cabin is the most obvious (to me).
calvin… good eye. I was looking mostly at the SIDES but
you appear to be right. If you capture a photo of the dozer
from the video as it LEAVES the right-hand frame of the
video… it DOES appear to have those ‘black and white’
stripes extending around the BACK of the cab… while
the DOZER in the Ball photos only appears to have
that single black/white *CAT* sign on the back of the
cab, with no extending black/white stripes.
I also now think I am seeing ( on the back? ) that the
TOP headlights seen in the Ball photos are NOT
present on the back of the DOZER seen passing by
the camera in the USDA video.
Other than that… they *appear* to be the exact same
make/model of dozer right down to blade configuration.
There were, in fact, TWO DOZERS ordered by IC Russ
Shumate the night before… but only the one showed
up in the morning. I wonder if this one now seen
arriving up near the Model Creek Shcool ICP is the
second one from THAT previous night’s order… or
whether this is an entirely different ‘order’ placed
after that original one.
Checking dispatch logs for anything about that…
Thanks again for your ‘good eyes’!
More later.
One of the things to notice in the transcript above is that there is
absolutely no mention of DIVSA Eric Marsh’s ( supposed )
“That’s exactly what we want” radio transmission at or about
the 1637 timeframe, as reported by the SAIR.
Since this USDA Disc 4 video was *ONLY* capturing the
“Air-To-Air” channel… I guess that isn’t surprising… but it
is PROOF that if Marsh really did make that transmission
then it most certainly *WAS* only on the highly-listened-to
Air-To-Ground channel… and Burfiend’s seatmate ( French )
would have been the one ( in the plane ) hearing it… since he
was the one monitoring “Air-To-Ground” traffic ( as proved in
the Helmet-Cam video itself ) and Burfiend was totally absorbed
with the “Lead Plane” duties and (only?) listening to the
Air-To-Air traffic.
There is a ‘Panebaker’ Air Study video that comes close to
covering the 1637 timeframe… but it (unfortunately) ends
just 1 second past 1637 and does not cover the 1637-1639
time window like the USDA video above does.
So finding actual ‘audio capture’ proof that Eric Marsh really
did make some kind of “That’s exactly what we want” radio
transmission circa 1637 remains in the ‘close but no cigar’
category ( for now ).
Having definite proof (now) that that (supposed) transmission
*MUST* have taken place on the highly-listened-to
Air-to-Ground channel still also means that it is odd that
NO ONE but ASM2 ( in their SAIT interview ) recalls hearing
any such transmission. Also… no one interviewed by ADOSH
recalls ever hearing any such thing, either.
So it would still appear that the only criteria the Arizona
Forestry SAIT people were using for ‘verified transmission’
with regards to this statement from Eric Marsh circa 1637
was simply Thomas French ( of Bravo 33 / ASM2 ) seeming
to ‘recall’ hearing it at or about that time.
The SAIR has always been using this one transmission from
Marsh as the ‘official’ end to the 30 minute ‘blackout’ period
described in the report when they say they have ‘no verifiable
direct communications’ with Marsh, Steed or GM.
It remains *odd*, then, that if they are trusting this simple
‘recollection’ on French’s part of something he thought he
heard around a time he thought he heard it… and the SAIT
considered this an ‘absolutely verified transmission’…
…that other simple recollections of transmissions from GM
during this same ’30 minute blackout’ period from other
‘witnesses’ were NOT also considered ‘verified transmissions’.
It would appear to be a pretty ‘flexible’ set of criteria that the
SAIT were using for what they deemed to call ‘verified
transmissions’ and worthy of mention in their final SAIR report.
You know what else is odd. The SAIR and the ADOSH reports neither mention the dozer operators (Justin Hernandez) well being and possible entrapment/ burnover. Another odd thing is the lack of mention in the notes about this person. From memory, the only notes that even mention the search and rescue for additional people (besides GM and DIV A) are from Eric Tarr and another helicopter that were preparing rappel gear (near or after dark). No BR guys mention the dozer operator. Todd Able doesn’t mention the dozer operator. Neither does Gary Cordes,Roy Hall.
Yes. There is no doubt that DPS medic Eric Tarr
thought they were ‘looking’ for 20-22 people
( Granite Mountain, DIVSA and a Dozer operator )…
…but it’s still a complete mystery who TOLD him
those are the people they should be ‘looking for’
from the helicopter.
From page 25 of SAIT Investigation Notes (YIN)…
Interview with ‘Ranger 58’…
Cliff = Clifford Brunsting – Pilot of Ranger 58
Eric = Eric Tarr. DPS medic onboard Ranger 58
_______________________________________
Cliff relayed to B3 we have 19 confirmed…fatalities B3 asked. Affirm. Eric was looking for 20-22 ppl he was told it would be the crew, dozer and a DIVS. So they walked the area very well.
________________________________________
Told by WHO???
WHO was it that talked to DPS Medic Tarr and not
only didn’t know that Eric Marsh WAS ‘DIVSA’ that
day… but also seemed to be pretty sure dozer
operator Justin Hernandez was ‘unaccounted for’
and might have been caught by the fire as well?
Bravo 33 ( French and Burfiend ) testified later that
THEY, themselves, had no idea that the DIVSA
they had been speaking to on the radio was also
the real Superintendent of GM ( and the 20th man
on that crew )… but ‘Bravo 33’ would have had no
idea about a ‘dozer operator’.
So if this ‘information’ about who to look for ( and
how many ) was relayed to ‘Ranger 58’ by ‘Bravo
33’ as they got clearance to take off for the search…
…then who relayed to ‘Bravo 33’ that they MIGHT
also need to be looking for a ‘dozer operator’?
When Blue Ridge ‘evacuated’ the cutover trail
and high-tailed it back to the Shrine area… did
they really just take their radio back from poor
Justin Hernandez ( a civilian entrusted to their care )
and say “you’re on your own”, and didn’t bother to
follow up and make sure he got out of there
successfully…
…or did BR Hotshot Ball ( turned HEQB ) actually stay
with Hernandez and make sure he made it back
to where his transport was down there at the
south end of the Sesame area where Lakewood
and Manaznita pavement ends?
If Ball actually did stay with him to make sure the
dozer got loaded up ( and the transport would
actually START )… then why the confusion?
Ball would have known ( in that case ) that Hernandez
was successfully loaded up and heading out of
the area… so why would ‘Ranger 58’ have even
been told to (also) be looking for a ‘dozer operator’
from the air?
No real answers to these questions yet.
We still don’t know how CLOSE the civilian
Hernandez actually came to being yet another
fatality that day.
Joy A. Collura on April 15, 2014 at 6:43 pm said:
its wood post and 3 strand barbwire fence…to answer someone what I saw 6-30-13 and all my hikes to that area the past almost decade in the location of describing the fencing for the Helm’s-
I confirmed it with another hiker and as well Yarnell local Buford-
I knew it was that but Sonny threw me off trying to tell me it was stucco but I told Sonny that was the front gated area not the area in question-
I hoped I answered the question I could not find and went with what Sonny told me to answer—
I am not sure why I was asked that but Sonny said I needed to come and answer someone; I scrolled to find the question to put it in right spot but I am still so tired and cannot locate it. I don’t know why the fencing matters right by the Helm’s but I can tell you ANYONE who is respectful before the fire or even after would not go that close in the tight terrain area yet they would possibly curve around their hill there by the dry cattle ground tank and go up where they came down during daylight not dark—then you scale the base of boulders & tight terrain around to the old grader wash road- I feel bad that the terrain burnt away because the Helm’s had a lovely private spot and they lost that from that fire because not only is their tight green terrain not there but people sneak in the restricted area and at times people are on their land (Helm’s) not even realizing it. GOOGLE Yavapai Assessor and you will see they own outside the areas of that fencing as well but people do not do what I do and get written permission from land/home owners if I am hiking off state or BLM land- it’s a respect thing. I know who owns every spot I lay my feet.
I put comment here:
http://www.investigativemedia.com/chapter-iv-comments/#comment-25798
Thank you that helps a lot. Joy we were trying to determine how substantial the fence was if GM had got to it to get into the Ranch area or Safety Zone as it was called.
WTKTT said:
>>”If GM hadn’t been ‘informed’ about it at all…( the 1.6 to 2 mile distant ‘safety >>zone’ ) and ONLY had the ‘safe black’ to consider that afternoon after they lost >>the chance to come back down the way they went up…
>>…then they might all still be here today.”
Captain Hindsight strikes again! just wanted to make sure you were familiar with your namesake:
http://www.southparkstudios.com/clips/359089/coon-and-friends.
sorry about that, here’s the correct link:
http://www.southparkstudios.com/clips/360430/captain-hindsight
**
** PANEBAKER AIR STUDY VIDEO
** 20130630_163338_fire_behavior_EP.MOV
Transcript of BOTH the foreground AND background radio conversation captured
by Panebaker Air Study Video 20130630_163338_fire_behavior_EP.MOV.
A public copy of this Air Study video is in Mr. Dougherty’s online Dropbox at…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/y3jy5opssrcvzb3/S3cCXl9pjr/AerialFirefightingstudy/Panebaker/Video/Video#lh:null-20130630_163338_fire_behavior_EP.MOV
ECITW ( Every Caveat In The World )
This is what I ( me, personally ) believe is being said in both the foreground
AND the background of this video. Your mileage may, of course, vary.
This video is 2 minutes and 9 seconds long, so given the small note in the
README.TXT file that accompanies these Air Study videos which states that
they all use the VIDEO END time as the timestamp in the TITLE… then that
means this particular video STARTED at 1631.29 ( 4:31.29 PM )
NOTE: This is one of TWO videos where the Air Study group stationed on
the side of Hays Ranch Road ( right by the helibase ) focused the camera
on the tripod facing due southwest and directly at the enormous smoke
cloud that was now sitting over that ‘middle bowl’ just west of Yarnell.
The TIMEFRAME for both of these ‘south facing’ videos is just 7 to 8 minutes
before Jesse Steed would make his first 1639 “We are in front of the flaming
front” MAYDAY call.
ALSO NOTE: This video also shows a lead plane guiding a SEAT in for a
retardant drop to the EAST of the smoke cloud, down around the area just
west of Yarnell itself. The drop takes place in about the center of the video,
right near the end of the video.
This MIGHT be the ‘lining up a drop north of Yarnell’ practice run(s) referred to in
documentation right before Marsh’s (supposed) 1637 ‘That’s where want
retardant’ transmission, but it’s actually about 6 minutes before that
transmission (supposedly) happened.
That 1637 transmission from Marsh about ‘retardant’ was ONLY mentioned
in one place in the SAIR investigation notes. It was ONLY Bravo 33 ( French
and/or Burfiend ) who SEEMED to recall this transmission from Marsh circa
1637.. and was used by the SAIT to represent the official ‘end’ of the (supposed)
30 minute ‘communications blackout’ period. It has not turned up in ANY radio
captures and no one else interviewed by the SAIT or ADOSH recalls hearing that
transmission from Marsh over the well-listened-to Air to Ground channel that day.
NOTE: The YARNELL-GAMBLE conversation was captured on TAC 1 shortly
BEFORE this video was taken.
NOTE: By 1631 ( 4:31 PM ), OPS1 Todd Abel had now made his way down to
Yarnell from the north side of the fire, and if he is the ‘caller’ voice in the
Blue Ridge Hotshot McCord’s YARNELL-GAMBLE video… he had already made
his ‘would appreciate it if you could hurry it up a little’ call to DIVSA Eric Marsh
( presumably right Abel arrived in Yarnell and saw the situation there for himself ).
NOTE: When this video starts, someone is just finishing a conversation
they were having with someone on one of the TAC channels. The voice
sounds like a possible match for OPS1 Todd Abel.
NOTE: This transcript includes BOTH foreground and background
conversations heard in this video. The ‘AA’ designation below stands
for ‘Air Attack’ and he is the one flying the lead plane that is
actually seen in this video guiding the other SEAT in for the drop
which is also captured in the video.
VIDEO STARTS AT 1631.29 ( 4:31.29 PM )
+0:00 ( 1631.29 / 4:31.29 PM )
(Unknown – Sounds like OPS1 Todd Abel?): Be sure to talk to him and ask him
if that’s where they’re all supposed to be.
+0:03 ( 1631.32 / 4:31.32 PM )
(AA): Okay… (Beckam?) three… ya got me in sight off your right side?
+0:05 ( 1631.34 / 4:31.34 PM )
(Unknown – Someone responding to +0:00 transmission?): (Okay?).
+0:07 ( 1631.36 / 4:31.36 PM )
(AA): Allright I’m gonna get it as low as I can… start your turn in… we’re gonna…
we’re gonna cross that ridge to left of the big white antenna.
+0:19 ( 1631.48 / 4:31.48 PM )
(SEAT): Which way are you turning?
(AA): I’m turnin’ right… my heading is through 300… I’m gonna roll out at about
three four… ah… zero
(SEAT): Roger that
(AA): I’m at 110.
+0:37 ( 1632.06 / 4:32.06 PM )
(AA): Your target’s gonna be at… uh… kinda the far end here… kind of up on
a little hill… some open flame… ok… I’m actually on a long final.
(SEAT): Ok… ah… you’re still far ahead of me… uh… I’ll just do what I can.
(AA): Ok.. ah… just kinda follow me… I’m passin’ the white antennas now.
** OVERLAPPING CONVERSATION AT +0:57 ( 1632.26 / 4:32.26 PM )
FOREGROUND
+0:57 ( 1632.26 / 4:32.26 PM )
(AA): You’re gonna be kind of a gentle right turn on the exit.
BACKGROUND
(Unknown): (Unintelligible?)
+1:05 ( 1632.34 / 4:32.34 PM )
(Unknown 2): (Best com?) ( I can do is on? ) (seven?)
+1:09 ( 1632.38 / 4:32.38 PM )
(Unknown – Seems to be same speaker as +0:57 above): Try sixteen.
+1:19 ( 1632.48 / 4:32.48 PM )
(AA): got me in sight… what I’d like to do is pretty much anywhere in here where
it’s heavy open flame is in the fuel… right through here… have ya got that?
(SEAT): Yea… is it like starting up the… ah… on the ridgetop or anything?
(AA): Affirmative.
(SEAT): Ok… do what I can
(AA): Then give me a gentle right turn on the exit
(SEAT): You got it.
+1:39 ( 1633.08 / 4:33.08 PM )
(OPS1 Todd Abel): Uh… Structure Group 2, Operations Abel
+1:45 ( 1633.14 / 4:33.14 PM )
(SPGS2 Darrell Willis): Any real progress?
+1:50 ( 1633.19 / 4:33.19 PM )
(SPGS2 Darrell Willis): Try again.
+1:54 ( 1633.23 / 4:33.23 PM )
(Unknown – OPS1 Todd Abel replying to Darrell Willis’ question?): Yup.
+1:55 ( 1633.24 / 4:33.24 PM )
(SEAT): Off the drop.
+1:57 ( 1633.26 / 4:33.26 PM )
(AA): Okay follow me around in the right hand and then… ah… load
and return, okay?
+2:02 ( 1633.31 / 4:33.31 PM )
(SEAT): Roger that. Load and return.
+2:05 ( 1633.34 / 4:33.34 PM )
(AA): Yea… we liked your drop… I know there was a lotta fire in there…
but… ah… (laughter) nicely done.
+2:09 ( 1633.38 / 4:33.38 )
(SEAT): Yea (laughter) ( VIDEO ENDS )
VIDEO ENDS AT 1633.38 ( 4:33.38 PM )
unsubstantiated.
Followup… see post above regarding the transcript for
the USDA Disc 4 Air Study video.
The USDA Air Study DVDs contain videos that OVERLAP the
timeframes of the other Panebaker / Moore Air Study videos.
So a LOT of the conversations in the Panebaker / Moore Air
Study videos that are ‘hard to hear’ because of the wind noise
in the microphone for most of THOSE Air Study videos are also
CLEARLY heard in the other ‘USDA Air Study’ videos.
The audio tracks of the USDA Air Study videos were recorded
with a direct ‘inline’ plug into the microphone jack of the video
camera itself… so they contain PURE / CLEAR radio traffic…
with no ‘wind noise’ or ‘traffic noise’ whatsoever.
The video transcribed directly above ( Panebaker 163338 )
is one of the ones that is ALSO completely captured and
‘synchronized’ with USDA Air Study Disc 4 video(s).
MOST of the ‘background conversation’ in the transcript above
for Panebaker Air Study video 163338 is ALSO captured
clearly in USDA Disc 4 video(s)… and can be EASILY heard
and verified using BOTH videos.
Reply to Deborah Pfingston post on April 12, 2014 at 8:31 am
>> Deborah Pfingston wrote…
>>
>> The Helm’s were inside because the fire came up soooooo quickly.
>> They even still had their animals out. They just made it in their home
>> after rushing around putting them in.
Yes. They also had only ‘arrived’ home that day not too long before they
had to (quickly) do all that.
They also testified ( to ADOSH ) that the ‘air was full of smoke and embers’
and they also specifically testified that they NEVER saw any firefighters
( or FF vehicles ) on their property that day. Not anytime they were
actually THERE, anyway.
ADOSH interviewed Lee and DJ Helm in person ( since the Arizona Forestry
SAIT was NOT cooperating with ADOSH and would not share their own
interview with them ), at the ranch itself, and while there is no ‘transcript’ of that
ADOSH interview with Lee and DJ Helm… here are copies of the ‘notes’ that
the ADOSH investigators took during that interview…
In ADOSH document “N9589 Notes redacted.pdf”…
Page 32 ( of 35 pages )
_________________________________________________________________
ADOSH Interview ( face to face ) with Lee and DJ Helm.
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF ARIZONA
Occupational Safety and Health Division
FIELD NOTES – Date: 7/16/13
Company Name: Yarnell Hill Fire
Met with Mr. Lee Helm + Mrs. DJ Helm
– Spent morning in Peeples Valley watching the fire advance North.
– Left Peeples Valley around noon, ran some errands in Yarnell, and
returned home ( to the Boulder Springs Ranch ) around 2 pm.
– Looking out North window and saw advancing fire from north, ran outside
and put animals in Barn.
– From inside home the sky was filled with black smoke blacking out the sun. Embers and smoke filled the air.
– Never saw any firefighters on their property on Sunday, June 30.
Lee + DJ Helm: ( Address and phone number redacted )
Boulder Springs Ranch Security Gate Code: ( Redacted )
_________________________________________________________________
This actual ADOSH ‘interview’ document is online at…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/20inrene9tcx74a/XZ137_JeS3/ADOSH%20Notes%20and%20Emails/N9589%20Notes%20redacted.pdf
>> Deborah also wrote…
>> All of the fence line is metal
Do you have any idea what that ‘fencing’ actually looked like?
It is now KNOWN to have been there on the western side of the ranch ( from
which Granite Mountain was approaching ) and GM would have had to ‘deal’ with
this fencing that afternoon, no matter what it was… but there is still no direct
evidence what that fencing *actually* looked like, or how substantial it might
have been.
There is actually a ‘folder’ that was part of the SAIT FOIA/FOIL release
package that is labelled “A52-Helm Ranch Photos Pre-Fire” and
(presumably) contains photos of what that fencing might have looked
like ( pre-fire, anyway ), but that folder is still not correctly linked and,
instead, goes to a folder called “Foley Site Visit Photos”.
So it is still not *generally* known what that ‘fencing’ actually looked like.
>> Deborah also wrote…
>> and the structures are stucco.
Yes… and porch posts were metal embedded in concrete pylons.
>> There was no exposed wood anywhere.
The Helms’ had a lot of old (wooden) wagons and carts and other antique
things ‘adorning’ the edges of their property… and there is evidence that
one of the wood ‘wagons’ or ‘carts’ near the northwest corner of the ranch
did, in fact, burn that day as the fire surrounded the ‘safety zone’… but this is
no valid indication that the area was not ‘survivable’ except for inside one
of the structures.
Indeed… one of the ‘other’ antique ‘wagons’ they had on the property was
not only wood… it actually had a ‘canvas’ cover… ( just like an old covered
wagon would ) and neither that canvas cover nor that green/red wooden wagon
appears to have burned at all. It’s location on the property DURING the burnover
is not known but it did, in fact, seem to never catch fire that afternoon.
There is no public copy of the actual 4.4 million dollars worth of ‘claims for
damages’ to this ‘safety zone’ that Lee and DJ Helm have already filed,
but 1 burned up antique wooden cart can’t possibly be worth 4.4 million.
>> Deborah also said…
>> They built wisely.
Yes, they did. They were ready for something like this to happen someday.
>> But I agree is was NOT true ‘safety zone’.
Whether or not it should have ever been a ‘predetermined safety zone’ according
to WFF standards for both ‘safety zones’ AND ‘escape routes to them’ is the
exact issue raised by the common claim 14 in ALL of the already-filed
‘wrongful death’ claims.
It will be up to true ‘experts’ to argue that one way or the other, I suppose.
>> But we all know if GMIHS would have made it to the ranch
>> they would have survived.
Since we know ( after the fact ) that there was no loss of life at that site ( human
or animal ) then yes… it must be assumed GM would have survived as well, had
they been able to actually ‘make’ it there.
In Eric Tarr’s (DPS medic) notes, he says that one of the residents of the Helms place rode to the ranch with 3 fire officials after GM deployment site was found. Was there a third person living at the ranch? The notes also say that after this person (whomever they were) was returned to their home, they were asked if they wanted to be evacuated.
Reply to calvin post on April 13, 2014 at 3:04 am
>> calvin wrote…
>> In Eric Tarr’s (DPS medic) notes, he says that one
>> of the residents of the Helms place rode to the ranch
>> with 3 fire officials after GM deployment site was found.
>> Was there a third person living at the ranch?
I don’t believe so… but it certainly was a big enough
operation to have either ‘hands’ or a ‘caretaker’
living there.
However… that scenario wouldn’t really match the
conversation(s) that Eric Tarr says he had.
When Eric Tarr first arrived at the BSR… apparently
only DJ Helm was there ( Mrs. Helm, wife ). She is the one
who met Eric at first and gave him permission to use
the Ranch as a ‘staging’ area for the ‘incident’.
Mr. Helm ( Lee Helm ) appears to have left the
Ranch and gone into town during the hour or so following
the burnover ( and before the deployment site was
discovered ) and was then the one who ‘returned’ with
the 3 fire command people ( presumably in his own
vehicle ). See below.
When Eric Tarr describes his conversation
with this ‘other person’ that arrived with the fire commanders
he also describes asking HIM for permission to use HIS
property as a staging area… so that implies that it was,
indeed, Mr. Lee Helm himself, and not a ranch hand
or a caretaker.
>> calvin also wrote…
>> The notes also say that after this person (whomever
>> they were) was returned to their home, they were
>> asked if they wanted to be evacuated.
Correct. DJ Helm said she didn’t want to evacuate
when Eric Tarr first asked her… and then when this
‘other male resident’ arrived with the ‘incident within
an incident’ people… he, too, then declined to evacuate.
I think it’s obvious from Tarr’s written testimony that this
‘other male resident’ that arrived with the incident
commanders was, in fact, Lee Helm. Tarr was also
asking HIS permission to use HIS property as a ‘staging
area’ and HE also gave HIS permission.
From Eric Tarr’s actual notes in the ‘M-Law Enforcement-
no-redactions.pdf’ document…
_______________________________________________
I hiked out to the ranch house with the firefighters ( Brian Frisby, Trueheart Brown, Jason Clawson, Aaron Hulburd and KC (Bucky) Yowell ) and made contact with a female resident of the Ranch house and advised her of the situation and I also requested verbal permission from her to utilize their property as a staging location. She advised me she was the home owner and that we could do whatever we needed to do with their property and she offered any assistance to us she could give. She also advised me that she did not want to evacuate.
Three Firefighters arrived at the Ranch in trucks and they advised me they were incident Commanders for this ‘incident within an incident’. I briefed them on what I knew and had observed up to this point. A male resident had also arrived at the Ranch with the Incident Commanders. I spoke with him and again requested permission to use his property and he advised me we could do what we needed to do there and offered any assistance he could to us. He also declined to evacuate.
_______________________________________________
**
** OTHER BACK BURNS NEAR YARNELL ON JUNE 30, 2013?
>> Reply to Deborah Pfingston post on April 12, 2014 at 8:11 am said:
>>
>> Deborah Pfingston on April 12, 2014 at 8:11 am said:
>>
>> Thank you for doing this digging for me ( regarding local firefighter interviews).
>> I have theory – of which I have had many but discover they won’t work –
>> I really think there was a back burn set possibly by the trailers.
>> Thoughts!
Deborah…
There has always been a well-founded suspicion that (perhaps) some ‘other’
back burn(s) was/were ‘fired off’ that afternoon which then ‘became’ the actual
fire that entered the box canyon and entrapped Granite Mountain ( and that HAS,
in fact, been discussed in this ongoing forum )…
…but the ‘consensus’ seems to be that there is no evidence ( in the public
record, anyway ) that anything like that actually took place.
There WAS, almost right off the bat, some suggestion that a ‘burn out’
might have been initiated by the owners and/or working hands at the
Boulder Springs Ranch itself, which became the ‘westward’ moving
fireline that entrapped Granite Mountain… but again… after some discussion
and hard looks at the available evidence there is no real indication
anything of the sort ever happened ( or was ever even considered ).
There IS evidence in the ‘public record’, however, that SPGS1 Gary Cordes
did, in fact, consider a possible ’emergency burn out’ at the last minute to try
and specifically protect the Glen Ilah sub-division, and that he told Blue Ridge
Hotshot Ball to ‘scout that out’ in the area southwest of Yarnell ( and around
Glen Ilah proper ) and see if it was a possibility at the 11th hour, as the
fire was fast approaching Glen Ilah.
This was never mentioned in any official report ( SAIR or ADOSH ), but
it surfaced in the Blue Ridge Hotshots’ redacted unit logs/notes when
they were (finally) made public.
When it all started hitting the fan circa 1600 ( and a full 20 minutes AFTER the
evacuations of Yarnell and Glen Ilah had already been ordered by SPGS1
Gary Cordes at 1540 )… apparently Cordes still wanted Blue Ridge Hotshot
Ball ( who had been HEQB Dozer Boss all day ) to see if there was any chance
of the dozer quickly cutting more line to the southwest of Yarnell, around Glen
Ilah itself… and Ball apparently borrowed the Blue Ridge UTV Ranger to scout
this out ( and, at this same time, dozer operator Justin Hernandez drives over
towards the Manzanita/Lakewood area at west end of Glen Ilah and ‘stages’
there where its ‘lowboy’ transport trailer already was. )
THAT ‘last minute plan’ ( find a way to do a fast ‘burn out’ to specifically
try and protect Glen Ilah ) never really materialized, either, because by the
time Ball got to to the Lakewood/Manazanita area to search for a possible place
to cut such a ‘burn out’ line… the area was basically ALREADY on fire.
Page 11 of Blue Ridge (redacted) notes…
These are ( with little doubt, even redacted ) Ball’s own ‘unit log’ notes…
_________________________________________________________________
1600??: BRIHC disengaging to safety zone. BRIHC one informs Structure Group
One they are pushing everyone out of subdivision. (xxxxxxxxxxxxxx)
Structure group one assigns me and one other to locate possibility of dozer line
to southwest of Yarnell. Acquire ATV: travel into subdivision back to Dozer line.
Multiple structures fully engulfed and multiple spot fires in subdivision.
Notify structure group one about fire and structures on corner of manzanita and
lakewood (xxxxxxxxx). Started evacuations of subdivision. Helitanker drops water
near manzanita junction. Inquiry about helitanker availability. Told there are
other priorities (xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx). Evacuations for next couple of hours.
Signed: (xxxxxxxxx) 7 / 1 / 2013
_________________________________________________________________
So even that ‘last minute emergency burnout’ plan of Gary Cordes’ never
came to be. It was just a last-minute desperation move on his part but it
was too late to ‘cut any line’ there southwest of Yarnell around Glen Ilah,
much less ‘light any emergency back burns’.
So there really is no direct evidence that there were any ‘official’ ( fire command
sanctioned ) ‘burn outs’ that afternoon, anywhere west or southwest of
Yarnell or Glen Ilah.
However… that doesn’t mean the ADOSH investigators themselves weren’t
fully aware that SOMETHING might have been ‘lit up’ around there that
afternoon, which only then contributed to the disaster.
Throughout their interviews… the ADOSH investigators asked a LOT of
questions about this. They asked over and over if any of the ‘planned’
burns ever actually happened… or if there were ANY other manually set
‘burns’ that any of the interviewees were aware of that day down around
Yarnell and Glen Ilah.
The ‘planned burnouts’ around the Double-Bar-A ranch and ( eventually )
all along Model Creek Road up NORTH in Peeples Valley were already
well known to the ADOSH investigators ( and fully testified to by the
various interviewees )… but the ADOSH investigators were still careful
to ask interviewees about any kind of activity like that on the SOUTH
side of the fire that they might be aware of.
None of the ADOSH ‘interviewees’ could recall anything like that happening,
to their knowledge, at any time that afternoon.
There were a lot of ‘plans’ to do ‘burn outs’ down around Yarnell at some
point later that evening… and ( indeed ) this was the ENTIRE plan and
work that Gary Cordes had come up with to try and ‘protect’ Yarnell and
what Granite Mountain and Blue Ridge Hotshots and the Dozer were
‘preparing’ to do all day…
…but that ‘primary burn plan’ never happened. It was abandoned when
the fire ‘exceed their expectations’ and started blowing right through
all the preset trigger points. There was only time to evacuate, then.
There had even been a ‘rumor’ that just before Tyson Esquibel and his
‘Task Force 1’ crew(s) were forced to abandon their work down in the
draw in Harper Canyon… that they might have done a ‘what the hell’ and
‘lit up’ a back fire as they were leaving Harper Canyon.
That turned out to be just a ‘rumor’. No one working the Harper Canyon
area that day ever said anything like that was ever even considered.
They just got caught by the advancing fireline and didn’t have time to
do ANYTHING but get the heck out of Harper Canyon.
All of that being said… there is still a DISTINCT lack of ANY interviews of
ANY actual ‘residents’ of Yarnell or Glen Ilah on the part of BOTH the
Arizona Forestry Division SAIT investigators AND the Arizona ADOSH
investigators. Neither investigative team seemed to really feel the need
to interview ( or even talk to? ) anyone ‘local’ ( except for the 2 hikers, the
volunteer firefighters and Lee and DJ Helm ).
They apparently didn’t consider that some residents ( either out-lying or
close to town outskirts ) MAY have taken some actions on their OWN
part to try and defend their OWN property that day.
It is still possible something like that *MAY* have happened… but there
is certainly nothing in the ‘public’ evidence record ( at this time ) to
support it.
Small detail, but I think it’s important to keep the record straight for credibility. Ball didn’t borrow the Blue Ridge crew’s UTV. He procured one from the Yarnell Fire Department. And he was on it well into the evening, while Trew was using the Blue Ridge UTV to find a way into, eventually, where Granite Mountain had gone.
Also, I haven’t seen any evidence that Cordes was thinking of back burning near Glen Ilah.
Reply to Marti Reed on April 12, 2014 at 10:36 pm said:
>> Marti said…
>> Small detail, but I think it’s important to keep the record
>> straight for credibility. Ball didn’t borrow the Blue Ridge
>> crew’s UTV. He procured one from the Yarnell Fire
>> Department. And he was on it well into the evening,
>> while Trew was using the Blue Ridge UTV to find a
>> way into, eventually, where Granite Mountain had gone.
Those really do seem to be Ball’s own ‘unit log’ notes
but you are right… all he says is “Acquired UTV”. He
doesn’t bother to say where he got it.
>> Marti also said…
>> Also, I haven’t seen any evidence that Cordes was
>> thinking of back burning near Glen Ilah.
There is actually no mention of this ‘last minute plan’
at all in Cordes’ own ADOSH interview… but the
ADOSH investigators also neglected to ask him
about it.
So all we have to go on for this (rumor?) is Ball’s own
‘unit log’ blurb. Did Cordes really think just a ‘dozer
push’ was going to protect Glen Ilah, even if it was
possible to find someplace to do that at the 11th
hour… or did Cordes really think there was going
to be time to (also) ‘back burn it’ even if it could be
accomplished?
Only a re-interview with Cordes and some specific
questions about what Ball is saying will answer that.
IMHO. GM, and the dozer were going to work to clear a dozer line to protect Glen Isla, and they were planning to burn the line BEFORE the next burn period.
Yes… that was the ‘original’ plan, all along,
as decided at the 0700 briefing. Actually,
they were still holding open the option of
clearing out that north/south Jeep trail
that extended north from the Sesame
area, all the way to the active fire… until
it was scouted by Frisby/Brown in the
UTV and they reported it was not viable.
That’s when the whole ‘cutover trail’ between
Sesame area and Shrine Road became the
‘backup’ plan and added to the idea of
clearing a line all the way from the anchor
point to the Sesame area… and then on
to the Shrine area. The intention was
always to finish that by day’s end and
then ( hopefully? maybe? ) ‘burn’ that
dozer line in the late evening when the
winds died down.
It never happened.
The Dozer did all it could do and it was
then Blue Ridge’s turn to ‘clean up the
line’ on the ‘cutover trail’… but just as they
got to work on their part of that operation
they had to RTO ( Reverse Tool Order )
and evacuate back to the Shrine area…
then out to the Ranch House Restaurant.
There is now a video that captures the
dozer AND its transport passing by
the Air Study video crew’s camera up
by the helispot on Hays Ranch Road
and heade WEST for the ICP at Model
Creek Elementary School at exactly
1636.10 ( 4:36.10 PM ), just 3 minutes
before Steed’s first MAYDAY at 1639.
I will post the link to that USDA Air Study
video that captures the dozer/transport
in a new parent comment in a few minutes.
calvin… that post about a video showing the DOZER and its TRANSPORT passing by the camera in one of the USDA Air Study videos finally made it through up above
( took a few tries, for some reason ).
Title of that post is…
>> WantsToKnowTheTruth
>> on April 15, 2014 at 8:56 pm said:
** USDA AIR STUDY VIDEOS
** TRANSCRIPT OF DVD DISC 4
** FILENAME: VTS_01_1
**
** CAPTURES AIR-TO-AIR
** CHANNEL TRAFFIC DURING
** DEPLOYMENT
**
** ALSO CAPTURES DOZER AND
** ITS TRANSPORT VEHICLE
** GOING BY THE CAMERA AT
** +5:22 ( 1636.10 / 4:36.10 PM )
A public copy of this DISC 4
USDA Air Study video is here…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/20inrene9tcx74a/aDdr_4rx1s/ADOSH%20Yarnell%20Hill%20Investigation/Photos%20and%20Video/USDA%20Videos/Disc%204/Disc%204/VIDEO_TS#lh:null-VTS_01_1.VOB
…and here is the part in the post
above that talks about the DOZER
going by the camera…
+5:22 ( 1636.10 / 4:36.10 PM )
____________________________
NOTE: DOZER AND ITS TRANSPORT GO BY THE CAMERA
At this exact +5:22 moment in this USDA video is when the camera captures the DOZER and its TRANSPORT passing by headed WEST on Hays Ranch Road, towards the ICP at the Model Creek Elementary School in Peeples Valley. The DOZER on the trailer exactly matches the one in the photos taken by Blue Ridge Hotshot Ball that morning while it was working on the ‘Cutover Road’ between the Sesame and Shrine area(s). The actual CLOCK time for this moment when the DOZER passes the camera is 1636.10 ( 4:36.10 PM ), only about 3 minutes before Captain Jesse Steed’s first MAYDAY call.
______________________________
Correction / update.
Upon closer examination, calvin has discovered that the DOZER seen going by the camera in this USDA Disc 4 video does *NOT* appear to be the same dozer seen in the BR Hotshot Ball photos.
See full post about this up above.
excellent statement here. If it was not for Brian Mockenhaupt going to Congress and speaking to my old hiking pal Ronda Carnes trying to find me in July, Joanna Dodder researching the details to my videos and photos and pointing out that the photos I took were of the men that died in the 6-30-13 fire and the Rolling Stones/Mens Journal Josh Eells seeking a hike we probably would of headed to Montana but it was the loss of the people in that town like Lobecks/Westfall who initially hit my heart and then the hundreds after is why we stayed and in staying we were still shocked 19 men died so all I want not from my photos alone but the community—share so this could be properly assessed. I never got my answers from the investigators or had them look into it so I strongly agree to this statement because I have seen some of there photos/videos and I do agree there needed to be more interviews from the locals—why me and Tex (Sonny) and a few others—just because we were at the fire line and the Helm’s lived near where they died—HOW ABOUT the many who were stationed on boulders taking photos between 2-7pm—they should of been interviewed too. Just my opinion. I hope in time they surface their photos/video—just my thought. Also in time I hope aerial comes forward more as well as the fire community that was on Shrine/Sesame/Candie Cane/Foothill & even on Hilltop where you can get good solid views. So many things could be looked in…We left that area for awhile; hiking the Grand Canyon area now—we were at Alamo Lake but Tex (Sonny) said it was sooo hot the mosquitos were even naked over there so we left there but an amazing area filled with nice gems/mineral kind of rocks for you rockhounds. I call them leaver-rites. Happy Easter everyone. Sonny is visiting old friends so I came on the wifi to catch up on reading here for a bit…
Thank you, Joy. ( ongoing thanks, of course ).
Quick question for you ( and/or Sonny )…
Do you know what the FENCING that was on the WEST
side of the Boulder Springs Ranch ( Helms’ place )
actually looked like?
It is actually visible in that photograph you took of the
Ranch that very morning… but it’s hard to tell from that
distance what it really looked like or how ‘substantial’
it might have been.
Was it just some simple ‘field fencing’… or was it much
more ‘substantial’ than that like ‘chain link’ or something?
Followup / Update…
Joy Collura answered the question above about
the ‘fencing’ on the WEST side of the Boulder
Springs Ranch in a new ‘parent’ comment up
above… and here is what she said…
>> Joy A. Collura on April 15, 2014 at 7:11 pm said:
>>
>> its wood post and 3 strand barbwire fence…to
>> answer someone what I saw 6-30-13 and all
>> my hikes to that area the past almost decade
>> in the location of describing the fencing for the
>> Helm’s – I confirmed it with another hiker and
>> as well Yarnell local Buford.
Thank you, Joy! ( ongoing thanks, of course ).
**
** JAKE GUADINIA VIDEO
** USB YARNELL HILL 021
This video was taken by DOC Lewis crew boss Jake Guardinia while he was
standing on top of a vehicle parked on the north side of the ICP up at the Model
Creek Elementary School in Peeples Valley, late afternoon on Sunday, June 30,
2013… just minutes before the deployment.
Exact time is unknown, but a document submitted along with Guadinia’s videos
indicates the time may have been 1630 ( 4:30 PM ).
It shows the huge smoke column sitting over the middle bowl just to the west of
Yarnell proper.
The foreground conversation is about the huge smoke column in the distance but
there appear to be one or two background radio transmissions on the TAC
channel(s) captured in this video as well.
Jake Guadiana is an Airzona State Forestry employee who is/was the crew
boss of the Lewis DOC crew in Yarnell that weekend.
A public copy of this specific video is here…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/20inrene9tcx74a/4q5jFNhHCn/ADOSH%20Yarnell%20Hill%20Investigation/Photos%20and%20Video/ASFD%20Photos/Jake%20Guadiana#lh:null-USB%20YARNELL%20HILL%20021.avi
ECITW ( Every Caveat In The World )
This is what I ( me, personally ) believe is being said in the background of this
video. Your mileage may, of course, vary.
VIDEO STARTS
+0:00
(Unknown): ?? (to come?)
+0:12.93
(Unknown): One Task Force… what’s goin’ on with you… did anyone get out?
VIDEO ENDS
Typos above. Sorry. The DOC Lewis Crew boss name is…
Jake Guadiana…
and it’s obviously ‘Arizona’ and not “Airzona”.
I’ve gotten ahold of some weather from around the fire. Next week I’ll try to do some modeling and show some runs on what the FB was in those areas. If anyone has found wx ops from the 30th tell me where I can find them so I can add them.
I posted this a little while ago under xxfullsailxx’s April 10, 8:21pm calculations comment, but it’s quite a ways down below, and I wanted to bring it up here, as it pertains to the current discussion:
xxfullsailxx,
Most of us agree that the original black, and the down and out along the two-track, were safe options up until the point of decent into the bowl.
The designation of BSR as a safety zone, may, or may not, have influenced GM’s decision at the top of the bowl.
More importantly, I think the result of the discusion of whether or not BSR should have been designated a valid safety zone, will be an important take-away for future learning on it’s own merit. I don’t think in any way, shape, or form, we are heading down a rabbit hole here.
While the IPRG formula you quote is correct, the 200′ figure stated in the Guide is the distance from ALL fuels (the radius, not the diameter). So at the widest, cleared point (250′) at BSR, someone would only be 125′ away from chaparral. 125′ is not even close to the 200′ in the formula. But, there’s more below.
From the guide:
“Separation distance between the firefighter and the flames should be at least four times the maximum continuous flame height. Distance separation is the radius from the center of the safety zone to the nearest fuels.”
Additionally, the formula listed in the guide emphatically states that it is for ZERO wind conditions.
“Downwind>More Heat Impact>Larger Safety Zone”, so the 200 figure never applied here from the get-go, because the wind never stopped blowing at some varying speed or direction.
Also, as we all know, structures ARE fuel, which decreases even futher the size of the available safe space. I think there is evidence out there that these structures came very close to burning, which would indicate to me that you don’t want a safety zone with a large amount of (bomb-proof??) fuel in the middle of it being used as space that is considered in your calculations.
Also from the Guide:
“A Safety Zone is an area where a firefighter can survive without a fire shelter.” Reports from the residents regarding the amount of heat outside, indicates that someone may have only survived out there WITH a fire shelter.
Although many firefighters passed through the BSR in the 24 hour period prior to entrapment, it seems nobody actually did the legwork to get the actual size of cleared ground (as noted by the wildly varying accounts, 6-8 acres, 20-30 acres, none of which were close to being correct), but instead they just eye-balled the contruction of the buildings and adjoining scraped-earth, and designated it ‘bomb-proof’ without further investigation.
So, leaving GM out of the equation for the moment, and looking just at the adequacy of BSR as a safety zone, I feel that the designation fails on many counts, as noted above.
TWARE,
Thanks for reposting that. I’d completely missed it in all the back and forth. Apologies for having made a redundant post. FWIW, I like yours better! 🙂
Again had someone truly scouted the Compound the would have noted fences and structures that were possibly flammable. Having a lot of background in wild land fire teams I am still very concerned about no engine protection at the ranch. You don’t just leave a place with people there with out protection, there had to have been a reason. May not know until a law suit goes to trial.
Bob,
Arizona is one of the states where the law states that no one can be forced from their home, even in a mandatory evacuation. Once they have been notified though, and refuse to leave, they are on their own, PERIOD!
Many structures have been saved in recent years with only a pumpkin, a pump, and a structure protection sprinkler set-up, and nothing more. When the fire is bearing down and you don’t have a safe spot to make a stand, you start the pump and get the hell out, and let the fire do what it’s going to do, let the sprinklers do what they’re going to do, and when the front passes. try to go back in and do some good work and save something.
I still believe that the original intent for the pumpkin was to have the ability to make a stand with sprinklers without having to commit crews in a place where the escape avenue had a likely-hood of being cut-off.
When all the structures in the north were either threatened, or already burning, there’s a VERY high probablity that ALL that type of structure protection equipment was on the ground and in use. When the fire roared south, all bets were off, and there was no equipment or time available to carry-out a plan on the BSR.
Yes I agree with that. They spent a lot of time with that pumpkin but did they set up a sprinkler system? I think maybe I should move on I am fixated on why no engine after all the prep. SAFETY?????
Yup, this is an excellent post.
-the BSR is SUBSTANTIALLY larger than a football field without even including the eastern barn area… there was more than enough cleared area inside the compound and around the structures of BSR to provide an adequate safety zone.
-the estimated flame lengths were AT THE MAX 50′ on that flat-ish ground around BSR. this takes into account the wind speed. sustained flame lengths were more likely in the realm of 20-30 feet.
-no matter which way the fire approached from, it was never going to be burning on all sides at the same time. the head of the fire approached from the north so after that initial pulse hit the ranch, it was [rapidly moving] flanking fire down the west side.
-please provide a reference for the amount of damage the structures sustained. otherwise, that is unsubstantiated speculation based on what DIDN’T happen. looks to me like all the structures held up pretty well. my speculation would be that most of the damage sustained was around the barn structure, the others all have more than enough clearance.
-again, i would refute most “civilian accounts”… just see any number of cheesy fire movies to understand how wildland fire is viewed by the general public… also, how exactly were they measuring “the heat outside” from inside the buildings? through the reflective windows you say? interesting…
-there is no reason to think that you couldn’t have (and wouldn’t have) been able to use a fuzee and/or drip torch to ignite fuels around the perimeter to expand the size. the most logical place for this would have been on the south side of the eastern barn structure which would have virtually “squared off” the SZ and quickly provided additional separation distance.
obviously there’s plenty of people who disagree, but in my view, BSR was an adequate safety zone for a crew +.
and again, safety zones are not always a green pasture with lawn chairs and coolers.
The Boulder Springs Ranch buildings survived because of the owners serious consideration when creating ‘defensible space’ on their grounds, along with the ‘fire-resistant construction’ of their buildings, and equally important, pure luck.
Almost all stucco constructed homes have roof over-hangs constructed with wood and soffit vents on the underside. Also, there are pictures taken of the ranch, both, before and after the fire, with several gable-end vents visible. Wildfires are quite capable of using these vents to bring heat and embers into an attic space, more so, when things are wind-driven. The photos also seem to show the certain sides of the home were closer to the vegetation than others. On the south side, there appear to be sliding doors with the vegetation being a bit closer on that side. Sliding doors are required these days to have tempered-glass, which is known to shatter between 550-720 F.
As I said, the owners did a GREAT JOB in preparing for the conflagration, but there were still ways for fire to get in the home, so a bit of luck was involved as well. It was a great ‘defensible space’, but not ‘bombproof’, and NOT a safety zone.
Regarding Safety Zones, the Incident Pocket Response Guide speaks for itself.
The open space requirements in the Guide are never even close to being met at the BSR. You’re not supposed to need to shelter in anything else (house, fire-shelter, or otherwise), and you’re not supposed to have to run all over the place in the space available to find a cool (read: survivable) spot.
An adequately sized safety zone will let you park your butt in the middle, knowing you’ll probably take some heat, but not have to do ANYTHING ELSE to survive. While burning-out is certainly an option, it should NEVER be required in a properly sized Zone.
The Incident Pocket Response Guide speaks for itself. The BSR never qualified as a Safety Zone.
TWARE,
I again find myself saying, thank you for an excellent post.
Because someone else was misstating that flame height takes into account wind speed, let me make the again very basic point that, in terms of SZ requirements, no, not even close. The basic SZ calculations take no account of convective heat, for starters. Downwind SZs require larger separation distances. Anyone who’s been downwind of a simple campfire can easily feel on a micro scale what the wind can do in this regard.
I do note that I don’t believe the arrogant ignorance as to actual SZ requirements that this comment thread has seen is a widespread issue in the real world. Cutting corners, though, is a real issue, but because people are rushed, tired, etc. and so did give sufficient priority to an issue they don’t think is critical that day, as opposed to being as ignorant of standards as one poster has been here. Because the same poster who continues to try to misrepresent SZ requirements also seems to have no familiarity with local vegetation or other aspects of local conditions, nor with many other relevant issues, his motivations for continuing to post misinformation must be interesting indeed.
should be “didn’t give,” not “did give,” priority.
Again you have both given excellent information. If your not wild Land Fire Fighters then I commend you for your Knowledge. You talk like seasoned veterans.
For those who are still fighting fires let me impart some old advice on Safety Zones. Brush fires Southern California rule of thumb not in any book. Safety Zone should never be more than 10 min. away from furthest crew member. over 15 Min. cuts your ability to reach it by 50%, over 20 min. start praying you don’t lose men. Beyond that ????
In this new age of extreme fires maybe you should start using my old rule of thumb gained from some old brush fire fighters. The Ranch was a SZ to far for GM no matter what its size.
i’ll bet dollars to doughnuts, that had you been with your respective module, be it an engine or crew, and your supervisor was briefed that day by Gary Cordes, and then came back to tell you that BSR was a potential SZ, that:
-you wouldn’t have gotten out your IRPG and tape measure.
-you wouldn’t have pulled out your pocket computer and run some BEHAVE models.
-you would have looked around and nodded your head, and gone on with your assignment.
because a safety zone is certainly what BSR looked like… and potentially was.
(and again, i would LOVE to see an inventory of BSR building damage… soon as you find it, you get back to me, otherwise, all you have is speculation.)
Yes, standards and guidelines aren’t really important. What’s more important are subjective feelings of comfort, particularly when that complacency is transmitted socially or, if widespread, socially. And then having individual behavior conform to that culture of complacency with a “nod of the head.”
Whatever FullSail’s actual motivations and actual background, he does articulate well what a dangerous culture of complacency looks and sounds like. What he does not do imo, however, is post in a way informed as to what the applicable standards are, or even at a more basic level post in a way informed by even the local conditions that were present.
Should have said, “or if widespread, culturally.” Empirically derived standards (which do exist for SZs), exist for real reasons, and a culture of complacency that treats them as irrelevant is a real threat to safety. And tends to lead to further bad decisions.
xxfullsailxx said:
“-you would have looked around and nodded your head, and gone on with your assignment.”
No, but it’s obvious by your statement that that’s what you would have done.
yep, i’d have been comfortable with BSR designated as a safety zone…
even more to your horror, i would have more likely been the module leader briefing you.
SZ’s often get designated that may require some degree of extra “effort” on the part of the people using it… i.e.:
-firing the perimeter or section of perimeter of the designated SZ.
-green grass that still supports some fire spread which may require an engine to deal with.
-short grass that requires firing… etc.
-the “cold black” that still has snag potential…
-the ‘ole “back to the rig and drive out” ER & SZ. (that probably 90% of resources working in the subdivisions were using.)
that’s great that you work in an area that always has acres of green pasture to kick back and relax in, but it’s not always reality in the west.
Yet another excellent example of a dangerous culture of complacency, along with FullSail’s already demonstrated ignorance of actual SZ guidelines.
On safety zones and separation distance:
Because one poster is persisting in putting up blatantly uninformed posts on SZs as they relate to the BSR, let me make what is a real basic point: when you are looking at a clearing where, given fuels, weather and fire behavior, the fire may burn around the SZ, the required separation distance is the radius of the SZ. This is a basic point for anyone with experience on fires. As indicated, I think in the case of GM, this is not that meaningful to the events that did in fact occur. However, because it is never helpful to have uninformed individuals posting incorrect information persistently, and particularly when someone else might remember that wrong info and utilize it, it is worth noting.
TWARE is in short correct that the BST was not a bomb proof SZ, even if the answer to that point is, yeah, but as it relates to GM, does it matter.
When I say required separation distance is the radius of the SZ, another way to look at this is, in rough terms, you double what you’d need based on the 4x rule of thumb. That is even without thunderboomer winds.
Oh, and I’m assuming a safe area the size of a dot. For a full crew, obviously, the math gets even worse. I.e., TWARE even more correct the more you look at this.
Thank you, SR. Good post, both for its accuracy, and because it highlights the issues of cultural complacency in determining safety zones (they’re no good if you can’t get to them, and can’t fit your resources in a dot, and it’s important to base action on *expected* fire behavior, so just following the formula isn’t enough). It looks like WFSTAR has a safety zone module in the works, which would be timely.
oh goodness. someone call the internet police, i think we have a stalker. really SR, i am flattered, please don’t let your emotions run too wild.
**
** ADOSH INTERVIEWS WITH PERSONNEL FROM…
** YARNELL FIRE DEPARTMENT
** PEEPLES VALLEY FIRE DEPARTMENT
>> Reply to Deborah Pfingston post on April 10, 2014 at 9:15 am
>>
>> Deborah asked…
>>
>> Would anyone be able to guide me to any interviews with Yarnell
>> Fire volunteer firefighters that were in Yarnell – or – any structure
>> firefighters that were in Yarnell on June 30th? Thank you.
Deborah…
This ADOSH document… “L3419 Notes redacted.pdf” …contains TYPED notes
from ADOSH’s interviews with personnel from these departments…
* Yarnell Hill Fire Department
* Peeples Valley Fire Department
ADOSH also attempted to also interview people from the Congress Fire
Department but then decided those interviews were NOT relevant to their
investigation. ( See their notes below ).
This ADOSH document is at the following PUBLIC link…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/20inrene9tcx74a/iWjePE8Dht/ADOSH%20Notes%20and%20Emails/L3419%20Notes%20redacted.pdf
These are not actual ‘transcripts’ of the entire conversation(s) but, rather,
the complete sets of notes they did for themselves FOLLOWING all
of the interviews.
NOTE about ‘redactions’ in this document…
They are NOT really redactions. All the information they tried to ‘redact’ is still
right there in the Adobe PDF file. Any place you see a ‘redaction’ and you want
to still read what is there… just ‘cut and paste’ the blacked out portion into any
text editor and all the ‘redacted’ information is still there fully captured during the
‘cut and paste’ operation. It’s a classic mistake that some people make when
they try to do redactions in an Adobe PDF file. They forget that just ‘blacking
out’ the text with that simple Adobe ‘blacking’ tool doesn’t actually REMOVE it.
NOTE: The only things ADOSH attempted to redact in this document ( but
failed to do so in a successful manner ) are simply phone numbers and web
site addresses. There are no ‘blocks of notes’ being redacted at all.
Their interview notes start on page 2 of the document…
** Yarnell Hill Fire Department
Yarnell Fire Department Personnel:
Captain Brad Haggard
Captain Sam Portillo
Daniel Harrison
Kristee Lewis
Ryan Gardner
Paul Murray
Aileen Casillas
Dani Koile
Anthony McComack
Brad Ruggles
7/18/2013 – An opening conference was conducted with the Yarnell Fire
District/Yarnell Fire Department on July 18, 2013 at 1005 by Marshall Krotenberg
and Bruce Hanna with Fire Chief Jim Koile. Chief Koile completed an information
sheet and provided a photo that he took of the lightning caused fire at the time of
the lightning strike.
Chief Koile stated that his station served as the Incident Command Post for the
Yarnell Hill Fire on June 29 and early on June 30 (until 1020) until the ICP was
relocated to Model Creek School in Peeples Valley, AZ which is about four miles
to the north. Chief Koile mentioned that his crew was sent to various locations
during the fire and that we should contact Captain Brad Haggard for further
information, exact assignments and employee interviews.
7/24/2013 – Spoke with Yarnell Fire Department Captain Brad Haggard at 1320
about fire personnel and responsibilities assigned to Department by the IC for the
Yarnell Hill Fire. Captain Haggard stated that IC requested that Yarnell set up a
temporary or portable water tank at the Ranch Road Restaurant adjacent to Hwy
89 and shuttle water using their water tender to a “pumpkin” set up at the Ranch
Restaurant and at the Helm Ranch House.
Water shuttling took place on Saturday evening June 29, 2013 starting at 2200 for
several hours and continued the next day by Captain Sam Portillo and Kristee
Lewis. At some point of Sunday June 30, 2013 (1300 to 1400) the Yarnell Fire
Department evacuated their station and headed to the ICP located at the Model
Creek School located in Peeples Valley, AZ.
Captain Haggard stated that six Yarnell Fire Personnel were asked to prepare
for the possible emergency rescue of 19 downed fire fighters and were sent
back to Yarnell, however only three fire fighters had wildland gear. Conditions
were too dangerous to enter the area so the team went back to Peeples Valley.
Sometime on Monday the Yarnell Fire Department returned to their station
except they had no electrical power. The Fire Department continued to
respond to EMS calls throughout Yarnell.
7/25/2013 at 0930 – I spoke with Captain Sam Portillo about his role in the
Yarnell Hill Fire. Captain Portillo stated that he and Kristee Lewis continued
to shuttle water to one portable water tank (may have been one additional
portable water tank at the Boulder Springs Ranch/Helm Ranch House) with
the water tender starting at 0600 on June 30, 2013 until evacuated later
that day to Peeples Valley.
On July 1, 2013 Captain Portillo stated that he provided support to hand
crews including structural protection and hot spotting in the Town of Yarnell.
He stated that there were several hot shot crews on site but only recalls
the Florence Hot Shot Crew.
Kristee Lewis stated that she had worked with both the Blue Ridge and Granite
Mountain IHC at a fire in New Mexico (Thompson Ridge) prior to the Doce Fire
and the Yarnell Hill Fire.
** Peeples Valley Fire Department
Page 4…
Peeples Valley Fire Department
17425 Burning Bush Drive
Peeples Valley, AZ
928-427-xxxx ( Redacted )
Captain Patrick McCray
Acting Fire Chief Shane Chaves for the Yarnell Hill Fire
Ken Shoup – Volunteer fire fighter who has a home in Peeples Valley,
AZ, works for the City of Scottsdale.
On July 18, 2013 at approximately 11:00 Marshall Krotenberg and Bruce Hanna
arrived at the Peeples Valley Fire Department to conduct an opening conference
with the Fire Captain Patrick McCray. Both doors to the facility were locked.
I contacted the Peeples Valley Fire Department on Thursday July 25, 2013 and
left a message for Fire Captain Patrick McCray.
I spoke with Shane Chaves today July 29, 2013. Mr. Chaves works for the
Yavapai Sheriff’s Department and was the Acting Fire Chief with the Peeples
Valley Fire Department during the Yarnell Hill Fire but as of July 25, 2013 he
resigned his position and is no longer affiliated with Peeples Valley Fire
Department. Subsequently Mr. Chaves may have returned to Peeples Valley
Fire Department as an EMT or Paramedic.
Mr. Chaves stated that he had four firefighters and two engines assigned to
the Yarnell Hill Fire (Structure Group 1) who were working off of Shrine Road
west of Yarnell on the south end of a dozer line while Granite Mountain IHC
was working on the north end of the dozer line with the Blue Ridge Hotshots.
I will have to verify with Peeples Valley Fire Fighters if any contact was made
with Granite Mountain IHC. Interviews had Granite Mountain assigned to the
east side of the ridge and dozer line and Blue Ridge Hotshots working the
east end of the dozer line in the flat off the ridge. The plan was to join the two
together.
7/29/2013 opening conference with Captain McCray
Information sheet partially completed by Bruce Hanna
Employee interviews – spoke with Captain McCray and Fire Captain Jake Moder
Four man crew and two engines were at the Yarnell Hill Fire assigned to
Structural 1 protection and fire line construction and were working off of
Shrine road waiting for a Dozer to arrive.
Fire Captain Jake Moder 928-910-xxxx ( Redacted )
Fire Captain Ron Smith 928-231-xxxx ( Redacted )
Bob Brandon 928-671-xxxx ( Redacted )
Matt Keehner 928-308-xxxx ( Redacted )
July 29, 2013 – spoke with Jake Moder. Captain Moder stated that Peeples
Valley was assigned by BLM to the Yarnell Hill Fire on June 30, 2013 at 0400
and was to report to Model Creek School at 0730. A briefing was held at 0800,
crew was assigned to Structure 1 protection in Yarnell. IC Task Force
Leader was Trainee Tyson Esquibel from Peoria Fire Department. Crew was
stationed on Shrine Road waiting for a Dozer. Dozer eventually dug a fireline
that ended at a wash. Lots of chainsaw work being done by the crew to tie
into ridge north of Yarnell. Made contact with a spotter from Central Yavapai
Fire District. Also had contact with Blue Ridge IHC and Sun City West.
Never made contact with Granite Mountain IHC but were maybe 3/4 of a mile
from the ridge and box canyon where the fire fighters were trapped. Matt Keehner
was assigned to scout area and serve as a temporary lookout and was assisted
by CYFD fire fighter. Wind shifted at 1545 and everyone immediately
evacuated the area.
Mr. Moder stated that he and the three other fire fighters were interviewed
together on July 10, 2013 for about 45 minutes by the investigation team
assembled by the Arizona State Forestry Division.
** Congress Fire Department
Page 8…
Congress Fire District
Congress Fire Department
26733 Santa Fe Road
Congress, AZ 85332
928-427-xxxx ( Redacted )
Opening conference
Information sheet
No contact made with Congress Fire District as of July 30, 2013.
The Congress Fire District may not be necessary for our investigation.
NOTE: No followup here and apparently ADOSH never conducted
any interviews with anyone in the Conress Fire Department.
Thank you for doing this digging for me. I have theory – of which I have had many but discover they won’t work – I really think there was a back burn set possibly by the trailers. Thoughts!
Reply to Deborah Pfingston post
on April 12, 2014 at 8:11 am
>> Deborah said…
>> I have theory – of which I have had many but discover
>> they won’t work – I really think there was a back burn
>> set possibly by the trailers. Thoughts!
Deborah…
See a longer post/answer/thoughts about this just above
with the date and title of…
WantsToKnowTheTruth on April 12, 2014 at 9:45 pm said:
** OTHER BACK BURNS NEAR YARNELL
** ON JUNE 30, 2013?
These possible ‘other back burns’ HAVE been considered
and talked about here in this ongoing discussion, but
there is nothing in the ‘public evidence record’ to
support it ( at this time, anyway ).
However… see ‘details’ in the post above about the
now known ’emergency burn out’ plan that was
apparently some sort of last-minute desperation
move on SPGS1 Gary Cordes’ part.
Debra- I am new to your name here so I am scrolling the comment wall while Sonny is visiting and your theory here—please do me a favor and talk to the homeowners near the trailers. You will be surprised to see the photos and videos. I think people who are seeking clarity should spend the time there and spend time with the community. I hope you get the answers you need for that theory. I hope the more interest shown may draw some to share public—
The pre-determined ‘bomb-proof’ safety zone. Hmmmm.
There has been a tremendous amount of discussion about this, so I decided to take a little better look at the BSR.
There are notes from Cordes I believe, describing it as 20-30 acres. Someplace else, someone states the actual size as being 6-8 acres. It seems those might be ‘land ownership size’ descriptions, and NOT the size of the ‘bomb-proof safety zone’.
As I look at the actual cleared area where the house is, including the open area to the north, the size is roughly 91,000 sq ft, or roughly 2 acres. There are several fingers of cleared land that push off from that chunk, but none of those are large enough to claim or use as a safety zone, including the narrow eastern finger with the barn on it, which is roughly 31,000sq ft, for roughly 3/4 acre.
There are media descriptions of the ranch owners having to shelter inside the house to survive the extreme heat (I’m hoping that Tex or Joy or someone else that knows them, can vouch for my memory on that, or else maybe remember the media source). If this is indeed correct, then this ranch was NEVER an appropriate safety zone, because, as has been described by others, as well, you DON”T need to take additional shelter (fire shelter, house, etc.), just to survive in an adedquate safety zone.
Very valid point. To me, it’s more of an OSHA point than anything, though, and obviously a training point going forwards. Not as jarring standards-wise as the tennis court. For me, I don’t see that it’s more than tangential to GM, as their motivation doesn’t seem to have been to get to the BSR to use it as a SZ (they had a better one where they were), and, had they made it to the BSR, even if they’d had to deploy, there likely would have been a very different outcome. Emotionally, I’m primed to think the issue of how adequate the BSR was as an SZ is more important, simply because one poster was trying to wave its (questionable) bomber nature around a bit much.
I guess ultimately, was GM affected by the characterization of the BSR? …is the test to me. Failure to completely take fire behavior into account in describing BSR as bombproof, if it didn’t directly affect GM, gets to be more of a side issue.
Looking close at the pictures it looks as if there was a 6 FT fence and gate around the entire property.
Also again I do not under stand why a Engine was not stationed at the Ranch which would be common practice.
unless the overhead felt it was unsafe to hang an engine out there.
What was the Pumpkin for? Extra water for house protection?
There is something very strange here and probably any explanation has been lost.
Questions for the Law Suit?
Bob,
See my post down below regarding the pumpkin. I surmised that the intent was to support a portable sprinkler system. In the end, those supplies apparently all got committed at the north end when things went to crap up there.
bob- please provide a link to those pictures you’re referencing…
because every picture i’ve seen (including google earth) there seems to be a fence running down the length of the west side of the property, but the rest of it looks pretty open to me.
if i had to guess, i would say the fence is for nothing more that tumbleweed control, given it’s location and the fact that it DOESN’T go all the way around the property.
but i’d love to see the pictures you’re looking at.
“Emotionally, I’m primed to think…”
lol, really? do i make you emotional?
i think you’ve recognized that BSR was indeed the target (not Yarnell, like you tried to state previously) not so much for a SZ, but more as a point at which to be able to consider reengaging the fire…
thanks for agreeing with me!
Again, you are wrong. With almost every post. Truly amazing. For other readers, the important thing to realize is that underneath the nasty attack posts, FullSail also seems consistently uninformed.
i really love how you say, “you are wrong” … and then don’t expand on WHAT you think is wrong, let alone WHY you think it’s wrong.
Those who do not recognize the element that emotions play in all decision making are susceptible to becoming slaves of their own.
Stop the bickering and move on.
To “The Truth” – the Helm’s were inside because the fire came up soooooo quickly. They even still had their animals out. They just made it in their home after rushing around putting them in. All of the fence line is metal and the structures are stucco. There was no exposed wood anywhere. They built wisely. But I agree is was NOT true safety zone. But we all know if GMIHS would have made it to the ranch they would have survived.
Reply to Deborah Pfingston post
on April 12, 2014 at 8:31 am
>> the Helm’s were inside because
>> the fire came up soooooo quickly.
>> They even still had their animals
>> out. They just made it in their
>> home after rushing around putting
>> them in.
Yes. They also had only ‘arrived’
home not too long before they
had to quickly do all that.
They also testified ( to ADOSH )
specifically that they NEVER saw
any firefighters ( or FF vehicles )
on their property that day. Not ever.
ADOSH interviewed Lee and DJ
Helm in person ( since the Arizona
Forestry SAIT was NOT cooperating
with ADOSH and would not share
their own interview with them), at the
ranch itself, and while there is no
‘transcript’ of that ADOSH interview,
here are copies of the ‘notes’ they
took during that interview…
In ADOSH document
“N9589 Notes redacted.pdf”
Page 32 ( of 35 pages )
______________________________
ADOSH Interview ( face to face )
with Lee and DJ Helm.
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF ARIZONA
Occupational Safety and
Health Division
FIELD NOTES
Date: 7/16/13
Company Name: Yarnell Hill Fire
Met with Mr. Lee Helm + Mrs. DJ Helm
– Spent morning in Peeples Valley
watching the fire advance North.
– Left Peeples Valley around noon,
ran some errands in Yarnell,
and returned home around 2 pm.
– Looking out North window and saw
advancing fire from north, ran outside
and put animals in Barn.
– From inside home the sky was filled
with black smoke blacking out the
sun. Embers and smoke filled the air.
– Never saw any firefighters on their property on Sunday, June 30.
Lee + DJ Helm: ( Address and
phone number redacted )
Gate Code: ( Redacted )
______________________________
That actual document is online at…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/20inrene9tcx74a/XZ137_JeS3/ADOSH%20Notes%20and%20Emails/N9589%20Notes%20redacted.pdf
>> Deborah also wrote…
>> All of the fence line is metal
Do you have any idea what the
‘fencing’ actually looked like?
It is know KNOWN to have been
there on the western side of the
ranch, from which Granite Mountain
was approaching, but there is still
no direct evidence what that fencing
really looked like, or how substantial
it might have been.
>> Deborah also wrote…
>> and the structures are stucco.
Yes… and porch posts were metal
embedded in concrete pylons.
>> There was no exposed wood
>> anywhere.
The Helm’s had a lot of old (wooden)
wagons and carts and other antique
things ‘adorning’ the edges of their
property… and there is evidence that
one of the wood ‘wagons’ or ‘carts’
near the northwest corner of the
ranch did, in fact, burn that day…
but this is no valid indication that
the area was not ‘survivable’ except
for inside one of the structures.
There is no public copy of the actual
4.4 million dollars worth of ‘claims for
damages’ to this ‘safety zone’ that
Lee and DJ Helm have already filed,
but 1 burned up antique cart can’t
possibly be worth 4.4 million.
>> Deborah also said…
>> They built wisely.
Yes, they did.
>> But I agree is was NOT true
>> ‘safety zone’.
Whether or not it should have ever
been a ‘predetermined safety zone’
according to WFF standards for both
‘safety zones’ AND ‘escape routes
to them’ is the exact issue raised by
the common claim 14 in the ‘damage’
claims already filed. It will be up to
true ‘experts’ to argue that one way
or the other.
>> But we all know if GMIHS would
>> have made it to the ranch they
>> would have survived.
Since we know ( after the fact )
that there was no loss of life at
that site ( human or animal ) then
yes… it must be assumed GM would
have survived as well, had they
been able to actually ‘make’ it there.
I am listening to so many voices right now as Sonny is visiting old friends
and I thought Debra—thinking of Yarnell Debras and then it clicked you are the relative to one of the men- sorry for my last comment of your name being new to me—I travelled so far the past few days and hiked too much; sun drained. I am deeply sorry for your loss. Deeply. I do think if you went to that community so many would be touched and clarity seeked could surface— people are looking at me with tears naturally flooding my eyes right now—I’m so choked a lady handed me water. Our current jeep and truck is dedicated to the 19 and I will let you know time can go by—but it is like yesterday this all happened. I will have Sonny send you some links sometime. I am not logged on there.
Reply to TTWARE post on April 10, 2014 at 12:50 pm
>> TTWARE said…
>> There are media descriptions of the ranch owners having
>> to shelter inside the house to survive the extreme heat (I’m
>> hoping that Tex or Joy or someone else that knows them,
>> can vouch for my memory on that, or else maybe remember
>> the media source). If this is indeed correct, then this ranch
>> was NEVER an appropriate safety zone, because, as has
>> been described by others, as well, you DON”T need to take
>> additional shelter (fire shelter, house, etc.), just to survive in
>> an adequate safety zone.
I remember the media article(s) you are referring to and I also
seem to recall Lee and/or DJ Helm describing some ‘melting’
that took place on either some siding on the house or one
of the out-buildings… but I didn’t bookmark any of those
links. I will see if I can find those links again.
In the meantime… here is an article that seems to indicate
there was PLENTY of actual (serious) ‘damage’ to the Boulder
Springs Ranch as a result of the fire…
Hugh (Lee) and DJ Helm were part of that very first group of
homeowners file a suit for damages back in December.
The TOTAL amount of DAMAGES to their ‘Boulder Springs Ranch’
they are claiming?…
$3,300,000 ( THREE MILLION THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND )
( 3 separate claims for 1.1 million ‘equal’ amounts from 3
different responsible entities ).
Here is the article ( still online )…
http://www.dcourier.com/main.asp?SectionID=1&SubsectionID=1&ArticleID=126609
From the article…
______________________________________________________
The Prescott Daily Courier – 12/20/2013 6:00:00 AM
13 new Yarnell Hill Fire claims filed
Late Thursday afternoon, the City of Prescott received 13 new
claims from Yarnell property owners, totaling more than
$40 million in alleged damages. That brings the total number of
property-owner claims from Yarnell property owners to 34 to date.
Along with the city, the claims name the State of Arizona, Yavapai
County, and the Yarnell Fire District. Like the previous 21 claims
from Yarnell property owners, the new claims demand equal
amounts from each entity.
Below is a list of Yarnell property owners who have filed claims of
negligence over losses in the June 30 Yarnell Hill wildfire, along the
amounts of their claims.
…
…
Hugh L. Helm & Diane J. Helm: State of Arizona – $1,100,000 , City of Prescott -$1,100,000, Yavapai County – $1,100,000, Yarnell Fire District – $1,100,000
______________________________________________________
So how’s that for a ‘bomb-proof’ safety zone?
The ‘owners’ of the ‘safety zone’ think they suffered 3.3
MILLION dollars worth of damage as a result of the fire.
I haven’t seen a public copy of the suit itself but I imagine it
probably details the damages such as ‘melted siding’ and
whatnot… if that really was the case.
SOMETHING adds up to $3.3 million in damages to that
‘safety zone’… and it sure wasn’t just the burned up
kitchen garden.
Excuse me… I mis-counted.
Lee and DJ Helm, the owners of the ‘safety zone’, are
asking for FOUR ‘separate and equal’ damage payments
from FOUR different entities, not just 3.
So the TOTAL amount of damages they are claiming
to the ‘safety zone’ as a result of the fire actually equals…
$4,400,000
( FOUR MILLION FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND )
As far as damage, on their property overall they lost a lot of nice green scrub, and have next to their property more burnt area. In other words, while a lawyer would have to actually read their complaint, I think it likely that the $1.1 they’re looking for from 3 different entities involves a lot of property value loss and not much direct damage in terms of windows, siding etc. Again, I agree that there is a valid point that SZ standards overall might not always be rigorously applied. For OSHA and training, very big issue. But, just because one poster here tried out of ignorance to make overly much of how bomber the BSR really was, in reality it wasn’t torched and relative to GM itself I don’t see it’s bomber-ness being that central.
Copy that. Only reading the actual ‘claims for
damages’ from the owners of the ‘safety zone’
would show any kind of detailed list of what
happened overall ( that adds up to 4.4 million )
or if there is any indication the temperatures
*outside* the structures might have risen to a
non-survivable level, even if only for a few moments.
Sidenote…
On page 20 of the WFAR is one of the only known
photographs taken pre-fire from the ‘safety zone’
itself and looking out WEST into the fuel-filled
box canyon.
It’s ‘Figure 8’ on page 20 and the left side of the
photo shows how thick the manzanita really was
coming right up to the southern and western
perimeter of the ‘safety zone’ itself. It pretty
much matches the photo of the same ‘approach
to the ranch’ area that Joy Collura took that
morning looking back east towards the same area.
Even if they had gone the ‘alternate escape route’
it looks like it would have still been a confusing
‘bushwhack’ just to go that last few hundred yards
and get into the ‘safety zone’ itself. Not ideal.
Regardless… this is really all moot.
We KNOW that Lee and DJ Helm were THERE
at the Ranch as it burned over… and that they
SURVIVED. So did ALL of their livestock…
…but they were all INSIDE the various structures.
If Granite Mountain had actually made it into that
compound then SURELY then would have also
taken refuge INSIDE the buildings. Even if the
doors were locked by then… I wouldn’t put many
doors up against 19 strong guys with 4 chainsaws
to boot.
It’s all really about ‘context’.
No ‘safety zone’ is a ‘safety zone’ unless you
can REACH it ‘safely’.
It’s not like they had choppers standing by all day to
LIFT them over there to it in a hurry, or anything.
( Actually, maybe they SHOULD have. See below ).
They had to first GET there ( safely )… or it’s
appropriateness as a ‘predetermined safety
zone’ ( or not ) doesn’t mean jack.
It was 1.6 miles away from where they were
working that day ( 2+ miles if they had tried
to get there by NOT taking the ‘shortcut’
through the fuel-filled box canyon ).
It really should have never even been mentioned
as any kind of viable ‘safety zone’ for GM that
day, given where they were sending them to
work, just as it was never even mentioned the day
before to the Lewis DOC crew sent to the same
working spot. It was ( at best ) a 35 to 50 minute
(hard) hike from their workplace and that’s even
giving them a full non-stop 3 mph fast pace for the
ENTIIRE distance. Anything slower than 3 mph
and you get into the FULL HOUR travel time.
Who in the world thought that showing someone
a ‘safety zone’ that could be up to/more than
3/4 HOUR (hard/fast) hike away from where they
wanted them to be working was EVER a good
idea that day?
Heck… if they really wanted them in town that
badly and they thought they had the 3/4 HOUR
to wait for them to even get to the Ranch ( then
add time for the additional hike into town itself )…
then they could have organized a ‘dust off’ with
the (available) 7-person transport chopper from
the helispot in that amount of time and flown
them right into the center of town to the YFD
helipad ( just as they did with the entire Lewis
DOC crew from that same location just hours
before that very morning ).
If GM hadn’t been ‘informed’ about it at all…
( the 1.6 to 2 mile distant ‘safety zone’ ) and
ONLY had the ‘safe black’ to consider that
afternoon after they lost the chance to come
back down the way they went up…
…then they might all still be here today.
Just one more ‘lesson to be learned’ right there?
Always consider ( realistically ) even just the
DISTANCE of ‘predetermined safety zones’ from
actual work zones?
I certainly hope so.
If it was felt to be too far, then GM should have chosen another safety zone. GM, not Cordes or anyone else, was responsible for their own safety zones and escape routes. So there is no point in pointing a finger at whoever informed them about the BSR. Granite Mountain were big boys, if someone suggested something that did not make sense to them, they could have done something else. They knew how far the BSR was, or if they did not, it was their own fault. And they had another safety zone – the black. The problem was not the zone, the problem was reaching it at 4 PM that day. But things like that happen all the time, you may have to change your safety zones as conditions change. This is not news.
Your SZ always moves with you and the black is always close. Flag escape routes into the black and cut holes when ever necessary. Part of Fire training Mike. You always have good info to inject into this discussion. Thanks
yes!
Reply to mike post
on April 10, 2014 at 8:56 pm said:
I’m not going to disagree with your
followup post at all. Yes… AT ALL
TIMES that day… it was THEIR
decision about whether to move, or
not… and whether it was ‘safe’.
The questions I was asking like
“Who would think that was a
good idea?” were rhetorical because
the whole situation just doesn’t
even to make any sense.
So here’s the honest question…
How USUAL is it, really, for people
to be showing crews a ‘predetermined
safety zone’… and then sending
them almost 2 MILES away from
it for their work assignment?
I mean… does that happen a LOT…
or was this just one more screwy
thing that happened in Yarnell the
weekend of June 30, 2013?
2 MILES away from something
someone wanted you to even
CONSIDER to be one of your
‘safety zones’ that workday?
Geezus.
Doesn’t even make any sense.
why do you continually leave out the fact that Cordes (who wasn’t responsible for GM) also identified the cold black as the “obvious” option for GM?
the reason it doesn’t make sense to you, is because you have no context from which to make judgments.
the BSR safety zone was “predetermined” in the context of, if and when we get to that point, or if you find yourself in the area… BSR is a survivable safety zone.
each and every crew had the right and responsibility to “trust but verify” and scout out their escape routes to ANY area they were thinking they may need as a SZ… see below…
That’s a good question, WTK. Resources pass each other scouting info all the time (e.g., yesterday’s fire behavior, conditions of back roads, gate locations, ponds, names of homeowners, etc., etc.). It is common practice that until the group leader (crew boss, squad boss, div sup) checks it out themselves, that kind of info is more of a helpful suggestion. Of course, it’s also nice when that kind of info is precise and accurate, but that can be tough to do when one is juggling a thousand pieces of info. That’s why the onus must fall on that field resource leader to check it out personally, and adapt if/when the situation changes.
once again… safety zones can be “identified” anywhere on a moving fire… like bob says, (paraphrasing here) they are fluid… you progress down the line and your previous SZ becomes obsolete and you either pre identify one or scout one that is appropriate for where you’ll be working next.
and next you could reference what mike has said… because he seems to have it figured out.
hmm, more personal attacks eh? your hypocrisy knows no bounds… you don’t have to try to be coy or passive aggressive, you can be direct with your attempts to insult…
you started out making a good point… but then you started talking about things you really don’t have a clue about… have you ever even been to a safety zone during a wildand fire? i didn’t think so.
the above was for my buddy SR…
(in case it wasn’t obvious.)
what is the most basic measurement we have to determine safety zone size? 4 X’s flame length…
flame lengths according to WFAR were modeled at 26′-51′
with my google earth ruler i’m measuring the BSR at approximately 250′ X 400′
@ 50′ flame lengths X’s 4 for distance separation = 200′
BSR was a viable safety zone.
might it have been smokey? sure, probably… … might it have gotten a little hot at times? sure, maybe… was there enough room to move around and feel “comfortable”? i think so.
are all safety zones just like what they talk about in guard school where you sit in your lawn chair and sit back drinking a cold one while the fire burns all around you? no.
Well said I think the problem was getting there no matter which way they went. They evidently had very little clue about how to get there and what they would face when they did. Thick brush Fences and not much time to dilly dally around.
wait, what? “well said?” you’ve been trying to argue AGAINST BSR being a safety zone this whole time…
i am here to tell you… IT WAS A SAFETY ZONE.
that fence that you speak of DOES NOT encompass the compound… from what i can see, it only runs along the western vegetation boundary.
the problem was NOT “getting there”… getting there was not a problem at all, they could have bushwacked their way there with little difficulty (as they tried to do) any day of the week. (insert SR’s passive aggressive attempts to refute my testimony here)
the problem was their lack of acknowledgment of the predicted weather and associated fire behavior.
Reply to xxfullsailxx post
on April 10, 2014 at 10:11 pm
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>>
>> that fence that you speak of DOES NOT
>> encompass the compound… from what
>> i can see, it only runs along the western
>> vegetation boundary.
Oh.. .you mean the side of the compound
that Granite Mountain WOULD have had
to deal with to get into the compound…
and now you clearly also acknowledge
the ‘vegetation boundary’ as well?…
…or were you talking about the other ‘sides’
of the Ranch… either completely blocked
by huge boulders or iron security gates?
Do you think Gary Cordes also gave
Marsh the code for the security gate…
or did he think the ‘gigantic’ 20-30 acre
size of the ‘safety zone’ negated him
mentioning THAT little detail?
It was a SECURE COMPOUND.
How often are places like that chosen
for ‘safety zones’? Inquiring minds
want to know.
>> the problem was NOT “getting there”… >> getting there was not a problem at all
Then why are they dead?
>> they could have bushwacked their way
>> there with little difficulty (as they tried to
>> do) any day of the week.
This wasn’t any day of any week.
It was the day 2 men led 17 others
to their death.
>> the problem was their lack of
>> acknowledgment of the predicted
>> weather and associated fire behavior.
No.. you forget.
Your “fire brothers” at the the Arizona
Forestry Commission have fully researched
this… spending a few million dollars in
the process.
No one did ANYTHING WRONG that day.
You must be mistaken.
they didn’t get there because they didn’t anticipate the fire behavior, because they weren’t focused on the anticipated fire behavior, they were focused on getting to their next mission.
and didn’t you just say they could have gotten into the structures if they really wanted to? what makes you think they couldn’t have hopped a fence or a boulder?
again, i would refer you to the intent and philosophy behind the SAIR. if “investigations” continued, as they did on the “Thirty Mile Fire” and the “Cramer Fire” then noone would have spoken a word about anything. they all would have lawyered up and plead the fifth for fear of being sued for trying to do their jobs, dealing with a situation that they didn’t create, but were trying to manage, despite the lack of preparation by the home owners, and despite their lack of cooperation and despite the worst conditions associated with rapid fire spread.
we do know what went wrong. pointing fingers and trying to fire people or suing the agencies involved, won’t change what happened and will prevent us (wff’s not YOU) from learning any lessons.
There lack of knowledge of the location?
I still do not think it was Bomb proof based on the heat it took the crew would have probably survived but again going to fire shelters. Again I ask you why was there not an engine stationed there? If it was so safe.
Google earth seemed so show fences and defiantly a gate was across the entrance with heavy brush along the perimeter. Tumble weeds? the brush would have stopped them in any direction. If getting there was not a problem then why did they not get there? To far, heavy brush, no marked trail, heavy brush and a fence at a location they would have hit the way they were coming and to say the least not scouted by GM, Escape route and SZ.
Why did they put a pumpkin there if it wasn’t to put a engine there for house protection and refill? I do not think they Overhead wanted to hang an Engine out in that brush field Bomb proof Ranch. That maybe part of the reason for the Law suit by the owners, they were left on there own?
Regarding the lawsuit, that certainly could be one component — but, since the damage to ranch structures wasn’t that great, prob not a big component.
I think the overall gist of the lawsuits will be, You guys had a fire that, given weather and fuel type, you knew you didn’t have the resources to deal with. (Insufficient IA will be another argument, too.) Rather than focus on defending what you could of Yarnell proper, you wasted what resources you had up on the hill, nearly got a lot of civilians killed with a very late evacuation, etc.
bob, you just agreed with me, when i said that BSR was a good safety zone based on our WRITTEN PARAMETERS for separation distance ( 4 X’s flame length). there was 250′ X 400′ AT LEAST (not including the barn footprint and not including a burn out ahead of the main fire)… a crew could have easily survived there without deploying shelters.
what heat did the structures take? i’d love to see a breakdown of how the building’s fared.
they didn’t put an engine there because it didn’t need defending… and they certainly had other priorities for the limited number of resources they had.
There was a statement that the windows melted awhile back I am assuming the Plastic type frames? some of the out buildings had some damage as well form the heat.
as would be expected. I agree that the zone was large enough Totally safe I still question that. Remember there has been clear-cuts that were cleaned out that crews still had to deploy shelters in.
xxfullsailxx, it sounds like you are arguing with Bob and SR about which hole in the swiss cheese was the most devastating. The reason that model has become popular (to the point of cliche) is because it addresses the issue of accumulation of compromised safety. Some are more important than others, certainly, but Bob and SR (and other posters) are not wrong for pointing out the other holes.
Thank you for bringing us back to subject.
wrong Sitta. i don’t really like cheese.
WTKTT is trying, yet again, to hang someone out to dry (Gary Cordes this time) for identifying possible safety zones to GM during they’re shift.
i am saying that it was perfectly reasonable for Cordes to have identified BSR as a safety zone, and to have given that intel to GM that morning.
i am simply defending Cordes from Captain Hindsight’s false allegations.
Given weather and fire behavior, your math is off. Survivable for most or all of the crew if they deployed? Yes. Survivable without deployment? Possibly. But, not quite big enough as a SZ. TWARE correct, even if it is not central to GM as opposed to OSHA and training.
Should have said math is off even assuming the structures weren’t there…TWARE is even more correct.
umm, my math is off? but i showed my work!… it’s really very simple math, i realize you probably didn’t get past pre-algebra based on your previous “calculations” that you pulled from god knows where (.5 mph)… but it’s really pretty simple:
weather and fire behavior are factored in to the flame length calculations (as are the fuel type and fuel loading) … reference page 22 of the WFAR report: at 40 mph winds, flame length were modeled at 51 feet.
i think there’s an online version of the IRPG if you need a reference for calculating SZ size, as i realize you probably don’t have one.
nice try though! hey SR, did you want to answer the question about how much wildland fire experience you have?
Again, simply not credible.
Others should look at the clear area around the BSR and think about fire behavior.
take up your credibility issues with the FBAN who analyzed the fire behavior for the WFAR.
(but fyi: i think most people would trust him/her over you.)
xxfullsailxx,
Most of us agree that the original black, and the down and out along the two-track, were safe options up until the point of decent into the bowl.
The designation of BSR as a safety zone, may, or may not, have influenced GM’s decision at the top of the bowl.
More importantly, I think the result of the discusion of whether or not BSR should have been designated a valid safety zone, will be an important take-away for future learning on it’s own merit. I don’t think in any way, shape, or form, we are heading down a rabbit hole here.
While the IPRG formula you quote is correct, the 200′ figure stated in the Guide is the distance from ALL fuels (the radius, not the diameter). So at the widest, cleared point (250′) at BSR, someone would only be 125′ away from chaparral. 125′ is not even close to the 200′ in the formula. But, there’s more below.
From the guide:
“Separation distance between the firefighter and the flames should be at least four times the maximum continuous flame height. Distance separation is the radius from the center of the safety zone to the nearest fuels.”
Additionally, the formula listed in the guide emphatically states that it is for ZERO wind conditions.
“Downwind>More Heat Impact>Larger Safety Zone”, so the 200 figure never applied here from the get-go, because the wind never stopped blowing at some varying speed or direction.
Also, as we all know, structures ARE fuel, which decreases even futher the size of the available safe space. I think there is evidence out there that these structures came very close to burning, which would indicate to me that you don’t want a safety zone with a large amount of (bomb-proof??) fuel in the middle of it being used as space that is considered in your calculations.
Also from the Guide:
“A Safety Zone is an area where a firefighter can survive without a fire shelter.” Reports from the residents regarding the amount of heat outside, indicates that someone may have only survived out there WITH a fire shelter.
Although many firefighters passed through the BSR in the 24 hour period prior to entrapment, it seems nobody actually did the legwork to get the actual size of cleared ground (as noted by the wildly varying accounts, 6-8 acres, 20-30 acres, none of which were close to being correct), but instead they just eye-balled the contruction of the buildings and adjoining scraped-earth, and designated it ‘bomb-proof’ without further investigation.
So, leaving GM out of the equation for the moment, and looking just at the adequacy of BSR as a safety zone, I feel that the designation fails on many counts, as noted above.
well, the more this gets discussed, the more i have my doubts that GM would have been in any better shape had they stayed on the two track… sure, they may have had more options, but i think they still would have been scrambling to find a deployment site.
so you’re assuming that there was an area ignition event that went on around the full 360 degrees of the compound? or did the fire hit the north side of the ranch and then work it’s way around?
do you agree that, had a resource been assigned to BSR and were viewing it as their safety zone, that they would have fired out the perimeter in a logical fashion?
i think i can assume that you disagree that the buildings would have provided some degree of insulation… but i think they would have offered some additional buffering. it is totally disingenuous to say they were susceptible to burning… again, they look to meet all necessary parameters of being “FireWise”.
i have a hard time trusting civilian viewpoints (like SR’s and the folks at BSR) because they tend to exaggerate, much like tex’s observation that Marsh “bound like a deer” when hiking…
i hear what you’re saying, but i still hold true that the BSR was a viable safety zone for a crew or more.
Again. not credible. Directly counter to the way it works. Key takeaway here is that FullSail’s posts are persistently way off base and should not be relied on.
Yes, I think the fire hit on the north side and ‘worked it’s way around’ both sides like a freight-train. I think the property owners could probably vouch for that. And yes, I have been in a safety zone when all sides were burning with maximum heat radiation at the same time. I’m sure plenty of others have been in that situation as well.
On your second point, I think it’s impossible to fire out against a 30-45 mph wind and make any kind of difference at all.
On your third point, I do indeed believe that the buildings provided a high degree of insulation. The owners themselves stated, that getting deep into the house was the ONLY way they survived. And, it is not disingenuous to say that the buildings might burn. The window glass broke from the heat, and once that happened, the curtains and every other combustible inside is quite capable of bringing that fire inside in a hurry. Then, the last vestige of safety, becomes the thing that’s going to kill you. It sounds like many people are confusing Fire-Wise and ‘prepped’ as being ‘fireproof’. Nothing could be further from the truth! They are simply places that are easier ‘to defend’, and less likely than others to burn. They actually burn quite well if the conditions are right. Even structures that are built like BSR.
To your last point, you don’t have to trust civilian viewpoints, just use ALL THE INFORMATION in the IPRG regarding Safety Zones, instead of selectively using just one formula in a flawed fashion, and I think you will see that BSR as a Safety Zone, does not compute.
TWARE,
Yet another excellent post.
On insulation and using structures as radiative shields, similar to other topographical features, I’d note that both types of “insulation” depend on being on the right side, kinda like a breakwater (harbor versus exposed to surf). Yes the BSR obviously insulated people inside. Outside, given the layout of the structures and associated clearing, it would seem prudent given conditions to not be overly confident that the structures would shield versus act like the wrong side of the pizza oven. Given squirrely winds, which given forecast and the weather that did materialize were certainly there, convective heat also could come very much into play in particular around features like structures, though elsewhere as well. Even assuming the structures didn’t catch fire themselves — which as you correctly note, was far from a given.
The Truth Will Always Remain Elusive
on April 11, 2014 at 3:37 pm said:
>>”And yes, I have been in a safety >>zone when all sides were burning >>with maximum heat radiation at the >>same time. I’m sure plenty of others >>have been in that situation as well.”
hmm, then how did you get there? wouldn’t you’re escape route have been compromised? in 13 years, i have never had that experience… so, i question it.
>>On your second point, I think it’s >>impossible to fire out against a 30->>45 mph wind and make any kind of >>difference at all.
then why don’t you try burning WITH the wind instead of “against it?”
>>They actually burn quite well if the >>conditions are right. Even structures >>that are built like BSR.
again, this is speculation. the structures very obviously did not burn. there was no reason to think they would, given the general site preparation.
>>”just use ALL THE INFORMATION >>in the IPRG regarding Safety Zones, >>instead of selectively using just one >>formula in a flawed fashion, and I >>think you will see that BSR as a >>Safety Zone, does not compute.”
the point is separation distance. this was easily achievable. top to bottom there was 400+ feet and structures in between. getting the additional clearance on all sides would have been easily achievable given a burnout in the appropriate places. my example used the most extreme of circumstances and very conservative measurements of the area.
in my opinion, BSR was a survivable safety zone. in fact, they don’t get much better than that in those conditions and fuel type.
i think captain hindsight (WTKTT) came up with 2-3 acres too. i agree, that looks about right.
given the flame lengths and what we know about separation distance from the IRPG, the BSR was indeed a valid safety zone.
even if you had to move from one corner to another, i think it was certainly survivable without having to deploy a shelter or take cover in a structure. plus you always have the option to burn out around the perimeter to increase the buffer…
but that is all moot.
#1. BSR survived. in the aftermath, it looked like it had survived a bomb going off. it was an identified safety zone that had been scouted out.
#2. Cordes also mentioned “the cold black.” this would be GM’s primary safety zone throughout their shift.
#3. i think most of us have agreed, at one point or another, that GM wasn’t necessarily looking for a “safety zone”… they were looking for the nearest point at which to reengage the fire by helping out in Yarnell.
Now FullSail is saying GM, were they to have made it to the BSR in time, could have burned out the perimeter to improve its SZ? Again, not credible.
WTF are you talking about? you are SOOOOOO clueless SR. i suggest you stop trying to negate everything i say.
any crew that MIGHT have been there at BSR and was planning on utilizing it as a safety zone
WOULD HAVE FIRED OUT AROUND THE PERIMETER AHEAD OF THE FLAMING FRONT IN ORDER TO INCREASE THE SEPARATION DISTANCE FROM THE MAIN FIRE.
this is WFF’ing 101. well, maybe 201… intermediate level.
You are seriously asserting they would have had time to do that, given conditions? We’re not talking about a little dry grass here. I seriously doubt at this point that you have any exposure to local conditions. Or, there may be something else driving your consistently being so wrong and so uninformed.
when are YOU SPECULATING that GM would have gotten there? because that’s what you’re doing… SPECULATING about how and why GM went down the path they chose. SPECULATING about how much time they might have had. and your SPECULATION comes from hindsight and “what if” scenarios…
the scenario i provided you, was a crew, AT THE BSR anticipating the approaching fire…
i can’t account for your lack of reading comprehension. i am sorry that our public school system has failed you. i pay my taxes!
now stop stalking my posts, you’re not worth arguing with.
Again, not credible. You’re talking about something that needed hours, not minutes, at minimum, and not just a little attempt at burning out. NFI.
Reply to xxfullsailxx post on April 10, 2014 at 10:39 pm
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>> i think captain hindsight (WTKTT) came up with 2-3
>> acres too. i agree, that looks about right.
Then send SPGS1 Gary Cordes an email and let
know he was EIGHT to TWELVE times wrong about
the size when he decided it would be the
‘fully scouted predetermined safety zone’.
He might appreciate the update.
>> given the flame lengths and what we know about
>> separation distance from the IRPG, the BSR was
>> indeed a valid safety zone.
>> even if you had to move from one corner to another, i
>> think it was certainly survivable without having to
>> deploy a shelter or take cover in a structure. plus you
>> always have the option to burn out around the
>> perimeter to increase the buffer…
You’re kidding us now, right?
You’ve gone from ‘totally, unquestionable bomb-proof’
to now painting a picture of 19 poor guys scrambling
around ‘from corner to corner’… perhaps reaching
for their shelter bags… trying to achieve ‘survivability’…
…an oh yes… might have to burn out a little just
to make it safer.
It was 20-30 acres. ( Gary Cordes said so ).
They should have been able to do the ‘lawn chair’
thing, right?
>> but that is all moot.
Yes, it is. They all died before even getting there.
>> #1. BSR survived. in the aftermath, it looked like it had
>> survived a bomb going off. it was an identified safety
>> zone that had been scouted out.
Yes. Fully scouted. 20-30 acres. Nice job, Gary.
>> #2. Cordes also mentioned “the cold black.” this
>> would be GM’s primary safety zone throughout
>> their shift.
…and if Cordes had never showed them the ‘ranch’
at all… it probably would have been where they stayed.
>> #3. i think most of us have agreed, at one point or
>> another, that GM wasn’t necessarily looking for
>> a “safety zone”… they were looking for the nearest
>> point at which to reengage the fire by helping out in
>> Yarnell.
Not true.
There has been no real ‘consensus’ on that or any
definitive proof. Just speculation.
If that really was the case… then why didn’t they (GM)
SAY so? Why does not ONE person in fire command
come out and admit that was what was happening
that day with Granite Mountain?
So let’s look at it gain…
L = Nope
C = Nope. ( Real intentions never communicated )
E = Nope. This is where they died.
S = Still questionable.
and who was responsible for providing LCES for GM? Steed and Marsh. NOT Gary Cordes.
>>Yes. Fully scouted. 20-30 acres. Nice job, Gary.
apparently you missed the dozen or so engines and miscellaneous other vehicles that went in and out of BSR all night… i’d say that most of those resources had scouted out BSR pretty darn well… and you could cut Cordes a little slack (though i know that’s not your style) about the 20-30 acres… he was looking at it at night, and that can be pretty deceptive when you’re driving around in the dark.
>>…and if Cordes had never showed them the >>‘ranch’
>>at all… it probably would have been where they >>stayed.
i don’t think that’s even KIND OF credible… either way, they were watching that fire roll towards Yarnell… and they had the best view of the fire, the town AND BSR, which looks pretty bomb proof from up on that hill. further more, they must have been listening to radio traffic all day about whatever was going on in around BSR and Yarnell, so they knew the situation down there. they were looking to be more useful than they were from the heel of the fire, and they were obviously determined to stay in the game.
>>Why does not ONE person in fire command come out and admit that was what was
>>happening that day with Granite Mountain?”
just watch the briefing video (which is based on the SAIR), that is what was said. (para-phrased) “it is thought that GM was attempting to re-position, so they could reengage the fire.”
Reply to xxfullsailxx post
on April 11, 2014 at 8:52 am
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>> just watch the briefing video
>> (which is based on the SAIR)
Just read the ADOSH interviews
( which are based on real people who
were ‘in fire command’ telling what they
knew or didn’t know ).
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>> that is what was said. (para-phrased)
>> “it is thought that GM was attempting to
>> re-position, so they could reengage the
>> fire.”
Keyword = thought.
Translation = (para-phrased) “We just
spent a few (more) million dollars of
taxpayer dollars and we don’t have a
frickin’ clue why one of the most valuable
resources on the fire ( with ELEVEN
fully functioning radios onboard ) was even
attempting to move through a fuel-filled box
canyon in front of an oncoming fire train.”
L = Nope ( Seriously non-existent )
C = Nope ( Seriously bad )
E = Fatal
S = Questionable
**
** TRANSCRIPT OF MOORE AIR STUDY VIDEO
** 20130630_Yarnell_SM (23).MOV
**
** POSSIBLE *NEW* RADIO CAPTURE FROM ERIC MARSH CIRCA 1628
The ‘Moore\Pictures’ sub-folder in the ‘Air Study’ parent folder in Mr. Dougherty’s
online dropbox has 45 still pictures in it… but it ALSO happens to have 3 short
Apple Quicktime videos sort of ‘hidden’ in there.
This is a report on the first of those 3 videos in that ‘Moore\Pictures’ folder, which
APPEARS to capture a previously unknown radio transmission from Eric Marsh
( and a response from Jesse Steed? ) circa 1628.56 ( 4:28.56 PM ).
The actual folder name in the Dropbox for these ‘Moore’ photos/videos is…
AerialFirefightingStudy\Moore\Pictures
There are 3 Apple Quicktime Movies in this folder.
Unlike the Panebaker Air Study videos… these ‘Moore’ videos do NOT have
either the START or END time stamped into their filenames, and the usual
Apple Quicktime .THM thumbnails are missing which would normally have
the actual EXIF timestamp metadata in them from which to obtain the
video START time(s).
The 3 ‘Moore’ Air Study Apple Quicktime .MOV movie files are only named…
20130630_Yarnell_SM (23).MOV
20130630_Yarnell_SM (32).MOV
20130630_Yarnell_SM (35).MOV
It is possible, however, to tell exactly when these ‘Moore’ Air Study videos
were taken based on Moore’s STILL photos shot just mere moments before
each video, which DO have proper time/date ( and GPS ) metadata
embedded in them.
The photo taken just moments before this first Moore video ( which shows
the exact same moment when fire was coming over a nearby ridge as the
video does ) is the following…
2013_Yarnell_SM (22): Date taken: 6/30/2013 – 4:28.50 PM
Actually… Moore took 3 still pictures very quickly just before shooting
the video of the same exact ‘fire coming over the ridge’ moment…
2013_Yarnell_SM (20) – Date taken: 6/30/2013 – 4:28.38 PM
2013_Yarnell_SM (21) – Date taken: 6/30/2013 – 4:28.43 PM ( +5 seconds )
2013_Yarnell_SM (22) – Date taken: 6/30/2013 – 4:28.50 PM ( +7 seconds )
These exact ‘time/date’ values come directly from the EXIF metadata
embedded in all the ‘Moore’ photographs. They are also GPS stamped.
The ‘separation’ between the 3 still photos just before shooting the video of the
same scene averages 6 seconds, so assuming the same separation between
the last still photo ( at 4:28.50 ) and the start of the video… that would put the
start time for this first ‘Moore’ Air Study video at exactly… 4:28.56 PM.
This first ‘Moore’ Air Study video is 37 seconds long.
A public copy of this first ‘Moore’ Air Study video is in Mr. Dougherty’s
online Dropbox at…
Folder: AerialFirefightingStudy\Moore\Pictures\2013_Yarnell_SM (22)
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/y3jy5opssrcvzb3/N9ZngvVRbg/AerialFirefightingstudy/Moore/Pictures#lh:null-20130630_Yarnell_SM%20%2823%29.MOV
ECITW ( Every Caveat In The World )
The following is what I ( me, personally ) believe is being said in the
background of this video. Your mileage may, of course, vary.
NOTE: No ‘audio filtering’ or ‘audio forensics’ required for this one.
There is some ‘wind in the microphone’ noise but ( unlike the Panebaker Air Study
videos ) there is no foreground ‘talk’ or Air-to-Air channel chatter whatsoever and
anyone with normal hearing should be able to hear what has been captured
in the background.
ALSO NOTE: When the video starts… someone is already ‘reporting’ to someone
else on one of the TAC channels in the background. It definitely sounds like the
distinct voice of Eric Marsh. He also definitely sounds like he is exerting himself at
that moment and he is breathing hard as he talks.
ALSO NOTE: This conversation would be shortly AFTER the radio conversation
captured in Blue Ridge Hotshot McCord’s YARNELL-GAMBLE video where we
(apparently) hear someone in fire command ( OPS1 Todd Abel? ) saying he would
‘appreciate it’ if Marsh and Granite Mountain could ‘come to town a little faster’…
and Marsh replied ( with some apparent exasperation in his voice? ) “They’re
comin’ from the heel of the fire”. This ‘can you please hurry up?’ conversation
apparently took place circa 4:20 PM, at or about the same exact moment the
SAIR says Steed and the Crew actually decided to take the ‘shortcut’ and drop
off the two-track road into the fuel-filled box canyon.
VIDEO STARTS AT 1628.56 ( 4:28.56 PM )
+0:00 ( 1628.56 / 4:28.56 PM )
(Eric Marsh): Don’t be upset… I’ve got quite a ways to come.
( slight pause ) I’m headin’ off the slope.
+0:07 ( 1629.03 / 4:29.03 )
(Unknown, but possible voice match for Jesse Steed): Copy… we’re all at the top…
NOTE: This video continues for another 30 seconds, but strong winds come up
in the foreground and the noise in the microphone obscures the chance of
hearing any other backround radio traffic, if any.
VIDEO ENDS AT 1629.33 ( 4:29.33 PM )
FINAL NOTE: If the timestamp for this video is correct, then it would be only
(exactly) 10 minutes from the moment this video ended to when Jesse Steed
would then make his first “We are in front of the flaming front” MAYDAY call
on the Air-to-ground channel, at 1639.30.
you have GOT to be kidding me… are you f$%^^’ing kidding me with this bullshit!? you know, most of your previous ad-libs are pretty impotent, and we both know that… but the first chance you get to perpetuate the controversy, you don’t hesitate. you put this bullshit “ECITW” half-assed disclaimer, then you go on to try to make yourself sound like some sort of audio forensic’s expert… which you’re very obviously NOT.
i suppose it’s the perfect opportunity for you to ad-lib whatever YOU want the story to be… the perfect opportunity for YOU to continue perpetuating some sort of conspiracy.
neither the voices themselves NOR the dialogue context are at all discernible… it could be the car radio on the local FM channel for all you know. and you SURE AS SHIT CAN’T TELL ME YOU THINK THAT’S MARSH’S VOICE FOR ANY GOOD REASON (other than the fact that it might fit your script.)
… give me a f&^*’ing break.
I stand by the transcription posted above.
I am NOT making it up.
That conversation is THERE.
I am a lifelong musician with perfect pitch, and I have
been told I have ‘far above average’ hearing… so I might
be wrong about what ‘normal’ hearing is… but I would
say that if you can’t hear at least half that conversation
( and the same exact words )… I would suggest you get
your ears checked.
If you are having trouble hearing the background… just
boost the GAIN a little bit on whatever player you
are using ( no audio forensics required ). That might
help you out.
And yes… I know EXACTLY what Eric Marsh’s voice
sounds like, after hours and hours of hearing it in
his training tapes AND on known verified radio
captures with modulation added.
He (Marsh) had a VERY distinct voice placement, pitch
and cadence. So did Jesse Steed, actually. His voice
signature is almost as distinct as Marsh’s if you bother
to listen carefully.
Could I be wrong about WHO it is speaking?
Perhaps.
Am I wrong about what is being said?
I don’t think so.
So whether it is Marsh or not… who else would be
saying, at EXACTLY 1628 that day… things like…
“I’ve got quite a ways to come”
AND
“I’m heading off the slope”
…and also be audibly out-of-breath while doing so?
i think it’s very telling that you’re all of a sudden going to qualify your “expertise” (word used VERY loosely) and try to make yourself sound like some sort of home grown voice “expert.”
“I have been told I have ‘far above average’ hearing”
LMAO… umm okay, you’ve been told that. great.
As I said in the original posting… it really
doesn’t take ANY ‘expertise’ at all to hear
this one. There is just a little wind noise
in the microphone. No Air-to-air chatter
or foreground talk in this one like a lot of
the Panebaker clips.
Do what I said.
BOOST your GAIN a little.
If you still can’t hear that conversation
there at the start of this video…
…then I would suggest getting your
ears checked.
I can’t make out much. Seconds 4-5 sound a bit like “going to have to go out [on? to?] the highway. The voice sounds similar to Steed’s. There is a voice that sounds similar to Marsh at about 8-10 seconds, but I can’t here anything it says. I don’t hear a low voice at the beginning (just the same youngish tenor from the start to 0:06), which comes in again later, between wind bursts. I’ve tried noise reduction, envelope resizing, and boosting the 300-500 Hz range, but that’s all I’ve got.
Are you sure you linked us to the correct video?
Yes. The link above is correct.
Here it is again…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/y3jy5opssrcvzb3/N9ZngvVRbg/AerialFirefightingstudy/Moore/Pictures#lh:null-20130630_Yarnell_SM%20%2823%29.MOV
It all happens within the first 10 seconds.
I ( me, personally, all caveats possible ) think
the conversation is perfectly understandable
even WITHOUT any ‘enhancements’ or
‘audio forensics’… but that’s just me.
I will do my best to extract/enhance this clip
and post it on Youtube, like I have done with
others.
It really doesn’t tell us anything that hadn’t
already been ‘figured out’ since the SAIR
came out ( that Marsh was quite some distance
BEHIND Steed/Crew that afternoon, etc. )…
…but the most important thing ( again, if that is
what is really being said ) would be the VERY,
very first thing being said… where Marsh ( if
that is really him ) telling Steed ( if that is really
who he was talking to )…
“Don’t be upset.”
( Was that enough ‘caveats’ up above or should
I lean on the keys some more? )
If that REALLY is what is being captured there,
then it’s significant. Given the timeframe… I
believe it proves ALL of the following…
1) Marsh and Steed WERE discussing their
‘move’ amonst themselves over radio channels
that were NOT just the GM private crew net…
so OTHER had a good chance of hearing this
conversation ( and others ). Could that be why
Blue Ridge Hotshot McCord named his own
video YARNELL-GAMBLE? Was this kind of
traffic between Marsh and Steed *actually*
showing up on the TAC channels… and others
were hearing this whole ‘gamble’ play out…
but have still refused to testify about hearing
anything?
2) Steed was UPSET ( about something ), and
it was Marsh telling him ‘not to be’. What would
Steed have been ‘upset’ about, at 1628?… that
he had been told to cut through some stupid
canyon ( that no one had scouted ) as a shortcut
and now it was turning into a nightmare ( and
he KNEW it ) and he wanted to bail out… but Marsh
was urging him to ‘keep going… I’ll be there in a
minute’?
Of COURSE this is all based on just a few
words heard in the background of a video…
…but what if I am RIGHT?
What if that REALLY is the conversation this
video accidentally captured?
Who else heard it? Who else heard MORE
of it? Why was Steed UPSET?.
Alternative theory for Steed being ‘upset’ would
be that, at that point, it was still only Eric Marsh
who had actually ‘seen the Google map on an
iPad’ at the 0700 briefing… and he wasn’t
even WITH Steed yet, even at that late time,
and Steed was being asked to make important
decisions without the only guy who had ever
even SEEN the route that day not even WITH
him. So that’s why Marsh was basically telling
him he was ‘hurrying’ to catch up ( but NOT
telling him to ‘stop the mission’.
I believe this one capture was worth calling
Mr. Moore himself in for an interview… to see
if he ( perhaps ) heard this all in real time and
in more context and remembers what the
full ‘context’ was… but neither the Arizona
Forestry Commission or ADOSH bothered
to interview him ( Moore ), or ask anyone
else if they overheard THIS conversation.
Followup… just in case something VERY
weird might be going on with your browser…
…what you SHOULD see in that video is
a zoomed closeup of the fire roaring over
a nearby ridge ( circa 1628 ) with a
telephone pole in the right-center of the
frame throughout the video.
That ridge is basically the ‘north side’
of the fire as it was filling up Harper
Canyon and about to burn the entire
Shrine road Youth Camp… from which
Blue Ridge, Tyson Esquibel ( and everyone
else ) were evacuating from at the very
moment this video was taken.
It really is a miracle even MORE firefighters
didn’t die that day.
Sitta
on April 11, 2014 at 11:33 am said:
>>Are you sure you linked us to the correct video?
now THAT is hilarious!
I have been reviewing all comments. I have been through the Forest Service docs and OSHA docs. Since I was taken out to the Incident Site (I am the mother to Andrew Ashcraft) I knew this was not a tragedy caused by just happenstance.
I don’t post because there are days when I think some of the discussions are just ridiculous. But there are times when I see something that reminds me of a clue or fact that needs to be examined in more depth.
The truth of what happened that day will come out. We will learn lessons from this only when the truth is complete. I do want to caution several of you: until you walk the path the guys walked (and I mean actually put your feet on the path in Yarnell) – if you did not know this crew on a personal/professional level watch your assumptions – if you think you know it all be careful.
If any of you ever want to send the 12 families standing together for truth feel free to send me the info ([email protected]) – it will remain confidential if you choose.
Reply to Deborah Pfingston post on April 9, 2014 at 11:49 am
>> Deborah wrote…
>> I have been reviewing all comments. I have been through the
>> Forest Service docs and OSHA docs. Since I was taken out
>> to the Incident Site (I am the mother to Andrew Ashcraft) I
>> knew this was not a tragedy caused by just happenstance.
First ( and foremost )… my sincere condolences for your loss.
>> Deborah also wrote…
>> I don’t post because there are days when I think some of the
>> discussions are just ridiculous.
Yes. It can get that way. This is a PUBLIC forum, with no actual
‘leadership’ involved. Mr. John Dougherty is the ‘moderator’ of
this PUBLIC comment space… but his policy is that as long
as a commenter stays within his published guidelines for
civil disucssion… ALL are welcome to post a comment.
So anyone can ‘ask a question’ ( sometimes ridiculous ones ).
and anyone can give a ‘response’ ( sometimes equally absurd ).
But all in all… they are some very diligent and concerned people
commenting here that still just want to learn more about
what ACTUALLY happened in Yarnell that weekend.
There have, in fact, been a lot of ‘details’ about that weekend
that have only been ‘discovered’ via this public discussion, and
I expect that will continue.
>> Deborah also wrote…
>> But there are times when I see something that reminds me
>> of a clue or fact that needs to be examined in more depth.
If you don’t mind me asking… what are some/all of those
‘somethings’ that you feel need to be examined in more depth?
>> Deborah also wrote…
>> The truth of what happened that day will come out.
>> We will learn lessons from this only when the truth is complete.
It was ( and shall remain ) a historic event. Time has a way
of making sure the truth DOES comes out regarding such things.
>> Deborah also wrote…
>> I do want to caution several of you: until you walk the path the
>> guys walked (and I mean actually put your feet on the path in
>> Yarnell) – if you did not know this crew on personal/professional
>> level watch your assumptions – if you think you know it all be
>> careful.
No one ‘knows it all’. We are just trying to ‘learn more’.
Those who did NOT know these men, or have the chance
to ‘know them on a personal/professional level’ have forever
lost the opportunity to do so, and that is part of the tragedy
itself and why as much as possible needs to be known.
We now rely on others ( such as yourself ) to tell us what we
do not ( but SHOULD ) know in that regard.
>> If any of you ever want to send the 12 families standing
>> together for truth feel free to send me the info
>> ([email protected]) – it will remain
>> confidential if you choose.
Thank you. Is the “12 families standing together for truth” an
official organization? Is there a website or some other online
presence for this organization?
The only reason I ask is that I’m just curious which of the
19 firefighters are actually represented.
Are you at liberty to say?
Speaking of ‘at liberty to say’… I’d like to just ask you a
few more quick questions.
You OBVIOUSLY do not have to answer them unless you
feel comfortable doing so.
1) Do you know if Andrew’s cellphone/smartphone was
ever returned to anyone in his family when the Arizona
Forestry SAIT and Arizona ADOSH investigations ended?
2) If it was NOT… was any explanation given as to WHY?
3) Related to the above… do you know if ALL of the families
received the cellphones/smartphones back? Particularly
Amanda Marsh? Eric Marsh’s cellphone seems to have
‘disappeared’ from the deployment site and doesn’t seem
to have ever been entered into evidence as were ALL the
other cellphones/smartphones found at the deployment
site. I am just wondering if, even despite that lack of any official
documentation regarding Eric’s cellphone… if it ever actually
made it back to HIS family… or if it is still simply ‘missing’.
Do YOU ( or anyone in this ’12 families’ group you mention )
know anything about it?
First ( and foremost )… my sincere condolences for your loss.
>>Thank you.
Yes. It can get that way. This is a PUBLIC forum, with no actual
‘leadership’ involved. Mr. John Dougherty is the ‘moderator’ of
this PUBLIC comment space… but his policy is that as long
as a commenter stays within his published guidelines for
civil disucssion… ALL are welcome to post a comment.
So anyone can ‘ask a question’ ( sometimes ridiculous ones ).
and anyone can give a ‘response’ ( sometimes equally absurd ).
But all in all… they are some very diligent and concerned people
commenting here that still just want to learn more about
what ACTUALLY happened in Yarnell that weekend.
There have, in fact, been a lot of ‘details’ about that weekend
that have only been ‘discovered’ via this public discussion, and
I expect that will continue.
>> I truly find most comments very interesting and thoughtful. I do understand that no all comments will be accurate. But I am glad that most seem to be really trying to find the truth.
If you don’t mind me asking… what are some/all of those
‘somethings’ that you feel need to be examined in more depth?
>>I have a huge pile of research. We try our best to examine anything that seems logical. To be honest I am a little fearful to reveal certain things. Let’s be honest here – there is a cover up and we all know that. I know it is for several reasons. There are those responsible for this tragedy and they should be running scared.
It was ( and shall remain ) a historic event. Time has a way
of making sure the truth DOES comes out regarding such things.
>> I can only pray for this closure. I also pray that the truth will come out or be proven – we can only learn from it not this deception. Hotshot crews should be insisting on this – their lives depend on it.
Thank you. Is the “12 families standing together for truth” an
official organization? Is there a website or some other online
presence for this organization?
>> This is not an official name. There is no website or online presence. But maybe there should be. Social media is a double edged sword. The families I stand with are: Andrew Ashcraft (wife and parents), Robert Caldwell (wife and parents), Travis Carter(wife and grandfather), Christopher MacKenzie(parent), Grant McKee(father), Wade Parker(parents), John Percin(parents), Jesse Steed(wife), Travis Turbyfill(wife), Kevin Woyjeck(parents), William Warneke(wife and parents) and Clayton Whitted(wife and parents). We have filed to find the truth, to get the benefits for the wives and children, insist on change (to be a platform for hotshots everywhere) and to force the State, Forest Service, City, etc to realize these were men not tools that can just be replaced. But may I say what I write is from me. It could be that not all the families members feel as I do.
1) Do you know if Andrew’s cellphone/smartphone was
ever returned to anyone in his family when the Arizona
Forestry SAIT and Arizona ADOSH investigations ended?
>>Yes Juliann did get Andrew’s cell phone back. But no report that they were able to receive anything off it. Some families did receive a report. This in itself is unsettling.
2) If it was NOT… was any explanation given as to WHY?
>>They explain nothing to the families. The only time they talk is when we insist on it.
3) Related to the above… do you know if ALL of the families
received the cellphones/smartphones back? Particularly
Amanda Marsh? Eric Marsh’s cellphone seems to have
‘disappeared’ from the deployment site and doesn’t seem
to have ever been entered into evidence as were ALL the
other cellphones/smartphones found at the deployment
site. I am just wondering if, even despite that lack of any official
documentation regarding Eric’s cellphone… if it ever actually
made it back to HIS family… or if it is still simply ‘missing’.
Do YOU ( or anyone in this ’12 families’ group you mention )
know anything about it?
>> I will let Amanda Marsh answer this question. Eric always carried two phones. I do think this is an important vein of investigation that needs to be insisted upon.
>>Has anyone thought about a back burn? The human factors aspect/ the oppression GMIHS lived under from the city? Who could have had the power to make them go off the hill? Did the left hand know what the right hand was doing? Who was the Forest Service man who was at the restaurant talking on the phone saying “we really f- – – ed up.”? Any answers.
Deborah…
Thank you.
All I can say for the moment is, once again, the
most important thing…
I am very, very sorry for your loss.
Andrew Sterling Ashcraft was an extraordinary
man ( as were they all ) and the world was
blessed to have him here for ANY length of time.
The (whole) truth about what happened that weekend
will be known. There really is no stopping it, at this
point… and the least we (who remain) can do to
honor ALL these men is continue to try and
expedite that process.
Deborah I’m sorry for your loss and hope the best for you and all in the future. GB
Deborah,
I’m likewise very sorry for your loss, and the losses of all involved, and wish everyone the best resolution possible. I also realize this type of internet dialogue can be a bit of a blunt instrument, but do believe it is part of how the internet makes cover-ups harder overall. As for the rumor you’re asking about, Joy had posted about this perhaps 4 weeks ago, with some ensuing discussion. If someone knows how to search this forum, the discussion might be easier to find that way.
GB.
I would also say as some one who experienced the same loss as you and As a retired wild land Fire Fighter I have an understanding of both sides of the issue. I feel a kinship to you and all the families and occasionally cry when I see there faces or find many reasons to believe this did not need to happen. In my search for the truth if I have said things that upset you I am truly sorry. I was 9 when my father died and it took a long time to learn the facts and that he to made mistakes that cost the other 14 there lives as well. It will take time for all of you to find the truth in all of this but don’t give up looking. God Bless you all.
To all of you a heartfelt thank you. Andrew was an incredible man – as part of GMIHS and outside as a father, husband and son. His smile, humor, ‘Be Better’ attitude, hugs and his ‘Yello’ when I would call him are missed every moment of the day. I was blessed to know him. It is because of who he was and who these men were – a crew of honor and intelligence that I will, daily, seek the truth. I worked with crash investigators and veterans for a long time so no apologies for bluntness – I prefer it. If any of you want to share any truth you come across please send it to [email protected]. Again thank you for insisting on the whole picture. *Bob – Andrew’s oldest is just 6 years old but is having a very hard time with this loss. He was very close to his Dad. I am so sorry that you experienced this loss too.
Would anyone be able to guide me to any interviews with Yarnell Fire volunteer firefighters that were in Yarnell – or – any structure firefighters that were in Yarnell on June 30th? Thank you.
Deborah…
I haven’t seen any full transcripts ( or audio ) of any of the ADOSH
interviews with both Peeples Valley Fire Department and Yarnell
Hill Fire Department personnel… but they DID conduct extensive
telephone and in-person interviews with LOTS of people from BOTH
of these organizations who were working the Yarnell Hill Fire
that weekend ( Friday – Sunday ).
They took ‘Field Notes’ during all these interviews and those
notes were, in fact, published recently along with all the other ADOSH documents.
In the ADOSH investigation supporting documentation, there is a document called…
“L3419 YFD, Peeples Valley, CYFD field notes redacted.pdf”
It’s in the ‘ADOSH Notes and Emails’ folder up in the online Dropbox.
Direct link to this document is…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/20inrene9tcx74a/uFZJ2EUBJv/ADOSH%20Notes%20and%20Emails/L3419%20YFD%2C%20Peeples%20Valley%2C%20CYFD%20field%20notes%20redacted.pdf
Here’s a SUMMARY of what is in this document…
** Yarnell Fire Department
These all appear to be the ADOSH
investigtor’s handwritten NOTES
taken during teleconfernce interviews
with various members of the
Peeples Valley Fire Department and
the Yarnell Fire Department.
NOTE: The NAMES are handwritten
and very hard to read so some of the
‘guesses’ below might be wrong and
would need to be verified…
Page 7 – Peeples Valley Fire Department
Captain Patrick (McCroey?)
Shane (Chaves?)
Ken (Shoup?)
Others?
Page 8 – Peeples Valley Fire Department AND
Yarnell Fire Department
Chief Koile
Wesley (Romen?) – Volunteer – Used to be dispatcher
Christy (Captain) (Lewis?)
Page 12 – Yarnell Fire Department
Specific phone interview with Brad
(Haggard?) – YFD Fire Captain.
Brad supplied his own list of people
who were apparently ‘on duty’
for Yarnell Fire Department that
weekend. Some of the names he
wrote down appear to be…
Krsitee (Lewis?)
(Daniel?) (Harrison?)
Paul (Murray?)
(Ailean?) (Cursillo?)
(?) Koile
Anthony McCormack
Ryan (Gardens?)
Brad Ruggles
etc…
Page 18 – Yarnell Fire Department
Specific conference call with YFD
Fire Chief Jim Koile.
NOTE: This document also contains
all the emails related to ADOSH’s
repeated attempts to try and set up
an interview with SPGS1 Gary
Cordes via Yavapai County officials.
They were eventually successful.
Followup…
Deborah…
See a new ‘parent’ comment
started up above for a much
more complete version
of the ‘interviews’ that ADOSH
had with personnel from both
the Yarnell and Peeples
Valley fire departments.
Unlike the hard to read
handwritten notes above,
these are fully-formed
typewritten summaries
of the same interviews.
That *new* post is up above
with this date and title…
WantsToKnowTheTruth
on April 10, 2014 at 11:15
pm said:
** ADOSH INTERVIEWS
** WITH PERSONNEL
** FROM…
** YARNELL FIRE
** DEPARTMENT
** PEEPLES VALLEY FIRE
** DEPARTMENT
Deborah,
Thank you for taking the time to guide us and remind us why we are here. I appreciate your caution about making assumptions. I hope to hike the path in Yarnell. I know it won’t complete the picture, but it should increase my understanding and empathy. We must never forget that we are missing 19 incredible people in our ranks, and that they all have loved ones who mourn them. I’m sorry I never got to meet Andrew in person. I’m sure I would have learned a ton from him.
As a current firefighter, I’m both comforted and made braver to speak out, knowing there are citizens out there who realize that we are not disposable, and recognize that some of the managers and directors and budget analysts have been treating us as just that. I’ve been very lucky with my supervisors and coworkers, but we still get that attitude from some of the organizations we get sent out to help. Like most WFFs, I’d read through case studies and tried to imagine myself in those circumstances. However, I’ve never been so moved with anger and loss as by the events and aftermath at Yarnell. Nothing before had made me question all the training, because never before had I seen so many violations so neatly swept under the rug. Never before had I seen so little respect for the families by the agencies, and so publicly displayed.
All of us in fire (heck, just all of us in general) have seen and made errors. We are human, and fires can be chaotic events that test us in every way possible. However, the good leaders among us admit our mistakes, learn from them, and help others learn from them. And ethical people don’t assist in covering up the truth.
Thank you for insisting on the truth. I hope it brings you some closure. I know that your efforts will make us safer out there, and I’m truly grateful for that.
** PANEBAKER AIR STUDY VIDEO
** 20130630_162508_2SEATS_EP.MOV
Transcript of the background radio conversation captured by Panebaker
Air Study Video 20130630_162508_2SEATS_EP.MOV.
A public copy of this Air Study video is in Mr. Dougherty’s online Dropbox at…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/y3jy5opssrcvzb3/S3cCXl9pjr/AerialFirefightingstudy/Panebaker/Video/Video#lh:null-20130630_162508_2SEATS_EP.MOV
ECITW ( Every Caveat In The World )
This is what I ( me, personally ) believe is being said in the background of this
video. Your mileage may, of course, vary.
This video is 1 minute and 49 seconds long, so given the small note in the
README.TXT file that accompanies these Air Study videos which states that
they all use the VIDEO END time as the timestamp in the TITLE… then that
means this particular video STARTED at 1623.19 ( 4:23.19 PM )
NOTE: This video starts just 19 seconds after the previous one
ended at 1623.00 ( 4:23.00 PM ). Most of the background conversation
in this video is obscured by very loud ‘wind in the microphone’ noise.
ALSO NOTE: At +28 seconds, two white-pickup-truck fire command
vehicles are seen speeding EAST on Hays Ranch Road AWAY from
the ICP at Model Creek School and (presumably) towards Yarnell.
One white pickup has a full emergency light-bar on the truck roof and
it is going full blast. The one behind it has no light-bar but emergency
flashers are also going full blast.
ALSO NOTE: At +34 seconds another white-pickup-truck appears heading
in the OPPOSITE direction on Hays Ranch Road and is seen ‘passing’ the
other two vehicles quickly heading WEST towards the ICP at Model Creek
School… also with full emergency cab-top light bar activated and flashing.
None of these ‘white pickup trucks’ with emergency lights on and running
circa 1623.49 ( 4:23.49 PM ) have been identified as of this writing.
VIDEO STARTS AT 1623.19 ( 4:23.19 PM )
+1:36 ( 1624.55 / 4:24.55 PM )
(Unknown – OPS1 Todd Abel?): Operations, Musser, ?? this is per
containing structure mod??…
+1:46 ( 1625.05 / 4:25.05 PM )
(Unknown): Were ya callin’ me?
+1:48 ( 1625.07 / 4:25.07 PM )
Audible quick tone beep
+1:49 ( 1625.08 / 4:25.08 PM )
(Unknown): Keep clearance on five.
VIDEO ENDS AT 1625.08 ( 4:25.08 PM )
Maybe Tex or joy will jump in on this trail out of BSR I am sure they would know.
I believe they already have ( almost from day one ) chimed in
and gone to great lengths to try to explain just *HOW* difficult
those manzanita patches in that exact area were to navigate,
even for one person… much less a line of 19 men trying to
stay in single file.
The only thing to complete the picture there would be for them
to say whether there was anything different about those same
thick ‘patches’ clearly visible ( in Joy’s own photographs ) over
there on the SOUTHERN approaches to the Boulder Springs
Ranch.
Maybe there were some ‘footpaths’ only visible at ground level
and not all that evident from satellite photos, or visible in
Joy’s own photograph. Maybe not.
Even if they were there… the other question would be if they
thought someone who had never set foot in that area before
would have been able to ‘find’ them quickly ( coming north
out of that draw on the final leg of ‘the journey’ ) even with
( perhaps ) a LOT of smoke and severe reduction in visibility.
Even if they had made it that far… to that ‘final push’ through
the draw and on into the southern end of the Ranch… they
wouldn’t have had much TIME to get even slightly lost or
confused. Minutes (seconds) would have probably mattered
a great deal, at that point.
Have the video cams pictures from the ranch come up on johns posting yet it would be interesting to see if they got any fire pictures as the fire blew thru the valley.
Yes… they have… but they are quite a surprise.
Mr. Dougherty just posted TONS of video that
is from a ‘Helms Ranch Security camera’… but
it happens to be the one that was focused on
the Helms Ranch FRONT GATE itself, and shows
all the vehicles coming and going from the
Boulder Springs Ranch from sometime Saturday
night on through Sunday.
There are ‘still-frame’ breakouts of someone did
that show all the vehicles that passed through
that gate in these timeframes.
There is only that ONE way to enter or leave
the Boulder Springs Ranch and this is the gate
that had the ‘security code’ on it that you had
to know to open it electronically ( HUGE gate ).
Sometime after the deployment… this big
electronic gate just got ‘propped open’ but until
then you had to know the CODE to get in ( or
out ) of the BSR compound ( where the
pumpkin had been set up late Saturday ).
There is NO SIGN of Gary Cordes’ vehicle EVER
passing through that front gate to either enter
or leave the Boulder Springs Ranch either all
Saturday night/morning… or anytime on Sunday.
So that is all very interesting ( and needs to be
looked at some more ), and MANY thanks to
Mr. Dougherty for the tremendous effort it took
to get these videos online and public…
However… that being said… here is where I
am a little confused.
What I was EXPECTING to see was some more
complete footage from some security cameras
that were KNOWN to be mounted on the
west-side fencing and pointed due north into
that ‘middle bowl’. Those cameras were meant
to capture traffic coming/going either over the
west-side fencing OR coming and going via
the north-side Jeep trail.
These would be the ones that would actually be
showing the ‘fire progression’ as it headed
TOWARDS the ranch through that ‘middle bowl’
that day… but so far I don’t see any footage from
THOSE cameras.
Some VERY short clips from THOSE cameras
first appeared in the MSM ( Mainstream Media )
the same day the ‘Helmet-Cam’ videos were
released to the media… and some of those
Helms Ranch west-fence security camera clips
were used as ‘background’ footage as some
announcers ( like on CNN ) were ‘leading into’
the main story… which was the Helmet Cam
video itself.
I thought THOSE were the ‘Helms Ranch’
security camera videos that we might be seeing
full footage from… but this is the first I’ve
even seen or heard that the FRONT GATE
camera footage was ALSO available ( and what
is now online in Mr. Dougherty’s dropbox ).
So… at the moment… there still doesn’t seem to
be any more actual footage available from those
west-fence mounted security cameras… or any
indication where the MSM got those clips THEY
were showing the day the ‘Helmet-Cam’ video
came out.
If the MSM got those west-side security camera
footage in THEIR SAIT FOIA/FOIL packages then
it would stand to reason that everyone else did
as well.
More on this later.
PS: There are also DOCUMENTS that accompany
these videos and apparently someone on the
SAIT team did a very diligent job watching these
videos and WRITING DOWN every vehicle that
came and went through that BSR main gate,
and at what TIME either Saturday or Sunday.
That complete ‘list of vehicles’ is also now
published… but so far… SPGS1 Gary Cordes’
vehicle is nowhere on that list. Might have
missed it so checking it again.
Followup…
The actual Helms Ranch Security Camera
that is focused on the FRONT GATE ( and
the source for all the video, still photos, and
documentation just published in Mr.
Dougherty’s online Dropbox ) is actually
mounted on the northeast corner of that
large equipment barn on the east end
of the Ranch property and is EXACTLY
here…
34.219261, -112.770066
Unfortunately, it is, in fact, facing
due EAST and only shows what was
happening in THAT direction, ( and with
the front gate ) but there is a clear view in
the distance all the way back to the
Highway 89 area and landscape features
to the EAST of Yarnell proper.
Some pretty fascinating stuff, though.
There is one section that seems to
CLEARLY show that the fire was arriving
into Glen Ilah ( and burning that subdivision )
before it ever ‘arrived’ at the Boulder
Springs Ranch itself.
There is also footage that does prove that
prior to the fire even arriving at the perimeter
of the BSR itself… the heavy SMOKE was
pretty much putting visibility at near ZERO
around that Ranch compound.
So if GM had been trying to ‘work their way’
off the eastward leg of the alternate escape
route, and due north through that ‘draw’
for the final leg into the Ranch itself… it
looks like the ‘visibility’ for that final push
into the BSR would also have been
near ZERO.
Unless that final push to the ranch
compound itself was CLEARLY marked
or visible… or fully pre-scouted… they
would have had a heck of a time finding
their way throught that draw and into that
Ranch in that final ( crucial ) timeframe.
More later.
Very good thank you. Did you see any Engines that were staged at the ranch or come and go on Sunday?
Mr. Powers…
There were MANY vehicles
( engines included ) coming
and going through that BSR
front gate throughout the
early morning and daylight
hours on Sunday.
A surprising number,
actually. It was a busy place.
I don’t know if that pumpkin
that had been set up there
on Saturday evening ( only
AFTER the fire ‘escaped’
over the road up on the
ridge ) was the ONLY place
the engines were told to
refill from… but that was
certainly ONE of the places
that many of them were
refilling from on Sunday.
There is no evidence in
these videos or images
that anything ever ‘staged’
there… but I suppose that
could be verified by
comparing the list of vehicles
that EXITED the gate to the
lost of ones that ENTERED.
That might show that one of
the engines arrived there…
but then never left… or was
there for an extended time.
BTW: Despite Tyson
Esquibel insisting in his
ADOSH interview that the
GM Crew Carriers WERE
‘staged’ at the BSR at some
point on Sunday morning,
I don’t see any Crew Carriers
ever entering the compound
at any time.
You can check all this
yourself in Mr. Dougherty’s
online Dropbox. It’s easy
to navigate… and one of the
SAIT investigators actually
took the time to extract
STILL photographs of all
the vehicles that came and
went… and they are in
their own separate folder.
It is highly unlikely any engines were refilling at BSR.
The person in charge of water supply would have established an easy-in, easy-out spot, next to the highway perhaps, and not have everyone driving to the end of a remote road, using extra time and fuel to dump and fill-up.
In addition to that, an ideal spot would be one that could be continually used, and not compromised by the fire at some point.
The one thing that stands out to me, and I think this is the case here due to the BSR ranch sticking-out to the west like a sore thumb, is that the pumpkin was probably established to support a structure protection sprinkler set-up..
The engines seen were probably patrolling and getting the lay of the land to see what they had. The one group looked to be a task force, as they come in and leave together. The water tenders would likely have been filling the pumpkin for use when needed.
TTWARE said…
“The water tenders would likely have been filling the pumpkin for use when needed.”
Yes. Much more likely. The primary chopper refill site was the helibase up north on Hays Ranch Road… but MAYBE that pumpkin at the BSR was still a designated ‘fill’ site for some of the choppers working the south end. There isn’t much documentation to prove this one way or the other, AFAIK, but its worth another pass at the evidence to see what all that traffic coming and going at the BSR was really all about.
If the ranch had a good water source they may have had a sprinkling system set up as well on the buildings. we seem to have very little info on the ranch. If it had a sprinkling system it could have very well been a bomb proof area, just hard to get to from the top of the mountain.
Looks like we were all inputting at same time with same Ideas
boy, sure looks like that BSR was pretty well scouted out the night of the 29th now doesn’t it? sure looks like there were engines in and out of that thing all day long on the the 30th as well…
so much for all THAT speculation…
oh, and it turns out… that BSR really COULD survive a bomb going off! might even call it a “bomb proof safety zone!”
i suppose it’s POSSIBLE that sprinklers were set up… but i highly doubt it. that place looked pretty well prepped prior to any resources showing up. i’m not sure it needed any sprinklers set up, unless they had a haystack or woodpile outside… but from what i’ve seen, all the structures were modern construction with metal roofs and plenty of clearance on all sides. i’d have been comfortable sitting there with my engine waiting for the fire to roll through…
Most structures that have defensible space, or are prepped, are NOT wildfire-proof, they just have a much better chance of surviving a firestorm.
Like in structure triage, time, energy, and sprinkler systems, are not wasted on properties that are not defensible, if you have some that are, or would be, with a little help.
Bomb-proof structure settings in chaparel country, while rare, would still need protection, because the only way anyone knows for absolute certainty that they would survive intact, is after they have been tested. I think I recall hearing that several windows at BSR broke out from the intense heat. If so, it was indeed, a close call.
I still think because of it’s remote location, the pumpkin was intended to support a sprinkler set-up, negating the need to have crews or engines stuck out there with no escape, if they were to need it.
Remember, the pumpkin was set-up the night before, probably as a what-if back-up. The next day as the fire roared toward Model Creek, the structure protection trailers were probably stripped bare, having deployed every sprinkler, pump, and hose roll where the structures were burning and going to burn. By the time the fire turned south, more than likely, there was no equipment left to deploy.
I also think I remember hearing a news report the the owners of BSR had to retreat deep into their house, saying that no one outside would have survived the heat.
Reply to TTWARE post on
April 10, 2014 at 9:22 am
>> TTWARE said…
>> Remember, the pumpkin was
>> set-up the night before, probably
>> as a what-if back-up.
That pumpkin was originally ‘set up’
very quickly late afternoon on
Saturday AFTER the small 2-4
acre fire that the DOC Lewis crew
had been ‘mopping up’ on for
FIVE hours ‘escaped’ over the
two-track. Russ Shumate only made
his first move to start doing copter
bucket drops AFTER the fire
‘escaped’ that small 2-4 acre
area up there.
The BSR location for the pumpkin
was (apparently) NOT chose with
ANY ‘safety zone’ considerations
in mind whatsoever. It was simply
a place that would be CLOSE to
where the fire was for choppers
to dip from.
Which also brings up a curious
point about Saturday. The Boulder
Springs Ranch was in no way ever
mentioned as a ‘safety zone’ until
Gary Cordes was pointing at it
( to Eric Marsh ) on a Google map
on Dean Fernandez’s iPad at the
Sunday 0700 briefing.
The DOC Lewis crew, who had
been fighting the same fire in the
same location the entire day before
( and stayed the night up on the
ridge ) was NEVER told that that
Ranch was to be, in any way,
considered a ‘safety zone’ from
that location where they were.
All of sudden… on Sunday… it WAS
OK to be telling crews headed to
the same location to fight the same
fire ( the same long distance away )
that the BSR was a ‘safety zone’
for them.
So why was it suddenly ‘eligible’ as
a ‘safety zone’ from that far away
location on Sunday… when it was
NOT any kind of ‘safety zone’
on Saturday… for crews working
that SAME location way up there?
The crews on top, ALWAYS had the black, AND it was right next to them. The need for the ranch as a safety zone was never an issue at that time. In actuality, the same would have applied for the 30th, as well.
I wish I could remember the media source that supplied the info regarding the owners of the BSR and their description of when the fire came through. If my memory is accurate about what they said regarding ‘no one would have been able to survive outside the house due to the extreme heat’, that would certainly put into question the ‘safey zone designation’ anywhere on the property. If Tex or Joy knows them, perhaps they could verify the owner’s description of the fire-storm.
Copy that. I really wish
this stupid ‘Boulder
Springs Ranch’ had
NEVER ‘entered the
picture’ as ANY kind of
‘safety zone’ for guys
that were going to
be working upwards of
a mile and half+ away
from it.
If all they had to even
consider ‘safety zone’
was the black itself…
then maybe those men
would all still be with us.
The moment that BSR
even entered the picture
that day… it became
this ‘hypothetically
reachable’ destination.
If they hadn’t even
known it was there, it
is doubtful they would
have even considered
doing what they did
that afternoon.
I wish GM had been like
the DOC crew on
Saturday working in
that same location.
No one EVER told
THAT crew that the
BSR was ANY kind
of ‘safety zone’, that
far away from where
they were actually
working.
dude, that whole fire had SO MUCH on their plates… what makes you think they were concerned about sprinklers around BSR?
don’t you think they were already stretched thin for resources? way too thin to be putting sprinklers up around a property with FireWise spec’d clearances around 90% of the structures…
structure protection trailers? from the State of AZ or Yavapai County? Yarnell VFD? who brought those?
by the time we got out of that area to the cabin #15; that fire was already destroying the tree where we had parked our vehicle. We beat the fire by less then 40 minutes going the way we went by staying on the 2 track ridge to the Congress side passing Acri’s property on the mountain top then dropping down near Candie Cane Lane leaving out to the vehicle on Foothill.
There was only one possible way to escape. The way I dragged Joy; the stubborn mule. I did not want to get an abandonment charge if she roasted so I went back for her. I still love the mule; she is a good kid. From the Helm’s ranch there is a bulldoze fire break from the 60’s which is named the 2 track ridge road but it would not have been an alternate escape route at all. Also that road leads to a dirt cow tank near the Helm’s which divides State Land & Helm’s property line and from there is also a continuation bulldozed path/firebreak not a jeep road that does connect to the jeep road as they call it. It was so dang overgrown and also a pipe that would of sucked the fire up at probably at a much faster rate then the route they choose so it was not an alternative escape route. The only route was my route; less fuel but harder way to get down due to steep boulders.
** PANEBAKER AIR STUDY VIDEO
** 20130630_162300_SEAT_drop_EP.MOV
Transcript of the background radio conversation captured by Panebaker
Air Study Video 20130630_162300_SEAT_drop_EP.MOV.
A public copy of this Air Study video is in Mr. Dougherty’s online Dropbox at…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/y3jy5opssrcvzb3/S3cCXl9pjr/AerialFirefightingstudy/Panebaker/Video/Video#lh:null-20130630_162300_SEAT_drop_EP.MOV
ECITW ( Every Caveat In The World )
This is what I ( me, personally ) believe is being said in the background of this
video. Your mileage may, of course, vary.
This video is 11 seconds long, so given the small note in the README.TXT file
that accompanies these Air Study videos which states that they all use the
VIDEO END time as the timestamp in the TITLE… then that means this
particular video STARTED at 1622.49 ( 4:22.49 PM )
NOTE: Cordes = SPGS1 Gary Cordes, Musser = OPS2 Paul Musser.
This appears to confirm that OPS1 Todd Abel was still busy up on the
north end of the fire at 1622 but he still planned on ‘coming down that way’
( to the Yarnell area ) in about 5 minutes to join OPS2 Paul Musser and
SPGS1 Gary Cordes, who were already both there in Yarnell.
VIDEO STARTS AT 1622.49 ( 4:22.49 PM )
+0:02 ( 1622.51 / 4:22.51 PM )
(Unknown – Cordes or Musser?): Go ahead.
+0:03 ( 1622.52 / 4:22.52 PM )
(OPS1 Todd Abel): Okay… ahhhhh… we’ll probly be around there in about five.
Uhm… What’s your plan on the ground?
+0:10 ( 1622.59 / 4:22.59 PM )
(Unknown – Cordes or Musser?): What I’d like ( VIDEO ENDS )
NOTE: Video ends and cuts off right after the word ‘like’.
VIDEO ENDS AT 1623.00 ( 4:23.00 PM )
** PANEBAKER AIR STUDY VIDEO
** 20130630_154940_SEAT_EP.MOV
Transcript of the background radio conversation captured by Panebaker
Air Study Video 20130630_154940_SEAT_EP.MOV.
A public copy of this Air Study video is in Mr. Dougherty’s online Dropbox at…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/y3jy5opssrcvzb3/S3cCXl9pjr/AerialFirefightingstudy/Panebaker/Video/Video#lh:null-20130630_154940_SEAT_EP.MOV
ECITW ( Every Caveat In The World )
This is what I ( me, personally ) believe is being said in the background of this
video. Your mileage may, of course, vary.
This video is 1 minute and 18 seconds long, so given the small note in
the README.TXT file that accompanies these Air Study videos which states
that they all use the VIDEO END time as the timestamp in the TITLE… then
that means this particular video STARTED at 1548.22 ( 3:48.22 PM )
VIDEO STARTS AT 1548.22 ( 3:48.22 PM )
+0:11 ( 1548.33 / 3:48.33 PM )
(Unknown 1): ?? (Short call… garbled voice)
+0:19 ( 1548.41 / 3:48.41 PM )
(Unknown 1): Communications (yard?)… try a different unit.
+0:28 ( 1548.50 / 3:48.50 PM )
(Unknown 2): Copy that… uh… we looked all around the top of
the (dingus?) up here.
+0:49 ( 1549.11 / 3:49.11 )
(Jim): Hey Ryan… Jim
+0:50 ( 1549.12 / 3:49.12 )
(Eric): Hey… this is Eric… go ahead.
+1:01 ( 1549.23 / 3:49.23 PM )
(Jim): You guys heard from ??
+1:05 ( 1549.27 / 3:49.27 PM )
(Eric): Yea. Affirm.
VIDEO ENDS AT 1549.40 ( 3:49.40 PM )
Followup… the ‘Eric’ listed as one of the speakers in the
transcript above is definitely NOT Eric Marsh. The only reason
he is listed by name is because he clearly identifies HIMSELF
( by name ) in the background radio captures.
His voice in no way compares with Eric Marsh’s distinct voice.
This ‘Eric’ appears to be associated with the Air Study Group
itself. His conversations were not part of the foreground
Air-To-Air traffic which always dominates these Panebaker
videos. He was talking ‘underneath’ all that but since his
voice seemed to be captured directly by the camera
microphone and without ‘radio modulation’… it is assumed he
was standing right there near the Air Study camera tripod itself
there on Hays Ranch Road, by the helibase.
Followup…
The ‘Eric’ being heard in the Panebaker video detailed
above seems to have been ‘Eric Panebaker’ himself.
His name is mentioned in THIS document in the
‘Moore’ child folder of the parent Aerial Study folder…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/y3jy5opssrcvzb3/N4kTFDZnEg/AerialFirefightingstudy/Moore/Moore%20Handwritten%20Notes/Hand%20written%20notes%20taken%20by%20Shannon%20Moore.docx
The document also details the EXACT location of the
other observation team and the location of the ‘Moore’
folder photographs ( and 3 videos ) taken that day.
It was not at the helibase, where the Panebaker videos
were all shot. The ‘Moore’ photos/video were all shot
at this other observation point on the west side of
Highway 89 about halfway between Peeples Valley
and Yarnell proper.
From the document…
________________________________________________
Hand written notes taken by Shannon Moore,
6/30/13, 1300-1900 – Yarnell Hill Fire
10:00-13:00 Travel from Flagstaff to Yarnell Hill Fire
13:30 Members from AFUE arrive on scene.
Eric Panebaker goes to ICP, I stay about
.5 miles west of the junction of hwy 89 and Hays Ranch Rd.
I wait to meet up with remaining members of AFUE, Ryan
Swartz and Robert Manwaring who is joining us from SDTC.
14:00 All AFUE on site and get radios cloned and get a brief
from Eric who had talked to Brad Zetler, Dan Sullivan both
air ops and Paul Musser-ops.
14:30 Robert and I depart for a view of East side (Right
Flank of fire). Find lookout spot on hwy 89 (Location about 3
miles south of hwy 89 and Hays Ranch Rd junction,
approximate N 34.25562, W 112.73572).
Etc… ( many more notes from that day )
________________________________________________
Hey Mike I’m wondering about this statement “If you start doing things that have a 99% chance of being safe on a regular basis, your chances of being an old hotshot are not going to be very good.” (4-7) I don’t know anybody who waits on a 100%. I honestly don’t think that all accidents are preventable, because we’re human. I also don’t WFF need to wait for 100% safe, it doesn’t show up. You can’t even stay in the house and be 100% safe. Just looking for feedback on that.
Fir Fighting has its own hazards as we all know. Following the 10 and 18 will keep you safe from the fire its self. There’s always that 1-5% accident, prop wash knocks the fire across the line or a back fire that gets across the line in a saddle. You generally survive those. The other accidents from falls, falling trees, vehicle roll overs, helicopter crashes and so on are inherent with fire fighting always first and foremost is prevention. I have never seen any one die from obeying the 10 and paying attention to the 18. LCES remains the critical ones, you are gambling if they aren’t in place, as GM did.
There’s a big difference between assuming some residual risk, and assuming a fair chance of catastrophic failure. GM had already, earlier in the day with no great stress nor any requests from the outside to do so, assumed a reasonable chance of a burnover for their lookout. And in fact McDonough’s reaction to his (close) trigger point being hit was to start evaluating possible deployment sites that may well not have been sufficient given fuels and fire behavior. The rest of GM seemed oddly complacent at this time? They then assumed more risk for the crew by deciding to head down to Yarnell. Then, when on the 2-track, they committed to a long slow bushwhack through unburned fuel in an unscouted terrain trap. (And, as noted, while a lookout certainly would have helped, fairly soon after beginning to descend, even if the lookout had warned them to escape uphill, given possible rate of travel back uphill this would have become impossible.)
I don’t doubt that they figured they could beat the fire. Part of the 10 and 18 are to give you an “out,” so that when you have a failure in one part of the system, you have a redundant check in place somewhere else. Someone gets one of the ankle sprains that “some people” like to sneer at, it may slow the crew, but doesn’t get the whole crew burned over because they helped one guy who sprained his ankle. In GM’s case, they either beat the fire (and even a simple sprained ankle could be the difference between beating it, or not), or, the whole crew was in dense fuel that inevitably was going to be a crown fire and without great options for escape.
Good points. I would add to that the fact that at 1540, just
as Brendan was ( in his own testimony ) ‘evaluating
deployment options’… Brian Frisby was just about to
round the corner, load him up, and tell Captain Brown
they needed to ‘evacuate all the vehicles… RIGHT NOW’.
Also at the same exact moment… (1540 ) SPGS1 Gary
Cordes is astonished at how FAST the fire is really
moving now… it is hitting his ‘AW SHIT’ trigger point,
and he (personally) orders the FULL evacuation of
Yarnell. In his later interviews, Cordes would testify
this is the moment he knew the fire had ‘totally exceeded
his expectations’ and was coming into Yarnell toot-sweet.
So this is 1540. A lot was happening that SHOULD have
given anyone the full heads up that they now had a
MONSTER on their hands… totally exceeding anyone’s
‘expectations’ and covering the distance between
1 hour trigger point intervals in just 15 minutes.
THIS is the ‘fire’ that Granite Mountain was now going
to decide ( but not even then… they still took another
20 minutes to decide ) to ‘cross the street in front of’.
It’s not like it was at some calm, predictable rate of
spread with predictable winds and direction when
they decided to ‘take the chance’. They had ALREADY
seen how the behavior was ‘far exceeding expectations’
a full 20 minutes BEFORE they even decided to try and
‘cross the street’ in front of it.
I was with a group of people the other day and without
any prompting on my part… the subject of Yarnell
just came up. Some of the people in that group still
only vaguely recall the MSM news reports and were
still convinced that those 19 men were all in a ‘safe’
place that day… and that this monster of a fire just
‘came and got them’.
Yes. It was a monster fire. They knew that.
No. It didn’t come and get them. They went out to meet it.
>> SR also wrote…
>> There’s a big difference between assuming some
>> residual risk, and assuming a fair chance of
>> catastrophic failure.
Yes. There is.
How ‘risky’ did THEY really think it was, but did it anyway?
What was Steed’s ACTUAL ‘comfort level’ when
Marsh was asking him (twince?) to say so?
Maybe that’s the essence of what Brendan McDonough
still doesn’t really want to talk about, even now.
Reply to SR post on April 8, 2014 at 2:09 pm
>> SR said…
>> They then assumed more risk for the crew by deciding
>> to head down to Yarnell. Then, when on the 2-track, they
>> committed to a long slow bushwhack through unburned
>> fuel in an unscouted terrain trap.
As long as this particular thread is just talking more
about ‘risk taking’… and what ‘level’ the meter was
pegging that day on their part… I think it’s time to
remember that regardless of whether they were familiar
with that terrain ( they SHOULD have been… it was
their backyard )… there has always been the following
documented evidence that they were specifically
TOLD / REMINDED about the risks and the dangers
THAT MORNING, at breakfast… in Yarnell itself.
The following is a reprint of a post from back on
January 17 of this year when this same ‘level of risk
taking’ was being discussed.
It’s a reply to a post from NV…
>> WTKTT on January 7, 2014 at 4:01 pm said:
>> Reply to NV on January 7, 2014 at 2:26 pm
>>
>> NV said…
>> I realize they were a local crew and had to be very
>> familiar with that type of scrub. But at each juncture
>> during the day they don’t seem to have taken the scrub
>> itself into account in their decision-making.
A lot of them were ‘transplants’ from other states for this
2013 fire season… but yes… MOST of them were ‘local’,
the fire was in their own backyard, they worked off-season
doing defensive work… and they SHOULD have known all
about that terrain ( AND the risk levels ).
Even if they didn’t… there is DOCUMENTED proof that they
were TOLD / REMINDED about all the dangers of that
terrain that very morning while they were eating breakfast.
The proof of that comes from the same proof that they
( the crew, anyway ) actually did ‘stop for breakfast’
when they first got to Yarnell… and that is where the
45 to 60 minute separation between Marsh and the rest
of them began that morning ( which was never mentioned
in the SAIR. )
That evidence and eyewitness testimony has been
reprinted in at least 3 separate online Mainstream
Media ( MSM ) articles and one of them is linked and
quoted below.
While they were eating breakfast up at the ICP at the Model
Creek Elementary School in Peeples Valley from about 8:00
AM to 8:40 AM… a well-known local hiker and hunter named
Rick McKenzie, whose family had been in Yarnell for over
150 years, sat down and talked to them.
He (Rick) was helping out fire command that morning up
there at the ICP and he sat down with the Granite Mountain
Hotshot crew while they were eating breakfast to make
SURE they knew how dangerous and impassable that
terrain can be before they ever even went up there that day.
He spoke to the crew at the table in general… but
specifically to squad boss Travis Carter…
“Y’all be careful up on that mountain,” Rick told him. “That
brush is so thick that you can’t even crawl through it. And
that manzanita burns hot. If the fire comes down off the
mountain, man, watch out. It’ll blow up.”
“Thanks,” Travis said, nodding. “We appreciate that.”
So they were TOLD / REMINDED about the high ‘risks’
involved for both ‘making forward progess on a hike’
AND ‘what might happen if the fire got into the bowls’
THAT morning… at breakfast… by someone who
knew the area as well as anyone.
The ‘risks’ should have been ‘fresh on their minds’ at that
point, even if they weren’t thinking much about it on the
drive down to the fire.
Here is just one of the MSM articles that has that
testimony from Rick McKenzie ( no relation to Christopher
MacKenzie ) in it…
Men’s Journal ( Magazine )
Article: The Last Battle of the Granite Mountain Hotshots
By Josh Eells Oct 2013
http://www.mensjournal.com/magazine/the-last-battle-of-the-granite-mountain-hotshots-20130911?page=6
SR: you have a very distorted view of the 10 & 18… they don’t provide anyone “an out.” they are two different concepts related to dealing with the same situation (wildland fire response).
one of them (the ten standard FIRE ORDERS), are “the rules” in order to engage the fire and the other (the 18 situations that SHOUT WATCHOUT) are prompts or “heads up” situations that require extra attention.
none of them “replace” the other, as you attempt to state… and none of them “provide redundancy”… they are all independent and complimentary of one another.
also: hotshots are 1000 X’s more likely to sprain an ankle during PT than they are on the fireline…
i would suggest you stop trying to talk about things you have absolutely no experience in and stick with your impotent speculations about how crow’s fly.
FullSail continues to show he doesn’t grasp just about every issue he posts about. I particularly like the sneering at ankle sprains and eye injuries, but that’s just me. Takes all kinds, particularly on the internet.
well, i suppose that’s the typical response from you… avoid addressing the meat of the argument and try to make ineffective generalities stick…
how much experience do you have actually applying the 10 & 18 to wildland fire situations?
oh wait, i think i know the answer… NONE.
Have to wonder where the urge to be like that comes from. For anyone reading this who’s “just dropping in,” FullSaill has a pattern of making clueless statements that are disruptive both by virtue of potential confusion they can cause, and because they’re often aimed at disrupting dialogue. In this case, someone who knows and works with the 10 and 18 would know that they do create a redundant system. Using the example of an unexpectedly slow rate of travel due to injury (we know FullSail tries to call ankle sprains and eye injuries mere boo-boos, so let’s say someone has heat stress), if you know your fire and weather and have given your crew a good margin of safety, you can deal with the medical issue without the whole crew being at risk. Likewise, probably more relevant to the YHF, lookouts aren’t needed ALL the time. Watchout 12, order 5. One of the other things FullSail does is try to place words in people’s mouths. I never said that the 10 or 18 “replace” each other, as he claims.
Let’s look at another relevant to YHF. Watchout 6 and 7, order 7 (and 8). Well, in that case, if those two Watch Outs apply, among other things if you are able, clear things up.
FullSail is the same guy who claimed that GM would have reasonably been relying on game trails to accomplish their bushwhack through dense (unscouted) chaparral over steep broken rocky ground in a short time. In short, FullSail says a lot of stuff that is simply clearly uninformed and not credible.
well, thanks for actually trying to clarify what you’re trying to say. once again, the 10 & 18 are independent resources:
you utilize one to engage a fire (the 10 standard fire orders)… these were boiled down a while back by someone you’ve probably never heard of, Paul Gleason. who argued that LCES was the nuts and bolts of the 10…
you utilize the other (the 18) to prompt you about “heads up” situations that require extra attention.
although i like the fact that you’re always thinking “outside the box,” to take them into account the way you’ve [attempted] to describe would be very cumbersome to try to utilize in the real world.
i can certainly understand how someone with little to no experience of wildland fire operations might idealize the 10 & 18 to be some sort of great matrix of redundancy. but, that’s not really how it works.
I was talking about risk of serious problems – i.e. burnover. You do something with a 1% chance of that 50 times during your career, you are more likely than not to come up snake eyes.
I think the percentage’s are way different than that. When you start taking those kind of risks the snake eyes may be a higher percentage. The old saying when you start playing with fire you might get burned,
Yes, Fires are actually difficult to model with statistics in general (model accurately, this is), but they clearly were taking outsized risks. Maybe they thought they had a time cushion measured in minutes, but not hours?
Agreed that putting #’s on wildfire risk is very difficult. I was merely illustrating the point with numbers. The point being if you do something with even a small chance of a very bad outcome enough times, don’t be surprised when the bad outcome occurs. This is the statistical illustration of the concept of “bad decisions with good outcomes”. Eventually it catches up with you.
Got you well said I got a little lost with where you were going. Sorry
Hey Mike there you are. OK so you’re talking about taking obvious risk? Thats what I’m getting. That makes more sense to me. Hopefully that’s it.
Man you guys like to type and read yourself. What will you do when this is over. You should consider the lecture circut.
Go back to playing with my Horses and Fishing and hunting. Maybe a little travel.
Don’t have to fight any more crazy fires or deal with crazy Overhead but it use to be FUN.
WFF-
Do you consider what they did taking an “obvious” risk?
My point was that when doing things that might risk a burnover, a standard of “I think we can make it” is far too dangerous. The standard needs to approach metaphysical certainty of safety (and I know, nothing is ever totally safe).
Nearly all WFF know this, this is not news. This is why there are so few of these events. Eric Marsh knew it. They just made a mistake that day. Others will determine if he was one who pushed the envelope too much. However, as an outsider, it does seem that applying the rules in that situation would have given them pause. Which goes to show the rules might be pretty darn important.
Well stated.
Having been on many trails like this when vegetation over grows the trail some times it is high enough that the trail looks like it stops. Actually when it is only used by hikers they walk under the higher branches of the large bushes. Most open trails for pack horses and riders are 6 to 8 ft. wide and show much better in areal photos. Higher growth of brush at the bottom might obscure the trail and it would still be there and accessible for hikers. Just my thoughts on trail talk.
For context, let’s remember that 1) based on the information available to GM at the time they decided on their bushwhack, they knew they were jumping off of a two-track that proceeded further. There’s no indication they had scouted the whole side of that two-track, so the condition would have been unknown, but the 2-track is going to go to somewhere. As it in fact does. So, what GM should have known, informed by prior experience, and what in fact was the case are consistent.
2) It’s not at all unusual for a two-track to peter out in one direction. GM was hiking, not relying on any vehicles. Not only was what GM should have known, based on experience, consistent with the 2-track, but the fact that it turns into a hiking path at one point is not unusual and would not have impeded GM. IF people are looking for different ways to normalize deviance in terms of making GM’s decision to jump off the 2-track and commit to their bushwhack seem required, any “difference” in the 2-track is useful for that purpose, as a distraction. But, not only would GM likely not have known, at the time they committed to their bushwhack, that the two-track further down stopped being passable by ATVs/ UTVs, HAD they known this, it wouldn’t have been directly relevant to them as they were on foot.
3) Elevation and commitment/duration of exposure. By dropping down, GM rapidly cut off the escape route option of retreating uphill, while they proceeded with a very slow bushwhack through unburned dense brush. Staying high on the 2-track would have both kept a view, and preserved options much better. Then, they could have either decided to make a much shorter committed push where they would have been exposed but for less time, or, as noted multiple times they could have pursued other options.
Basically, the 2-track condition, or where it terminates, is a non-story unless one is looking for distractions. Trails systems tend not to be designed by city planners with computers, and whether or not the trail terminated at Candy Cane Lane or BSR or connected via a connector to BSR, etc. etc. etc. is not a big deal. Known trail versus committed, prolonged bushwhack with escape uphill rapidly lost as an option is the key comparison for decision-making purposes.
All of your points are well taken, and I think you summarize
pretty well that there *must* have been this *accomplish
the mission* factor involved… and that *mission* was
NOT “just be safe” that afternoon.
Even if they *were* leaving the black because of some
perceived level of ‘uncomfort’ ( not believing it really
was safe, lightning concerns, yada, yada, yada ),
then you just pointed out ALL the options that remained
open to them that they did NOT choose that day.
They also had 6+ smartphones and at least one
( perhaps more, according to Brendan McDonough )
portable GPS unit(s) with them. 20 seconds and you
would know EXACTLY where that trail really went.
If just ‘getting out of there safely’ was their only *mission*,
they could have still accomplished that any number
of ways.
Something else was in play that day.
The inability to gauge their own safety against what
they *wanted* ( or were told l) to achieve.
They miscalculated. Badly.
Bad/poor decision WITHOUT a good outcome ( this time ).
Also don’t forget that it really does look like the
“Can you get here a little faster?” request from someone
in fire command heard in the YARNELL-GAMBLE
video is looking more and more like it took place
almost EXACTLY prior to the moment when they decided
to drop down into the fuel-filled box canyon.
Perhaps the sense of heightened/perceived *urgency*
for their *mission* that that radio call conveyed really
did contribute to that fateful decision that day.
More to come on this, I’m sure.
I still think Blue Ridge Hotshot McCord ( who was the
one who shot the YARNELL-GAMBLE video and
apparently the one who chose that mysteriously
descriptive name for the video itself ) needs to be ‘interviewed’ by someone.
What other radio traffic was heard just before/after that
video that didn’t get captured?
Did the caller who was urging them to ‘come a little
faster’ have any response to Marsh’s “They’re comin’
from the heel of the fire” statement… or was that
the actual END of that particular conversation?
We know that at least one person ( McCord ) heard that
ENTIRE conversation on the radio… but he was never
interviewed by ANYONE.
Reply to Bob Powers post on April 8, 2014 at 7:14 am
>> Mr. Powers said…
>> Having been on many trails like this when vegetation over grows
>> the trail some times it is high enough that the trail looks like it
>> stops.
That *appears* to be what *might* have been the case for that
final few hundred or so yards of the ‘alternate escape route’,
as far as getting ALL the way into the BSR compound.
As thick as some of that manzanita appears to have been
right around the southern approach to the compound, coming
north out of that draw, there also *appear* to be one or two
discernible ‘footpaths’ sort of ‘hiding’ under the top growth that
*might* have led right to the edge of the property and ( if there
was no substantial fencing ) also right into the southern edge
of the compound to the south of the actual residence.
Lotta *mights* and *maybes* in there, obviously.
Only someone who was really familiar with that area could
say for sure if these ‘footpaths’ were viable, or not.
And therein lies the real issue.
“Only someone who was really familiar with the area”.
Granite Mountain was NOT ( familiar with the specific area ).
I still think it’s safe to say that the final hundred yards or so
of the ‘alternate escape route’ *might* have been a little
confusing to a line of men who had NOT pre-scouted that
final push into the compound… especially if the area was
then filling with heavy smoke by the time they needed to
navigate through there.
It all still comes down to ( as you have said over and over )
‘planning/scouting’… or lack thereof.
The BSR could have been 20-30 acres and EIGHT to TWELVE
times larger than it really was ( as SPGS1 Gary Cordes seemed
to think )… but still be a questionable location for a ‘safety zone’ if
there really weren’t good, well-defined ‘escape routes’ to get you
there in a hurry. ‘safety zones’ and ‘escape routes’ are
inseparable. They have to BOTH be ‘good to excellent’ or you
have a potential problem in an emergency situation.
Agreed on scouting/planning.
As regards the BSR, I’d keep in mind context. GM left the black not because of some of the crazy ideas advanced like being afraid of lightning, but in all likelihood to get to Yarnell to “help,” whatever form that would have taken. So the BSR wasn’t critical as a destination — they weren’t leaving the ability to hunker down in good black just to hunker down at the BSR. Had they been pushed south first, I don’t think they were that fixated on the BSR, anyway, versus simply getting down to Yarnell.
In terms of exposure to risk, the problem is they were continually increasing it versus other options, with the bushwhack being a prime example even once the decision was made to get to Yarnell.
See above. Spot on. Agree.
My response to your other post just above could
have been posted here as well.
There was a *mission*… and that *mission* did
NOT include making just ‘safe’ choices that day.
Not in their minds, anyway.
It was the YARNELL-GAMBLE.
Maybe Blue Ridge Hotshot McCord really did name
his video that way because there was no doubt
in HIS mind what HE was hearing over the radio
at the time he shot that video.
Fire command was asking them to take a chance,
and they were accepting that ‘gamble’.
I still think someone needs to interview McCord
and ask him about the REST of that ‘can you
get here a little faster?’ conversation he
(obviously) overheard on the radio.
WTKTT said,
>>”Fire command was asking them to take a >>chance, and they were accepting that >>‘gamble’.”
Lie.
No. Context.
The paragraph above that establishes
the context of the statement.
Perhaps THAT is what Blue Ridge
Hotshot McCord thought and *might*
be why he chose to name his video
YARNELL-GAMBLE.
Why do YOU think Blue Ridge Hotshot
McCord ( or anyone ) chose that
specific name for that video?
What do you think would have
prompted him to believe that
YARNELL-GAMBLE was
an appropriate name for it?
gamble = take a chance.
fire command was not asking them to take a chance.
why would i speculate about what someone i don’t know would name their video?
Reply to
xxfullsailxx post
April 8, 2014 at 8:35 pm
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>> fire command was
>> not asking them to
>> take a chance.
If Blue Ridge Hotshot
McCord *thought* that
was what he was
hearing over the radio,
that would explain
why he would name
his video…
YARNELL-GAMBLE.
Maybe one day we’ll
hear from him about
that. Someone should
have interviewed him.
No one bothered.
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>> why would i
>> speculate about
>> what someone i
>> don’t know would
>> name their video?
Because it means
something.
He could have chosen
any name… but he
chose…
YARNELL-GAMBLE
…and it’s the video that
captures someone
asking DIVSA Eric
Marsh if he could
‘get to town a little
faster’ circa 1620,
the exact moment
they were about to
decide whether to
drop into the fuel-filled
box canyon… or not.
He did NOT name it…
NOTHING-TO-
SEE-HERE-MOVE-ALONG.MOV
FIRE COMMAND WAS NOT ASKING THEM TO “TAKE A CHANCE”…
those are YOUR ad-libbed words, as usual.
hey wait! i do have a theory…
it’s all about this internet conspiracy theorist with no life who likes to hyper-analyze a situation he has absolutely no direct experience of while hiding behind the cowardly comfort of his anonymous computer keyboard…
want to hear more about it?
cause i could talk about the lack of value of speculation, hindsight bias, conjecture, libel & slander, false allegations, lynch mobs, the plus’s and minus’s of the anonymity of the internet, wannabe investigative journalists, the psycho analysis of narcissistic conspiracy theorists, etc. etc. etc.
just let me know if you want to hear more!
right, and in this scenario, (where you have a Div. Sup. and a crew responsible for anchoring and flanking one side of the fire) whose responsibility is it to “identify safety zones and escape routes and make them known?”
the Div. Sups. AND the crewboss’s… enough said.
also WTKTT, why do you continually (and conveniently) leave out the part where Cordes tells Marsh, “and of course, you have the cold black.” ?
SR: you are wrong. they WERE indeed fixated on BSR. Yarnell was a LOOOONG ways away from BSR (and yes, for you, even as the crow flies) and the only way they were going to get there was by buggy. BSR represented the nearest opportunity for them to get reunited with their ride.
i’m sure that you might try to argue now, that the distance they SHOULD consider between BSR and Yarnell is that of a straight line and NOT the road system that they would actually have to drive. because, that makes sense [to you].
FullSail evidently doesn’t even understand distance.
is that really all you you’ve got? …what a joke.
Does anyone know if image 0877 0878 or 0879 from Mackenzie camera shows the “two track road?”
If you are referencing the two-track/one-track/hiking trail that we are talking about, the answer to your question is “no.”
Those photos ( and the Parker photo ) were taken here…
34.227511, -112.789962
The two-track road they would head south on in just a few
minutes was exactly 217 feet due south of that little ‘knoll’
they were ‘resting’ on and watching the fire.
In his VIDEO… if Christopher MacKenzie would have kept
panning his camera a little to the right, past the point where he
captured (Misner?) making that (apparently) sarcastic comment
in response to Marsh’s “I could just feel it, ya know” remark to
Steed, and then he (Misner?) spits on the ground… the video
camera would have captured a glimpse of that two-track heading
south… and the view at that point would have matched Marsh’s
later description over the radio of it “heading SOUTH…
mid-slope… cuttin’ over”.
The view directly SOUTH from where they were ‘resting’
looked pretty much exactly like THIS view in one of the
recently available ADOSH photographs…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/20inrene9tcx74a/EC2oDLR41K/ADOSH%20Yarnell%20Hill%20Investigation/Photos%20and%20Video/ADOSH%20Hiking%20Yarnell%20Hill%209%2018%2013#lh:null-P9180052.JPG
Just to be clear. I am not talking about the images that were taken later in the day 6/30 (0885-0891). I am referencing the pictures from earlier in the day.(0877-0879 and 0882)
P 10 WAFR (image 0877) appears to me to show the two track and it is captioned with…..Photo taken by a GMIHC member on two-track road early on
June 30, 2013 during test-fire operations
P 12 WAFR (image 0882) doesn’t (in my opinion) show the two track it is captioned with….Photo taken by a GMIHC member on two-track road
early on June 30, 2013 during retardant drop on their burn out operations.
TTWARE said something concerning the two track that seemed to imply that the two track kind of became less of a two track as it moved south and basically ended up as a hiking/game trail as it approached BSR. (TTWARE please correct me if I am mistaken.) Which prompted me to return to the images from Mackenzie (Pre burn) and check the condition of the two track.
So I believe the two track in the images IS the same two track that makes its way SOUTH and the same Two track that makes its way near BSR and Candy Cane Lane.
Image 0882 (and others) seem to show some trail improvement (cuttings) on the lower side of the two track. If this is the case, and the two track had been improved/cleared where the trail was in its widest part, I am just curious how that reflects on the condition of the same two track as it moved south.
Calvin – I guess I misunderstood your earlier question, and I ‘m sorry. What I should have said is “not the portion that we were talking about below.” I see that you are asking a very different question, to which I do not know the answer, although I suspect it is either “yes” or “kind of.” If I get time, I’ll get back to you. 🙂
Calvin,
If I understand your question correctly. even though there are no ‘crew’ pictures of the two-track as it proceeds south NEAR the bowl, there IS a two-track where the photos you reference are taken. Those photos are taken substantially north of the ‘bowl’, at the place where they were cutting line and trying to burn earlier in the day.
The two-track jeep trail which comes up from the old grader, tees-off as it gets up the ridge a ways, and the right-turn passes by the photo site. The left-turn at the ‘T” continues south a ways and nears the ‘bowl’, it becomes a track-and-a-half, and then continues narrowing as I stated in my previous post.
Reply to xxfullsailxx post on April 7, 2014 at 7:35 pm
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>> I just don’t think there’s much more story to tell.
>> The rest of the story died with GM, sad to say.
Perhaps. Time will tell… but some of us still believe the FULL ‘story’ of June 30,
2013, involves more than just why Eric Marsh or Jesse Steed made the decisions
THEY did that day. Entire towns were almost totally lost. MANY more than 19
people COULD have easily died. The ‘complete’ story of that weekend still needs
to be told… and it WILL be… someday ( Hopefully sooner rather than later ).
>> xxfullsailxx also said…
>> some will argue that B. McDonogue (sp.?) has more of the
>> story… i have my doubts… he’s just some dumb kid (no offense meant)
>> in his second year on a hotshot crew… i doubt he really had a clue
>> what all was going on, until it was way too late. but maybe he’ll prove
>> me wrong some day.
Your ‘fire brother’ that you just called a ‘dumb kid’ and ‘clueless’, who
was at the end of his THIRD full season as a fully qualified member
of a Type 1 Hotshot Crew, and who was fully trusted by his own
highly experienced Supervisor to serve as a ‘lookout’ for 18 of his
own ‘fire brothers’…
…is named…
McDonough
Brendan McDonough
** B-R-E-N-D-A-N ** M-C-D-O-N-O-U-G-H
I have my own ideas about who was ‘in search of a clue’ that weekend ( and
there appear to be many )… but it is, at least, customary to try and get their
NAMES right.
WTKTT says:
>>Entire towns were almost totally lost. MANY more than 19
>>people COULD have easily died. The ‘complete’ story of that >>weekend still needs to be told… and it WILL be… someday ( >>Hopefully sooner rather than later ).
wow, so now you’re going to delve in to the politics of defensible space, home owner’s insurance, and evacuation policies… glad you’ve decided so late in life to familiarize yourself with WUI issues throughout the west. good luck with that!
>>** B-R-E-N-D-A-N ** M-C-D-O-N-O-U-G-H
thanks! but why so many hyphens… must be of Slavic descent?… i wasn’t really looking for the correct spelling… just acknowledging that i didn’t know it.
also fyi: my impression is that ** B-R-E-N-D-A-N ** M-C-D-O-N-O-U-G-H was put there because he wasn’t feeling well… GM had the best eyes on the fire that day… a lookout would have been better placed on the ridge line somewhere, in the black. 3 years you say? wow.
>>I have my own ideas about who was ‘in search of a clue’ that >>weekend ( and there appear to be many )…
oh i’m sure you do… i can only imagine what goes on in your maniacal brain that you don’t divulge on this website…
Reply to WFF post on April 7, 2014 at 11:25 am
>> WFF said…
>> Yea you know where they deployed that is the only thing known after the
>> photos at the lunch spot. “We have a good idea where and when they
>> started” is speculation.
No. It’s not.
First of all… they did not ‘depart’ on their journey south from ‘the lunch spot’. There
really is no doubt that they ‘departed’ from the location of both the MacKenzie
videos ( 4:02 timeframe ) and the final Wade Parker photo at 4:04… the last known
photo from them and also taken at the same spot as the MacKenzie videos.
The ‘lunch spot’ ( form earlier in the day ) was a little northeast of that 4:00 PM to
4:04 PM ‘resting spot’ and further down the slope. They were close to the
two-track at that last ‘resting spot’ before they ‘gaggled up’ and headed south.
These (different) locations are now all known… so it is not ‘speculation’.
In case you missed the posts on that… the SAIT investigators themselves made
a great effort to nail down these various ‘exact locations’ and there is now a folder
in Mr. Dougherty’s online dropbox containing those results.
That folder is labelled the ‘Stewart Turner’ photos but has the following two
sub-folders in it…
Ashcraft Photo Location
Parker Photo Location
The SAIT actually found the EXACT spot where those photos were taken.
They then took their own GEO-STAMPED photos at those exact locations for the
Ashcraft 2:16 ‘lunch spot’ photo and the 4:04 PM Parker photo at the OTHER spot
that they would later ‘depart’ from… and the GEO stamps are accurate.
Here is that folder…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/j0n13974nlb6xxp/470HDybJDQ
The exact location of the 4:04 PM Wade Parker photo ( the last known photo from
them and the location they departed from and headed south ) is…
34.227511, -112.789962
>> WFF also wrote…
>> Here is a question how do we know that when supposedly (paraphrasing)
>> Marsh said “that’s it, that’s exactly what we want” on A/G, he wasn’t talking to
>> Steed and just hadn’t changed his radio to the crew channel?
Because the SAIR says that Marsh specifically ‘called out’ (verbally) to ASM2 and
specifically identified himself ( verbally ) as “Division Alpha”, and specifically used
the entire phrase ‘That’s where we want the retardant’ ( which is absent from your
paraphrase of what was was published in the SAIR ).
If all of that ( in the published SAIR ) is true… then there’s no way that Marsh
could have been talking to Jesse Steed.
Page 27 of the SAIR ( Adobe Reader page 33 )…
_________________________________________________________________
At 1637, ASM2 flies a drop path for a VLAT north of Yarnell west to east and apparently over DIVS A, turning northward to avoid high ground at the end of Yarnell. DIVS A, seeing the flight, calls and calmly says, “[ASM2], Division Alpha, That’s exactly what we’re looking for. That’s where we want the retardant.”
_________________________________________________________________
So the SAIR says the specific ‘call signs’ were there for there to be no question
who Marsh wanted to say that TO, and no question on ASM2’s part that Marsh
was directing that statement to THEM and it was SPECIFICALLY about
‘a retardant drop’.
So… is all that really true?
Is that really what happened?
What is the ‘verifiable proof’ the SAIT had to back this up?
Well… let’s see…
The SAIT chose to PUBLISH both that QUOTE and put a definite TIME on it as if
it was an absolute fact. What made them so sure?
The only reference anywhere else in the SAIT material to this call from Marsh
about ‘retardant’ is in the few notes they made during their interview with Bravo 33.
From the SAIT Yarnell Investigation Notes (YIN)…
__________________________________________________________________
INTERVIEW with Bravo 33 July 9, 2013 – 1700
Interviewees:
John Burfiend-ATS Specialist
Clint Clauson – ATS Trainee
Thomas French – AT Specialist
Interviewers: Mike Dudley, Brad Mayhew, Tim Foley,
Jay Kurth, Jimmy Rocha
We needed to go back to the right flank (16:30 AZ time). Made 3 practice runs. Painted 2. We came around.
Got a call from Division A stating they were going down their escape route to the safety zone. Didn’t know Division A was the superintendent of the Granite Mountain hot shots. Asked him “is everything OK?” He replied “everything is ok, just heading to the safety zone”. We came around, made a practice run through the bowl, west to east. I was talking to Tom about the rising terrain on exit. Division A clad and said “that is what we are looking for, that is exactly right”. Within 5 minutes of that, they went in shelter.
__________________________________________________________________
So according to the SAIT investigator’s own notes… what Bravo 33 said they
heard from Marsh does NOT match what the SAIT ended up publishing as
a ‘direct quote from Marsh’ in there own PUBLIC report.
Bravo 33 ( in their interview ) say they ONLY heard this from Eric Marsh…
“that is what we are looking for, that is exactly right”.
The SAIT then comes up with this and publishes it as if its a direct, verifiable
quote from Eric Marsh…
“[ASM2], Division Alpha, That’s exactly what we’re looking for.
That’s where we want the retardant.”
The Bravo 33 ‘interviewees’ did, in fact, say that “Division A” called THEM… so
we can only assume that means they were remembering they DID hear the
correct “ASM2, Division Alpha” call signs to remove any doubt about whether
Marsh was trying to talk to someone OTHER than them…
…but Bravo 33 doesn’t say they specifically heard the word ‘retardant’ ( much
less the entire phrase “That’s where we want the retardant” ) from Marsh.
The SAIT either just ‘made that up’ or that part of the interview where those
words *might* have been recalled just never made it into the SAIT interview notes.
Either of those explanations would be *odd*… but I suppose anything is possible.
Notice also that Braov 33, themselves, never seems to nail this down to exactly
1637… yet that is the TIME the SAIT published for this transmission. There is no
indication how the SAIT came up with that 1637 timestamp.
** VERIFIABLE TRANSMISSIONS?? CRITERIA??
This actually brings up another important point that hasn’t been discussed
much and it has to do with what criteria the SAIT was actually using when they
say things like ‘verifiable transmissions’ in the SAIR.
Keep in mind that the 1637 “That’s where we want the retardant” transmission
documented above from Marsh to ASM2 is, in fact, being considered a
‘verifiable transmission’ and it is, in fact, the one they are using as the
official END of the 30 minute ‘blackout’ period when they say there WERE no
‘verifiable transmissions’ from GM.
As you can see above, however, the ONLY criteria they seem to be using
for this entire transmission is just that one little moment in the Bravo 33
interview when they say they ( and only they ) RECALL hearing something
like that… which doesn’t even match what the SAIR ended up publishing.
NO ONE ELSE reported having heard this transmissions from Marsh, even
though it was ( apparently ) over the VERY well-listened-to Air to Ground
channel. Only Bravo 33 reports hearing it in THEIR short interview, and
there is no known radio capture of that transmission.
So what kind of game is/was the SAIT really playing here when it comes
to what they considered ‘verifiable transmissions’, and worthy of being
‘acknowledged’ and ‘mentioned’ in their own final public SAIR document?
If their only criteria for ‘verifiable transmissions’ was whether or not just ONE
of their interviewees simply ‘recalls’ hearing something… then they left
awful lot OUT of that SAIR document.
There are any number of OTHER transmissions that day that were not only
‘recalled’ by one ( or even more ) interviewees… there is even defacto radio
capture evidence to back up some of those ‘recollections’…
…yet… a number of those NEVER made it into the report ( but the Bravo 33
recollection of Marsh’s radio message DID make it into the report and
officially ENDS the ‘blackout’ period ).
The Paul Musser radio call to Eric Marsh at 1442 is just ONE of those
‘obvious omissions’. It is backed up by BOTH some radio capture
evidence AND the testimony of others ( Todd Abel, etc. ).
The YARNELL-GAMBLE radio conversation(s) would be another example.
They are just as ‘verifiable’ as some simple (vague) recollection on the part of
Bravo 33… but were never even mentioned in the SAIR document.
So they really were ‘cherry picking’ when it came to what they were going
to call ‘verifiable transmissions’ and what they would not.
Somehow… as vague as Bravo 33’s recollection was… the SAIT thought that
Bravo 33’s recollection of Marsh’s radio call WAS ‘verifiable’… even though
no one else reports having heard it and there is no radio capture of it.
So ‘verifiable’ that they ended up using it as the bracketed END of the
period they chose to call ‘no verifiable transmissions from them’.
That really is rather odd ( or at least rather inconsistent ).
Maybe they thought the idea that Marsh *might* have been asking for a
retardant drop was so important to their OWN narrative that they totally relaxed
whatever criteria they WERE actually using for ‘verifiable transmissions’
in order to ‘paraphrase’ what Bravo 33 said… put their own words in
Eric Marsh’s mouth… and make sure that got published in the SAIR.
I would still love to hear Jim Karels himself explain ( in his own words ) what
they meant by ‘verifiable transmissions’… and why the (vague) Bravo 33
recollection somehow rose to or exceeded that standard ( versus other known
recollections ) in order ‘make the cut’ and be ‘published’ in their final report.
Time correction for up above…
The (completely verifiable) OPS2 Paul Musser radio call to
DIVSA Eric Marsh about whether both Granite Mountain AND Blue
Ridge were still ‘committed to the ridge’ came at 1542 ( 3:42 PM )
and not 1442 as I accidentally typed up above.
Followup…
Just to be clear… the TWO ‘events’ that the SAIR report itself
said are the START and STOP of the ‘blackout’ period when
they ( in their words ) ‘cannot verify communications’
are as follows.
START: 1604. They don’t say specifically what ‘event’ that
was but they must be referring to the 1604 Parker photo
which was, of course, a ‘verifiable’ text message with
hard-copy reception evidence.
*** 33 MINUTE BLACKOUT *** NO “VERIFIABLE” ***
*** COMMUNICATIONS, ACCORDING TO SAIR ***
STOP: 1637. The vague testimony from ONLY Bravo 33 that
they thought they remembered hearing Marsh say ( their
testimony, not SAIR ) “that is what we are looking for, that is
exactly right”.
From page 1 of the SAIR…
_____________________________________________________
There is a gap of over 30 minutes in the information available for the Granite Mountain IHC. From 1604 until 1637, the Team cannot verify communications from the crew, and we have almost no direct information for them.
_____________________________________________________
So the key line is still this one…
“The TEAM cannot verify communications from the crew.”
Doesn’t say they didn’t HAVE them.
Doesn’t say what the sources might have been.
It just says THEY ‘couldn’t verify’, according to some criteria
of their own which remains unknown and unexplained.
Yet… “The Team” totally accepted that ONE recollection on
(only) Bravo 33’s part of something Marsh seemed to say
to them at 1637… and used that for the official END of
the ‘blackout period’. To them… that supposedly constituted
a ‘totally verified communication from the crew’.
Why did they not ‘question’ that one vague recollection, drop
it into the ‘unverifiable’ category… and then say that the next
‘verifiable’ communication was Steed breaking in on Arizona
16 with his “We are in front of the flaming front” transmission?
The SAIT knew all about the Helmet-Camera video… very
early on. They KNEW there was going to be no way to deny
that it existed… or what was captured on it.
So why didn’t they just call THAT the ‘END’ of the “blackout”
and say the START was 1604 ( Parker photo, verifiable )
and the STOP was 1639 ( Jesse Steed on Helmet Cam )?,
and that the “blackout” was the full 35 minutes in-between?
Somehow… they decided to include this one vague recollection
on Bravo 33’s part in their own ‘verifiable communication’
category… and they used THAT for the official ‘STOP’ of the
supposed ‘blackout’ period, instead of the Helmet Cam video.
The only real explanation is that Jim Karels ( and the SAIT )
really wanted ( for reasons unknown ) that reference to Marsh
talking about a ‘retardant drop’ to make it into the official report…
regardless of whether it was meeting the same ‘verifiable
communications’ criteria they seemed to be applying to all the
other communications we ( and they? ) now KNOW took place
during that 33 minute ‘blackout’.
“The Team could not verify.”
is not the same as…
“The reported events could NOT be verified.”
All that line in the SAIR report means is that THEY could
not find a way to meet THEIR ‘verifiable’ criteria… whatever
that might have been ( since they don’t even say so ) for
certain ‘communications’ that they DID know about.
It doesn’t mean those ‘other’ communications aren’t ‘verifiable’.
Their statement just meant THEY could not ( or WOULD not )
accomplish the task.
Elizabeth, WTKTT, and others who are debating the two-track/single-track,
First, WTKTT, the single-track trail IS visible on Google Earth as it forks left toward BSR. It is also visible as it continues on past the west side of BSR and into the jeep trail off to the north. Not only is this track shown on Google Earth, it is also shown on state land maps (search azland.gov/webapps/parcel and there’s a menu button in the upper right where you can click-on ‘Open Street Map’), AS WELL AS other topographical maps, which list it as a pack trail as it heads east and around to BSR. One other important consideration is that the ‘ranch’ buildings appear to be fairly new, and these trails were probably in existence and in use long before BSR was, hence their appearance on many different maps.
Elizabeth, while the single-track certainly had SOME overgrowth, pre-burn it is visible from the air in many places along the drainage as a totally open traverse. It was a long-used pack/hiking/game trail, which would tend to beat down the overgrowth somewhat. It absolutely would NOT be a bushwhack on the order of the actual decent site.
I’m not trying to put forth an alternate agenda here as much as I’m just trying to add some background detail. It’s quite possible that if GM had proceeded down the single-track track the fire would have roared up that drainage and caught them anyway. The only thing for certain is if they had continued on the single-track, they would have had a few more minutes to be able to observe the fire and weather from the ridge-line before they dropped-down.
Reply to TTWARE post on April 7, 2014 at 8:17 pm
>> TTWARE said….
>> Elizabeth, WTKTT, and others who are debating the
>> two-track/single-track.
I’m not really ‘debating’ it. I would agree that it is not ‘technically’
correct to say it was a ‘two-track’ ( UTV capable ) all the way
to the Ranch… but it was THERE as a valid ‘hiking trail’, fer
sure and ( as you point out again ) CLEARLY visible even
from space, all the way to the Ranch ‘area’.
That is never going to change.
I still believe that Google maps is WRONG to be showing
( with Labels option on ) that the end of the eastward leg
of that ‘trail’ is somehow CLEARLY ‘connected’ to the
car-wide jeep trail that emerges from the north side of
the Ranch property… or that there was a totally CLEAR
final north leg all the way to the south side of the Ranch…
but that’s just me. I’m still seeing a lot of manzanita there
on the south side of the Ranch that they would have had
to ‘figure out’ at the last minute. Maybe it was all ‘taller’
than some other stuff and there were ‘footpaths’ they
could see but that don’t clearly show in satellite photos.
Joy and Sonny would probably know about that.
>> TTWARE also wrote
>> It’s quite possible that if GM had proceeded down the
>> single-track track the fire would have roared up that
>> drainage and caught them anyway.
Yes. See posts on this ongoing discussion from MONTHS ago
that even had ‘charts’ which pointed out how, if their ‘rate of
travel’ had fallen below what the SAIR says they were
accomplishing on the first part of the journey ( anchor point
to descent point )… then in various increments of lower
‘mph’ values… exactly where they might have been ‘caught’
in the middle of that other ‘blind canyon’ as the fire came
over those ridges in the 4:40 to 4:55 timeframe.
The ONLY chance of success on that ‘alternate trail’, if they
had chosen the eastward leg into that other ‘blind canyon’,
was to maintain a good pace and hope they reached the
large clearings at the end of that eastward leg.
Only then… given the time and fire progression… would they
still have had ‘choices’. If they didn’t think that last ‘due north’
leg to the Ranch was clear to them… they could have just
bailed out to the southeast towards Candy Cane lane, and
lived to tell the story.
If the fire had reached the ‘mouth’ of that other eastward leg
canyon BEFORE they got there… well… we might have heard
the same “our escape route has been cut off” radio transmission
anyway… and a ‘deployment’ attempt would have simply been in
another place that day.
I still say the IMPORTANT question is… was whoever decided to
NOT go that way and drop into a fuel-filled box-canyon instead
even AWARE that the ‘alternate trail’ was an option.
What did Eric Marsh REALLY mean when he used the phrase
‘predetermined escape route’ over the radio that day?
HOW ‘predetermined’ was it?… and by WHO?
Was it ‘predetermined’ all the way to the ranch, or only just
some kind of vague ‘head south on that two-track’ suggestion?
Or ( perhaps? ) was it actually ‘predetermined’ that they SHOULD
just ‘cross through that box canyon’ by whoever it was that
made the actual ‘predetermination’ that morning?
In other words… was crossing through the canyon actually
part of the ‘predetermined escape route’, or not?
We still don’t really know what Marsh actually meant when
he said ‘predetermined escape route’.
Well said were you saying it was ID or designated trail. You are right though a trail is faster than a bush whack they still may not have had time to get to the Ranch. Although they would have had other options that they did not have in the canyon.
There WAS no “two-track” that could have gotten GM safely and in a timely fashion directly to the Boulder Springs Ranch had they stayed on it.
If GM had not DROPPED OFF into the valley, they would have ended up having to bushwack ANYWAY to get to the BSR, because the overgrown one-track that is in there but not really particularly visible from anything that I have seen goes to CANDY Cane Lane, not to BSR, such that GM would have died in the brush slightly to the southwest of the BSR as opposed dying in the brush to the slight northwest.
Again, folks, before you believe someone who is claiming to assert the facts, do your own research. Or ask someone who has proven that they are doing decent research. Again, there WAS no obvious, easily-traversed, cleared-out, more-quickly-traveled two-track that would have taken GM to the BSR *without* requiring a bit of a bushwack. I say that with all due respect to everyone who has asserted otherwise.
TTWARE – I saw your comment below, which was helpful and for which I thank you, but even that “one-track” does not seem to go directly to the BSR, so that GM still would have had to bushwack back in.
Elizabeth,
See my comment above regarding the actual routing of the ‘single-track’. It does indeed proceed to BSR.
There continues to be a disconnect here. Perhaps Elizabeth is primarily interested in, at all costs, making GM’s decisions look not simply reasonable but in fact the “only” decisions they could have made — scared of lightning, forced to bushwhack by 2-track “disappearance,” etc. I would recommend to Elizabeth that she actually read the posts detailing how the 2-track proceeds towards the BSR and the options available at various points. I also would again recommend to Elizabeth that she seek input from people with legit experience, and further, since she seems completely without relevant real-world experience and some big comprehension gaps, that she travel to AZ, hike the relevant area, and also hike some green chaparral on equivalent terrain. As it is, strictly as a matter of my opinion, her posts read almost like they are astro-turfing a “no negligence here” defense. I am sure of course that she has no such intention, therefore my rec that she travel to AZ and get educated in the hands-on, as opposed to college and grad school, sense.
SR, go read the post below from WTKTT, where he explains that the one-track that was the “other” option (as opposed to dropping down into the valley) goes to CANDY CANE LANE, as opposed to the Boulder Springs Ranch. Therefore, in order to GET to the Boulder Springs Ranch, GM was going to have to come OFF the one-track at some point and bushwack. If that is inaccurate, please explain WHAT part of it is inaccurate. Thanks.
Incredibly disingenuous. Beyond that, I don’t know what to say, other than get thee to AZ and stop this inane misdirection.
I do, in fact, believe it is wrong for Google maps to
be indicating that the northward leg of that journey
would have been some absolutely CLEAR path
from where the eastward leg of the ‘trail’ terminates
in that large clearing… to the ACTUAL southern
perimeter of the Boulder Springs Ranch… but
huge CAVEAT here…
…that is all based on close inspection of pre-fire
satellite photos.
There does not APPEAR to be near as clear a
path to the actual ‘southern perimeter’ of the
Ranch from that super-large clearing as there
is CLEARLY a path to the SOUTH and around
to Candy Cane lane.
I don’t know why Google Maps ‘Label’ option
didn’t just show THAT route as the ‘continuation’
of that eastward trail since the continuation is
so much more obvious in that direction ( in the
satellite photos ) than it is in the northerly
direction towards the Ranch.
Actual ‘bushwhacking’ to traverse that northern
leg and get into the Ranch area? I don’t know.
I guess it would have depended on the height
of all that Manzanita clearly shown there.
If it was ‘taller’ than some of the other stuff…
maybe it would have been more like
‘bushducking’ than ‘bushwhacking’ with some
foot-paths visible that aren’t clear in satellite
imagery.
I suppose Joy Collura and Tex (Sonny) Gilligan
might know the answer to that one.
All I know is… if whoever was looking at ‘Google
Maps on an iPad’ that morning completely
trusted that the ‘trail’ went ALL THE WAY into
the BSR compound itself like the other parts
of that ‘two-track’ or ‘single track’… that wasn’t
the case. It would have gotten a little ‘confusing’
for those last coupla hundred yards to men who
were not familiar with the area at all and who had
done NO scouting of the full trip themselves.
Don’t forget about the SMOKE at that point.
It probably would have been pretty bad, at that point.
It’s actually doubtful that by the time they reached
the bottom of that eastward leg that they would
have even been able to SEE the BSR itself still
a few hundreds yard to the NORTH and NOT
right there at the end of the eastward leg of
the ‘trail’ they would have come down on.
Correction for post just above.
I said…
“…that is all based on close inspection of
pre-fire satellite photos.”
That is not actually true.
There are other ground-level photographs
that reveal some good details here.
If this ‘how clear was the path from
the end of the eastward leg, north into
the ranch’ question is being revisited, don’t
forget there is always the photograph
of the ‘southern approach’ to the Ranch
that was taken by hiker Joy Collura
THAT MORNING ( June 30, 2013 )…
It was taken the morning of the incident itself,
as Joy and Tex (Sonny) Gilligan were
heading up into the Weaver Mountains to
look at the Yarnell Hill Fire for themselves
and they passed by the Boulder Springs
Ranch in about the same general area
where that eastward two-track terminated.
That entire area in the foreground is the
southern approach to the Ranch as it
looked THAT DAY… and shows pretty
clearly the possible ‘tangled mess’ that
GM would have had to deal with for the last
few hundreds yards of their journey after
turning north at the bottom of the eastward
leg of the ‘escape route’ trail…
https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/sh/eedzcsi1dpeczak/vRGDU9CIpx/Reduced%20Photo%20Images/1%20%28142%29.JPG?token_hash=AAGqQKbREb0yMp88nKg-tR9VdXMfGRn9RxBsV3o8LU35CQ
The only assertion was that the 2 track would have been faster and possibly safer if they had to drop off the back side of the ridge. Much more choices that could be made than down into the canyon. Again the real problem was there was no escape route.
to BSR from the top of the fire. Without the knowledge they chose one of the worst decisions to head to the Ranch not knowing what they would have to do to get there. Or even how they would get there. No plan between point A and point B and they referred to it as an escape route. I still say the decision to leave the black was when they kicked the dominos over, and this tragic event started to unwind. The decisions from that point on just kept getting worse.
Hey Bob!
I think it’s time everyone,
Elizabeth
SR
WFF
Wantstoknowthetruth
etc.
reveal their complete names just like John, Rod, you and I do!, then we should meet at the Ranch House Cafe in Yarnell (I already have four wheel drive vehicles lined-out).
I also have a feeling Maclean’s snooping around in here somewhere (as all good authors do). John, you like your eggs scambled, over easy or sunny side up!
Larry Sall
Larry, folks here already know alllll about me – first and last names, training, background, etc. 🙂 What more information about me do you want, Larry? Please contact me at [email protected] and tell me what more you need to know about me. I can send you a copy of my birth certificate, I can send you pictures of my non-visible moles, I can send you pictures of my teeeeeeny tiny tattoos. Whatever it takes to cement in YOUR mind that I am who I am I would be happy to do, Larry. Also, aren’t you and Bob RETIRED? That would explain why you are willing to plaster your name all over this website and current fire guys who are employed by the state and federal government and are trying to keep a low profile are not. Bob’s mentee, for example, is, as best I can tell, basically retired, but he still does odd fires and random overhead stuff here and there, and he *still* does not want his name all over this website.
Also, I’ll go to breakfast with you, Larry. I love breakfast – most important meal of the day. When would you like to do that? E-mail me, and we can set something up. 🙂
Alright…one down (Elizabeth) and a half dozen to go. I’m buying her breakfast if we all get there.
Larry thanks for the invite I have a good 10 hour drive to get there so will pass for now.
WTKTT April 7 1:47 PM check out his Google earth Map of the fly thru on that trail it to me is the classic 3 mph. double time it off the mountain. And if you notice several spots that could have served as SZ or the ranch on the back side before the drop into the BSR drop off and into the desert. Again scouting would have and should have been done to ID escape route and alternatives.
A lot of measurements and math was done a long time ago now
with regards to that ‘alternate escape route’.
IF they had been able to maintain the same FORWARD rate of
travel that the SAIR says they did from the anchor point area to
the ‘Descent Point’… then they *MAY* have made it to the
southern perimeter of the ranch just a few minutes before
the fireline reached the northern perimeter…
…but I still think once they realized they had to ‘figure out’
those final few hundred yards to the ranch ( and seen how
close the fireline was to the north and how fast it was heading
south ) they would have probably just exited SOUTH and
AWAY from the approaching fire out the draw and on to the
Candy Cane Lane area. Rushing headlong ( due north ) through
the draw and TOWARDS the fire and smoke, wouldn’t have
been the best idea in the world that afternoon.
Regardless… there is no question that ‘trail’ was there… and
it COULD have been used as an alternate way to get to the
BSR that afternoon.
The REAL question is ( and has always been )… was whoever
made the decision to drop into the fuel-filled box canyon even
AWARE of that option? There is still no definitive proof that
the person(s) deciding to drop into the box canyon had any idea
that alternate route even existed.
When Marsh reported ( several times ) over the radio that
Granite Mountain was ‘making their way out the predetermined
escape route’.
WHAT did that really mean?
THAT still hasn’t really been determined.
WHO decided what this ‘predertmined route’ was that Marsh
referred to ( multiple time )… and WHEN did they decide it?
Was the ‘predetermined escape route’ the alternate trail…
or did someone actually draw their finger over a fuel-filled
box canyon on a Google Map showing on an iPad and suggest
THAT was, in fact, their idea of an ‘escape route’? That’s still a
very important ‘detail’ about June 30, 2013 that hasn’t been
resolved yet.
Reply to Bob Powers post on April 7, 2014 at 2:52 pm
>> Mr. Powers wrote…
>> And if you notice several spots that could have served as SZ
>> or the ranch on the back side before the drop into the BSR drop
>> off and into the desert.
Yes. At the exact point where the ‘eastward leg’ of that
‘alternate escape route’ comes out of its own ‘blind canyon’
and it would have been time for them to evaluate/decide
whether to now start on the due-north final part of their
journey through the draw and on to the southern perimeter
of the BSR…
…there was a VERY large ‘clearing’.
ALMOST as large as the non-structure occupied cleared
area of the Boulder Springs Ranch itself.
I still think they would have had time to ‘bail out’ direct southeast
on the CLEARLY visible continuation of that ‘trail’ around to
the Candy Cane lane area… but that HUGE clearing at the
very base of that eastward leg is there… and might have
come into play if the timing required it.
I have completed uploading all files to the Serious Accident Investigation Report and the ADOSH investigation. The last big block of video uploaded was the Helm’s Ranch Security Camera video files in the SAIR report.
Once again… THANK YOU, John. I know it has been a
tremendous effort on your part to get this public FOIA ( Freedom
Of Information Act ) material posted online… but it is VERY
much appreciated.
One minor nit, though.
On your page of links where all the SAIR FOIA/FOIL material is
listed… which is here…
http://www.investigativemedia.com/yarnell-hill-fire-serious-accident-investigation-report-supporting-documentation/
…there are the following two folders at the bottom of the list…
A51-Foley Site Visit Video:
A52-Helm Ranch Photos Pre-Fire:
That last one… which supposedly contains photographs of
the Helms’ Ranch ( Boulder Springs Ranch ) taken BEFORE
the fire… has a broken link.
Well… it’s not actually broken… but clicking that ‘Helm Ranch
Photos Pre-Fire’ link just takes you to the same ‘Foley Site
Visit’ folder as the link just above it.
Any chance of fixing the ‘A52-Helm Ranch Photos Pre-Fire:’
link so it actually shows those Boulder Springs Ranch photos?
Once again… THANK YOU for everything… including your
extraordinary patience with this ongoing discussion.
I’m with fullsail rate of travel is irrelevant. The lesson learned is in the mistake. Dropping off the road into the green possibly without a lookout. They sacraficed their ability to monitor the fire behavior going on and their ability to react. I haven’t seen anything yet that convinces me that they thought they were taking anything other than calculated risk with the observed behavior being an eastward movement that they observed for several hours. I am looking at some information that shows the fire may have been closer, but I haven’t figured it yet. There is also some indication that the forecast weather change may have been miscommunicated. There was a change at around 2:45 to 3. I still haven’t seen anything to indicate what was thought about it.
I don’t believe there is a single chance that anyone has any idea what the rate of travel was or that it would matter. Pure speculation. If they were going 100 or .01, dropping into the drainage is still the problem. Has been since July. Speculating what the rate of travel in brush was there that day, is 4th grade amature hour. Remeinds me of Ford/Chevy arguments. So if the point is that going down into a green drainage where you couldn’t see was a bad idea, it doesn’t take or require rate of travel to see that.
But, we do know where they deployed, for a fact. We have a good idea where and when they started. As a factual matter, the rate of travel (painfully slow) that they experienced matched up with what they would have reason to expect when they dropped down. Rate of travel is important. If they could have gotten to the ranch in 5 minutes, obviously we wouldn’t be having this discussion. Slow rate of travel is what made dropping down such a bad decision. Likewise, evaluation of the actual escape routes available during the bushwhack requires rate of travel as a consideration. Timed escape routes….i.e. rate of travel.
One lesson learned is in fact that rate of travel is key.
Yea you know where they deployed that is the only thing known after the photos at the lunch spot. “We have a good idea where and when they started” is speculation. “they would have reason to expect” is speculation. “Slow rate of travel is what made dropping down such a bad decision”, I disagree turn them around, rate of travel is incident to dropping off into a green drainage with no view. They dropped down lost their SA and ability to react to new changes. You don’t drop down it doesn’t matter how fast travel would have been. It doesn’t matter where the two track went they stay high and they would have kept their options open. Here’s my speculation, dropping down to me means they didn’t have a perception of a threat, they didn’t feel there would be a threat. That they would make and there wasn’t going to be anything close to them when they got there.
Here is a question how do we know that when supposedly (paraphrasing) Marsh said “that’s it, that’s exactly what we want” on A/G, he wasn’t talking to Steed and just hadn’t changed his radio to the crew channel?
WFF you make several good points but then state they took a calculated risk. They did not have a perceived threat? That tells me you think it is OK to not evaluate things that could happen and check the 10 and 18. They did not do either. Going back to the original discussion it was all about why they took a route that was very slow going and they should have known better. But then they should have known better than to do what they did when they left the black. The final out come has to do with the rules regardless of how they got there.
Well Bob you can speculate on what I think when ever it makes you happy. I didn’t say anything about what I would do or thought was OK. I speculated that they didn’t percieve a risk. Risk is walking out into traffic, calculated risk is watching for an opening in traffic that you think you can make it across. You’ve got allot of experience don’t discredit it by saying you never took calculated risk. That is what you used to do and what we still do. Burning is calculating that you can hold the road and using whatever mitigation you need to increase your odds. Putting in line on top of a ridge is calculated risk, ridgetops increase the odds of holding the line. When the PIG is 10%, it’s still that 10 out of 100 emmbers are going to start, but you’d burn with a 10% wouldn’t you. I’ve done allot of burning at higher than that. It does not appear that they percieved the risk. They made a mistake that I don’t think they percieved. Leaving the black and walking down the two track didn’t violate anything. They could have turned around and gone back. You said your self they could have bailed off the back. Someone also said that the two track went somewhere. Leaving the black wasn’t the mistake. Is it just impossible that they didn’t see it coming?
While I agree with your risks listed I never took a calculated risk when it came to safety. I guarantee it. I never had a accident with crews under me of worse than a twisted ankle. No broken bones and no deployments. 3 summers hot shots, 4 summers Engine Foreman, crew boss, sector boss, division boss, Type two line and fire boss, and ops and IC type two. Safety and fire safety were my priorities and they served me well discussed that with Gary way back. I lived and preached the 10 and 13 my entire carrier. I got a lot of rewards for my safety record and served on R5 Fire Safety First committee 1973. That’s where my real reputation in Wild Land Fire is and I am proud of it. when I talk about calculated risks I am talking SAFETY I believe they felt they could beat the fire to the ranch SZ and then down the road and out. Nothing heroic nothing fancy just decided to get off the mountain with out a safety plan. Can’t prove it so just my thoughts.
Yep thats pretty much what I’m saying. I just don’t think that they saw a threat they considered a risk. That’s it and it was wrong.
I like to discuss with you, to bad we cant sit a table and talk it out this dam computer any way.
Agreed that staying on the two-track that Elizabeth may want to disappear would have kept their options open and been the way to go. In terms of weight to give 1) green drainage, 2) no view and no lookout, and 3) inevitable painfully slow speed, it’s a fair point that they all work together, if that’s your point. If GM was only going to spend 1 minute in the green, as an extreme example, though, I’d say the bushwhack would have been reasonable based on what they knew when they dropped down. But, it was obviously going to leave them exposed for much longer.
In terms of your assertion that dropping down meant that GM didn’t perceive there to be a threat, WFF, consider that there’s a difference between feeling there’s no threat, and feeling you can pull something off. Context suggests the latter. And in fact, given weather and fire behavior, their believing there was no threat again would be quite strange.
OK we don’t know what was obvious to them, so you’re speculating. We always take calculated risk, everytime we go to a fire. It’s what we percieve the odds are and we always mitigate to our advantage. That’s no revelation, or shouldn’t be. An emtire IHC got wiped out, so yea quite strange since you’re going for understatement. Your on the RTS bandwagon about Eric aren’t you? Prove it without speculation, second, or thrid hand information. Do it I want to see it, first hand. I think you’ve got nothing. I want you show me it was negligence, or it’s just slander.
Your problem you don’t want to believe what has already been said. RTS saw Eric do it as did current HS Superintendents and talked to him about it. It is fact not fiction or slander first hand knowledge by RTS who also received the information from Superintendents that surveyed the Fire and discussed what happened. If you want something more you may have to wait for the law suits if they make it to court.
How did they mitigate the risk when they dropped into the bowl? It seems as if they just went for it. Would have to believe that they did not perceive any real risk. If you start doing things that have a 99% chance of being safe on a regular basis, your chances of being an old hotshot are not going to be very good.
Mike, good point. But, at the time they dropped down, they weren’t looking at a 99% chance of being safe imo. Cutting it close at best.
Agreed, but they just didn’t realize it. For whatever reason, they had a blind spot that day.
Tats why were still here maybe some one has the answer or maybe not.
Why don’t you think they realized it?
Good question.
SSR – Is the question you asked trying to determine whether they did realize it or not, or asking the reason why they did not realize it?
If the former, I do not think they could have realized it because I really do not think they were wanting to chance dying. If the latter, I don’t know why they did not realize it.
Reply to WFF post on April 7, 2014 at 11:25 am
>> WFF said…
>> Yea you know where they deployed that is the
>> only thing known after the photos at the lunch
>> spot. “We have a good idea where and when
>> they started” is speculation.
No. It’s not.
First of all… they did not ‘depart’ on their journey
south from ‘the lunch spot’. There really is no
doubt that they ‘departed’ from the location of
both the MacKenzie videos ( 4:02 timeframe )
and the final Wade Parker photo at 4:04… the
last known photo from them.
The ‘lunch spot’ was a little northeast of that
4:00 PM to 4:04 PM ‘resting spot’ and further
down the slope. They were close to the
two-track at that last ‘resting spot’.
These (different) locations are now all known…
so it is not ‘speculation’.
In case you missed the posts on that… the SAIT
investigators themselves made a great effort
to nail down these various ‘exact locations’ and
there is now a folder in Mr. Dougherty’s online
dropbox containing those results.
That folder is labelled the ‘Stewart Turner’ photos
but has the following two sub-folders in it…
Ashcraft Photo Location
Parker Photo Location
The SAIT actually found the EXACT spot where those
photos were taken.
They then took their own GEO-STAMPED photos at
those exact locations for the Ashcraft 2:16 ‘lunch spot’ photo and the 4:04 PM Parker photo at the
OTHER spot that they would later ‘depart’ from…
and the GEO stamps are accurate.
Here is that folder…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/j0n13974nlb6xxp/470HDybJDQ
The exact location of the 4:04 PM Wade Parker
photo ( the last known photo from them and the
location they departed from and headed south ) is…
34.227511, -112.789962
>> WFF also wrote…
>> Here is a question how do we know that when
>> supposedly (paraphrasing) Marsh said “that’s it,
>> that’s exactly what we want” on A/G, he wasn’t
>> talking to Steed and just hadn’t changed his
>> radio to the crew channel?
Because the SAIR says that Marsh specifically
‘called out’ (verbally) to ASM2 and specifically
identified himself ( verbally ) as “Division Alpha”,
and specifically used the word ‘retardant’ ( which
is absent from your paraphrase of what was
was published in the SAIR ).
Page 27 of the SAIR ( Adobe Reader page 33 )…
__________________________________________
At 1637, ASM2 flies a drop path for a VLAT north of Yarnell west to east and apparently over DIVS A, turning northward to avoid high ground at the end of Yarnell. DIVS A, seeing the flight, calls and calmly says, “[ASM2], Division Alpha, That’s exactly what we’re looking for. That’s where we want the retardant.”
__________________________________________
So the SAIR says the specific ‘call signs’ were
there for there to be no question who Marsh
wanted to say that too, and no question on ASM2’s
part that Marsh was directing that statement
to THEM and it was SPECIFICALLY about
‘a retardant drop’.
So… is that really true?
Is that what really happened?
Well… let’s see…
The SAIT chose to PUBLISH both that QUOTE
and put a definite TIME on it as if it was an
absolute fact. What made them so sure?
The only reference anywhere else in the SAIT
material to this call from Marsh about ‘retardant’
is in the few notes they made during their
interview with Bravo 33.
From the SAIT Yarnell Investigation Notes (YIN)…
__________________________________________
INTERVIEW with Bravo 33 July 9, 2013 – 1700
Interviewees:
John Burfiend-ATS Specialist
Clint Clauson – ATS Trainee
Thomas French – AT Specialist
Interviewers: Mike Dudley, Brad Mayhew, Tim Foley,
Jay Kurth, Jimmy Rocha
We needed to go back to the right flank (16:30 AZ time). Made 3 practice runs. Painted 2. We came around.
Got a call from Division A stating they were going down their escape route to the safety zone. Didn’t know Division A was the superintendent of the Granite Mountain hot shots. Asked him “is everything OK?” He replied “everything is ok, just heading to the safety zone”. We came around, made a practice run through the bowl, west to east. I was talking to Tom about the rising terrain on exit. Division A clad and said “that is what we are looking for, that is exactly right”. Within 5 minutes of that, they went in shelter.
__________________________________________
So according to the SAIT investigator’s own
notes… what Bravo 33 said they heard from
Marsh does NOT match what the SAIT ended
up publishing as a ‘direct quote from Marsh’
in there own PUBLIC report.
Bravo 33 says they heard…
“that is what we are looking for, that is exactly right”.
The SAIT then comes up with this and publishes
it as if its a direct, verifiable quote from Eric Marsh…
“[ASM2], Division Alpha, That’s exactly what we’re looking for. That’s where we want the retardant.”
The Bravo 33 ‘interviewees’ did, in fact, say that
“Division A” called THEM… so we can only assume
that means they did hear the correct “ASM2,
Division Alpha” call signs were present…
…but Bravo 33 doesn’t say they specifically heard
the word ‘retardant’ from Marsh. The SAIT either
just ‘made that up’ or that part of the interview
never made it into the SAIT interview notes.
Notice also that Braov 33, themselves, never
seems to nail this down to exactly 1637… yet
that is the TIME the SAIT published for this
transmission. There is no indication how the
SAIT came up with that 1637 timestamp.
OK I didn’t say they left from the lunch. Congrats on the Mckenzie pic. So you know that wasnt taken while moving? I doubt it. With Marsh good I’m glad that isn’t the case.
>> You said…
>> “We have a good idea where and
>> when they started” is speculation.
If by ‘started’ you meant “where they
left the safe black and ‘started’ their
journey south”… that is NOT in the
realm of speculation anymore.
It is as *known* (with certainty) about
as much as anything that happened
that day CAN be known.
Two things:
1. xxfullsailxx – I’m apologize to you. Many months ago, I thought you were just trying to be disruptive, and I realize now that I misunderstood what you were doing and, more importantly, WHY. I am sorry for being unkind to you. I apologize.
2. Does ANYONE have a photo taken AFTER the fire that shows that the two-track that GM was on before they then dropped into the valley actually EXTENDS southeast (then curves back a bit northish) to the BSR, such that GM COULD have stayed on that allegedly-existing two-track rather than dropping off into the valley? I have not seen a SINGLE photo taken AFTER the fire that reveals an obvious and well-defined two-track that GM could have stayed on and taken to the BSR at the exact point when they instead dropped down into the valley. If anyone has seen one in the HUNDREDS of pictures that are publicly available, please let me know (either here or via e-mail to [email protected]). Thanks. (This is relevant to Bob Power’s point to xxfullsailxx below.)
Sounds like Elizabeth is trying to “disappear” the two-track for purposes of analyzing YHF. Never existed. Never heard of that 2-track guy, officer.
Bob’s point regarding the 2 track is quite sound, and based on experience. And, one further benefit is that GM would have kept elevation for longer had they stayed with the two track, with obvious implications. Since GM chose not to stay on the 2-track, “disappearing” it seems irrelevant, anyway. They chose not to follow the obvious way down.
Elizabeth, you again need to find people with legit experience to get info from. Getting out to AZ wouldn’t be a bad idea, either.
Reply to SR post on April 7, 2014 at 9:20 am
>> SR said…
>> And, one further benefit is that GM would have kept
>> elevation for longer had they stayed with the two track,
>> with obvious implications.
Most definitely. If they had just kept walking south on
that two-track… it would have EVENTUALLY reached
that point where it was going to take the eastward
turn and want to drop them down into another
‘fuel-filled canyon’ for that eastward leg towards the
Boulder Springs Ranch…
However… they would have been CLIMBING even
higher during that continued SOUTHERN trek and
at the point where they would have then had to
decide whether to continue on the eastward part
of the two-track ( into that other canyon )… they
would have had a CLEAR VIEW looking back
to the north/northeast of what the fire was doing,
and its incredible speed increase SHOULD have
been quite evident at that point… at that high
vantage point.
All they had to do then was realize the whole plan to
get to that Ranch was now ‘not an option anymore’,
and drop off that high point to the south towards the
Congress side of the ridge and work their way east
towards the Candy Cane lane area, instead. ( which
is EXACTLY what the hikers Tex (Sonny) Gilligan and
Joy Collura did that day ).
Elizabeth,
I response to your query regarding the two-track, here are some details that were provided to me by a highly reliable source who is very familiar with the area in question:
The use of the descriptive term “two-track” becomes a bit of a mis-nomer, as the road passes by the bowl and GM’s point of decent. It’s more the size of a ‘track-and-a-half’, that continues to decrease in size as it heads slightly SW, until reaching the top of the rise, where it becomes a single track. When that trail reaches the next drainage over from ‘the bowl’, it turns eastward, following the drainage down. This portion is a very rugged single-track, sort of a ‘pack-trail’, if you will, and not even the sort of thing an ATV could traverse in either direction. Because it proceeds close besides, and then, back and forth through what is a pretty significant drainage, it may have only been barely evident, if at all, in any before OR after pictures taken in that area.
As far as how clear the trail was pre-burn from an egress standpoint, one would have to assume that there would be SOME over-grown brush affecting movement. But, having said that, the fact that the trail had been there for a LONG time, and was used periodically by hikers, as well as game, would lead one to assume that it would be an easier slog than a place where no trail existed at all.
In addition, I just pulled up google earth to look at the area, and if you make sure the ‘roads’ layer is checked, it shows the progression of this ‘roadway’, down the drainage and all the way back around to the Boulder Springs Ranch.
I used 2 track sience it was designated as such in the conversations. More of a basic trail, hiking, horses, Maybe mortercycles or maybe cattle. Used from the ranch to get to the top of the mountain. My experience says its a trail that starts at the ranch or end of the road. Not having scouted the ESCAPE ROUTE lose terminology I would have stayed on a trail not gone into thick brush and a canyon. My lesson in life, never on a fire go into a brush filled canyon for any reason or any body and Always know what the fire is doing and have a lookout.
Because there’ve been a considerable number of fanciful or downright strange assertions surrounding the bushwhack, pardon me for stating the obvious here, but: having something peter out into a foot trail isn’t at all unusual. So, before someone says, well, maybe they knew that the 2-track portion ended, so had no choice but to drop down on a bushwhack. No. Staying on the 2-track would have been the thing to do. Though staying in the black would have been better.
Reply to TTWARE post on April 7, 2014 at 12:47 pm
Everything you say above is true.
It ( the two-track ) turned more into just a ‘hiking trail’
as it turned eastward and descended into that ‘other’
drainage/canyon feature…
…but even with ‘Labels’ turned OFF in Google maps…
it is clearly visible from satellites all the way through
that ‘drainage/canyon’.
One minor correction to what you said, though…
>> TTWARE said…
>> In addition, I just pulled up google earth to look at the
>> area, and if you make sure the ‘roads’ layer is checked,
>> it shows the progression of this ‘roadway’, down the
>> drainage and all the way back around to the Boulder
>> Springs Ranch.
Yes… it does… However… the Google ‘Labels’ option is
making a critical mistake down there at the bottom of
that ‘two-track/hiking trail’.
The Google Maps ‘Label’ option is trying to make it
appear that that ‘two-track/hiking trail’ connects
DIRECTLY to the Boulder Springs Ranch and then
even goes on to become a contiguous part of the
full-road jeep-trail that exits the BSR on the northern
perimeter.
That is NOT the case.
That ‘two-track/hiking trail’ is actually more meant to
be a ‘connector’ to the Candy Cane Lane area and
does NOT actually go ‘directly’ to the Boulder Springs
Ranch. There is a ‘draw’ there at the end of the eastward
leg of that ‘trail’ and while the BSR would probably
have been in view to the due north, at that point, passing
north through that drainage and then through the heavy
manzanita on the southern side of the Ranch does
NOT appear to have been all that clearly marked.
They would still have had to sort of ‘figure out’ that
final due-north leg of their journey and do some
‘bushwhacking’ just to make it to the southern perimeter
of the Ranch ( while now hiking due north and straight
at the oncoming fireline/smoke ).
Their best option, at that point, would have been to
just exit southeast through the draw and over towards
the Candy Cane Lane area instead of still trying to
make the Ranch.
Followup…
If this ‘how clear was the path from the end of the
eastward leg, north into the ranch?’ question is being
revisited, don’t forget that it’s not all based on
Google or satellite imagery. There are some good
ground-level photos to look at as well.
There is always the photograph of the ‘southern
approach’ to the Ranch that was taken by hiker Joy
Collura THAT MORNING ( June 30, 2013 )…
It was taken the morning of the incident itself, as Joy
and Tex (Sonny) Gilligan were heading up into the
Weaver Mountains to look at the Yarnell Hill Fire for
themselves and they passed by the Boulder Springs
Ranch in about the same general area where that
eastward two-track terminated.
The entire area in the foreground of that photograph
is, in fact, the southern approach to the Boulder
Springs Ranch as it looked THAT DAY… and shows
pretty clearly the possible ‘tangled mess’ that GM
would have had to deal with for the last few hundreds
yards of their journey after turning north at the bottom
of the eastward leg of the ‘escape route’ trail…
Here is the photo…
https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/sh/eedzcsi1dpeczak/vRGDU9CIpx/Reduced%20Photo%20Images/1%20%28142%29.JPG?token_hash=AAGqQKbREb0yMp88nKg-tR9VdXMfGRn9RxBsV3o8LU35CQ
Reply to Elizabeth post on April 7, 2014 at 8:51 am
>> Elizabeth asked…
>>
>> 2. Does ANYONE have a photo taken AFTER the fire that
>> shows that the two-track that GM was on before they then
>> dropped into the valley actually EXTENDS southeast (then
>> curves back a bit northish) to the BSR, such that GM
>> COULD have stayed on that allegedly-existing two-track
>> rather than dropping off into the valley?
There is a PUBLIC YouTube video which is a complete
“YOU ARE THERE” fly-through of that alternate escape route.
It’s been sitting in a PUBLIC YouTube account since November
30, 2013.
That ‘fly-through’ video of the alternate escape route is here…
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HhN2wNNS2no
Here is the ‘About’ information accompanying that video…
TITLE: Fly-through of alternate route for GM Hotshots on 06/30/13
Published on Nov 30, 2013
A fly-through of the alternate escape route that could have been
taken by the Granite Mountain Hotshots on the afternoon of June
30, 2013… if they had only known about it. There is still no definitive
proof ( as of this date ) that any of the men were actually aware of
this alternate route that afternoon. The point where the roll of pink
tape was found ( which is shown in the video ) is assumed to be
the point where they actually left the two-track high ridge road
and descended into the box canyon.
Also… there was a post just a few days ago with some links to
some *new* post-fire photographs in the ADOSH material that
might be what you are looking for.
Here is a reprint of that post from a few days ago…
>> WantsToKnowTheTruth on April 3, 2014 at 12:43 pm said:
>> Reply to SR post on April 3, 2014 at 9:12 am
I still believe there’s a good chance that the ‘swiss cheese’
model was TOTALLY in play at 4:20 PM… and that the moment
Captain Jesse Steed saw that Ranch come into view… he
still had NO IDEA where that high-ridge two-track really went.
Even if someone had simply TOLD him that two-track went
all the way to the Ranch… from that ‘Descent Point’ where
he was standing it was still impossible to ‘see’ that and he
may have then doubted anything anyone even ‘told’ him.
If anyone else still has ANY doubts that it was IMPOSSIBLE
to see, from that point, where the two-track really went as
it headed south from that point… there is an amazing new
set of pictures released with the ADOSH material that
further proves that.
* GPS STAMPED ADOSH PHOTOS TAKEN JULY 18, 2013
Folder… ( 22 photos )…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/20inrene9tcx74a/C_WOT51-a3/ADOSH%20Yarnell%20Hill%20Investigation/Photos%20and%20Video/ADOSH%207-18%20photos%20w%20GPS#/
There are all post-burn but fascinating photos.
Photos 3-9 are actually a panaorama sequence taken at the exact
spot where Tex (Sonny) Gilligan found the roll of pink tape/flagging
at the ‘Descent Point’.
Photo 3 starts looking north back towards the anchor point and the
panorama sequence ends with photo 9 looking due south down
the two-track trail.
This is after the burn… but this photo was taken standing at the
EXACT spot where GM would have left the two-track road, and the
EXACT spot where Tex (Sonny) Gilligan found the roll of pink tape…
and it shows the EXACT view you would have had looking south
along the two-track at that point.
The trail starts to CLIMB away at that point and curl around the hill
and you can only see another 100 feet or so of the trail.
It is IMPOSSIBLE to tell where that trail goes at this point with
your own eyes.
You would HAVE to have known where it goes from that point.
If you did NOT have that prior knowledege… then dropping
into the canyon would have looked like the ONLY option,
regardless of what a PITA it was going to be.
Followup #1…
Since you can only safely have one hyperlink in a post
here on this WordPress deal without risking a fall into
‘Message waiting for moderation’… here is a FOLLOWUP
post with another link to one of the specific photos
shown above.
This is the YOU ARE THERE photo… seeing exactly
what you could ( and could NOT ) see standing exactly
where Jesse Steed was standing. ( This is post-burn,
of course, but you will still get the full experience ).
The view is directly SOUTH, looking down the two-track,
from the ‘Descent Point’.
Just to the left ( out of frame ) would be the view down i
nto the box canyon and on to the Boulder Springs Ranch
in the distance.
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/20inrene9tcx74a/C_WOT51-a3/ADOSH%20Yarnell%20Hill%20Investigation/Photos%20and%20Video/ADOSH%207-18%20photos%20w%20GPS#lh:null-IMGP0249.JPG
Followup #2
Same spot as above… but this photo has just a bit of the
Boulder Springs Ranch on the left side. It is still the ‘view’
looking south down the two-track at the exact place the
roll of pink tape was found.
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/20inrene9tcx74a/C_WOT51-a3/ADOSH%20Yarnell%20Hill%20Investigation/Photos%20and%20Video/ADOSH%207-18%20photos%20w%20GPS#lh:null-IMGP0248.JPG
GPS stamp in this photo is… 34.221465, -112.781978
Camera: Pentax WG-3 GPS
Lens: 4.5 mm
Exposure: Auto exposure, 1/320 sec, f/7.9, ISO 125
Flash: Auto, Did not fire
Focus: Normal
Date: July 18, 2013 9:06:45 AM
Location: 34° 13′ 17.3″ North, 112° 46′ 55.1″ West
Location Decimal: ( 34.221465, -112.781978 )
Fullsail—To bring this discussion back into perspective.
Would you have done a bush whack thru heavy chaparral when you were in a hurry to get to a SZ ?
GM committed to a slow decent thru heavy brush which had not burned in over 40 years.
There rate of travel may have been faster by measuring the zig zag decent. But the distance in a striate line to reach there objective was taking a lot longer to achieve.
Working thru thick brush, following openings that you still have to cut openings thru and running into boulders that you have to go around or over is very time consuming.
Thus the travel is not at a normal crew pace. Their decision to drop into the bowl and thick brush field is in itself puzzling it was there back yard they should have known what it would take to do that.
Even if not scouted common science says the 2 track would take you to the Ranch. The 2 track had to start some where the Ranch or the end of the road it did not start from the top of the hill. The 2 track would have been way faster travel than what they did. Estimating rate of travel is just that an estimate of time and distance, or from point a to point b. When they left the 2 track there rate of decent was way slower and that is the fact that has been suggested. Another poor decision that should have been a major concern to the crew before they ever left the black,
Completely agree.
In terms of time of travel, one key underlying point here is that time of exposure to risk is the thing that matters in the context of going through that bowl. (Or, elsewhere, time to reach an objective for other reasons.) There is no “A for effort” given. While FullSail’s assertion that GM could have kept a normal pace is not credible given conditions, let’s even say, hypothetically, that they were walking at 4 mph but having to circle around a lot. They were still moving forwards at less than a shopping mall pace. They were still exposed to a fire below and anticipated, realized weather shift and an uphill escape route behind them over uneven, rocky ground, dense brush, etc.
again, your reading comprehension leaves a lot to be desired. nowhere did i indicate that they would have been able to maintain a “normal crew pace.” what i was giving you with the 3 mph expected crew pace, was a frame of reference for you to understand just how far off your .5 mph assertion was.
there is nothing to indicate that GM perceived themselves as “at risk” to the fire when they made their descent. if they felt imminently threatened by the fire (like they might have needed an escape route) they would have stayed in the black.
their miscalculation was the fire behavior, not the route hiked. it’s easy for someone like you to make judgments in the after math of a tragedy like this… but your judgments are mis-guided, much like your logic.
#1. they weren’t in a hurry to get to a safety zone. they were in a hurry to get to a position where they could get a new assignment.
#2. i never said they were travelling at a normal crew pace… i said that .5 mph was a ridiculous assertion, which it is. nothing about the terrain looked all that difficult, we negotiate through terrain like that all the time. the chaparral in that area is not the same continuous-coverage chaparral that you find on hillsides in southern CA.
#3. i think we all agree that GM was very familiar with the terrain and fuels around the Yarnell area… they are very similar to that found around Prescott. they knew better than any of us about the advantages and disadvantages in attempting to walk across that ground as well as the pace of their crew on such a bushwack.
#4. there was nothing inherently wrong with trying to shortcut (not take the two track) across that ground. we do it all the time (just like you stated when you talked about 55 years of hiking with crews through chaparral.)
#5. the inherent mistake was not posting a lookout and not giving more consideration to the possible wind shift and associated fire behavior.
FYI: and only because SR seems to want to beat this point to a bloody pulp… i grew up in tucson moutain biking and hiking all over southern az… went to college in flagstaff, hiking and biking all over northern az… then started in fire in flagstaff, and spent two seasons working, guess where, ALL OVER AZ… so stop trying to make yourself seem like the expert you’re not SR.
Somehow in all that time you never noticed that dense chaparral takes a long time to walk through? Again, amazing,
What gets weird again is when you mention mountain biking…I assure you, mountain biking doesn’t give you great direct experience with hiking through dense brush.
Not having a lookout was certainly ONE mistake. But, given the fact that they set off on a committing, slow bushwhack, very soon after they committed to that bowl, the lookout also in a way was going to become useless.
Rate of travel. Again, key. In evaluating the escape routes available, if any, among other things. Not long after dropping over that lip, because of the painfully slow rate of forward travel and slower rate yet of any escape back uphill, if their lookout alerted them they were still without any good options. Because given the slow rate of travel they were already out of time.
Also Elizabeth should refer back to WTKTT info on where that 2 track came out at the ranch. Google earth? And fullsail is the only expert here according to ELIZABETH ??? fullsail you spend so much time trying to discredit others you are spinning in circles.
Reply to Bob Powers post
on April 7, 2014 at 11:58 am
>> Mr. Powers said…
>> Also Elizabeth should refer back to
>> WTKTT info on where that 2 track came
>> out at the ranch.
Correct. Actually… everyone should take
a ‘close’ look at that ‘actual’ situation.
That two-track which was (supposedly)
their ‘designated escape route’ to the
BSR did NOT actually ‘come out at the
right at the Ranch’.
If Marsh and Cordes really did spend any
time looking at that ‘road that leads to the
ranch’ with Google maps on an iPad ( and
there still is no real proof they DID )… then
they didn’t ZOOM DOWN enough.
Even though ‘Google Maps’ with ‘Labels’
turned on seems to clearly show that
two-track terminating AT the Boulder
Springs Ranch… that is actually NOT
the case. Google is trying to ‘connect’
the end of that two-track to the same
one that leads north out of the northern
perimeter of the Ranch itself… but that
clear ‘connection’ Google is trying to
show there when the ‘Labels’ option is
ON doesn’t actually exist.
If you turn ‘Labels’ OFF in Google Maps,
just about all of that ‘escape route’ is
still clearly visible from satellites as
‘dirt paths’… but it is actually meant more
as a path over towards the ‘Candy Cane
Lane’ area than any kind of direct path
to the Boulder Springs Ranch itself.
There is a ‘draw’ there at the bottom of
the eastward leg of the route that they
would have had to traverse… and THEN
there are patches of VERY THICK
manzanita surrounding the southern
approach to the Ranch itself that is as
thick as anything they would have been
encountering out in the fuel-filled box
canyon. They would have had to ‘bushwhack’
the last leg of the journey, anyway, just to
reach the actual perimeter of the Ranch,
or at least stop and ‘figure out’ that last
leg of the journey… but they would now
be heading due north and straight at
the approaching fire.
If they really had gone that way… one would
only assume ( and hope ) that by the time
they reached that draw… they would have
abandoned the final due-north bushwhack
to the Ranch itself and opted, instead, to
just head southeast and out the draw
towards Candy Cane Lane… which is
where that ‘two-track’ really goes at
that point.
Correction for post above.
I said…
“Google is trying to ‘connect’
the end of that two-track to the same
one that leads north out of the
northern perimeter of the Ranch
itself”
That two-track ( jeep trail ) leading
north out of the Ranch area itself
is NOT the same one as the
two-track known now as the
‘alternate escape route’ that
passes through its own blind
canyon to the SOUTH of the Ranch.
They are TWO DIFFERENT
two-tracks… with NO clear
‘connection’ between them.
Google Maps with ‘Labels’ turned
on is simply mistakenly trying to
make it LOOK like they are a
continuation of the same two-track.
That is NOT ( nor ever was ) the case.
Way to fuckin’ bury the lead. Sweet mother of God….
Elizabeth, I suspect you simply have no practical experience and so no way to understand how maps piece together with objectives.
WTKTT,
I beg to differ, the connection is very apparent on many maps, as well as visible to the naked eye on google earth. The ranch appears to be fairly new, and those trails have been around since the mining days, probably long before Candy Cane Ln.
i agree with this… the two track looks pretty easy to follow to me.
also- you’re being misleading again with the whole “designated escape route”… there was no designated ER… that why we’re here.
Reply to TTWARE
post on April 7, 2014
at 8:49 pm
>> TTWARE said…
>> WTKTT,
>> I beg to differ, the
>> connection is very
>> apparent on many
>> maps, as well as
>> visible to the naked
>> eye on google
>> earth.
Fair enough… but I’m
still not ready to buy
‘very apparent’… not
to men on the ground
totally unfamiliar with
the area and who had
done no scouting.
The ‘way to go’ once
they reached the end
of the eastward leg
was perfectly apparent,
yes. There are clearings AND paths
through that first ‘draw’
as you now head due
north… but I’m still not
so sure it was ‘very apparent’ after that point
how to ACTUALLY cut through those manzanita stands and achieve the final part of the journey INTO the compound itself.
Check out this photo of the area in discussion taken that very morning by Joy Collura as she passed the Boulder Springs Ranch…
https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/sh/eedzcsi1dpeczak/vRGDU9CIpx/Reduced%20Photo%20Images/1%20%28142%29.JPG?token_hash=AAGqQKbREb0yMp88nKg-tR9VdXMfGRn9RxBsV3o8LU35CQ
SR- i am done with you. you are like arguing with a brick wall. all you have going for you is self proclaimed experience/knowledge of all things “chaparral.” congratulations, you’re the self-proclaimed, internet’s own, shackleton of shrubbery.
beyond that, you continually whine about being “personally attacked” and then go on to make your own personal attacks… i don’t mind them, but you should stop whining about it like an eight year old school girl.
you continue to [try] call out folks for a lack of “experience” but have yet to provide any background for your own self-proclaimed doctorate of shrubbery… who are the people with “legit experience?” yourself? laughable. you’re worried about wff’s spraining their ankles hiking around in the woods…
you claim “fanciful notions” while talking about “escape hatches” and “blinking out” and google earth hypnotic images…
you continually (and conveniently) avoid the primary points that negate what your trying to speculate about… while again, trying to make yourself sound like you know something that you don’t.
i think we’ve established, that you’ve never spent a day on a wildland fire, let alone a fire crew and let alone an IHC… i certainly don’t think you have as much experience walking around in the woods as Eric Marsh or Jesse Steed. and i suppose THAT’s what really matters here. you seem to be continually speaking like you know something that they didn’t… but you don’t. they knew the terrain and fuels they were hiking through. they knew, better than you do, what kind of time they could make to the ranch. they chose the route because they thought it would be the quickest way to get to the ranch and be able to get a new assignment.
no amount of speculation by you, the self proclaimed expert of all things chaparral, is going to change that.
this deserved it’s own discussion…
WTKTT on April 5, 2014 at 3:06 pm said:
>>”That means it took them 19 minutes ( 4:20 PM to
>>4:39 PM ) to travel those 470 yards from the two-track
>>down to the deployment site.
>>19 minutes = 1,140 seconds
>>470 yards = 1,410 feet.
>>That’s a travel rate of… 1.23 feet per second ( 0.83 mph ).”
wait, you’re measuring their distance traveled in a straight line!? talk about smooth sailing! LMAO! you have got to be kidding me!? this whole time you’ve been measuring the distance traveled by GM after dropping off the two track and wiggling their way down to the deployment site by using the ruler function on google earth to measure a straight line!? that’s ridiculous… and further shows how far out of touch you are with this whole situation. i don’t know what the hell measurements SR was using to come up with .5 mph, but he’s even further off the mark. please reference the squiggly line shown in the SAIR for a possible path that GM walked… you would have to straighten out THAT line in order to come up with a relative distance measurement…
are you kidding me? i guess that’s MY BAD for not having bothered to check your work or asking… i guess it didn’t really matter until this point in the discussion when you’re so desperate for something new to sensationalize that you’ll re-ignite a past discussion to perpetuate any sort of controversy.
so NO, a straight line with the google earth ruler does not do justice to the path that GM would have had to walk down that drainage… they would have been winding their way around rocks and brush probably trying to connect GAME TRAILS, openings and drainage’s.
and again, Marsh and Steed were both very familiar with walking in a variety of AZ scrub and terrain. i’m sure they knew [certainly much better than you or SR] what kind of progress their crew could make through the drainage. and i think we can well establish that their pace was probably a steady walk while snaking their way down the canyon…
their fatal flaw was trying to short cut through the green and losing sight of the fire and not having a lookout to report the change in wind direction and thus, the fire spread.
Steady walk through dense chaparral over broken, rocky ground? Not credible, and reflective to me that FullSail is simply inventing fanciful notions.
GM made the progess you’d expect through that type of bowl: slower than a shopping mall walk. That slow pace would have been evident shortly after dropping over the lip. It is what it is.
SR, you want to explain how you came up with .5 mph?
right, i guess you don’t want to “show your math.”
for obvious reasons.
btw, your whole premise was based on your .5 mph progress rate which i think we’ve established is not credible.
do you want to explain your experience walking/hiking with an IHC? or type 2 crew even?
see below for SR’s “rhetort.”
i don’t think you have any “practical” experience as a wff… so stop making such spectacular speculations about the speed and time spent hiking as an IHC.
This is getting to be funny. It may be a surprise to FullSail, but WFFs of what sort don’t levitate. And, as we know, GM progressed through their bushwhack at less than a leisurely shopping mall pace. This was predictable, because of the dense brush. What they set out on had every reason to be a slow slog, which it was.
-how did you come up with .5 mph?
-do you have experience as a wff?
those are pretty direct questions that you keep avoiding…
I’m not avoiding them, they’re just not directly relevant. You trying to question my experience is an obvious “rhetorical technique” or, more down to earth, a punk move, because you are persisting in saying something stupid and are trying to change focus with a personal attack.
As far as .5 mph versus .83 which WTKTT got, I honestly don’t think it’s that key. Both are a crawling pace. You don’t seem to understand that the bushwhack was predictably going to be at that pace, and are digging deeper.
It is what it is. Get out and get experience.
both .5 mph and .83 mph are logical fallacies.
and you, quite obviously, have zero experience as a wff.
one more thing… you seem to keep wanting to make a big deal out of the terrain as well…
nothing about that terrain looks foreboding… steep towards the top of the ridges and flattish in the valley bottoms… it all looks pretty typical of what you might find yourself hiking over while working on a fire… there are no cliff bands on the route down, nothing technical, just a lot of rock and brush. no need for “escape hatches” (fanciful notions you say?)
there is a big difference between “hiking” as a civilian (which i am assuming you are at this point) and “hiking” around while working as a wff… ask any wff.
The college educated among us might say FullSail is resorting to a “rhetorical technique,” namely, since FullSail’s persisting in saying something stupid, attacking someone personally when it’s pointed out that FullSail’s saying something that doesn’t hold up. Look, FullSail, the reality is they undertook a bushwhack that clearly was going to be a slow slog. And, did turn out that way. As we know.
Chaparral doesn’t have to look “foreboding” to be a slow slog to hike through. Which it was.
You can invent all sorts of weird ideas like, Well, they probably were really moving quickly, but just snaking back and forth a lot. Well, no. Not the way it works. Not credible, but more importantly, you don’t get extra credit in time to travel from A to B by snaking back and forth. The key question for them was, How long will we spend in this bowl, with escape back uphill quickly becoming impossible to us, before we make it the ranch or elsewhere reasonably safe? The clear answer was, A long time. As their progress indicates. We know where they started, we know where they deployed. Their lack of forward progress is not at all surprising.
What IS surprising is the decision to have started the bushwhack. To understand such an unconventional choice — a long, committing bushwhack through dense unburned brush — you need broader context. Including reports of prior unconventional tactics and a reported desire for secrecy over crew movements.
wow, i was very directly addressing your points.
you make a claim (not unlike elizabeth) that you are being “personally attacked” because you have no logical retort.
my “foreboding” comment was with regard to the terrain, not the chaparral. nice try taking it out of context.
i disagree about your “A to B” comment… the straight line may show you that it’s only a mile as the crow flies from the two track to the BSR… but hiking down there, is quite obviously something different (which you contradict yourself by acknowledging and then quickly discarding that fact).
GM knew that fact as well, when they embarked down the bowl. what they didn’t anticipate was the wind shift and associated fire behavior.
I WILL AGREE WITH YOU, that hiking out in front (or flanking) the fire through the green is definitely an unconventional method of travel… just NOT for the reasons you’ve cited (the terrain and fuels).
I think you’ve again illustrated you don’t understand that travelling through dense chaparral is going to be slow.
Until you get more (some) direct experience, you’ll likely not be able to understand. Or, you’re simply looking to consciously normalize deviancy, in terms of trying to take something that was going to be a slow slog, and was, into something that seems more reasonable that it was.
Bottom line, anyone who thinks that the bushwhack undertaken by GM looked to be anything other than a slow slog when they started it, should spend some time in that kind of dense brush.
FullSail
I could say a lot in reply here to you. Over 55 years of walking thru thick brush both with crews and without. at work and hunting in heavy chaparral, you have chased your rabbit around in a circle to prove every body wrong and you right. Sorry you missed the boat on this one and SR is absolutely right on this one.
bob- you have long ago, lost credibility with me.
if it’s such a bad idea, then why were you walking for 55 years through thick brush?
if you agree with SR, then wff crews would NEVER do such a thing…
Because I hunted Rabbits, Quail both mountain and valley, Some times working deer out. I also spent time hiking to fires with small and large crews that had no road access. as well as ridge top fire breaks in the LA Basin with my HS crew. So yes I know a lot about walking thru brush. You can take or leave my credibility your is in great question. SR never said that a crew never slogged thru brush but they should have known what it was like and the time it took. I am doubting you have ever been there.
Yes he keeps digging deeper.
Experience gives shared referencepoints, that FullSail seem to lack.
Reply to xxfullsailxx post on April 6, 2014 at 7:52 am
>> xxfullsailxx said
>> wait, you’re measuring their distance traveled in a straight line!? >> talk about smooth sailing! LMAO! you have got to be kidding
>> me!? this whole time you’ve been measuring the distance
>> traveled by GM after dropping off the two track and wiggling
>> their way down to the deployment site by using the ruler
>> function on google earth to measure a straight line!? that’s
>> ridiculous… and further shows how far out of touch you are
>> with this whole situation.
Fer cryin’ out loud.
Please read what is posted.
That measurement is taken directly from the SAIR… which you
seem to put such trust in.
See page 26 of the SAIR.
>> xxfullsailxx
>> please reference the squiggly line shown in the SAIR for a
>> possible path that GM walked… you would have to
>> straighten out THAT line in order to come up with a relative
>> distance measurement.
Once again… please read the SAIR.
That is the path THEY are assuming they walked ( without
providing any evidence why they thought so )… and I’m
also assuming ( unless they are even more incompetent than
has already been proven ) that the measurment they would
publish matches the route the believe they took.
If they didn’t… well… what can anyone say.
TOTAL incompetence.
>> are you kidding me? i guess that’s MY BAD for not having
>> bothered to check your work or asking… i guess it didn’t really
>> matter until this point in the discussion when you’re so
>> desperate for something new to sensationalize that you’ll
>> re-ignite a past discussion to perpetuate any sort of
>> controversy.
Whose desperate now?
Re-igniting discussions based on false assumptions.
>> so NO, a straight line with the google earth ruler does not do
>> justice to the path that GM would have had to walk down that
>> drainage… they would have been winding their way around
>> rocks and brush probably trying to connect GAME TRAILS,
>> openings and drainage’s.
So… why don’t you do something useful?
Check it yourself… then contact the SAIT and ask them why
their published distances don’t match their published diagrams…
…then come back here and let us know what they said.
If it really is ‘far off’… I’d love to know what THEIR explanation
is for that. I really would. They are the ones that had full access
to the site… and were being highly paid to come up with the
facts and the details.
are you talking about the map on page 27 of the SAIR? ah yes, i see, page 26 in adobe reader, not the page number…
the .27 miles? and didn’t you go in to google earth and “confirm” this measurement at some point?
see, the SAIR doesn’t go on to infer such things as a .83 mph rate of travel… because they admit to not knowing the exact route as well as time spent making decisions… (and apparently SR just missed the mathematical conversions portion of his “college education” to somehow pull .5 mph out of who-knows-where… so since you don’t contest that .27 miles is an accurate distance hiked, we can agree that .83 mph is way off the mark too… thanks.
this is your problem all along… false allegations based on shaky evidence and a lot of presumptions.
i think you would help yourself by revisiting the “investigative process” and “approach and philosophy” found on page 5 (SAIR pg. #) to understand WHY every minute detail isn’t needed and FOR WHOM the SAIR was written…
It would seem that walking through the brush was not really the problem, but when they did it was. Also not having eyes on the fire, having unstable weather etc.
I understand what you say about the SAIR not aiming to provide every detail, most times WFFs do not need all those details to learn lessons. But what about the families that do want the details and to know exactly “what happened”. Who is supposed to do the investigation to answer their questions?
It would have been dumb to do at virtually any time, given their other options, but you’re correct that the fire below and forecast weather change, that did occur, are what combined to make this so bad an idea at the time they did it. There are conditions where it would be perfectly safe, except for risk of the odd sprained ankle, eye injury, etc., to walk through that brush. (But, with better options, why bother?) In the case of GM, at the time they decided on the bushwhack they already knew it wasn’t safe.
SR- it’s easy to judge as an arm chair quarterback… especially when your frame of reference is outside the day to day operations of wildland fire management during the summer months.
sprained ankle? eye injury? really? you forgot to mention scrapes and other boo boo’s…
you really don’t have a clue about what wff’s do on a day to day basis during the active fire season do you? … yet you don’t hesitate to judge.
now whine some more about how you were “personally attacked.”
It is easy to sneer, on the internet, at ankle sprains or eye injuries when you’re not the one suffering them. Real-world, they are serious things, and ones that can impact the usefulness of a whole crew, not simply the one who suffers them. Recognizing the risk and minimizing likewise is important in the real world.
umm, SR… we are expected to wear 8″ leather boots and eye protection (PPE) to prevent those silly injuries… and we hike around on steep, rugged ground through vegetation ALL SUMMER LONG… so stop talking about things that you have absolutely no clue about.
mike- i would imagine the families had full access to the actual people involved… as well as the SAIT… (if they wanted it) at least until the lawsuits were filed. they were the first ones to hear and see the SAIR and have their questions answered.
and that’s why ADOSH got involved, right? to try to assign “blame” or to further investigate what happened.
if you’re suggesting that they come to this website and to have their questions answered, i would beg to differ with you. you end up with people like SR and WTKTT drawing illogical conclusions (.5 mph) and false allegations because of their severe lack of understanding about the situation they are hyper-analyzing… not to mention the pages and pages of scrolling through speculation and assumption.
One very useful part of this site is in fact debunking of assertions that don’t hold water. For the families, for WFF’s looking for lessons learned, etc. That’s why noting that FullSail is so fully off, without a factual basis, for so much of what he is saying in this case is a valuable function. The bushwhack that GM chose was, at the time they chose it, going to be a slow slog. Wishful thinking, or loud shouting, or personal attacks, can’t change that simple fact. People who question can among other things get experience in moving through dense chaparral and then reflect on what is obvious to those who have, namely that GM was in for a slow slog when they committed to their bushwhack.
yep, you’re right, i’m sure it’s very helpful to the families to have people with ABSOLUTELY NO WILD LAND FIRE EXPERIENCE to be second guessing the decisions made by their deceased family members (who were professionals). such as you, SR, who is basically saying that GM, though fully aware that their route would be a “slow slog” and “pathetically slow”, knowingly took the route anyways and despite realizing how slow (.5 mph by your ill-conceived math) their progress was, continued until it was too late… apparently blinded by the dense chaparral.
what “factual basis” are you speaking from? because i think it’s very apparent that you’re not very good at math or reading comprehension… oh wait, i know, you’re Dr. Chaparral!
I was not implying the answers would come from here. The sequence of events will be known when someone with the express intent of learning what happened is able to talk to those involved and put the story on the record.
I don’t think ADOSH was really that helpful. They were looking to hang the overhead on the fire, and they did. Whatever mistakes those guys made, they were not the primary cause of the demise of the 19. However, at least ADOSH did leave an interview record, so we know a lot more about the timeline than the SAIR gave us.
I am not sure the families have gotten the answers to their questions yet. I was one who earlier suggested that Musser might in fact have met with he families. One of the reasons given for the lawsuits is in fact to find out what happened.
i hear you on all your points.
i just don’t think there’s much more story to tell. the rest of the story died with GM, sad to say.
some will argue that B. McDonogue (sp.?) has more of the story… i have my doubts… he’s just some dumb kid (no offense meant) in his second year on a hotshot crew… i doubt he really had a clue what all was going on, until it was way too late. but maybe he’ll prove me wrong some day.
Your ‘fire brother’ that
you just called a ‘dumb
kid’ and ‘clueless’, who
was at the end of his
THIRD full season as a
fully qualified member
of a Type 1 Hotshot
Crew, and who was
fully trusted by his own
highly experienced
Supervisor to serve
as ‘lookout’ for 18 of his
own ‘fire brothers’…
…is named…
McDonough
Brendan McDonough
M-C-D-O-N-O-U-G-H
** PANEBAKER AIR STUDY VIDEO
** 20130630_154138_fire_behavior_EP.MOV
Transcript of the background radio conversation captured by Panebaker
Air Study Video 20130630_154138_fire_behavior_EP.MOV.
A public copy of this Air Study video is in Mr. Dougherty’s online Dropbox at…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/y3jy5opssrcvzb3/S3cCXl9pjr/AerialFirefightingstudy/Panebaker/Video/Video#lh:null-20130630_154138_fire_behavior_EP.MOV
ECITW ( Every Caveat In The World )
This is what I ( me, personally ) believe is being said in the background of this
video. Your mileage may, of course, vary.
This video is 31 seconds long, so given the small note in the README.TXT
file that accompanies these Air Study videos which states that they all use the
VIDEO END time as the timestamp in the TITLE… then that means this
particular video STARTED at 1541.07 ( 3:41.07 ).
NOTE: A conversation is already in progress in the background on
one of the TAC channels when the video starts and the talk now
seems to be about evacuations and the ‘people on the road(s)’.
Helicopter flyovers and loud foreground talk obscure most of the
background conversation and a VERY loud helicopter flyover
completely obscures the final 8 seconds of background audio,
but some of the background conversation can still be clearly heard.
VIDEO STARTS AT 1541.07 ( 3:41.07 PM )
+0.00 ( 1541.07 / 3:41.07 PM )
(Unknown): uh… bring it in here and… uh… be able to figure out
( if we’re gonna ) ?? …we’ve got all these people ( along? ) the road… ??
+0:17
(Unknown 2): ah… ??… not… ??… before long.
+0:23 ( 1541.30 / 3:41.30 PM )
(more background conversation in here but a VERY close
and loud helicopter flyover obscures it all from here to
the end of the video ).
VIDEO ENDS AT 1541.38 ( 3:41.38 PM )
** PANEBAKER AIR STUDY VIDEO
** 20130630_153622_5KA_EP.MOV
Transcript of the background radio conversation captured by Panebaker
Air Study Video 20130630_153622_5KA_EP.MOV.
A public copy of this Air Study video is in Mr. Dougherty’s online Dropbox at…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/y3jy5opssrcvzb3/S3cCXl9pjr/AerialFirefightingstudy/Panebaker/Video/Video#lh:null-20130630_153622_5KA_EP.MOV
ECITW ( Every Caveat In The World )
This is what I ( me, personally ) believe is being said in the background of this
video. Your mileage may, of course, vary.
This video is 43 seconds long, so given the small note in the README.TXT
file that accompanies these Air Study videos which states that they all use the
VIDEO END time as the timestamp in the TITLE… then that means this
particular video STARTED at 1535.39 ( 3:35.39 PM )
NOTE: This video STARTS just 7 ( SEVEN ) seconds after the
previous video ( 153532 ) ended and comes right after OPS1 Todd Abel
seemed to finish his conversation with Willis with “I copy”.
ALSO NOTE: This Air Study video ( and the ones posted just below that
immediately precede this one ) establish exactly where SPGS2 Darrell
Willis was during this entire timeframe and what he was doing. He was
very busy at this exact time conducting burnouts in the Model Creek
Road area AND trying to put out some ‘spotting’ at the same time. Willis’
own unit logs describe these activities but Willis was vague on the times.
These 3 Air Study videos ( taken in sequence ) establish EXACTLY when
he was actually doing all that AND when he was talking to OPS1 Todd Abel
about it all.
VIDEO STARTS AT 1535.39 ( 3:35.39 PM )
+0:00 ( 1535.39 / 3:35.39 PM )
(Unknown): ( Blocked by helicopter flyover ).
+0:06 ( 1535.45 / 3:35.45 PM )
(Unknown): Okay, I copy that.
+0:07 ( 1535.46 / 3:35.46 PM )
(SPGS2 Darrell Willis): Say… can you catch that helicopter to pick up
those spots… uh… north of the… Model Canyon road?
+0:15 ( 1535.54 / 3:35.54 PM )
(Unknown): Okay… you’re… is that the main road… uh…
preppin’ stuff on ?? when we talked?
+0:19 ( 1535.58 / 3:35.58 PM )
(SPGS2 Darrell Willis): Yea… and that we’re just burnin’.
+0:22 ( 1536.01 / 3:36.01 PM )
(Unknown Air Attack?): Okay… we’re gonna bring… uh… some (tankers)
in there ??… uuuuh… if that’s what ( loud traffic noises here in the foreground ).
+0:30 ( 1536..09 / 3:36.09 PM )
(unknown): ?? copy… why dontcha come out in front of the ?? a coupla
times and ?? (drop?) across the road.
+0:39 ( 1536.18 / 3:36.18 PM )
(SPGS2 Darrell Willis): Okay… I’m talkin’ about the bottom part of the road.
+0:42 ( 1536.21 / 3:36.21 PM )
(Unknown): Yeah.
VIDEO ENDS AT 1536.22 ( 3:36.22 PM )
** PANEBAKER AIR STUDY VIDEO
** 20130630_153532_EP.MOV
Transcript of the background radio conversation captured by Panebaker
Air Study Video 20130630_153532_EP.MOV.
A public copy of this Air Study video is in Mr. Dougherty’s online Dropbox at…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/y3jy5opssrcvzb3/S3cCXl9pjr/AerialFirefightingstudy/Panebaker/Video/Video#lh:null-20130630_153532_EP.MOV
ECITW ( Every Caveat In The World )
This is what I ( me, personally ) believe is being said in the background of this
video. Your mileage may, of course, vary.
This video is 1 second long, so given the small note in the README.TXT
file that accompanies these Air Study videos which states that they all use the
VIDEO END time as the timestamp in the TITLE… then that means this
particular video STARTED at 1535.31 ( 3:35.31 PM ).
NOTE: This video was shot starting just 21 seconds after the previous
one ended ( 153510 ) and is only 1 second long. OPS1 Todd Abel apparently
just says “I copy” back to SPGS1 Darrell Willis after he finishes answering
Abel’s previous question and fully reports his location ( on Model
Canyon Road ) and his status at the end of the previous clip.
VIDEO STARTS AT 1535.31 ( 3:35.31 PM )
+0:00 ( 1535.31 / 3:35.31 PM )
(OPS1 Todd Abel): I copy.
VIDEO ENDS AT 1535.32 ( 3:35.32 PM )
** PANEBAKER AIR STUDY VIDEO
** 20130630_153510_EP.MOV
Transcript of the background radio conversation captured by Panebaker
Air Study Video 20130630_153510_EP.MOV.
A public copy of this Air Study video is in Mr. Dougherty’s online Dropbox at…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/y3jy5opssrcvzb3/S3cCXl9pjr/AerialFirefightingstudy/Panebaker/Video/Video#lh:null-20130630_153510_EP.MOV
ECITW ( Every Caveat In The World )
This is what I ( me, personally ) believe is being said in the background of this
video. Your mileage may, of course, vary.
This video is 23.6 seconds long, so given the small note in the README.TXT
file that accompanies these Air Study videos which states that they all use the
VIDEO END time as the timestamp in the TITLE… then that means this
particular video STARTED at…
VIDEO STARTS AT 1534.47 ( 3:34.47 PM )
+0:02 ( 1534.49 / 3:34.49 PM )
(Unknown, possibly OPS2 Musser?): Fire may light the structures
here… Do you copy?
NOTE: Next transmission seems to be catching OPS1 Todd Abel
and SPGS2 Darrell Willis in mid-conversation. Abel seems to be answering
the last thing Willis had said ( pre-video start ) and he does not appear
to be responding to the +0:2 transmission above.
+0:05 ( 1534.52 / 3:34.52 PM )
(OPS1 Todd Abel): My hope here is… that… the way… ya wanna keep…
I think we’ll be in good shape… but if we hit some type a weird wind shift…
ah… what exactly is your location?
+0:15 ( 1535.02 / 3:35.02 PM )
(SPGS2 Darrell Willis): Okay we’re comin’ up this road… uh… road, uh…
Model Canyon road… and lightin’ some (fires?) ( VIDEO ends and cuts
off the rest of his sentence ).
VIDEO ENDS AT 15335.10 ( 3:35.10 PM )
**
** SOUTH… MID-SLOPE… CUTTIN’ OVER…
FYI: No revelations here… but a very interesting photo has appeared in one of
the new ADOSH investigation folders.
It is a high-res photo taken from back near the anchor point, looking due
SOUTH at the ‘escape route’.
This photo matches EXACTLY what Eric Marsh himself appears to have been
reporting over the radio over one of the TAC channels circa 1613.44 ( 4:13.44 PM )
in response to the direct query from someone in fire command…
“Granite Mountain… what’s your status right now?”
That’s the radio capture where Marsh jumps in ahead of Jesse Steed and
answers the radio call before Steed has a chance to, even though it really
wasn’t directed at HIM ( Caller asked speak directly with Granite Mountain
Sup ( Jesse Steed that day ) and NOT “Division Alpha” ).
Here is what Marsh’s response *appears* ( your mileage may vary, etc. )
to have been…
1613.44 / 4:13.44 PM
Eric Marsh: Well the guys… uh… Granite… is makin’ their way out the exact
escape route from this mornin’… an’ it heads… ah… (pause) SOUTH.
( slight pause ) mid-slope, cuttin’ over.
Key line here…
“(pause) SOUTH ( slight pause ) mid-slope, cuttin’ over.”
The following ADOSH photo shows EXACTLY that (description), and anyone
standing at the same location where THIS photo was taken would most probably
have used those EXACT same words to describe what THIS pictures
clearly shows… ( Heads SOUTH, mid-slope, cuttin’ over )…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/20inrene9tcx74a/EC2oDLR41K/ADOSH%20Yarnell%20Hill%20Investigation/Photos%20and%20Video/ADOSH%20Hiking%20Yarnell%20Hill%209%2018%2013#lh:null-P9180052.JPG
So I wonder if it’s possible that this ADOSH photo actually captures just about
the spot where Marsh really was at 1613 ( 4:13 PM ) when that “What’s your
status?” radio call came in… and when he PAUSED and LOOKED SOUTH,
this is exactly what he saw and exactly what he described himself seeing at
that moment ( 4:13 PM ).
It might not be the EXACT spot where Marsh was at 4:13 PM and still trying to
‘catch up’ with Steed and the crew… ( he could have even been farther down
towards where the two-track junction is but still had the same exact ‘view’
to describe over the radio )… but it could be close… since his ‘description’ of
the route he was looking at matches this photo EXACTLY.
** SIDENOTE…
By the way… below is a rework of what I ( me, personally, only, your mileage
may vary, yada, yada… ) believe is the full transcript from the video referenced
just above with the TIMESTAMPS reworked based on the assumption that the
video title represents the END time for the video and not the START time…
That video is a long one ( 3 minutes 30 seconds ) so this ‘rework’ of the
timestamps now puts the “Granite Mountain… what’s your status?”
call from fire command into the 1613.30 timeframe.
** AIR STUDY VIDEO 20130630_161620
The following is a reprint of what I ( me, personally ) believe
to be a full transcript of this particular AIR STUDY video,
INCLUDING the part at the start of the video where ASM2
is actually requesting that someone ‘check on them’…
which is the REASON for the “Granite mountain… what’s
your status?” query that happens a few seconds later.
ECITW ( Every Caveat In The World )
This is what I ( me, personally ) believe is being said in the
background of this video. Your mileage may, of course, vary.
This video is 3 minutes and 30 seconds long, so given the
small note in the README.TXT file that accompanies these
Air Study videos which states that they all use the VIDEO END time
as the timestamp in the TITLE… then that means this particular
video STARTED at…
1612.50 ( 4:12 PM plus 50 seconds ).
VIDEO STARTS ( 1612.50 / 4:12.50 PM )
+0:08.23 ( 1612.58 / 4:12.58 PM )
(Unknown): ASM2, Copy that… behind the hills is where you
place Granite Mountain?
+0:12.726 ( 1613.02 / 4:13.02 PM )
(ASM2): They’re on the corner just repeatedly saying that they’re
comfortable and that’s not credible. ASK him whether Alpha can
be placed WITH them.
NOTE: A few seconds later… Someone OTHER than who
ASM2 was just talking to ( someone with what sounds like a
Cajun accent? ) does exactly what ASM2 just TOLD them to do.
He calls Granite Mountain directly and asks them to report their
STATUS. If the time stamp on the AIR STUDY video can be
trusted then it is now about 4:17 PM, just before the SAIR says
they are about to leave the two-track road and drop into the box
canyon at approximately 4:20 PM.
+0:40.52 ( 1613.30 / 4:13.30 PM )
(Unknown): Granite Mountain ( Five? )…
What’s your status right now?
NOTE: A pretty heavy accent on this speaker. Sounds like
Louisiana Cajun? What he says almost sounds like…
“Granite Montun… wuz yo status rat now?
ALSO NOTE: Even though the caller asked for ‘Granite
Mountain’ specifically, and not ‘DIVS A’… Eric Marsh responds
immediately on behalf of Granite Mountain before Jesse Steed
even has a chance to say anything. Jesse only ‘chimes’ in with
his own ‘status’ report about “we’re pushin’ our way down into
the structures” when Marsh is done speaking.
+0:54 ( 1613.44 / 4:13.44 PM )
Eric Marsh: Well the guys… uh… Granite… is makin’ their
way out the exact escape route from this mornin’… an’ it
heads… ah… (pause) SOUTH. ( slight pause )
mid-slope, cuttin’ over.
+1:07.18 ( 1613.57 / 4:13.57 PM )
( Another voice immediately adds to what Marsh said but it is )
( NOT Marsh this time. It sounds like Jesse Steed )
Jesse Steed: We’ll be pushin’ our way down into the structures.
+1:10.16 ( 1614.00 / 4:14.00 PM ) ( Another voice. Very quickly )
Copy that.
+1:21.17 ( 1614.11 / 4:14.11 PM )
( Unknown): Ten four. You with Granite Mountain right now?
+1:24.68 ( 1614.14 / 4:14.14 PM )
(Eric Marsh?): Uh… just checkin’ it out to see where we’re gonna
jump out at.
There appear to be some other background conversations
in this video before we hear the 11 ( ELEVEN ) shutter
clicks of the fellas in the foreground actually shooting photos
of the VLAT drop… but there is also HEAVY road traffic
at this point that will take a lot more work to filter out.
END OF AIR STUDY VIDEO 20130630_161620 ( 1616.20 / 4:16.20 PM )
Typo above. I typed a ‘7’ in one spot instead of a ‘3’.
The following paragraph above *should* have read like this…
If the time stamp on the AIR STUDY video can be trusted then it
is now about 4:13 PM ( when the “Granite Mountain, what’s your
status right now?” radio call takes place ), just before the SAIR
says they are about to leave the two-track road and drop into the
box canyon at approximately 4:20 PM.
On debunking the idea that GM was using “game trails” or shortcuts to afford themselves a decent speed of travel in dropping into the bowl:
A few times the idea has been advanced that GM didn’t have reason, before the fact, to know that dropping into to bowl would involve a long slog through dense brush. Along with this idea, it’s been suggested that game trails or shortcuts may have been used to allow the crew to move at a good clip. First, based on timelines, we know that GM was moving at roughly .5 miles an hour once they dropped into the bowl. That is painfully slow.
Second, there’s no indication that locals routinely used trails or shortcuts through that area to save time. Nor is there any firm indication that this route had been actively scouted by Marsh or Steed before it was taken. While it is not uncommon for steep rocky ground to have a chimney or crawl between boulders or some similar small shortcut to save a minute here or there, it’s also true that based on the layout of that bowl that a significant shortcut, that might save a half-hour or more, doesn’t seem to have been available. There was no continuous feature like a broken cliff that might afford a direct and much faster route down an “escape hatch.”
Third, local knowledge of that kind of brush, particularly paired with steep, broken ground, reflects that travelling through it will be slow. While it is often possible to “blink out” game trails, following a game trail doesn’t mean that dense brush is not an issue. Even if a trail also sees significant human traffic, without meaningful improvements the foot traffic itself doesn’t make for easy going through that kind of brush. GM obviously was a local crew, recently off of another local fire.
The “sawyer” theory is to me slightly more plausible. But, there was not time available to meaningfully improve a route through that bowl, no improvements had been made beforehand (nor does the route appear to have been scouted), and in fact the rate of travel shows that an improved route was not available.
In other words, it was reasonable for GM to believe, before committing, that the route through that bowl would be a slow slog. If they had been analyzing this as an escape route, it is imo unlikely they would have selected it, versus the other options available.
However you then characterize this kind of highly committing shortcut, I don’t believe GM had reason to believe, before the fact, that dropping into the bowl would go quickly because of “game trails” or other features. And, they did have feedback, from their slow rate of travel, very soon after dropping down that in fact this would be a slow route to complete.
When I mentioned no indication that local used shortcuts through “that area,” I mean the area of the bowl that GM travelled through.
Reply to SR post on April 3, 2014 at 9:12 am
I still believe there’s a good chance that the ‘swiss cheese’
model was TOTALLY in play at 4:20 PM… and that the moment
Captain Jesse Steed saw that Ranch come into view… he
still had NO IDEA where that high-ridge two-track really went.
Even if someone had simply TOLD him that two-track went
all the way to the Ranch… from that ‘Descent Point’ where
he was standing it was still impossible to ‘see’ that and he
may have then doubted anything anyone even ‘told’ him.
If anyone else still has ANY doubts that it was IMPOSSIBLE
to see, from that point, where the two-track really went as
it headed south from that point… there is an amazing new
set of pictures released with the ADOSH material that
further proves that.
* GPS STAMPED ADOSH PHOTOS TAKEN JULY 18, 2013
Folder… ( 22 photos )…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/20inrene9tcx74a/C_WOT51-a3/ADOSH%20Yarnell%20Hill%20Investigation/Photos%20and%20Video/ADOSH%207-18%20photos%20w%20GPS#/
There are all post-burn but fascinating photos.
Photos 3-9 are actually a panaorama sequence taken at the exact
spot where Tex (Sonny) Gilligan found the roll of pink tape/flagging
at the ‘Descent Point’.
Photo 3 starts looking north back towards the anchor point and the
panorama sequence ends with photo 9 looking due south down
the two-track trail.
This is after the burn… but this photo was taken standing at the
EXACT spot where GM would have left the two-track road, and the
EXACT spot where Tex (Sonny) Gilligan found the roll of pink tape…
and it shows the EXACT view you would have had looking south
along the two-track at that point.
The trail starts to CLIMB away at that point and curl around the hill
and you can only see another 100 feet or so of the trail.
It is IMPOSSIBLE to tell where that trail goes at this point with
your own eyes.
You would HAVE to have known where it goes from that point.
If you did NOT have that prior knowldege… then dropping
into the canyon would have looked like the ONLY option,
regardless of what a PITA it was going to be.
Since you can only safely have one hyperlink in a post
here on this WordPress deal without risking a fall into
‘Message waiting for moderation’… here is a FOLLOWUP
post with another link to one of the specific photos
shown above.
This is the YOU ARE THERE photo… seeing exactly
what you could ( and could NOT ) see standing exactly
where Jesse Steed was standing. ( This is post-burn,
of course, but you will still get the full experience ).
The view is directly SOUTH, looking down the two-track,
from the ‘Descent Point’.
Just to the left ( out of frame ) would be the view down i
nto the box canyon and on to the Boulder Springs Ranch
in the distance.
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/20inrene9tcx74a/C_WOT51-a3/ADOSH%20Yarnell%20Hill%20Investigation/Photos%20and%20Video/ADOSH%207-18%20photos%20w%20GPS#lh:null-IMGP0249.JPG
Same spot as above… but this photo has just a bit of the
Boulder Springs Ranch on the left side. It is still the ‘view’
looking south down the two-track at the exact place the
roll of pink tape was found.
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/20inrene9tcx74a/C_WOT51-a3/ADOSH%20Yarnell%20Hill%20Investigation/Photos%20and%20Video/ADOSH%207-18%20photos%20w%20GPS#lh:null-IMGP0248.JPG
GPS stamp in this photo is… 34.221465, -112.781978
Camera: Pentax WG-3 GPS
Lens: 4.5 mm
Exposure: Auto exposure, 1/320 sec, f/7.9, ISO 125
Flash: Auto, Did not fire
Focus: Normal
Date: July 18, 2013 9:06:45 AM
Location: 34° 13′ 17.3″ North, 112° 46′ 55.1″ West
Location Decimal: ( 34.221465, -112.781978 )
wow, you go to great lengths to disprove the speculation about your speculation… i’m not sure you can accurately claim that their pace was .5 mph since you don’t really know what all went on between leaving the lunch spot and deployment… at a brisk marching pace an IHC can move at ~3+ mph… i think that .5 mph would have been, as you say, painfully slow and a pretty unacceptable rate of travel.
are you or have you been a wff? because very often “we” will bushwack a direct route, rather than take a round-a-bout trail… there were a lot of evident game trails through the area, that were very well seen in post fire pictures… i don’t think it’s unreasonable to SPECULATE that they were at least attempting to link them together with drainage’s/crags/openings.
i think you would be amazed at what many wff’s can walk through/up/down while carrying packs and saws/tools.
also, did you mean “escape route” when you say, “escape hatch?”
because yes, i agree, that unless they had a route designated and flagged (which does NOT seem to be the case) they were simply trying to bushwack because they thought it might be faster/most direct.
FullSail, I am seriously beginning to doubt your overall level of experience here.
3+ mph through dense chaparral? Not only does the time line reflect that this didn’t happen — so based on what occurred, we can know that they did not travel anywhere near that pace — but, it’s also not credible.
As is this idea of linking game trails as a means of just “zipping along” in that kind of dense brush. You may not understand this, but game trails are usually made by four-legged animals that don’t do a lot of pruning or other kinds of trail improvement.
As far as “escape hatch,” yeah, I said it and meant it, but used it in quotes for a reason. You might recognize it as a whimsical term for a 3rd-classable chimney or other section of cliff, that often is crappy and scary but can allow you to get down a cliff quickly and unroped. Or, in your case FullSail, clearly you don’t recognize it as such. FWIW, I think given what we know that it still would have been unreasonable and imprudent for GM to have tried to utilize such a feature, had it existed, because of the risk of a fall or other serious injury, but the point is such a feature can allow much faster and more direct descent in some areas. But didn’t exist in this case.
I’m also not suggesting that anyone needs to know the term “escape hatch,” btw. The context in which it was used was pretty clear, and I think FullSail simply was seizing yet another opportunity to throw mud. In the process, FullSail however is showing that he sure ’nuff hasn’t tried to hike through much chaparral, or even without the timeline we do have he’d know that 3 mph ain’t happening, particularly for a full crew that hasn’t dropped gear.
FullSail is also doing a bit of normalization of deviance. WFFs don’t very often go on hour-long bushwhacks through dense chaparral over broken, rocky ground. It would be stupid. There is virtually always a faster, safer way, even if conditions are such (early morning, etc. etc.) that fire is not an issue. A pattern of excessive bushwhacking is itself a real question mark and judgment and safety issue.
The key words to bear in mind here are “dense chaparral,” along with related issues like “bowl,” “uphill escape route,” etc. More generally, many regions of the country have their own sort of virtually impassable dense brush. Having a good bit of exposure, I can say that dense chaparral is some of the worst to deal with, but in general, no, a prolonged committing bushwhack through dense brush is not a normal thing that WFFs “very often” do. Suggesting that it is normal is, to be blunt, irresponsible. Do WFFs often go off of established trails? Of course. The difference entails, among other things, judgment. That judgment should make clear that long bushwhacks through dense brush aren’t normal or very often done.
hmm, so maybe the intent of your original post was to try to argue with me? because again, you’re making a lot out of MY speculation (game trails) that was in response to YOUR speculation (about how and why GM chose to go down off the two track.) i made no reference to them “zipping along” through that terrain. that is your poor reading comprehension skills biting you in the rear.
i was giving the 3 mph figure as an example of what’s expected for a rate of travel for an IHC crew (a casual arduous pack test pace.) then, i was [basically] agreeing with you that .5 mph would have been “pathetically slow” and expounding the point by saying it would be unacceptable for an IHC’s rate of travel. (the 3 mph rate of travel is possible over a variety of terrain, and a variety of fuels… obviously that rate of travel would vary given percent of slope, up or down and fuel type.)
admittedly, i have not heard the term “escape hatch” other than those used on boats… in fact, when i google search images for “escape hatch” i don’t seem to see anything besides submarines. and i have CERTAINLY NEVER heard it used with regard to wff’ing.
so, moving on, let’s answer a few questions…
-do you think that GM was indeed familiar with the local terrain and fuels in and around the Yarnell area? right, i do too. then what makes you think that an IHC captain WOULDN’T be familiar with the pace his crew could walk through terrain and fuels that they were probably VERY familiar with?
-you keep expanding on the use of the term “dense chaparral”… and you seem to want to make yourself sound like an expert about it. have you actually been to that area of Arizona? would you happen to know, in terms of tons per acre, how dense that chaparral actually was? because, i don’t think you really do.
-do you think that GM was in a hurry to get down to Yarnell? i tend to think so, given the fact that their intent seems to have been to re engage on the fire and assist with structure protection… so then why would you think that .5 mph was an acceptable rate of travel for X number of minutes? because they were clueless about what they were doing? i don’t think so.
i am not looking to perpetuate this silly, speculative argument with you. i am trying to understand why GM decided to take the path that they did, same as you… (at least I THINK that’s your intention here). i tend to believe that Steed/Marsh had reason to think they could make reasonable time by taking the shortcut because they had game trails, openings and washes to connect their path down. in fact, the SAIR also SPECULATES this on page 38… and, indeed, openings, arroyos and game trails are all shown in the post-fire overhead pictures of the area:
YOUR THEORY seems to suggest that Steed/Marsh were either completely inept at their jobs (one of their primary jobs being the efficient movement of 18-20 men over terrain and through a variety of fuels) or they were on a suicide mission, with crew in tow, by knowingly hiking their personnel through dense brush at a “pathetically slow” pace without second thought.
i don’t think that is/was the case.
Reply to xxfullsailxx post on April 3, 2014 at 10:15 pm
>> xxfullsailxx
>> i’m not sure you can accurately claim that their
>> pace was .5 mph since you don’t really know what
>> all went on between leaving the lunch spot and
>> deployment
It doesn’t matter ‘what all went on between leaving
the lunch spot and deployment’.
First of all… you are wrong about them ‘leaving the
lunch spot’. That is NOT where they departed from
when they finally decided to leave the safe black and
head south. It was from the location where the MacKenzie
videos were taken circa 4:02 PM and the same location
as the final known photo from them ( The Parker photo
taken at 4:04 PM, as they were leaving that spot ).
The exact location of 4:04 PM Wade Parker photo…
34.227511, -112.789962
Second… to establish their ‘rate of travel’ from the
two-track down to the deployment site… it only matters
what the estimated TIME is that it took them to cover
THAT part of the journey.
According to the SAIR… it actually was NOT .5 mph, but
it was *almost* as bad ( .83 mph ).
The SAIR itself says they left the two-track road and began
their descent into the fuel-filled box canyon at right about
4:20 PM. No one has yet really questioned that estimate.
The SAIR also says the exact distance from that
‘Descent Point’ down to the deployment site is
470 yards ( 1,410 feet ).
SAIR page 26
Descent Point to Deployment Site: 0.27 mi / 470 yards.
As for the TIME it (supposedly) took them to cover
those 470 yards… we now know that when Jesse
Steed’s first MAYDAY call comes onto the radio
at 4:39 PM, the ropes had already been pulled on
the chainsaws and they were running full blast
right next to him… which is why he is SHOUTING
when he says “We are in front of the flaming front”.
So that means they had already found the deployment
site by 1619 and were already ‘improving’ it before
Steed ever even decided to call Air Attack.
Regardless… even with ‘guesstimating’ how much
time had transpired before that moment… let’s say
they actually didn’t reach that spot until circa 1639.
That means it took them 19 minutes ( 4:20 PM to
4:39 PM ) to travel those 470 yards from the two-track
down to the deployment site.
19 minutes = 1,140 seconds
470 yards = 1,410 feet.
That’s a travel rate of… 1.23 feet per second ( 0.83 mph ).
>> xxfullsailxx also said…
>> I think that .5 mph would have been, as you say,
>> painfully slow and a pretty unacceptable rate of travel.
Agreed. Given the circumstances, 0.83 mph was equally
unacceptable. They should have KNOWN they were
‘bogging down’ and definitely ‘getting into trouble’ with their
original TIME/TRAVEL estimates and they should have
stopped to re-evaluate their plan before it was too late
to turn back.
>> xxfullsailxx also said…
>> There were a lot of evident game trails through the
>> area, that were very well seen in post fire pictures.
There have also always been a series of ‘clearing’s that
are fully visible via pre-fire satellite imagery that ‘line up’
from west-to-east down the center of the canyon from
the two-track to the deployment site… but these ‘clearings’
were on the steeper part of the slope. They are still
clearly visible, even today, via Google maps since the
satellite imagery being used by Google for that area is
still pre-fire.
There is no evidence that GM descended in these
‘clearings’, or that these clearings were in any way
‘evident’ to them. They seem to have stuck to the
drainage area at the northern edge of the canyon
for their actual descent.
The keyword here ( for either game trails or clearings )
is ‘evident’.
What may be ‘evident’ in satellite imagery and/or photos
before and/or after the fire doesn’t mean they were ‘evident’
in any way to people who hadn’t even scouted that area
before trying to go through it.
Typo above. I typed ‘1619’ instead of ‘1639’
in one spot.
Paragraph above should have read…
So that means they had already found the
deployment site by 1639 and were already
‘improving’ it before Steed ever even decided
to call Air Attack.
thanks captain hindsight…
so then, given the fact that they certainly did not walk in a straight line AND the fact that there was probably some time between stopping and realizing their tragic predicament and the moment they made the first radio transmission the rate of travel was probably upwards of 1 mph… maybe even pushing 2 mph if they were walking the squiggly line that the SAIR shows…
either way, it doesn’t change my PLAUSIBLE SPECULATION that game trails were present and probably played a role in the route they took. (and, once again, i am primarily basing this off of the post fire pictures that quite obviously showed a network of game trails.)
and you’ll enjoy this WTKTT…
i might further speculate that the network of game trails leading up and down the saddle-box canyon all seemed to be leading towards the BSR… i bet they have water, maybe salt licks and possibly feed out to attract wildlife. maybe we should indict the owners of the ranch for illegally feeding wildlife which created game trails which led GM to take a route off the two track!
I don’t think you’re checking your own notes,
or even your past postings here on this
ongoing discussion… and you’ve got us ALL
confused now.
IIRC… YOU are the one who has always scoffed
at ANYONE suggesting there was a chance
in hell of them ‘dropping packs and running’
at the MOMENT they realized their
predicament, and having any chance at all
of actually making it back up the to the ridge.
Now… here you are… somehow trying to
argue/speculate that maybe there were
all kinds of ‘game trails’ and maybe they
weren’t really having to ‘bushwhack’ much
at all and maybe now ( by your admission
up above )… maybe they really did have a
lot more TIME between realizing the trouble
they were in and the first MAYDAY?
You DO, realize ( right? )… that every moment
you are now giving them up above to reach
the increased rate of travel you seem to
be arguing for… ADDS to the time they
MIGHT have had to ‘drop packs and run’…
AND you also seem to be arguing that
maybe they would have had these ‘game
trails’ right there to help them escape?
So… how much EXTRA time ARE you
willing to give them between first realizing
they were in trouble… and then finally
making the first MAYDAY call at 1639?
Just curious.
30 seconds?
60 seconds?
More?
oh you’re going to go back to this again… yay!
Cpt. Obvious saves the day… again.
first of all, “game trails” through chaparral doesn’t mean smooth sailing… it’s still a bushwack. as our astute brush expert, doctor SR has pointed out, four legged creatures don’t limb the brush on their way through. what they DO provide is a general direction and foot path… my main point has been that GM must have been travelling at a reasonable pace, even while snaking their way around rocks and brush…
regarding the rest of your confusion:
you do realize that the winds in that drainage were probably upwards of 30-40 mph right?
and while i realize that you have ZERO first hand knowledge, but when winds and slope align then the fire is probably moving that fast as well… especially in dry brush.
and you do realize that the fire (as shown on the well researched fire progression map) was probably racing up the hill behind them as well…
nothing i’ve said is contradictory… obviously there was a time lag between realizing the situation, sizing up their options and putting the saws to work… (as i’ve said before). but i don’t even think an extra FIVE minutes would have helped them at the point they realized their situation. and certainly was not enough time to try to RTO back up the hill…
Keyword = “up”
Reply to xxfullsailxx post
on April 5, 2014 at 7:01 pm
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>> first of all, “game trails”
>> through chaparral doesn’t
>> mean smooth sailing
Probably not… but I’ll ask the
same question that SR did.
EXACTLY how much REAL
experience do YOU have
with THAT particular hiking
combination ( Game trails
in heavy Arizona chaparral )
in order to speak ‘expertly’
about it? I’m just curious.
Maybe you do know ‘all about
that’.
>> xxfullsailxx also said…
>> it’s still a bushwack. as
>> our astute brush expert,
>> doctor SR has pointed out.
There’s that world again…
‘expert’. See question above.
>> four legged creatures don’t
>> limb the brush on their way
>> through.
Not usually, no.
>> what they DO provide is a
>> general direction and foot >> path…
There still is no real evidence
that any such ‘foot paths’
were in any way visible in
that drainage… for the 470
yards west of the deployment
site that they were traversing.
>> my main point has been
>> that GM must have been
>> travelling at a reasonable
>> pace, even while snaking
>> their way around rocks
>> and brush.
Ah… okay. I see. So they
MUST have been? That
is defacto admission on your
part that you consider .83
( to, perhaps, 1.0 ) mph is
a perfectly ‘reasonable pace’.
Thanks. Now we truly know
what your ‘main point was’.
I disagree with you.
I still think that ‘pace’ range is
indicative of being seriously
‘bogged down’ on a hike.
>> xxfullsailxx also said…
>> you do realize that the
>> winds in that drainage
>> were probably upwards
>> of 30-40 mph right?
No, I don’t.
If they WERE… don’t you
think that should have been
just one more big RED FLAG
to them? Just one more
reason they should have
stopped and re-evaluated
that bad decision?
If you are right ( and even the
winds were that bad as they
were actually descending and
‘bushwhacking’ )… I think that’s
just ‘one more thing’ that
should have contributed to
them re-evaluating what
they were doing.
>> xxfullsailxx also said…
>> and while i realize that you
>> have ZERO first hand
>> knowledge, but when
>> winds and slope align then
>> the fire is probably moving
>> that fast as well…
>> especially in dry brush.
You are right… and ANYONE
with any experience SHOULD
have known ALL that.
So… are you NOW saying that
Jesse Steed and the rest of
Granite Mountain had
absolutely ZERO ‘first hand
knowledge’ of what all that
meant, as well ( combined
with the reduced rate of
travel )?
That seems to be what you
are saying.
>> xxfullsailxx also said.
>> and you do realize that the
>> fire (as shown on the well
>> researched fire
>> progression map) was
>> probably racing up the hill >> behind them as well…
It probably was… but THEY
didn’t know that WHILE they
were descending.
They were descending into
a fuel-filled box canyon with
no lookout. Whoops.
>> xxfullsailxx also said
>> i don’t even think an extra
>> FIVE minutes would have
>> helped them at the point
>> they realized their situation.
>> and certainly was not
>> enough time to try to RTO >> back up the hill.
Fine. So you are still sticking
with ‘no chance in hell’ for
ANY kind of ‘drop packs and
run’ scenario.
You still didn’t answer my
question.
You are now saying it is ‘obvious’ and a ‘given’ that
a certain amount of time
MUST have passed between
the moment they first realized
how much trouble they were
in… and then they finally
accomplished ALL of the
following things…
1) Made the decision to deploy
versus ANY other option.
2) Searched for and found
the chosen deployment site.
3) 18 – 19 men pulled up
from single file to a group.
4) Ropes were pulled on
the saws and work began.
5) Steed decides to call
Air Attack.
How much TIME do you
think actually transpired
to accomplish ALL of
those things listed above?
I’m still just curious what
your ‘expert’ opinion might
be on that.
Keyword = “up”
Followup…
I left out 3A…
1) Made the decision
to deploy versus ANY
other option.
2) Searched for and
found the chosen
deployment site.
3) 18 – 19 men pulled
up from single file to a
group.
3A) 1 or 2 men now
INFORMED 16 or
17 others what the last
act of their life was
going to be. They were
not ‘consulted’. No
time for that.
4) Ropes were pulled
on the saws and work
began.
5) Steed (only now) decides to call Air
Attack.
The ‘3A’ step itself
must have taken at
least a small amount
of time as well… so
that needs to be
‘added in’ to the
overall estimate.
WTKTT,
Thanks, I need to check on the .5, but given your eye for detail let’s go with the .83. Yes, extremely slow. Retreating back uphill would obviously be slower, so each minute down cost a multiple of time in terms of nearest escape. And, as they got further in the bowl, progress would bog more as the brush got relatively denser.
And, they had every reason to know that this would be the case when the decision to descend via that route was made. Heat stress, psychological stress, and other factors can of course impair judgment along with the simply fact of having gotten away with similar things before.
Yes. Add to that xxfullsailxx’s new assertion
that the winds in their faces were ALREADY
clocking 30-40 mph and blowing them
BACKWARDS in the drainage… even WHILE
they were still descending… and…
Well… you get the picture.
It was a bad place to be taking a hike.
Every minute down was one more minute
they should have used to stop… re-evaluate
that bad decision… and GO BACK.
whoa, “new assertion?”
who said “ALREADY”? you did…
(pretty typical for you really, to be ad-lib’ing your own narrative… that’s your favorite game, why should i expect any less?)
again, you act like this all happens in a vacuum. there was a distinct change from when they descended the two track to when they realized what the fire was doing… they would have been (mostly) sheltered from the wind on the way down… being on the leeward side of the knob and descending into a bowl, right? (right). the wind-slope alignment would have come in to play once the fire wrapped around the knob below them.
they couldn’t see the fire, and couldn’t feel the wind switch out of the north… until it was too late.
i realize you’re running out of controversy, (and therefore, people to blame) but don’t go vomiting all over your shoes looking for the next scandal…
First you say…
>> you do realize that the
>> winds IN THAT DRAINAGE
>> were probably upwards
>> of 30-40 mph right?
Now you say there was
hardly any wind in the drainage
at all ( that they could feel )…
>> xxfullsailxx
>> they would have been
>> (mostly) sheltered from
>> the wind on the way
>> down… being on the
>> leeward side of the knob
Fer cryin’ out loud…
Pick a story a stick with it.
You and SR can finish this
debate about what a ‘slow
rate of travel’ is.
I will always believe .83 to 1.0
mph represented an
unacceptable rate of travel
based on THEIR own imagined
travel rates/times to accomplish whatever the heck it was they thought were trying to do… and they SHOULD
have REALIZED that significantly reduced rate
of travel MIGHT be putting
them at GREAT risk that day.
Not much is ever going to
change my mind about that.
On game trails being “evident,” and rates of travel.
Basically, whether a game trail is “evident” or not doesn’t have much bearing on whether it’s reasonable to think it will make a bushwhack faster. Given the route GM took, what they seem to have followed is a natural drainage and not a game trail over the lip of the bowl. Would planning on linking up game trails and clearings be a plan with a reasonable likelihood of providing a prudent pace through that bowl? No. The ability to see game trails depends on factors ranging from lighting to the acquired skill of blinking them out, in addition to the thickness of vegetation in a given area. GM was not, I assure you, standing at the top of that bowl and able to see a network of game trails and how they linked to one another. It is not a credible idea.
FullSail to me clearly has not spent much time in that area, or would know how ludicrous it is to think this would be a reasonable plan. Likewise, the idea that GM was in fact cruising at 2 mph doesn’t hold water, on two levels. One, not credible given conditions and rate of forward travel. Two, if there WERE an incredibly snakey trail that they were following at 2 mph (not credible, but let’s assume), their rate of forward progress is what counts, and it was still slower than a shopping mall stroll.
FullSail has alluded a few times to the work capacity test as somehow suggesting that GM could have traveled faster. WFFs, in the “strenuous” version of the test, have to carry a 45 pound pack 3 miles in 45 minutes. Key point: they don’t do this through heavy brush. The fact that someone can pass a fairly easy standard on a flat hike doesn’t mean anything about what that same person can do in thick brush over broken rocky ground.
Even the way FullSail misuses the term arroyo suggest to me he doesn’t have much firsthand experience in the southwest.
Going with .83 as GM’s rate of travel, yes it is painfully slow. It is reasonable to believe they had slowed further by the time they stopped and made the decision to deploy. It is not surprising that a bushwhack of the type they chose resulted in such a slow rate of travel. It is the normal thing. If someone has not scouted the area (and GM had not) standing above GM’s route and planning on linking game trails that you don’t even know of would be reckless and not based on sound experience. There is no suggestion to me that this is what GM did, btw, I am simply addressing FullSail’s odd claim that this is what they may have done to expect to be able to go faster.
Because .83 mph seems a little abstract, let’s put it in terms of laps around a track. At 1 mph, you take 15 minutes to walk once around a track.
Key takeaway is that long committing bushwhacks are not “very often” done, for very good reason. And, ability to reverse, particularly uphill, goes away quickly so people should act quickly if they realize they aren’t making good time.
One other minor comment directed to WTKTT: re Google Earth, whether it’s a feature of the way they process images, or the way our brain perceives their images, it tends to be the case that chaparral, choked washes, etc. look much more passable on Google Earth than they are. Whereas things like cattails can look solid and be reasonable to get through.
hey SR… did you see all those game trails there on google earth? those GAME TRAILS that go up and down that very drainage that GM tried to hike through? all those game trails that are VERY EVIDENT in the pre-fire satellite images that google earth still has up?
i’m sure they “look much more passable on Google Earth than they are” because of “the way our brain perceives their images.”
wow, you have got to be kidding me with that shit… you would have been better served censoring yourself from writing that comment… what a joke.
oh wow, i hadn’t seen this one…
i think we’ve established that .5 mph AND .83 mph are not even kind of close to reality. those figures are based on time and distance over a straight line (as the crow flies, if you will)… the path that GM took was very obviously NOT a straight line for the obvious reasons that you are so desperately trying to speculate about…
i have never spoke of game trails as if they provided GM a “planned route”… like they looked down the drainage pointing out game trails to each other like they were playing connect the dots. i SPECULATED about your SPECULATION about how and why they chose the route they did…
SR says,
>>FullSail has alluded a few times to the work >>capacity test
i spoke of the work capacity test once, and i believe i explained the context for which i was using it… glad you finally looked it up. now stop taking my example out of context.
“misuse the term arroyo?” oh please, do explain… apparently in your world it doesn’t mean “intermittently dry creek”…
SR says,
>>”their rate of forward progress is what >>counts?”
oh goodness… i don’t even know what to do with that… so you could be hiking down a hill on a switch back trail that is 5 milies in length, moving at 3+ mph but your actual FORWARD PROGRESS might only be 3 miles as the crow flies… and that’s what counts!? very sound logic… about as sound as your math skills.
i don’t think you have any clue what wff’s do on a daily basis… i also don’t think you have any clue how dense that chaparral was… i bet you don’t even understand that the term “chaparral” , when used outside of CA., is used as a general descriptor for brush… the actual “chaparral” in and around the Yarnell area consisted of scrub oak, cat claw and juniper… and, while dense in some areas, it grows in varying pockets and not the continuous coverage you find on southern CA hillsides…
you’re really hell bent on making the point that game trails were not used… okay fine, they didn’t walk down a single game trail… you speculate that (based on a complete lack of wildland fire experience)… i’ll speculate there were game trails that gave them some semblance of general route and path (based on 13 years experience).
Simply, FullSail continues to be clueless pretty much across the board on this point. Whatever his motivation for typing without the hands-on experience he is clearly lacking on this point, there’s not much to say except that he clearly hasn’t spent much (any?) time in relevant parts of the southwest.
on which point? because there were like five points above, none of which you addressed…
**
** (1) DID SPGS1 GARY CORDES EVER ACTUALLY SCOUT THE
** BOULDER SPRINGS RANCH BEFORE ESTABLISHING
** IT AS SUNDAY’S ‘PREDETERMINED SAFETY ZONE’?
**
** (2) THE BOULDER SPRINGS RANCH HAD PERIMETER FENCING
In Gary Cordes’ ADOSH interview… there was some extensive discussion at the
start of it about what Cordes spent his time doing on Saturday evening and very
early Sunday morning.
Cordes actually arrived in Yarnell and checked in with IC Russ Shumate
at 2340 ( 11:40 PM ) Saturday night.
In his ADOSH interview… the ADOSH investigators were actually going over
Cordes’ officially submitted incident ‘Unit Log’ with him, line by line.
Cordes details some of his ‘scouting’ around the town of Yarnell itself and goes
into good detail about his time-consuming hike ( circa 4:40 AM ) all the way
out to within 200 yards of the fire.
At NO time, however, in either his own ‘Unit Log’ entries or during the ‘line by line’
talk-thru of it with the ADOSH investigators does Cordes ever actually say he
was ever physically at the Boulder Springs Ranch itself prior to the main
briefing at 0700 on Sunday morning when he started telling inbound
resources ( like Eric Marsh ) that it was the ‘predetermined safety zone’
for that day’s work cycle in that area.
The ADOSH interview also never fully establishes WHEN, exactly, Cordes
had actually DECIDED that the Boulder Springs Ranch would be the ‘designated’
Safety Zone for the Sunday work cycle.
All we know ( in the only evidence that has been made public, anyway ) is
that come the 0700 Sunday briefing… it WAS already the ‘predetermined
safety zone’… and SPGS1 Cordes was then telling ( soon to be DIVSA )
Eric Marsh that was the case for that work cycle.
There is actually what might seem to be some evidence in the ADOSH
interview transcript that Cordes might not have ever actually seen the
Ranch in the daylight at all ( like not EVER ) since he seemed to have
no real idea in his interview what the SIZE of the ‘safety zone’ even really was.
Even then, in his ADOSH interview more than 2 months after the incident ( on
September 11, 2013 ) Cordes was telling the ADOSH investigators that the
Boulder Springs Ranch ‘safety zone’ was ’20-30′ acres in size.
That is WILDLY wrong. Not even close.
It was no such thing. Not on June 30, and not two months later, either.
That may have been what someone told him the actual size of the entire
Helms’ entire ranch property was, or something, and it was sticking in
his brain even 2 months later during his ADOSH interview… but the cleared
area Cordes would end up designating as the ‘predetermined safety zone’
for the June 30 work day could never be realistically described as being
anything more than about 2.5 acres.
So even two months after the incident, Gary Cordes was telling ADOSH
investigators that the area he had designated as the ‘predetermined
safety zone’ for Eric Marsh and Granite Mountain was well MORE than
EIGHT to TWELVE TIMES as large as it actually ever was.
That’s a pretty big mistake to make for an experienced wildland firefighter
who is SUPPOSED to be a good judge of ‘acreage’, distances, and lot size(s).
The actual ‘clearing area’ at the Boulder Springs Ranch containing all the
primary structures was a ‘rectangle’ with the following ‘side’ measurements…
385 feet ( north to south, measured along the western perimeter fencing )
285 feet ( east to west, not including the isolated equipment Barn in the rocks ).
NOTE: This ‘rectangle’ does not include the small northern side ‘push out’
in the rock formations where some large cargo containers were stored.
This rectangle simply includes the entire area that could be considered ‘safe’.
385 x 285 = 109,725
Total square feet: 109,725 feet
Total acreage: 2.51 acres
NOTE: 1 (square) acre = 43,560 square fee
NOTE: A square enclosing one acre is approximately 69.57 yards,
or 208 feet 9 inches (63.63 metres) on a side.
Here is the moment in Gary Cordes’ interview where he tells the ADOSH
investigators the size of the ‘open area/site’ ( the safety zone itself )
was 20-30 acres.
NOTE: It is not a typo in the transcription writer’s part. If you listen to
the audio there is no doubt the transcriber got it right.
_________________________________________________________________
ADOSH INTERVIEW WITH GARY CORDES – 09/11/13 – 11:02 AM
Q = Bruce Hanna
Q1 = Barry Hicks
Q2 = Dave Larsen ( Rest in Peace )
Q3 = Brett Steurer
A = Gary Cordes
Page 11…
Q1: Now where – was the Boulder Springs Ranch and the Helm Ranch the same?
A: I’m guessing the la- it is the la – what’s the owners last name?
Q1: Helm.
A: Yeah, then that would be it. It, it’s, it’s the one where they deploy just west of.
Q1: Okay.
A: It’s a very large uh, 20 to 30 acre open site uh, that was real cleaned out and it
was pretty – it was bomb proof.
Q1: But did Eric actually go to the Helm Ranch with you?
A: No.
Q2: You, you pointed that out to him as you drove uh…
A: When we were parked on the, when we were parked on the uh, Sesame Street
Road, first of all, we pointed it out on the iPad at, at our initial briefing and
then while we were parked on the um, on the Sesame Street Road, I pointed in
the direction of where it was and said that’s where the ranch is over in that area.
_________________________________________________________________
** (2) THE BOULDER SPRINGS RANCH HAD PERIMETER FENCING
The following pre-fire photo of the Boulder Springs Ranch complex in Mr.
Dougherty’s SAIT FOIA/ FOIL dropbox clearly shows there was, in fact,
‘perimeter fencing’ on the western side of the Boulder Springs Ranch,
which is the direction Granite Mountain was approaching it.
It doesn’t look like just simple ‘field fencing’, either.
Sections of it ( in this photo, anyway ) appear to be full 5-6 foot high hard-post
chain link. Photo enhancement even shows what *appears* to be some
kind of angle-back barbed wire on the top on the sections near the residence.
It does not appear to have been ‘electrified’… but it still *might* have presented
quite an obstacle to the 19 men who would have had to deal with it coming
from the west, especially if the fire had been RIGHT THERE on the northern
perimeter of the property as they arrived and cutting off any chance to find
a way AROUND the fencing.
If it actually was just some field fencing… then it probably wouldn’t have
been much of a problem for fellas with chainsaws… but if it was really
anything substantial… well… I would say at least Marsh should have been
TOLD it was there since he would be coming from the west and have
to deal with it. Maybe he was (told). Maybe not. We don’t know ( at
this point ) if Cordes himself even knew it was there.
Here’s the pre-fire photo taken by hiker Joy Collura on Sunday, June 30, 2013.
It was taken the morning of the incident itself, as Joy and Tex (Sonny)
Gilligan were heading up into the Weaver Mountains to look at the
Yarnell Hill Fire for themselves and they passed by the Boulder Springs Ranch.
https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/sh/eedzcsi1dpeczak/vRGDU9CIpx/Reduced%20Photo%20Images/1%20%28142%29.JPG?token_hash=AAGqQKbREb0yMp88nKg-tR9VdXMfGRn9RxBsV3o8LU35CQ
NOTE: The small BLACK boxes you can see mounted to some of the fence
posts on that west-side perimeter fence appear to be the housings for the
security cameras on that side of the ranch.
This ‘perimeter fencing’ is also clearly visible in Google Maps, which still shows
pre-fire images of that area. The fencing extends all the way along the
western side and then also appears to continue on to the north along
that ‘jeep trail’ leading away from the property.
NOTE: There are a number of post-deployment photos of that western side
of the Boulder Springs Ranch which do NOT show any ‘fencing’ of any kind
still remaining there… but I imagine it was all just removed by the dozer when
it cut that line towards the deployment site… and perhaps all the downed
fencing just got cleaned up before July 9, when the those post-deployment
photos were taken.
Perhaps when we get to see the actual security camera footage from
that western edge of the Helms Ranch it will show much better what that
perimeter fencing really looked like. ( simple or complex ).
wow, well this is fun…
#1. why do you keep using the words “primary” and “designated.”
-neither of those were used in the Cordes interview.
-neither of those are the case.
#2. why do you continue to conveniently leave out the part where Cordes says,
-“And black, and, and I told ‘em of course you have the black as a safety zone.”
#3. there might be one section of fence on that side with the black boxes… it doesn’t look too foreboding though and i would presume that it is more for the blocking of tumble weeds, than security.
-especially since the other three sides of the ranch appear to have no fencing at all
-“perimeter fencing…” huh, pretty funny.
#4. post fire, the BSR looked completely unscathed, right? in fact, it looked like a bomb went off around it, yet it survived! you might even describe it as “a bomb proof safety zone.”
#5. once again, Cordes is briefing them on what he has been scouting out since 2200 the night before. he is giving Div. A intel, so Marsh can proceed as Div. Alpha. beyond that, Cordes has no “authority” over Div. Alpha… they both work for ops.
-this includes designations of safey zones and responsibility for LCES. (Marsh is now responsible party for Div. Alpha resources in establishing LCES and the tactics).
-this also includes the dozer line operation, which is now part of Div. Alpha until another Div. Sup comes to change Division boundaries.
…nice try though!
Until Scouted the BS Ranch was just more BS……
there’s no reason to think it wasn’t scouted by Cordes… unless you subscribe to the “guilty until proven innocent” philosophy that WTKTT continues to propogate.
Or that it was? So we agree to disagree.
My other question earlier why was there not an Engen assigned to protect the ranch?
Just makes me wonder….
From what I have read so far there is no indication any one scouted the ranch. If they did there would have been some note about the fence on private property. Which looks like it would have blocked GM on the route they took. Which also means they had no clue. It could also be that the 2 track went right into the Ranch or even had a gate on that side but no one made mention of that either. This again is the unknown that could have been fixed with a scouting of route and site. As stated before how safe would you have really been had the house or barn building caught fire
in the middle of the Bomb proof SZ?
There is also the fact ( as
Google maps clearly shows )
that the approach to the
Ranch property itself from
the two-track was NOT at
all ‘well defined’. There was
a point, at the end of the
eastward leg of the two-track
as it came out of its own
‘blind canyon’… that they
would have had to ‘figure out’
the last due-north leg of
the journey to get to the
Ranch itself. Even more
heavy manzanita there on
the south side of the ranch
to SLOG through just to
approach the Ranch perimter
from THAT direction.
They could have easily gotten
REALLY confused even at
that final part of the journey
and wasted a lot of time even
trying to figure out that last
coupla hundred yards, if
it hadn’t been fully scouted.
wait, what? now you’re speculating based on WHAT DIDN’T HAPPEN!?
the structures didn’t burn down BECAUSE IT WAS A BOMB PROOF SAFETY ZONE!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
all your doing bob, is regurgitating WTKTT’s vomit. it’s really quite disturbing.
Fullsail
No backup and reread WTKTT was supporting my observations–OK
The structures didn’t burn true—Lucky??
I do not Know but I have a concern that no Engine was placed there for protection. Which leads me to believe and my thoughts only. Fire staff did not put an Engine for structure protection at the Ranch
because they felt it was unsafe to do so?
No escape route out if the road or Ranch compromised? The fact there is no Engine there when there should have been is interesting and some what puzzling don’t you think. A bomb proof safety zone should have still had structure protection for the errant sparks that catch buildings on fire?
Reply to xxfullsailxx post on April 3, 2014 at 7:02 am
>> xxfullsailxx wrote…
>> #3. there might be one section of fence on that side
>> with the black boxes… it doesn’t look too foreboding
>> though and i would presume that it is more for the
>> blocking of tumble weeds, than security.
You may be right.
Maybe it was ‘nothing to even mention’ to anyone
you were telling it was a ‘safety zone’… maybe not.
There is no doubt it was there ( fencing on the west
side ) the morning of the incident itself… but that one
picture taken by Joy was from quite a distance.
There is actually a folder in Mr. Dougherty’s online
dropbox for the SAIT investigation supporting material
that has this title…
A52-Helm Ranch Photos Pre-Fire:
…but the link is BROKEN.
If you click it… it simply goes to the same set of
‘Foley’ pictures as the folder listed ABOVE it… which
is this one…
A51-Foley Site Visit Video: https://www.dropbox.com/sh/2b4a2ee08ng34g5/13y8-vxKms
I don’t know if that ‘A52-Helm Ranch Photos Pre-Fire:’
folder would have any better photos of that fencing
to see whether it really was a no-brainer, or not…
but it would be interesting to see ( the photos ).
Any comment about the fact that SPGS1 Cordes
thought the ‘safety zone’ was EIGHT to TWELVE
times the size it actually was… even two months
after the incident?
If he had ever actually seen the site at ANY time
( daylight or nightime )… do you think there’s any
chance he could still be describing it to anyone
as ’20 to 30 acres’?
Misjudging the 2.5 acre ‘safety zone’ to be 3 or 4 acres
might be understandable…
…but saying it was 20-30 acres? Really? Wow.
nice, you addressed 1 of 5 points… way to go. once again, you’re making bad judgments and accusatory statements (verging on libel & slander) based on some very shaky, unfounded evidence…
MAYBE you’re working for the defense of the state? since we’ve basically exonerated Cordes of any of YOUR speculative, unfounded accusations of “wrong doing” at this point…
oh btw, didn’t that BSR look like a pretty bomb-ass safety zone post fire? yeah, i thought so too.
Reply to xxfullsailxx post
on April 3, 2014 at 5:01 pm
>> xxfullsailxx wrote…
>> Since we’ve basically exonerated
>> Cordes of any of YOUR speculative,
>> unfounded accusations of “wrong
>> doing” at this point…
Who is ‘we’?
Regardless…
Until there is definitive proof, one way or
the other, that SPGS1 Gary Cordes actually
did ‘scout’ the location he was going to
designate on Sunday as the ‘predetermined
safety zone’ to all inbound resources working
the south end of the fire… and didn’t’ just
peek at some blob on a Google map and
think it would automatically be OK… and
until there’s proof he didn’t ACTUALLY think
the site was ’20 to 30 acres’ when it was
( at best ) only 2.4 acres…. filled with
structures that COULD have ignited…
…there is no evidence that anyone did
or didn’t do ‘anything wrong’.
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>> oh btw, didn’t that BSR look like a pretty
>> bomb-ass safety zone post fire? yeah, i
>> thought so too.
So that sounds like your “regardless of
whether the safety zone was scouted
or not… everything turned out OK in the
end, didn’t it… SO… nothing to see here…
move along… move along” point of view.
Hmmm… also sounds a lot like…
“Possible bad/poor decisions that just
happened to result in acceptable outcomes”
…doesn’t it?
I would still like to know… for sure and
certain… whether that safety zone was
‘scouted’ before it was being designated
as a valid one for the employees working
in that workplace that day… and that
INCLUDES ‘how to get to it safely’.
Safety zones aren’t much good unless
you can GET to them safely, under
emergency conditions. See ALL of
Mr. Powers’ comments for more
about that aspect of it all.
There might or might not be things to criticize Cordes for that day, but this safety zone issue is not one of them. Picking a safety zone, determining the routes to reach it and deciding when those routes were no longer operational due to the fire – that was ALL Granite Mountain’s responsibility. They are responsible for their own safety, which includes their safety zones and escape routes. This dog won’t hunt.
If the BSR had turned out to be inadequate, that would have been on Marsh or Steed – especially if THEY had not scouted it. It seems like it was adequate, but it could not be reached that afternoon. That too is on Marsh and Steed, which is the whole point of the last 6 months here.
Marti I was just reading the Mar 31- Apr1 post. I’m sorry for your loss. After all this energy your question is more than likely not going to get answered. Their may one or two people who have an idea or know, maybe. My guess is that they thought they had time. Bad decision that simple. Nothing worse than that kind of loss. GB
I think you’re right and thank you.
p99 SAIR At 1603, the ASM1 requested Dispatch to place resource orders for six additional LATs with SWCC, necessary due to the wind shift of 300 degrees, structures threatened and thunderstorms pushing the fire in multiple directions. At 1608, SWCC sent these orders to the National Interagency Coordination Center (NICC) in Boise, ID, which denied all the requests as UTF due to the “Very limited availability of airtankers with increasing activity in the western states. Unable to fill at this time.” The NICC Coordinator on Duty followed direction from the Multi-Agency Coordinating Group, responsible for the national reallocation of scarce resources at the National Interagency Fire Center, in issuing the airtanker UTFs to SWCC.
It seems interesting that ASM1/ Bravo1 was the actual aircraft that made the call for the 6 additional LAT”s at 1603 (after leaving the fire at 1445?) I mention this with the thought *someone* put out that Div A/GM might have thought they had a lookout in the air?
Questions:
1. Who notified ASM1/ Bravo3 and told them of a 300 degree wind shift, , structures threatened and thunderstorms pushing the fire in multiple directions, around 1603?
2. Is it possible Div A/ GM was in touch with ASM1 circa 1600?
What you just said confirms what I have been saying.
At 1600 the fire was being pushed in multiple directions with
300 deg. wind shifts. You don’t need a lookout you need to be deep in the black and hunkered down. Again moving was pure folly, with or without a lookout. Any line personnel should have been finding safety zones immediately not hiking a mile or more thru the brush……….GET IN THE BLACK
Reply to calvin post on April 2, 2014 at 4:26 pm said:
>> calvin wrote…
>>
>> It seems interesting that ASM1/ Bravo1 was the actual
>> aircraft that made the call for the 6 additional LAT”s at 1603
>> (after leaving the fire at 1445?) I mention this with the thought
>> *someone* put out that Div A/GM might have thought they
>> had a lookout in the air?
Well… in their interview with ADOSH… they don’t recall doing
anything of the sort. All they remember is saying they just did
an “all available” call and said “give us everything you have”
because it was perfectly obvious what was going to happen…
but then they are not even sure that OPERATIONS on the fire
even realized what THEY already knew…
_____________________________________________________
ADOSH INTERVIEW WITH
PAUL LENMARK AND RUSTY WARBIS
ADOSH interviewed them both together on in one interview on
September 24, 2013 – 9:00 AM
Q=Barry Hicks
Q1=Marshall Krotenberg
Q2= Bruce Hanna
Q3=Dave Larsen ( Rest in Peace )
Q4= Brett Steurer
A=Rusty Warbis
A1=Paul Lenmark
A2=Alex Viscusi
A or A1: And then I remember we had a conversation with dispatch too about it because we did an all available…
Q: Give you everything you could get.
A or A1: We’ll take it whatever we can get because Yarnell
is gonna be…
Q: Right, okay. So dispatch knew that, ah – ah fairly well and –
and – and you felt like operations was clear that that was gonna be
the case, ah – ah, at some – that Yarnell was gonna be an issue.
A or A1: I think so.
_____________________________________________________
>> calvin asked…
>> 1. Who notified ASM1/ Bravo3 and told them of a 300
>> degree wind shift, , structures threatened and thunderstorms
>> pushing the fire in multiple directions, around 1603?
That’s hard to say. I’m not sure anyone had to tell them that.
They were pretty much ‘running their own show’ that day.
I checked their ADOSH interview and while that transcript is pretty
much a mess and hard to follow…there is really NO mention of
anyone ever ‘telling’ them anything of the sort.
It’s really a strange interview they had with ADOSH, though.
These guys ( Warbis and Lenmark ) couldn’t remember
ANYTHING when it came to times or specifics or who was
really working the fire or who they ever really talked to that day.
Neither one of them could even remember the number of the
airplane they were flying on either one of their ‘shifts’ on
the fire that day.
It’s kind of a mystery where that whole entry on page 99 of the
SAIR came from… because even in the SAIT’s own ‘Investigation
Notes’ Warbis and Lenmark said no one EVER notified them
about any ‘wind shifts’…
Page 13 of YIN…
INTERVIEW WITH Bravo 3 – 7/7/2013 – 15:00
Interviewees: Rusty Warbis, Paul Lenmark
Q: Any communication of wind shift:
A: No. It was never communicated to me.
>> calvin also asked…
>> 2. Is it possible Div A/ GM was in touch with ASM1 circa 1600?
I really doubt it.
They didn’t know ANYONE by name ( only by position and they
were even confused about all that ) and the only conversation
they say they ever had with “Division Alpha” was early on in their
first 4 hour gig on the fire ( NOON to 4:00 PM ) when they said
even Division Alpha ( Marsh, but they didn’t know that ) was telling
them that he was unable to ‘anchor and flank’ and that whole
plan wasn’t even going to work.
That’s a pretty astonishing claim for them ( Warbis and Lenmark ),
to make… that even around NOON or 1:00 PM THEY knew that
Marsh was ‘out of the game’ already, based on what the fire was
actually doing even that early in the day… and that even Eric Marsh
already knew that the whole ‘anchor and flank’ thing that he had
been sent up there to do just wasn’t going to work…
…but here is exactly what they said to ADOSH investigators…
_____________________________________________________
Q: Yeah – yeah. Ah, so did you all ever talk to Division Alpha in
terms of what their – what their plan was or, ah, knowing that
they’re pretty much outta the game up there at this point in time.
Did you have any conversation with ‘em?
A or A1: Um, I had contact with those divisions. I was unaware
that th- th- th- that Alpha was the hotshot superintendent. Um,
my understanding was that Alpha was that rim on the other
side – the west side…
Q: Okay.
A or A1: …and Alpha, to me, was – with the other things that
were going on – head, um, and the right flank. To me, Alpha
was outta the game.
Q: Yeah, okay.
A or A1: Didn’t you touch base with them on that side just to
make sure to see how far along they were, and they weren’t…
A or A1: They weren’t…
A or A1: …and they were – they were coveyed back.
A or A1: Yeah, yep.
Q: So some time that morning, they had – they had figured out
they were not gonna be able to anchor and flank it…
A or A1: Yep.
_____________________________________________________
Lenmark and Warbis told ADOSH investigators that’s the only
time they talked with “Division A” that day… sometime right
after they got there ( NOON ish ).
They also assert to ADOSH that they NEVER actually SAW
where ANYONE was on the south side of the fire the whole time
they were there that day.
That pretty much puts the kibosh on any chance they
were acting as ANYONE’s lookout that day… or that anyone
could have possibly even THOUGHT they were.
_____________________________________________________
Q: Yeah – yeah, I understand that, so. Got it. Ah – ah, so take
us – take us through, ah – ah – ah, you – we got up to the
first VLAT drop and then you, ah, you’ve worked all these and
then you took a – took a good lap around and looked at what was
going on and, ah – ah, and you could – could you see those
guys up there on the – on the south end when you made your
turnaround? No visual…
A or A1: I never had visual with anybody on the south end of the fire.
Q: Is that right? Okay.
____________________________________________________
Lenmark/Warbis weren’t even in the air over the fire at 4:03…. Don’t believe what you read in the SAIR or the ADOSH reports (or sometimes even in the dispatch logs) as gospel without finding unrelated, reliable corroboration, hopefully from two unrelated sources (that is my rule of thumb, anyway).
Calvin, I gave you an answer to your 911 versus 910 question below. I took it from my notes (for those who are going to ask what my “source” was).
**
** OPS2 PAUL MUSSER ONLY CALLED
** DIVSA ERIC MARSH ONE TIME THAT DAY
Now that we can finally see ( thanks to Mr. Dougherty ) the ACTUAL transcript
of OPS2 Paul Musser’s ADOSH interview, we also now know the following…
1) OPS2 Paul Musser only ‘called out’ to DIVSA Marsh ONE time that entire day.
2) The CLEAR background radio capture of Musser calling “Division A” at
1542.14 ( 3:42 PM plus 14 seconds ) MUST be that ‘one and only’ call.
Here is OPS2 Paul Musser CONFIRMING that that radio call is the one and only
time he tried to communicate with either Marsh or Granite Mountain that day…
__________________________________________________________________
ADOSH INTERVIEW WITH PAUL MUSSER – 08/16/13 – 9:00 AM
Q=Brett Steurer
Q1=Bruce Hanna
Q2=Barry Hicks
Q3=Paul Katz
A=Paul Musser
Page 32…
A: Uh, got on the 89 to a vantage point and met with Gary Cordes. Face to face
with Gary. As far as – oh at that point, I’d also called Granite on their radio.
Because Todd was still tied up with Model Creek. I called Granite on the
radio and asked if them and Blue Ridge were still committed on the ridge?
They said that they were committed on the ridge. But Blue Ridge was on the
bottom and may, may be available. I talked with Gary, he said no their
committed to, uh, hold – to prepping and hold the dozer line.
Q2: You’re talking about Blue Ridge?
A: Yes, Blue Ridge.
Q2: Okay.
A: And that Granite was still committed in the black…
Q2: Okay.
A: …up on top.
…
Q2: Uh, and, uh – and you had no other conversations with Granite Mountain that
you recall?
A: No.
_________________________________________________________________
I believe some people had just been assuming that OPS2 Paul Musser
had made this ‘availability check’ with DIVSA Eric Marsh regarding Granite
Mountain AFTER OPS1 Todd Abel’s known exchange with Marsh ( captured
in the Robert Caldwell video at 1550 – 3:50 PM ) where OPS1 Todd Abel
said the following…
1) Keep ME informed ( of your situation )
2) Hunker and be safe ( in the black )
3) We’ll get some Air Support down there ASAP.
As it turns out… we can now be SURE that OPS2 Paul Musser definitely
made HIS ‘availability check’ with Marsh almost a full 8 minutes BEFORE
the ‘hunker and be safe’ exchange between OPS1 Todd Abel and DIVSA
Eric Marsh.
When OPS2 Paul Musser made that ‘availability check’ with Marsh
regarding Granite Mountain at 1542.14… Musser had, in fact, already
transitioned from being just a simple “Planning OPS” to the second fully
functioning “Field OPS” on the fire. Musser’s focus was now purely
‘structure protection’ and had already been doing exactly that in the
Sickles Road area before then moving to Yarnell to do the same thing,
right before he called DIVSA Eric Marsh ( that one and only time ).
So when Eric Marsh and Jesse Steed started having their (multiple)
‘comfort level’ and ‘discussing options’ conversation(s) in the 3:50 to
4:04 timeframe… this is now the right ORDER that the now fully-functional
TWO different “Field OPS” had contacted them prior to that…
3:42 – Field OPS Musser checks on ‘availablity’ of GM for specific structure
protection ‘prep’ work down in Yarnell. No help with ‘evacuations’ mentioned.
8 minutes LATER…
3:50 – Field OPS Todd Abel orders/tells/suggests/advises DIVSA Eric Marsh to
“Keep him updated AND hunker and be safe”. No requests for help with structure
protection OR evacuations were made.
14 minutes LATER…
4:04 – GM Captain Jesse Steed leads 17 men out of the safe black and
south towards the Boulder Springs Ranch with DIVSA Eric Marsh
‘catching up’ to them from the rear at some point.
**
** OPS2 PAUL MUSSER DIDN’T ACTUALLY
** SAY “CAN YOU SPARE RESOURCES”?
There has, of course, always been the ‘revelation’ in the ADOSH report that
OPS2 Paul Musser had called Eric Marsh and/or Jesse Steed and asked if they
could ‘spare resources’… which was NEVER reported in the SAIR.
From page 18 of the ADOSH report…
__________________________________________________________________
At approximately 1545 hours, Division A Supervisor Marsh had a radio
conversation with Operations Section Chief I Abel regarding the weather and the
position of Granite Mountain iHC. Marsh was located near the top of the Weaver
Mountains and had a clear view of the thunderstorm, the fire, and the valley below.
Marsh and Abel had been watching the storm for some time and discussed their
concerns regarding the storms effects. Marsh reportedly stated that Granite
Mountain was safe and in the black (i.e., previously burned wildland).
Marsh mentioned that the winds were “squirre|y” at his position and that the
retardant and dozer lines north of Yarnell were being compromised.
Shortly thereafter, Operations Section Chief 2 Musser radioed GMIHC and
asked if they could spare resources to assist in Yarnell.
Either Marsh or GMIHC Captain Steed responded that they were committed
to the black and that Musser should contact BRIHC working in the valley
(during his interview Musser stated that he wasn’t sure who he was talking with).
__________________________________________________________________
Keyphrase: “asked if they could spare resources to assist in Yarnell”.
Now that we can finally ( thanks to Mr. Dougherty ) see the actual interviews that
ADOSH was basing its own ‘narrative’ on…
Nowhere in Paul Musser’s interview with ADOSH did he ever specifically
say he asked Eric Marsh or Granite Mountain if they could “spare resources”.
What appeared to be an exact QUOTE that appeared in the ADOSH report now
appears to be just something that the ADOSH investigators came up with on
their own as they were typing their report.
That doesn’t mean Musser wasn’t trying to (quote) “check on their availablity”
and/or find out if there was any chance GM could somehow assist him with
(quote) “more prep stuff down here”. ( See interview quotes below ).
All that means is that there is no (public) evidence, at this point, that he ever
asked the direct question “Can you spare resources?” as ADOSH reported.
Here is what Paul Musser ( himself ) says he ACTUALLY said…
_________________________________________________________________
ADOSH INTERVIEW WITH PAUL MUSSER – 08/19/13 – 9:00 AM
Q=Brett Steurer
Q1=Bruce Hanna
Q2=Barry Hicks
Q3=Paul Katz
A=Paul Musser
Page 32…
Q2: Okay.
A: Uh, got on the 89 to a vantage point and met with Gary Cordes. Face to face
with Gary. As far as – oh at that point, I’d also called Granite on their radio.
Because Todd was still tied up with Model Creek. I called Granite on the
radio and asked if them and Blue Ridge were still committed on the ridge?
They said that they were committed on the ridge. But Blue Ridge was on the
bottom and may, may be available. I talked with Gary, he said no their
committed to, uh, hold – to prepping and hold the dozer line.
Q2: You’re talking about Blue Ridge?
A: Yes, Blue Ridge.
Q2: Okay.
A: And that Granite was still committed in the black…
Q2: Okay.
A: …up on top.
…
Q2: Okay. When you, uh – let me back up to when you made contact with Granite
Mountain, who – who did you talk to – Eric?
A: I think so.
Q2: But you can’t remember for sure if that was Eric or…
A: I – I – ‘cause I – I think I called division Alpha, not Granite, no.
Q2: Oh, okay.
A: That’s who I would have called.
Q2: Uh, so it would have…
A: Yeah, I wouldn’t have called Granite direct.
Q2: Okay.
A: I would have called – gone through their supervisor.
Q2: Okay.
A: Which at that point was division Alpha.
Q2: Okay. And, uh, so, uh, that conversation was you’re in the black and you need
to stay in the black?
A: No, no that conversation was are you still committed on top of the ridge. And
they said yes we are committed on top of the ridge.
Q2: Okay. And so you’re assumption was they were in the black?
A: If – if they were committed on top of the ridge, they would have one foot in
the black.
Q2: Okay.
A: Because that was their assignment, yes.
Q2: Okay. Uh, and that’s – that’s an important point here, I think Paul that – that,
uh, uh, as far as you know that was the last communication you had with those
guys?
A: I think that was, yes.
Q2: Okay. And, uh, so, uh…
A: I know Todd had talked to them earlier – a little bit earlier about the
thunderstorms that were coming in.
Q2: Right.
A: And making sure that they were in the black. Actually had air attack go up
and make sure that…
Q2: Right.
A: …everything was good.
…
Q2: Okay. So, uh, based on your flight, uh, up there, uh, from the point that those
guys were, uh, uh – or that you assume that they were, they could see the, uh,
progress of the fire from that – that it was no longer going northeast, that it had
turned and was moving to the south (unintelligible).
A: They had the best view of anybody on the fire.
Q2: Okay.
A: Uh, other than possibly air attack, ‘cause air attack can move.
Q2: Right. Right, yeah.
A: Uh, but not they had the best view of anybody on the fire.
Q2: Yeah, okay. So, uh, they’re knowledge of…
A: And that picture shows you that.
Q2: Yeah, they’re knowledge of the fire is – uh, or their view of the fire was
probably better than anybody else’s at this point and time?
A: Yes it is.
Q2: ‘Cause they weren’t im- obscured by smoke or, uh – and the brush…
A: Not according to the – yeah, not according to…
Q2: …And the brush was gone and so they had a – they had a good view?
A: Yes.
Q2: And so, um – and – and so that – that communication with Granite Mountain,
uh, do you remember about what time it was, ‘cause it…
A: I – it was prior to them pulling everybody out. It was some place from –
‘cause when I got down to Sickles I knew that the next…
Q2: Right.
A: …the next place was gonna be Yarnell.
Q2: Yeah.
A: And so I was checking the availability in case we got into something right there.
Q2: Right, okay.
A: Uh, so probably – and I don’t know what time Gary pulled everybody out. Uh,
I’m guessing before 4 o’clock.
Q2: Okay.
A: 3:30 to 4:00, I think, but I don’t know.
__________________________________________________________________
So Musser’s own best guess as to when he called “Division Alpha” Eric Marsh
to see if they were still (quote) “committed to the ridge” is sometime between
3:30 and 4:00 PM’.
* WHEN IT REALLY HAPPENED ( 3:42 PM plus 14 seconds )…
This is a reprint of a previous post about the moment captured in the background
of an AIR STUDY video when we clearly hear OPS2 Paul Musser attempting to
contact DIVSA Eric Marsh.
** On March 23, 2014 at 10:13 pm, WantsToKnowTheTruth posted…
**
** FULL TRANSCRIPT OF BACKGROUND RADIO CONVERSATIONS
** CAPTURED IN AIR STUDY VIDEO 20130630_154232_fire_behavior_EP
This is the AIR STUDY video that has always been reported to have the ‘callout’
from OPS2 Paul Musser to DIVSA Eric Marsh in it, but a public copy of that video
has not been available until today ( March 23, 2014 ).
We also now discover ( as the ADOSH investigation notes suggested ) that the
video BEGINS with what appears to be Eric Marsh ‘finishing’ a conversation with
some other (unknown) person.
AIR STUDY VIDEO…
20130630_154232_fire_behavior_EP.MOV
Public Dropbox location…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/f8c8k68ctnpl4x8/MMsNwr4O2Y/Panebaker/Video#lh:null-20130630_154232_fire_behavior_EP.MOV
Length: This video is only 24 seconds long.
The video has a filename/timestamp of 154232 but this is now assumed to be
the END time for the video, so the actual START time for this video would be
154208 ( 3:42 PM plus 8 seconds ).
FULL TRANSCRIPT OF BACKGROUND RADIO CONVERSATIONS…
NOTE: No ‘audio forensics’ required here. All the background radio conversation
captured in this AIR STUDY video can be clearly heard by anyone with normal
hearing. Regardless… usual ‘caveats’ apply. This transcript is what
I ( me personally ) am hearing in this video. Your mileage may vary.
ALSO NOTE: This video BEGINS at 1542.08 ( 3:42 PM plus 8 seconds ).
That is about 2 minutes and 8 seconds AFTER Gary Cordes had officially
requested the full evacuation of Yarnell and Glen Ilah at 1540.00.
ALSO NOTE: When the video starts… someone is already answering
someone else’s previous radio call in the background and the voice that
is heard responding is a more than 90 percent probable match for Eric
Marsh. Even the ADOSH investigation notes confirm that it is most
likely him speaking at the start of this video.
VIDEO STARTS
+0:00 ( 1542.08 – 3:42.08 PM )
(Eric Marsh?): …towards the structures… uh… (pause) southern… uh…
(pause) into Yarnell.
NOTE: As soon as Marsh finished answering whoever he
was talking to… OPS2 Paul Musser calls him directly…
+0:06 ( 1542.14 – 3:42.14 PM )
(Paul Musser): Division Alpha, Operations Musser.
NOTE: Silence for a moment, then someone comes on and
simply says “Thank you” to (Marsh?) for his previous response.
+0:13 ( 1542.21 – 3:42.21 PM )
(Unknown – Possible match for Darrell Willis’ voice?): Thank you.
NOTE: There is no other background traffic in the remaining
11 seconds. Marsh does not respond to Musser by the time
the video ends at 1542.32
+0:24
VIDEO ENDS
So the exact ‘clock’ time for this clear attempt on OPS2 Musser’s part to
engage in conversation directly with DIVSA Eric Marsh is now known to be…
1542.14 ( 3:42 PM plus 14 seconds ).
That is about TWO minutes after the moment when SPGS1 Gary Cordes
officially called for full the full evacuation of Yarnell and Glen Ilah, and Musser
was known to be physically with Cordes at this time on the side of Highway 89
down in the north end of Yarnell, near the point where Shrine road meets 89.
** TODD ABEL’S VERSION OF WHAT MUSSER SAID TO MARSH
So the only thing missing now to fully explain where ADOSH came up with
that paragraph that appeared in their report is Todd Abel’s version of the
same radio call, in which he tells the ADOSH investigators HIS ‘interpretation’
of what Paul Musser told him.
So here is that piece of the puzzle…
________________________________________________________________
ADOSH INTERVIEW WITH TODD ABEL – 08/22/14 – 1:09 PM
Q=Bruce Hanna
Q1=Dave Larsen
Q2=Nicolas Cornelius
A=Todd Abel
Page 47…
Q1: His, uh – well we’ll talk – we will talk to, uh – yeah, all right. Okay so air
attack is obviously seeing something that has his – that he’s thinking it’s
gonna come in ( to Yarnell ). Uh, I expect that (unintelligible). And – and air
attack – no who – who then – I would let you speak – checked on Blue Ridge
crew when they were on the – on the dozer line?
A: Uh, Musser – Paul did.
Q1: Paul did?
A: Mm-hm, yeah.
Q1: Did he call them?
A: Uh, he actually – well I – this is him telling me what he did.
Q1: Okay.
A: Uh, do you want me to share that with you, ‘cause I…
Q1: Please.
A: Yeah, I didn’t hear it. He, um – he was looking to see if he could – he called
Division Alpha, Eric Marsh to see if they had anything available to bring it
down into Yarnell to help – you know start prepping some more stuff.
Q1: Mm-hm.
A: Um, and, uh, he said, uh, Eric Marsh said, um, Blue Ridge may be available.
Give them a call. And Gary at that time was standing next to Paul or I don’t
know if he was standing next to him or over the radio said, I got them – or – or
they – they are prepping the dozer line in – in case we have to burn it, yeah.
Q1: All right. Thank you for that.
A: Yes.
__________________________________________________________________
So the ADOSH investigators took the following two actual ‘quotes’ from
their actual interviews with Paul Musser and Todd Abel and then
‘munged’ them together…
* THIS…
(Paul Musser): “I called Granite on the radio and asked if them and Blue Ridge
were still committed on the ridge? They said that they were committed on the
ridge. But Blue Ridge was on the bottom and may, may be available.”
* PLUS THIS…
(Todd Abel): “He (Paul) called Division Alpha, Eric Marsh to see if they had
anything available to bring it down into Yarnell to help – you know start prepping
some more stuff. Um, and, uh, he said, uh, Eric Marsh said, um, Blue Ridge may
be available. Give them a call.”
* EQUALLED THIS…
This is ADOSH’s own ‘summary’ of those two statement taken together and
is what they ended up typing into the actual ADOSH report…
“Operations Section Chief 2 Musser radioed GMIHC and asked if they could
spare resources to assist in Yarnell. Either Marsh or GMIHC Captain Steed
responded that they were committed to the black and that Musser should
contact BRIHC working in the valley.”
So it’s interesting to see how ADOSH came up with THEIR own ‘narrative’
and that no one ever actually seemd to use that exact phrase ‘spare resources’.
ADOSH appears to have gotten the INTENT of the whole exchange correct,
of course, but again… just interesting to see what was ACTUALLY said
and how they ‘summarized’ it.
There ARE a couple of ‘revelations’ here, however.
1) OPS2 Paul Musser WAS ‘sure’ he had called “Division Alpha” ( Marsh ).
The blurb that appeared in the ADOSH report said that ‘during his interview
Musser wasn’t sure who he was talking to… Marsh or Steed’… but if you
read Musser’s actual interview there is no doubt in his mind that he CALLED
“Division A” and would NOT have called direct to “Granite Mountain”.
Musser is SURE of this… and the background radio capture in the AIR STUDY
video confirms this. If that 1542 radio capture really is the moment he was
making this call out to ‘Division Alpha’… then there is no question that
Musser called out to Eric Marsh… and he talked to Eric Marsh, not Jesse Steed.
2) OPS2 Paul Musser seems to have (mistakenly) thought, BEFORE and
DURING his radio call to “Division Alpha” Marsh, that BOTH Blue Ridge AND
Granite Mountain were ‘out on the ridge’.
Musser specifically asked Marsh if “them AND Blue Ridge were still committed
out on the ridge”. It was not until AFTER his radio call that Gary Cordes ( who
was standing right next to him ) then told Musser that he believed Blue Ridge
was still working on what he had them doing ( improving dozer line ). Even
Gary Cordes was clueless, at this moment ( 1543 ), that Blue Ridge was already
in the process of just evacuating the GM buggies and then beginning their OWN
evacuation to the Youth Camp. Blue ridge WAS becoming a ‘free resource’ at
that exact moment, but neither Cordes nor Musser really knew that (yet).
3) OPS2 Paul Musser seems to have been clueless about how FAR AWAY they
(GM) really were. He seems to have thought they were in the immediate area,
or at least close enough to be used for some immediate-need ‘structure prep’.
4) OPS2 Paul Musser did not ask them to help ‘evacuate’ anyone. The specific
reason for his request is Musser thought they might need help to start ‘prepping
some more stuff’ ( e.g – assist with structure protection ) there in Yarnell.
If Musser really had been fully aware of how FAR away GM actually was, and
how long it would take them to get back to town ( via any hiking route )…
he probably would have never even made that call at that time. He didn’t
have that kind of time to wait for what he was actually asking for
help with ( MORE structure prep… right HERE… right NOW! ).
Likewise… if Musser had really known, before he made that call, that
Blue Ridge was NOT ‘out there with GM’ as he (mistakenly) thought,
and that they were only a few blocks away at the end of Shrine road
and actually already evacuating their vehicles ( and GM buggies )…
he probably wouldn’t have made the specific radio call that he did
at that specific time. Blue Ridge was becoming immediately available
right there near him, to do exactly what he wanted help with circa 1543.
I might add which some are reading into the discussion of the thunder storms. Every one was concerned and watching them.
They are specifically watching the storm because of the erratic winds that accompany them. Lightning was at that time not there primary concern although I am sure they were keeping an eye on it. I think people are reading in a concern about the storm as being lightning when wind is way more dangerous and unpredictable. As a storm comes and passes an area the winds will shift from ( S, SW,N, all the way around as the storm moves thru) With all different speeds or erratic winds. That is the main thunderstorm concerns on fires. Another indicator that walking thru a brush field with a fire expected to burn in all directions is not a good decision.
Reply to Bob Powers on April 2, 2014 at 7:31 am
>> Mr. Powers said…
>> Lightning was at that time not there primary concern
>> although I am sure they were keeping an eye on it.
I agree.
The consensus following the latest ‘Lightning Round’
and the revist on that based on the *NEW* evidence
in the ADOSH material that Todd Abel was just as
concerned about it as Russ Shumate was when he
based his entire IA plan on that concern…
…seems to match your conclusion.
Yes… it was something people were definitely ‘keeping
and eye on’ and ‘talking about’ on Sunday just as
they ‘should have’… BUT…
No… consensus seems to be that it is highly unlikely
those lightning concerns had any real effect on any
of the fateful decision making that afternoon.
Unless some *new* evidence comes to light…
I think the ‘lightning’ thing has now been officially
opinion-bombed.
Thanks for everyone’s input!
So why is this “just Interestng” that someone paraphrased? Does that paraphrase somehow indicate an attempt to mislead or an attempt to conceal. I think phrasing Gary Cordes as “clueless” is interesting, sorta plants a seed that Gary doesn’t know what he’s doing or is going on. That’s how I interpet that. What indicates that Musser thought they were close or in the immediate area. He asked if they were still committed to the ridge, that seems to indicate that he thought they were on the ridge.
It paints a picture for me of supervisors trying to maintain a overall picture and how difficult it is during events like this to aquire that picture and to stay in the know of a fluid environment where other supervisors are taking independent actions to secure their AOs. Which is something that we value is wildland.
Agree with that completely.
Reply to WFF post on April 2, 2014 at 7:35 am
>> WFF wrote…
>> So why is this “just interestng” that someone
>> paraphrased?
It is ALWAYS interesting to me ( personally… your mileage
may vary ) to see the difference between what appears
in ‘official’ reports and what those statements were
really BASED on. I always prefer seeing the REAL
evidence, and the REAL statements, rather than just
one more layer of hearsay and interpretation. I like
to make up my own mind about things. That’s all.
You are free to make your own conclusions. I’m
just showing you the ‘layer’ underneath the report.
>> WFF also said…
>> Does that paraphrase somehow indicate an attempt
>> to mislead or an attempt to conceal?
In this case… I don’t think so… and I said so. See above.
>> WFF also said…
>> I think phrasing Gary Cordes as “clueless” is
>> interesting, sorta plants a seed that Gary doesn’t
>> know what he’s doing or is going on. That’s how I
>> interpet that
There is no gardening going on here. Again… you can
now see ( thanks to Mr. Dougherty ) what was actually
said… and make up your own mind whether people
‘knew what they were doing’ or ‘knew what was going
on’ at that time.
>> WFF also wrote…
>> What indicates that Musser thought they were close
>> or in the immediate area?
The timeframe and the circumstances.
The complete evacuation of Yarnell is now officially
in progess ( as of 1540 ). Musser had left the ICP and
his ‘Planning OPS’ duties behind about a half hour
before this and had inserted himself into the fire as
the second active ‘Field OPS’. He had already ‘pulled
resources’ to himself and handled the ‘Sickles Road’
situation by himself ( See the rest of his interview ).
Once Sickles Road was under control… he says he
knew Yarnell was next so he moved himself there
to start doing the same thing he had done up
at Sickles… direct and immediate structure/point
protection.
So there are now TWO direct… active ‘Field OPS’
on the radio looking for resources and trying to handle
the developing situation ( as there probably should
have been, given the situation, but the confusion that
might have been contributing to the situation is for
others to decide ).
Musser hits Yarnell and his immediate thought there
is “availability of resources” ( He says so in his interview ).
He had been functioning as just ‘Planning OPS’ all day
and there is no telling what he really did or didn’t know
about exactly what resources were down there, where
they might be, or what they might be doing.
Doesn’t matter. He had a radio. He could find out.
So that is what he did… but his GOAL was ‘structure
protection… ASAP’ as he had just taken care of around
Sickles… and those were the ‘resources’ he was looking
to ’round up’.
By the time he runs into Cordes on the side of the
Highway 89 right there near where Shrine road meets
Highway 89… Cordes is now seeing the fire hit what
Cordes called his “AW SHIT” ridge… which means the
fire IS going to come in ( to town ).
So the NEED that Musser was trying to address was
‘immediate need’… not an hour from then. He just
wanted to know who was around and available to
for structure/point protection work in the ‘immediate’
timeframe.
He thought that BOTH the Granite Mountain Hotshots
AND the Blue Ridge Hotshots were ‘together out on
the ridge’ and said so in his radio call.
He was mistaken. Apparently, he didn’t get a good
briefing from Cordes about all that until AFTER he
made the actual radio call. Blue Ridge was ‘local’
( just a few blocks from where he was standing
with Cordes )… but Granite Mountain was really,
really far away and he just didn’t seem to understand
that. He had been ‘Planning OPS’ all day and now he
was being the second active ‘Field OPS’. It’s hard
to say whether he had even been looking at any
maps that day until he jumped into the situation
to do structure/point protection work circa 4:10
PM or thereabouts. The ADOSH investigators never
pursued any line of questioning about that.
>> WFF also said…
>> He asked if they were still committed to the ridge, that
>> seems to indicate that he thought they were on the ridge.
Yes… and he ALSO thought Blue Ridge was out there
with them ( said so in his radio call )… so that itself
indicates a level of ‘unawareness’ at that point.
It’s understandable. It really is. See above. He had simply
been “Planning OPS” all day and now he’s jumping in
as the second fully active “Field OPS” on the fire.
He probably had to get “up to speed” ( in a hurry ) on
things everyone else had already had all day to become
familiar with like where people were really working and
what a lot of the actual distances involved were.
>> WFF also said…
>> It paints a picture for me of supervisors trying to
>> maintain a overall picture and how difficult it is during
>> events like this to aquire that picture
…especially when you have been just ‘Planning OPS’
all day… doing all that important work… and now you
are ‘jumping in’ as the second fully active ‘Field OPS’.
You said it yourself. It IS, in fact, ‘difficult’ to ‘aquire
the full picture’ in a hurry like that.
>> WFF also said…
>> and to stay in the know of a fluid environment where
>> other supervisors are taking independent actions to
>> secure their AOs.
All we are now seeing here ( thanks to Mr. Dougherty
and the new ADOSH material ) is a ‘better picture’
of everyone doing just that. Regardless of what Musser
did or didn’t know circa 1542… he had now transitioned
from just ‘Planning OPS’ to the second fully functioning
‘Field OPS’ with ‘structure protection goals’.
He had every right to get on the radio and start asking
people if they were ‘available’… regardless of whether
he fully understood where they were, what they were
doing, or how far away they might be.
So that’s what he did.
I STILL think ( me, personally ) it’s ‘interesting’ to learn
more about how all that was going down at that time,
why he made the ‘availability’ call to Eric Marsh, and
exactly what the TIME was when he did that.
It’s pretty much a given now that Paul Musser made
his ‘availability’ check with Eric Marsh BEFORE we
hear OPS1 Todd Abel on the radio with Marsh
telling him “Keep ME informed, Hunker and be safe,
we’ll get some Air Support down there ASAP.”
( circa 3:50 PM in the Caldwell video capture ).
I think some people had been assuming that Musser
made his ‘availablity’ call/request AFTER that
“Hunker and be safe” command/directive/suggestion/advice
from OPS1 Todd Abel.
So that changes things.
It changes the ‘sequence of events’ that preceded the all
important ( but still mysterious ) ‘comfort level’ and
‘discussing their options’ conversation(s) out there
on that ridge.
WTKTT said…..
I think some people had been assuming that Musser made his ‘availablity’ call/request AFTER that “Hunker and be safe ”command/directive/suggestion/advice
from OPS1 Todd Abel
You are right, but not everyone.
So does the timeline go like this?
1. Musser calls Div A 1542
2. Able calls Marsh. “Hunker and be safe, air support ASAP. 1550
3. Rory Collins leaves fire. 1558
4. Discussing options conversation (?)
5. At 1603, the ASM1 requested Dispatch to place resource orders for six additional LATs with SWCC, necessary due to the wind shift of 300 degrees, structures threatened and thunderstorms pushing the fire in multiple directions..
6. GM leaves (lunch spot/ Mackenzie photo spot?) 1604
Many thanks WTKTT.
I forgot to add #7 to the timeline (BTW #7 is referring to the request for 6 LAT’s from #5 of timeline above)
Entire timeline repost (from above)
So does the timeline go like this?
1. Musser calls Div A 1542
2. Able calls Marsh. “Hunker and be safe, air support ASAP. 1550
3. Rory Collins leaves fire. 1558
4. Discussing options conversation (?)
5. At 1603, the ASM1 requested Dispatch to place resource orders for six additional LATs with SWCC, necessary due to the wind shift of 300 degrees, structures threatened and thunderstorms pushing the fire in multiple directions..
6. GM leaves (lunch spot/ Mackenzie photo spot?) 1604?
7.At 1608, SWCC sent these orders to the National Interagency Coordination Center (NICC) in Boise, ID, which denied all the requests as UTF due to the “Very limited availability of airtankers with increasing activity in the western states. P99 SAIR
calvin…
Confirming 1,2,3… but I think another
important ‘absolute known time’
that has also been figured out
here ( and not in any report ) is
that Frisby picked up Brendan
no later than 1541.30. That is
when Frisby had just loaded Brendan
into the UTV, called Brown, told
him to start evacuating vehicles,
and Brown did his ‘about face’
during his hike on Cutover trail.
( recorded by his GPS unit which
was getting time from satellites ).
That’s much earlier than any
report has put that event.
It COULD even be the reason Marsh
didn’t answer OPS2 Musser right
away at 1542. He was now in the
middle of those conversations with
Frisby after he had just picked
up Brendan.
As far as #4 goes… I think there
were multiple ‘comfort level’ and
‘discussing there options’ conversations all the way from
1541.30, when Frisby picked up
Brendan and called off the face-to-face with Marsh… right on
through what we hear in the
MacKenzie videos at 4:02 PM
and beyond that… to 4:03 or 4:04.
I also still think it is possible to nail
down a time on most of them.
#6 – They definitely ‘gaggled up’
and headed south circa 4:04
( Parker photo, etc. ). It was
also definitely from the MacKenzie
video location and NOT lunch spot.
I think we’ve had this conversation
before but just looking at the demeanor
and activities of the men in the
4:02 videos ( stowing chaps, gloves,
relaxing, taking photos ) I still believe
it’s obvious that the ACTUAL decision
to leave the black came right AFTER
the MacKenzie videos in a small 70
second window from 4:02.20 to
4:03.30. At 4:02.20 those men didn’t
look like they had ANY plans of
going ANYWHERE.
As for 5,7 and who actually told
ASM1 those details about what
was happening in Yarnell… stay
tuned. ADOSH interviewed Bravo 1
but I haven’t gotten to that one yet.
More later…
Actually it doesn’t change the sequence. The sequence remains what it always was. This may have changed your perception But not the sequence was what happened, not what has been speculated.
i think what’s happening here is that WTKTT’s conspiracy world is crumbling around him and the more he scours the evidence, the more he realizes that all his speculation and unfounded accusations over the last six or so months are eroding away into a little pile of meaningless dirt laying at his feet.
so he assigns the words “clueless” and “mistakenly” in order to insinuate a lack of awareness or ineptitude to the folks involved as if the events unfolded in a vacuum where all the overhead have this omniscient view of the entire fire area and developing situation.
he does this for a number of reasons, the first of which, i think, is because he is nothing more than an internet conspiracy theorist and he is always looking for an angle to assign blame in order to perpetuate the conspiracy.
another reason is an overall ignorance of how these complex wff’ing situations play out in the real world, and not in his micorscopic internet vacuum.
it’s not all his fault… i feel kind of sorry for him.
There was conversation a couple of days ago that I’ve been wanting to say something about. It has to do with Granite Mountain and the media. It has to do with the fact they were somewhat spotlighted by a photographer during the Station Fire.
I did quite a bit of google searching for images of crews, while trying to get a bead on what the related crews and their vehicles looked like. I saw a lot of stuff on both the Internet general and also YouTube. What I found never led me to think that the coverage of Granite Mountain was either unusual or remarkable. Crews get spotlighted by photographers and media fairly regularly. Maybe some crews are more comfortable being photographed and maybe some crews are less. But I don’t think there’s much of a big deal to that.
I’m writing this on my iPad while I’m screen- recording on my iMac so I can’t provide links and stuff, so I’m just writing this out of my head. If you want more documentation of what I’m saying, do your own googling.
The Blue Ridge Hotshots have been featured periodically by photographers in various fires, also. Does that imply they need the publicity? Given the fact that they don’t do much pr on their own, I would say no.
Lots of crews do annual wrap-up videos on YouTube. Including Granite Mountain. They use YouTube to do their own (often totally creative and fun and informative) public relations.
I think the conversation that wound up apparently agreeing that Granite Mountain somehow needed/invited an unusual amount of public relations because they were under pressure is mistaken. I think that dog don’t hunt.
I just, as a photographer, want to say this. I don’t think they were hunting for attention.
There was never any ‘agreement’ whether that was the case,
or not ( that Granite Mountain was being encouraged in any
way, shape, or form, to ‘seek publicity’ because of their
unique ‘city owned’ status, or something ).
It was simply the LA times photographer himself reporting that
on that day ( in 2009 ) at the Station fire… other crews kept
physically turning their backs on him and refusing to be
photographed… until he met up with Granite Mountain.
Granite Mountain had a completely different policy than
the other crews ( THAT day, on THAT fire anyway )… and
seemed to WELCOME the publicity. That’s what raised the
‘possibility’ that they might have been ‘instructed’ to be that
way by their manager(s), but there is certainly no PROOF of that.
I’m still actually just curious about what that LA times photographer
said one of the crews told him… that if ANY of them allowed
their face to be photographed they would end up owing the
entire rest of the crew a ‘case of beer’… and that was their
POLICY.
Is that just something weird with just a couple of crews that
this photographer happened to run into on the Station Fire,
or does that kind of ‘no pictures please’ and ‘case of beer’
policy thing crop up quite often?
WHO CARES!! What in heavens name does that have to do with what happened at YHF? So, GM let a photographer take a couple of photos. Your link also shows other non GM WFF photos at the Station Fire, so your assertion that GM “had a completely different policy” is bunk. As I said before and Marti notes again the internet tubes are flush with photos of WFF crews. I said it before and will again. You paint this “cooperation” as something “VERY interesting.” Generally when someone uses the term “VERY interesting” it ain’t good. So out with it Truther-don’t imply-Just SAY IT: WHAT IS SO INTERESTING about that story/photo that has anything to do with what happened to GM on June 30, 2013? And if you answer is nothing-they aren’t related, then why “VERY interesting”? I’m just trying to figure out why you thought posting that was relevant in the first place. Because frankly, it reads to me like a smear.
I still have no clue about what that is all about.
Move on already WTKTT.
Hey Marti, you’re right there is no relevance. Most crews give their people a hard time about press attention. It’s just small time crew fun. Whats happening on this thread is why most firefighters don’t like or trust the press. Speculation, misleading statements by people who don’t understand what they’re talking about. I think that WTK likes to plant little seeds of insinuation and watch conspiracy mongers over react. WKT does good research and details are their thing, but he likes the speculation. GM took someone on more than likely because they liked him.
**
** REPLY TO CALVIN’S QUESTION(S) – REDUX
**
** LOCATION OF PANEBAKER AIR STUDY VIDEO
** 20130630_161858_VLAT_split_2_EP.MOV
Calvin…
I found the reference that Elizabeth was making to the filename/timestamps
for the AIR STUDY videos apparently being END times and not START times.
It’s the third line of a 3 line text file that is/was part of the AIR STUDY video
supporting documentation.
That file is here in Mr. Dougherty’s online Dropbox for the SAIT FOIA package…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/y3jy5opssrcvzb3/M0SZ9RarYn/AerialFirefightingstudy/_README.txt
Contents of this 3 line text file…
_________________________________________________________________
3 data collectors (Moore, Panebaker, Swartz) took these photos and videos on
June 30, 2013 for a US Forest Service FAA project (Aerial Firefighting Use &
Effectiveness). Robert Manwaring of the San Dimas Technology & Development
Center provided these files, along with the collectors’ descriptive information, to
the Accident Investigation Team. The time stamp on the video is the end time
of the video, not the beginning.
_________________________________________________________________
There is also this Microsoft Word DOC information in the specific Panebaker
video folder. It also discusses the general Air Study video date-time filename
formats but makes NO MENTION of them being END times, but I suppose the
other 3 line text file blurb in the other folder applies to Panebaker videos as well.
I don’t know if you have seen this document but it might help determine when
VLAT drops are being shown in certain videos…
_________________________________________________________________
Panebaker Photo and Video Information.
All photos and videos were taken from a location on the North side of Hays Ranch
Road in Peoples Valley (34 16.327 X 112 43.863). Photos were taken primarily
with a Canon EOS REBEL T3i, a couple were taken with a Nikon Coolpix P520.
Video in the video folder was also taken with the Nikon Coolpix P520.
Video in the “video_with_134175_audio” is video taken with a Contour 2 camera
and the audio from the Air-to-Air frequency 134.175. This footage is almost a
constant feed of the of the air-to-air radio traffic. There are a few breaks due to
battery issues and the footage cut off when we left the Peoples Valley location
to assist with the medical/recovery task force.
The naming convention for all of the photos and videos is –
“date_time_photographer/videographer initials”.
All times are in Mountain Time (no daylight savings UTC-7) On several of the
videos there are brief descriptions immediately following the time. Below is a
brief summary of my actions on the 6/20/2013. (many of the times are estimated)
~1030 Depart Flagstaff for the Yarnell Fire.
~1315 Drive through Prescott.
~1400 Arrive Yarnell ICP (Peoples Valley School). Talk to Dan Sullivin and Brad
Zettler (Air support for local team). Get radio clone and tell them our intentions.
The AFUE group plan was to observe and document retardant use from the road
and stay out of the way of the ground resources. Briefly talk to Paul Musser (OPS
on the local team) and advise him of our plan as well.
~1440 VLAT (T911) drop
~1442 T810 drop
~1445 Another SEAT drops
1459 T910 – 9 miles out
1459 T874 Drop
~1500 AA->T910, plan is it widen the line in the lighter fuels to protect the homes. Coverage level 6, whole load.
1507 T910 drop
1516 T810 on scene, plan is to pretreat holmes with CL 6
1523 T810 drop.
~1525 T874 inbound, point protection in someone’s front yard
1530 T874 drop.
1542 Div A to AA? Wind shifted and the fire has burned through the retardant.
1540 T830 on scene.
1549 T830 drop.
~1550 T911, 20 mi. out, look at the town of Yarnell for drop.
~1555 T413 CL4, 125 drop speed. (rough estimate of drop time)
1606 T911 in area, CL4, 150 drop speed.
1607 T874 in area.
1615 T911 split load, drop 1, 2000 gal left.
1617 T911 split load drop 2.
1624 T874 and T830 drops, close proximity to houses.
1624 T413 in area.
1633 T413 drop.
1640 Possible deployment in division A, hold T910 drop.
1647 Still can’t find people or get ahold of Div. A or Granite Mountain.
1658 T910, CL4 full load.
1706 T910 drop
1708 T06 on scene.
1723 I stop filming/taking pictures, start helping Medical response task force.
_________________________________________________________________
NOTE: The Panebaker videos were shot with a Nikon Coolpix P520 which does
default to the Apple Quicktime .MOV format but does NOT add time/date stamps
to the movie filenames. It uses the same DSCN0001.MOV movie filename
format approach as other digital cameras. Obviously the Air Study videos were
all manually renamed before being given to the SAIT… but why someone would
chose to use END times in the filenames versus standard START times
is anyone’s guess.
Anyway… here are the ‘reworked’ answers to your questions from the other day…
>> Reply to calvin post on March 30, 2014 at 4:26 am
>>
>> calvin said…
>>
>> The 161620 Vlat video shows the same retardant drop
>> as the 161858 video, right??
Based on the filenames/timestamps for the AIR STUDY videos being
the END times instead of the START times… here’s the *new* answer to
the question(s) you posed earlier…
No. They are two different drops… but even assuming timestamps are END
times something might still be a little ‘wonky’ with the timing here.
The 161620 video is 3 minutes and 30 seconds long.
That makes the actual starting time 161250.
The actual VLAT drop in this video begins at +2:32 into the video.
That makes the actual drop time 161522.
The drop lasts for 12 seconds and ends at 161534.
The 161858 video is 1 minute and 49 seconds long.
That makes the actual starting time 161709.
The actual VLAT drop in this video begins at +0:03 into the video.
That makes the actual drop time 161712.
The drop lasts for 6 seconds and ends at 161718.
( only HALF as long as other one ).
That means that the elapsed time between the END of the first 12 second
drop ( 161534 ) and the START of the second 6 second drop ( 161712 ) is…
1 minute and 38 seconds. ( 98 seconds ).
If this is (supposedly?) the same VLAT making BOTH drops, then that’s a pretty
quick ‘turnaround’ time for a lead plane and a DC10 VLAT air tanker to make two
extremely low-level drops at the same exact location… but I suppose if they were
both in a hurry and in a tight turnaround loop coming out of the first drop ( with no
other aircraft around to worry about or have to avoid )… it’s doable.
I can find no evidence that we are watching two drops from two different VLATS
( 910 and 911 ) in this video, so if all the filename timestamps ARE correct…
then only the one VLAT ( 910? ) must have been able to achieve that
98 second turnaround time.
>> calvin also wrote…
>> In the 161620 video we hear (I assume) the VLAT pilot saying
>> he has about 2,000 gallons left (following that drop.) And then we
>> see the VLAT drop again in the 162508 video and again in the
>> 163338 video. Is that correct?
The 161620 video is 3 minutes and 30 seconds long.
That makes the actual starting time 161250.
The 162508 video is 1 minute and 49 seconds long.
That makes the actual starting time 162319.
NOTE: The title of the 162508 video is actually…
20130630_162508_2SEATS_EP
It is, in fact, a video of two SEAT drops and not a VLAT drop.
The first SEAT drop is at +0:34 ( 162353 ).
The second SEAT drop is at +0:56 ( 162415 ).
They are dropping at the same location as the VLAT drops seen in the other
videos… but the VLAT itself isn’t in this video.
The 163338 video is 2 minutes and 9 seconds long.
That makes the actual starting time 163129.
>> WTKTT… can you tell me a little about the 163338 video.
>> Like where the camera is filming, which side of the fire the
>> retardant drop is made, and where GM were. Many Thanks!
The 163338 video is 2 minutes and 9 seconds long.
That makes the actual starting time 163129.
The (single) SEAT drop in this video begins at +1:49 into the video.
That makes the actual drop time 163318.
The (single) SEAT drop lasts for 3 seconds and ends at 163321.
The Nikon Coolpix P520 camera used to shoot this video was on a
tripod that was exactly here…
34.266758, -112.716906
REMINDER: Just cut-and-paste that line with the comma above into the search
bar of Google Maps, hit ENTER, and a large GREEN ARROW will be pointing
to that exact spot.
It’s that spot up on Hayes Ranch Road near those ‘circular’ crop fields and where
the established ‘helibase’ was that day and where most of the other AIR STUDY
videos were shot.
This particular video is shot looking almost due southwest from that location.
For more of an exact idea of the ‘orientation’ here…
At +1:02 in this video, as they are zooming in on the two planes to the left of the
smoke column ( that means they were flying on the EAST side of the column,
coming from pretty much due south and heading due north ) there is a distinct
electronics tower seen in the left of the frame on a hill in the distance.
It only appears for a moment… then they pan back right… but that gives you a
reference for the ‘line of sight’ for this particular video from that particular location.
The ‘line of sight’ from the camera… right down the center… would be pretty much
directly to the center of Glen Ilah, in the distance, even though the ridge in the
foreground is obscuring both Yarnell and Glen Illah.
The same electronics tower is also seen in this video earlier on in left of the
frame, at +26 seconds, but it’s much easier to see exactly what it looks like in
the +1:02 moment after they have ‘zoomed in’.
The reason I say ‘electronics’ tower is because that is NOT the primary cell
tower for Yarnell. That sits on a hill farther south of town.
It’s a Verizon tower and the exact location of the power shed at the base
of the antenna is…
34.192114, -112.754748
The electronics tower seen in this Panebaker video MAY have some cell
pods on it… but it’s hard to tell.
It’s on a hill east of Yarnell, about the center of town.
If you took ‘Happy Way’ ( about two blocks south of where Shrine road meets
Highway 89 ) east out of Yarnell and continued on when it changes from
pavement to dirt and went all the way to the top of the hill, you be at the power
shed for this electronics tower seen in the video.
The center of the roof of the power shed at the base of that tower is exactly here…
34.216253, -112.743606
So given the fact that the electronics tower is at about the midpoint of the town
of Yarnell… it looks like those planes are flying pretty much due west of the center
of Yarnell, from due south to due north, on the EAST side of the smoke plume,
and trying to lay some retardant to keep the fire out of Yarnell.
At 1631 plus 29 seconds ( which seems to be the actual START time for the
video named 163338 )… ALL the drop-capable aircraft on the fire had already
been given the go-ahead to ‘drop-at-will’ for more than a half-hour.
Gary Cordes couldn’t transmit on Air-To-Ground circa 1600 because his
Bendix King had taken a dump and then he switched to the Motorola in his
truck… but circa 1600 he requested OPS1 Todd Abel to immediately tell Air
Attack to start ‘dropping at will’ and try and save whatever ‘town’ they thought
they could ( from Cordes ADOSH interview ).
Makes sense to me that a video would reference its time stamp to its ending point since that’s when it’s saved. But I would understand how it’s easy to get confused here.
Well… actually… when it comes to using the Apple
Quicktime MOV format for movies on these digitial
cameras they all pretty much do the same thing.
They do NOT store the ‘CreationDate’ ( actual START
time ) in the movie itself. They create a file with
extension THM ( Thumbnail ) and that’s the little photo
you see of the start of your movie on the LCD screen
on the device itself.
All the EXIT metadata for that movie is in the THM
thumbnail… and NOT in the .MOV movie itself.
( A THM file is just a JPEG file with a different extension ).
That’s why we still don’t know the EXACT time for
Blue Ridge Hotshot McCord’s YARNELL-GAMBLE
movie when we hear SOMEONE telling Eric Marsh
they would ‘appreciate it’ if GM could ‘come to town a
little faster’. Mccord renamed it himself, and supplied
it to the SAIT investigators… but he didn’t give them
the associated .THM thumbnail file that had all
the metadata in it.
It’s been narrowed it down to right around 1619 ( 4:19 PM ),
at almost the exact moment that either Steed alone or
Marsh/Steed together made the decision to leave the
two-track road and descend into the fuel-filled box
canyon… but it’s through ‘indirect’ evidence.
If McCord had just given the SAIT the THM file that
belonged with that Apple Quicktime movie… we would
know the exact time according to his own iPhone
But it IS ‘normal’ for a movie to be saved according to the
actual START time, and not the end time.
Whatever. It’s no big deal either way.
The math is easy.
WTKTT. Are you serious?
1615 T911 split load, drop 1, 2000 gal left.
1617 T911 split load drop 2.
Soooo, T911 was finished dropping all of its retardant after the 1617 video? Really? This was the load of retardant the SAIR describes as overhead waiting to be dropped (all 10,743g) during time of deployment?
My apologies if I am missing something here!
Calvin, Tanker 910 was the VLAT that was overhead at the time of the deployment, and he had a full load (whatever he came in with, that is) at the time of deployment. I had posted about this on a prior thread, and I am going off my notes here: According to my notes, at roughly 4:36-ish pm, Bravo33 (e.g. the lead plane) cleared in Tanker 910 and was getting ready for a live run, when the flaming front cut off GM. Tanker 910 got in behind Bravo33, in case the chance to make a good drop for GM became clear, which it didn’t, which is why 910 ultimately dropped elsewhere on the fire. 911 was gone at this point (on a trip to Phoenix, I think, for a “load and return”).
Marty Reed said: “I agree with that, believe me…[b]ut what I’m trying to get at is WHY did they make THAT decision, when the “escape route” was, according to Brendan, the two-track ALL THE WAY to the ranch, if it wasn’t for the PERCEIVED speed advantage?”
I wouldn’t put too much emphasis on Brendan’s after-the-fact recollection. But, as to why make the choice they did, I’d say lack of familiarity/experience is one possible explanation. Another is the emotional and social compensation that can come from doing something others recognize as having been difficult. Particularly if overhead’s self-perception had been that prior unconventional tactics had generated recognition.
I’m pretty much agreeing ATM that Brendan’s repeated seeming certainty may be fairly unreliable. It kind of struck me though. But I haven’t had time to listen, which could possibly change my opinion.
One of the things that has bothered me a lot, though, is that, if he was listening on to the intra-crew frequency while bumping the Sup truck, which we apparently assume (for good reasons) he was, how was it he didn’t seem to know, when the search crews were headed out, that they had taken the shortcut into the bowl, and why. My wondering is based on assuming there was some kind of communication between Steed and Marsh about that decision, which I have no evidence to assume was in the original plan. But I have no evidence to assume it wasn’t either. I’m kinda sorta thinking ATM that if they made the decision on the fly to cut down instead of staying on the two-track, they (meaning probably Steed with or without a convo with Marsh) might have just guessed that shortcut would have gotten them to the ranch faster than staying on the two-track. Which leads me to think that decision didn’t have much to do with all the other contextual complexities, but just a basic mis-calculation. and maybe, under the circumstances, fairly understandable.
Lesson Learned: An escape route is not an escape route unless scouted and made safe.
And, of course, I trust you know that and I’m not really saying that to you. I think you are right that what drove them to leave their totally adequate black had much to do with a desire to redeem their otherwise frustratingly inefficient day. But their decision to cut down into the bowl seems to be pretty much a miscalculation that they could do that faster by cutting down.
I really wish Brendan felt comfortable enough to speak honestly about what he heard and didn’t hear.
test
If the view is that a simple miscalculation was involved, more attention needs to be paid to ensuring other crews are familiar with local conditions, as well as mindful of time as a big issue in terms of escape routes and overall situational awareness. While this was a local crew, just off of another local fire, certainly it’s possible that they’d just not had the experience of being suckered into a bushwhack before.
Because of the reports of a culture of secrecy over crew movements for GM, I’m inclined that the second case, of knowing that the bushwhack was an issue, and doing it anyway, may have been at play instead.
Marti,
Another aspect that was discussed a long, long time ago, but perhaps forgotten over time, is where the two-track ‘seems to go’, from the point where they dropped down into the bowl. From the point at the top of the bowl where the crew headed down, and where the Boulder Springs Ranch comes into view across the way, the two-track then heads up and out of sight over the ridge in a slightly SOUTHWESTERLY direction, giving the impression that if they were to continue on the two-track, they would actually be going away from the ranch and heading down toward Congress.
If they didn’t actually have a map in hand at this point, they might have been confused about whether the two-track eventually ended-up at the ranch, which it did, hooking around and coming in from the south.
I’m not saying that this would be the only factor in their decision process, but it certainly could have played a role in it.
There was no written Operation plan on the 30th which leads back to the state being sued along with the overhead. This is a real problem with no maps, no clear divisions, and no clear directions. leaves a lot open to question and assumptions.
Reply to TTWARE post on April 2, 2014 at 9:07 am
>> TTWARE said…
>> If they didn’t actually have a map in hand at this
>> point, they might have been confused about
>> whether the two-track eventually ended-up at
>> the ranch,
Exactly right.
The Arizona Forestry SAIT had always tried to
‘establish as fact’ that ‘they’ ( plural? ) KNEW
that two-track went all the way to the Ranch.
Now that we can (finally) see Gary Cordes’ actual
ADOSH interview transcript… we learn that
while there WAS, in fact, a moment at the 0700
briefing when Cordes was using Dean
Fernandez’s iPad to ‘show Marsh the ranch’
on either a Google or a USDA TOPO map…
Cordes admits that was just a ‘breakout’ from
the general meeting so it was really just him
and Marsh looking at the iPad.
Cordes also still does not CONFIRM that he
SPECIFICALLY showed Marsh that two-track
road that led all the way from the anchor point
to the Ranch. All Cordes says is that they
“had an iPad out and were looking at the roads”
( all of them around there ) in a general way…
and nothing SPECIFIC about that high ridge
two-track ‘escape route’.
If it was Google Maps with the ‘road labels’ turned
on… then Marsh *probably* did see that high-ridge
two-track curling south and then east to the ranch,
( because you can hardly miss it, even now, in
Google maps with ‘labels’ turned on )…
…but there is no specific verification even from
Cordes that that ‘escape route’ was specifically
shown to Marsh, or discussed in any way.
Regardless… that all only concerns Marsh, and
what he may of may not have seen on an iPad.
That doesn’t automatically mean Steed saw
ANY of that, at ANY time.
So back to your point.
Yes… it was IMPOSSIBLE to know, just by
standing at the ‘descent point’, that the two-track
would, in fact, take an eastward turn to the
ranch if you just stayed on it heading south
for a little longer.
That is something that Jesse Steed would have
to have KNOWN before he got to the ‘decision
point’… or he would have been mightily confused
about what to do at that point.
If there was an intra-crew radio discussion about
THAT confusion and THAT decision… then
Brendan McDonough probably heard it.
If Brendan didn’t hear anything on the intra-crew
related to THAT decision… then either Steed
just made that decision on his own OR Marsh
was already there with him and they made
that decision together, in person, no radio traffic.
wow SR, that’s the most bullshit psycho-analysis i’ve seen yet…
who exactly was going to be emotionally/socially compensating them for bushwacking?
unconventional tactics generating recognition? please do expound.
because it sounds to me like you have a little inferiority complex when it comes to hotshots… but that’s just MY amateur psycho-analysis…
Reply to SR post on April 1, 2014 at 7:46 am
>> SR said…
>> I wouldn’t put too much emphasis on Brendan’s after-the-fact
>> recollection.
Agreed. He was *really* hedging there as to whether that is
something he was TOLD that morning… or something he
just ‘assumed’. He also then let it slip ( when they asked him
to run Google Earth because they couldn’t even figure out
how to run it correctly ) that he ( Brendan ) had been ‘using
Google Earth’ himself since the incident and had ‘looked over the
area’ in Google Earth at least 3 times all on his own… AFTER
the incident and BEFORE that ADOSH interview.
Maybe that entire crew WAS told that that the two-track went
all the way to the Boulder Springs ranch that morning when
they arrived up on the ridge for their ‘third’ briefing that day
( according to Brendan ).
Maybe not. Maybe Brendan was just reflecting the claims
of the already published SAIR report, and what he had seen
himself since then in Google Earth… and he was just telling the
ADOSH investigators what he thought they wanted to hear.
>> SR also said…
>> But, as to why make the choice they did, I’d say lack of
>> familiarity/experience is one possible explanation.
>> Another is the emotional and social compensation that can
>> come from doing something others recognize as having
>> been difficult.
The ‘flip side’ to that consideration ( which hasn’t been discussed
much )… would be the possible ’emotional’ and ‘social’
‘consequences’ of NOT trying to ‘get to town’. Maybe that
actually crossed their minds as they saw that fire racing
to town.
I mean… at that point ( circa 4:00 PM and their ‘discussing
their options’ conversations ) no one knew what was going
to happen. For all anyone knew… that entire frickin’ town
was going to burn to the ground and be (literally) wiped
off the map.
Maybe ( just *maybe* ) the thought crossed their minds that
if that really did happen… and they had simply ‘sat it out’
up on that ridge… that they would have a ‘lot of explaining
to do’. If there were dozens ( perhaps hundreds ) of citizens
killed or wounded… maybe some SAIT investigators would
have been asking THEM a lot of questions about just
sitting up there and watching it all happen ( even though that
really was all they could have done ).
So that phrase ’emotional and social compensation’ has
a flip side, too.
The flip side would be ’emotional and social CONSEQUENCES’.
It can also factor into ‘decision making’.
No citizens died. Zero. Zip. Nada.
( Well… except for some suicides following the incident
after people lost all they had. Tex and Joy know about those,
I believe, and I think Tex even actually had to go out and find at
least one suicide hikers body ).
It was NOT a complete and total nightmare that day with
hundreds of casualties and a completely ‘lost town’.
But at 4:00 PM… from high up on a ridge… it might have
looked like there WAS a high probability it WAS going
to be ‘that bad’.
WTKTT SAID
Reply to calvin post on March 31, 2014 at 2:54 am
>> it was IMPOSSIBLE for T911 to have been over the fire
>> during the deployment, waiting for visual confirmation
>> of GM location WHILE (10,743g) of retardant was still
>> in the plane.
Yes. I agree with you… but have been sidetracked
lately looking at the enormous amount of *new* information
that is now available regarding this Yarnell incident.
Do you have, yourself, a good ‘re-estimate’ of how much
retardant T911 actually DID have left while it was
‘standing by’, to dump on GM in the box canyon, if
instructed by ASM2 / B33 to do so?
My immediate answer to your question is, I have no idea how much retardant T911 departing from Wickenberg at 1543 had available at the time of deployment. But, it doesn’t appear that it had all 10,743 gallons available as the SAIR states.
This is what I think I know about it though. T911 departs Wickenberg and arrives over the north part of the fire where it makes a 12 second retardant drop at approximately 161522 as seen in the 161620 video. Following that drop, someone announces they have 2,000 gallons (of retardant) left. Then we see a second drop lasting an additional 6 seconds at approximately 161715 in the 161858 video.
The actual STOP time for T911 departing Wickenberg at 1543, according to page 101 from SAIR is 1651 (also at Wickenberg.) If that is the case (T911 landing aircraft at 1651 at Wickenberg), then T911 MUST have left the fire, safe to say, before the actual call from Caldwell reporting “in front of the flaming front”
IMHO
There is only one airfield in Arizona capable of handling slurry operations for 910 & 911, and that is Williams Gateway in the Mesa/Chandler area. The ONLY tankers operating out of Wickenburg were the SEATs.
TTWARE…. my bad, thanks for the correction. Do you know the approximate flight time from Williams Gateway to Yarnell?
Short answer, no I don’t. Those DC10s are capable of flying very fast, but in this senario, flying low with a load on, they were more likely lumbering along (for them) because the distance to Yarnell is only around 85 miles, but they may have had to add a bunch to that to get around Sky Harbor in Phoenix.
Thank you!
Reply to xxfullsailxx post on March 31, 2014 at 4:51 pm
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>> their primary designated safety zone was the cold black.
Not according to SPGS1 Gary Cordes, who briefed them.
Keywords (here) = primary / designated.
Cordes ‘designated’ the Boulder Springs Ranch FIRST ( sic: primary )…
in the briefing… and then just adds ‘and black, of course’.
From Gary Cordes’ ADOSH interview…
Q2=Dave Larsen ( Rest in peace )
A=Gary Cordes
_________________________________________________________________
Q2: …uh, sevenish, escorted Granite Mountain down Sesame Street and
shared the location of the safety zone at Boulder Springs…
A: Ranch, right?
Q2: …and, and what – I can’t get that next word, what is it?
A: …and black, and, and I told ‘em of course you have the black as a
safety zone… Um, and this…
Q2: Oh.
A: …and this was also, this was also discussed at our, at our briefing. We had a,
an iPad out looking at the roads and everything and I showed them on the
iPad, the ranch on the iPad as well um, and referred to it there in that, during
that briefing as well.
Q2: Okay, this is, this is a briefing, uh, well, whatever, 6:45 or 7:00…
A: Yeah. Yeah. When we – when I – when we met with everybody was there,
we – there were several break outs where we discussed, had little briefings
with each other and uh, there was a point where we were at a table inside the
fire station with an iPad and we went over the – we were looking at the maps
on the iPad.
__________________________________________________________________
>> xxfullsailxx also said…
>> Cordes had been scouting out the fire area since 2200 the previous evening.
That is true… but AFAIK there is no detailed account of ALL his movements.
>> xxfullsailxx also said…
>> he had personally scouted out the BSR as a safety zone.
Okay… full stop. Is that your OPINION?… or do you have a specific
source that establishes that as a fact?
I would LIKE to believe he did… and would certainly HOPE that he did before
just willy-nilly telling multiple resources ( not just Granite ) that that was the
‘designated safety zone’ for the Sunday work period…
…but have you seen proof that he did ( actually go scout it ) anywhere
in the evidence record?
I haven’t. Not yet anyway.
Please provide a source reference for your ‘statement’.
I honestly hope I have just ‘missed’ it and you can point me right to it.
First of all, Cordes does not pick the safety zones for Granite Mountain, that is a decision for Granite Mountain itself. Second, safety zones are fluid in nature. No matter how safe a spot is, the instant you can no longer reach one safely, it stops being a safety zone. The ranch should no longer have been viewed as a safety zone that afternoon, and the black was their best, and had become their “primary”, safety zone.
I agree… but that’s not what happened on June 30, 2013.
SPGS1 Cordes ( perhaps with help from BLM Rep Dean
Fernandez ) was the one who CHOSE that area, at
some point, and was also the one ‘designating’ the
Boulder Springs Ranch as the ‘bomb-proof safety zone’
for ALL incoming Type 2 Short Team resources ( not
just Granite ) that were arriving that morning and were
going to be working the south end of the fire.
No one seemed to doubt him.
No one seemed to object.
and ( as far as we know )
No one who was told it was their safety zone went
over there to check it ( or the possible escape
routes to it ) out for themselves.
That’s what the evidence is ( currently ) saying.
again, look up “chain of command” or take an I-200 course. your Wildland Fire 101 by google isn’t doing you much good…
like mike said, SPGS Cordes doesn’t designate Div Sup Marsh’s safety zone. and he certainly doesn’t make the “primary” or the “designated” call. “Keywords (here) = primary / designated.” and, he didn’t “brief” them, he was showing them around the area he had been scouting all night (he says so in his interview).
in the post fire pictures, it sure looks like it was a “bomb proof SZ”… doesn’t it… what reason do you have to think Cordes DIDN’T scout out BSR?
and who are you to demand an account of every minute of each person’s time? are you even an AZ taxpayer? who holds you accountable for your false accusations and libel? what is your name and phone number in case any one of the many people you have falsely accused of wrong doing or falsely claimed were implicit in the death’s of GMIHC want to take issue with the many wrong things you’ve said?
you are nothing but a narcissistic internet hack with nothing better to do who has found his audience…
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>> what reason do you have to think Cordes DIDN’T
>> scout out BSR?
Nice dodge of the question.
I am not the one who just claimed, on a PUBLIC forum,
that it was an absolute FACT that Gary Cordes personally
visited the Boulder Springs Ranch at some point prior to
the 0700 briefing ( yes,it was an official briefing ) and was
then ‘designating’ ( yes, designating ) that area as the
‘predetermined safety zone’ ( as Marsh himself would
refer to it later, several times ) for that work cycle.
YOU are the one who made that ‘statement of FACT’.
I asked you if it that was just your OPINION, or if you
had any evidence to back that up.
You dodged the question.
So I’m going to take that as a “Yes… I am simply assuming
he went there at some point and I don’t know it for a fact.”
Unless you want to try again?
Once more with evidence?
well, actually, you’re the only one making a big deal about the BSR being labelled a safety zone. and the more you speak about it, the more evident it becomes that you have no clue what you’re talking about.
didn’t you think that, post fire, that the BSR looked like a pretty safe place to be? yeah, i thought so too.
you’re going to try to call me out on “making claims on a public forum?” really? now THAT’S hilarious! you do sound down right defensive, and a little desperate… i’d be happy to address your issues, as soon as you address mine:
who are you to demand an account of every minute of each person’s time? are you even an AZ taxpayer? who holds you accountable for your false accusations and libel? what is your name and phone number in case any one of the many people you have falsely accused of wrong doing or falsely claimed were implicit in the death’s of GMIHC want to take issue with the many wrong things you’ve said?
Reply to xxfullsailxx post
on April 1, 2014 at 8:02 pm
>> xxfullsailxx said
>> well, actually, you’re the only one making a
>> big deal about the BSR being labelled a
>> safety zone.
Well, actually, no.
I guess you missed the post below about
claim 14 from the ‘Wrongful Death’ notice
of claims for just TWO of those poor men
that died that day?
That same claim 14 is in ALL of the
‘Wrongful Death’ Notice of Claims…
and it is coming from one of your own.
A former ( Western Division ) Hotshot,
and experienced WFF… now turned attorney.
I’m sure there are going to be all kinds
of ‘experts’ ( like yourself? ) being called
to the witness stand to testify about this
Boulder Springs Ranch… if/when the
trials begin.
I’m also sure the photos you mentioned will
be shown in court.
>> xxfullsailxx
>> you’re going to try to call me out on
>> “making claims on a public forum?”
Yep. See my ‘greeting’ when you
resurfaced. If you are here for no other
reason than to just ‘watch me’… then
( as I said )… I’m going to be watching
you just as hard.
I know you might have trouble fitting the
following statement into your brain… but
when I said above that I really hoped you
DID have some piece of evidence that I
was unaware of to back up your statement…
…I meant it.
I *really* was hoping you did.
Once again… this isn’t a contest, fireboy.
If you find something out before someone
else does… more power to you.
Back to reading the evidence…
Man thats rediculous. No one assigns “priamry” SZ. Stop saying things you don’t know anything about. Hey and did you know there was an engine moving to the ranch to stag there. Find that, wow you’d be surprised how far behing you are. Why don’t you find me some Wx Ops so I can provide some solid FB runs. That would be useful.
>> WFF said…
>> Man thats rediculous. No one assigns “priamry” SZ.
>> Stop saying things you don’t know anything about.
Who is that addressed to?
I am not the one who FIRST said that anyone ‘assigned
a PRIMARY safety zone’ to anyone and that it was
an absolute FACT.
That was your buddy xxfullsailxx.
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>> their PRIMARY designated safety zone
>> was the cold black.
His ‘statement of fact’ and his ‘choice of words’, not mine.
All I did was show Cordes explaining ( himself ) what
he actually said in his ‘unit log’ to the investigators,
and what might be considered his ‘primary’ designation
( or ‘predetermined zone’, as Marsh would then refer
to it the rest of the day ) if anyone wants to start using
that kind of terminology to describe what he said.
I will leave it to others to decide if he was setting something
as a ‘primary’ or a ‘secondary’ or a ‘tertiary’ or whatever
adjectives someone wants to use.
Just read what Cordes said and make up your own mind.
>> WFF also said…
>> Hey and did you know there was an engine moving
>> to the ranch to stag there.
Hey… yeah. Multiple times. What about it?
What do you think that represents?
That’s where the pumpkin was.
Why wouldn’t some ‘engines’ be going there?
>> Why don’t you find me some Wx Ops so I can
>> provide some solid FB runs. That would be useful.
Sure… I’ll get right on it.
Want fries with that?
LMFAO
Youre getting sorta defensive now that not everyone is stroking you. Hold the fries. I’ll take that as you haven’t seen any wx ops. Is that laugh my fat ass off?
WTKTT said,
“I am not the one who FIRST said that anyone ‘assigned a PRIMARY safety zone’ to anyone and that it was an absolute FACT.
That was your buddy xxfullsailxx.”
actually, that’s not true, you did say it first:
http://www.investigativemedia.com/yarnell-hill-fire-chapter-vi-comments/#comment-18191
yet another lie…
You got me. I WAS the one that typed
the adjective p-r-i-m-a-r-y first in the
exchange referenced above.
So scratch most of the above and you
can just stick with this…
“I will leave it to others to decide if he was
setting something as a ‘primary’ or a
‘secondary’ or a ‘tertiary’ or whatever
adjectives someone wants to use.”
“Just read what Cordes said and make up your own mind.”
SPGS1 Gary Cordes’ interview with
ADOSH is still right here…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/20inrene9tcx74a/e61NRKIxLS/ADOSH%20Yarnell%20Hill%20Investigation/Central%20Yavapai%20Fire%20District/Transcripts/Gary%20Cordes%20Interview%209-11-13.pdf
and yep, after the fire rolled through, that Boulder Springs Ranch sure looked like it was a BOMB PROOF SAFETY ZONE didn’t it?
you keep forgetting to add that Cordes also mentioned the “cold black”… i think he said something like, “you know, and the cold black OF COURSE.”
and you forgot to address my concerns…
**
** ADOSH INTERVIEW WITH TYSON ESQUIBEL
The public transcript of the ADOSH interview with TFLD(t)
Tyson Esquibel is here…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/20inrene9tcx74a/0Wa61ru1K_/ADOSH%20Yarnell%20Hill%20Investigation/AZ%20Forestry%20Division/Employee%20Interviews%20By%20ADOSH/Transcripts/Tyson%20Esquibel%20Interview%208-28-13.pdf
Tyson Esquibel was a Task Force Leader Trainee ( TLFLD(t) ) assigned
directly ( and only ) to SPGS1 Gary Cordes in Yarnell on June 30, 2013.
ADOSH INTERVIEW WITH TYSON ESQUIBEL – 08/28/2013 – 1:11 PM
Q=Bruce Hanna ( AOSHA )
Q1=Rick Picard ( Deputy Chief / Operations Chief – Peoria Fire Department )
A=Tyson Esquibel ( TFLD(t) under Gary Cordes in Yarnell, 06/30/13 )
** Tyson Esquibel says Granite Mountain Crew Buggies were
** ( at some point that morning ) parked at the Boulder Springs Ranch itself.
Page 16 ( of 107 pages )…
__________________________________________________________________
Q: Well, this – this is the Helms Ranch right here ( Points to map ).
A: Okay.
Q: This is the deployment site. This is the top of the ridge.
A: Okay.
Q: My understanding from talking to these guys is that here’s the old grader right
here. They had their buggies out in here somewhere, and they woo- walked
up – I don’t know if they walked up this trail or somewhere along here,
because this is a photo that was taken at 4:04 by Wade Parker.
A: Um, I do not believe they were parked up here. Um, one of our first
assignments after we put LCS in place, lookouts, communications, escape
runs, and safety zones.
Q: Maybe they were parked – maybe they were up in here.
A: Um, they were parked at that ranch, Boulder Springs Ranch. We sent a
couple resources down this road here, and they, uh…
Q: They had the gate open on the Helms Ranch?
A: Uh, I believe so. One of the first assignments was to, uh, check their buggies
and make sure they were in a good secure area.
Q: So you think they were – they were staged there at the ranch?
A: Uh, yes, sir.
Q: Huh. It’s a little different than what we were told, but – they had a basket
there for water, right, for the helicopter?
A: Uh, yes.
Q: That they had – Yarnell had put in, and they were moving water all night, I
guess, on the 29th?
A: Yes, sir. They had a pumpkin in there.
Page 20…
Q: So, did you ever go to the Helms Ranch?
A: Uh, yes, sir.
Q: About what time did…
A: Uh, I think – I think we’re calling it two different things. I called it, uh,
Boulder Springs.
Q: Boulder Springs? This is…
A: Yeah.
Q: Yeah, okay.
A: Um…
Q: Where did you hear that term? Did somebody tell you that’s what it was?
A: Well off of this map here, let’s see. It might’ve been a different map. Um,
there was Boulder Springs Road that ran right up to it.
Q: Okay.
A: Uh, so we were calling it Boulder Springs Ranch.
Q: And what did you guys – you had parked there? You had staged vehicles there?
A: Uh, that’s – my understanding was that’s where the port-a-tank was.
Q: Right.
A: We’re talking about the same place?
Q: Right.
A: Uh, Granite Mountain buggies were in that area, and we sent 2 trucks in there
to, uh, check on those buggies and, um, to start, uh – uh, structure protection
triaging and, um, identifying hazards and roads back in that area.
Page 29…
Q: Okay. Let me look through (your notes) here. 1030. Engine 103 and engine 146
Manzanita Rooad to Boulder Spring Ranch to meet with structure group 1.
What does this say here? Assess?
A: Uh, assess Granite Mountain buggies and, uh, start triaging the area.
Q: So at 1030 in the morning, the buggies were parked there?
A: Uh, yes, sir.
Q: To the best of your knowledge?
A: Yes.
Q: Okay. So how in the heck did they get from there up to here?
A: I don’t believe they did.
Q: Well, the hikers saw ‘em up here. The old grater was up here, and they –
could they have moved the buggies at some point?
A: Yeah, that’s possible, but, um, I don’t think there was any passable roads in
that area.
Q: None of these?
A: Not by, uh…
Q: There are viable ways of getting in and out of there?
A: …a crew buggy. It’s possible, but to the best of my knowledge they were
down here. ( Points to map ).
Page 80…
Q: Okay. I just wanna go over one point again.
A: Okay.
Q: Do you think – you’re saying you think that Granite Mountain had parked
their buggies at that ranch.
A: Boulder Springs Ranch?
Q: Yeah.
A: Yeah.
Q: You’re like 100 percent sure?
A: Um, I know in the morning they were definitely there.
Q: At some point they were – they were there?
A: Yeah.
Q: How would they have moved ‘em?
Would they have sent a couple guys back and?
A: Uh, how do they normally move them…
Q: Yeah.
A: …or how did they move them that day?
Q: Do you think they moved ‘em?
A: Uh, I heard that they were moved.
Q: Oh, you did hear they were moved?
A: Yeah, but I don’t know who or – or…
….
Q: Uh, there’s – there’s, uh, the 2 hikers, have you heard about the 2 hikers
supposedly had spoken to ‘em several times up here, Eric Marsh?
A: Okay.
Q: They – they sent us a picture and clearly the two buggies are parked out in this
area somewhere.
A: Are they? Okay.
….
Q: But, yeah. I – I can’t disagree. I mean, if you say they were there at some
point, that’s – that’s fine, you know.
A: Yeah, in the morning at a minimum they were there.
_____________________________________________________________
** Tyson Esquibel seems to suggest that Brendan McDonough
** MAY have told Blue Ridge to start looking for GM in the area
** just west of Boulder Springs Ranch, at the end of Lakewood Drive,
** since that’s where Blue Ridge wanted to start the search.
Page 62 ( of 107 pages )…
_______________________________________________________
Q: Okay. Let’s go back to your notes a little bit more.
A: Okay.
Q: Okay. So we hear about a deployment, and then does Gary Cordes give you
some specific directions as to what he wants you to do?
A: Uh, right after we heard the deployment, uh, yeah. We met at the, uh – we
were all at the café.
Q: Right.
A: Uh, we got together with Blue Ridge.
Q: Okay.
A: And, um, the plan was to, um, get all the ALS gear into the pickup that I was in.
Q: Mm-hm.
A: And we were gonna take, um, uh, four additional medics with
myself. I’m an EMT.
Q: Okay.
A: They were – they were gonna take the 4 medics, um, and then we were gonna,
uh, either try to locate them or treat them when they were located. Uh, my
truck was gonna go in with the Blue Ridge, um, supt, and, uh, they had a
Rhino, and then they were gonna take their sup truck along with us; so it was
gonna be those 3 vehicles that were gonna go – either try to locate them when
it cooled down enough or, um, start treatment whenever they were able to find ‘em.
Q: And where were you going to go in?
A: Um, we were…
Q: And how far were you gonna go?
A: We were thinking that they were down, um, this Lakewood Drive. Um, the
fire was pushing through there at that time, so the, um, Blue Ridge sent their
Rhino in there to start scouting it out to try to figure out how we could get into
‘em. We had no clue where Granite Mountain was at that point.
Q: You thought that Granite Mountain may have made it down into that area?
A: Uh, we thought that they were back up beyond, um, Boulder Springs Ranch,
somewhere in that area.
Q: How did you – how did you come to that conclusion?
A: Um, I think that, uh, Blue Ridge had their lookout with ‘em, so he had, uh,
and this is all, uh, speculation. I don’t know how they knew that.
Q: No, I understand.
A: But he, uh, my guess would be that he was – he was the – he knew where they
were previously, so that’s all we had to go by. I personally did not know
where they were.
Q: Okay, so the speculation is that the Blue Ridge lookout may have seen the last
location where they had been working?
A: I think they had a better idea than we did. Yes.
_________________________________________________________________
Wow. That so totally doesn’t make any sense inside my head at this point. However,
“When you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains–however improbable–must be the truth.”
They knew where they were previously? No one told them they were headed to BS ranch. So again they were not looking there. If McDonough and Cordes knew where they went why did they not say something. Maybe at that time they really didn’t know and in the interview had 20/20 hindsight? just an open thought.
Reply to Marti Reed post on April 1, 2014 at 8:21 am
>> Marti said…
>> Wow. That so totally doesn’t make any sense
>> inside my head at this point.
I’m not sure what to make of that, either.
ADOSH investigator Bruce Hanna himself was having
such a hard time believing this that he came back
to it FOUR separate times during the interview just to
try to VERIFY… and despite the fact that Esquibel wasn’t
sure of a lot of other things… he seemed to be pretty
damn sure about this one thing ( that, at some point,
the GM Crew Carriers WERE staged right at the BSR ).
So I guess it’s conjecture time again.
Let’s assume he’s right.
WHY would they have gone there at all?
Did they just get LOST trying to find the Sesame
area and ended up there just to try and get ‘directions’
on how to find the ‘Sesame area’, where they were
SUPPOSED to go?
Remember… Cordes ONLY showed Marsh ( in his
Supt truck ) and perhaps Steed ( in the Chase truck )
how to get out to Sesame. The GM crew was still
making their way down from the ICP in Peeples Valley
where they stopped to have breakfast.
By the time GM got to Yarnell ( circa 8:00 AM, an hour
after the briefing at the fire station )… Cordes had long
since gone about his business and no one was
‘showing them’ ( the Crew Carriers ) how to get
anywhere. They were on their own with either maps
or GPS to find this ‘Sesame area’ and the
GM Supt and Chase trucks already ‘staged’ out there.
Chief Dan Andersen saw the two GM Crew Carriers
pass his house on Lakewood ( heading west ) at
exactly 8:03 AM. That is just four minutes before
Marsh would meet the hikers WAY out west on the
ridge. Andersen’s house was on the extreme eastern
end of Lakewood ( you could see it from the Ranch
House Restaurant ), so that doesn’t tell us whether
GM Crew Carriers took the correct path towards
Sesame as they went east.
Maybe they got ‘lost’ and just ‘ended up’ at the
Boulder Springs Ranch looking for a moment
looking for directions… and Esquibel happened to
see them there for that short time and then just
thought that’s where they were ‘staging’.
Who knows.
I will tell you who knows ( if Esquibel is right )…
Brendan McDonough.
>> Marti also said…
>> “When you have eliminated the impossible, whatever
>> remains–however improbable–must be the truth.”
This entire incident has become an exercise in
‘accepting the improbable’. I expect it will continue.
I seriously dought in the time frames of Marsh or the crew they went to the BS ranch. And I have named it the BS ranch because of so many assumptions being made about it. But I diverse The crew came from town to there Parking spot the time frame dose not give any time to take a trip some where else and Marsh would have told them where to come and park. I think there was some confusion by the witness ( maybe a lot of confusion). But the improbable rules here it seems.
Elizabeth,
With regard to some talk of “foreboding clouds” and thunderstorms, and arguing against the GMHS decision to leave their perfectly good SZ on June 30th, you posted “making clear that moving to the Boulder Springs Ranch was an irrational act….. how would GM have anticipated the almost rogue wind change that came somewhere around 4:24-ish?)”
YES ELIZABETH, THE GMHS LEAVING THEIR SZ AND MOVING TO THE BOULDER SPRINGS RANCH WAS IN FACT AN IRRATIONAL ACT.
“Based on what I am understanding about the weather and fire behavior and predicted fire behavior at 4:04-ish, I continue to develop the view that it was not irrational for GM to move as they did, when they did, toward the Boulder Springs Ranch.”
Elizabeth,
It posted before I was finished. So continuing with the above ….
For the life of me, I CANNOT understand where you are going with this one and how you’re coming to these conclusions. Fear of lightning is a bogus argument, because they were NOT on a ridgetop, and could have easily move to safe ground to avoid lightning. Lightning should have been the LEAST of their worries. This argument is similar to the 30 Mile Fire where the WFF feared getting hypothermia in a cold stream over burning to death in a fire. Totally unrealistic and a Liberal legal manuever.
And “how would GM have anticipated the almost rogue wind change that came somewhere around 4:24-ish?” Pretty simple on this one. It was a COMMON Southwest thunderstorm in their own backyard. They had experienced very similar weather earlier on the nearby Doce Fire.
Myself and most all other experienced WFF hold the view that “it was irrational for GM to move as they did, when they did, toward the Boulder Springs Ranch.”
Thunderstorms, almost by definition, not only can have dramatic or “rogue” wind shifts, there can be multiple wind shifts too. I would imagine that not marching into the unburned anywhere close to a fire when a thunderstorm is present is pretty much a no-brainer, no matter what you think a thunderstorm is going to do. They are predictable in their unpredictability.
The lightning theory just seems to be a reach. Its beauty is that it really can’t be disproven. But the point is that if that was the reason they left the black was lightning (I don’t believe it was – the alternative explanation makes more sense and has more evidence), they still did almost certainly the worst possible thing they could have done. Trying to go to Yarnell to help at least explains the direction they went.
I think Elizabeth again needs to look for advice from people with real-world, relevant experience. In the case of lightning, people with WFF experience would be a good place to start, but also anyone who works outdoors in either AZ or for that matter around the CO front range. Is lightning a concern to be kept in mind? Yes, beforehand it’s best, if other safe options exist, to not plan to sit on a ridge during a thunderstorm. (And GM was not faced with doing so.) Is it very common to see lightning in the distance? Yes. If you see lightning in the distance, does it mean you’re at imminent risk of getting struck? No. Nor does it mean you have to stop what you’re doing just because of that distant lightning. If you see distant lightning, should you assume a fairly high risk of dying through other means to avoid lightning exposure? Try to downclimb a loose cliff, spend an hour in dense unburned fuel with a fire blowing towards you, that kind of thing? No.
All well said
If Lighting would have been close and over the fire where would all the air craft be? Not over the Fire
If Lightning was near or over the fire would the Air craft have been talking about it? YES
Would the Air Attack be telling IC and OPS and ground forces that Lightning was Eminent on the fire? Yes
Simple question where is the proof?
Air attack would have been all over it…..
RTS- i agree with 90% of what you’re saying… especially about lightning in the southwest. and, if lightning were a major factor that day, the reports would have said so.
one thing i hesitate to agree with you about, is the fact that GM’s decision was wholly irrational. if i try to put myself in Eric’s shoes, i think i could potentially “rationalize” my way to BSR… of course, in hindsight, it might be easy to say that the decision was irrational (though i’m not even sure that’s the “right” word).
i know you’re not a fan of the SAIR, but i think one of it’s contributions to trying to understand HOW it happened, is that it at least attempts to challenge the reader to place yourself on that ridge, and rationalize your way off it. i am referring to the “Analysis” portion and the “course of actions.”
xxfullsailxx,
I think a lot of us, if we tried to put ourselves in their shoes up there, could for many different reasons, rationalize beginning to move-out to the south. Other than the lack of succinct comm with adjoining resources, including Div A’s higher-ups, when they began to move-out, they had their bases covered. They could see the fire, see the weather, and had easy access to a down and out off the backside.
As they moved along, those bases remained covered until they reached the point where they uncovered all of those bases, and decended into the bowl. I think that’s the point where any rationality ended.
yep, i hear you.
So then, why do YOU think they decided to drop into the bowl?
why don’t you consult the SAIR like i told you? i think that all the speculative reasons are there…
why do YOU think they dropped off the two track?
do you think there were external factors involved? like someone demanded they do something against their own will?
or maybe they were fooled by an ice-cream truck mirage down in the box canyon? maybe they thought they saw a beer cart? women’s swedish volleyball team?
unless you think there was some sort of external factor involved (which i don’t), it’s all speculation.
Thx for not even remotely rationally responding to my question.
dude, what do you want?
we (wff’s) bushwack… there were game trails… the ranch looked so close… they thought it would be faster… little fairies were guiding them…
all the same reasons the SAIR talks about… i agree with.
Unless, when they got to that point, they thought it would be faster, and therefore maybe safer, than staying on the two-track, which was longer, and (as WTK has described) may have had its downsides.
just the usual unfounded speculation that we’re all used to coming from WTKTT… (what i would call “vomit”)
btw: the SAIR was actually first in considering that scenario…
My comment above was meant to be a response to this comment.
“So then, why do YOU think they decided to drop into the bowl?”
I think we all pretty much know, relatively speaking, why they decided to head to Yarnell. But why did they decided to take the “shortcut” if it wasn’t for the perceived speed advantage?
I agree, at this point, that lightning was most likely not a major factor in their decision.
my reply is above…
And my speculating is not based on WTK’s thinking, it’s based on my own.
I grew up here in New Mexico, camping, back-packing, horse-packing all over. I was a Girl Scout, a GS camp counselor and riding director and Leader. In my mind, from the very get-go of this I can’t imagine “short- cutting” into a manzanita-filled potential chimney with a fire headed in its direction under a thunderstorm.
On the other hand, my 15-year-old Eagle Scout brother got himself killed and risked the lives of five other people making a similar “shortcut.” Because his scoutmaster yelled at him, saying “You guys hurry up and get down from there, we’ve gotta go!”
Thinking that dropping into the bowl was faster is problematic. A reasonable person, with prior experience walking through that type of brush over and through a steep and rocky bowled drainage, would know that kind of bushwhack didn’t make sense. They would have done it once or twice before, and realized that it is a bad idea. Moreover, if they did try it again, after the first few minutes of making literally only a slow crawl in terms of progress, again they would have headed back up, realizing that retreat uphill would become impossible otherwise later on.
This is somewhat analogous to experience with lightning. In that area of AZ during monsoon, as other posters have noted the thunderstorm at Yarnell is a normal occurrence, and seeing lightning is a normal and regular occurrence. Likewise knowing that the bushwhack GM undertook is going to be painfully slow and difficult is simply a normal thing. To be blunt, I believe OSHA would be warranted in saying that a bushwhack of that nature, when other alternatives existed, was a violation even without a fire involved. That is because minor injuries are quite possible from taking a full crew on that type of bushwhack, and there’s no corresponding need to expose them to that.
well, actually, i would imagine GM was pretty familiar with both that terrain AND that fuel type…
i don’t think you really know how fast their progress was. hotshot crews bushwack through all sorts of crap and make good pace of it…
besides the fact, that post fire photos of the drainage show what look to be a network of game trails that would have provided some degree of “path.”
Marti,
Faster, quite often does not equate with safer. As I said above, that is the point where all rationality ended.
On the faster point, I’d even suggest posters here think about their own experiences with unplanned sustained bushwhacks, and how many actually did end up being faster?
I agree with that, believe me. That exact same thinking got my brother killed. But what I’m trying to get at is WHY did they make THAT decision, when the “escape route” was, according to Brendan, the two-track ALL THE WAY to the ranch, if it wasn’t for the PERCEIVED speed advantage?
The big IF…
IF they had scouted the 2 track to the ranch.
I believe they could have made the Ranch with a little time to spare.
The move was still a calculated risk
You make it or you don’t.
When they dropped into the bowl all bets were off.
Scout the escape route make sure it is feasible before you commit to the unknown.
Elizabeth’s theory about the lightining being a major saftey concern and that being the main catalyst for GM to move from the black certainly merrits everyones attention. It’s one thing that I never really gave alot of consideration too until she brought it up. The way Elizabeth lays it out, It is hard not to give it some serious consideration..
Good job Elizabeth!
I think the other thing to consider is that we have also really only
seen the evidence ( revealed only in Darrell Willis’ ADOSH
interview transcript )… that there WAS a time ( in 2012 ) when
“Death from above” was a BIG concern for Marsh, Steed
AND the entire crew. I’m talking about Wesley fire incident that
Willis still says they were “sent home from” because of that
refusal by Marsh to ‘go direct’ when there was so much
‘Death from above’ ( falling tree ) potential.
Yes… I know… falling trees and lightning are certainly NOT
the same thing… but here’s the point I want to make.
Eric’s own unit log from Wesley indicates how concerned his
CREW was with the situation. So it wasn’t just all about him.
He was hearing these “Death from above” concerns from
his OWN men… and like any good supervisor SHOULD do
he was paying attention to them. He also AGREED with
their concerns.
So fast-forward to being on top of the highest ridge in the
neighborhood, where a fire had already started with multiple
lightning strikes… and a thunderstorm is rolling in ( and you
can HEAR the thunder ).
We DO NOT KNOW how that might have factored into the
decision making… but what if the approaching storm ( and
the potential lightning risks ) really were part of what Marsh
meant when we hear him say to Captain Jesse Steed…
“That’s why I called you before to ask you what your comfort
level is.”
Is it possible ( just like Wesley ) that the CREW itself had
already been expressing their OWN concerns about possible
“Death from above” out there… and ( just like Wesley ) it
was time for management to realize they really WERE
concerned ( maybe not all but perhaps a few of them )?.
Base on the *new* evidence we can now read ( thanks to
Mr. Dougherty publishing it ) with regards to OPS1 Todd
Abel’s direct concerns about the same thing ( lightning up
on that ridge )…
I believe it IS possible that those kind of “Death from above”
considerations *may* have factored into the decision making,
regardless of anything else anyone was ‘asking’ them
( or even trying to tell them ) to do.
The only real head-scratching moment would be is if the
potential ‘lightning’ threat really was involved in any way,
shape or form in their ‘comfort level’ and ‘discussing their
options’ conversation…
…then why would anyone be reluctant to report that as
having been the case?
Brendan McDonough has chosen NOT to talk about everything
the SAIR even says he ‘heard’ that afternoon.
Fine, whatever… but why in the world would he be reluctant
to say that they were VERY concerned about the lightning,
if that really factored into it at all?
Does he really think that would be bringing some kind of
‘shame’ to his ‘fire brothers’ or something and needs to
remain a ‘secret’?
I mean.. who is NOT afraid of lightning? ( If you aren’t… you
actually need to re-evaluate because you SHOULD be ).
I once knew someone that was so deathly afraid of lightning
that if we were out on the football field… even at just practice…
and he heard thunder… he would curl up in a ball in fear and
we had to CARRY him off the field.
The very sound of thunder… and him knowing he was outside…
just put him in a catatonic state. It was that bad.
Not saying there was anyone like that on the Granite Mountain
crew ( certainly they’d been exposed to field lightning many,
many times before )… but just like Wesley… what if a
‘consensus’ was emerging amongst the crew that day
when they heard thunder that that ridge wasn’t the best
place to be… no matter how much BLACK there was?
Correction for above…
I left the important word RECENTLY out of the first sentence.
Should have read like this…
“I think the other thing to consider is that we have also
really only RECENTLY seen the evidence ( revealed only
in Darrell Willis’ ADOSH interview transcript )…”
There is a LOT of stuff that we are only now seeing
because ( thanks to Mr. Dougherty ) it has only
RECENTLY been (publicly) published.
So combine what has come out of Darrell Willis’
heretofore unheard ADOSH interview ( the Wesley
fire incident ) AND what we can now read in OPS1
Todd Abel’s interview ( his ongoing concerns that
day about lightning on the ridge and his specific
discussions with Marsh about it )…
…then that’s why I believe the whole ‘lightning’ thing
deserved another round of discussion.
That’s what can/should happen when *new* evidence
comes to light. You ‘revisit’ things. Maybe the wattage
of the light being shed on some things just got
ramped up… but maybe not.
I think the ‘consensus’ amongst experienced WFF is
going to be the same as before… that ‘lightning concerns’
could not possibly have factored into their decision
making that afternoon… but so be it.
I still think this ( and a lot of other things ) deserve a
‘revisit’ now that we can finally see this actual
ADOSH investigation material.
i would suggest you go visit the Wildland Fire Lessons Learned webpage to see how many lightning accidents are out there.(while you’re at it, check out hazard tree accidents to understand just how “NOT the same thing” they really are)
i don’t think you could survive on an IHC in the southwest (or anywhere for that matter) with an irrational fear of lightning (as your stupid anecdotal story attempts to suggest.)
As someone born and raised in the SW I tend to agree with you here. I have a really (and some would say irrational) powerful fear of lightning. Seriously. But I have had to learn how to deal with that. I know how to “hunker down.” I think lightning may have been a concern among the GM hotshots, but not a defining one, all things considered.
Here is where you call me crazy. I love to watch lighting. I have sat in a lookout during a storm, Anselmos fire (SPELLING). I have seen the blue electrical light dance around the edges of a lookout from being hit so much. As a patrolman I have sit in my truck as storms moved thru to check for fire starts.
I have been on mountains with horses move to young tree stands tied up and hunkered till the storm passed. I have been on small lightning fires in the mountains and hunkered while new storms passed. Wild yes but you can stay safe and some times watch a better show than the 4th of JULY.
I LOVE watching lightning when I’m in a vehicle or inside a building!!
I’m sitting here remembering times somewhere in the middle of the Grand Canyon with lightning going off all around, above, and below me. I would just make myself as tiny as I possibly could. Many of my friends would have just kept walking! I hated it at the time, but I love remembering it. Awesome!
OTOH I have black widow spiders living in my garage and I’ve never been willing to go to all the bother to try to get rid of them.
Go figure!
I learned at a young age that lighting was just mother nature you learn to live with all kinds of mother nature. Not spiders spray em hire someone to.
**
** LIGHTNING ROUND
Ever since I saw the new ADOSH material and ( for the first time ) could read
about OPS1 Todd Abel’s own ‘lightning concerns’… I was putting this post
together as kind of a ‘lightning summary’.
I mentioned it somewhat and Mr. Powers ( and others ) have already refuted
most of the ‘lightning concerns’ with regards to any ‘decision making’ that
day… but since Elizabeth just brought up ‘lightning’ again ( and her prior
attempts to discuss this topic, even before the ADOSH material became
available ) I thought I would just go ahead and post this, anyway.
There is plenty of documentation now to support the base theory that Russ Shumate based his own IA ( Initial Attack ) Plan for Saturday on well known
concerns about crews being unsafely exposed to ‘lightning risks’ in that kind
of high ridge environment, at that time of year.
The Weaver Mountains seem to ‘famous for it’ and always an area of
high concern with regards to ‘lightning’.
Indeed… the fire itself BEGAN because of ( multiple ) lightning strikes up there
on the Weaver Mountain Ridge in the late afternoon on Friday, June 28, 2013.
** OPS1 Todd Abel’s concerns about lightning
In the recently released ADOSH supporting material ( many thanks again to Mr.
John Dougherty for publishing this information ), we only NOW learn that OPS1
Todd Abel really was quite concerned with the ‘lightning safety’ on Sunday…
almost as much as IC Russ Shumate was the day before when he basically
based his entire IA ( Initial Attack ) plan on his own concerns for the safety
of any crews he might put up on that ridge…
…and that Todd Abel even took Eric ‘aside’ after one of the briefings and
specifically mentioned HIS ‘lightning’ concerns for that day’s work cycle…
* START OF EXCERPTS FROM TODD ABEL’S ADOSH INTERVIEW
_________________________________________________________________
ADOSH INTERVIEW WITH TODD ABEL – 08/22/13 – 1:09 PM
Q = Bruce Hanna
Q1 = Dave Larsen ( Rest in Peace )
Q2 = Nicolas Cornelius
A = Todd Abel
Page 8…
A: And, uh, so once again the type fire, 4 IC Russ Shumate was kind of giving
them the same briefing that I had just received from him a half hour ago.
Q1: Right.
A: And, uh, Eric was able to listen to that.
Q1: Okay.
A: Um, and – and hear that briefing. Um, and then once they got done and started
going over about some other business about getting aircraft ordered and all
that stuff. And, um, you know, trying to fill some more positions on the team.
Um, uh, me and Eric kind of stepped to the side and I gave him a more formal
briefing. I wanted to make sure that all the information that I got I wanted to
pass onto him. And that briefing pretty much went, uh, you know, just like a –
a – that briefing checklist in the – in the IRPG. Uh, basically followed that
format. But obviously went into a lot of details on the – you know the fire
behavior they had yesterday. Um, the predicted, uh, um, cell build ups this
time of year with the outflows and the lightning strikes and all that.
Page 13…
Q1: Current monsoon weather. Tell me what – what – what that means to you,
current monsoon weather? ‘Cause that doesn’t mean a lot to me.
A: Okay what – what that monsoon wea- possibility of monsoon build ups, to me,
it – it – obviously it does a lot of things to fire and safety for firefighters.
Knowing that these guys could be at – were gonna be up on this ridge,
lightning was a concern for me.
Q1: Okay.
A: I wanted them to make sure that they kept good lookouts and watched for
those build ups, ‘cause of the lightning.
Q1: Okay.
Page 44…
NOTE: We already knew that OPS1 Todd Abel and DIVSA Eric
Marsh had talked about the ‘weather’ situation and Marsh telling
Abel the winds were ‘getting squirrely’ up on the ridge… but only now
( in the recently released ADOSH material ) do we discover that
Abel’s ongoing ‘lightning concerns’ that day ( which he had ALREADY
expressed to Marsh that morning ) were specifically discussed
during that conversation… and that OPS1 Todd Abel was still
worried about it ( lightning ) and their safety up on that ridge…
A: …3:45. This all was about in the same timeframe of wind shifts, the
conversation with Eric. He was the first one to feel those squirrely winds start,
right?
A: Yeah.
Q1: And he’s talking to you about he’s got wind issues.
A: Mm-hm.
Q1: Let me ask you this, you say you’re nervous, um, because of this…
A: This cell building over here.
Q1: …this cell – what does that mean to you?
A: That means outflows, possible lightning strikes, all that stuff.
Q1: Okay.
A: So that’s why I wanted to make sure that he had eyes on it to make sure he
watches that thing and make sure that if it’s getting too – if he gets to really
start feeling those winds changing and everything that they can get hunkered
in that black – that 250 acres of safety zone there.
Q1: Mm-hm.
A: And – and stay out of harm’s way. You know they could even drop down off
the ridge for lightning purposes if they had to.
Q1: Sure.
A: Was my thought process.
________________________________________________________________
* END OF EXCERPTS FROM TODD ABEL’S ADOSH INTERVIEW
We still do NOT know how concerned Marsh himself was about being up on that
ridge with regards to potential ‘lightning’ risks… but at least we NOW know that
his direct supervisor ( OPS1 Todd Abel ) was VERY concerned about, was
expressing that concern to Marsh, and those concerns WERE part of his intent
when he told Marsh to ‘hunker and be safe’ (up there) that afternoon.
We also still do NOT know if any ‘lightning concerns’ were, in any way, part of
Marsh’s own ‘what’s your comfort level?’ queries to Steed about their option of
staying up on the ridge.
Only someone who heard that ‘discussing their options’ conversation and is
willing to talk about it might be able to say whether that was, in any way, part
of the ‘comfort level’ discussions at that time.
The rest of this is just sort of an ‘all-in-one-place’ SUMMARY reference of what
the other official documents have already had to say about ‘lightning’ that day…
including the account that at 4:20 PM, the exact moment Steed/Crew were having
to decide whether to stay on the high-ridge two-track OR drop into the canyon,
loud THUNDER was heard in Yarnell and they would have ALSO heard it.
Again… there is no evidence that influenced their decision making at 4:20 in ANY
way… but it’s still interesting to note the timing on that and the fact that they HAD
to have ‘heard’ this thunder.
SAIR – Page 7
Late afternoon on June 28, the Yarnell Hill Fire started high on a ridge
west of Yarnell, Arizona when lightning ignited multiple fires.
SAIR – Page 14
Multiple lightning ignitions occurred from thunderstorm activity on lands
southwest of Prescott at about 1700 Phoenix Standard Time (PNT) on
Friday, June 28. Of the seven lightning fires discovered, four were on
State, private, and adjacent Bureau of Land Management (BLM) lands.
The Yarnell Hill Fire was one of these four.
SAIR – Page 17
Friday, 28 June 2013 – Several parties notify the Arizona Dispatch Center
(Dispatch) of a lightning-ignited fire on State of Arizona land west of Yarnell
at about 1730 ( 5:30 PM ) on June 28. It is one of four fires on state lands in
the vicinity caused by significant lightning activity. Dispatch begins documenting
the incident at 1736 ( 5:36 PM ) as the Yarnell Hill Fire.
An Arizona State Forestry Division (AZSF) firefighter, a qualified Type 3 Incident
Commander (ICT3) who has worked in the local area since 1995, coordinates
responses to the lightning strikes. He and the BLM Duty Officer on scene
anticipate multiple new lightning-caused fires in the morning.
NOTE: Shumate and BLM Duty Officer ( Dean Fernandez? ) were already
expecting more lightning the next MORNING ( not afternoon ).
SAIR – Page 18
On Friday evening… ICT4 is concerned about firefighters moving across the
rugged terrain at night, and he knows he cannot provide logistical support for
them overnight. He is also concerned about potentially exposing firefighters
to lightning on the ridge. In consideration of these factors, the relatively low fire
behavior and the attention required by other fire starts, he prepares to begin full
suppression efforts on Yarnell Hill the following morning ( Saturday, June 29 ).
He requests two Type 2 Department of Corrections crews, a light helicopter,
and an AZSF engine for the morning.
Saturday, June 29, 2013
The fire is holding on all four sides and none of the other starts from the day
before shows smoke. At 1442, ICT4 advises Dispatch he is releasing Air Attack.
At 1540, he releases the BLM brush engine and a local Peeples Valley fire engine,
because the multiple fire starts he had expected do not materialize. ICT4 releases
the two SEATs for new assignments and the State of Arizona Aviation Officer
orders them to reposition to the Wickenburg SEAT Base.
Weather conditions are hot and dry, and increasing west-southwest winds elevate
fire activity at around 1600. ICT4 responds at 1610 by requesting the two SEATs
and Air Attack to return to the Yarnell Hill Fire. One SEAT and Air Attack launch
from Wickenburg but the second SEAT stands by for potential new fire starts
from active lightning across central Arizona.
SAIR – Page 21
SPOT WEATHER FORECAST FOR SUNDAY, JUNE 30, 2013
DISCUSSION…STRONG HIGH PRESSURE OVER THE SOUTHWEST WILL
MAINTAIN THE HEAT SPELL THROUGH THE WEEKEND. LIMITED MOISTURE
WILL RESULT IN ISOLATED THUNDERSTORM ACTIVITY SUNDAY AFTERNOON
AND EARLY EVENING. THESE STORMS WILL PRODUCE LIGHTNING AND
GUSTY WINDS…BUT LITTLE OR NO MEASURABLE PRECIPITATION.
NOTE: Lightning was EXPECTED that afternoon wherever cells developed.
SAIR – Page 28
Circa 1300 ( 1:00 PM ) or 13:30 ( 1:30 PM )…
GM Capt ( Jesse Steed ), GM Lookout ( Brendan McDonough ), and others talk
over the radio about thunderstorms coming in. GM Capt ( Jesse Steed ) mentions
he might have seen a few lightning strikes.
SAIR – Page 77
Figure 8 shows the lightning between 1300 and 1530 as the storms were
tracking west-southwest ( towards Yarnell ).
SAIR – Page 78
Around 1620 MST, field personnel near Highway 89 in the Yarnell area
began to hear thunder, and shortly afterward noted spritzes of rain or mist
mixed with ash. The Earth Networks Total Lightning Network verified the
thunder, showing two in-cloud lightning flashes at 1620 (Figure 11).
NOTE: 1620 ( 4:20 PM ) is the exact moment the SAIR says that
Steed and the Crew decided to leave the two-track high ridge road
and drop into the box canyon.
SAIR – Page 81
As the outflow boundary raced towards the fire location between
1500 to 1600 MST, the parent line of storms lagged several miles
behind. Various lightning detection systems showed lightning flashes
within the parent storms, but lightning strike locations and trends would
not indicate a significant change in storm movement.
Some indicators appeared after 1600. Subtle indicators included the gradual
change in wind direction as the boundary approached (west-northwest) as
well as a brief lull just prior to the outflow passage. Distinct indicators included
an abrupt change in wind direction and speeds, referred to as “ripping” when
the outflow boundary hit the northern end of the fire. Other distinct indicators
included “spritzes” of rain, thunder, and some flashes of lightning
( both cloud-to-ground and in-cloud ) that coincided with the rapidly increasing
fire column and fire behavior.
** IC Russ Shumate’s concerns about LIGHTNING…
From ADOSH report…
Friday, June 28, 2013
Shumate developed a full suppression strategy based upon the policy of the
Arizona State Forestry Division. The tactic for the next day was to use a
helicopter to transport people to and from the fire. This suppression strategy
was concerned with mitigating risks of the predicted monsoonal LIGHTNING
and rains, but did not initially appear to plan for potential extreme fire behavior.
Saturday, June 29, 2013
On June 29 Shumate returned to the fire early in the morning and began
assigning resources to the Yarnell Hili Fire, which was the only lightning-caused
fire still active from the storm on June 28. Sometime after 0700 and prior to
1100, Dean Fernandez, a BLM representative, took a morning flight to update
the situation of the fire and estimated the fire to be approximately eight acres.
From this assessment, Shumate and Fernandez developed an initial attack plan
to put six firefighters from the DOC Lewis Crew and one helitack crew member
on the fire using the helicopter for transportation. Shumate also planned to
remove the firefighters from the fire by 1530 due to perceived
LIGHTNING RISK from afternoon storms.
huh, interesting… so apparently you’re not from the southwest.
because even any layperson from the general area would know that thunderstorms and lightning are pretty prevalent starting in late june and running into july and august in the southwest U.S.
and, i suppose it’s because you’re a layperson, without any prior knowledge of wff OR the southwest in general, that you need a long winded explanation of the dangers that might present themselves while working out of doors in the southwest during late june and early july.
congratulations on educating yourself. we’re all very proud of you.
Thought we weren’t going to hear from you today.
Glad you’re still reading!
So… now that you have your ‘daily attack’ fix out of the way…
What do YOU think?
Do YOU think the (obvious) lightning concerns had
ANYTHING to do with any of the decisions that were
made out on that ridge that day?
Mr. Powers and others have already chimed in.
Don’t you want to follow with your ‘expert’ opinion?
WTKTT said, “Thought we weren’t going to hear from you today. Glad you’re still reading!”
well, some of us have lives… you know, a job, a wife, kids, a dog that needs walking… none of us have the “commitment” to the “salt mines” like you do… (that’s another way of saying compulsive narcissism)
WTKTT said, “So… now that you have your ‘daily attack’ fix out of the way…”
i think you mean “constructive criticism”… it’s not my fault you’re too obstinate to understand.
WTKTT said, “Do YOU think the (obvious) lightning concerns had ANYTHING to do with any of the decisions that were made out on that ridge that day?”
hmm, well let’s see… as usual, you want to try to speak for the deceased and put thoughts in people’s heads… no, i don’t know if Marsh or Steed considered lightning to be an imminent threat. neither do you.
as i tried to say above in my constructive criticism… lightning is always a “hazard” consideration in the southwest whenever monsoons are forecasted. you can check your IRPG for current lightning guidelines as well as definitions for Lightning Activity Level (LAL).
GM moved because they were watching the fire roll towards Yarnell and were out of position. they weren’t satisfied with sitting in the black, so they attempted to move towards BSR.
You are completely right. Nothing else to add
fullsail,
Do you think that PFD Willis’ comment regarding this same notion may have influenced the GMHS to leave the black? Remember that Willis made almost this identical claim during the YHF fatality site news conference. “GM moved because they were watching the fire roll towards Yarnell and were out of position. they weren’t satisfied with sitting in the black …”
not sure i understand your question.
i do not think that willis directly influenced their decision to move.
fullsail,
I agree that Willis’ very similar statement regarding sitting in a SZ and doing nothing (compared to engaging) did NOT directly influence Marsh, Steed, and the GMHS decision. Do you think that it may have INDIRECTLY, subtley influenced them, since that attitude seemed to have been somewhat of a PFD standard?
RTS- i haven’t listened to the Willis interview yet… would like to soon. my initial reaction since seeing the GM crewmembers background was that yes, there were a lot of wanna-be structure guys and that was a big draw to get on with GMIHC…
would like to pick up on this discussion after i’ve heard willis’s interview.
Several things:
1. God bless you, xxfullsailxx. Welcome back.
2. It troubles me that there is the tendency for various anonymous posters to assert things about the Yarnell Hill Fire as if those things were fact, whereupon other posters then ADOPT the non-facts as if they WERE facts and keep repeating them until everyone forgets that they never WERE verified facts to begin with. One good example of this pertains to Marsh “hiding” his location on June 30th – that is not a FACT – we have no verified evidence that that actually happened, and the evidence that we DO have suggests exactly the opposite. Another example pertains to lightning – I asked about the lightning back in OCTOBER. I was told nononononono – there was noooooo lightning that day. We now see that ACTUALLY there WAS lightning that day, including a pop right in the time of the escape route being cut off. (I have no idea if the lightning is relevant – my only point is that there WAS lightning, contrary to the previously proffered “facts.”) My hope is that people reading this thread do their own research if they care enough about finding actual facts rather than relying on things that some anonymous guy here says. Doing your own research involves finding the relevant SOURCE documents or materials in the stack o’ information that has been released regarding the fire or contacting me at [email protected] if you want tips on making further public records or FOIA/FOIL requests.
3. The videos that Calvin and WTKTT are watching are named by their ENDING time. So the 161620 video ENDS at 4:16.20 and the 161658 video ENDS at 4:16.58. See point “2,” above.
4. I will mail $50 to anyone who can show me proof that, as of 4:04 on June 30, there was a SERIOUSLY foreboding pyrocumulous cloud in GM’s line of sight making clear that moving to the Boulder Springs Ranch was an irrational act. I am pretty sure that there was NOT such a cloud (visible) until AFTER it was too late (e.g. some time after 4:35 p.m.), but foreboding clouds are not my area of expertise. (P.S. There ALSO were no SOUTHERN winds at 4:04 p.m., so, absent a crystal ball, how would GM have anticipated the almost rogue wind change that came somewhere around 4:24-ish?)
5. The only reason I EVER mentioned Cordes is because I was sick of reading anonymous posters on this thread bash poor Willis, who was on the other side of the fire at the time of the deployment and who already had his cell phone records inspected by ADOSH to assess whether he (Willis) had actually been the person who somehow ordered GM to the Boulder Springs Ranch. (I was also sick of the gross misstatements about Marsh….) I ABSOLUTELY 100% am not pointing any sort of finger at Cordes, and WTKTT’s attempt to turn my comment about Cordes being the overhead who particularly wanted help from GM into some sort of WTKTT-all-caps-asterisk-headline-revelation that the families of the deceased GM guys should be specifically noting was what some might deem an “asshole” move. See point “6,” below, and point “2,” above.
I have found NOTHING to suggest that Gary Cordes did a DAMN thing blame-worthy or somehow suspect.
6. Based on what I am understanding about the weather and fire behavior and predicted fire behavior at 4:04-ish, I continue to develop the view that it was not irrational for GM to move as they did, when they did, toward the Boulder Springs Ranch.
7. The SAIR addresses LCES. If you missed that reference, go back and re-read the SAIR. Even if you didn’t miss that reference, go back and re-read the SAIR.
8. The SAIR never said there was a 33-minute black-out in all possibly relevant communications related to GM. Rather, the SAIR said there were no “verifiable” communications, presumably because there is no way to 100% verify who was saying what – exactly, with any degree of certainty – in the accidentally-recorded background voices in the video clips.
9. Before condemning the SAIR, go back and read it AGAIN. As I see it, the biggest problem with the SAIR is that it is not written in clear, direct, 4th-grade language. (Of course, it if answered all of the questions that could be answered, and it did so in crystal-clear language, it would be a 300 page document that took 18 months to prepare at a cost of 2x the current cost.) Actually, one of the biggest problems with the SAIR (and the ADOSH report) is that the timeline is off. If the SAIR (or ADOSH report) says that something happened at 4 p.m., don’t bet the farm on it.
(Marshall, HI!!! …waving…. Did Andy tell you that page 19 is wrong?)
Elizabeth… let me be the first one to say that now that we can
actually SEE the ADOSH investigation supporting material… there
really was no reason for a lot of the recent consternation.
A LOT of the ( what other people, not me ) called your ‘wild claims’
about some things that seemed to be coming out of nowhere
ARE, in fact, SUPPORTED by *new* information contained
in the ADOSH material. Particularly the ACTUAL audio and
written transcripts of the ADOSH interviews with people like
Abel, Musser and especially Cordes.
All you had to do was SAY that was where a lot of your thoughts
and assertions were coming from… and a lot of the needless
back and forth could have been avoided.
I was the one who kept pressing you to at least SAY what you
were basing your public assertions on… and now that we can
see the same material you obviously had I still don’t understand
why you were being so secretive about it all… but my comment
above still stands.
A LOT of what you were asserting recently APPEARS to
be based on some solid testimony.
I still haven’t gotten through even half of what Mr. Dougherty
has published recently… but I’ve already seen the quotes
from interviews with people like Musser and Cordes that
were obviously the basis for some of the claims you
were making.
I wished we had known that you were just ‘quoting the
ADOSH material’. Could have saved a lot of back and forth.
Mother of God. Sweet Mother of God. Sweet Mary Mother of God. During the Lenten season….
What… you’re surprised that all I really wanted to
know was what you were BASING your assertions
on? That really is all I ever wanted to know but
you kept refusing to answer. I still don’t understand
that at all. Honestly, I don’t.
I will even say it again ( since it’s Lent )…
Now that WE ( thanks to Mr. Dougherty ) can
see the same evidence that you apparently
had but were refusing to name… there IS
evidence to back up a lot of the claims you
were making.
Why didn’t you just say so ( or show the parts
you were referring to )?
I have absolutely no clue what you mean by this.
Wow thats pretty impressive that you can turn that around and blame E for the way you act. Man you really are arrogant aren’t
Reply to Elizabeth on March 31, 2014 at 3:03 pm
>> Elizabeth said…
>>
>> 3. The videos that Calvin and WTKTT are watching are
>> named by their ENDING time. So the 161620 video ENDS at
>> 4:16.20 and the 161658 video ENDS at 4:16.58.
I certainly HOPE you ARE right about that… because now that
we can finally see ALL of these AIR STUDY videos I don’t
like the alternative workload of having to figure out which ones
might be off and which ones aren’t…
…but would you mind telling us exactly how/where you, yourself
became aware of that?
I don’t see that exact ‘detail’ about the filenames/timestamps
explicitly stated in any of the accompanying material… so
I’m just wondering how you, yourself, became aware that
the filenames/timestamps are the ENDS and not the
STARTS of the videos.
Thanks in advance.
Elizabeth-
you can take your “blessings” and put them somewhere that doesn’t see the light of day much… (that’s me restraining myself)
i really enjoy how you talk about your “professional reputation” and how anyone who contacts you can rest assured that you won’t sell them out or that you can be trusted to keep their anonymity…
but when push came to shove, you didn’t hesitate to try to use what personal information i provided, and try to throw it back in my face.
furthermore, anytime anyone disagrees with your silly hypotheses, you feel personally “attacked” and you start throwing around the word “god” like a priest throwing holy water at a prostitute.
no thanks!
Right on………..
**
** ERIC MARSH AT THE STATION FIRE
NOTE: No ‘revelations’ here… but found a VERY interesting photograph.
The ‘Station Fire’ burned in Los Angeles County, CA from August 26 to
September 25.
Eric Marsh and the Granite Mountain Hotshots rotated onto that fire the first
week of September, 2009.
There ended up being a FAMOUS picture from that Station Fire that
includes Eric Marsh and the Granite Mountain vehicles.
By FAMOUS… I mean it was taken by an AP photographer and quickly
‘made the rounds’ in the MSM ( Mainstream Media ), appearing with
almost every major outlet story covering the ‘Station Fire’.
Here is that picture that AP Photographer Jae C. Hong took of Eric Marsh
at the Station Fire…
http://www.examiner.com/slideshow/california-firefighters-continue-the-battle-against-the-station-fire#slide=6
Caption from the photo…
Firefighters Eric Marsh, left, of Prescott, Ariz., and Lincoln Peters, of Neddles,
Calif., watch a wildfire burn during the Station Fire in La Crescenta, Calif.,
Tuesday, Sept. 1, 2009. (AP Photo/Jae C. Hong)
NOTE: Eric’s Superintendent truck and the two Granite Mountain Crew Carriers
can be seen in the distance on the right side of the photograph, parked along
the curb of a road in the middle of the residential area they seemed to have
been instructed to try and protect… down below the hill where photo was taken.
In addition to all the major AP-served MSM outlets… this photo
of Eric Marsh at the Station Fire also ended up published
by ‘The Weather Channel’…
http://www.weather.com/newscenter/specialtopics/slideshows/wildfires090209.html?page=7&scheme=image-horiz-plain.css
Another (related) followup… The LA Times itself ran an article
about Granite Mountain’s involvement with the Station Fire.
Again, no ‘revelations’ here… but an interesting mention that
Granite Mountain seemed to have a completely different
attitude about ‘publicity’ than most other Type 1 Hotshot Crews,
or at least the ones that were working the Station Fire.
An LA times photographer had been struggling to find any
firefighters on the fire that would even let him take any
photos of them. Whenever he raised his camera… they would
all turn their backs on him. Some even said their policy was that if
any press person got a picture of their face they would have
to buy a case of beer for the rest of the crew.
Not so with Granite Mountain.
They ‘welcomed’ the attention and even allowed this LA
times photographer to ’embed’ with them all day.
The article ended up publishing two pictures of Granite
Mountain working the Station Fire doing a ‘burnout’ that day.
One of Clayton Whitted and one of Christopher MacKenzie.
The LA times article is here…
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jul/07/nation/la-na-nn-granite-mountain-hotshots-station-fire-20130707
When a crew’s employer has threatened to dismantle the program a time or two, perhaps high-profile PR is seen as a need, rather than a bother. Another example of external forces???
Reply to TTWARE post on Mar 31, 2014 at 4:34 pm
>> TTWARE said…
>> When a crew’s employer has threatened to
>> dismantle the program a time or two, perhaps
>> high-profile PR is seen as a need, rather than a
>> bother. Another example of external forces???
Spoken like a true AICT.
( Anonymous Internet Conspiracy Theorist ).
LMFAO.
My own opinion?
It’s possible. When your Wildland Division Chief
has to struggle for funding and support like no
other Type 1 crew’s upper level management
really does… then any PR you can give him to
take into the City Council meetings DOES help.
City Managers like that kind of stuff.
No… I take it back.
City Managers *LOVE* that kind of stuff.
I kind of disagree with you and WTK here. I’ve looked a lot at media representations/outreach regarding/by hotshot crews.
Some crews publish videos of their activities every year. Many Native American crews do that. Many other crews do, too.
Blue Ridge Hotshots don’t do that all that much of that themselves, but I found them featured in several stories. I don’t think Granite Mountain featured in some stories being all that remarkable or unusual.
What is the point here? Are you saying the GMIHS were media whores? (“…a VERY interesting photograph.”) Is that the point? Funny thing. Your link shows pics of a whole lot of FF who are not GM guys. Google shows lots of pictures of hotshots. Sometimes I think fullsail is being a jerk. Then you post something like this and almost prove his point. Perhaps Clayton Whitted was just a nice guy ( ice cream rather than beer) and was just helping a reporter understand wildland fire fighting. But not to you WTKTT. No siree. It’s a “VERY interesting” story. And then The Truth Will Always Remain Elusive takes it and runs with it to the exact spot you were pointing to. It’s all nefarious! NEFARIOUS!! (Although I am in agreement with Elizabeth’s supposition that you Truthers are one in the same).
There’s nothing nefarious in my comment above. If you understood local small-town politics, you would know that sometimes, one has to show the local polititians that your job is important, because for the most part, they don’t have a clue what you’re doing out there.
The pols prove that from time to time, by threatening to cut, or eliminate your program (which was done to GM), without REALLY understanding what it entails.
And yes, maintaining good PR, can be a very important aspect in staying in the good graces of those back home, who control the purse strings.
My comments were not a direct criticism of GM, or the individual crewmembers. I was simply stating what is sometimes a fact of life, when dealing with polititians in that kind of environment. Over time, employees get a sense of whether or not PR may help the over-all cause, and if they think it will, they don’t turn it down.
It’s not nefarious or improper, but simply a fact of life in some political environments.
And to Mr/Ms Observer,
Small town political machinations have been in existence across this country for eons, long before GM, or YH. It doesn’t take a tremendous amount of exposure to it, to understand how the system works.
For you to suggest that it took WTKTT to lead me by the hand, down the primrose path, for me to be able understand it, and then, as you say, ‘run with it’, is laughable.
Equally laughable, is though you in-correctly criticise me for ‘running with it’, in the VERY NEXT STATEMENT, you spew out a previous gem from Elizabeth, that “WTKTT and I are the same person” and YOU “run with THAT’, to exactly the place where she wanted you to take it.
Next, you will probably be jumping on commentary from RTS, and accusing him of being a ‘disgruntled, former GM crewmember who had been fired’, another one of Elizabeth’s gems.
Apparently, during all of your ‘Observations’, you haven’t noticed that as Elizabeth rides through here on her high-horse, repeatedly chastising posters for not being factual in their commentary, she routinely makes incorrect suppositions about others that are not factual.
Sort of like, when someone incorrectly accuses someone of ‘running with it’, and then turns right around and ‘runs with’ someone else’s incorrect supposition.
aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa I have certainly never thought you guys were one in the same infract you impress me as a old WFF and have your ST** together. And incase some one brings it up RTS is not my son. But he did work for me a long time ago.
TTWARE keep up the good work…
Reply to Observer on March 31, 2014 at 6:33 pm
Yes… I thought it was ‘interesting’ that of all the
firefighters working on that Station fire that day
that this guy approached were physically ‘turning
their backs’ on a professional photographer ( and
were actually under some kind of ‘unspoken
rule’ that would cost them beer/money if they
didn’t behave that way )…
…but Granite Mountain was the opposite.
And yes… being “better than everyone” but also
being “nice” WERE the stated objectives for
this group ( as reported publicly even by Duane
Steinbrink, the first Prescott Wildland Divison Chief )
So they were just living up to their own standards.
They were just “being nice”, it seems.
But it’s still interesting.
It ‘sets them apart’ from their peers, is part of
their ‘story’ now… and is worth noting.
It also certainly did not HURT the program to have
good PR, given their unique status within the
WFF and their unique funding complications.
Nothing ‘nefarious’ at all.
It’s just… well… ‘interesting’.
See my comment above.
I did. I agree. It varies from crew to
crew, apparently. I still think the word
‘interesting’ applies to the fact that
some crews have some kind of
weird ‘aversion’ to allowing their
picture to be taken… to the point
where it costs them money/beer
if they let it happen…
…and others don’t. Kinda strange.
And doesn’t have a fking thing to do with the Yarnell Hill fire tragedy.
WFF,
You posted : “So in your career you were always on, never made a bad decision? Obviously you didn’t make one that cost anyone their life, but never had a close call? You were always on 100% everyday all the time every fire. That’s pretty special.”
I made plenty of bad decisions in my career, however, I learned from them and did my very best to NOT do them again. It’s called Lessons Learned.
I never claimed to be ‘100% on everyday, all the time, every fire.’ I never said that. I don’t claim to be ‘special’ in any sense of the word.
I have NEVER deployed a fire shelter nor has anyone I have ever supervised. I have NEVER had a serious accident on my Crew nor anyone I have ever supervised.
I have had my share of ‘close calls’ during my career, usually in the Watch Out #19 category of Death From Above. However, I give all the credit to Jesus Christ watching over and protecting me and assuring that I follow ‘The WFF Rules.’
OK that works. I know that no one is “on” everyday, espcially under circumstances like that. I’ve spent plenty of time in SZ, no time in a shelter, but I know people who have. I won’t debate Eric’s work habit. I didn’t know him to be careless, but I wasn’t with him his entire career. Your faith is in the right place.
Hit the like button
**
** LOCATION OF PANEBAKER AIR STUDY VIDEO
** 20130630_161858_VLAT_split_2_EP.MOV
Reply to calvin post on March 30, 2014 at 4:26 am
>> calvin said…
>>
>> The 161620 Vlat video shows the same retardant drop as the 161858
>> video, right??
No. Same location… but two different drops.
The VLAT drop in the 161620 video lasts a full 12 seconds.
The VLAT drop in the 161858 video only lasts 6 seconds.
However… something is not right in Denmark here.
Based on the FILENAMES / TIMESTAMPS and the ‘overlapping’ time(s)…
you would THINK these would HAVE to be two different videos of the
SAME drop, right?
Well… that doesn’t appear to be the case.
Best I can figure with a quick look at one is…
In the 1616.20 video… we spend most of the time in that video just ‘waiting’
for the drop, which comes near the end.
The actual VLAT drop in the 1616.20 video begins at… +2:32 ( 1618.52 ).
The drop lasts for 12 seconds and ends at 1619.04.
The actual VLAT drop in the 1618.58 video begins at… +0:03 ( 1619.01 ).
The drop lasts for 06 seconds and ends at 1619.07
( only HALF as long as other one so it can’t be the same drop ).
That’s pretty much impossible.
According to those TIMESTAMPS… we should be seeing the SECOND VLAT
drop begin before the FIRST one is even over.
The flight paths and exit out of the drops are also slightly different in the two
videos so they really CAN’T be the ‘same drop’ even though they are carrying
similar timestamps ( but even those aren’t quite the same ).
Even though its the same exact LOCATION for BOTH of these VLAT drops…
the TIMESTAMP on one of the videos ( or BOTH? ) has to have been WRONG.
I believe they actually had TWO video cameras with them… so now the question
is which one was filming which of any of the particular videos… and which one
had the wrong time?
Maybe BOTH of them did ( have the wrong time set ).
This is a big deal… because we have been trusting a lot of the AIR STUDY video
times for a lot of the captured background radio conversations and the real truth
about these AIR STUDY video times ( which camera was correct ) has to be
figured out.
Oh well. Another day at the salt mines with even MORE work to do.
ROFL. More on this later…
>> calvin also wrote…
>> In the 161620 video we hear (I assume) the VLAT pilot saying
>> he has about 2,000 gallons left (following that drop.) And then we
>> see the VLAT drop again in the 162508 video and again in the
>> 163338 video. Is that correct?
Yes… that also seems to be what I am hearing… but see above.
I’m not sure now we can fully trust these FILENAME / TIMESTAMPS
on these AIR STUDY videos.
>> WTKTT… can you tell me a little about the 163338 video.
>> Like where the camera is filming, which side of the fire the
>> retardant drop is made, and where GM were. Many Thanks!
The camera was on a tripod that was exactly here…
34.266758, -112.716906
REMINDER: Just cut-and-paste that line with the comma above into the search
bar of Google Maps, hit ENTER, and a large GREEN ARROW will be pointing
to that exact spot.
It’s that spot up on Hayes Ranch Road near those ‘circular’ crop fields and where
the established ‘helibase’ was that day and where most of the other AIR STUDY
videos were shot.
This particular video is shot looking almost due southwest from that location.
GM was, unfortunately, exactly where you might think watching this video. They
are directly on the OTHER side of that smoke column with the fireline bearing
down on them and only had about 3 or 4 minutes to live ( if the TIME on this
video can be trusted… which may now NOT be the case. See above ).
The FLAMES that are seen in about the center of the video after they zoom in
are, geographically, right near the ridges on the north side of the Shrine Area.
These are the same flames that would be seen a few minutes later ( circa 1620 )
cresting the ridges near the Shrine Youth camp in Blue Ridge Hotshot McCord’s
YARNELL-GAMBLE video and the other Blue Ridge photos taken circa 1620,
right as they were preparing to evacuate the Youth Camp.
For more of an exact idea of the ‘orientation’ here…
At +1:02 in this video, as they are zooming in on the two planes to the left of the
smoke column ( that means they were flying on the EAST side of the column,
coming from pretty much due south and heading due north ) there is a distinct
‘electronics’ tower seen in the left of the frame on a hill in the distance.
It only appears for a moment… then they pan back right… but that gives you a
reference for the ‘line of sight’ for this particular video from that particular location.
The ‘line of sight’ from the camera… right down the center… would be pretty much
directly to the center of Glen Ilah, in the distance, even though the ridge in the
foreground is obscuring both Yarnell and Glen Illah.
The same ‘electronics’ tower is also seen in this video earlier on in left of the
frame, at +26 seconds, but it’s much easier to see exactly what it looks like in
the +1:02 moment after they have ‘zoomed in’.
The reason I say ‘electronics tower’ is because that is NOT the primary cell tower
for Yarnell. That sits on a hill farther south of town which is verifiable here…
http://www.cellreception.com/towers/
Just enter Prescott, AZ ( Yarnell, AZ won’t work ). When Prescott comes up in
Google maps, just ‘pull’ the map down to Yarnell with your mouse and you will
then see this Cell tower location in Yarnell.
It’s a Verizon tower and the exact location of the power shed at the base of the
antenna is…
34.192114, -112.754748
The ‘electronics’ tower seen in this Panebaker video MAY have some cell
pods on it… but it’s hard to tell.
It’s on a hill east of Yarnell, about the center of town. If you took ‘Happy Way’
( about two blocks south of where Shrine road meets Highway 89 ) east out
of Yarnell and continued on when it changes from pavement to dirt and went
all the way to the top of the hill, you be at the power shed for this tower.
The center of the roof of the power shed at the base of that tower is
exactly here…
34.216253, -112.743606
So given the fact that the ‘electronics’ tower is at about the midpoint of the town
of Yarnell… it looks like those planes are flying pretty much due west of the
center of Yarnell, from due south to due north, on the EAST side of the smoke
plume, and trying to lay some retardant to keep the fire out of Yarnell.
At 1618… ALL the drop-capable aircraft on the fire had already been given the
go-ahead to ‘drop-at-will’ for about 18 minutes already.
Gary Cordes couldn’t transmit on Air-To-Ground circa 1600 because his Bendix
King had taken a dump and then he switched to the Motorola in his truck… but
circa 1600 he requested OPS1 Todd Abel to immediately tell Air Attack to start
‘dropping at will’ and try and save whatever ‘town’ they thought they could ( from
Cordes ADOSH interview ).
SIDENOTE: I don’t believe the ‘drop’ being caught in this video is a VLAT
drop at all. When they zoom in… it looks like just a lead plane coming
in and then a SEAT making the actual drop behind it.
Followup… the 163338 video TIMESTAMP may be WRONG.
See above about the discovery that something now appears
to be really ‘wonky’ with some of these AIR STUDY video
filename / timestamps.
If the TIME really was 1633 plus 38 seconds at the start of
this particular video… the smoke plume itself really should
have been much larger at that point ( See the Matt Oss
video taken from about the same distance away but on
the opposite Congress side ).
The FLAMES that we also see in the center really are
geographically about where Blue Ridge was about to see
them ‘cresting’ over those ridges near the Shrine Youth Camp…
but the times seem to be a little off.
It would almost appear that even though this AIR STUDY
video has a filename / timestamp of 1633 plus 38 seconds…
…what is being filmed seems EARLIER than that.
Perhaps as much as 10 or 13 minutes earlier and more in the
1620 to 1623 timeframe.
More on this later.
Thanks again. I really didn’t mean to make this an issue. My initial point was only that it was IMPOSSIBLE for T911 to have been over the fire during the deployment, waiting for visual confirmation of GM location WHILE (10,743g) of retardant was still in the plane.
calvin… copy that.
Now that we can finally see ( I believe? ) ALL of these
infamous Panebaker AIR STUDY videos ( and the
moments they seem to capture )… I was already scratching
my head about some of the TIMESTAMPS.
Your post just brought that into focus.
Ever since Elizabeth first started posting them on
Youtube… we have been *assuming* that the hard-coded
filename/timestamps coming off the camera(s) was
accurate.
I’m just not sure we can continue to automatically
assume that.
If/when I have the time… I’ll try to get my ‘head around’
what the real problem is there. It might just be one
or two of them that have ‘wonky’ filename / timestamps…
…or it might be ALL of them.
Either way… if someone didn’t have the brain cells to
be doing an official ( expensive ) AIR STUDY tactics
video and even bother to make sure the TIME on their
damn camera was correct…
…all we have to do is discover what the ‘offset’ for
the camera that was set WRONG is.
Standard stuff when people aren’t paying enough
attention to have the right time set on their devices.
More later
Reply to calvin post on March 31, 2014 at 2:54 am
>> it was IMPOSSIBLE for T911 to have been over the fire
>> during the deployment, waiting for visual confirmation
>> of GM location WHILE (10,743g) of retardant was still
>> in the plane.
Yes. I agree with you… but have been sidetracked
lately looking at the enormous amount of *new* information
that is now available regarding this Yarnell incident.
Do you have, yourself, a good ‘re-estimate’ of how much
retardant T911 actually DID have left while it was
‘standing by’, to dump on GM in the box canyon, if
instructed by ASM2 / B33 to do so?
What fuel type? I’m using the 40 model. I don’t believe that there was a heavy grass component in the drainage, just straight Manzanita. What about a SH4 or an SH7. Difference is basically half ton of fuel per acre. I’ll need some help so this is relevant, that will help keep the speculation down. I’ll run a SH7
I’m using the RAWS station at Congress AZ. the print out is for June 29-30, 6pm to 6pm. Right out of the gate the readout for 1400 to 1800 6-30 is winds SSW. Nothing out of the N or NE and low speeds 12-13mph so this won’t be reflective. But we can see what the FB was at those variables.
Can you attach stuff to this or am I going to have to do something fancy?
I was remembering they ran something in the SAIT but you would have to go back and dig that up. we were messing with some of that 4 months ago or so. Might look there.
Well Boys!
I can see the battle continues. There’s good points all around and I am inclined to take Willis, Abel, and Musser out to the whipping post myself but the decisions made by Marsh sealed the fate of his crew.
Early on in this fires infancy a Heliport was constructed and used to transport firefighters. Why didn’t the Granite Mountain/Blue Ridge crews use this resource instead of hiking in? What a important resource to use! You can deliver fresh crews, supplies, water and in this case evacuate or transfer a crew to where they may be needed! The incident commander(s) …sounds to me that there were several of them…were unable to collectively recognize the value of this Heliport and use it.
The incidents official report is a joke. I think the highest point in Florida is what, 300 feet and that’s a freeway overpass. Who picked Mr.Karel’s anyway! There isn’t even a definition of ‘escape route’ in the report…yikes!
“Hot Shot” crews are self contained units of experienced firefighters that can be relied upon to safely construct fire line for as much as 48 hrs. or more with limited supervision. They are specialists in fighting wildfires, not protecting structures or evacuating stubborn residents. This distinction should be made and the “Hot Shots” mission restored.
Recommendations for flashy fuel environments:
Re-establish the “Mission”
Re-establish the 10:00 a.m. rule.
Re-establish initial attack.
Fight fire at night.
Create, restore and maintain Fuel Breaks.
These observations, complaints, and recommendations are not all my own. They are from Southern California’s old foreman and superintendents who innately possess the sixth sense needed to fight fire in the most extreme fire behavior on Earth.
Any thoughts?
Larry Sall
Little Tujunga Hot Shots
Angeles National Forest, Southern California
1970/71
Thank you Larry how refreshing. Been along time science I saw you. Angeles N.F 1967 to 1974 OG Hot shots 2/1972 to 4/1974
Howdy Bob!
I’ll always remember Oak Grove. Especially Woody Wood Pecker smoking a cigar. What a great crew symbol! I also liked the superior line you guys put in. I’ll say hello for Rod, Walt and Gary Reynolds and I’ll tell them your on watch.
Keep up the good work Bob-
Larry
Check out the reunion in May.
In Tahoe right!
Little T will be in Redding mid April for theirs. I know Reynolds, Wrench and maybe Mike Emeterio might show for Oak Groves.
Great its open to all.
Reply to Larry Sall post on March 30, 2014 at 4:03 pm
>> Larry wrote…
>> Any thoughts?
Haven’t seen anyone respond yet… so here’s a few.
>> Larry also wrote…
>> Early on in this fires infancy a Heliport was constructed
>> and used to transport firefighters.
Yes. When the Lewis DOC Crew Boss was asked by IC Russ
Shumate at 0900 on Saturday morning ( June 29 ) to see if there
was any way to ‘drive’ or ‘hike’ his DOC crew up the fire… he said
NO ( even though any of the local YFD fire personnel could have
easily pointed out the two-track roads that led all the way there
and would, in fact, be used the following morning by Granite
Mountain to accomplish the same task ).
That’s when Shumate requested helicopter transport for them, a
suitable ‘landing spot’ was found up on top of the ridge, and 7 FF
were flown directly up there circa 10:30 AM ( Saturday morning ).
>> Larry also wrote
>> Why didn’t the Granite Mountain/Blue Ridge crews use this
>> resource instead of hiking in?
Good question.
The answer *might* be that when Marsh agreed to be DIVSA
at the 0700 briefing ( but did not officially BECOME DIVSA
until hours later when the command transfer to Type 2
team actually took place )… he decided not to wait on anyone
or anything ( not even his own crew ) and ‘took off’ hiking up to
the fire right after that 0700 briefing. That’s when he first met
hikers Tex ( Sonny ) Gilligan and Joy Collura ( who were already
up there ) at about 8:07 AM.
The ‘transport’ helicopter ( seated seven plus pilots ) was still
being used, at that same time, to get the Lewis DOC crews
OFF the fire, where they had all spent the night.
The landing spot up there had burned over during the night
( and burned up some of the Lewis DOC crew supplies
in the process )… but it appeared to be ‘usable’ as a landing
spot again on Sunday morning ( June 30 ) since they WERE
actively flying the full DOC crew out of there ( with multiple flights )
while Marsh was hiking in.
The rest of the Granite Mountain crew had stopped for breakfast
up at the Model Creek School ICP in Peeple Valley… and they
didn’t even arrive at their Sesame clearing staging area until
sometime just after 8:00 AM ( at about the same moment Marsh
was already all the way up on the ridge and meeting the hikers ).
Former Yarnell Chief Dan Andersen says he was drinking
coffee on his porch on Lakewood Drive in Glen Ilah and
saw the two GM Crew Carriers pass his house heading
west at exactly 8:03 AM. That would put GM out to their
Sesame clearing staging area and getting ‘geared up’
for their hike no earlier than about 8:10 AM.
So that’s pretty much it.
Just shift transition overlap ( and confusion? ).
The chopper was being used to get the previous night’s crew OFF
the ridge and back to the Yarnell Fire Station but Granite Mountain
(crew) didn’t go to the Yarnell Fire Station where the helipad was.
At the same time the ‘dust off’ was happening with the chopper for
the previous crew… Granite Mountain went to Sesame area and
‘geared up’ for the hike in.
There was a point when Blue Ridge was staged at the Yarnell Fire
Station when they thought that was going to happen. They were
late to the fire that morning, had missed all the briefings, but there
had, in fact, been *assigned* to DIVA ( Eric Marsh ) who was
already out there scouting up on the western ridge.
While they were ‘staged’ at the Yarnell Fire station is when the last
of the Lewis DOC crew arrived via chopper at the YFD fire station
helipad and some members of the Lewis crew had discussions
with some members of the Blue Ridge Crew ( See Blue Ridge
unit logs ).
So Blue Ridge was staged there at the YFD fire station, where the
helipad was, and they were watching it be actively used to bring
the Lewis crew back from the same ridge that Granite was ‘hiking’
to ( and they seemed to have been already informed they were
assigned to DIVSA Eric Marsh that day )… so for a while I believe
they thought they were just going to be flown out there when the
chopper was done doing the Lewis crew.
It didn’t happen. Blue Ridge ended up staying ‘in town’ and really
not doing much of anything at all that day ( the majority of the
crew, that is ).
Blue Ridge HS Ball became HEQB for the dozer ( since he
didn’t have a card ) and stayed with the Dozer most of
the day… and BR Supt Frisby and Captain Trueheart Brown
were ‘all over the place’ meeting up with Marsh/Steed ( others )
and scouting all around that day with the UTV… but the only time
the other 17 members of the BR crew were ever actually put to
work at all that day is when they got them all spread out on the
dozer line to try and ‘improve’ it circa 4:00 PM. However… just
minutes after they got to doing any actual work there they were
given the RTO ( Reverse Tool Order ) and evacuated back to the
Shrine Youth Camp and out of the area back to the Ranch House
Restaurant, with no further assignment(s).
So the actual Type 1 Blue Ridge Hotshot Crew really did nothing
but ‘stage’ at numerous places all day taking lots of pictures and
waiting for someone to give them some real work to do.
They weren’t even given any real assignments as the fire came
into town… at the exact same time we are supposed to believe
Granite Mountain was ‘hurrying’ to be there ( from 2 miles away,
cross-country ) because THEY thought they were (somehow)
needed in town.
>> Larry also wrote…
>> What a important resource to use!
>> You can deliver fresh crews, supplies, water
Yes… you do have to wonder about this.
Example: If they were actively removing one entire crew
( the Lewis DOC crew ) with a helicopter from the same exact
area they were now asking another crew ( GM ) to start
‘working the fire’… then why didn’t they coordinate this so that
as one load of crew came OFF the fire… the chopper could take
fresh crew back OUT on the next trip?
Granite Mountain was already pegging high on the ‘fatigued
crew’ charts before they ever showed up in Yarnell on what
was supposed to be their day off. Saving them that 2 mile hike
with packs just to GET to work would have helped them out.
It didn’t happen. Granite hiked in ( whether they needed to or not ).
Maybe the chopper simply wasn’t going to arrive to start doing the
Lewis crew transfers off the ridge before the time when Granite
Mountain felt they could just get out there themselves and they
didn’t want to stand around waiting for it… losing any good
‘morning’ time with little to no wind out there.
>> Larry also wrote…
>> and in this case evacuate or transfer a crew to where
>> they may be needed!
That’s a very interesting ‘what if’ scenario that you just raised.
The helispot up there was KNOWN to be usable that day since it
was, in fact, actively used that very morning to fly the entire Lewis
DOC crew out of there.
Hiker Joy Collura’s photos from that day SHOW this happening.
( She even still maintains that the rotor wash from the several
landings up there to retrieve the Lewis crew is what actually
torched up the fire in that morning timeframe… and her entire
set of fire progression photos from that morning does seem
to support that. )
So they ( fire command ) KNEW ( or SHOULD have known ) they
had a viable landing spot up on that western ridge that day.
When GM’s lookout ( and their vehicles ) had to be evacuated
because the fire had totally reversed direction… it should have
become clear to SOMEONE that they could just chopper those
fellas off that ridge at that point… just like they did with the
Lewis DOC crew just hours before that.
Add to that the fact that they were (supposedly) CALLING them
on the radio and ‘asking them to come down’… if they felt they
needed THEM so bad from THAT far away AND they HAD agreed
to ‘send some help’… why would you think you even had the
time to let them hike two miles to get down from there?
If you were so short handed in town that you needed guys who
were more than two miles away ASAP… then why not just
OFFER TO COME GET THEM via that usable helispot up there
and with a landing pad right there in the middle of town?
Sure… the WINDS might have been a factor in exercising what
should have been that clear option at that time… but it’s interesting
to note that even though Marsh had reported the winds getting
“squirrely” up there just before Brendan had to abandon his lookout
post… we can still see ( and hear ) for ourselves what conditions
were really like ‘up there’ in the 1600 ( 4:00 PM ) timeframe
because of the MacKenzie videos.
The wind didn’t seem to much of a problem for some chopper
landings in that timeframe. There wasn’t even really any
audible ‘wind noise’ in MacKenzie’s camera microphone
around that time.
Also… choppers were not ‘grounded’ at that time ( 1600 ) or
even for more than 40-50 minutes after that. There is plenty of
video and photographic evidence of ‘choppers’ flying
all over that area even right up to ( and during ) the
Helmet-Cam video circa 1639 when Jesse Steed sent out his
first MAYDAY call. So the choppers were ‘up’ and flying
that area all during that 1600 to 1640 timeframe.
Maybe ‘removal by chopper’ like they had done with the Lewis
Crew from that same location just hours earlier that day really
was part of the now infamous ‘discussing their options’
conversation between Marsh and Steed. Maybe they did
consider ‘asking about that option’. They had SEEN the
Lewis DOC crew being taken out of that same exact location
just hours earlier. So what were THEY… chopped liver?
Only someone who actually overheard them ‘discussing their
options’ and who wants to talk about it could tell us that.
Again… you raise a very valid ‘what if’ scenario with regards
to using that existing helispot better that day.
Thank you sir,
Your comments are very much appreciated along with the time line you present. The Helicopter prop wash sturring up the fire is a very interesting point. In the last few months (un related to the Yarnell Hill incident) I’ve been talking with my old Hot Shot foreman Walt Sniegowski and we are convinced the presents of helicopters close to the line on active fires, even over cold trail, may inadvertently cause fire to come alive, jump firelines and trap firefighters (ex.The Loop Fire 1966) especially helicopters dropping on fire below a crew. Thanks for pointing out the helicopter observation.
Anyway, back to the Yarnell Hill Fire. The Lewis inmate crew apparently didn’t do anything. Why were they dispatched for an initial attack? Good grief…a twenty man pick up crew could have driven up to or hiked in to this fire early on and stomped a line around it with their boots without even using hand tools!! I know it would reek to high heaven but they could have all surrounded the hot spot and pissed on it! This just frustrates the hell out of me!!
Sorry for the rant. Lets just see what kind of Standard Operational Procedure the State of Arizona generates. It will tell us a lot about whether they were listening or not.
Larry
The situation on Saturday was a little more complex
than at first glance ( reported and photographed
from the air at 10:30 AM Saturday to be just 2-4
acres, little to no fire, little to no smoke ).
Even the words being used at that time by IC
Russ Shumate ( 10:30 AM Saturday ) were
‘mop-up operations needed’.
At 10:30 Saturday morning… that simple 2.-4
acre fire seemed to be dead and already in its
coffin but still just needed the nails.
So not even the whole Lewis crew was sent
up because Shumate was more concerned
about getting whoever he sent up there OUT
of there quickly due to lightning concerns if
a storm popped up.
So for FIVE HOURS… the crew up there was
supposedly doing nothing but ‘mop-up’.
Next thing anyone knows, the thing has
FLARED up, jumped its eastern 2-track road
fire break… and the rest is history.
The ‘official’ explanation was that ‘a small
island of unburned fuel on the eastern flank
flared up and jumped the road’.
That was after FIVE hours of mop-up
on just a small 2-4 acre deal.
There is no evidence whatsoever that the Lewis
crew themselves might have CAUSED this
‘flare-up’ by conducting their own ‘burnouts’
up there that day. There is no evidence of any
‘authorization’ for them to do anything of the
kind from fire management and no evidence
they even tried any ‘indirect’ stuff.
So it really is still quite a mystery what actually
happened on Saturday. I have been calling it
the ‘second Yarnell Hill Fire’. The FIRST one
was the lightning strike from Friday and the
one that appeared to ‘die’ by Saturday morning.
The SECOND one was at the end of the
DOC crew work shift when something
suddenly FLARED, jumped a road, they were
somehow unable to catch it or get the resources
in play to control it… and was nw officially the
‘escaped fire’ that would go on to kill Granite
Mountain the next day.
However… we DO know now ( as even more
evidence is revealed in public ) that even that
little 2-4 acre deal on Saturday was in VERY
rocky, steep and tough terrain for ANY hand
crew of ANY experience level to really deal with.
Some of the points involved are now being
described as actual CLIFFS with heavy
vegation. Impossible for any hand crew.
The only question(s) all that raises, then, is
what ANY hand crew was doing for FIVE
hours without ALSO providing a realistic
evaluation back to management… so that
bucket drops could have been employed
and the nails would have been in the coffin.
IC Russ Shumate didn’t even request local
YFD to set up a ‘pumpkin’ for potential bucket
drops at the Boulder Springs Ranch until
AFTER he was told the fire had ‘escaped’.
The pumpkin was then set up fairly quickly at
the Boulder Springs Ranch at that point… but then
(apparently) nothing happened.
It was too late. The ‘escaped’ fire had gotten
into that downslope manzanita fuel-fest backed
with wind and that’s all she wrote.
The only cure was prevention.
That thing needed to be ‘stomped out and
pissed on’ sometime during that FIVE hour
period on Saturday when the Lewis crew
was actually UP there, with little to no wind,
AND there AIR resources around to help.
Yep, I guess I’d be tired to if I’d been up all day Friday and then being put in charge of a lighting fire late in the afternoon. The drive, the logistics, the coffee pot, glassing the 2-4 acre fire from town, making phone calls and checking my overtime math. Yep, after 30 hours I’d be tired to.
Did anyone run across any wx ops in the 214 or have any wx ops from that day? Sitta did you do any more work?
**
** WRONGFUL DEATH LAWSUIT(S) AND THE BOULDER SPRINGS RANCH
Since it came up recently… a number of people seem to be unaware what the
currently filed ‘wrongful death’ lawsuits have to say about the crucial decision
that day to actually even ‘designate’ the Boulder Springs Ranch as a ‘safety zone’
in the first place.
Anyone can ‘Google’ copies of the ‘Notice of Wrongful Death Claims’…
but here’s at least one place where you can find the one filed
on Christopher MacKenzie’s behalf…
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CDwQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.investigativemedia.com%2Fwp-content%2Fuploads%2F2013%2F12%2FMacKenzie-Claim-Letter-Final-12-19.doc&ei=Bpg4U4eQAYu0sQSP0YCYCA&usg=AFQjCNHixjtYfsUF6MUWjEXqNfZSpq_whw&bvm=bv.63808443,d.cWc&cad=rja
MOST of the currently filed wrongful death claims are coming from the same
attorney ( Thomas K. Kelly, a former WFF Hotshot ) and they all have the same
‘claims’ in them.
Notice of Claim
Decedent: Christopher MacKenzie
Date of Death: June 30, 2013
Claimant: Michael MacKenzie and Laurie Goralski
Defendants named ( thus far ) as of December 19, 2013…
State of Arizona
Roy Hall – Incident Commander
Russ Shumate – Incident Commander
Arizona State Forestry Division
County of Yavapai
Central Yavapai Fire District
Todd Abel
City of Prescott
Darrell Willis
With the limited disclosure available to Claimant described
above ( and based on the only evidence available so far as of
this Dec 19, 2013 filing ), the following willful, reckless, negligent
and careless acts supporting this claim each contributing to the
wrongful death of Christopher MacKenzie and other members
of the Granite Mountain IHC:2
NOTE: There are 31 ( THIRTY ONE ) separate ‘negligence’ claims
that are then listed… but here is the one that specifically calls
into question the decisions made by whoever had chosen ( or
was designating ) the Boulder Springs Ranch as a valid ‘safety
zone’ for that workplace that day…
14. On June 30, 2013, the Incident Management Team identified
the Boulder Springs Ranch as ?an excellent safety zone.?
(SAIR Report pg. 15). The Boulder Springs Ranch was surrounded
by unburned fuel, heavy brush and terrain which did not make it
an ?excellent? safety zone. To exacerbate the misinformation, in
order to access the designated safety zone, the Granite Mountain
IHC would be required to leave the safety of the black and traverse
steep, rocky, difficult terrain in thick, heavy, unburned chaparral fuel.
Granite Mountain IHC lacked necessary maps to properly determine
the distances between their safety zone in the black and the Boulder
Springs Ranch. The Boulder Springs Ranch was not a ?bomb proof?
or ?excellent? safety zone as described and designated by Incident
Command; (ADOSH Report).
Again thank you for your diligent efforts.
Looks a LOT like your ‘list of concerns’ from way
back when ( and recently )… doesn’t it?
Followup… the ‘Wrongful Death Notice of Claims’
also fail to mention that even the (only) two-track road
leading from where they were going to be working and
the Boulder Springs Ranch had its OWN set of
‘obvious’ issues.
That road did NOT stay up on that ridge.
It had its OWN ‘eastward leg’ that dropped down into
its own ‘blind canyon’ that was also filled with
unburned fuel.
If they had stayed on the two-track… they would have
ALSO lost sight of the fire for about the same amount
of time that day and depending on their forward
progress… could have just as easily been ‘trapped’
in THAT canyon versus the one they did die in.
About the only thing that might have saved them was
if they had just stayed on that high ridge two-track
long enough to actually become AWARE of the
incredible forward progress of the fire BEFORE
they dropped into EITHER of the ‘canyons’ they
would need to traverse to get to the (supposedly)
‘bomb-proof’ safety zone.
If they had caught a glimpse of what the fire was
doing just before they had to turn east and drop
into that OTHER canyon… they would now have
been at the same point where the hikers dropped
off to the Congress side and worked their way
around back to Candy-Cane lane that day.
So if the whole idea of even setting that Ranch as
the ‘safety zone’ was that it was supposed to be
adequate for all resources working the western ridge
AND the ‘middle bowl’ area that day…
…they really did forget to check out the ‘escape route’
part of that so that no one would be in blind canyons
walking through unburned fuel.
Yes… Marsh could have taken an hour or two to go
‘check that out for himself’… but I suppose he was
just trusting what he was told that day.
Just looking at a ‘Google map on an iPad’… it really
does sort of LOOK like that two-track road stays
‘up on the ridge crest’ as it works its way east to
the Boulder Springs Ranch…
…but that is NOT TRUE.
They would have to have been looking at it in 3 dimensions
with Google Earth to know that eastward leg of the
two-track dropped into its OWN ‘fuel filled blind canyon’.
Followup…
The public link posted above is a .DOC file and not everyone
might be able to read that.
Here is the ‘Notice of Wrongful Death Claim’ for Andrew Ashcraft,
sitting on an Arizona News site.
It’s a PDF file instead of a DOC so most anyone should
be able to read this one…
http://ftpcontent.worldnow.com/kpho/KPHO%20NEWS/Ashcraftnotice.pdf
It contains the exact same ‘Claim 14’ as noted above questioning
the crucial choice of the Boulder Springs Ranch as a ‘safety zone’
that day.
Attorney Thomas K. Kelly is a former WFF ( Wildland Fire Fighter ).
Also ( in case anyone is interested ) here is one of
Attorney Thomas K. Kelly’s BIOS confirming that he was
a WFF Hotshot ( working the Western region(s) )…
http://my-gratitude-project.blogspot.com/2011/04/james-arthur-ray-legal-dream-team.html
________________________________________________
Tom Kelly was born and raised in Prescott, Arizona. After
graduating from NAU with a degree in zoology and
chemistry, Tom worked in a variety of fields. Prior to
attending law school he worked as a union ironworker
helping construct high-rise buildings and bridge decks,
as a high school teacher and coach helping educate
young people in science and athletics and, working as
a U.S. Forest Service Hotshot, Tom spent years helping
suppress wild-land fires throughout the western U.S.
________________________________________________
Every one should read when you see the family it could have been any of us in our early carriers. Made me think and shed some tears. Thanks for the Post WTKTT.
There is similar (personal) information and
family photos in EVERY one of the ‘wrongful
death’ claims for ALL of them.
I only posted links for two ( Ashcraft and
MacKenzie ).
The toughest parts are the detail about
how each and every family member
actually found out about the death(s).
There might be some ‘lessons learned’
for the future there as well with regards
to ‘getting a handle on incidents’ if/when
they DO take place… but that’s for
another forum entirely.
Bob just read your response about firing on the Peyette. 23 years 26 states all 40 fuel models. I came up working for two of the most recognized hotshot sups in the Nation. Pally you don’t have anything on me, just a more recognized name. So put your tape measure up and zip your pants up no needs to see it or hear it.
And then You should know what I am saying. And now I know you are not some kid I will call it accordingly. And I worked for some of the Best IC in the Country so we Bothe Need to talk a little more about facts and quite gaming each other. Right??
Also I speak of the Payette based on 15 years in R4 and the Payette was a Neighbor Forest. Also my FMO who I was assistant to was a Type 1 IC with a full team for 8 years so I got a lot of info from him and members of his team that were on the Payette. Talking to some Overhead lately it has gotten worse in R4 as I am sure you are aware.
The impetus for the ‘hurry up’ statement, overheard in radio traffic in regards to GM’s movement, either right before, or right after, GM was making the determination to drop down into the bowl, could have been driven by, either, of a couple of opposing factors.
One is, ‘hurry up’ because everything’s hitting the fan and we really need your help, and the other is, ‘hurry up’ because the fire’s blowing-up and we don’t want you guys to get caught. The motive behind the request to hustle seems like an important detail to know for obvious reasons.
It certainly would be informative if that particular radio conversation could be fleshed-out a bit, by any of the participants, or others who heard it.
**
** LOCATION OF PANEBAKER AIR STUDY VIDEO
** 20130630_161858_VLAT_split_2_EP.MOV
Reply to calvin post on March 30, 2014 at 4:26 am
>> calvin said…
>>
>> The 161620 Vlat video shows the same retardant drop as the 161858
>> video, right??
No. Same location… but two different drops.
The VLAT drop in the 161620 video lasts a full 12 seconds.
The VLAT drop in the 161858 video only lasts 6 seconds.
However… something is not right in Denmark here.
Based on the FILENAMES / TIMESTAMPS and the ‘overlapping’ time(s)…
you would THINK these would HAVE to be two different videos of the
SAME drop, right?
Well… that doesn’t appear to be the case.
Best I can figure with a quick look at one is…
In the 1616.20 video… we spend most of the time in that video just ‘waiting’
for the drop, which comes near the end.
The actual VLAT drop in the 1616.20 video begins at… +2:32 ( 1618.52 ).
The drop lasts for 12 seconds and ends at 1619.04.
The actual VLAT drop in the 1618.58 video begins at… +0:03 ( 1619.01 ).
The drop lasts for 06 seconds and ends at 1619.07
( only HALF as long as other one so it can’t be the same drop ).
That’s pretty much impossible.
According to those TIMESTAMPS… we should be seeing the SECOND VLAT
drop begin before the FIRST one is even over.
The flight paths and exit out of the drops are also slightly different in the two
videos so they really CAN’T be the ‘same drop’ even though they are carrying
similar timestamps ( but even those aren’t quite the same ).
Even though its the same exact LOCATION for BOTH of these VLAT drops…
the TIMESTAMP on one of the videos ( or BOTH? ) has to have been WRONG.
I believe they actually had TWO video cameras with them… so now the question
is which one was filming which of any of the particular videos… and which one
had the wrong time?
Maybe BOTH of them did ( have the wrong time set ).
This is a big deal… because we have been trusting a lot of the AIR STUDY video
times for a lot of the captured background radio conversations and the real truth
about these AIR STUDY video times ( which camera was correct ) has to be
figured out.
Oh well. Another day at the salt mines with even MORE work to do.
ROFL. More on this later…
>> calvin also wrote…
>> In the 161620 video we hear (I assume) the VLAT pilot saying
>> he has about 2,000 gallons left (following that drop.) And then we
>> see the VLAT drop again in the 162508 video and again in the
>> 163338 video. Is that correct?
Yes… that also seems to be what I am hearing… but see above.
I’m not sure now we can fully trust these FILENAME / TIMESTAMPS
on these AIR STUDY videos.
>> WTKTT… can you tell me a little about the 163338 video.
>> Like where the camera is filming, which side of the fire the
>> retardant drop is made, and where GM were. Many Thanks!
The camera was on a tripod that was exactly here…
34.266758, -112.716906
REMINDER: Just cut-and-paste that line with the comma above into the search
bar of Google Maps, hit ENTER, and a large GREEN ARROW will be pointing
to that exact spot.
It’s that spot up on Hayes Ranch Road near those ‘circular’ crop fields and where
the established ‘helibase’ was that day and where most of the other AIR STUDY
videos were shot.
This particular video is shot looking almost due southwest from that location.
GM was, unfortunately, exactly where you might think watching this video. They
are directly on the OTHER side of that smoke column with the fireline bearing
down on them and only had about 3 or 4 minutes to live ( if the TIME on this
video can be trusted… which may now NOT be the case. See above ).
The FLAMES that are seen in about the center of the video after they zoom in
are, geographically, right near the ridges on the north side of the Shrine Area.
These are the same flames that would be seen a few minutes later ( circa 1620 )
cresting the ridges near the Shrine Youth camp in Blue Ridge Hotshot McCord’s
YARNELL-GAMBLE video and the other Blue Ridge photos taken circa 1620,
right as they were preparing to evacuate the Youth Camp.
For more of an exact idea of the ‘orientation’ here…
At +1:02 in this video, as they are zooming in on the two planes to the left of the
smoke column ( that means they were flying on the EAST side of the column,
coming from pretty much due south and heading due north ) there is a distinct
‘electronics’ tower seen in the left of the frame on a hill in the distance.
It only appears for a moment… then they pan back right… but that gives you a
reference for the ‘line of sight’ for this particular video from that particular location.
The ‘line of sight’ from the camera… right down the center… would be pretty much
directly to the center of Glen Ilah, in the distance, even though the ridge in the
foreground is obscuring both Yarnell and Glen Illah.
The same ‘electronics’ tower is also seen in this video earlier on in left of the
frame, at +26 seconds, but it’s much easier to see exactly what it looks like in
the +1:02 moment after they have ‘zoomed in’.
The reason I say ‘electronics tower’ is because that is NOT the primary cell tower
for Yarnell. That sits on a hill farther south of town which is verifiable here…
http://www.cellreception.com/towers/
Just enter Prescott, AZ ( Yarnell, AZ won’t work ). When Prescott comes up in
Google maps, just ‘pull’ the map down to Yarnell with your mouse and you will
then see this Cell tower location in Yarnell.
It’s a Verizon tower and the exact location of the power shed at the base of the
antenna is…
34.192114, -112.754748
The ‘electronics’ tower seen in this Panebaker video MAY have some cell
pods on it… but it’s hard to tell.
It’s on a hill east of Yarnell, about the center of town. If you took ‘Happy Way’
( about two blocks south of where Shrine road meets Highway 89 ) east out
of Yarnell and continued on when it changes from pavement to dirt and went
all the way to the top of the hill, you be at the power shed for this tower.
The center of the roof of the power shed at the base of that tower is
exactly here…
34.216253, -112.743606
So given the fact that the ‘electronics’ tower is at about the midpoint of the town
of Yarnell… it looks like those planes are flying pretty much due west of the
center of Yarnell, from due south to due north, on the EAST side of the smoke
plume, and trying to lay some retardant to keep the fire out of Yarnell.
At 1618… ALL the drop-capable aircraft on the fire had already been given the
go-ahead to ‘drop-at-will’ for about 18 minutes already.
Gary Cordes couldn’t transmit on Air-To-Ground circa 1600 because his Bendix
King had taken a dump and then he switched to the Motorola in his truck… but
circa 1600 he requested OPS1 Todd Abel to immediately tell Air Attack to start
‘dropping at will’ and try and save whatever ‘town’ they thought they could ( from
Cordes ADOSH interview ).
SIDENOTE: I don’t believe the ‘drop’ being caught in this video is a VLAT
drop at all. When they zoom in… it looks like just a lead plane coming
in and then a SEAT making the actual drop behind it.
** COMMENT IN WRONG PLACE!
Okay… this ENTIRE COMMENT (above) ended up in the
totally wrong place.
It was supposed to be a reply to Calvin, not TTWARE.
Mr. Dougherty… if you are following along at all… could you
please delete the entire comment above that was a reply
to Calvin and NOT to what TTWARE ( The Truth Will
Always Remain Elusive ) was saying.
Thanks ( and apologies to TTWARE for this misplaced
post ).
So Gary Cordes is the whipping boy, now. Man we’ve gone from Willis ordering them down, to Musser, to Abel, to AA not doing their job, then it was Marsh the risk taker, then Sciacca wasn’t doing his job taking roll call, now we’ve got a documented hero who saved lives who should have also been able to performj a monitoring of mlvements of a crew and DIV that weren’t his responsiblity.
So the entry 3-29 11:45 a converation xxfullsailxx is on again, but if you listen you loose your reason to keep speculating. You don’t have any idea what a day like that is and isolated resources become dealing with chaos. You’re not sherlock holmes you’re watson.
Wouldn’t Marsh have driven past the “ranch” that morning? If he did then he saw it. An electric fence? wow. Youve never been in a briefing like that have you. People are trying to establish a picture, man cmon stop makiing guesses. You’re strength is research, just do that, you don’t have the experience for speculation. You don’t have any idea who else knew what. You keep dragging Brendan back into this like he owes you something who are you that anyone owes you? Can you prove that Willis and Brendan were/could listen to the crew freq? Have they said so. Are you sure you’re not liable for defamation of character with all this speculation? How do you know that xxfsxx isn’t using his macro capability, just more speculation.
I do not believe that either Musser or Cordes should be “whipping boys”, they were both dealing with a chaotic situation where people were in danger. But, it appears they were both involved in requesting Granite Mountain’s help, and as such are part of the story. I think it is apparent that without that request, the GMHS would have stayed put. After the request, they made a very bad decision and they got caught. The story here is frustratingly incomplete. The ADOSH version is that the request occurred, got turned down, and the next thing everyone knew was deployment had taken place. That clearly does not appear to be the case (the “come faster” conversation etc). We do not even know what the GMHS were supposed to do besides “help” – but certainly that is known. I do not believe Cordes or Musser were focused on structure protection, unless it related to the protection of lives. How was Granite Mountain supposed to aid in that? There is a more complete story to be told, and I do believe the families do want to know the events that led to the deaths of their loved ones. Maybe some people will feel like they are getting blamed if a more complete story is told, I do not know. Why are we not getting a more complete story of what happened, when those details are certainly known? Even more frustrating, why do some people appear resistant to having a more complete story told?
I fear that Granite Mountain got requested to move to do something that had become moot and inoperative before they even got there. In essence they died totally in vain, and no one wants to admit that.
Yea Mike I agree with most of that. I think GM was probably asked if they could get in the mix. And if they declined (seems to be consenus) that is standard. I think that the work here will tell the best story. As long as this has been going on it seems there is no relavent way to expect that the investigations wold have been able to peice the details together in the time they were given. The investigation should still be taking place. I don’t believe that anyone other than who decided to drop off the road is accountable for the fatalities. Everyone else (and most of the decisions makers have been named at one point or another) were too busy to take special interest in one resource especially since that resources supervisor was there.
The only thing that I’m resistant to is speculation and insinuation. I think there is going to be a detail specific timeline, just stop making accusations and keep putting the story together. In the end there will be many things that people will be able to blame that is what the Swiss cheese model looks like when the hole goes through.
WFF
No Marsh did not drive by the Ranch his vehicles were on the other side of the fire. A separate road goes to Bolder springs Ranch. And yes now that we know that Cordes knew where GM was going and supposedly he told them it was a safety zone he holds some blame in this fiasco and there deaths Marsh used his info which he had not scouted. That is why the law suit talks about the ranch. We are here trying to find out the whole story. This discussion has turned up a lot of unknown information science The SAIT was released.
Hey Bob I don’t think you know whether he went in and looked or not. I don’t think you know why or the specifics on the law suit, it probably covers a lot of things just to blanket possibilities. Everything that you guys are doing can be done without accusations. Formulating possibilities and bouncing them off each other is fine. Just don’t act like its fact.
From where I come from if I think an accusation is warranted I will say it. You can disagree your choice.
According to the info from Joy and Tex he went up the NE side of the line and was scouting from there after the briefing. He would have had no time to drive to Bolder springs Ranch and back to where he Parked and walked up to the fire, when Joy and Tex saw him. Also the Law Suit specifies that the SZ at the ranch was not scouted and the information should not have been given to Marsh. That assisted in the decision and death of the fire fighters.
I appreciate you asking me about facts and I try very hard to stick to them. I am an old WFF and I call a spade a spade been like that all my life. Fire Fighters Die because of bad decisions or bad information always double check both personally and talk to others when your decision affects your life.
I would have never picked a safety zone over a mile from where I was working. Would you? All my SZ were close to the line or in the burn and never more than 100yrds away. That is just common science.
Bob-
you are out of touch with reality.
#1: if you were crewboss and someone told you, “hey bob, there’s a bomb proof safety zone down at the end of that road…” wouldn’t you go scout it? right… you would. then wouldn’t you go look at the possible routes that would get you from your assignment, back to that SZ? right… because that’s SOP’s.
#2: Cordes had no responsibility for Div A or GM. he had his own mess to deal with. and once shit was hitting the fan, he had PLENTY on his own plate and no need to be micro-managing what an IHC was doing… it wasn’t his responsibility. it was Div Alpha’s. period.
do your own research and stop drooling over what WTKTT vomits out.
I have been doing research for 50 years including here. The only bomb proof safety zone is the one I chose and yes I would scout it out. I do not see any Info that Marsh checked on it at any time show me that information. Again a SZ in the middle of a brush field and a mile and half walk to it
does not fit my definition of a safety zone.
Situations that shout watch out, stop and rethink cover the bases LCES or stay where you are………..IN THE BLACK.
The Ranch was plowed to protect it not done to provide a safety zone for crews or Engines. I do not believe that any one looked at the ranch from a safety zone stand point, also if it was such a good spot why did they not assign an engine for protection? Seems to me some one must have been concerned about that. Decided not to put an engine in harms way. Just a question I have no answer for at this time.
The ranch was in as much jeopardy as the other homes in town right? I think you know the answer to that, after burning up engines on several fires in the past no one wanted to stick an engine at the Ranch in the middle of that brush field.
And in the end GM headed to the Ranch and you are right the rest is History and lesions learned.
-from the post fire pictures, the Boulder Springs Ranch looked pretty bomb proof to me.
but that wasn’t my point:
Cordes was not responsible for GM.
Not on the ‘org’ chart… but he
WAS the one officially tasked
that morning with providing
them with their ‘intel’ and
SHOWING them what
HE ( himself, alone? ) had
chosen as their primary
‘designated safety zone’
for that workday.
Whether that was what was
supposed to happen or not
( via the org chart ) can
be debated… but that’s the
way it actually went down.
#1. look up chain of command.
#2. their primary designated safety zone was the cold black.
#3. Cordes had been scouting out the fire area since 2200 the previous evening. he had personally scouted out the BSR as a safety zone.
#4. The BSR turned out to be a pretty “bomb proof” safety zone after all.
#5. my previous comments weren’t directed toward you.
Reply to xxfullsailxx post on March 31, 2014 at 4:51 pm
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>> their primary designated safety zone was the cold black.
Not according to SPGS1 Gary Cordes, who briefed them.
Keywords (here) = primary / designated.
Cordes ‘designated’ the Boulder Springs Ranch FIRST ( sic: primary )…
in the briefing… and then just adds ‘and black, of course’.
From Gary Cordes’ ADOSH interview…
Q2=Dave Larsen ( Rest in peace )
A=Gary Cordes
_________________________________________________________________
Q2: …uh, sevenish, escorted Granite Mountain down Sesame Street and
shared the location of the safety zone at Boulder Springs…
A: Ranch, right?
Q2: …and, and what – I can’t get that next word, what is it?
A: …and black, and, and I told ‘em of course you have the black as a
safety zone… Um, and this…
Q2: Oh.
A: …and this was also, this was also discussed at our, at our briefing. We had a,
an iPad out looking at the roads and everything and I showed them on the
iPad, the ranch on the iPad as well um, and referred to it there in that, during
that briefing as well.
Q2: Okay, this is, this is a briefing, uh, well, whatever, 6:45 or 7:00…
A: Yeah. Yeah. When we – when I – when we met with everybody was there,
we – there were several break outs where we discussed, had little briefings
with each other and uh, there was a point where we were at a table inside the
fire station with an iPad and we went over the – we were looking at the maps
on the iPad.
__________________________________________________________________
>> xxfullsailxx also said…
>> Cordes had been scouting out the fire area since 2200 the previous evening.
That is true… but there is no detailed account of ALL his movements.
>> xxfullsailxx also said…
>> he had personally scouted out the BSR as a safety zone.
Okay… full stop. Is that your OPINION?… or do you have a specific
source that establishes that as a fact?
I would LIKE to believe he did… and would certainly HOPE that he did before
just willy-nilly telling multiple resources ( not just Granite ) that that was the
‘designated safety zone’ for the Sunday work period…
…but have you seen proof that he did ( actually go scout it ) anywhere
in the evidence record?
I haven’t. Not yet anyway.
Please provide a source reference for your ‘statement’.
I honestly hope I have just ‘missed’ it and you can point me right to it.
mike-
that is what happens on going fires during initial attack. resources get moved around and requested, priorities change. the environment is very dynamic and fluid. those resources have a duty to assess their current situation and decide if it is safe and prudent to disengage from their current assignment in order to change locations.
there is ABSOLUTELY NOTHING WRONG with operations requesting resources be re-allocated to more pressing needs. it happens ALL THE TIME. it is how developing incidents deal with a shortage of resources, which 90% of the time is the case. it takes time to get the proper overhead (Div Sups, Safety Officers, crews, engines, IMT’s etc.) to the incident, briefed and then sent to there respective assignments.
for the umpteenth time, the onus was on GM and Div. A… not only to scout their own escape routes and safety zones, but also to evaluate whether or not is was reasonable to leave their current assignment.
what part of the story do you feel is missing? yep, Musser and Able were both looking for help in the subdivisions. i have been on plenty of crew assignments where we were dealing with structure protection. it is not at all uncommon for crews to deal with structure triage, firing operations, spot fire patrols etc. there are any number of ways the crew could have been used.
i don’t think that WTKTT making PRESUMPTIONS about Cordes “failing” to let anyone else know about the BSR safety zone does anyone any good (if it’s even true that is).
it is all hindsight. it is all speculation. don’t you think the families have plenty of “if only…” scenarios?
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>> don’t you think the families have plenty
>> of “if only…” scenarios?
Sadly ( as the evidence continues to show )…
…they have FAR too many of them.
wow, you certainly are obtuse…
no one can deny that.
I was not implying there was anything wrong with either Musser or Cordes making a request (although I do think it came from being somewhat desperate) but it is part of the story and should be known. One of the reasons there is so much speculation is that details known to people who are still alive have not been brought to light. What happened after GM turned down the request? What communication took place with GM during that time – we should not have to be listening to the background noise of air videos to discern that. What specific purpose did Musser and Cordes have in mind? GM has taken a lot of heat for possibly being over-committed to structure protection. Was this true of Musser and Cordes?
GM was responsible for itself and failed to do what was needed to come home safely. But a lot of things went wrong on the Yarnell Hill Fire, and focusing on just that one decision and neglecting the rest of the story (why were evacuations so delayed etc?) misses things that could be done better in the future.
Mike I think we’re on the same page everytime something new comes up they’re going to have someone new, it’s been this way since I signed on in Oct.
and thank you WFF, for helping to provide some reality to this witch hunt.
I was just reading Mart’s comment on her revelation (3-27 around10p). You know I’m glad you see that. I agree with xxfull sailxx. The lesson is right there and has been since the day after. You guys are pulling the seeds out of a cotton bail. There isn’t going to be a smoking gun because what happened is obvious. The overhead is responsible for the death of the crew. Everything else didn’t cause the decision. Listening to the options conversation could prove the bad decision process, but it’s right there One, two, or four people made the decision
I can’t explain or understand what you think you’re going to get out of every detail. You guys have an insatiable need to pick this out. I think it’s therapy, you guys can’t let go and just take it for what it is.
John Dougherty is a genious. You guys are all doing his research and giving him credit for letting you do it. It’s the ultimate Tom Sawyer painting the fence.
I’d like to know if John or someone is putting together an overall timeline with all this research. I think that would be a useful tale to tell, but it won’t change the lesson it would tell it more clearly. I said early on that the investigation happened to fast in a rush and I don’t see why anyone would think either could have been done well.
**
** THE APPLE IPAD THAT WAS USED TO SHOW ERIC MARSH
** THE BOULDER SPRINGS RANCH ( AND ROADS LEADING TO IT ).
The original SAIR report has always said this…
SAIR page 21…
________________________________________________________________
At the 0700 briefing ( at the Yarnell Fire Station ) on June 30, ICT4 (Russ
Shumate) and others from the previous shift meet at the Yarnell Fire Station
with incoming personnel including ICT2 (Roy Hall), two Operations Section
Chiefs (OPS1 (Todd Abel) and OPS2 (Paul Musser) ), SPGS1 (Gary Cordes),
a fire behavior analyst (FBAN (Byron Kimball)), YCSO deputies, and the
Granite Mountain IHC Superintendent (Eric Marsh).
The briefing covers strategy and tactics, the previous night’s spot weather
forecast (Figure 4), and radio frequencies.
They review the area using Google Maps on an iPad, and they note
Boulder Springs Ranch as an excellent safety zone.
_______________________________________________________________
And this…
SAIR page 41…
_______________________________________________________________
The Granite Mountain IHC heard the Boulder Springs Ranch was a
“bomb proof safety zone” that morning. Using Google Maps and an iPad,
they had seen the Ranch, as well as potential trails and roads leading to it.
_______________________________________________________________
NO other ‘official’ report ( WFAR or ADOSH ) ever mentioned any such thing,
so it has always been a mystery whether that actually happened Sunday
morning… or not.
Gary Cordes’ ADOSH interview seems to clear that mystery up.
According to Gary Cordes… all of that DID happen… and he was the one
pointing out the Boulder Springs Ranch( and the roads ) to Eric Marsh
( and, perhaps, Jesse Steed ).
I have also always wondered, myself, that if that moment really did happen…
then WHO was showing Marsh the ‘Boulder Springs Ranch’ and (supposedly)
‘the roads leading to it’ on that iPad… and WHOSE iPad was it?
Again… Gary Cordes’ ADOSH interview answers both of those questions.
It was Gary Cordes himself showing the Boulder Springs Ranch
( and the roads? ) to Marsh… and Cordes was apparently using Dean
Fernandez’s GPS activated iPad to do it.
Cordes says in his ADOSH interview that there were a number of iPads floating
around that morning at the 0700 briefing at the Yarnell Fire Station… but Cordes
also specifically recalls that the one he was using to show Marsh the Boulder
Springs Ranch ( and, supposedly, the roads that led to it ) belonged to either
OPS1 Todd Abel or BLM Rep Dean Fernandez.
We don’t have any photos from Todd Abel to see if he had an iPad that day…
but we DO have photos from Dean Fernandez proving that HE did.
Even though the SAIR report never reported BLM Rep Dean Fernandez
as being at that crucial 0700 briefing… we have always KNOWN he WAS
there due to other documents and actual photographic evidence ( his own ).
We also know for a fact he was already there at 6:25 AM and part of
all those informal ‘pre-meeting’ meetings we also now know took place.
There has always been this photo sitting in the ‘Dean Fernandez Photos’ folder
in Mr. Dougherty’s SAIT FOIA/FOIL release package Dropbox…
https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/sh/02ue6bnjp6nazkm/NgwlAQidTe/Photos%20and%20Video/Fernandez%20photos/2013-06-30%2006.25.13.jpg?token_hash=AAGrVEbWjnR3H0bBTmnBmnp_BJwq8cfsRtEB6XWnCtKVqA
It was taken with Fernandez’s Apple iPad at exactly 6:25 AM, Sunday,
June 30, 2013. He was standing in the parking lot of the Yarnell Fire
Station. ( It is GPS stamped and proves this )
Here is the EXIF metadata from that photograph…
Camera: Apple iPad
Lens: 4.3 mm
Exposure: Auto exposure, Program AE, 1/355 sec, f/2.4, ISO 50
Flash: No flash function
Date/Time: Sunday, June 30, 2013 6:25:13 AM
Location: Latitude/longitude: 34° 13′ 21″ North, 112° 44′ 46.8″ West
Location Decimal: ( 34.222500, -112.746333 )
File: 1,936 × 2,592 JPEG (5.0 megapixels)
Filename: 2013-06-30-06.25.13.jpg
There is no direct evidence of it… but it’s seems possible that since he was
much more familiar with Yarnell than Gary Cordes AND Frenandez had been
on the fire the day before ( Saturday ) and helped to set up the pumpkin
at the Boulder Springs Ranch…
…that it was Dean Fernandez himself who probably told Gary Cordes that the
Boulder Springs Ranch would be an ideal ‘safety zone’ to designate for Sunday.
Cordes obviously agreed since that is exactly what he was telling inbound
resources on Sunday… but there is still no evidence that Gary Cordes himself
ever visited the Boulder Springs Ranch prior to telling everyone working that area
that that was to be their ‘bomb-proof safety zone’ on Sunday.
ALSO… now that this ‘Apple iPad’ moment appears to be verified… we
can now also see where a major problem began that day.
Apparently… Cordes simply took Marsh ‘aside’ for this moment and
was privately showing him the Boulder Springs Ranch on the iPad,
which is contrary to what the SAIR said.
The SAIR was trying to establish that this ‘presentation of the Boulder
Springs Ranch’ as a ‘bomb-proof safety zone’ was formally part of
official meeting and that THEY ( plural, everyone there ) ‘noted’ it
as a good safety zone.
That part of the SAIR ‘story’ still appears to be fiction.
Apparently… ONLY Cordes and Marsh were looking at the iPad,
and all the other fire overhead wasn’t paying attention.
IC Roy Hall, OPS1 Todd Abel and OPS2 Paul Musser would all testify
later that even when they heard Eric Marsh was ‘heading out his
escape route’ and ‘heading to his pre-determined safety zone’…
…they had absolutely no idea WHERE that was or what he was
really talking about.
When that meeting ended… only Eric Marsh and Gary Cordes really
knew what Marsh was going to be referring to later in the day.
If EVERYONE at that meeting had been fully aware of DIVA’s designated
‘safety zone’ and ‘escape route’ ( as the SAIR implies they all were )…
and EXACTLY where it was and what his ‘predetermined escape route’
was to have been…
…things actually might have turned out differently that day.
I believe this represents what Gary Cordes himself has said is one of the
actual ‘lessons to be learned’ from the Yarnell Fire with regards to
‘complacency’, ‘inattentiveness’, and ‘creeping normalcy’.
On a day like that… with extreme fire behavior actually EXPECTED… it is
astounding that the IC and BOTH OPS on the fire were standing RIGHT
THERE at that meeting and (apparently) didn’t even bother to at least be
sure they knew what ‘safety zone’ was being established for their own
Division Supervisor… exactly where it was… and whether THEY
( fire command ) really felt it ( and the escape route being set )
was adequate for the terrain, circumstances, and EXPECTED
conditions that day.
It’s not like there were 20 Divisions on that fire.
Marsh was their ONLY Division Sup that was going to be all the way
out in the boondock that day… in harm’s way… and they ( fire command )
left the meeting not having any idea what he was going to mean later on
when they would hear him say ‘predetermined escape route
and safety zone’ over the radio at a critical time.
“Creeping normalcy”.
They simply weren’t paying attention and didn’t feel the need to.
WTKTT—The real thing that continues to haunt me is why you would designate Boulder Springs Ranch as a SZ.
1. Not scouted
2. The ranch was plowed for its safety not as a Safety Zone.
3. It was no where near any crews, Equipment etc.
4. it was in the middle of a huge brush field.
5. Over 1 mile from where GM was. That is just to far in an emergency to be a true safety zone. SZ should be close and accessible with in a short time. Five minuets or less, that’s why the Black for a crew is the most reliable. If you have to run you do not want to run very far, very few have survived that last dash.
Mr. Powers… I believe everything you just pointed out
is why this decision itself is, in fact, a part of most of
the ‘wrongful death’ lawsuits filed so far.
It’s a FUNDAMENTAL set of questions to ask since that
location itself ( and the attempt to reach it ) played such
a vital role in what happened later that day.
Unfortunately… even with all the evidence that has
already come to light… there isn’t any detail at all,
really, about WHO really made that decision, and/or
why.
As I said above… it is POSSIBLE that Dean Fernandez
simply pointed it out to Cordes that morning on his
iPad… in one of the ‘meetings before meeting’… and
Cordes just simply agreed that it ‘looked fine’.
Whether Dean Fernandez ( BLM Rep ) himself was
‘qualified’ to even make that evaluation according to
WFF standards… I do not know.
Even Eric Marsh had the opportunity, after someone
just pointed to it on an iPad, to raise his own
objections or raise any of the points about it that
you make above.
None of that happened.
They just pointed to the iPad… and that was that.
It is still unknown if enough time was actually taken
for Marsh to be FULLY aware of the ‘roads leading
to it’… but Brendan McDonough’s new ADOSH
interview transcript seems to indicate that WAS
the case.
Brendan is now saying that even HE seemed to be
aware that the two-track road eventually ‘wound up’
at the targeted ‘safety zone’ ( BSR )… as early as
that morning… after they ( the crew ) were also
‘briefed’ by Marsh/Steed.
But unless we start to seriously question Gary Cordes’
interview with ADOSH… then the mystery of whether
Marsh was ever actually SHOWN the location of that
(supposed) ‘bomb-proof safety zone’ before he ever
went up on that ridge is over.
He was ( shown the location on a map )…
…and it was Gary Cordes himself who showed it to him.
if only this, if only that… blah-blah-blah.
if only lightning hadn’t struck atop the weaver mountains.
congratulations, you’re the king of hindsight.
and only because you keep talking about it like you understand it, and therefore, you keep misusing it…
BECAUSE YOU MAKE TOO MANY ASSUMPTIONS AND DON’T CONSIDER ALL THE FACTS!
what G.Cordes was referring to is called “normalization of deviance,” here’s the video:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NcgeWkG1HCg
now at least you can try to understand what you’re talking about. not that it will stop you from putting words in other people’s mouth.
Reply to xxfullsailxx pos ton March 29, 2014 at 2:55 pm
That a good video.
I wish everyone who had worked the Yarnell Hill Fire
had seen it the night BEFORE they showed up there.
Ironic that he continually uses the word ‘shortcut’
itself in part of his ‘lecture’…
_______________________________________________
You take the shortcut… even though you know you
are violating safety procedures… and what happens?
Nothing.
Nothing bad happens.
The absence of something bad happening then means
it was SAFE to take the shortcut.
So what happens then?… you do it again. Same result.
You get away with it so many times…
The SHORTCUT becomes the NORM…
Until… something bad DOES happen.
_______________________________________________
BTW: I was totally familiar with the term “normalization of deviance” for quite some time ( Like almost a lifetime )…
but I still like the way Cordes phrased it…
“Creeping normalcy”.
Bad decisions with good outcomes.
ah, yes… of course you’re familiar.
that’s why you continually misuse the phrase “creeping normalcy” …not only in terminology, but also in context.
You say tomato… I say….
Call it whatever you want.
It was in full play that weekend… and despite
your “there’s nothing more to see here…
move along… move along” attitude you
now seem to be indicating that you,
yourself believe that it ( tomato )
was ‘in play’.
This ‘lesson’ from Yarnell goes all the
way up the ladder… from poorly
planned/executed IA, to failure to identify
proper extended attack and assign the
right ‘team type’ as early as possible,
to really, really bad ( or non-existent,
as in Blue Ridge’s case ) briefings,
right on to poorly chosen safety zones,
escape routes, reliance on deployment
as an ‘option’, taking walks through
fuel without proper lookouts, intel, or
planning… yada, yada, yada.
It ( tomato ) was ALL in ‘full swing’ that
weekend. I still agree with Cordes’
own evaluation of that weekend.
Everyone in the WFF business needs to
ask themselves if they, personally, are
( or have been steadily ) slipping into
that slot where you might get ‘tomato’
back in your face.
“You say tomato… I say….
Call it whatever you want.”
well, since mullane coined the term, i’ll go ahead and call it “normalization of deviance” … but that wasn’t my point. my point is that you are SO arrogant and SO ignorant that you will do and say anything to make yourself feel and seem like a self proclaimed expert.
“you now seem to be indicating that you, yourself believe that it ( tomato )
was ‘in play’.”
we all know you don’t hesitate to assign words or thoughts to people who can’t speak for themselves… don’t try to speak for me. there is nothing in what i said that indicates what i believe was or was not in play. i was simply attempting to correct your ignorance… a moot point i realize.
“It ( tomato ) was ALL in ‘full swing’ that
weekend. I still agree with Cordes’
own evaluation of that weekend.”
you continue to use the term (tomato) out of context. dealing with wildland fire in and around the urban interface is a complicated task. lots of moving parts. i wouldn’t expect you to understand. your laundry list of “lessons” means nothing… because it comes from an anonymous internet hack with too much time on his hands.
(see, i don’t need a function key, i like to change it up every once in a while)
>> xxfullsaixx said…
>> (see, i don’t need a function >> key, i like to change it up
>> every once in a while)
That’s good.
Glad to hear you are even
boring yourself at this point.
** PANEBAKER AIR STUDY VIDEO
** 20130630_161858_VLAT_split_2_EP.MOV
Transcript is below.
ECITW ( Every Caveat In The World )
This is what I ( me, personally ) am hearing in the
background of this video. Your mileage may, of
course, vary.
NOTE: No filtering or audio forensics needed for this
one. Most of this background conversation is easily heard
by anyone with normal hearing at those places where
the loud foreground conversation is not obscuring
the background conversation.
Public copy of this AIR STUDY video is here…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/y3jy5opssrcvzb3/S3cCXl9pjr/AerialFirefightingstudy/Panebaker/Video/Video#lh:null-20130630_161858_VLAT_split_2_EP.MOV
Duration: 1:49
VIDEO STARTS
+0:00 ( 1618.58 – 4:18.58 PM )
(Corey Moser?): I’m gonna head over there and check
the ranch out and see if they’ve got that… uh… mostly cleared.
+0:10 ( 1619.08 – 4:19.08 PM )
(Unknown): Ah… ( six five?)… Did you copy that?
+1:17 ( 1620.15 – 4:20.15 PM )
(SPGS2 Darrell Willis?) (Cory?)… if you’ve got time and
it’s in any way possible… right now… ??… get with
(Barry?)… ??… there so we gotta pick up the slop.
+1:32 ( 1620.30 – 4:20.30 PM )
(SPGS1 Gary Cordes): Copy… but the intel I am getting from, uh…
Blue Ridge is that they have… uh… lost that dozer line up
( loud foreground voice obscures this part ) where we’d… uh…
planned to do the ??.
VIDEO ENDS
NOTE: This *seems* ( emphasis *seems* ) to be the moment
that day when SPGS1 Gary Cordes is finally telling either OPS1
Todd Abel or OPS2 Paul Musser that burning out that dozer line
that Blue Ridge and Tyson Esquibel had been working on is no
longer an option for protecting Yarnell.
If that is the case… then this is happening almost a full
30 minutes ( half-hour ) later than the time when SPGS1
Gary Cordes was first informed by Blue Ridge Superintendent
Brian Frisby that the ‘burn out’ option was no longer viable.
According to the SAIR… 1620 is the exact moment that
Granite Mountain was leaving the two-track road and
dropping into the fuel-filled box canyon… and also the
exact moment that the entire Blue Ridge crew was
retreating from the dozer line back to the Shrine
Youth Camp in order to evacuate that area.
ALSO NOTE: Now that there is a full hour and a half of
Gary Cordes’ voice ( recorded in his ADOSH interview )
to listen to… it’s fairly easy to identify his voice in some
of these other captured recordings. Like Eric Marsh…
he has a very recognizable voice print and speech pattern.
In the video T911 makes a retardant drop at 1618, right??
SAIR p100 says….Weather: Although there were sufficient airtankers assigned to the fire, the afternoon’s severe weather hampered the tankers’ effectiveness by closing reloading bases periodically and at other times by making flying to and from the fire unsafe. However, this was not the case at the time of the entrapment as a Very Large Airtanker (VLAT) was over the fire carrying 10,743 gallons of retardant and was prepared to drop at the ASM’s order if the crew could be located.
If T911 is making retardant drops as early as 1618 I would think it almost impossible that at 1635 and beyond T911 still has 10,743 gallons of unused retardant.
Both 910 and 911 were working that day, before and after shelter deployment.
Yes, but T910 was not on the fire at 1618, or during deployment. And the SAIR says it was specifically T911 that was carrying 10,743 gallons. And we now know that it was T911 making a drop in the video above
Reply to calvin post on March 29, 2014 at 12:07 pm
>> calvin said…
>> In the video T911 makes a retardant drop at 1618, right??
Yes. One of the foreground guys ‘misses’ his chance to
take still pictures of the moment and says…
“Oh… I missed it… F**k!”
>> calvin also said…
>> If T911 is making retardant drops as early as 1618
>> I would think it almost impossible that at 1635 and
>> beyond T911 still has 10,743 gallons of unused
>> retardant.
Good point. It’s possible.
Calvin… speaking of 1635 and that timframe…
Have you seen a few of the *new* Panebaker Air
Study videos uploaded by Mr. Dougherty that we
have never heard about or seen before in
that same 1630 – 1635 timeframe.
TWO of them clearly show the enormous firestorm
and column that is about to entrap Granite Mountain…
…but they ALSO show what appears to be this
infamous ‘lining up a retardant drop’ flight that
Marsh would ( supposedly ) SEE and say “That’s
correct… that’s where we want the retardant”
at 1637.
From looking at these new videos in the 1635
timeframe… if those really are the ‘practice runs’
being referred to… I don’t see how it is even
remotely possible that Marsh could have been
seeing that from the OTHER side of that huge
smoke column clearly seen in the video.
So I now tend to agree with what I think you said just
a short while ago… that there now should be a lot
of doubt that this 1637 Marsh radio call about
retardant ever happened at all… or if there was a
radio call to that effect at that time… it was
NOT Eric Marsh making it. Whoever was reporting
that it was him making that call might simply have
been mistaken.
Followup / Clarification
Calvin… when I said “Good point. It’s possible”
up above… I was ‘agreeing’ with your statement.
It is, in fact, ‘possible’ that what you said it true…
That based on the new evidence… it seems it
would be ‘almost impossible’ that at 1635 and
beyond T911 still has 10,743 gallons of
unused retardant.
The 161620 Vlat video shows the same retardant drop as the 161858 video, right??
In the 161620 video we hear (I assume) the VLAT pilot saying he has about 2,000gallons left (following that drop.) And then we see the VLAT drop again in the 162508 video and again in the 163338 video.
Is that correct?
WTKTT… can you tell me a little about the 163338 video. Like where the camera is filming, which side of the fire the retardant drop is made, and where GM were. Many Thanks!
Ok— We know that Cordes knew where GM was going, Interesting I think.
First he heard the same discussion we have discussed between Marsh and Air Attack with no specific reference to Bolder Springs ranch. From that conversation Cordes knows exactly where GM is headed. Big question how did he know or surmise that?
If he really knew that why did he not tell them to stay in the Black as he was in the middle of a lot of fire activity. Critical fire activity and GM was headed to a clearing in the middle of a large brush field that may or may not have been bomb proof and they had to walk thru over a mile of brush to get there,
This leaves one conclusion for me if one or more overhead knew what GM was doing and allowed it, then the state investigation is right and the state is liable.
Gary Cordes could be sued as well for being implicated in the move that caused the crew to lose their lives.
I can not respect Cordes if he said nothing about GM not following LCES or the 10 and 18, he just simply ignored that. You decide that’s my feeling on it.
Reply to Bob Powers post on March 28, 2014 at 12:23 pm
>> Mr. Powers said…
>> Ok – We know that Cordes knew where GM was going.
No doubt about it. There is also now no doubt that the SAIT
investigators knew this as well ( and all the other details
we can now read for ourselves in the ADOSH interviews ).
It is not believable to think that ANY of these dozens of
people that ADOSH interviewed would have told any
remarkably different stories during their interviews with
the SAIT investigators.
>> Mr. Powers also wrote…
>> First he heard the same discussion we have discussed
>> between Marsh and Air Attack with no specific reference
>> to Bolder Springs ranch.
Yes. It was amazing to hear Dave Larsen ( Rest in Peace )
nail Gary Cordes down about that. If you listen to the AUDIO
of Cordes’ interview at the same point… you can clearly
hear how UNBELIEVABLE Dave Larsen thought that was
and that he really couldn’t believe what he was hearing
from Gary… that a man was about to take 18 other firefighters
for a ‘walk in the fuel’ right in front of an advancing fire… with
no lookout… and wasn’t even bothering to make sure whatever
was up there flying over him knew EXACTLY where he was going.
This very section from Cordes’ interview *MAY* be where
Elizabeth was coming from recently with all her queries
about WHY would anyone be calling ‘Air Attack’ to tell
them where they were going… but NOT tell them where
they were going?
This still needs more research ( why Marsh chose Air channel
for that ‘announcement’ ). In Cordes’ interview… he says that
right around that time he, himself, HAD been trying to talk
to Marsh directly ( he doesn’t say why… which is even
more to find out )… but Cordes says he was somehow
UNABLE to contact Marsh at that point.
Did Marsh’s Bendix King take a dump that day just like
Cordes’ did… but Marsh didn’t have another one to fall
back on like Cordes’ did? Is it possible in that late
timeframe that Marsh was making that ‘announcement’
on the Air channel because just like people could no
longer seem to raise HIM on the TAC channels… Marsh
also discovered he was not able to get OUT on the
TAC channels, either? Was the Air channel the only
one that was working at all for him at that point?
More to come on that, I’m sure.
>> Mr. Powers also said…
>> From that conversation Cordes knows exactly where GM is
>> headed. Big question how did he know or surmise that?
You need to read Cordes’ entire interview transcript.
It has these answers.
Cordes was the one who ‘briefed’ them that morning, and
Cordes was the one who now VERIFIES that there WAS,
in fact, an iPad at that meeting showing ‘maps’ of the
area and Cordes is the one who showed Marsh where
the Boulder Springs Ranch was on that iPand. Cordes even
answers the question I’ve had for a long time as to WHOSE
iPad it might have been. Cordes says there were even 2 or
3 of them ‘floating around’ that morning but the one he
specifically used to show Marsh the Ranch belonged to
either OPS1 Todd Abel or BLM Rep Dean Fernandez.
Cordes says that the ONLY ‘safe zones’ he ever mentioned
was either ‘in the black’ or ‘to the Boulder Springs Ranch’.
There was never anything about ‘back to the vehicles’.
So when Cordes heard Marsh say he was ‘leaving the
black’ and heading out their ‘predetermined escape route’…
that was an ‘either/or’ situation as far as Cordes knew
and it HAD to mean Marsh was now headed to the
Boulder Springs Ranch.
>> Mr. Powers also said…
>> If he really knew that why did he not tell them to stay
>> in the Black as he was in the middle of a lot of fire activity.
Cordes says specifically that he didn’t think anything about
what Marsh said because Cordes was also as sure as
he could be that Marsh/Steed/Crew had all the time in the
world to accomplish that.
He was wrong to think that ( dead wrong )…. but that’s what he
thought… and why he didn’t even think to say anything about
their decision.
The fire had ALREADY ‘totally outperformed’ his expectations
and totally blown through his ‘trigger points’ at a rapid rate…
yet Cordes still somehow just felt that GM had all the time
in the world to accomplish the move they just announced
over the radio. Unbelievable.
>> Mr. Powers also wrote…
>> Critical fire activity and GM was headed to a clearing in the
>> middle of a large brush field that may or may not have been
>> bomb proof and they had to walk thru over a mile of brush
>> to get there,
See above. Even if Cordes had no idea they would ‘shortcut’
through the canyon… he still was absolutely convinced
they had the time to get all the way to the Ranch even by
taking the ridge two-track all the way to it. Wrong again.
Also… speaking of ‘may or may not have been bomb-proof’…
…did you know that all of the ‘wrongful death’ lawsuits that
have been filed to date actually call this fundamental choice
of the Boulder Springs Ranch as a ‘safety zone’ into question?
The ‘wrongful death’ lawsuits allege that, itself, was an
uninformed decision and there is ‘negligence’ there in anyone
even deciding that the Boulder Springs Ranch was, in fact,
an absolute up-to-speed, certifiable safety zone ( Large
propane tanks on-site, area filled with structures that
could burn, etc. )
I suppose that will all be debated at trial, with experts testifying
for both sides.
>> Mr. Powers also wrote…
>> This leaves one conclusion for me if one or more overhead
>> knew what GM was doing and allowed it, then the state
>> investigation is right and the state is liable.
I am absolutely sure that the moment Arizona Forestry
was advised there were FF fatalities on a State-run fire…
their primary focus was then ‘limiting liability’. Jim Karels
( in charge of the SAIT ) fully understood that, I’m sure.
>> Mr. Powers wrote…
>> Gary Cordes could be sued as well for being implicated in the
>> move that caused the crew to lose their lives.
Yes. He could.
I am sure that’s going to be all over the news if the man
who just received Prescott Wildfire Academy’s Firefighter
of the Year award is suddenly added ( by name ) to the
existing multiple ‘wrongful death’ lawsuits.
>> Mr. Powers wrote.
>> I can not respect Cordes if he said nothing about GM not
>> following LCES or the 10 and 18, he just simply ignored that.
>> You decide that’s my feeling on it.
I still respect Cordes for pointing out that what the WFF industry
really needs to take a hard look at is this ‘creeping normalcy’
within the ranks when it comes to ‘bad decisions with good
outcomes’… but I hear what you are saying.
Cordes might be the new AWA “Firefighter of the Year”… but
he’s not ‘clean’ with regards to what happened on June 30, 2013.
There’s more to come on this, I’m sure.
Creeping normalcy Cordes was part of it and while he brought it up he turned around and in his statements said he was using it in what he did. His award is laughable. Also while I did not know about the law suet on the part about the safety zone I had early concerns about it. When you do not scout a escape route and check your safety zones you fail your basic training and safety of your crew as a Division Boss or a crew boss that is one of your primary responsibility’s. Never take any thing for granted. I go back to what I have been saying for months Bolder Springs Ranch was not a SZ or was there an escape route. Until scouted they were nothing but marks on the landscape. The Black was the only true Safety Zone. They needed no escape route, They were there own look out on top of the mountain they could see the fire front. They had communications both radio and phone with there supervisors, adjacent crews, and Air Attack. They had the entire 1o standard orders covered. The 18 situations that shout watch out were covered. I do not know how much clearer I can make that. They went from the best possible scenario to the worst possible scenario.
How could Cordes or any one else think that was a good move????
Reply to Bob Powers post
on March 28, 2014 at 3:58 pm
>> Mr. Powers wrote…
>> I go back to what I have been saying for months
>> Bolder Springs Ranch was not a SZ or was
>> there an escape route. Until scouted they were
>> nothing but marks on the landscape.
Correct.
There is still ( as yet ) no evidence that even
though Gary Cordes had been in the area since
the night before… that he ever actually visited
the Boulder Springs Ranch before pointing to
it on an iPad the next morning and telling
anyone “that’s your safety zone. It’s bomb-proof”.
What if that ranch happened to have an 80,000
volt electric fence on the west side… or even
just some substantial no-pass-thru fencing?
That would have been quite a suprise to Marsh
and Steed if they had even made it there and
the fire was RIGHT behind them.
Do Hotshots normally carry wire cutters?
What about guard dogs ( BIG ones ) ?
Anyone bother to check that out before
‘setting the safety zone’?
I suppose that will all come out at trial… but
there was certainly some ‘creeping normalcy’
going on there as well. Just point at a map,
draw your finger around… everything will
be fine.
>> The Black was the only true Safety Zone.
>> They needed no escape route,
That true… but stay tuned for a post I’ve been
putting together called “LIGHTNING ROUND”.
There is *new* evidence in the ADOSH interview
transcripts that LIGHTNING was just as much
of a concern that day as it was the day before
when Russ Shumate based his entire IA Plan
on a fear of leaving ANY men up on the Weaver
Mountains if a thunderstorm kicked up ( even
though they had ‘safe black’ as well that day ).
OPS1 Todd Abel’s interview itself seems to
prove that Abel was just as concerned about
this as Shumate was the day before… and
TOLD this to Marsh.
There is also new evidence that there were
more than just a ‘few’ lightning strikes and
loud thunder in the area just moments before
the decision was made whether to stay up on
the high ridge two-track… or drop down into
the box canyon.
If they had stayed on the two-track, at that point
when they were both SEEING lightning in the
area AND hearing loud thunder… they would have
had to climb even HIGHER to the next ridge,
with no cover whatsoever… and been 19 walking
lightning rods at that point.
We also see now from the Wesley fire incident
that the CREW itself was VERY much aware
of “Death from above”… and would not hesitate
to say so when it was bothering them.
So… I’m not saying that the LIGHTNING issue
is the reason for the decision making that day…
but it *may* have contributed.
There’s even a chance that’s what Marsh was
actually referring to by ‘comfort level’ in that
converstion with Steed captured in the MacKenzie
video.
There is no question that ‘black’ was ‘safe black’…
but it was still on top of the Weaver Mountains
and a thunderstorm was arriving.
If they were really, really afraid of the lightning
aspects up there… then all the ‘safe black’ up
there in the world wasn’t going to make them
feel any better about staying up there at
that time.
Followup to above…
If ‘lightning concerns’ really did factor into
the ‘comfort level’ discussion or any of
the ‘discussing their options’ decision
making…
…once again… Brendan McDonough
most probably knows that.
I fall back on what Gary said. No fire fighter has to my knowledge been hit by lighting. WTKTT you drop just off the back side of the ridge and stack your tools get away from them and sit out a storm if it comes you way.
all the info on lightning was cloud to cloud or NE of the fire no cloud to ground on the fire its self according to the lightning radar equipment.
There was no lightning ground strikes on the fire that day. Fire fighters have lived with lightning for years you are trained on what to do.
Copy that. It also doesn’t
matter how worried Todd Abel
was about it… it only matters
how worried Marsh/Steed/Crew
were concerned.
There IS, however, some new
evidence that OPS1 was
VERY concerned… and that
this concern was made
clear to DIVS A as the
storms rolled in.
If you haven’t had a chance
to read Mr. Abel’s ADOSH
interview transcript… give
me a little time to finish
assembling the breakout
post and I will show you
that part.
The Weaver Mountains were
considered ‘high risk’ for this
sort of thing, apparently.
True but Things to conceder…..
1. Planes still flying in the fire area.
2. No discussion of Lighting on any radio traffic.
3. Nothing noted on BR notes.
4. There were no huge thunder clouds over the fire from the pictures of the blow up and McDonough pictures in the vehicle only the smoke column.
5. No discussion of Lighting accompanying the high winds that hit the fire.
That info leads me to believe there was no lighting over the fire.
No need to pack wire cutters when you have a pulaski or 2…
it sounds to me like Gary Cordes was dealing with much more than having to worry about where GM was. the assumption, in that situation, would be that your crews were doing the right thing by either staying put, or making their way to a safe place. there was no time context given on his ASSUMPTION that GM was going to Boulder Springs Ranch. as far as he knew, they had plenty of time to make it there and a clear path. Cordes was dealing with evacuating people out of the subdivision, people who had previously refused to leave but whose homes were now burning, all the while GM was probably on the move. besides the fact, that neither Div A (marsh) nor GM were working for Cordes…
Bob i would suggest you listen to the Gary Cordes interview yourself to understand the circumstances of what he was talking about. to try to hold him somehow accountable for GM’s actions is unwarranted. stop relying on WTKTT’s half-assed assessments and start doing your own research if you want to make such unsubstantiated suggestions.
Reply to xxfullsailxx post on March 28, 2014 at 8:48 pm
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>> there was no time context given on his ASSUMPTION
>> that GM was going to Boulder Springs Ranch.
Not true.
Cordes could not recall the exact ‘time’… but he gave all
the CONTEXT in the world needed to set the exact TIME.
Cordes, himself, was careful to advise the ADOSH
investigators that HE was not sure what exact TIME
he heard Marsh say ( Cordes’ quote ) “heading to our
pre-designated safety zone”… or whether it was before
or after he definitely also heard Marsh say that Marsh
was witnessing the fireline “cross the dozer line at
the grader location”…
…but Cordes is/was as sure as he can be that he
heard Marsh make his ‘announcement’ about the
‘heading to our pre-designated safety zone’ directly
to ‘Air Attack’ over the ‘Air to Ground’ channel.
The ADOSH investigators took special care to
CONFIRM that detail with Cordes.
So that is all the ‘context’ needed to put a ‘timeframe’
on that even when Cordes could not.
That ‘specific announcement’ from Marsh to
‘Air Attack’ only happened ONE TIME that day, and
a lot of people heard it.
According to Arizona Forestry’s SAIT investigators…
it happened as late as about 1630 that day…
Page 15 of SAIT Yarnell Investigation Notes (YIN)…
______________________________________________
INTERVIEW with BRAVO 33 ( ASM2 )
July 9, 2013 -1700
Interviewees: Bravo 33 ( ASM2 )
John Burfiend – ATS Specialist
Clint Clauson – ATS Trainee
Thomas French – AT Specialist
Interviewers: Mike Dudley, Brad Mayhew, Tim Foley, Jay Kurth, Jimmy Rocha
I didn’t remember the conversation about Granite Mountain
being in the safe zone until I was shaving. This past
Saturday I visited with Todd Able – he confirmed the
conversation.
We needed to go back to the right flank (16:30 AZ time).
Made 3 practice runs. Painted 2. We came around.
Got a call from Division A stating they were going down
their escape route to the safety zone.
Didn’t know Division A was the superintendent of the
Granite Mountain hot shots.
Asked him “is everything OK?” He replied “everything
is ok, just heading to the safety zone”. We came around,
made a practice run through the bowl, west to east.
I was talking to Tom about the rising terrain on exit.
Division A called and said “that is what we are looking for,
that is exactly right”.
Within 5 minutes of that, they went in shelter.
_______________________________________________
NOTE: Marsh also made the same ‘going out the
exact escape route from this morning’ announcement
at about 1616 ( captured in the background of that
Air Study video in response to the “Granite Mountain…
what’s your status right now?” query )… but that
announcement on Marsh’s part was NOT directly
to Air Attack over the Air to Ground channel… so it
could not be the one that Cordes is sure he heard.
cool, thanks… because again, what this shows is your complete ignorance of what is going on in that situation. you continue to speak as if this is all happening in a vacuum because you have absolutely no frame of reference as to the chaos that might be going on in the background, let alone trying to deal with a radio that is blowing up, that you are having technical difficulties with, while you are driving around trying to talk to overhead, your own crews/engines and dealing with the public who, after previously refusing to leave, are now looking for help in leaving.
WTKTT says, “Even if Cordes had no idea they would ‘shortcut’ through the canyon… he still was absolutely convinced they had the time to get all the way to the Ranch even by taking the ridge two-track all the way to it. Wrong again.”
yes, YOU are wrong AGAIN. Cordes overheard some radio traffic on A-G. he ASSUMED that they were headed to BSR and he ASSUMED that if they were headed there, that they had enough time to make it. Cordes was not responsible for Div A or GM. he had his own mess to deal with.
again, more false allegations based on shaky evidence from some anonymous internet conspiracy theorist with an audience who has no idea what he is talking about.
Reply to xxfullsailxx post
on March 29, 2014 at 6:30 am
( Heavy sigh )
I never said Cordes wasn’t busy, or
that he didn’t have all the reasons in
the world to not know the exact time.
Hardly ANYONE ever knew what time
it was that day. The ONLY time OPS2
Paul Musser EVER looked at his own
watch that day was at 12:04 when he
distinctly remembers looking at it as
he witnessed a VLAT drop.
I was telling YOU that YOU were wrong to
assert that there was no ‘time context’ for
when Cordes heard Marsh say they
were ( Cordes’ quote ) “heading to our
pre-designated safety zone”.
Even though Cordes wasn’t sure of the
time ( understandable )… he gave all
the context we need to ‘figure it out’
for him.
>> xxfullsailxx also said…
>> Cordes overheard some radio traffic on
>> A-G. he ASSUMED that they were
>> headed to BSR and he ASSUMED that
>> if they were headed there, that they had
>> enough time to make it.
Correct ( nice to see you are actually
reading the real evidence this time ).
His ‘assumption’ was dead wrong.
>> xxfullsailxx
>> Cordes was not responsible for Div A
>> or GM. he had his own mess to deal with.
Technically correct. He was just SPGS1.
But HE ( Cordes ) was also the one who
CHOSE the ‘Boulder Springs Ranch’ to
be the designated ‘safety zone’ for
incoming resources in the Yarnell area
on Sunday morning.
HE ( Cordes ) was the one showing that
‘safety zone’ to Marsh at the 0700
briefing ( and supposedly the road that
led to it )… without also making sure
that the other fire overhead ( IC Roy Hall,
OPS1 Abel and OPS2 Musser ) standing
right there at the same meeting were also
( at the very minumum ) aware
that’s the IMPORTANT information he was
telling THEIR DIVSA.
Hence… the confusion and cluelessness
later on the part of fire command.
ONLY Cordes knew what Marsh was
really talking about at a time when it
was critical for ALL the fire overhead
to know what he ( Cordes ) knew.
Even AFTER the deployment… it appears
that Cordes was still the ONLY one in
Yarnell ( besides Brendan McDonough
and anyone else ( like Willis ) who had
been listening to the GM crew frequency
that afternoon ) who knew where they
had ACTUALLY been going… and how
to find them quickly… but somehow never
communicated this to people who THEN
needed to know that.
I’m not BLAMING him for anything.
I am telling you what the evidence says.
>> xxfullsailxx also said…
>> again, more false allegations based
>> on shaky evidence from some
>> anonymous internet conspiracy theorist
>> with an audience who has no idea
>> what he is talking about.
As I have told you before…
Your browser has macro capability.
You could put all that into a function key
and that would save you both time
and keystrokes.
“he’s not ‘clean’ with regards to what happened on June 30, 2013.”
that sure sounds like blame to me…
you’re giving very misleading accounts of “evidence” …as usual.
The Panebaker video files have been uploaded to the SAIR Supporting Documentation post. In addition, the A31-Tom Story photos are now available. Additional files are being uploaded. Thank you.
WFF said: “The lessons learned are obvious. …. Downhill into a green drainage, during an extreme fire day, without the ability to monitor current conditions. Really everything else is details to statisfy curriosity and need to know. The lesson is right there, bad judgement.”
I think that structurally, organization and training-wise, you have a different set of problems here. Not just one bad decision, and bad decisions throughout an organization. Take SZs. To me it is clear, looking at the lookout, tennis court and GM, that there was a persistent problem. Either lack of awareness, or deciding that these details were trivial and could be ignored because that’s the “way to roll.” Someone somewhere should be attentive, even if in private with no notes taken, of documenting when this issue appeared out of PFD, and how, so that better steps can be taken to make certain it doesn’t crop up and persist elsewhere.
Likewise, treating deployment as…just another day? With their lookout just walking around evaluating deployment when his (close) trigger point got hit — THAT was organizationally acceptable? It is a little point in evaluating the accident that actually occurred , but as a training point, it is jarring to me that the radio traffic that should have been occurring at that time, didn’t happen.
Poor evaluation of SZs and deployment sites, and poor to no analysis of escape route and timing. There is a certain seat-of-the-pants calculating ability, whether figuring SZ geometry or speed of travel, that seems lacking, whether because people didn’t know how to do them, or because people didn’t have the discipline to do them. Again, hopefully someone is looking at which of those it is, and trying to ensure that this is not a pervasive problem that extends to other crews.
Obviously, the broader bad judgment/good outcome issues, which seem recurrent.
I don’t disagree that bad judgment is at the bottom of many of these, but I think there was a systemic organizational failure here as well. Which does make it different.
SR,
I agree completely
**
** DOZER TRANSPORT WAS STAGED AT LAKEWOOD / MANZANITA
Calvin ( and Marti )…
There was some discussion during Cordes’ ADOSH interview about
whether any other group of ‘structures’ in the Sesame area ( other than
the Boulder Springs Ranch ) was being referred to as ‘a ranch’ that day.
Turns out ( From Cordes’ perspective ), there was.
Cordes himself was ( that day ) referring to the group of structures at
the bottom of the Sesame area ( where GM buggies were staged )
as ‘a ranch’. It’s that group of residential buildings ( and a barn ) that
were right there where the pavement of Lakewood / Manzanita ended
and the start of the ‘dirt road’ that heads north into the Sesame area.
This would be the exact area shown in some of Ball’s Blue Ridge photos
with that ‘white fence and gate’ on the right of the photo.
It’s also the same place where we already discovered the Blue Ridge
Chase Truck with the UTV trailer was ‘staged’ most of the day
( at the bottom of the Sesame Area near those buildings ).
So that’s the spot that Cordes is calling ‘a ranch’ in his ADOSH interview…
…and towards the end of the interview he happens to mention that is
ALSO where the DOZER TRANSPORT was staged all day and the
spot where they ‘unloaded’ the dozer that morning.
Makes sense.
That spot, at the bottom of the Sesame clearings, was ideal for the dozer to
quickly get to all those areas it was working that morning and afternoon in the
Sesame area and on that ‘Cutover Trail’ to the Shrine area.
From Gary Cordes’ ADOSH interview…
_________________________________________________________________
Q: Okay. And the other question I have is, um, you said that you took Granite
Mountain down Sesame and there’s a ranch house in that area near where
their buggies were parked…
A: It was um, there’s a ranch house, what we called the ranch, it was a big ole
barn and, and an A-frame building that was in there, that was the original,
what they called the ranch. I wanted to say it started with a W. Um, I don’t
remember the name of it, but that’s where we dropped the um, we dropped the
uh, transport for the dozer.
_________________________________________________________________
Thanks. I have not seen any evidence that the dozer was moved “north.” I am not saying it was or wasn’t. But Cordes had asked Ball to scout the area around Glen Isla for a place to build indirect line (with the dozer.) Ball went to the YFD to get a quad in order to scout as asked. Ball then returned to scout, and it appears he was still in Glen Isla at the time of entrapment/burnover. p 9 YIN…. Ball got a quad from FD and was trying to get on the dozer line to tie in with Justin (Hernandez) to check it people evacuating trying to get out. P10 YIN…. The fire was pushing hard it was passed Ball called Travis and said let no one else in.
According to Ball, after he got a quad from FD, he TRIED to tie in with Justin. The notes do not say that he does tie in with Justin, but does lead me to believe that Justin and the dozer were still on the south side of the fire. TOL… if Ball was trying to return to Justin (his subordinate), I would think he had not yet taken the radio back, Maybe the batteries died in the spare radio that was provoded to Justin by BR?
Also… Cordes ordered resources (engine/ WT?) to Boulder Springs Ranch at 1632
Thanks, WTK and Calvin!
That does make sense to me, finally. This has been so difficult to piece together.
Based on Ball’s 3:30 photo of the dozer on the cross-over, 3:50 photo of the white gate, and 4:28 photo at YFD, in the context of what the rest of Blue Ridge was doing, I had pretty much decided Ball had walked down to the gate. Nobody mentions, iirc, driving Ball down to that area. And he could easily have walked it in 20 minutes.
I have WONDERED if he then walked to the Ranch House Cafe or drove the utility truck/trailer there. The truck he rode shotgun in to YFD was white, and, as some noticed, doesn’t look like any of the photographed crew trucks. I had speculated that it might have been Cordes’ truck, which is the lowest-slung white pickup of the herd. I just don’t think he was involved in the whole “bumping of the trucks” over to the Youth Camp and then down to Yarnell scenario, given the time-stamps on his cellphone photos.
As the story of the dozer slowly emerges, I have been wondering if, in fact, the dozer came down to its staging area with Ball. As in, he rode with it down. That makes even more sense. They seem to have come at the same time. Which ties in with him getting the quad from YFD. In my head, the fact that his YFD photo is at 4:28 puts him going from there to his first trip into Glen Isla (his first photo there is at 4:43) right during the time of the deployment.
Ball’s last photo from that first trip in was taken at 4:48. His next photo, from his second trip in, was at 5:43. I don’t remember, ATM, when the dozer got tangled up in the power lines.
So, I guess we’re finally getting relative clarity on Calvin’s persistent question, “What happened to the dozer?” We still don’t know what happened to its driver…..
PS If anybody would like to view the timeline video I made from Blue Ridge Hotshots 6/30 photographs, you can see it here: http://m.youtube.com/watch?v=-Fkg_DDO2zI
(I’m hoping that link works–I’m doing this on my iPad…)
Reply to Marti Reed post on March 28, 2014 at 7:33 am
>> Marti said…
>> As the story of the dozer slowly emerges, I have been
>> wondering if, in fact, the dozer came down to its staging
>> area with Ball. As in, he rode with it down. That makes
>> even more sense. They seem to have come at the
>> same time.
Yes. That makes sense.
As soon as Blue Ridge Supt Brian Frisby accidentally
came across Brendan and realized they BOTH they
to ‘get the heck out of Doge’ ( at exactly 3:41.30 )…
Frisby knew that ‘all bets were off’. As he is even
leaving the old-grader location with Brendan he
calls his Captain Brown and tells him so. He tells
him to immediately pull guys off that ‘dozer line
improvement’ work and hustle them around to
the Sesame area to evacuate ALL the vehicles
over there ( Their Supt truck and GM’s 4 vehicles ).
By the time they accomplish that ( get the vehicles
all the way around to the Shrine Youth Camp )
Cordes is seeing his second ‘all firefighters off the
fire’ trigger point get met… and it’s time to get
EVERYONE ‘out of Dodge’.
At that point… the ONLY ‘safe’ thing for the DOZER to
have done is to head back SOUTH through the Sesame
area to that Lakewood/Manzanita termination pavement
termination point where the DOZER TRANSPORT was.
MOST of the Blue Ridge team went EAST on the
cutover trail and back to where their buggies now were.
Ball was still HEQB and most probably stuck with the
DOZER and most probably went SOUTH off the Cutover
trail and evacuated to the DOZER TRANSPORT spot.
Nothing else would really make any sense once Cordes
sent out the order for ‘all resources OFF the fire’.
Others have scoffed at anyone even caring where the
dozer was… or its involvment with this incident… but
the reality is that this dozer was one of THE most
important resources on the fire that day… and its
whereabouts and activities help to ‘tell the story’
of what fire overhead was really trying to do.
We also now discover that there *may* be, as yet,
this very important (heretofore) UNTOLD story of
how the dozer might have been involved with the
GM’s decision to ‘come down’.
There *MAY* have been this *OTHER* plan, in the
11th hour there… to try to use the dozer to just push
an emergency ‘break’ around the Glen Ilah area, since
it was now obvious the fire was going to roll over that
place like a wave at the beach ( and they had been
mostly ignoring that possibility most of the day ).
Ball was told ( by Cordes? ) to go ‘scout that out’, and
the dozer was evacuating back SOUTH to where its
transport was down there in Glen Ilah.
Maybe ( just maybe ) part of the ’emergency plan’
was to have Granite Mountain ‘arrive’ over there to
the west of Glen Ilah at the same time the DOZER
was getting that ’emergency fire break’ plowed up,
wherever that was going to be.
There wasn’t even time for that plan to even begin
to work… but that doesn’t mean it wasn’t the
‘last minute plan’ to try and save some of Glen Ilah.
More to come on this ( still reading ADOSH material ).
Why if they had BR with the Dozer would they need GM? And BR and the dozer were totally bailing out any way. As you say his trigger point to get every one off the line had been met. With all that happening why would GM even think getting to Boulder Springs Ranch was safe? Just makes no simple common science to me. Even when GM got to the Ranch they would have been stuck there till the fire burned over them. Again makes no science.
Reply to Bob Powers post
on March 28, 2014 at 2:00 pm
>> Mr. Powers said…
>> Why if they had BR with the Dozer
>> would they need GM?
Good question. I’ve been asking this one
from day one. Why would there have
been any need to even ASK GM to
‘come down’ when, in the same timeframe
the request was supposedly made… it
was perfectly known to SPGS1 Gary
Cordes that this ‘burn the dozer line’
thing was never going to happen and
Blue Ridge was now totally free for
a new assignment.
At the same time GM was still advancing
to their deaths in the canyon… Blue
Ridge was totally ‘buggied up’ and ready
to convoy to the Ranch House Restaurant
with no further ‘assignment’ but to ‘be safe’.
Even if GM had never left the black… Cordes
had an entire crew of 20 elite Hotshots
just standing around in a parking lot and
never gave them anything else to do at all.
>> And BR and the dozer were totally bailing
>> out any way. As you say his trigger point
>> to get every one off the line had been met.
Yes. We now also discover that Cordes
was right up there near Shrine road
and SAW them ‘evacuating’ so he knew
exactly when they were ‘free’ for other
assignments ( if he needed any Hotshots
at all )… but he just let them go stand
around in a parking lot and didn’t need
them to do anything at all.
They even had FOUR Crew Carriers
that could have been used to help with
evacuations ( Both Blue Ridge Carriers
and both GM Carriers ).
That’s enough room for ( at least )
FORTY people ( comfortably ).
…but Cordes didn’t even bother to use them
for that, either. He just let them ( Blue Ridge )
stand around in that parking lot doing nothing
at all at the same time GM was still trying to
make it there thinking THEY were ‘needed’.
>> With all that happening why would GM
>> even think getting to Boulder Springs
>> Ranch was safe?
We still don’t know how ‘safe’ they did
or didn’t think it would be ( how much
risk perceived ). Brendan McDonough
knows that… but he’s not talking.
>> Just makes no simple common science
>> to me. Even when GM got to the Ranch
>> they would have been stuck there till the
>> fire burned over them.
Absolutely true. It was another half-mile,
at least BEYOND the Boulder Springs
Ranch to the majority of the western
Glen Ilah ‘structures’.
If Marsh/Steed really thought this ‘exit’
was a ‘no-brainer’… then why didn’t
they just ask Brendan to make sure
and meet them at the Ranch with
the Carriers so they would be
immediately mobile when they arrived?
>> Again makes no science.
Nope. Doesn’t make any ‘sense’, either.
**
** GARY CORDES — ON LESSONS TO LEARN FROM YARNELL
Just 15 days ago… The 12th annual Arizona Wildfire Academy’s
‘Firefighter of the Year’ award was presented to Gary Cordes
in Prescott, Arizona.
Gary has been fighting wildfire for 24 years.
He single-handedly saved MANY lives in Yarnell on June 30, 2013.
At the same time we now learn ( from Cordes’ own ADOSH interview )
something we SHOULD have known from the Arizona Forestry Division’s
taxpayer-funded ‘investigation’ ( that anyone who didn’t have shit-for-brains
at the Yarnell Hill Fire should have known that Granite Mountain was
no longer ‘in the black’ and WERE headed for Boulder Springs Ranch )…
…there is also something else at the end of Gary’s ADOSH interview
that pretty much anyone who calls themselves a Wildland Firefighter
needs to read.
It’s the standard part of ALL the ADOSH interviews where they gave
the interviewee a chance to say pretty much anything they wanted
with regards to ‘what lessons can be learned from this?’.
Gary Cordes had been thinking about it… and his 24 years of fighting
wildfire… and he had a LOT to say.
In a nutshell… it’s about ‘hubris as a bad habit’ and ‘taking chances and
getting away with them’ and the ‘creeping normality’ that causes…
until it bites you in the ass… and how all that needs to STOP before
more fine men get KILLED.
I’m going to post the link to the transcript of Gary Cordes’ ADOSH interview…
but I am ALSO going to post his entire ‘closing comments’ below… because…
well… because they are IMPORTANT… and as compared to the powerful
message Mr. Cordes has for the WFF community… bandwidth is dirt cheap.
Gary Cordes’ *advice* to any WFF filled with ‘hubris’ and a ‘nothing to see
here.. can we just move on?’ attitude about WFF fatalities like Yarnell might
just be enough to save some lives all by itself.
It really ought to be published in a WFF manual somewhere and not just
buried in a transcript of an interview. Maybe that will happen.
Here is the transcript…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/20inrene9tcx74a/e61NRKIxLS/ADOSH%20Yarnell%20Hill%20Investigation/Central%20Yavapai%20Fire%20District/Transcripts/Gary%20Cordes%20Interview%209-11-13.pdf
And here is what Mr. Cordes had to say…
_________________________________________________________________
ADOSH INTERVIEW WITH GARY CORDES – 09-11-13/11:02 am
Present at this interview…
Q = Bruce Hanna – OSHA Investigator
Q1 = Barry Hicks – WFA Contractor for ADOSH
Q2 = Dave Larsen – WFA Contractor for ADOSH ( Rest in Peace )
Q3 = Brett Steurer – OSHA Investigator
A = Gary Cordes – SPGS1 at Yarnell
Q1: Gary… you may have the best view of this thing of anybody that
we’ve talked to yet, um, um, and uh, give you the chance to share anything
you may wanna share in hindsight now and we all have better vision, uh, in
hindsight than we do ahead of time. But uh, just think about that, Gary, for
a minute and share whatever you wanna share with us.
A: Well I really don’t have to think that long on it. Uh, obviously any of us that
have been involved in this, whether we’re laying on the back of the truck
trying to sleep and, and uh, get ready for the next day uh, as we stayed on this
incident trying to figure out, you know, what we could’ve done better, what
we could’ve done different, you know, how did this occur, um, you know,
obviously um, I’m 56 years old, um, um, I’m a training Chief, so I’m, I’m
close to retirement, I’m like what can I, what can I offer, um, in this and not
walk away with my experience and just disappear, how can we make
something better. Uh, so given all that and having thought of that, two weeks
after this incident I go to this state uh, Fire Chiefs convention, and I sat in a
uh, in a lecture that was about two and a half hours long that was given by a
uh, an astronaut that’s in his late 60’s from um, NASA, and uh, he was a part
of the state, uh, the space shuttle program and, and I’m paraphrasing and I’m
gonna try to surmise it fairly short, but basically the events that occurred with
the space shuttle were – occurred because of design and even though we had
many successful missions, the failure missions were where we were pushing it
against the edge and, and uh, I think in the fire service we see the same thing.
Um, and he talked about anytime you violate, and by no means am I saying
anybody violated anything in this, and, and that’s not where I’m headed with
this, but anytime you violate a safety standard, 99% percent of the time
nothing goes wrong, and so that creates a new norm and so people start
feeling comfortable with that and I go, I relate back and I use a lot of
analogies which irritate people, but I used to work in the lumber business
years and years ago and the guys run those saws without guards because the
wood hangs up on it, and it’ll break your hip when it kicks back. Well
inevitably what happens is, after about two or three years of running that saw,
a guy lops a finger off. He never does before because cognitive and, and very
focused. But we start to get comfortable and that norm changes for us and so I
take all of that and I sit down and I look at what happened on the is fire and
I’ve talked to a lot of people that have made comments that are on shot crews
that said, we’ve walked a ridge similar to that during a fire. We have, we
have, we’ve taken those same risks and I think what happened here is, and my
closing statement in the AAR I did with my, my group before we left the
incident was, the fire outperformed out expectations. And, I think they saw
the fire across the dozer line, I think they saw um, it not moving as
aggressively um, as whether that other column collapsed or whether it got
push- pushed harder with the winds, but I would, I would anticipate that that
crew felt that they had time to make it from point A to point B and they just
miscalculated it, no different than I miscalculated my trigger points that, that
got ate up in 15 minutes that I figured I have over an hour. Uh, it was just
things had come into alignment so I take that and I look at it and say, what do
we, we don’t need to swing the pendulum so far to the, to the other side, but
we do need to say, are we establishing norms that we’re becoming
comfortable and, and we know there’s risks in all of this business and, and uh,
and it’s really hard to ascertain you know, all of those factors and, and uh, I
think that fuel model, given the conditions and the lineup and, and everything
just way outperformed what anybody um, had anticipated and, and I, I
personally have a new definition of extreme, um, in fire behavior, and uh, I
don’t, you know, I don’t know how to, how to – and I’m still working on, how
do we bring that into a training mode, how do we, how do we educate people
to, to understand that, but what I did do on the last fire I was on was we had a,
a guy with a singed mustache, that was operating a dozer, um, because they
decided to go direct and, and uh, it happened to be a piece of my equipment I
loaned to a, to the next division over, um, we did an AAR on that, called it a
near miss and there’s a lot of people that didn’t wanna call it a near miss, and I
think that’s that pride in the Forest Service and, and in firefighting in general
is, is we do have near misses, but I, but what I did with all the young
firefighters, we had probably 60 people in our AAR the next day, uh, with that
division who was very sobered by it and um, my structure group, um, I – my
point to them was, we do not wanna create a new norm and I brought up the
whole NASA thing and all that and I, and I said, don’t let this be your new
norm. Because that was too close. Had we added a foot or two to that sage
brush model we were 2198 in, in Idaho, we’d have probably killed somebody. And,
and so you know, I’m taking this really serious and I’m looking at it and, and
I’m not trying to be the alarmist, but I think we need to move the pendulum a
little bit to the right and, and, and tell people we shouldn’t be taking these
risks or we need to super analyze it and I’ve sat here in a lot of incidents and a
lot of briefings and you hear the same thing, the Haines of six, um, the fire
behavior is extreme and nothing happens, so what is that doing in the back of
our minds subconsciously, uh, where it’s setting a, it’s, it’s erasing that, that
intent I guess, is what I’m trying to say and, and uh, um, I think it’s just
inherent when we don’t see these things happen, that, that creates that norm.
Uh, hopefully that makes sense.
Q1: Well it makes a lot of sense to me, I agree. I’m, I’m glad you’re thinking of
this thing and I, I think you’re exactly on the right track um, um, and um, I,
you know, as you were talking I’m, I’m thinking to myself um, on the same
video uh, with Darryl Willis and was Jim Paxon saying I’ve left the black
hundreds of times, or something like that…
A: Right.
Q1: …and, and um, and um, and I, I do believe that new norm thing is um, is
maybe alive and well and we sure outta take a hard look at it, uh, in terms of
what that new norm is, but…
A: Well what, what have we seen – and I’m not a big global warming fan, but on
the other hand, I look at it and say what have we seen in the last 10 years with
fire behavior, it’s increasing. What are we seeing with the fuel models and,
and uh, even though we’re burning and we’re doing good mitigation, we’re
still way behind the uh, eight ball on all of this and uh, I think we’re seeing
those intensities uh, and more – we’re seeing bigger fires. And, and uh, and,
and that’s not all because we’re, we’re making a bigger box around it and
lighting it off, it’s – we’re seeing a lot more aggressive uh, behavior in all fuel
models. And I think we need to look at that and recalculate and that’s the
whole thing in all of this is, you know, these guys used, and, and I know – I
knew Eric, worked with him on a lot of different fires, I worked with that
crew, um, he, he was a solid individual and, and uh, we – I know we will all
take risks, and I’m not saying he, he intentionally took a risk, but what I’m
saying is, we all have that – those comfort zones but uh, I also know he’s very
intelligent and, and uh, would’ve calculated in the fa – in their favor and, and
uh, somewhere in all of this um, as I go back to my one statement, the fire
outperformed our expectations and it just flat did and, and I’m not saying that
is an excuse, I’m saying there was some components that we just didn’t
realize were gonna wind up like they did. Or maybe we’ve heard it at those
briefings so many times and never saw it happen that we didn’t antici – truly
anticipate that we would see it like we saw it.
Q1: Um, well um, I think you’re exactly right and um, well Gary, anything else
you wanna share with us before we close this thing out? I really appreciate
your candor and…
A: You know, I, I would like to say something and, and uh, there’s been some
rumors out there that these guys were trying to save structures and that they
were structure department, um, these guys were about as green as, as, and
when I say green, I’m talking Forest Service green, as a, as a, as a uh, type 1
team could be, or crew could be, uh, working for a structure department.
There was no – these guys were not structure guys, and, and uh, um, they,
they were solid and I don’t, I don’t, truly don’t believe that they, they thought
they were gonna come down there and just save structures and, and, and that
that was the greatest influence. And, and um, I think it’s, it’s strictly they
were trying to probably read, trying to stay in the game, come down out of an
area that was, was inactive ‘cause it was very inactive where they were at, um,
and they’re on a, they’re on the dog end of the fire basically, and if it hadn’t
hooked around, there wouldn’t have been an issue at all, we wouldn’t be here
today.
Gary Cordes
________________________________________________________________
These are appropriate sentiments and needed to be said. However, IF (as has been alleged – it is a big IF, but given the circumstances it is very plausible) Cordes was “involved” asking GM to move to Yarnell, offering lessons in the abstract without acknowledging your own role is a bit much. I think he and Musser know exactly why Granite Mountain took the action they did. This thing is not going to be put to rest until someone comes out and says “They moved because we asked them to.”. Enough of this “they were trying to get in the game” crap. The onus is still, and always will be, on Granite Mountain for actually doing it, but until people admit the truth of the events that day, the healing for everyone impacted will not begin.
Gary Cordes from an old Fire Fighter
HORSE SHIT BULLSHIT
UNPLAND EXIT FROM THE BLACK
NO LCES
UNBURNED FUEL BETWEEN YOU AND THE FIRE
NO COMMUNICATIONS WITH OVERHEAD
When you continue to break the rules, you put your self in a position for injury or death. That’s where he should have stayed with that conversation……
Try to out guess a fire in unburned fuel and sooner or later you are going to DIE………In this day and age you have all the tools at your call use them. And stick with the basics.
Some of you may disagree with me but that is where I stand………………
The part that caught my eye was Cordes mentioning that Marsh was very intelligent and would have calculated in GM’s favor, which I read to mean would have made all his assumptions as favorable as possible to reach the conclusion that what they did would be ok. That they wouldn’t be moving at .5 m/hr but instead maybe 3, etc. etc.
Someone should ask Cordes about the prior experiences that led him to think Marsh would find a way to calculate in such a way.
This is why we kill fire fighters to much complacency and no real supervision. In this day and age if we keep this up in these type of burning conditions. There is going to be a lot more funerals……………..
Cordes assumed a calculated risk to move was OK ??
and for get about LCES?
How about hay reevaluate and stay in the black.
I am, in fact, impressed with Cordes’ obviously
deeply considered ‘reflections’ on what happened
and the ‘lessons to be learned’… and I think he
is SPOT ON about the ‘creeping normality’
syndrome when you get USED to breaking the
rules and nothing bad happens ( yet! )…
…but I’m certainly not ready to absolve him of
any ‘failures’ that day… no matter how many
“Firefighter of the Year” awards they give him.
He NEVER says… in his interview… that he
personally requested Marsh or Steed to do
anything at all… but it turns out that Elizabeth
was right… when the shit started to hit the
fan down there he is directly telling OPS2
Paul Musser that they need to ‘get him some
more resources’ if there’s any chance at
saving some town.
There is also (indirect, not direct) evidence now
that Musser relayed this to Todd Abel, who
was still up NORTH and busy as heck at
that moment… and Todd Abel *may* have
then told Musser to call Granite.
So the whole ‘fuss and muss’ with Elizabeth
recently about her claiming all of this was
a FACT ( but refusing to simply say that is
what you can infer from these ADOSH
interviews… which now seems to be what
she was ‘mysteriously’ referring to )…
…may turn out to be true.
The evidence DOES seem to be there… but
so far I would still call it ‘indirect’ and not the
‘direct’ kind of evidence Elizabeth was
recently claiming to have on this.
Examples…
– There doesn’t seem to be any DIRECT evidence
that Cordes specifically ‘asked for GM’… but
there is ‘direct’ evidence he was pleading
for ‘more resources’ to OPS2 Abel and Musser.
– There doesn’t seem to be any DIRECT evidence
that Abel told Musser to call GM and ‘ask them
to come down’… but there is ‘indirect’ evidence
that is what happened.
– There doesn’t seem to be any DIRECT evidence
that Musser even used the phrase “can you
spare resources for Yarnell?” when he did
talk to Marsh, as the ADOSH report itself
seemed to claim. Musser only says he asked
them if they were ‘still committed to the ridge’
and Marsh said YES to THAT question only…
but there is ‘indirect’ evidence that it was made
clear to Marsh that they were needed in town.
This is a ‘developing story’ given the TONS of
new information that is now available.
I do wonder, though, whether that whole frap
with Elizabeth making what seemed to be
‘wild claims’ recently was simply that SHE
was reading these detailed ADOSH interviews
herself and seeing the same ‘new evidence’…
but simply let the whole thing turn into a
wheel spinning because she ( for some reason )
didn’t even want to reveal that her claims
were coming from this ADOSH material.
We can all see the ADOSH material now, so
there’s no for anyone to be ‘secretive’ about
their ‘sources’ anymore… if that’s what that
debate was really all about.
Dropped the word ‘need’ in the last paragraph
above. Last paragraph should have read…
We can all see the ADOSH material now, so
there’s no NEED for anyone to be ‘secretive’
about their ‘sources’ anymore… if that’s
what that debate was really all about.
xxfullsailxx – I told you “welcome back”, and I meant it because I think we need checks and balances. BUT…the overall message you keep sending is that there is “nothing to see here.”
I just checked the number of people who visited this thread today, against the number of people who visited it last night, and I was surprised at the number of people who have visited it so far today. I don’t think they are logging on because there is “nothing to see here.” FYI.
Also…WTKTT is the engine that is driving this thread. Without him, who would there be to throw rocks at? Is WTKTT always right? Probably not. But without him (and John Dougherty) we wouldn’t have anything except what the liars said in the very beginning.
I am just glad that WTKTT, Sitta and others have thick skins, otherwise…well, there wouldn’t be anything to see here. Would that make you happy? I’m just askin’?
Gary-
from my viewpoint there are a few different “themes” in this commentary…
one theme would be: looking to understand more about what went on… without all the accusations or condemnation of actions. another theme would be the discussion of lessons learned…
then you have WTKTT’s theme of leading a lynch mob, twirling his noose while hiding behind a white cloak (cowardly accusing people of wrong doing behind the anonymity of the internet)… who learned everything he knows about wildland fire from google and the few people here who have had the patience to try to steer his ignorance toward some sort of constructive amateur investigation. who continues to use technical terms and make proclamations about a situation he has ZERO experience with. whose whole frame of reference is based on one of the worst tragedies in wildland fire… it’s this lynch mob-accusatory-self proclaimed expert-hiding under a rock mentality that i am so against.
WTKTT has nothing to do with John Dougherty, that is, unless John is using him to do his dirty work… by digging up pieces of information and throwing out false accusations like a monkey throwing shit. it is unprecedented for someone to publish a FOIA request to a public website. part of me commends John for doing that, because of the access it provides the friends and family of GM and WFF’s who want to understand more or do their own research. part of me condemns it, for empowering anonymous internet junkies into thinking they have something to say about an occupation they know nothing about. i have told John as much through email.
you seem to be standing behind WTKTT but in front of the lynch mob. you seem to be cheering on the pursuit, and looking for someone to hang. but all of those people involved with that incident, from the very beginning, to the very last smoke mopped up, had good intentions. none of them were hoping to burn up a hot shot crew that day. they were all dealing with a situation that they didn’t create, in the best way they knew how. yet you continue to fuel the fire of controversy and conspiracy like someone (Darrell Willis) had the malice or incompetence or whatever to send GM into harms way.
I agree that everyone was trying to do their best, and there are really no “villains” here. But there has not been an honest accounting of what happened that day of the things that led to Granite Mountain moving, The SAIT tried to create the impression that EVERYONE was clueless as to why that happened, when that clearly is not the case. I thought maybe people were holding back on truth-telling due to legal fears. It appears now that the individuals were much more forthcoming than it appeared, and it was the investigative that shaped or altered the narrative. People need to know what happened that day, however painful the details might be (talking about friends, families and fellow WFF).
Reply to xxfullsailxx on March 28, 2014 at 3:59 pm
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>> it is unprecedented for someone to publish a FOIA
>> request to a public website.
You’re kidding us all with that one, right?
There is nothing you’ve said above that you haven’t
said about a dozen times now. Everyone gets it.
Ever since you got your butt kicked off of Mr. Gabbert’s
Wildfire Today site because of your rabid attack-dog
Yahoo chat room public posting style and your
(obvious) opinion that no one who isn’t a firefighter
has the right to comment on anything that has anything
to do with ‘firefighting’ and/or ‘the brotherhood’…
…everyone KNOWS where you ‘stand’.
You pee forest-green and think anyone who doesn’t should
find another bathroom… or something.
We get it.
You really don’t have to keep repeating it.
If doesn’t surprise any of us at all that your definition
of FOIA seems to be…
Firefighters Only Information Act.
You and your ‘band of brothers’ are PUBLIC SERVANTS.
Welcome (back?) to a PUBLIC forum.
>> xxfullsailxx also said…
>> all of those people involved with that incident, from the
>> very beginning, to the very last smoke mopped up, had
>> good intentions. none of them were hoping to burn up
>> a hot shot crew that day. they were all dealing with a
>> situation that they didn’t create, in the best way they
>> knew how.
And THAT, my friend… is something you and I will
ALWAYS be able to agree on.
Now… back to reading more of the ‘evidence’ and
finding out more about what actually HAPPENED.
i’m not quite sure what you found so controversial about the FOIA comment… apparently you can find controversy in just about anything. all i was saying is that in the history of WFF fatalities, never before has the “evidence” been made public. and that has both positive and negative consequences… you, in my opinion, are a negative consequence.
and, a “right to comment” is one thing. throwing around false allegations and slander while hiding behind your keyboard is a wholly other thing. a very cowardly sort of thing, wouldn’t you agree? you can try to make yourself sound as noble as you want, but you and i both know what you really are.
WTKTT says, “And THAT, my friend… is something you and I will ALWAYS be able to agree on.”
no THAT, “my friend”… is hilarious!
your tone, since you walked in to this room and to this day is one of judge, jury and executioner. you have accused nearly every person involved in Yarnell Hill Fire of wrong doing or gross negligence at some point over the last six months. from the initial attack IC to Blue Ridge to Musser to Roy Hall and now on to Cordes… for you to try to say that you ALSO thought everyone there that day was just doing the best they could is a fucking joke. you have been looking for someone to hang since the day you got here.
Well…I don’t think Sitta has demonstrated any signs of being part of any mob or faction other than a wildland firefighter who is interested in learning as much as she/he can to pass on to her/his crew. Although I ‘m sure she/he can speak for herself/himself, I am just glad she/he has thick skin.
As far as WTKTT, I know he/she has thick skin. And I should have said WTKTT is the primary engine that drives this thread, not the only one, but I would hate to see him quit.
As far as I go, yes I am standing behind WTKTT, I don’t want to do the work he/she does, nor can I do the work he/she does, it is much easier to evaluate his work than do mine own. And I hope he/she doesn’t leave, I’m not sure anyone else is going to step up and take over if he leaves. We have already lost Elizabeth.
Now as far as my role…there is no chance anyone is going to be lynched here. The powers that be state wide, not to mention in Prescott itself has a narrative that they are that they are not only comfortable with, they really embrace it, “they” made of their minds how things went on the Yarnell Hill Fire within the first few hours based on the Willis interview and nothing is going to shake their confidence in that story.
You would probably be shocked how many people there are in Prescott and even family members, who are more than happy to accept the original narrative that God had a different plan for those men. I am the heretic that should be stoned to death. There is not going to be a lynching…ever…of anyone who contributed to what happened on the Yarnell Hill Fire. The only question…will be how many awards and ceremonial dinners and accolades they get.
I suppose it is possible I could get lynched (just kidding – I think), I am the problem, not Darrell Willis or Gary Cordis or anyone else. I have experienced a problem with one negative interaction so far (and counting) in Prescott with a friend of the home town heroes, the ones who didn’t die.
I am the bad guy, not them.
Now as far as what I think, I think all of the problems started AFTER the Granite Mountain Hotshots died. As I have said many times, I agree Eric Marsh made a catastrophic mistake, even though he was told take his crew to Yarnell ASAP, the decision was his.
The lies, the cover-up, the whitewash, hiding the facts and the evidence and manipulating the investigation to arrive at the conclusion “they” wanted, that is where it went south. And I am the bad guy, not them. I’m the one who has a problem, they are all safe behind their circle of wagons which is defended by many of the citizens of Prescott, maybe even many of the families, nobody wants to let go of the original narrative, it all fit into place so neatly. The 100 Club, the dinner where Gary Cordis got his award, the events to support that narrative has been non-stop and will probably really pick up the closer we get to June 30,2014. Brendan McDonough has been hired to take the lead as the PTSD counselor for the Wildland Firefighter Foundation, none of them need your defense, but they probably won’t tell you to stop.
The wildland firefighters already have what they need out of the lessons learned here. They have been stated many times by many of you. Everybody knows what went wrong, for the most part, and what to do to keep it from happening again. Follow all of the rules all of the time.
This thread is now just “investigating” the cover-up. I have quit several times before, and I am going to quit again…unless and until I get at least 1 email from a Granite Mountain Hotshot family which tells me they appreciate what we are trying to do here. If there is not even one family who supports this thread…well, I think we have enough lessons learned for the WFF’s. My email (once again) is [email protected]
Because frankly, repeatedly being accused of leading a lynch mob, not to mention my recent negative interaction of Prescott while watching all of the local news coverage of all of the heroes who are anything but heroes in my book, well…I have gone to far and said to much, just as WFF has said. It has been a very slippery slope. I’m not even a firefighter, nor or any of my family members, and if fact, I don’t really know anybody who does fight wildfire these days except for you…and I don’t know you very well, but I do appreciated what both you and my new friend WFF do to protect our national resources (although I hope you watch out for that structure protection part of the job).
So…the bottom line, let’s just go with your version of events and call it good.
Well said But I for one hope you stick around. We have the ability to agree to disagree with each other which I respect.
Speaking of investigations, which seems to be my thing tonight, while I’m actually multi-tasking on totally un-related tasks tonight.
I have read, periodically, that the ADOSH report has something like 80 or so mistakes in it. Has this been documented anywhere to anyone’s knowledge?
Reply to Marti Reed post on March 27, 2014 at 11:44 pm
>> Marti said…
>> I have read, periodically, that the ADOSH report has something
>> like 80 or so mistakes in it. Has this been documented
>> anywhere to anyone’s knowledge?
I don’t think it’s been ‘documented’ ( yet )… but perhaps RTS
( Robert the Second ) knows more about that.
RTS was the one who first posted something like that
way back on February 2, 2014, in response to a question
YOU, yourself were posing about whether the ICP had
ever officially been ‘evacuated’.
That was one of the ‘inaccuracies’ in the ADOSH report,
but it was RTS who then replied and said a number of
other people were saying there were at least 79 more.
Here’s that original exchange from early February…
____________________________________________________
Marti Reed on February 2, 2014 at 11:24 am said:
Where did Incident Command move after Evacuating Model
Creek School? I have it in my head they went to Yarnell Fire
Department. Is that a mistake?
WantsToKnowTheTruth on February 2, 2014 at 6:33 pm replied…
Marti… I don’t think it ever actually ‘moved’ at all.
ADOSH said they ‘evacuated’ the Model Creek School when
they never really did.
Robert the Second on February 2, 2014 at 10:32 pm replied…
WTKTT and Marti,
Several folks, claiming as many as “80 inaccuracies and
inconsistencies” in the ADOSH report, state that the ICP was
NEVER evacuated and NEVER moved.
_____________________________________________________
Thank you!
RTS- did you read Marsh’s unit logs from Wesley fire?
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/20inrene9tcx74a/zENI9HkFsa/ADOSH%20Yarnell%20Hill%20Investigation/City%20of%20Prescott%20Fire%20–%20GMHS/Erics%20unit%20logs%20%283%29.pdf
sounds pretty skookum to me… in his tactics presented, in looking out for his crew AND in how he dealt with an overzealous Div Sup…
i realize there were probably a variety of first hand experiences with GM, but this one instance speaks to a pretty strong leader, looking out for his folks.
I disagree with you been on a lot of those fires. in Idaho when the fire drops back to the ground you go direct. To try and go indirect and burn out can move the fire back into a crown fire and cause all kinds of new problems. Send sawyers swappers and a lookout ahead and drop the snags near the line before the crew gets there. Been doing that and building line ever science we started using chain saws. Standard tactic in timber fires. From what I under stand other crews were doing it and he refused.
Is that true in Oregon, also?
Depends on the fuel type. But in some instances yes. I am very familiar with the Payette as they were a next door neighbor to my forest. You have PJ mixed with pine and Doug Fir and a lot of ground fuel and very steep slopes.
bob-
there are very few universal truths in fire. for you to say “in Idaho when the fire drops back to the ground you go direct” is complete and utter ignorance. aren’t there a lot of other qualifiers or quantifiers to be able to make such a statement? i.e. wouldn’t it depend on the number of snags to be felled? what timber type? what time of year & local conditions?
and if the number of snags to be felled presented a greater work load (and therefore, greater exposure) than connecting an indirect piece of handline and burning it out, then it would certainly make more sense to do the latter.
and from what i read, it looked like he was trying to provide options to a Div Sup and building a consensus with his counter parts while looking out for his crews safety.
so stop trying to “school me” with your condescending tone…
Burning does not automatically lead to fire in the crowns. Damn Bob you know good and well it’s not that black and white. For Pete’s sake stop misleading people with absolutes.
If you have never been on the Payette then you need to do some info research. That is where I was talking about not every fire. Also hells canyon splits the Oregon and Idaho border which then has the same burning conditions, they have had sever problems on the Payette for years when they have gone indirect and so quit doing burn outs from indirect line, WFF you are not any where near the background I have
So do not assume to tell me I would mislead people with absolutes. I referred to one specific location. The IC and Plans Said no Firing out line that’s what they meant. Marsh was arguing a losing cause and the Division said to set up fallers for snags Other crews did he did not. When is the last time either one of you fullsail, WFF went against plans, Line, IC or the Division boss who was following orders and a smoke jumper from Idaho who knew the country.
I would also add before any of us make a final judgment it would be good to have the other side of the story. The FIRE RATEING, we are looking only at Marshes Direly. Since this fire went for 7 days plus this would have been a type 1 team.
They would have looked at all the safety before assigning direct line on the fire. The Division boss and OPS would have been part of that Type I team as well.
fullsail,
I did read them and I was actually fairly impressed with his observations, his decisions based on THE RULES, and such. What confused me though is how he (GMHS) was so skookum then, but NOT at all on the YHF.
So in your career you were always on, never made a bad decision? Obviously you didn’t make one that cost anyone their life, but never had a close call? You were always on 100% everyday all the time every fire. That’s pretty special.
Just so it doesn’t get lost in the weeds and roots, what I wrote below in response to the convo re Prescott Fire Department with-holding not only Chris’s Powershot camera but also cellphones and gps units from the chain of evidence and thus the SAIT and SAIR:
“Writing as the one who spent about a month and a half during the holidays piecing this together, thinking I had discovered something significant:
The thing I learned from this, regarding the SAIR, was that it, IN FACT, was NOT a real investigation. That was a real eye-opener to me.
It didn’t/doesn’t MATTER (legally) that the camera, cellphones, GPS units, etc, were not entered into the chain of evidence. It doesn’t MATTER (legally) whether anybody told the truth or not. It doesn’t MATTER whether anybody heard the conversation when the Granite Mountain Hotshots were discussing their options and making their decision. (As I have written repeatedly, we DON’T KNOW what they decided, much less why they decided it; all we know are the consequences; EVERYTHING else is SPECULATION).
No truth was required in any of this so-called “investigation.” There was no legal enforcement for ANYTHING.
It didn’t MATTER whatsoever that the Yavapai Sheriff’s Department was gathering anything. They may as well have not even been involved in any of it. It didn’t MATTER whether or not they sent the cellphones they gathered from the deployment site to be investigated.
As a citizen and a concerned person, my biggest “lesson learned” by my involvement in this ASAIT has been that, given that there is no obligation to actually discern the factual truth in this event, and nothing to actually/legally hold anybody accountable to disclosing it, there is mostly NO BASIS for determining ANYTHING, much less anything related to any “lessons learned.”
Wildland Fire Fighters beware.
There is nothing in any of this so-called “investigation” that has anything to do with either a commitment to the facts of the incident, or, thus, to learning anything real (and, thus in YOUR interest) from it.”
And then I wrote:
“And by “this ‘so-called investigation’” I don’t mean the ASAIT, I mean the SAIT. The ASAIT has no teeth, no power, unless someone decides to do something with what the ASAIT has done.
Apparently, the SAIT decided to have no power, either.”
And I’m not even mentioning all those radios, which were meticulously photographed on the deployment site before taken to the YCSO, for what significance I truly have no idea.
Reply ↓
Marti,
RTS and Gary Olson have reminded us this many times before, but the way you worded it just now was like a solid hit in the gut.
I also saw the WFSTAR Yarnell video for the first time today, which tries very hard not to draw any conclusions (other than that climate change and WUI is making wildland fire fighting more dangerous).
I guess I’m feeling somber because, despite the incredible amounts of work people have put in here, it still seems like we’ve got a long way to go to get any truth out, much less change the culture.
Sitta-
you obviously haven’t been paying attention because both those videos have been out for months. pretty disappointing that WFSTAR couldn’t come up with something a little more creative…
you need lessons learned spelled out for you by “the experts?” or you want some anonymous internet posters to provide you with some talking points?
what “truth” do you need out?
what facts are there to change?
you say, “As I have written repeatedly, we DON’T KNOW what they decided, much less why they decided it; all we know are the consequences…”
i disagree.
-“we” (WFF’s) DO know what they decided… they decided to leave the black…
-“we” (WFF’s) DO know why they decided to leave the black… because they thought they could be of help in Yarnell.
the SAIR’s stated intent:
“This report does not identify causes in the traditional sense of pointing out errors, mistakes, and violations but approaches the accident from the perspective that risk is inherent in firefighting. LEADERS ARE RESPONSIBLE for guiding firefighters in consideration of the tradeoffs between safety, risk management, and other organizational goals.”
GM would have been fine had they sat their butts down in their safety zone for the rest of the afternoon. NOONE would have blamed them for that and NOONE expected otherwise. THEY were the ones who were not satisfied with sitting in the black. THEY were the ones who chose to try to walk out.
are there external pressures involved? sure. are those pressures exacerbated by city budgets, communities threatened by wildfire, bad supervisors, chaotic developing situations? sure. none of that changes the fact that a crewboss’s first responsibility is to his/her crew.
there is a happy medium, between scouring every detail of every piece of evidence, and providing a timely written account of events. just because the SAIR doesn’t meet your [civilian] expectation of what an investigation should contain, doesn’t mean it doesn’t have value to the people it was actually written for (WFF’s).
and while we may not agree with the SAIR’s methods, we (WFF’s) don’t really need the evidence scoured and spit-shined to understand the situation that day, or what went wrong, or why it went so wrong.
According to Brendan, according to his ADOSH interview, the escape route was the two-track ALL THE WAY to the ranch. We don’t know who decided to leave that. Or why.
And yes we know they left the black they were in. That’s what I mean when I say, all we know is the consequences. We have absolutely no idea why they decided to do that. Everything that has been written here is SPECULATION. Because it was done via a conversation that there are no consequences for not investigating.
You wrote: “-”we” (WFF’s) DO know what they decided… they decided to leave the black…
-”we” (WFF’s) DO know why they decided to leave the black… because they thought they could be of help in Yarnell.”
The point I am making is that, yes, it appears that way, but only AFTER the SAIT didn’t report that, it has been wrestled out by others. AND we DON’T know if that was even FACTUALLY the content of their discussion.
Why don’t we KNOW that?
I have to say xxFillSailxx is dead on right no confusion there. BLACK WAS SAFE.
And I totally agree with that. That part is obvious.
and what i am saying to you is…
we (WFF’s) do know why they left…
there is no mystery or conspiracy, no matter how much you want to believe there is.
they were requested in Yarnell. they felt a duty to act. they made a bad decision. period.
So if you ( and however many WFFs you
are including in your ‘mind reading’ leap )
are so sure there is “nothing to see here…
move along… move along…”
Then why don’t you explain again what
you are even doing here on this forum?
monitoring your lynch mob…
and having more productive discussions about lessons learned with the folks who DIDN’T learn everything they know about WFF from google.
Ah… ok… I see.
There is “nothing (more) to
be learned’ from YHF”…
…but you are still here to
‘learn something’.
I get it now. Thanks.
umm, you don’t “get” anything. you’re just some internet junkie conspiracy theorist with an audience.
You know your
browser has
macro capability,
right?
You could just
put that phrase
into a function
key so you don’t
have to keep
typing it.
It will save
you both time
and keystrokes.
Very, very, very, good Marti. This is without a doubt your single greatest contribution to this thread in a long list of contributions. This comment alone and your identification of this shameful truth should silence anyone else who would ever challenge the value of this thread or John Dougherty’s reporting on this event.
Without this tread and the participation of everyone who has contributed to it so far…without this thread…all any of us would know is what the paid liars, shills and shameless hucksters have said. I don’t need to name them again, you and they know who they are.
Thank you for everything you have done, and thank you for this comment which sums up where we are and clearly summarizes how truly ashamed the Yavapai County Sheriffs Office, the City of Prescott, the State of Arizona and the U.S. Forest Service (because they supplied the paid liar, shill and huckster who acted as the assistant Team Lead for the ASAIT) and ever other agency and person who has been involved in the shameful chapter in wildland firefighting history.
Yes, in case you are wondering…I do feel a little better…thank you. The big question is…how do the families of the 19 heroes from the Granite Mountain Hotshots feel? A secondary question is, how do you feel about yourself…Brendan McDonough?
Why do the details of my work history matter? Because if you don’t know what I was, and what I am now, you wouldn’t know how much weight to put on my opinions on this matter. As it is, I think you should accept what I say as a matter of fact.
I was one of them, I know what they look like, how they talk, and why they do what they do. I had a seat at the table were people like these sell their souls. That is a fact, even if I sound like your crazy uncle once in a while.
The powers that be (you know who you are) have betrayed the Granite Mountain Hotshots, their memories and their families…shame on all of you.
Thank you and you’re welcome!
I went to Prescott College 1969 to 1973. My friends were on that hotshot crew and I worked for the caterers.
I spent the 1980’s in Flagstaff, both in town and out in the forest. My daughter’s father and half-sister live there. I’m pretty sure when Terra comes back to New Mexico after getting her Masters in Public Planning this year, we’ll be visiting Flagstaff. I really want to meet you in person!
right on
**
** SPGS1 GARY CORES NEVER HAD ANY DOUBT THAT
** GRANITE MOUNTAIN WAS HEADING SOUTH TOWARDS
** THE BOULDER SPRINGS RANCH
On page 23 of the SAIT Yarnell Investigation Notes ( YIN ) document, at the
end of their interview with SPGS1 Garey Cordes, there has always been this
little blurb…
Q: Were you surprised where they were?
A: No.
Calvin ( and others ) caught this right away when that YIN document was
finally released publicly.
Assuming the ‘they’ meant ‘Granite Mountain’, that’s always been a slight
mystery given the overall conclusions of the SAIT that no one at the
management level ever really knew where Granite Mountain was going.
Well… as it turns out… there is no mystery at all about this statement
from SPGS1 Gary Cordes to the SAIT investigators.
In the recently released transcript of Cordes’ interview with ADOSH investigators,
Gary Cordes says that he NEVER had *ANY* doubt that when he heard Eric
Marsh say they were ‘making their way out their escape route’ over the radio…
that Marsh meant they would be heading SOUTH all the way to the Boulder
Springs Ranch.
The full transcript of SPGS1 Gary Cordes’ interview with ADOSH
investigators is publicly available here…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/20inrene9tcx74a/0kYgLpZLXO/ADOSH%20Yarnell%20Hill%20Investigation/Central%20Yavapai%20Fire%20District/Transcripts
Here is the part where he says he never had any doubt Marsh and Granite
Mountain were heading to the Boulder Springs Ranch…
__________________________________________________________________
ADOSH INTERVIEW WITH GARY CORDES – 09-11-13/11:02 am
Q = Bruce Hanna – OSHA Investigator
Q1 = Barry Hicks – WFA Contractor for ADOSH
Q2 = Dave Larsen – WFA Contractor for ADOSH ( Rest in Peace )
Q3 = Brett Steurer – OSHA Investigator
A = Gary Cordes – SPGS1 at Yarnell
A: There was a point where Eric said he was headed to the safety zone,
his designated safety zone.
….
Q2: So that message came from Eric?
….
A: Yeah, what I had actually heard, and that’s what I was touching on a little bit
earlier, but I didn’t wanna get too, too far into it, ‘cause I’m not sure of the
timeframe and what had actually occurred, but I did hear Eric say that he was,
he was headed to his pre-designated safety zone. And, and so my assumption
was that he was headed to the um, to the Boulder Springs Ranch.
Q1: So that was your assumption is that he was going to the Boulder Springs
Ranch and not the black, is that right?
A: Yeah, exactly.
…
Q1: Okay, so then somewhere in there he, and he actually called you rather
than somebody else…
A: No, he did not call me, he, he made the announcement to air attack on
air to ground.
Q1: Oh.
A: That, that he was going to the pre-designated safety zone.
…
Q1: Uh, he tells air attack that he’s going to his designated, pre-designated
safety zone?…
A: Right.
Q1: …and he doesn’t say where that is, he just says, safety zone?
A: Right.
Q1: And so your assumption is…
A: He had plenty of time to get there and, and he was headed to the Boulder
Springs Ranch.
Q1: Okay.
__________________________________________________________________
So… as usual with this incident… the minute we finally learn a little more
of the TRUTH and answer some lingering questions… it leads to more valid
QUESTIONS.
If there was NO DOUBT in SPGS1 Gary Cordes’ mind that when Eric
‘announced’ they were ‘making their way out their pre-determined escape
route’ that it couldn’t have meant anything other than he was heading
SOUTH to the Boulder Springs Ranch…
Then…
1) Why did the SAIR pretend GM’s move was such a COMPLETE mystery?
2) Why didn’t the other fire overhead make the SAME conclusion?
3) Why would fire overhead still be assuming they were ‘in the black’?
4) Why was there all the confusion after deployment about where
they should even start looking for Marsh and GM?
5) After the deployment… why wasn’t Gary Cordes making sure everyone around
him at the Ranch House Restaurant knew what he was already SURE of?
…and a LOT of other *new* questions/mysteries.
I have, ever since I read that, had it echoing in my mind.
Coupled with wondering why, if Brendan was listening, he didn’t say something when the search teams were looking. Then, after reading Brendan’s interview, I believed he really believed the escape route was the two-track ALL THE WAY to the ranch.
I truly am mystified by Gary’s response. He was the one who pointed GM, on the way in, to the ranch as the “bomb proof” safety zone, at a time when he probably wasn’t concerned with what exactly would be the way to get there.
If he was not surprised that they wound up where they did, apparently he was about the only one (unless Brendan and maybe some other/s aren’t divulging) who wasn’t.
And if Cordes wasn’t surprised since he figured GM would have taken that shortcut, why didn’t he say something when the search crew was looking ( unless he was, as seriously may be the case, totally focused on the evacuation of Glen Illah, which it seems to me he was.)
I find a lot of this still really problematic.
And I have TONS of respect for Gary Cordes.
And what I said about Cordes above was just that
WTF WTF WTF………
Reply to Marti Reed post on March 27, 2014 at 9:54 pm
>> Marti said
>>
>>…unless he was, as seriously may be the case, totally
>> focused on the evacuation of Glen Illah.
He certainly was. Right before, during, and after the
deployment… Cordes was the one making 4 separate
trips deep into Glen Ilah and driving back out with
elderly people.
Gary had lost his Air-to-ground frequency when the
microphone on his Bendix-King portable took a dump
back around 1600, and he was from then on relying
only the Motorola radio in his truck which had the
TAC frequencies… but not Air-to-ground.
So Cordes never heard the MAYDAYS or the actual
deployment traffic over Air-to-ground. He was
actually no-shit rescuing lives in Glen Illah during
the actual deployment.
SIDENOTE: We now discover that it was Gary Cordes
himself who was the ‘mysterious hero’ who saved
Glen Ilah resident Bryan Smith and his 85 year old
cousin, who had collapsed in the street with fire
all around her. Cordes was the one who picked her
up off the street and put her in his vehicle and saved
them both.
That harrowing story is here…
Article: Yarnell Fire Evacuation Was Flawed and Chaotic
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/11/17/yarnell-hill-fire-evacuation-flawed/3619999/
Only on one of his ‘trips’ delivering civilians back to the
Ranch House Restaurant did Charlie Reyes, boss of
Engine 59, tell Cordes that Granite had deployed.
Cordes was SO SURE that Granite was headed to
Boulder Springs Ranch and had had plenty of time to
get there… his only initial response to Reyes was…
BULLSHIT!
They’re in their (ranch) safety zone and it’s BOMB-PROOF!
See ‘Followup’ post about this just below…
Followup…
Not only was Gary Cordes absolutely sure that Marsh and Granite
Mountain were ‘escaping’ SOUTH to the Boulder Springs Ranch…
he was also so sure that they had had plenty of time to make
it there that when the Captain of Engine Crew 59 ( Charlie Reyes )
first informed Cordes that Granite Mountain had ‘deployed’… Cordes’ first reaction was…
“BULLSHIT!”
“They’re in their (ranch) safety zone and it’s BOMB-PROOF”.
Page 39 of Cordes’ ADOSH interview transcript…
_____________________________________________________
Q1: Okay. Um, so uh, at, at some point um, air uh, during all of
this, um, um, how did you uh, how did you hear of the uh,
deployments?
A: That was back when I met with the group uh, before I went in
to do the rescues, uh, when I met with Engine 59. It was Engine
59 that told me that they had transmitted over the radio, over air
to ground that they had deployed and I, and I, it was Charlie Reyes
whose the, whose the engine boss down there and I told him BS,
that uh, they didn’t need to deploy ‘cause the safety’s, they were in
their safety zone and it was bomb proof and he said no, they never
got – made it there, they got cut off. And that’s when I knew
obviously something bad had most likely occurred.
Q1: Okay. Um, so there was no, there was no question in your
mind though that when, when Eric indicated he was going to the
safety zone, he wasn’t talking about the black, he was talking
about the, the Helm Ranch?
A: Yes, that would, that was my interpretation, yes.
_____________________________________________________
A minute or so after that, Q2 ( Dave Larsen – Rest in Peace )
then just wanted to verify with Cordes that he was sure
Marsh had heard the weather reports AND was aware that
the fire was ALREADY progressing south/southeast when
Marsh said he was going to head to the Boulder Springs Ranch…
____________________________________________________
Q2: Okay. Is the timing of, of all of this, and again, I’m kinda
slow on the uptake, uh, too many night shifts.
A: Yeah, I hear that.
Q2: I uh, Granite Mountain is saying that they are heading to
the pre-destined, pre1833 designated…
A: Safety zone.
Q2: …safety zone and you think that is, is uh…
A: Boulder Springs Ranch.
Q2: …after – yeah, and that has occurred after the wind advisory?
A: Yes.
Q2: And, and you’re saying he had the information at that time that
it had crossed the uh, crossed the road at the grater?
A: Yes.
Q2: So he knew that he was, it’s already blowing by him, below
him and he’s heading to safety, a safety zone?
A: Right.
Q2: That, is that an accurate assessment of, of the, of the
picture there?
A: Yes.
_____________________________________________________
WFF,
This may help some regarding the weather for June 30, 2013.
The link is for the Stanton RAWS (3600′) east of Congress. The SAIT used this site. One of the key readings to focus on are the HIGH NIGHTTIME TEMPERATURES ABOVE 81 DEGREES. Next, would be the LOW RELATIVE HUMDITIES and the WINDS (increasing and shifting).
http://raws.wrh.noaa.gov/cgi-bin/roman/meso_base_past.cgi?stn=QSTA3&year1=2013&month1=6&day1=30&hour1=2&time=GMT
The times on the left are in GMT (Greenich Mean Time), so you must subtract 6-7 hours for AZ times. For example, 0600 GMT is midnight (2400) Mountain Standard Time. and 1200 GMT is 0600 Mountain Standard Time. Or something like that.
Just out of curiosity, I figured a (rough) FDFM and PIG with the RAWS data and my wildland app.
INPUT: Temp 92, RH 15%, Slope 10%, Aspect East, Date/Time June 30, 24:00, Fire is 1000′ above me, Fuels Shaded [this represents midnight in Yarnell, extrapolated from the QSTA3 RAWS data, which is when temperature was lowest and RH close to highest]
OUTPUT: Fine Dead Fuel Moisture = 7%, Probability of Ignition = 50%
INPUT: Temp 106, RH 9%, Date/Time June 30, 15:00, Fuels unshaded, all else the same.
OUTPUT: FDFM = 2%, PIG = 100%
Caveats: this is based on a RAWS station located 4 or 5 miles SSE of Yarnell, and about 2000′ lower in elevation than the fire, not on weather readings taken at the scene. Just wanted to see a rough notion of how the readings would compare to what I’m used to seeing.
Hey Sitta, I haven’t had a chance to do a run yet. In and out of meetings. A lower elevation would probably give a higher temp/ low RH, probably result in a higher FB, but thats not a sure thing. Hold on to that and I’ll see if we can come up with a couple of other locations. A cross reference would be probably give the best overall perspective. In all those 214s there are going to be Wx recordings.
I didn’t get any response from WFF’s (current or former) to this comment, so I am reposting it. I would like to know if this is a valid point? And if it is, I want it to be posted here as something for the State of Arizona to at least think about.
Well…that brings up another bone I have to pick with the State of Arizona Division of Forestry, which I also stand ready to be corrected on.
During my years on the fire line, I worked beside a lot of “con” (Department of Corrections) crews in many states, on MOP UP. By and large, I observed these crews to be above average for Type II (?) crews because they wanted to please, stay outside a little longer, get paid a little money, they ate better food, and they were proud of their crews and themselves while they were doing rewarding work.
I did not EVER…as a firefighter or as a fire coordinator (and please keep in mind I worked in fire operations – expanded fire dispatch, from Alaska to North Carolina and in many western states) have any experience in working with, or sending con crews on initial attack.
New Mexico did not even use con crews for mop up or on anything else (that I can remember). Although on a fire in Nevada (I think, or maybe it was northern California) con crews thought that the Santa Fe Hotshots were from the New Mexico State Penitentiary in Santa Fe (which had the bloodiest prison riot in U.S. history) which automatically got us a lot of deference and respect from those crews.
In any case, I think Arizona State Department of Forestry needs to take a hard look at using con crews for initial attack, and is just one more symptom of their overall cost cutting, save money at any cost, including increasing the danger to wildland firefighters and the citizens they serve disease they have.
I strongly believe that IF, the Granite Mountain Hotshots, or any another crew with first rate initial attack credentials would have been used on the Yarnell Hill Fire, it would just be another insignificant fire in the history of wildfires in Arizona.
Gary,
I know that the ASF was using Inmate Crews for IA back in 2007 with fairly good results. Like all other Type II Crews, they MOSTLY performed mop-up
There was a big push by the State and the Governor’s Office to INCREASE the number of these Crews several years ago. Each Inmate Crew is supervised and managed by a Crew Coordinator. And they even established a position out of the Phoenix office a few years ago for a Supervisor to oversee ALL of the State’s Crew Coordinators.
As you well know, each Crew is a little different and they’re all based on the Leadership styles of the supervisors. But with the new Overseer Coordinator position (for lack of a better term), there should be at least some ‘quality’ standards for them.
One of my coworkers recently told me that nearly all of California’s Type I crews are DOC now, but I don’t know how to actually look that info up.
Yea Gary they’d be able to tell the difference between Hotshots in 75 and 13. Your picture would be Polaroid and their pic would digital. Sort of a reflection in irony on is own.
And we always said and believed lighting never strikes twice in the same place, but had a stand of young trees close and off the ridge line incase any body got nerves.
Also Gary thanks for the reminder of the good time we had on all those small lightning fires. Sea Rats- and making coffee in a food can you had to watch it didn’t burn your lips.
Right on, as you could probably tell, I got lost on a little trip down memory lane on that one.
That’s a good one WFF, dry humor, sarcasm, thoughtful wit, I am starting to really like you. Plus you are contributing some good comments. Keep up the good work!
Reply to calvin post on March 26, 2014 at 3:32 am said:
>> calvin said…
>> Mcdonough does state that he did have a written “unit log” that (a copy) was
>> provided to the SAIT. The ADOSH team asked to see the original copy during
>> Mcdonough’s interview.
>>
>> I would like to see this document.
>> Specifically the time of the last weather observation.
calvin… see the post ( and the reprinted ADOSH emails ) just below this
post regarding ADOSH having obtained ALL of Willis’ emails.
In the same emails we see them making the actual ‘requests’ for
Brendan’s original weather reports and field logs that they told him they
were going to make during his ADOSH interview.
Through Marsha Collier of Prescott Fire… Brendan says he cleaned out
his car and no longer has the original documents.
Lori Burkeen of Prescott Legal department is, herself, now telling ADOSH
that if they want those copies of Brendan’s field logs and weather reports
that Brendan freely gave to Arizona Forestry SAIT… they would have to
take that up with them.
So now we KNOW ( for sure ) that the SAIT has ALWAYS had copies of
Brendan’s actual weather reports ( and field logs ) from June 30.
These documents were NOT included in the SAIT FOIA/FOIL package.
Maybe someone on the SAIT ‘cleaned out their car’ and lost them as well.
Have you seen those? It might be good to do some runs on those and see what kind of fire it results in. I’d like to know if there was spotting, what the distance was, and what the PIG was. Actually several or any Wx recorded from different locations would be a good start.
I may have gotten confused about which way was North in this. when GM dripped off the two track into the drainage, that drainage ran southeast-northwest? So they were traaveling east/southeast to the ranch?
No speculation, no long winded tutorial, no you said this and I respond with this, just the weather ops. If I need a conspiracy theory I’ll ask how the masons were involved or watch the SCIFI channel.
Reply to WFF post on March 27, 2014 at 11:18 am
>> WFF aksed…
>> Have you seen those?
What… me? personally?
Please read the post above. AFAIK no one has
seen Brendan’s actual weather reports and/or field logs
( both of which are know to exist ) from June 30, 2013,
other than the Arizona Forestry SAIT investigators.
Those documents were not included in the SAIT
FOIA/FOIL package. They should have been.
>> I may have gotten confused about which way was
>> North in this. when GM dripped off the two track into
>> the drainage, that drainage ran southeast-northwest?
>> So they were traaveling east/southeast to the ranch?
Once they were in the fuel-filled box canyon… Yes.
**
** ADOSH OBTAINED ALL OF DARRELL WILLIS’ CELL PHONE RECORDS
** AND
** ERIC MARSH’S CELL PHONE WAS PAID FOR BY CITY OF PRESCOTT
Circa September 4, 2013, ADOSH investigators already knew for sure that
both Darrell Willis and Eric Marsh had cell phones on June 30… but they
weren’t quite sure yet if BOTH of them were supplied/owned by the City of
Prescott or not.
So they requested that the City of Prescott supply all cell phone records
for BOTH Willis and Marsh to see what would happen.
Turns out Willis’ cell phone is/was ( owned by the City of Prescott ), but Eric
Marsh was using his own personal cell phone ( but was receiving a stipend to
pay for it from the City of Prescott ).
The City of Prescott was then obligated to obtain/turnover Willis’ cell phone
records… but because they were only paying Marsh a ‘stipend’ for his phone…
they said that ADOSH would have to make that request through his widow…
Amanda Marsh. ( Marsh’s cell phone is already known via public reverse lookup
on his published number to have been a ‘Nextel’ account in Prescott ).
The City of Prescott DID supply ALL of Willis’ cell phone records to ADOSH,
but there is no evidence in the recently released ADOSH information package
that indicates they ever followed up with a similar request to Amanda Marsh.
ALSO NOTE: ADOSH investigators had already learned by September 4
that Brendan’s original Weather reports had already been ‘discarded’
by the City of Prescott. Marsha Collier of Prescott Fire had already said in
a separate email that Brendan said that he had cleaned out his car and now
couldn’t any of the original documents )… but ADOSH still made another
attempt on September 4 to obtain Brendan’s original weather reports.
There are THREE emails reprinted below…
The FIRST one is the ADOSH request for both Willis’ and Marsh’s
cell phone records to Lori Burkeen of Prescott Legal Department.
The SECOND one is her reply ( 13 days later ) with ‘inline’ comments
about all the documents ADOSH requested.
The THIRD was sent by Lori Burkeen just 4 hours after the second one and
had an attached file containing ALL of Darrell Willis’ cell phone records for
the month of June, 2013
That attached file was named…
“Darrell’s Cell Phone Records June 2-30.pdf”
EVERY document being requested below is present in the recently released
ADOSH investigation materials folder… EXCEPT for the file containing Willis’
cell phone records. It was not released.
Not too surprising. I’m sure this entire document is being withheld
from FOIA/FOIL requests due to privacy laws and the ‘exceptions’ allowed
under FOIA/FOIL… but it’s still interesting to FINALLY learn that at least
SOMEONE obtained ( and HAS ) Willis’ cell phone records from June 30, 2013.
** THE EMAILS
** From page(s) 16-20 of ADOSH document: “Emails L3419 12-30-13.pdf”
This is the first email that ADOSH sent requesting the cell phone records
( and other documents like Brendan’s original weather reports / field logs,
and any documentation about the Wesley fire GM was ‘sent home from’ )…
________________________________________________________________
From: Hanna, Bruce – OSHA State (AZ-SP)
Sent: Wednesday, September 04, 2013 1:20 PM
To: Burkeen, Lori ( Risk Management Technician, Prescott Legal Department )
Subject: Additional documentation requested.
Good afternoon, Lori,
Our consultants two of which you have met have requested the following
documentation from the City of Prescott Human Resources Department
and the City of Prescott Fire Department:
– Brendan McDonough’s Field Notes from Yarnell Hill Fire (Copies previously
provided to SAIT).
– Darrell Willis – City supplied cell phone call history for June 29 and 30, 2013
and cell phone number, service provider, and account number.
– Eric Marsh – City supplied cell phone call history for June 29 and 30, 2013
and cell phone number, service provider, and account number.
– Eric Marsh personnel and medical file provided for review by ADOSH at
City of Prescott
– Eric Marsh payroll records for 2013
– Jesse Steed payroll records for 2013
– Granite Mountain IHC assigned work schedule for 2013
– Granite Mountain IHC “Standards for Interagency Hotshot Crew Operations
Annual IHC Preparedness Review for 2013, 2012 and 2011 (Appendix B).
– Granite Mountain IHC “Standards for Interagency Hotshot Crew Operations
Annual IHC Mobilization Checklist for 2013, 2012 and 2011 (Appendix C).
Chief Willis mentioned in his interview that Granite Mountain refused two
assignments and got unfavorable reviews. The Chief stated that he may
have copies of those particular incidences. We would like those reports if
they are available.
Again, thank you for your cooperation and assistance in this difficult time.
Bruce B. Hanna
State Industrial Hygiensit II
Arizona Division of Occupational Safety and Health
800 W Washington St
Phoenix, AZ 85007
__________________________________________________________________
It took 13 days for Lori Burkeen to REPLY to ADOSH… but when she did
she provided a full ‘status’ report on all the documents requested with
‘inline comments’ inserted into the original request…
__________________________________________________________________
From: Burkeen, Lori
Sent: Tuesday, September 17, 2013 11:07 AM
To: Hanna, Bruce – OSHA State (AZ-SP)
Subject: FW: Additional documentation request.
Attachments: OSAH-ERIC MARSH 2013 hours (3).docx;
OSHA-JESSE STEED 2013 hours.docx
Mr. Hanna:
I apologize for the delay. I was hoping to gather ALL documents before replying to
you. However, I am delayed on a few items. Here is the status of the documents
thus far:
– Brendan McDonough’s Field Notes from Yarnell Hill Fire (Copies previously provided to SAIT)
Lori: Per Marsha Collier at Fire, Brendan McDonough has advised her that he
no longer has these documents. They will need to be requested from SAIT. If
you wish to speak with Mr. McDonough to question why he no longer has them
available, please let me know if we can assist you in speaking with Mr. McDonough.
– Darrell Willis – City supplied cell phone call history for June 29 and 30, 2013
and cell phone number, service provider, and account number.
Lori: Darrell Willis does have a City supplied Cell phone Verizon provider
( cell phone number redacted ). I’m still working on getting the call history.
– Eric Marsh – City supplied cell phone call history for June 29 and 30, 2013
and cell phone number, service provider, and account number.
Lori: Eric Marsh did NOT have a City supplied cell phone. He received $25/month
stipend for his personal cell phone. You would need to request that information
from his widow, Amanda Marsh.
– Eric Marsh personnel and medical file provided for review by ADOSH
at City of Prescott
Lori: Personnel file is available. I have it copied and is available for release. It is
too large to scan. Please let me know if you wish to pick it up or would like
me to mail it to you. Per our City Attorney, we cannot release Marsh’s medical
documents without a subpeona or written release from his widow.
– Eric Marsh payroll records for 2013
Lori: Attached
– Jesse Steed payroll records for 2013
Lori: Attached
– Granite Mountain IHC assigned work schedule for 2013
Lori: Granite Mountain IHC assigned work schedule for 2013 was 01/01/2013
Mon-Thur 0700-1730 10 hrs per day four days a week with a 1/2 hr lunch break.
04/09/2013 Tues-Sat 0800-1630 8 hrs per day 8 days a week with 1/2 hr lunch
break. Their work schedule would have remained Tues-Sat until the end of fire
season, in past years they would switch back to 4 10’s sometime in October.
– Granite Mountain IHC “Standards for Interagency Hotshot Crew Operations
Annual IHC Preparedness Review for 2013, 2012 and 2011 (Appendix B).
Lori: Will send via separate email ( documents too big for one email )
– Granite Mountain IHC “Standards for Interagency Hotshot Crew Operations
Annual IHC Mobilization Checklist for 2013, 2012 and 2011 (Appendix C).
Lori: Will send via separate email ( documents too big for one email )
Chief Willis mentioned in his interview that Granite Mountain refused two
assignments and got unfavorable reviews. The Chief stated that he may have
copies of those particular incidences. We would like those reports if they are
available.
Lori: I have one log from Eric Marsh. I will send via separate email.
Document too big for one email.
Lori Burkeen
Risk Management Technician
City of Prescott Legal Department – Risk Mgt Division
( Phone number redacted )
__________________________________________________________________
About 4 hours later ( same day ), Lori Burkeen sends ADOSH another email
with Darrell Willis’ complete cell phone records as a file attachment…
__________________________________________________________________
From: Burkeen, Lori
Sent: Tuesday, September 17, 2013 2:51 PM
To: Hanna, Bruce – OSHA State (AZ-SP)
Cc: Ripley, Linda
Subject: RE: Marsh personnel and medical file/Tom Cooley
Attachments: Darrell’s Cell Phone Records June 2-30.pdf
Yes, Mr. Cooley works for the Prescott Fire Department – Fire Suppression
Division.
Also, I have received the cell phone records for Darrell Willis. They are attached.
I believe we have made available or have produced everything to date that
you have requested. Please let me know if we are still missing anything.
As always, please let me know if we can be of additional help.
Lori Burkeen
Risk Management Technician
City of Prescott Legal Department – Risk Mgt Division
( Phone number redacted )
__________________________________________________________________
WTKTT,
Just want to say thanks again for digging into the documents like you have. I haven’t even gotten everything downloaded yet — it’s nice to have you cataloging/summarizing and linking what you find.
It is truly amazing what is in this most recent ‘dump’
of information related to the incident.
I don’t think I’ve even looked through HALF of it yet…
and there are ‘facts’ and ‘mysteries solved’ in almost
every document I’ve seen so far.
More to come.
I agree!
I’ve had time to read through some of it, and look at some of the pictures and videos, but not enough to really sync anything much in my head, much less converse about any of it.
I really appreciate WTKTT’s pulling things out and transcribing them here.
And I also appreciate your comments, Sitta!
One of the ‘indirect’ revelations coming out of the
ADOSH material is, of course, even more proof
of how MUCH the Arizona Forestry SAIT
investigators MUST have known.
Example: Just read Gary Cordes’ ADOSH
interview… then compare that with the SAIT
Investigation Notes ( YIN ) and Cordes’
handwritten ‘Unit Log’ from that day.
The SAIT KNEW that Gary Cordes never had
any doubts that Granite Mountain had ‘left
the safe black’ and were headed to the
Boulder Springs Ranch.
Same thing applies to all the other ADOSH
interviews. It is not believable that these men
would have told any remarkably ‘different’
stories to the SAIT investigators… with the
same information we can now see.
The SAIT was a ‘coverup’.
There really is no doubt about it now… and I
think the taxpayers of Arizona should ( at the
very least ) be asking for the 1 or 2 million dollars
back that THEY paid for this worthless document.
As I have stated before, Tony Sciacca was a highly respected hotshot crew boss from my generation. I also know that in later life, he was a highly respected USFS Fire Management Officer, and he rose to be one of the most highly respected fire commanders in the nation before he retired from the USFS.
I would imagine he is a good safety officer today. There is a lot that happened on the Yarnell Hill Fire that I can’t explain, to myself or anyone else except to say that chaos was running the fire on June 30, 2013. Which as I have said before, is not uncommon, especially in the first 36 hours.
Copy (all) that… but that still doesn’t mean there aren’t little
‘details’ that have emerged ( and are still emerging ) from
the YHF that might not fall into the top level ‘Lessons learned
from the Yarnell Tragedy’ category… but they just *might*
( emphasis *might* ) be some ‘good things to remember’
in the future.
Such as…
1) For Hotshots… don’t believe your radio is going to be usable
once you get into a REAL ( foil lined ) fire shelter. It might be
working from under those green ‘practice’ things… but the situation
is probably going to be much different when it’s the ‘real thing’.
2) For Line Safety Officers…. if you are ever tasked with making
sure ALL firefighters are ‘accounted for’ and ‘safe’… don’t assume
that just because you see a Crew Carrier parked somewhere or
you see it go by you that it *actually* has the Crew in it. Find out
for sure.
3) If you are asking important/direct questions over the radio
and you even get the slightest feeling that the person on the other
end is trying to ‘dodge’ your question… Be polite… but
ASK IT AGAIN and make SURE YOU GET A GOOD ANSWER.
You know… stuff like that.
I agree.
Although I believe that in part because Tony Sciacca is himself a former hotshot and he knew Eric Marsh and Jesse Steed very well personally, and I imagine he had the utmost respect for both men.
I think he probably had the miscellaneous structure groups and the John Q. Public’s who were still walking their dogs in the shadow of the pyro cumulous cloud of ash and fire (as xxfullsailxx said) more on his mind than some of the best of the best. Just sayin’.
i don’t think any of us WFF’s need any lessons learned from an anonymous internet conspiracy theorist who has never set foot on a fireline or even probably thought about WFF’ing prior to this incident.
The lessons learned are obvious. Most aren’t new there the same ones from other fires. People aren’t perfect the higher the stress level and the responsibility role the tougher it is to not make mistakes. Anyone who has worked fire on days like this knows well how hectic and loose it is.
All other speculation aside. Downhill into a green drainage, during an extreme fire day, without the ability to monitor current conditions. Really everything else is details to statisfy curriosity and need to know. The lesson is right there, bad judgement.
well said cant add any thing to that……….
agreed.
I think most of the lessons learned are obvious to those who have been on the fireline for a few years, but there’s a new crop of hundreds (thousands?) of WFFs every year, who haven’t had this pounded into their heads. And then there’s the public, who needs to know the consequences of firewise vs. fire hazards (and by the looks of most WUI, is not even aware of the game yet). We need to keep teaching the lessons until the public (or insurance companies?) grok them. Most disturbingly, there are the folks in leadership positions in fire who *should* OBVIOUSLY know all this stuff, but based on their actions (which have only been scrutinized as far as they pertain to actual WFF deaths), obviously do not commit it to action.
When people quit dying, we can quit pretending that the lessons discussed here are obvious for everyone.
Which of course, is why it is so important to have experienced people responsible for firefighters lives, and to follow all of the rules all of the time as Bob Powers and RTS say. Yes…I am conflicted.
The rules were designed to fit each situation.
Gary — I get you now, you used them to fit your situation and used what you needed to stay safe.
****(Follow the rules all the time)****
Little difference same concept…………
Right on.
And that is why, Gary, it concerns me to hear upper fire management (administration) suggest that the vast majority of WFFs ought to be college students on summer break (such seasonals, after all, are cheap, disposable, and still on Mom and Dad’s insurance plan).
**
** ERIC MARSH’S UNIT LOG FROM THE WESLEY FIRE, 2012
After Darrell Willis informed ADOSH investigators that he recalled at least one
time ( in 2012 ) when Granite Mountain had been ‘sent home from a fire’ ( The
Wesley Fire )… ADOSH asked Willis to produce any documentation regarding
that incident.
Willis produced a ‘Unit Log’ that Marsh wrote telling his side of the story on the
Wesley fire.
NOTE: When Brendan McDonough was asked the same question in HIS
ADOSH interview about ‘ever being sent home from any fire’… Brendan said
that as long as he had been with the crew ( 3 seasons, 2011, 2012, and 2013 )…
…it had NEVER happened.
Here is Eric Marsh’s handwritten Unit Log from the Wesley Fire…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/20inrene9tcx74a/YdEUVtovCB/ADOSH%20Yarnell%20Hill%20Investigation/City%20of%20Prescott%20Fire%20–%20GMHS
Filename: Erics Unilt Logs (3).pdf
UNIT LOG
1. Incident Name: Wesley – DIV A
2. Date Prepared: 09/22/12
3. Time Prepared: 1600
4. Unit Name/Designators: Granite Mountain IHC
5. Unit Leader ( Name and Position ): Eric Marsh, SUPT
6. Operational Period: 09 21-22 12
7. Activity Log ( Continue on Reverse )
Time: N/A
Major Events
On 9/21, a plan was prepared by TFLD(t) Humbach to use some of our existing
control line/features and tie in a piece of indirect line across Lick Creek from the
East to West ending up in an open area with sparse fuels. I scouted the line out,
and soon after tied in with Snake River’s SUPT and we both looked at the line,
made some adjustments, and made a plan to begin work.
Talked to TFLD(t) Humbach about the specifics of the piece of indirect work and
the plan was to start on it a.m. 092212.
When arriving @ (?) spoke @ the end of shift, I tied in with DIV A Sayer and
discussed the indirect, got some feedback concerning other line construction
that would hopefully tie in to our indirect , and also updated on fire movement
during the shift. ( signed Eric Marsh ).
On 9/22, assignment for us after 0700 radio briefing was to engage in construction
of indirect piece crossing Lick Creek. We left camp, parked @ DP5, and hiked in
to begin work.
Soon after, DIV A Sayer and TFLD(t) Humbach tied in with me at the start of our
line and said they had a change in plans. Our new assignment was to do direct
into Lick Creek. I stated that I was not comfortable with that tactic based on the
exposure to hazardous trees (snags / fire damaged). Sayer stated that his
comfort level was high and that they had gone direct in hazardous conditions the
first 5 or so days of the fire. My crew had been in DIV A for 7 days, loosing direct
and indirect line.We had also constructed control/contingency lines. As a lookout
over a three day period prior to 9/22, in Lick Creek fire area I heard and witnessed
multiple hazard trees fall. My Captain, Jesse Steed, and other crewmembers also
had similar experiences.
I had ruled out going direct due to control issues, but more because of safety
concerns in Lick Creek prior to a.m. 9/22. This feeling was crew consensus
.
I stated that I would not go direct. We then argued about going direct vs. burning
the indirect. I stated that the same conditions would need to exist for either tactic
to be successful, so the question is which is safer.Sayer and Humbach hiked up
the hill to scout out the direct line from the top. Approximately 20 minutes later, I
chose to scout the direct line from the Lick Creek drainage to the top of our
indirect. I did this with the intent of investigating to my fullest potential the direct
line construction option for DIV A and also to assess current fire conditions,
location, work loads, time frames, escape routes, and hazardous trees. My
scouting mission revealed low to moderate fire behavior with occassional
single to small group torching with calm winds to updrainage 0-2 mph. Fire edge
was fingered with (?) spots 5-150 feet from the dominant fire edge. Approx.
3/4 mile of direct fire edge. Within one hour time period while scouting in the Lick
Creek, six hazard trees fell in the fire area, the closest one (about) 50 yards away.
Evidence of both snags and “green” trees that had fell in previous days was
abundant. The sixth tree that fell was behind Sayer as I tied in with him on the
black edge; the distance back maybe 75 – 100 yards. My comfort level for working
in that area remained low.
We continued our discussion about risk vs. reward, differing comfort levels, his
reluctance to burn the indirect, and my primary job being to ensure the safety of
my crewmembers. We parted ways again without consensus on any plan. My
crew continued constructing the indirect line while I scouted through the siutation
with the help of my Captain.
My discussions with Sayer were not mean or vindictive, but they were
opinionated and passionate.
I simplified it down to there being 3 options for dealing with this piece of ground.
(1) Construct indirect and burn
(2) Construct indirect and let the fire bump it.
(3) Go direct.
Since there was such resistance to burn, I decided to remove that option.
I thought going direct was too hazardous, so that left option (2), indirect and let
the fire bump it. I then contacted TFLD (?) and told him a summary of the
morning events and that we could construct the indirect, (?) it and set up
sprinklers. I later tied in with (Crane?) Valley IHC and they tied into the West
side of our line from their anchor.
I then informed (Shoban?) #1 (Sam) that we had turned down the assignment to
go direct, to ensure that they had that knowldege. ( Signed: Eric Marsh ).
Date Prepared: 092412
Time Prepared: 2130
Operational Period: 092412
Time: 1730
Major Events
As the crew was leaving DIV A enroute to ICP to close out our day 14, I was
asked to tie in with DIV A and DIV A(t) @ (Bitter Spike?). DIV A(t) John Segan
telling me how we had done some good work but due to our refusal to go direct
on 9/22, that we had failed to meet their operational directives for their division.
They handed me an evaluation that stated such which I refused to sign based
on the inaccuracies.
The eval stated that after presented with options to mitigate the snags, that I still
refused the assignment.
Options cited were IHC fallers and/or professional fallers. I ran an IHC so I have
my own fallers ( BandC ). My concern was not the complexity of the trees but
the condition of the trees based on fire damage.
Also I refused the assignment based on the fact of sheer numbers of hazard
trees. Can you cut them all?
This negative evaluation appeared to be a reprisal for saying no to DIV A’s plan.
I presented an option to him that allowed my crew and other resources to work
in safety – indirect. The same assignment that was already tasked to my crew!
During the eval discussion, it was stated by DIV A that the indirect line, which
he assigned to me, was not in line with his objectives. He then discussed my
unwillingness to change tactics based on fire behavior. Again untrue.
The fire was backing towards the indirect line at a reasonable and predictable
rate. Since I was not allowed to conduct any firing operations, even with
favorable conditions, our ability to utilize proven and safe tactics were limited
by DIV A. This info was presented to me as I was leaving, after we had held
the fire with out indirect line ( rain helped ). No discussion with DIV A
occurred between the refusal and our demob 9-22 to 9-24.
Points:
(1) Resources need the ability to refuse unsafe assignments without
fear of reprisal.
(2) Crew’s side of the story needs told. This is not about me vs. DIV A, but
rather about a crew being punished with a bad eval for trying to go home safe.
( Signed: Eric Marsh )
He was only on the fire 7 days. And says he was closed out on day 14 to go home? So was he sent home intentionally or did they go home after 14 days on duty? So the excuse was they met there 14 day rest period rather than the fire sent them home. Willis says they were sent home I tend to believe that. The crew may have been told they hit there 14 day brake. There excuse for refusing the direct line was week when fallers could have secured the snags along the line. Marsh made up his mind he did not want to do it and wanted to do it his way.
Reply to Mr. Powers on March 27, 2014 at 10:18 am
>> Mr. Powers said…
>> He was only on the fire 7 days. And says he was
>> closed out on day 14 to go home? So was he sent
>> home intentionally or did they go home after 14 days
>> on duty?
Good question. ADOSH requested ALL material that
Prescott Fire might have had regarding BOTH of
‘incidents’ that Willis talked about in his ADOSH
interview…
…but all Prescott Fire coughed up was this one
handwritten log sheet from the Wesley fire.
Marsh IS, in fact, making it sound like he was already
on his way to just ‘check out’ from the fire ( as if they
knew they were done )… and then he gets ambushed
with this ‘bad evaluation’ and refuses to sign it.
He does, however, still use the word ‘demob’ in his
unit log. Is there only one meaning for that word in
the WFF biz… or more than one.
If you simply leave a fire because your contract has
officially ended ( no incidents or bad reports )… can
you also just simply refer to that as your ‘demob’
moment? That’s what Marsh seems to be trying to
establish in his written unit log, anyway.
>> Mr. Powers also said…
>> So the excuse was they met there 14 day rest period
>> rather than the fire sent them home.
Maybe that’s what Marsh ( and/or Steed ) simply
told the crew… and why Brendan said in his ADOSH
interview that they had NEVER been ‘demobbed’
or ‘sent home from a fire’.
>> Willis says they were sent home I tend to believe that.
I can’t imagine why Willis would say that to the ADOSH
investigators unless it was, in fact, the truth.
>> Mr. Powers also said…
>> The crew may have been told they hit there 14 day
>> brake.
It’s possible. If that’s what happened ( and it really
wasn’t true )… then how usual / unusual is THAT?…
…for a Type 1 Hotshot Crew Boss to LIE to his men
about something like that?
Wouldn’t that be quite a risk that someday your own
men will be talking to some other crew who knows
the REAL story… and would suddenly find out that
you ( The Supt ) had LIED to them?
It’s a small world in WFF, right?
>> Mr. Powers also said…
>> There excuse for refusing the direct line was week
>> when fallers could have secured the snags along the
>> line. Marsh made up his mind he did not want to do
>> it and wanted to do it his way.
Marsh wanted to ‘burn freely’.
Said so himself ( in his post-incident unit log ).
They weren’t letting him.
He didn’t like it.
I have no doubt he meant his last two sentences,
but I still can’t help shaking my head at the irony…
Marsh closed with…
(1) Resources need the ability to refuse unsafe
assignments without fear of reprisal.
(2) Crew’s side of the story needs told. This is not
about me vs. DIV A, but rather about a crew being
punished with a bad eval for trying to go home safe.
Keyphrase: “This is not about me vs. DIV A”.
I wonder if that is exactly what was going through
Jesse Steed’s head during the ‘discussing their options’
conversation on June 30, 2013… when (now) HIS
“DIVS A” was actively pressing him about HIS ‘comfort
level’ for some assignment HE was being asked to
‘perform’ by “DIVS A”.
We all know what “comfort level” means now the minute
it appears in any WFF conversation. Standard lingo.
It means someone is trying to get someone else to
do something they want them to do.
“Tell me your comfort level” means “Tell me why you
are hesitant to do something I want you to do.”
It’s the ‘nice’ way to put the pressure on.
Demob is used for all reasons to leave the fire.
sent home, end of fie, or met 14 day limit.
for what ever reason your going home.
Thanks. So the fact that Eric himself used
the world ‘demob’ in his own notes means
nothing, really. They *might* have been
hitting a normal ‘off the fire’ point ( as
Brendan says happened at Wesley ) OR
they might have actually been being
‘sent home early’ ( as Willis testified
to ADOSH ).
I guess only some more documentation
regarding Wesley fire is really going to
clear that up.
ouch
It said that the crew had been on that division for 7 days.
Maybe I assumed to much from that statement. I did not see a start date only the last date. If that was the open line DIV that would normally be where the Hot Shots were.
A need to know is when they arrived. Thanks WFF
Regardless of any ‘time limits’… there is still the fact
that Prescott Wildland Division Chief told ADOSH
investigators that GM was, in fact, “sent home from
the Wesley fire” because they refused an
assignment.
I can’t even imagine a scenario where Darrell
Willis… the ‘defender of GM’ at all times… would
say something like that it wasn’t the truth ( or
he didn’t fully believed that is what happened ).
Additional videos have been uploaded to the Aerial Firefighting Study in the supplemental information for the Serious Accident Investigation Report. Two additional videos will be uploaded shortly to complete this folder.
Please note there is a new link to the Aerial Firefighting Study folder: https://www.dropbox.com/sh/y3jy5opssrcvzb3/oIJILFQ6SO
Thank you, John. ( ongoing thanks, of course ).
“State lawmakers took the first steps Tuesday to immunize the Land Department from mistakes and negligence that result in forest fires — even if that means destroyed homes and dead firefighters.”
azdailysun.com from March 26, 2014
http://azdailysun.com/news/local/state-and-regional/panel-grants-immunity-for-mistakes-that-result-in-wildfires/article_b0371fa6-b4ae-11e3-a0fa-001a4bcf887a.html
Figures.
I am confused…again. I know that I haven’t been on the fire line for a long time. OK…it’s been a really long time. BUT…I think I could show photographs of hotshots working on a fire line in 2013, AND photos of hotshots working on a fire line in 1975, and the general public wouldn’t be able to tell the difference.
In fact, wildland firefighters may not be able to tell the difference, if they did not look closely at the equipment or tools that are being used. Camelbacks for water on firefighter backs now versus hard plastic and metal 1 gallon canteens that have narrow nylon straps that cut into your shoulders, and bang you in the back of your head every time you swing your tool while bent over working the fire line or mopping up.
Not to mention some of the weird looking tools that are being used now, brooms and garden rakes with short handles, and some kind of hybrid (even more hybrid than the original) trenching tool, which we did not have way back when. It also looks like McCloud’s have disappeared…good. MEDC has been busy.
And if you see a photo of a firefighter eating MRE’s, instead of eating out of small metal olive drab cans, that is also a dead-give-away. Although I was still with the Santa Fe Hotshots with Region sent out the MRE’s for us to taste test. They got four stars, or however many stars the very finest cuisine get.
That being said, there were a number of things we never said to each other, and no fire manager officer or other fire overhead ever said to us either. Here is my top 10 list. Listing all of the things that we never said, heard or worried about would be kind of like proving a negative, how do you name all of the things you never thought of, heard, or worried about.
Number 10. You had better not go fight a wildfire because you might get eaten by a bear or a mountain lion.
Number 9. You had better not go fight a wildfire because you might get hit by a falling widow maker or tree.
Number 8. You had better not go fight a wildfire because might get wet and cold, and die from hypothermia.
Number 7. I couldn’t think of any more off the top of my head…so I skipped directly to Number 1.
Number 1. You had better not go fight a wildfire because you might get hit by lightning.
WTF…as others have said!
I have said many times that I do not blame the field level Arizona Division of Forestry managers e.g., Russ Shumate, for the Yarnell Hill Fire, because I think they are just doing (as they have always done) the best job they can, and play the hand the cheap-ass Arizona State Legislature, and the conservative (cheap-ass) citizens of Arizona deal them.
I will also defer to RTS, and others who have more initial attack experience in Arizona than I do, although I spend 6 years on the Happy Jack Hotshots on top of the Mogollon Rim (lots of lighting), where our district, the Long Valley Ranger District had the forest helicopter. And 4 years with the Santa Fe Hotshots flying to lighting fires out of the Santa Fe National Forest Helibase in the Jemez Mountains to the Sangre de Christo Mountains and beyond.
Plus going to lighting fires on the Tonto N.F. in small teams of hotshots (and other forests, including the Prescott N.F., Weaver Mountains and all) which were our bread and butter during the monsoon season, and things were slow out-of-state. Easy money…and it all paid the same.
Lightning fires. Such a fond memory. I feel some more random thoughts coming on. Lighting fires, otherwise known as helitack, and smokejumper fires. I think you already know what a “hotshot” fire is, if you have been following this thread.
Now let me tell you what a lighting fire is like. It’s like going camping with your buddies, except no alcohol. Yes, you will have to cut a little line, very “little” I might add. You will probably have to cut down a tree or two. Do a little mop up, very “little” I might add.
And maybe make a little hooch out of your poncho, because it is either raining, or it will be raining. Build a warming fire, because it will be cold after you cut a little line, work up a sweat, and the chilly night air sets in. Poke a couple holes in your little can of beanie weanies, and heat it up. And best of all, poke a couple of holes in your little can of pound cake (or something like a brownie), pour a little water in it, steam it over the warming fire, and it will taste just as good as it did when it was first baked…during the Vietnam War.
Kick back, make a pillow by folding your gloves on top of your hard hat, put on your hoodie and goose down vest, and settle in to tell some lies to each other that get better each time you tell them. Drift off to sleep thinking about the “oats” (overtime), not to mention the hazard pay, and night time differential you are making while you are waiting for daylight so you can hike out to a road carrying all of the equipment and tools that flew in with you so you can be picked up by a miscellaneous district person driving a 4×4.
Not go fight a wildfire because you might get hit by lighting? Are you kidding me? Has anybody out there ever heard of a wildland firefighter getting killed by lightning? I know it must have happened somewhere, but that sure as hell doesn’t stop crazy golfers from going golfing does it? As the old joke goes, hit the ball, drag your buddy, hit the ball, drag your buddy. I think you have a better chance of getting killed if the damn helicopter augers in on auto rotate…and nobody ever stayed at base because that might happen.
FYI – I have written long enough that you have finally found out one of my most innermost secrets. I always wanted to be a helitack, and then a smokejumper, but I was to damn big (fat). I would have needed a cargo chute not to go splat on the ground. Jealousy can be a terrible thing.
i do believe that we have probably become more “lightning conscious” in the past ten years…
http://www.wildfirelessons.net/irdb/?executeSearch=true&LibraryKey=b58e5b48-1c09-4f15-ad0d-c26639dab1a2&TagsList=Hit_by_Lightning
i don’t think that having a bunch of resources hanging out on a scabby ridgeline through mid-afternoon monsoon or, worse yet, dry lightning is a good idea. i wouldn’t keep my crew up there through a lightning storm.
though i do continue to struggle with the initial attack decisions of the Yarnell Fire… on one hand, i can totally understand the response that was made and minimal resources thrown at it that first day. i can only imagine the budget constraints that AZ DOF is under these days (nice work blue hair conservative AZ voters)… and i know BLM took their share of budget cuts last year…
on the other hand, it was a Type 4 incident, with a trainee, and neither of them were up on the hill assessing the work load, or the progress that was being made or the possibility of needing more resources or improving access in to the fire?
it seems to me, that if it is near the end of June in the southwest and you have dry fuel advisories, long term drought, and a lightning start in 40 year decadent brush that is also within close proximity to three communities, that you better damn well stomp it out the first chance you get…
but then you look at the photos of that fire on the afternoon/evening of the 28th and it looks like it put itself out and is hung up in the rocks… and you put yourself in the shoes of a duty officer, with limited resources and a lot of potential other starts and the decision to throw a short DOC crew up on the hill to mop it up until potential t-storms develop seems pretty reasonable.
Well…that brings up another bone I have to pick with the State of Arizona Division of Forestry, which I also stand ready to be corrected on.
During my years on the fire line, I worked beside a lot of “con” (Department of Corrections) crews in many states, on MOP UP. By and large, I observed these crews to be above average for Type II (?) crews because they wanted to please, stay outside a little longer, get paid a little money, they ate better food, and they were proud of their crews and themselves while they were doing rewarding work.
I did not EVER…as a firefighter or as a fire coordinator (and please keep in mind I worked in fire operations – expanded fire dispatch, from Alaska to North Carolina and in many western states) have any experience in working with, or sending con crews on initial attack.
New Mexico did not even use con crews for mop up or on anything else (that I can remember). Although on a fire in Nevada (I think, or maybe it was northern California) con crews thought that the Santa Fe Hotshots were from the New Mexico State Penitentiary in Santa Fe (which had the bloodiest prison riot in U.S. history) which automatically got us a lot of deference and respect from those crews.
In any case, I think Arizona State Department of Forestry needs to take a hard look at using con crews for initial attack, and is just one more symptom of their overall cost cutting, save money at any cost, including increasing the danger to wildland firefighters and the citizens they serve disease they have.
I strongly believe that IF, the Granite Mountain Hotshots, or any another crew with first rate initial attack credentials would have been used on the Yarnell Hill Fire, it would just be another insignificant fire in the history of wildfires in Arizona.
Reply to Gary Olson post on
March 26, 2014 at 11:57 pm
>> Gary said…
>>
>> I strongly believe that IF, the Granite Mountain
>> Hotshots, or any another crew with first rate
>> initial attack credentials would have been used
>> on the Yarnell Hill Fire, it would just be another
>> insignificant fire in the history of wildfires in
>> Arizona.
Strongly agree. This is not meant to be a ‘dis’
aimed at the DOC crew… but given the location
of the fire, the terrain, the conditions, etc… I
believe it was just ‘outside’ their expertise but
either didn’t realize it for 5 hours that day or
were afraid to admit it.
If Granite Mountain has been called up the night
before and were there in the AM… they would
have probably had the nails in the lid of the
coffin on that thing before 3:00 PM ( when the
winds started to pick up ).
Even if the terrain was a nightmare… I believe
THEY would have determined that very early
on and the much-needed bucket drops that
day would have been rockin’ and rollin’ LONG
before anything ever ‘jumped a road’.
There are LESSONS to be learned here still…
even from just what happened ( or didn’t
happen ) on Saturday.
That is correct. I did not mean to dis the DOC crew, but I did mean to dis the State of Arizona for using a DOC crew for initial attack.
Copy that. Brendan McDonough
himself, in his ADOSH interview,
says he’s the one who took a small
‘crew’ over the west ridge to do
some ‘cold black tie in’ work… and
Brendan described some of that
terrain where the fire had been
burning on Saturday as (literally)…
“cliffs with heavy vegetation”.
There’s no ‘hand crew’ in the world
that could really fight that on foot with
nothing but Pulaskis and Chainsaws.
Bucket drops were the way to go.
It didn’t happen.
WTKTT,
You posted some statements here regarding what YOU believe are the duties, functions, and responsibilities of Safety Officers.
WTKTT posted “Sciacca said: “And I was like, well I guess everybody’s in the buggies. You don’t ask those questions.”
“Are you f**king kidding me? “You don’t ask those questions.” Really?… even when you are being paid to be a ‘Line Safety Officer’ and it’s time for you know EXACTLY where ALL the crews are?” … Unbelievable.”
Not really. That’s totally believable to me that he did and said that. I think you’re giving way too much responsibility and maybe even culpability to the Safety Officer(s) and NOT the GMHS themselves. The GMHS was responsible to maintain PROMPT communication with their supervisor and adjoioning forces (Fire Order #7) and they didn’t do that.
“One more ‘lesson’ ( for future Safety Officers ) to take away from the Yarnell Hill Fire… Just because you see Crew Carriers driving by you… do NOT *assume* anyone is actually IN them. … Find OUT if they are… and if not… then find out WHERE that entire crew REALLY is… ASAP.”
Safety is NOT in the Operations realm; they are in the Command and General Staff area. Safety Officers are NOT suppossed to get involved operationally.
“There was still time for him to have gotten on the horn and found out EXACTLY where they were… EXACTLY what they were DOING and what their plans were… and if they were SAFE ( and going to remain so ).”
There MAY be a bit of ‘hind sight bias’ here because in the normal sense of fire operations, Safety Officers don’t normally concern themselves who is or is not in every vehicle that they encounter.
As WFF, we should be safe because it’s the right thing to do, not because a Safety Officer is present or we might get ‘caught’ by a Safety Officer. The bottom line to me is that Marsh and Steed and GMHS were engaging in unsafe actions by NOT following ‘the WFF Rules’ that day. And I allege this was the result of ‘prior bad decisions with good outcomes’ or put another way, they continued to get away with their unsafe actions and it strongly influenced continued unsafe behaviors. And I NOT buying either Willis’ or McDonough’s assertions that they were always safe and everyone always spoke up and whatever else they alleged.
RTS… ALL your points are well taken and I was expecting a
fair amount of ‘push back’ on this one.
It was just ‘a moment’ that day in a lot of ‘moments’ that might
have gone differently.
I still think it was a ‘bad assumption’ on Sciacca’s part… to
be functioning ( on scene trying to make sure all FFs are
getting safe ) that entire Hotshot crews were headed to
safety when their buggies were, in fact, EMPTY.
Could you explain the difference between a ‘Line Safety Officer’
and a normal ‘Safety Officer’?
I am assuming ( perhaps wrongly ) that the distinction is that
a ‘Line Safety Officer’ is, in fact, supposed to be ‘Out on the
Line’ and making sure the ‘Line’ resources are both…
1) Following all established Safety Procedures
2) Actually ‘intervening’ directly when it is discovered they are NOT
I also still think it’s astounding that Sciacca was NOT more
aware that there were TWO Hotshot Crews even working
the fire that day until he (apparently) ‘accidentally’ found that out.
Perhaps some of Sciacca’s testimony about how all anyone
ever told him was that there were ‘3 structure protection groups’,
and that Musser’s IAP ( Incident Action Plan ) apparently didn’t
even show the presence of 2 Hotshot crews… was some of
the evidence ADOSH used for their conclusion that there
was WAAAY too much emphasis on ‘structure protection’
going on that day… and not enough emphasis on the (true)
location and safety of ALL resources working the fire.
I’m sure this debate will continue for a loooong time.
WTKTT,
Fair enough, good comments. The Fireline Safety Officer (SOFR) functions as you stated, “on the fireline.” They are required to be Task Force Leader (TFLD) qualified pass the ‘arduous’ Pack Test. The Safety Officer Type 2 (SOF2) is Division/Group Supervisor (DIVS) qualified and only has to pass the moderate Pack Test. However, BOTH can and do function as SOFR on wildfires.SOF2 are often ordered to ‘FILL’ SOFR resource order requests. Such was the caseon the YHF.I think that BOTH Sciacca and Cole are Red Carded as Type I Safety Officers.
Yes, empty Crew Carriers would imply that the Crews are out on the firelines somewhere, but it is generally accepted and understood that they are practicing the WFF Rules wherever they are and whatever they’re doing. If I saw empty Crew Carriers, that’s how I would take it. In the light of what occured on the YHF, I will likely change my attitude toward those observations.
WTKTT posted that Safety Officers are to:ensure that the WFF are “1) Following all established Safety Procedures [and] 2) Actually ‘intervening’ directly when it is discovered they are NOT.”
Yes, to a point. Safety Officers can only intervene into the Operations realm when it is in fact a safety concern or potential safety concern. However, NOT all Safety Officers are proactive, as you are implying should have been the case in the YHF that day.
One consequence of Wildland Urban Interface (WUI) fires these days, is that the actual WILDLAND firefighting takes a back seat compared to the actual Structure Protection or now-called Structure Defense, after the YHF debacle.
>> RTS wrote…
>> Yes, to a point. Safety Officers can only intervene
>> into the Operations realm when it is in fact a
>> safety concern or potential safety concern.
>> However, NOT all Safety Officers are proactive,
>> as you are implying should have been the case
>> in the YHF that day.
I also did not meant to imply that the moment
Sciacca even might have ‘felt’ something
‘wasn’t quite right’… that he could have immediately
even done anything about it.
See my own quote below about how ( I don’t
know where I heard this but I believe it is true )
the ONLY time a ‘Safety Officer’ can immediately
override the normal ‘chain of command’ is when
there is, in fact, an IMMEDIATE threat to life or
serious injury.
Even if Sciacca had realized that not ALL of the
firefighters were ‘accounted for’ ( GM totally
missing ) circa 4:15… there would still have
been a number of other things that would have
had to have happened before he ( or anyone
else ) could have ‘intervened’.
There would have to have been enough SERIOUS
concern about their whereabouts AND about
the fire progress to really believe an ‘intervention’
countdown should have started.
Example: Clawson, Hulburd and Yowell were
right there on Shrine road with Sciacca. If
Sciacca had actually noticed the GM buggies
were EMPTY as they drove past him… he
MIGHT have then turned to one of them to
ask them if the knew what the heck was
going on and if they knew where GM really was.
That wouldn’t have done any good.
We can hear with our own ears in the Helmet Cam
video that all three of them (also) believed Granite
Mountain was ‘in the safe black’ and when the
MAYDAYS started to appear on Air-to-Ground
they were just as dumfounded as anyone as to
why Granite would be running saws and saying
they ‘deploying shelters’ in the safe black’.
So even if Sciacca was trying to determine exactly
where this ‘missing Hotshot crew’ really was…
his own concern could have then gotten
short-circuited if he trusted what someone
else near him was telling him.
The ONLY ‘countdown to intervention’ that would
have done any good is if he really did decide
for himself to trust no one’s ‘assumption’ about
where they were and had called them DIRECTLY
in the 4:15 to 4:30 timeframe.
It didn’t happen… but I sure wish it had.
WTKYY,
You more or less sum it up with this:
“We can hear with our own ears in the Helmet Cam video that all three of them (also) believed Granite Mountain was ‘in the safe black’ and when the MAYDAYS started to appear on Air-to-Ground they were just AS DUMBFOUNDED AS ANYONE as to why Granite would be running saws and saying they [were] ‘deploying shelters’ in the safe black’. WTF? WTF? WTF? WTF? WTF?
ALL of us, EVERY ONE of us feels that same way, EXCEPT for the rare few that believe that some strange, intense smoke or the possibility of some super-intense heat or possible lightning FORCING them out of their perfectly good SZ.
Funny you should mention lightning,
and that suddenly Olson and
xxfullsailxx are having an exchange
about it.
There is NEW EVIDENCE in Todd
Abel’s ADOSH interview that it was
more of a concern than anyone
has previously thought with
regards to GM and Sunday.
Like Shumate on Saturday…
Todd Abel was VERY worried
about it and told Marsh so.
I’m putting a post together about
it with the new info from Todd Abel.
Stay tuned.
Paul had only been there since that morning what do you expect his IAP to be. Is this even 24 hours after the start? Common man you’re doing alot of research but not showing allot of knowledge. You think that someone was running chick in during this, maybe people were showing up at a card table and presenting their Red Card that’s in the manual too.
You’re givng way too much credit for people having total SA. Listen to RTS he’s a carded SOF, probably wouldn’t have taken the time to show it that day..
Reply to WFF post on March 26, 2014 at 5:52 pm
>> WFF said…
>> Paul had only been there since that morning
>> what do you expect his IAP to be?
If it’s the ‘IAP’ he was (apparently) showing to
all the mid-afternoon inbound Type 2 ordered
overhead… I EXPECT it to be ACCURATE…
or at least not give the false impression that
there were ONLY ‘3 structure groups’ working
the fire.
>> WFF…
>> Is this even 24 hours after the start?
Start of the fire?
Start of the decision to try a Type 2 short?
Not sure what you mean there.
>> WFF
>> Common man you’re doing alot of research but
>> not showing allot of knowledge. You think that
>> someone was running chick in during this,
>> maybe people were showing up at a card table
>> and presenting their Red Card that’s in the
>> manual too.
Again… not fully ‘parsing’ what you were trying
to say there… but what I AM doing at the moment
is listening to the audio interviews and reading
all the transcripts of the recently released
ADOSH investigation material.
There is a LOT of it… and it is providing a level
of detail that’s long overdue.
We can debate the ‘actual’ check-in procedures
( flawed or not ) or the ‘actual’ job descriptions
for some of these people… but there is no longer
any mystery about what they, themselves, had
to say to ADOSH.
Sciacca SAYS he just ‘assumed’ the entire
Granite Mountain crew were ‘safe in their buggies’
circa 4:15 PM.
He was dead wrong.
>> WFF said…
>> You’re givng way too much credit for
>> people having total SA
Not asking for ‘total SA’. We all know that was
‘out the window’ at the Yarnell Hill Fire.
I was ‘hoping’ for at least ‘enough’ SA that a
Line Safety Officer ( at a moment when it was
absolutely critical to know where ALL the crews
were ) would not just ‘assume’ 19-20 firefighters
are in Crew Carriers… when they are NOT.
>> WFF also said.
>> Listen to RTS he’s a carded SOF, probably
>> wouldn’t have taken the time to show it that day.
I do listen to RTS.
I listen to YOU as well.
You both seem to know what you are talking about,
so why wouldn’t I?
RTS- thanks for at least ATTEMPTING to straighten out WTKTT.
WFF- forgot to mention… there has been some discussion about WTKTT being nothing more than an internet conspiracy theorist. i think that’s the lens through which to view his assertions…
Tough audience.
Thats a load from you.
I’ve seen worse.
WFF: please don’t beat your head against that brick wall. I appreciate what you’re saying, but trust me, it falls on deaf ears.
WTKTT makes a lot of assertions that are way off base and his evaluations of this entire incident carry very little water. he has ZERO wildland experience and has only recently (as of this incident i would guess) come to realize that wildland fire even exists. his learning curve is long, and his obstinate ignorance runs even deeper. this is where his criticisms come from… deep ignorance. oh, and nothing better to do.
besides, he’s an anonymous internet source… and you know how seriously people in the real world take anonymous internet sources.
WFF and xxfuelsailxx ??? Anonymous What
Don’t beat a dead horse that you are riding too…….. Although I have been taking you serious. An WTKTT has been doing a lot more research than any of us and giving good written feed back. Some time’s we all have to keep him on the right path. But he is really trying to help and I appreciate that. There are a lot here not willing to put there names out there and I am OK with That.
Those of us that put our real name out there have nothing to lose and we will be held to a higher standard because you know who we are.
Mackenzie Camera… Does anyone find it odd that the SAIT had the Mackenzie camera in their possession but chose to not include any photos or videos from the camera into the SAIR?
Question. The SAIR indicates GM began moving SOUTH about/ after 4:04pm. How was this time determined? From the Mackenzie camera?
Reply to calvin post on March 26, 2014 at 6:10 am
>> calvin said…
>>
>> Mackenzie Camera… Does anyone find it odd that the
>> SAIT had the Mackenzie camera in their possession but
>> chose to not include any photos or videos from the camera
>> into the SAIR?
I don’t believe the SAIT ever had the actual camera.
As the story goes ( one of them, anyway ), after someone
( Willis? Some other PFD person? ) took the camera away
from the deployment site *without* turning it over to the
YCSO police inestigators… it then somehow magically got
into the bag of MacKenzie’s personal effects that was
already over at the Medical Examiner’s office. The ‘chain
of possession’ on the camera itself up to that point is
still totally unknown. Then the Chino Valley FD people took
care of delivering the bags of personal effects back to
all the families.
When MacKenzie’s father got Christopher’s camera… the
original article says his stepdaughter was the one who
then discovered it had pictures/video on it.
Somehow a CD was made ( that managed to preserve all
the original date/time stamps and filenames ).
MacKenzie’s father brought that CD with him to Christopher’s
funeral in California. Darrell Willis was at that funeral.
Christohper’s father walked up to Willis and handed him
the CD and said something like “I think you need to see
this. It has photos and videos on it from Christopher’s
camera.”
Willis (supposedly) pretended to be ‘amazed’, and acted as
if he had no idea there ever was a ‘MacKenzie camera’.
Willis then delivers that CD ( or perhaps a COPY of it that
he made ) to the SAIT investigators.
There is no record that the SAIT ( or the YCSO police or
ADOSH ) ever requested to see the original camera.
That being said…
Yes… I do think it’s odd that no MacKenzie photos appeared
in the SAIR report.
Here is a possible scenario why…
The SAIT knew those photos/video/audio existed.
ADOSH didn’t know anything about it until Darrell Willis
‘announced’ he had seen them in his ADOSH interview.
The SAIT was NOT cooperating with ADOSH at that point.
It’s possible that the attorneys for Arizona Forestry were
still debating whether AFD had any obligation to release
the MacKenzie material publicly, or not… and so the SAIT
pressed forward ‘assembling’ their SAIR document under
the assumption they would NOT… and that no one would
ever know those photos existed.
At some point… the attorneys realized that it was GOING
to become public knowldege… so that that’s when they
decided to do a ‘co-release’ of both the SAIR document
AND the MacKenzie photos/videos on the SAME DAY.
Actually… the MacKenzie photos/videos were published
in public about 2 hours BEFORE the SAIR was published.
It was totally ‘coordinated’ with the Prescott Courier. The
Courier had all the photos/videos long before September
28, 2013 so they could do all the ‘prep’ for their own
article… but the Courier had secretly totally agreed to NOT
publish the material until the same moment the SAIR
was published.
So they did that. I think 10:00 AM was the target time on
the 28th… but then there was some kind of screw-up on
Arizona Forestry’s part and THEY didn’t get the SAIR
actually published until a few hours later than that.
>> calvin also asked…
>> Question. The SAIR indicates GM began moving SOUTH
>> about/ after 4:04pm. How was this time determined?
>> From the Mackenzie camera?
I believe so… and the ‘Parker’ photo.
I believe the SAIT was sure that they ‘left’ that rest spot to
head south based first on the Parker photo… and then the
MacKenzie material just ‘reinforced’ that timeframe when
the SAIT finally saw the MacKenzie material.
They added 60 seconds… and then just put the exact time
for them ‘heading south’ at 4:05 PM in the SAIR report.
BY THE WAY…
calvin… in the recently released ADOSH material, there
is a full explanation for why the dozer got caught in power
lines.
It’s in the Paul Musser interview transcript.
As it turns out… it wasn’t about ‘drooping’ powerlines at all.
Most of the powerlines in the west end of Glen Ilah were
actually ‘on the ground’ or partially so. It was a mess.
They had to wait for hours to get the power company to
confirm that all the juice was off… and they even wanted
the power company to come out and ‘cut’ some of the
lines so they could get the dozer out to the ranch to
start plowing the road to the deployment site.
The power company eventually confirmed that all those
lines were ‘dead’… but they refuse to come out and
cut or clear anything. They told Paul Musser and Todd
Abel to just ‘drive through them’… ‘do whatever you want’…
so they tried that… and that’s when the dozer got totally
tangled in some of the powerlines.
From Musser’s ADOSH interview transcript ( page 54 )…
8-16-13/9:00 am – Case # Musser
Q=Brett Steurer
Q1=Bruce Hanna
Q2=Barry Hicks
Q3=Paul Katz
A=Paul Musser
A: Uh, to get us in there. Still active fire going on structures and
stuff. Uh, a lot of power lines down. Um, so we had to figure how
we could get in and get around the power lines and stuff like that.
Q2: Right.
A: …to gain ground access. Met with, uh, APS ( Arizona Public
Service – Utility Company ) – several different people in APS to
make sure that everything was dead. Which took us a while to do.
‘Cause we had confirmation that it was dead, but I couldn’t talk to
the person that gave that confirmation, so…
Q2: Oh yeah.
A: …so I had to talk to them personally that everything was dead,
um, because we were gonna bring a dozer in to, uh, help clean
up and create access. Tried to get them to cut the lines, they said
just push it over and move on. Which then tangled up in the
dozer and…
Q2: Right.
A: …so we had to deal with a few of those things. But once
we were able to clear access, um, and then we got the dozer
in, uh, later that night. I don’t know what time it was – midnight
maybe.
So this entry is just speculation. You know you have a pretty good research ability, lots to detail. Just provide information, leave out the conspiracy Mulder.
It’s not just speculation. I did all the research and provided the trail of evidence of the camera in December-January. Based on FACTS. Check it out!
And She is right.
Thank you!
Reply to WFF post on March 27, 2014 at 10:34 am
>> WFF wrote…
>> So this entry is just speculation.
Nope. The only thing ‘speculative’ about it is
the fact that a crucial pieced of physical evidence
that SHOULD have gone through the normal YCSO
police investigator’s ‘chain of evidence’ procedures
somehow ended up OUTSIDE that process…
…and we don’t fully know how ( or why ).
>> WFF wrote…
>> You know you have a pretty good research
>> ability, lots to detail. Just provide information,
>> leave out the conspiracy Mulder.
I’ve never used that word.
That is YOU ‘using that word’.
The facts will be the facts… when they are
(finally) fully known.
Writing as the one who spent about a month and a half during the holidays piecing this together, thinking I had discovered something significant:
The thing I learned from this, regarding the SAIR, was that it, IN FACT, was NOT a real investigation. That was a real eye-opener to me.
It didn’t/doesn’t MATTER (legally) that the camera, cellphones, GPS units, etc, were not entered into the chain of evidence. It doesn’t MATTER (legally) whether anybody told the truth or not. It doesn’t MATTER whether anybody heard the conversation when the Granite Mountain Hotshots were discussing their options and making their decision. (As I have written repeatedly, we DON’T KNOW what they decided, much less why they decided it; all we know are the consequences; EVERYTHING else is SPECULATION).
No truth was required in any of this so-called “investigation.” There was no legal enforcement for ANYTHING.
It didn’t MATTER whatsoever that the Yavapai Sheriff’s Department was gathering anything. They may as well have not even been involved in any of it. It didn’t MATTER whether or not they sent the cellphones they gathered from the deployment site to be investigated.
As a citizen and a concerned person, my biggest “lesson learned” by my involvement in this ASAIT has been that, given that there is no obligation to actually discern the factual truth in this event, and nothing to actually/legally hold anybody accountable to disclosing it, there is mostly NO BASIS for determining ANYTHING, much less anything related to any “lessons learned.”
Wildland Fire Fighters beware.
There is nothing in any of this so-called “investigation” that has anything to do with either a commitment to the facts of the incident, or, thus, to learning anything real (and, thus in YOUR interest) from it.
And by “this ‘so-called investigation'” I don’t mean the ASAIT, I mean the SAIT. The ASAIT has no teeth, no power, unless someone decides to do something with what the ASAIT has done.
Apparently, the SAIT decided to have no power, either.
Yes, I find it very odd. And in spite of what xxfullsailxx thinks, I think there have been several of odd things the ASAIT has uncovered that none of the 3 official reports did, in addition to a long list of contributing or casual factors that the SAIT blew by.
Mcdonough 7/5/2013 YIN… says at 1445 he takes the weather 3 times and decides it is time to move
Mcdonough 8/20/2013 ADOSH interview…. says he left his lookout post at approximately 1550.
Interestingly, Mcdonough refuses to guesstimate on any times during the ADOSH interview, except the lookout departure time, which, he remembers DIFFERENTLY than he did just 5 days after the YHF incident.
Follow up…. Mcdonough does state that he did have a written “unit log” that (a copy)was provided to the SAIT. The ADOSH team asked to see the original copy during Mcdonough’s interview.
I would like to see this document. Specifically the time of the last weather observation.
In his ADOSH interview… the ADOSH investigators asked
Brendan if he still had the ‘original’ document. Brendan
said he wasn’t sure if he still had it or not ( hard to
believe he wouldn’t know one way or the other but that’s
what he told ADOSH ).
ADOSH investigators said flat-out… “We think we’ll need
to see that” and Brendan said he would “check and see
if he still had it.”
Brendan also then told him that he definitely gave a
COPY of his original document to the SAIT.
I don’t see the document ANYWHERE in the recently
released ADOSH material… nor does it appear to
have ever been released in the SAIT FOIA/FOIL
package.
Either Brendan did NOT give a copy to the SAIT, or
that’s just one more thing that is still ‘missing’ from
the SAIT materials that they are ‘withholding’ from
FOIA/FOIL requests.
Followup…
It is now an established FACT that Brendan DID
give copies of his original Weather reports and
Field logs to the SAIT investigators.
Lori Burkeen, of the Prescott Legal Department,
has confirmed this in emails to ADOSH dated
September 17, 2013.
Lori was responding to document requests from
ADOSH and informed them that she was
told ( by Marsha Collier of Prescott Fire ) that
McDonough told Collier he could no longer
find his originals because he had ‘cleaned out
his car’… and that if ADOSH wanted the copies
of those documents that Brendan gave to
the SAIT… ADOSH would have to contact SAIT.
The SAIT was not cooperating with ADOSH
circa September.
Brendan’s documents were also never included
in the official SAIT FOIA/FOIL release package…
…and they SHOULD have been.
There were ‘withheld’ from FOIA requests by
Arizona Forestry… for unknown reasons.
Reply to calvin post on March 26, 2014 at 3:25 am
>> calvin said…
>> Interestingly, Mcdonough refuses to guesstimate on any times
>> during the ADOSH interview, except the lookout departure time,
>> which, he remembers DIFFERENTLY than he did just 5 days
>> after the YHF incident.
It’s obvious in his ADOSH interview that Brendan’s private
attorney ( she was with him at the interview ) had already
advised him NOT to even try and mention any times.
Brendan makes an ‘announcement’ to that effect at the start
of the interview… as if prompted by his attorney to do so.
Matter of fact… it’s not recorded in the transcript… but if you
listen to the AUDIO recording of Brendan’s ADOSH
interview… the first time ( early in the interview ) when
anyone asked him about a ‘time’… there is a slight pause
and I believe you can hear Brendan’s attorney ‘whispering’
to him. That’s when Brendan makes his ‘announcement’
that ‘the times really fuzzy to me that day so I’m not going
to try and even say any times’.
I believe what happened there is that Brendan already knew
he had been getting into trouble with his ‘times’ between his
media interviews and his SAIT interview… and his attorney
was now telling him he better lay off saying anything about
any times altogether.
Thanks, yeah, I did listen to Mcdonough’s interview. He was pretty non committal on just about everything.
If you listen to all of the other interviews and gauge
the ‘level of cooperation’ exhibited by just about
everyone else… then on a scale of 1 to 10
for ‘freely sharing information’ and/or ‘willingness
to cooperate with the investigation’… Brendan’s
interview rates about a 1.5.
He didn’t want to be there.
He wasn’t seeing ‘the point’ of it all.
He even admitted during the interview that he,
himself, had been using Google Earth to
review the area prior to that interview ( 2 or
3 times since the incident, I think he said )…
…but then when they fired up Google Earth
at the interview he mostly just said “These
maps are horrible” and “I don’t recognize
anything”.
They even let him drive Google Earth, eventually,
because he knew how to do it better than they
did… but he still wasn’t telling them much of
anything at all.
**
** LINE SAFETY OFFICER TONY SCIACCA THOUGHT
** GRANITE MOUNTAIN CREW WERE IN THEIR TRUCKS
ADOSH’s actual transcript of their 8/20/13 interview with Yarnell Hill Fire
Line Safety Officer Tony Sciacca is here…
INTERVIEW WITH TONY SCIACCA
8/20/13 – 8:48 am – Case # Sciacca
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/20inrene9tcx74a/lp4KiC6kbk/ADOSH%20Yarnell%20Hill%20Investigation/City%20of%20Prescott%20Fire%20–%20GMHS/Employee%20Interviews%20by%20ADOSH/Transcripts
When Tony Sciacca’s actual ‘unit logs’ were released just a few weeks ago…
we finally learned that he was, in fact, clocked in and ‘on duty’ as the one-and-only
Line Safety Officer hired for the Yarnell Hill Fire as early as 1500 ( 3:00 PM )
on June 20, 2013.
That’s a full 1 hour and 42 minutes BEFORE GM’s deployment.
The person hired to be the overall ‘Safety Officer’ ( Marty Cole, also from
Prescott like Sciacca ) wasn’t there yet and didn’t even arrive in Yarnell until
just before the actual deployment.
In Sicacca’s actual ADOSH interview ( now publicy available )…
…we learn a lot more.
Sciacca did, indeed, arrive at the Model Creek ICP even before 3:00 PM
( 2:55 PM ) and was fully ‘clocked in’ and ‘on the job’ in his contracted
‘Line Safety Officer’ capacity just before 3:00 PM that day.
Sciacca checked in with Roy Hall, IC, right at 1500 ( 3:00 PM ) and asked the
standard “Whadda ya got” query. Sciacca said Hall was already overloaded and
just said “Well look (at) it. I got a mess.” Hall was too ‘busy’ to even give Sciacca
any kind of proper briefing and basically blew him off and punted him over
to OPS2 Paul Musser.
From page 10 of Sciacca’s interview transcript…
A = Tony Sciacca
_________________________________________________________________
A: Came in and tied in with Roy. And I said, you know, asked him what he had
and he said, “Well look (at) it, I got a mess.” He told me that, uh, he was busy.
He had a lot of distractions going on at the time. I asked him, I said, “So, uh,
you have a safety officer?” and he goes, “Well tie in with Paul Musser.”
Tied in with Paul and I said, “Hey, you know, what do you
got going?” and he says, “Well I’ve got three structure protection groups
going on,” and Byron Kimball was there.
He was there as the FBA and, uh, we were talking about what
was going to happen and, uh, I looked at Paul and I said, “Is your safety
officer here yet?” “No, not yet. He’s not around,” so I said, “Well can you
preference for me?” “Well no.” I said, “Well I’m going to tie in with, uh,
Willis on that north end,” because I know Darrell and we work together a lot, so.
_________________________________________________________________
So Musser himself bascially ‘blows him off’ as well and only informs
Sciacca that there are ‘3 structure groups’ working the fire with NO
mention of Granite Mountain OR Blue Ridge Hotshots.
Sciacca even says Musser (quickly) showed him a piece of paper that
Musser was calling his IAP ( Incident Action Plan ), which just had a bunch
of handwritten notes on it about ‘Structure groups’ and approximately where
they were working. There was nothing on OPS2 Musser’s own IAP about
ANY ‘Type 1 Hotshots’ even working on the fire. It was just all about
‘structure protection groups’ working the fire.
NOTE that Sciacca also OFFERED to sub in ( at that moment ) and be the
overall ‘Safety Officer’ ( something Sciacca was also fully qualified to do )
since there wasn’t one working the fire circa 3:00 PM… but OPS2 Paul Musser
said NO… he didn’t need/want him for that.
Sciacca then just leaves the ICP to go find his buddy Darrell Willis.
He finds Willis, gets a good clone from Willis’ radio, and then sets off
ON HIS OWN just trying to fulfill his ‘Line Safety Officer’ duties and first
just find out ( again, on his own ) who the heck was working the fire and
where the heck they were working.
Even Willis didn’t tell him that there were TWO full Hotshot Crews working the
south end of the fire… so even at this point… Sciacca is only ‘looking for’ 3
‘structure groups’.
Once Sciacca got a feel for who was fighting the fire up NORTH, he moved
towards Yarnell to get the same ‘eyes on’ who was working the fire down there
and he bumped into Gary Cordes.
This was now around 1600 ( 4:00 PM ) and when Sciacca bumped into Cordes
he was also ultra-busy and already actively “pulling all his people off the fire”.
Cordes told him about the Youth Camp at the end of Shrine road and
that that is where his ‘people’ were currently evacuating from.
So this is now when Siacca is already known to have gone down the Shrine
road and now we learn that he went all the way down to the Youth Camp,
where the Blue Ridge and Granite Mountain vehicles had been staged…
but are now ‘evacuating’.
This is really the first moment that Line Safety Officer Sciacca became
aware that the Blue Ridge and Granite Mountain Hotshots were even
there at all… when he first saw all the Hotshot Crew vehicles LEAVING
the Youth Camp.
Page 15 of Sciacca’s interview…
_______________________________________________________________
A: So when I – yeah, when I came around, trying to figure out who was in
Yarnell when that fire was coming there I wanted to see…
Q1: Right.
A: I pulled in. Sheriff had some evacuations going on.
Q1: Right.
A: And I drove up that canyon, that’s when I saw the Blue Ridge
and the Granite Mountain buggies.
I was told by, uh, one of the Engine Captains there was a piece of dozer line
that I never saw that was in there some place and they – I saw – when I was up
in this little draw here, Blue Ridge came out with, uh, looked like they were
three engines, a water tender, Blue Ridge Hotshot buggies and Granite
Mountain Hotshot buggies. And everybody was driving out.
Q1: Coming out?
A: Coming out. And I was like, well I guess everybody’s in the buggies. You
don’t ask those questions.
________________________________________________________________
So not only was this the first moment that the only ‘Line Safety Officer’ on
the fire that day even became aware there were two full Type 1
Hotshot crews working the fire… he also believed that both Hotshot
crews were already simply ‘in their buggies’ as they passed by him
and evacuated the area.
Sciacca then got totally absorbed in what he called the ‘public safety aspect’
of being a ‘Safety Officer’, since he saw people on Shrine road just walking
their dogs and was telling them to “get out of here!”… and he made no other
attempt to determine the whereabouts of Granite Mountain… until someone
told him about 30 minutes later that there had been a deployment ( because he
wasn’t even monitoring Air to Ground and didn’t hear any of that traffic himself ).
He had seen all FOUR of the GM vehicles leaving the Youth Camp and
he had just *assumed* they were all onboard, and safe.
Sciacca said:
“And I was like, well I guess everybody’s in the buggies.
You don’t ask those questions.”
Are you f**king kidding me?
“You don’t ask those questions.”
Really?… even when you are being paid to be a ‘Line Safety Officer’
and it’s time for you know EXACTLY where ALL the crews are?
Unbelievable.
One more ‘lesson’ ( for future Safety Officers ) to take away from
the Yarnell Hill Fire…
Just because you see Crew Carriers driving by you… do NOT
*assume* anyone is actually IN them.
Find OUT if they are… and if not… then find out WHERE that entire
crew REALLY is… ASAP.
I wish Sciacca had. I really do.
There was still time for him to have gotten on the horn and found
out EXACTLY where they were… EXACTLY what they were DOING
and what their plans were… and if they were SAFE ( and going to
remain so ).
Sciacca says he saw BR and GM buggies coming out. He doesn’t say anything about Supt trucks or chase trucks. TOL…. if Sciacca had seen Eric’s supt truck (with Eric driving it) it would seem that Sciacca would have communicated directly with him. Since he knew him (presumably quite well.) If he saw GM supt truck with someone else driving it (Mcdonough) it would seem logical to actually ASK where Eric Marsh was.
WTKTT…. did you add that Sciacca saw All FOUR GM vehicles? Is that your opinion?
Reply to calvin post on March 26, 2014 at 3:09 am
>> calvin said…
>> Sciacca says he saw BR and GM buggies coming out.
Yes… but BEFORE he says that he says this…
“And I drove up that canyon, that’s when I saw the Blue
Ridge and the Granite Mountain buggies. I was told by, uh,
one of the Engine Captains there was a piece of dozer line
that I never saw that was in there some place.”
You are technically correct that he never specifically
says he saw all FOUR of the GM vehicles… but from
what he says above it would *appear* that two things
happened…
1) He made it down to the Youth Camp in time to
see ALL of the vehicles that were there since he
actually SPOKE to one of the engine captains
back there just BEFORE the entire convoy
started to head out. If that is the case… then whether
he actually SAW the GM Supt truck and GM Chase
truck there… they WERE there to be seen.
>> calvin also said…
>> He doesn’t say anything about Supt trucks or
>> chase trucks.
See above. Never mentions them specifically but if
he went as far back as he says he did and was
talking to one of the engine captains back there…
all FOUR of the GM vehicles were there.
>> calvin also wrote…
>> if Sciacca had seen Eric’s supt truck (with Eric driving it)
>> it would seem that Sciacca would have communicated
>> directly with him. Since he knew him (presumably quite
>> well.)
Yes. Sciacca knew Eric. He ALSO knew Brendan quite
well. Sciacca knew Brendan even before he started
taking fire classes and even before Brendan joined
the GM Hotshots. Brendan’s MOTHER used to work
for ‘Forestry’ and Sciacca knew her as well.
Brendan was THERE… and he WAS driving the
GM Supt truck… but apparently Sciacca either never
saw him or didn’t have time to speak to him.
>> If he saw GM supt truck with someone else driving it
>> (Mcdonough) it would seem logical to actually
>> ASK where Eric Marsh was.
Yes, it would.
We also know now ( from the recently released
redacted Blue Ridge unit logs )… that Brendan was
actually the SECOND vehicle in that convoy that
left the Youth Camp. Brendan drove out right
behind the first BR Utility truck that was LEADING
the convoy and that’s why we don’t see him as
part of the convoy in the BR video of them all
driving south on Highway 89. Brendan WAS in
that convoy… but he was NOT back there with
the GM Carriers. He was, in fact, one of the LEAD
trucks and was in front of the cameraman in
the second BR Crew Carrier.
Regardless…
I would think that even if Sciacca had seen Brendan
driving the GM Supt truck ( instead of Marsh )… that
should have struck him as a little ‘funny’ and then
caused him to verify what was going on and whether
or not the GM crew really WERE in those buggies,
or not.
He (Sciacca) didn’t do that.
Whether he ever ‘caught a glimpse’ of who was
driving the GM Supt truck or not…
He just assumed the entire GM crew were all ‘safe’
in their buggies.
>> WTKTT…. did you add that Sciacca saw
>> All FOUR GM vehicles? Is that your opinion?
See above. It’s not an opinion… it’s an assumption
based on exactly what Sciacca says he did ( went
all the way back to the Youth Camp and had time
to speak with an engine captain before THEN
witnessing all the vehicles leaving. )
Sciacca himlself ‘stayed’ back there to make sure
EVERYONE got out. He says there was one last
firefighter walking towards the last engine and
Sciacca purposely stayed back there to be sure
he witnessed this last FF actually get INTO that
engine… and then Sciacca personally led that
engine ‘out of there’ making sure it was in his
rear view mirror.
It sounds like to me Tony self dispatched. He just showed up and expected people to fit him in. He asks if Musser can you “preference me”, that’s not Paul’s call and he wouldn’t have had time for that. There was already an assigned SOF. Your a SOF no ones going to question it just do it. Tony was pimping at the wrong time. A briefing in that kind of chaos is thin at best, you get immediate SA in your AO and get to work. The team was behind the fire and just trying protect the public thats the only option they could engage in, suppression was over. Its clear that they needed help just get in there pick some ground to help with, tie into who is there, and start helping. Why would you ask if the crew is in the buggies? There are people walking their dogs, the SO has evacs going, and you’re going to stop say “hey is everyone here” Tony was prioritzing and going to protect the public was the call. Everyone including GM was aware of that. It’s what caused them to make their decisions.
Even if Tony had been aware that GM wasn’t there, BR wasn’t in their buggies either. What was he going to do run around trying to locate them. What in those conditions would have indicated to him that they needed special attention over the public and structure protection groups.
Is there anyone here that believes that WFF should have packed up and disengaged leaving structure protection?
>> Reply to WFF post on March 26, 2014 at 8:13 am
>>
>> It sounds like to me Tony self dispatched.
>> He just showed up and expected people to fit him in.
>> He asks if Musser can you “preference me”, that’s
>> not Paul’s call and he wouldn’t have had time for that.
>> There was already an assigned SOF. Your a SOF no
>> ones going to question it just do it. Tony was pimping
>> at the wrong time.
Tony Sciacca was specifically called and ‘asked’ to
come to Yarnell and serve as a ‘Line Safety Officer’
by Glen Joki… Roy Hall’s right-hand-man ( Deputy ).
A BIG problem that day… though… was that it was really
Roy Hall and Glen Joki who were doing the ‘pimping’
and it was outside of the ROSS system ( which Roy
said he didn’t want to deal with ).
There was this incredible confusion that day because
shortly after trying to fire up the day with the ‘Type 2
short team’ decided on the night before… they realized
that wasn’t going to get the cows in the barn… so then
they were trying to ‘ramp up’ ( off the ROSS system )
to a ‘fully Type 2 team’. That’s when guys like Jason
Clawson, Aaron Hulburd and Casey (KC) Yowell
from Prescott got thrown into the mix.
But then it was shortly after all this ‘off the ROSS radar’
ramp up to full type 2 was the moment they decided
even THAT wasn’t going to be good enough so the
decided to skip Type 2 altogether and go straight to
the ordering process for a full Type 1 incident.
So all this ‘off the radar’ ordering turned into a mess
as people like Clawson showed to supposedly help
with a ‘Type 2’ incident but it was already going up
the ladder to ‘Type 1’.
Regardless… There is no mention of whether Sciacca
was an ‘off the ROSS radar’ ( at 1:50 PM Sunday which
is when Glen Joki called him )… but Sciacca was
definitely ASKED to be there as a ‘Line Safety Officer’.
The only difference is that Sciacca left Prescott as
soon as Joki asked him to work Yarnell over the
phone… but Marty Cole ( overall SO ) just waited in
Prescott most of the afternoon for his ‘paperwork’
to appear before he even bothered to leave Prescott.
From Tony Sciacca’s ADOSH interview transcript…
________________________________________________
ADOSH INTERVIEW WITH TONY SCIACCA
August 20, 2013 – 8:48 AM
Q=Bruce Hanna
Q1=Barry Hicks
Q2=Dave Larsen ( Rest in Peace )
A=Tony Sciacca
A2=Jon Paladini
Page 9…
Q1: Uh, yeah. Uh, so, uh, could you, uh, could you, uh,
walk us through, uh, from the time you got ordered for
the Yarnell Hill fire and, uh, uh, and actually, uh, take us
back a little before you got – actually got ordered ‘cause
I – it seems like you and Roy might have had some
conversations or you and somebody had some
conversations if – if you could take us back to…
A: Yeah.
Q1: …that and then up through the ordering process till
when you actually arrived?
A: Yeah I basically got – heard – I heard from Glenn Joki
who was working as – he usually works as Roy’s Deputy
on that team.
Q1: Right.
A: He was at the dispatch center there at, uh, Arizona.
Gives me a call and says, “Hey, can you come down be
safety officer – line safety officer?” “Sure.”
That was about, eh, ten minutes to 2:00 thereabouts.
I kind of knew it was coming. I jumped in the car.
Drove, uh, you know 55 minutes down the hill.
I showed up, um, at the school there in Yarnell about five
minutes to 3:00, thereabouts. And Roy and I – Roy was
there, another retired Forest Service guy.
Q1: Right.
________________________________________________
>> WFF also said…
>> The team was behind the fire and just trying protect the >> public that’s the only option they could engage in,
>> suppression was over.
Not exactly correct at YHF. Not in the timeframe when
Sciacca met with Cordes and went down the Shrine
road. Suppression was still active up NORTH… and
the moment Sicacca ‘bumped into’ Cordes down
in Yarnell… Cordes was actually ( at THAT moment,
anyway ) more focused on making sure all FFs
were evacuating, since THAT trigger point had
just been met and it was time to ‘get ’em out of Dodge’.
He (Cordes) has just given the order for ALL firefighters
to EVACUATE… and that’s why he was up near the
Shrine road area. He had set a specific trigger point
for Yarnell evacuations. That had been met more than
a half-hour earlier and was was ‘in progress’ with
YCSO fully in charge of that. Cordes had ALSO
set ANOTHER trigger point for “All firefighters off
the fire” and THAT trigger point had just been met
before Sciacca runs into Cordes so THAT was
the priority ‘at that moment’.
Sciacca did not go down Shrine road looking for
citizens. He initially went down there because Cordes
just told him that’s where all his ‘resources’ were
evacuating from and it was his job as Line Safety
Officer to go make sure that was happening.
Which he did.
Sciacca was so concerned about making sure
all the FFs were ‘out of there’ that he waited ‘back
there’ near the youth camp until the last FF that
was walking to an engine got into the truck, and
he personally led that truck out of there.
It was only AFTER he was sure that all the firefighters
were ‘out of that area’ ( his first priority ) that he then
saw people on Shrine road just standing around in
shorts looking at the fire and saw people (quote)
“walking their poodles like nothing was happening”.
Only THEN did he turn his attention to helping any
‘citizens’. He thought both Hotshot crews AND all
the other FFs were now ‘safe in their buggies’ and
evacuated off the fire. He was wrong.
>> WFF also wrote…
>> Its clear that they needed help just get in there pick
>> some ground to help with, tie into who is there,
>> and start helping.
Which is exactly what Sciacca did… but the FIRST
priority ( at THAT time ) was making sure all FFs
were ‘getting off the fire’ and into a SAFE place.
>> WFF also wrote…
>> Why would you ask if the crew is in the buggies?
Why would you NOT ( If you are a Safety Officer? ).
See above. The EXACT priority at that EXACT moment
when Sciacca jumped in down there as ‘Line Safety
Officer’ was to make sure all FFs were evacuating.
Sciacca didn’t get lost in warning ‘civilians’ when he
first went down Shrine road. He knew what the
priority was ‘at that moment’ and he went ALL the
way to the Youth Camp out of concern for ALL of
the fireghters back there.
Only when he was ( mistakenly ) sure all the FFs
were ‘off the fire and safe’ did he start warning civilians.
If he had only known that the Crew Buggies he saw
go by were EMPTY… he might have gotten on the
radio to find out EXACTLY where that entire CREW
really was… and the outcome that afternoon might
have been different.
A ‘Safety Officer’ ( or ‘Line Safety Officer’ ) is allowed
( and, indeed, is SUPPOSED to ) override the normal
chain-of-command when there is a (quote from the
manual) “Immediate threat to life or risk of serious injury”.
In the 4:20 to 4:39 timeframe… if any ‘Safety Officer’ at the
Yarnell Hill Fire had been aware of both 1) Exactly where
Granite was ( in the box canyon ) 2) The actual fire
progression in their area…
…that would have CERTAINLY constituted an ‘immediate
threat to life’ for that crew and any Safety officer working
the fire would have been able to directly ORDER them to
take immediate life-saving measures ( go back, change
course, get the hell out of there NOW, whatever ).
Your descriptions of what you think a WFF ‘Safety
Officer’ is supposed to do or be responsible for
doing obviously aren’t matching my understanding.
Do you have a link to an actual job description, or the
course materials for certification as an SO or LSO?
Ok thats not the way it was presented, but fair enough. I know Tony so I don’t have a doubt that he was doing a good job. No one knows Casey as KC he goes by Bucky, him, Clawson, and Hulburd work for the FS in Prescott so they could have been IA at the very least closest resource. If Roy felt that he needed to go outside ROSS, then he knew he was behind or would be soon.
You want to learn about SOFs go to the SWCC site on the left side below the title “Fire Management and Administration” click on Training on the right side click on National Incident Qualifications and Certifications System (IQCS). You know a manual but don’t know IQCS? I’m not aware of a qual. called LSO.
Saying that if Tony had asked or known where GM was things would have turned out different is purely speculation. I doubt in that confusion he would have done any better than anyone else did and I like Tony. They were only in a life threatening position going into and in the drainage and ORDERING them is drama. If they were hiding their intentions/actiions then why would Tony have accomplished what no-one else did? I didn’t give a description of what I think a SOF is responsible for I discribed what I thought Tony was probably doing under those circumstances.
Reply to WFF post on
March 26, 2014 at 5:27 pm
>> WFF said…
>>
>> Ok that’s not the way it was presented,
>> but fair enough. I know Tony so I don’t
>> have a doubt that he was doing a
>> good job.
I don’t ( know this Sciacca ) guy.
All I have to go on is his OWN unit logs
( and now ) his own ‘story’ that he told
ADOSH investigators.
>> No one knows Casey as KC he
>> goes by Bucky
Ah… ok… thanks.
His actual ‘unit designation’ name
in the ROSS computer system is…
Yowell, KC ( AZ-PDC ).
>> him, Clawson, and Hulburd work for the
>> FS in Prescott so they could have been
>> IA at the very least closest resource.
That is exactly what happened when this
Roy Hall guy realized the type 2 short
wasn’t cutting the mustard. He told
everyone around him ( Bea too ) to
‘order close and get them here ASAP’.
He said so in his own SAIT investigation
notes. Prescott was only 55 minutes away
so he was ‘preferencing Prescott’ to try
and flush out the type 2 short to a full type 2.
>> If Roy felt that he needed to go outside
>> ROSS, then he knew he was behind or
>> would be soon.
There is no actual documented ‘moment’
when they all realized the type 2 short
that had been decided on the night before
just wasn’t enough horsepower… but it
was shortly after the actual morning
briefings on Sunday.
>> You want to learn about SOFs go to the
>> SWCC site on the left side below the title
>> “Fire Management and Administration”
>> click on Training on the right side click
>> on National Incident Qualifications and
>> Certifications System (IQCS). You know
>> a manual but don’t know IQCS? I’m not
>> aware of a qual. called LSO.
Thanks for the link(s).
>> WFF also said…
>> Saying that if Tony had asked or known
>> where GM was things would have turned
>> out different is purely speculation.
Of course it is.
>> WFF also said…
>> I doubt in that confusion he would have
>> done any better than anyone else did
>> and I like Tony.
See a post somewhere above.
If Sciacca had realized GM wasn’t in
their buggies… and even felt like a lifting
a finger to find out where they REALLY
were… there’s still a good chance he
might have just asked someone who
was right there with him on Shrine
road like Clawson, Hulburd or Yowell.
That wouldn’t have done any good.
We can hear with our own ears now
in the Helmet-Cam that they were just
as convinced GM was in ‘safe-black’
at that moment as fire overhead was.
The only thing that *might* have made a
difference is if Sciacca had wisely decided
not to trust what anyone was ‘assuming’
and had called GM directly in the 4:15
to 4:30 timeframe.
I wish he had.
>> WFF also said…
>> They were only in a life threatening
>> position going into and in the drainage
>> and ORDERING them is drama. If they
>> were hiding their intentions/actiions then
>> why would Tony have accomplished
>> what no-one else did?
See above. Maybe. Maybe not.
It would have depended how insistent
Sciacca was being on knowing EXACTLY
where they were, EXACTLY where they
going, and EXACTLY how much they
knew about the fire in their area.
Even so… they may still have even given
Line Safety Officer Sciacca the ‘run around’
and the same ‘obtuse talk’ they were
practicing that afternoon… even if he HAD
called them directly in the 4:15 to 4:30 timeframe,
So yea… there’s only a SMALL chance
Line Safety Officer Sciacca could have
made a difference in the final outcome
for GM… but it’s a moot discussion, anyway,
because he never even tried.
>> WFF also said…
>> I didn’t give a description of what I think a
>> SOF is responsible for I discribed what I
>> thought Tony was probably doing under
>> those circumstances.
Copy that. Titles actually didn’t mean
much at that point. The shit was hitting
the fan so hard the blades were brown.
Wow… We must be at a standstill for opinions and evidence if people are stooping to name calling and cussing in their messages… Been away for a while, time to do it again, don’t think I am missing much…
Not sure if this has been assessed in all of the discussions….
20130630 161620 VLAT split 1 EP on Youtube, Elizabeth Nowicki uploaded, to me it sounds like, right around the 0:53 mark that I hear “Granite Mountain coming off the mid slope, heading SOuth”, “heading to the structures”….
NOT VERBATIM, just paraphrased. Do we know who is actually speaking??? Is it Marsh, Steed???
Reply to Rocksteady on March 25, 2014 at 9:52 am
>> Rocksteady said…
>>
>> 20130630 161620 VLAT split 1 EP on Youtube, Elizabeth
>> Nowicki uploaded, to me it sounds like, right around the
>> 0:53 mark that I hear “Granite Mountain coming off the mid
>> slope, heading SOuth”, “heading to the structures”….
>>
>> Not sure if this has been assessed in all of the discussions
It has ( somewhat… perhaps not enough yet )… and you are
confirming that you also hear what others do.
>> Rocksteady also said…
>> NOT VERBATIM, just paraphrased. Do we know who is
>> actually speaking??? Is it Marsh, Steed???
There appears to be little doubt that it is Marsh who speaks
first in response to the “Granite Mountain… what’s your
status?” query… and Marsh informs the caller that “the guys”
are heading “SOUTH”… and then it appears to be Jesse
Steed who quickly adds to that with his own ‘status report’ and
says “We’ll be pushin’ our way down into the structures.”
The following is a reprint of what I ( me, personally ) believe
to be a full transcript of that particular AIR STUDY video,
INCLUDING the part at the start of the video where ASM2
is actually requesting that someone ‘check on them’…
which is the REASON for the “Granite mountain… what’s
your status?” query that happens a few seconds later.
ECITW ( Every Caveat In The World )
This is what I ( me, personally ) believe is being said in the
background of this video. Your mileage may, of course, vary.
Almost two months ago… from Chapter IV ( FOUR )
of this ongoing discussion…
WantsToKnowTheTruth on January 31, 2014 at 4:15 am said:
Actually… here is what I believe is the FULL transcript of that
video… including the part at the very beginning which is
what causes someone to actually call Granite Mountain
to ask them what their status was ( at 4:16 ).
What is actually captured at the start of this video is someone
confirming with ASM2 that he ( ASM2 / Bravo 33 ) can
actually SEE Granite Mountain ‘behind those hills’ and ‘on the
corner of the fire’… but ASM2 is concerned that they keep
saying they are ‘comfortable’ where he can see them.
ASM2 says that is ‘not credible’ ( based on the fire behavior
he is seeing at 4:16 ) and he INSISTS that someone
on the ground call Granite Mountain and at least insure that
DIVS A (Marsh) is ‘with them’. ASM2 was being forced to play
double duty as Air Attack at this point since Rory Collins
abruptly left the area a few minutes earlier… and ASM2 needs
to KNOW if ‘DIVS A’ ( or simply ‘Alpha’, as ASM2 says ) is
actually with GM where he can see them down there at 4:16 PM.
HUGE CAVEAT: This is MY best interpretation of the background
audio for that entire video. Your mileage may vary, of course, but
I would put money on the following translation for the background
captured radio traffic in this ENTIRE AIR STUDY video…
AIR STUDY VIDEO 20130630_161620 STARTS
+0:08.23
(Unknown): ASM2, Copy that… behind the hills is where you
place Granite Mountain?
+12.726
(ASM2): They’re on the corner just repeatedly saying that they’re
comfortable and that’s not credible. ASK him whether Alpha can
be placed WITH them.
NOTE: A few seconds later… Someone OTHER than who
ASM2 was just talking to ( someone with what sounds like a
Cajun accent? ) does exactly what ASM2 just TOLD them to do.
He calls Granite Mountain directly and asks them to report their STATUS. If the time stamp on the AIR STUDY video can be
trusted then it is now about 4:17 PM, just before the SAIR says
they are about to leave the two-track road and drop into the box
canyon at approximately 4:20 PM.
+0:40.52
(Unknown): Granite Mountain ( Five? )…
What’s your status right now?
NOTE: A pretty heavy accent on this speaker. Sounds like
Louisiana Cajun? What he says almost sounds like…
“Granite Montun… wuz yo status rat now?
ALSO NOTE: Even though the caller asked for ‘Granite
Mountain’ specifically, and not ‘DIVS A’… Eric Marsh responds
immediately on behalf of Granite Mountain before Jesse Steed
even has a chance to say anything. Jesse only ‘chimes’ in with
his own ‘status’ report about “we’re pushin’ our way down into
the structures” when Marsh is done speaking.
+0:54.09 to +1:03.81
Eric Marsh: Well the guys… uh… Granite… is makin’ their
way out the exact escape route from this mornin’… an’ it
heads… ah… (pause) SOUTH. ( slight pause )
mid-slope, cuttin’ over.
+1:07.18
( Another voice immediately adds to what Marsh said but it is )
( NOT Marsh this time. It sounds like Jesse Steed )
Jesse Steed: We’ll be pushin’ our way down into the structures.
+1:10.16 ( Another voice. Very quickly )
Copy that.
+1:21.17
( Unknown): Ten four. You with Granite Mountain right now?
+1:24.68
(Eric Marsh?): Uh… just checkin’ it out to see where we’re gonna
jump out at.
There appear to be some other background conversations
in this video before we hear the 11 ( ELEVEN ) shutter
clicks of the fellas in the foreground actually shooting photos
of the VLAT drop… but there is also HEAVY road traffic
at this point that will take a lot more work to filter out.
AIR STUDY VIDEO 20130630_161620 ENDS
Regarding the PFD Wildland Chief Willis interview.
Willis talked about the INTENSE fire behavior on the previous Doce Fire (similar fuel type, terrain, weather) and the initial stges of the YHF. Very “intense downhill fire behavior”, a definite indicator of EXTREME conditions every time on every fire.
The YHF repeatedly ‘burning through retardent lines’ – a common indicator of intense burning conditions and heavy fuel loadings.
Then he gets into what several of us call the dangerous Municipal -Structure -Wildland BLENDING of strategy, tactics, and safety talk. Willis stated “They (GMHS) had a choice. They’re not just hoping to sit here … They wouldn’t want to sit around an do nothing … there’s NO CREW IN THE NATION that would do that …” REALLY? No Crew in the entire nation? I don’t think so. I know of most Crews and WFF that would be totally satisfied doing that. As investigator Dave Larsen (RIP) stated tha he figures he’s spent half his career in Safety Zones.
One of the Investigators then asks Willis “what triggered the [GMHS] movement” to leave the balck they were in. Willis responded ” They had a PERFECT SZ, they could have ridden it out. Then Willis goes on to contradict this statement and engage in a number of LOGICAL FALLACIES next. “I agree with you on that [SZ issue] BUT not for agressive FF’s … why do structure FF’s run into burning buildings?”
WTF? How does one LOGICALLY segue from talking about Wildland FF to Structure FF strategy, tactics, and hazards in the same sentence basically? One CANNOT do this logically, so one must resort to logical fallacies to accomplish the transition. Once again, I’m posting the link for logical fallacies from Wikipedia:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_fallacies
This dangerous blending of Structural/Municipal/Wildland tactics, strategy, and hazards attitude is a very real threat and a very real concern to many of us that are strictly WFF. And it needs to be addressed and dealt with realistically on a national level.
Amen RTS!!! I am a former WFF and married to a hotshot, and I almost s*#t myself when I heard Willis say this about “…no crew in the nation that would sit in the black and do nothing” (paraphrase). Why say such nonsense that goes against WFF?! Because, RTS nails it, with Willis’ blending of the structure/wildland, that mentality creates extremely dangerous expectations from very different disciplines! I can assure you Chief Willis that our hotshot crew is the epitome of aggressive firefighting AND they aren’t expected to run into burning buildings. They do all they can to save homes but the crews safety comes first always and shouldn’t it?!! Logical fallacies can really mess with a persons head. I imagine if it was the opposite: if the Fed IHC’s were expected to do structure work and aspire to ultimately end up in the suppression side which has nothing to do with wild land? Weird. The exact mission gets convoluted and how could a person get really good at just one discipline while trying to do two? And that’s not even going into the issues of budget and personnel at the PFD. You Supt’s out there imagine keeping 19 FF’s safe, fighting fire, logistics, planning, etc AND then believing your crew could be cut any day any year. That feeling just doesn’t happen on the Fed side. I suppose it was one way for Willis to keep GM motivated.
Adressed at the national level yes. Do Managers recognize that when fires are prioritized it’s mainly the threat of structures used to get resources? Of course they do. So what kind of fire are we fighting–wildland or structure? Anymore it’s both at the same time and no way of getting away from it so why not address it and bring it to the forefront?!!
I am still having a problem with Willis and McDonough discrepancy on the bad ratings and being shipped home. Willis as supervisor would have seen the ratings and known what was in them. This may be a case of McDonough covering for the crew. I am surprised they did not follow up on that, get the records from the file pure and simple. This should have been part of Willis’s ratting in 2013.
Mr. Powers…
Do you think it’s possible that BOTH of them are telling the
truth ‘as they know it’?
Is it possible that GM was ‘demobbed’ and sent home… but
the CREW itself was never really AWARE of that?
If Marsh or Steed didn’t specifically tell the entire crew they
were booted off the fire… and even (perhaps) just lied to
them and said their work was simply ‘finished’ and they
were allowed to leave… then Brendan really would think
he’s telling the truth.
If a ‘terrible evaluation’ followed… I’m assuming that’s an
email these days.
Would a CREW normally know about that?
Maybe Brendan ( and the others ) were simply totally
clueless about what REALLY happened up at the
management level regarding the Idaho incident.
You may be right. Normally the rating is done before you leave the fire but things have changed RTS would know,
Bob,
That’s usually how it’s done, but sometimes they just mail it to your supervisor.
Mr. Powers ( and RTS )…
See a new post above containing the FULL
transcript of Marsh’s handwritten ‘Unit Log’
from the 2012 Wesley fire.
On September 24, 2012… Marsh was called to
a meeting with DIVS A and the DIVS A(t) working
the fire.
The DIVS A(t) trainee was the one who HANDED
Marsh ( in person ) their ‘bad evaluation’… and
Marsh refused to sign it.
So yea… looks like the ‘eval’ took place in person
as the demob was happening.
Whether or not even that hand-delivered ‘bad
eval’ document was ever seen ( or known about )
by anyone else ( Steed included? ) is still
a mystery.
Obviously Willis saw it ( eventually, since he refers
directly to it in his ADOSH intverview )… but one
of the only explanations for Brendan insisting that
GM was never ‘demobbed’ in 2012 would be that
he simply wasn’t even aware that it happened.
Regarding the Brendan McDonaugh interview.
“A: My safety zone what they had established for me was that grader. That was
that dozer – had pushed that out.”
What ‘THEY’ had established for me, like the GMHS ‘they?’ In other words, he didn’t chose his own SZ location? Either way, a pretty poor choice if you ask me based on experience, the IRPG SZ Guidelines, and all AND based on the day’s YHF fire behavior they were experiencing AND MOST OF ALL, the fire behavior that the GMHS had experienced on the previous Doce Fire. The diameter was TOO SMALL, more like a ‘deployment zone.’
Then match this up with the tennic court SZ for 30+ WFF PLUS vehicles. It appears that SZ discernment and selection was lacking in the PFD world.
RTS… I knew you were going to ‘catch’ that gem.
Brendan’s statement ( that this old-grader location was
established FOR him as his safety zone ) doesn’t even match
his multiple other accounts to investigators about what
he did when he left his lookout post.
Brendan has always said that ONE of the things he did after
walking down from the knoll itself was to spend some time
‘looking for a safe place to deploy’.
He says he even considered other spots around there.
Now… in is ADOSH interview… he says that had already
been ‘figured out’ for him ahead of time.
As with this entire incident and investigation… every time we
get some ‘new’ evidence it seems to answer lingering
questions… but then raise complete new ones as well.
It really, really would have been nice if everyone had just
told the whole truth from day one instead of creating this
jigsaw puzzle that still has to be fully assembled.
p21 SAIR…BR Supt and BR Capt depart and drive GM Lookout down to the old grader, dropping him off at 1239. They feel comfortable leaving him at this spot, and BR Supt tells the lookout, “If you need me, call, and I’ll come get you.”
THEY (BR) FEEL COMFORTABLE LEAVING HIM (Mcdonough) AT THIS SPOT.
Am I missing something??
At 1239… there really wasn’t any reason to NOT feel
comfortable leaving Brendan there.
The fire was still heading AWAY from that location
and no one knew the day was going to suffer the
hellacious turnaround yet.
The only thing Brendan was to be ‘looking out’ for at
THAT time was just to make sure the ‘backing action’
of the tail of the fire didn’t start ‘creeping over’ to
where GM was working.
No one knew that the tail was GOING to become
the fast-moving HEAD… in just a few hours.
There Main Safety Zone was really to call BR and have them run over with the ATV and Pick up
McDonough. That has always concerned me, again I would not have put a look out there with out a better plan. Like there own ATV and or a good SZ.
When you are in brush with no line between you and the fire there are a lot of things that can go wrong. I think his inexperience caused him to not move sooner (and call BR to pick him up).
Copy that Mr.Powers.
**
** BRENDAN MCDONOUGH’S FIRST ADOSH INTERVIEW – 08/20/2013
The full transcript of Brendan McDonough’s first ADOSH interview on
August 20, 2013 ( the day after Darell Willis’ first ADOSH interview ) is here…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/20inrene9tcx74a/s3DfuB0I8j/ADOSH%20Yarnell%20Hill%20Investigation/City%20of%20Prescott%20Fire%20–%20GMHS/Employee%20Interviews%20by%20ADOSH/Transcripts/Brendan%20McDonough%20Interview%208-20-13.pdf
There are a LOT of ‘revelations’ and things never heard in public before
contained in this interview.
Here are just a FEW of them…
ADOSH INTERVIEW WITH BRENDAN MCDONOUGH
Augsut 20, 2013 – 1:00 PM
At City of Prescott Legal Department
Q = Bruce Hanna
Q1 = Barry Hicks
Q2 = Dave Larsen ( Rest in Peace )
A = Brendan McDonough
A1 = Attorney Emily Dolan
*** First report that Steed ( and others ) attended morning briefing at YHF…
Q2: Okay. Ah, did you guys have a – th- th- overhead – go to a briefing?
Or hear a…
A: Yeah. They went to a briefing at Yarnell Fire Department.
Q2: Fire Department?
A: Mm-hm.
Q1: Who – who all went? Was it, ah, Eric and some more there?
A: Eric and Steed and few other of the overhead.
Q1: Okay.
NOTE: This is the first we hear that there was a chance Captain Jesse Steed
actually attended that 7:00 AM morning briefing at the Yarnell HIll Fire Station
along with Eric Marsh. This is the ‘briefing’ where the SAIR said they all
(supposedly) were looking at ‘Google Maps on an iPad’ and identifying the
Boulder Springs Ranch as a ‘bomb-proof’ safety zone, AND someone
(still unknown) was ‘pointing out the roads leading to it’ such as the high-ridge
two-track. There is still some doubt as to whether that ‘Google Maps on an iPad’
moment ever happened at all, since ONLY the SAIR is reporting that, but
if that moment DID happen… and Steed WAS there… then BOTH Marsh and
Steed would have been fully aware that the high-ridge two-track went all the
way to the Boulder Springs Ranch.
*** More confirmation there were 4 GM vehicles there that day…
Q2: I ran the Helena ( Hotshots ). Tell me about how you guys were
organized? Did you have, ah, Eric and an assistant? Did you have three mods
or two or what – tell me about that?
A: It’s based off, like, any other Hotshot crew, you have your sup, captain, squad
bosses, your saw bosses, your lead saws, your senior fire fighters.
Q2: Okay.
A: Ah, two squads.
Q2: Two squads.
A: And a chase truck and a superintendent truck.
Q2: How – how – how – and so how many – how many buggies did you have? Did
you have two of those?
A: Two buggies.
*** Brendan says the GM crew received THREE briefings that morning…
Q2: Okay. So when you got up here, um, and assembled after hiking up – the hike,
you guys talk for a while? A brief?
A: Yeah. We had a briefing before we even got up there. We had two briefings.
We had a briefing at Yarnell and then we had a briefing when we parked.
Q2: Sure.
A: And then we had another briefing when we got to the top of the ridge.
Q2: What did you talk about when you did your own crew briefing and you – you
park? What do you guys say?
A: The weather, fire behavior, safety zones, escape routes. I mean, what we
could expect, what they know. To try to get a lookout established, ah,
communication plans. Things like that. Just hazards that we might run into.
Snakes, high heat, um, to make sure we were hydrated and bring extra water.
*** Brendan says they were absolutely aware that MORNING that the two-track
*** up on the ridge went ALL THE WAY to the Boulder Springs Ranch…
Q2: Where – were they talking about your safety zone? When would you talk
about that? Where – where was it?
A: I – one of our safety zones was back in the black.
Q2: Right.
A: And they had another one for the ranch.
Q2: Oh, that big…
A: That clearing.
Q2: …big ranch thing? Okay.
A: It was cleared out.
Q2: Yeah. We saw that.
A: ‘Cause it had a, I mean, there was a nice two track leading pretty much right
to it almost.
Q2: Was there? Okay.
A: Somewhat. From what I understand. Yeah.
Q2: So that’s where you got – that – was that the escape route if you decided that –
you de- decided either you were go in it and stay in the black or go to the
ranch?
A: From what I was informed, yes. But I had moved to a different position.
Q2: Sure. Right. So you were on your own. You – what was your, um plan?
A: My safety zone what they had established for me was that grader. That was
that dozer – had pushed that out.
Q2: Okay.
Q2: If they were gonna do a – a safety zone at the ranch, ah, what was their
planned escape route? What – was it along, I mean, was it a along the ridge?
A: There’s a two track that’s up there.
Q2: Right. So that was it? The plan?
A: From what I understand. Yes.
*** Brendan says the two-track escape route was ‘clear’.
Q2: Going back to the – to when they were gonna think about going to the ranch
they were gonna go out along the two track on the ridge. That being their
plan? Did they – did they send a saw team back to spruce that up some?
A: It was clear.
Q2: It was clear. Okay. So they didn’t.
A: Not. I don’t know.
Q1: Not when you were there or anything?
A: Not when I was there.
*** Brendan uses the same ‘mid-slope’ description of the two-track
*** escape route that Marsh uses later in captured radio conversation,
*** and confirms again that he understood it went all the way to
*** to the Boulder Springs Ranch.
NOTE: At this point in the ADOSH interview with McDonough they are all
looking at the upper ridge and southern two-track in Google Earth
Q1: Now Dave, that looks like a two track right there.
A: That’s the two track that would be have been the escape route that they took.
Q1: Oh okay.
A: Kinda mid slope along that ridge.
Q2: Right. When it was time to go the ranch, that’s what they were gonna use?
A: I believe so.
Q1: Okay.
Q1: Okay. That – that helps us. That helps us. Now, ah…
Q2: And they’re gonna walk out this ridge to this thing- is this the ridge?
A: This is the ridge right here.
Q: Gotcha.
A: And this two track ties all the way – it goes all the way around from what I’ve
heard to back down…
Q2: Back down — yeah, it does. We – we had a guy walk it from behind the ranch
up and around.
A: Mm-hm. Yeah.
Q2: It does? Okay.
*** Brendan”s third weather ‘spin’ had to be much earlier than
*** his stated time of 3:50 PM
Q1: Yeah. Ah, so you were doing them on the hour. Were you noticing any
change during or having – how many of those did you take while you were
there before you pulled out? Do you remember?
A: I believe I was working on my third weather which was…
Q1: Okay.
A: Which was, they deploy at 4:47. Correct? So it would have been 3:50.
NOTE: Not possible. Brendan had decided to leave his lookout position
15-20 minutes before that and Frisby was actually picking him up down by
the Old Grader location in the UTV Ranger at exactly 3:41 PM. That’s one
minute after Cordes had ordered the official evacuations for Yarnell and
Glen Ilah at 3:40 PM and 10 minutes after Byron Kimball’s weather warning
of wind shifts and 40-50 mph winds went out over TAC 1 channel at 3:31 PM.
*** Brendan contradicts official reports and says he was NEVER
*** supposed be serving as Blue Ridge’s lookout.
Q2: Sure. Right. So you were on your own. You – what was your, um plan?
A: My safety zone what they had established for me was that grader. That was
that dozer – had pushed that out.
Q2: Okay.
A: And then just back down the road and Blue Ridge superintendent actually
came to meet with Eric and their Captain to talk about what’s going on. And
they took me to my lookout position and they said, “We can see what’s going
on. If you need, we’ll come pick you up.” That’s exactly what happened.
Q1: So you – were you serving as a lookout for Blue Ridge as well as?
A: No sir.
Q1: So Blue Ridge had their own lookout?
A: Yes sir.
Q1: Was he in a…
A: They showed up a later time.
Q1: And do you know where their lookout would have been or did you ever know that?
A: They were closer to town working off a road I believe.
*** Brendan says that circa 4:00 PM… the winds were ‘straight out of the
*** north/northeast and the fire was actually moving ‘straight up and down
*** as North / South’… but it was simply the terrain of a ridge that was
*** making it move somewhat ‘east/southeast’ as well.
Q2: Four? Okay.
A: At this point, the fire is moving straight up and down as north South. It’s
moving – it’s starting to come out of the north but it’s really moving east so
that my way out is getting cut off sooner than theirs. They had more concern
at that point for me and my safety.
Q1: Right.
A: Just because of the direction of the fire.
Q2: Right.
A: So it was – the winds were out of the north, northeast but primarily due to the
terrain of that ridge, it’s moving to the east.
NOTE: At 4:00 PM… if Brendan was fully aware that the fire was already
heading in ( his words ) “straight up and down as North / South”… then
that means Marsh and Steed were fatefully mistaken during their
infamous ‘discussing their options’ conversation(s) to ever believe
they would be travelling ‘parallel’ to the fire on their trip to the ranch.
*** Brendan is asked if he ever heard that Marsh/Steed/Crew
*** were moving out of the black towards the Boulder Springs Ranch
Q2: So when you – you went and they picked you up and you moved vehicles and
all that stuff that’s going on, do you know what the – what the crew was
doing? Were they moving towards the ranch?
A: That wasn’t relayed to me. I just told – ‘cause I knew – I knew the storm was
coming in. I knew they weren’t — I mean, you don’t want to sit there and be a
Chatty Cathy on the radio. ‘Cause I told them, “Hey if you guys need anything?
I’ll be with Blue Ridge.” They knew that. “Um, just let me know.
And I’ll get ahold of you and I’ll see you guys soon.”
Q1: Right.
A: …last transmission that (unintelligible).
Q1: Yeah. Anything else, Dave, that you can think of?
Q2: Well, did you – we heard that there was some transmissions as th- as
they were beginning to deploy, did you hear any of that at any time?
A: That was over command.
Q2: Did you HEAR any of that stuff?
A: Yeah. Eric had called in saying that they were deploying, ah, preparing a
deployment site and trying to give a general location and you could hear
chainsaws in the background cutting out an area.
NOTE: Brendan wasn’t asked if the information and/or the decision to
move was specifically ‘relayed’ to him… he was only being asked if he
HEARD or KNEW anything about it.
Brendan then ‘falls back’ to the same thing he told the SAIT and only talks about
the last time HE, himself, had anything to say TO THEM or inform THEM about,
and refuses to talk about anything he might have simply HEARD, even if it
wasn’t directed at him.
None of the investigators ‘caught this’ and tried to clarify.
Brendan had already stated to them in this very ADOSH interview that
‘listening to the crew channel’ was his number one priority that day… but no
one pressed him on what he did or didn’t simply HEAR over that crew-channel
during the crucial ‘discussing their options’ timeframe.
The SAIT investigators apparently did.
The SAIR still states ( unequivocally ) that Brendan DID hear Marsh and Steed
‘discussing their options’… but never said another word about it.
More to come…
WTKTT,
Reposting these here in case you missed them.
“WantsToKnowTheTruth on March 22, 2014 at 5:53 pm said:
If you also read most/all of the ‘Who were the Granite Mountain Hotshots’ pages with bios and memorials… you see a recurring theme.”
“Most of the ‘rookies’ specifically mention ‘looking up to Steed’ and ‘wanting to be like him’ and more than one described his amazing physical abilities and their admiration for the shape he was in.”
“There isn’t a whole lot of mention of Marsh in those same ‘bios’ and ‘memorials’.”
Reply ↓
“Robert the Second on March 23, 2014 at 9:34 am said:
WTKTT,
“You are closer than you think here. There were at least two former GMHS that did NOT return to the Crew after both the 2011 and 2012 fire seasons. And the alleged reasons mentioned by these men to their parents and friends related specifically to ‘bad decisions with prior good outcomes.’”
RTS… rest assured… I saw that.
The ADOSH report has always had this in it…
Page 8…
September 4, 2013 – ADOSH e-mails five ex-Granite Mountain
Hotshots requesting interviews.
There was never another ‘timeline’ entry saying whether
those requests for interviews were granted by ANY of
the FIVE former GMHS they contacted… or if any of
those ‘interviews’ ever took place.
I have been scouring all the latest ADOSH information
published by Mr. Dougherty… but so far I can’t even find
the emails that were ‘sent’ to the former GMHS… much
less any ‘replies’ or any evidence the interviews happened.
If you ( or anyone ) find anything pertaining to these
ADOSH ‘former GMHS’ interviews before I do…
…please post a link.
Scratch that.
I have found the emails in the ADOSH material.
They are in THIS document…
J9925_1_of_2.pdf
Report coming.
Here’s a direct link to the document…
( ADOSH emails to former GMHS are near the bottom )…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/20inrene9tcx74a/aLy2ZykXvH/ADOSH%20Notes%20and%20Emails/Emails%20J9925%201%20of%202.pdf
so, i am curious to know… and this is a genuine question, not rhetoric.
what do you think are the top five revelations (or call them “discrepancies” or “truths” or “cover ups” if you want) that have been “dug up” by this internet commentary? anything that was not covered in one of the three investigation reports?… i am not talking about all the little details that surface by scouring the FOIA materials, i am talking about revelations that were not revealed in official reports or that would actually negate the reports.
i am just looking for the gist of the matter, not long winded explanations.
This is an excellent question, xxfullsailxx.
For me, the revelations/lessons learned have been:
* No 30 min radio blackout
* Abuse of the terms “escape route” and “safety zone” (both from GM and Darrell Willis)
* Application of the 10 (and 18) (I still do not know why the SAIR did not use these as a measure of situational awareness and/or appropriate risk management.)
* This was not unprecedented fire behavior, and weather reports did reach the crews. It was another plume dominated fire, with the addition of storms cells that were observed and reported. Nothing mysterious or unforeseeable there.
* Human factors that I have not personally experienced: having to justify one’s organization to a funding agency that is threatening to cut support; potential loss of life in WUI due to slow evacuation roll out; authoritarian leadership, such that those of lower/lowest rank may not have felt empowered to call out serious safety issues.
I’m sure there’s more, but those are the elements that stand out for me, and I’ll be trying to relay them to my coworkers. I think that some here have made a compelling case for the issue of prior bad decisions/good outcomes. At this point, I doubt the scope is limited to GMIHC.
I felt that the Pattern Recocgnition article at Wildfire Today summarized the lessons we should have seen in the SAIR rather nicely.
http://wildfiretoday.com/2014/03/19/pattern-recognition-in-todays-wildfire-community/
Thank you Sitta, I agree with all of the “lessons learned” that you identified. And I am going to try to think of more myself. I think others have been identified throughout this thread. But I also think our greatest strength is our free form, and our greatest weakness is our free form.
I really do mean it when I say I a glad xxfullsailxx is back in his role as the most vocal member of the loyal opposition, since we need a system of checks and balance.
Elizabeth played an important part in that system, but well…I (and maybe some others) caused her to well…I’m not sure, but she hasn’t posted here since that flare up occurred. I do hope Elizabeth’s absence from this thread is temporary, and she returns to help us work through this disaster.
In my defense however, I for one…was never even completely house broken and I sometimes experience little “accidents”, and arguing in a civilized manner was never my strong point.
I can’t remember anymore what my strong points were, except that (as I have said before) I had a habit of swinging whatever tool my supervisor handed as hard as I could until I was told to stop, which continued with me through my second career. So…I am still hoping that Elizabeth returns, and I will try to disagree in a less disagreeable manner with her next time. I think I have acknowledged before that I am not a nice person, and I was never paid to make friends, only try as best I could to get the job done.
The last time I thought about this problem seriously, I unilaterally named “us”, the Alternative Serious Accident Investigation Team (ASAIT), which was when I also unilaterally appointed WTKTT to be our lead investigator. Which probably did not sit well with everyone who was actively involved scouring for “all the little details”, but still very important facts surrounding this incident that the SAIT blew by with their SAIR. And in the end, WTKTT declined to accept my unilateral appointment anyway. As a result, I didn’t throw out my other bureaucratic inspired suggestions.
And sometimes… bureaucratic can be a GOOD word. Like when you want to organize something, and get measurable, meaningful and perhaps even long lasting results in addressing a very real problem.
All “joking” (and given my dry, sarcastic, self-deprecating punctuated by ego driven flare-ups of hubris sense of humor, it may be hard for some to tell when I am joking and when I am being serious) aside, I am finally going to throw out my other suggestions in response to xx-fullsail-xx’s challenge.
We need a system to vet, and then approve, maybe with caveats or asterisk included, conclusions the ASAIT comes up with, although given our free-for-all style, I’m not sure how this is would be possible, much less organized.
I specifically remember a long list of conclusions that Bob Powers came up and documented several months ago, and you and I have also made other lists in the past. Although I would have to extensively search through a lot of material to find them at this point. I don’t think most of the things that were named were particularly controversial, and I hope at least some of them could be “approved” by even a largely anonymous, and completely informal working group.
So…in the meantime, I think we need a “recorder” to start keeping track of the important conclusions the ASAIT comes up with, otherwise most of what we manage to conclude with continue to be largely lost to the volumes of comments on this thread. Therefore, I nominate YOU.
Now…given how your last suggestion was received, or at least responded to, (it had to do with organizing the comments on this thread, I didn’t respond to your grand suggestion because I didn’t know what to say), or a whole bunch of other reasons, you may not be receptive to this nomination.
But…I hope you will at least consider it, and then once we at least have a list of recommendations or identified issues, we can then at least then fight about them in an attempt to meet the challenge of our loyal opposition and good friend, xx-fullsail-xx has issued to the ASAIT.
Or barring these suggestions, do any of you have any others? WHAT SAY YOU (Lord of The Rings)?
I second the nomination. Fullsail, please consider.
I agree on the appointment…..
One other thing that stood out was the Type 2 team. Not a full team and not a setup team. This caused a lack of organization and leadership that caused a lot of confusion on the fire. Teams should be organized as a group and assigned to work short and long Teams. Not a haphazard mix. Note that NIFC is addressing this. The States need to as well.
And Sitta covered every thing I posted earlier. We talked about but never got into the slow evacuation of the towns and civilians. another lack of planning and timing.
And, I don’t think our list would necessarily have to be about revealing smoking guns, I think it should be about systematically documenting lessons learned, since as Bob Powers already said a long time ago, all of the previous investigative reports used to do that. The SAIR is the first one that did not, I think. Maybe when we are “done”, John Dougherty would even write and article and document our list in that manner. That actually may end up being helpful in wildland firefighter training, as least as discussion points.
xxfullsailxx,
I know you query involved anything not covered in the “3” reports, but as far as revelations go, I have to go back to, what I believe, was Gary (hopefully I’ve got the correct person here), stating, both, before and after the SAIT was released (and prior to the release of any other reports), that based on his experience, “he believed that GM was asked, or requested, or ordered, to go into Yarnell”.
At the time, without any other supporting evidence, I personally didn’t automatically discount that “gut feeling based upon experience”, deferring for the time-being, ‘to that experience’.
With the release of then ADOSH report, which included the previously unknown ‘request from Musser’, that experience-based gut-feeling was proven to be correct.
So, in answer to your question, this revelation, while initially based upon an ‘experienced-based gut-feeling’, became a basis in fact, with the release of additional reports and information.
Maybe this doesn’t fit into the top five revelations, but personally, I found it to be quite important as a recognition of experience-based validated insight, being provided by some of the posters here.
.
Yes, that has been my favorite drum to beat since this started, other than I thought to much emphasis was placed on structure protection on the Yarnell Hill Fire and that the culture of wildland firefighting and structural firefighting should never be mixed. Although I always implied or outright said that I thought it was Darrell Willis who told Eric Marsh to move towards Yarnell ASAP (other requests aside). I still do.
okay, so i am not going to negate the responses, because that wasn’t the intent of my query… but i will say this:
i think there are valid talking points that you all have brought up, but really no “revelations” that weren’t already brought to light in at least one of the three reports. by that i mean, nothing that really changes “the facts” as stated in any of the reports.
MAYBE there is something to the “no 30 min. radio black out” theory, but even that has yet to be truly vetted as fact.
thanks for the responses…
P64 SAIR…1637 ASM2 flies a drop path for a VLAT north of Yarnell west to east. DIVS A acknowledges the drop.
I do not believe this (Div A acknowledges the drop) to be true. There was no drop, Eric Marsh didn’t acknowledge it.(as far as all the notes and audio recordings indicate)
After he calls for the drop (that didn’t come) IMHO.. he hauls ass to get to the crew… and then makes a call out to Bravo33 once he arrives at the DZ.
Snark away!
The whole past bad decisions with good outcomes aspect never was documented or even looked into explicitly except on here (that I am aware).
If I recall correctly, there’s been discussion both on here and on wildfiretoday about GM having chosen the worst possible place to deploy, counter to Willis’ assertion that they chose the best place possible. I haven’t seen that discussed explicitly in a report.
Related, I haven’t seen a coherent decision tree of: making a judgment that deployment is likely survivable a predicate to deployment, addressed explicitly except on here.
A persistently carefree approach to SZs was partially addressed by ADOSH, but more fully discussed here. And I believe there is more fleshing out that could be done, and people should be concerned that this not be a pervasive issue that applies to many other crews.
Some flaky theories that were floated here were also debunked on here. That may not seem productive, but better they be debunked on here than allowed to hit the mainstream without existing objections to their credibility.
I think the ADOSH report was better than the discussion on here in noting that many significant decisions throughout the day seemed to take no notice of the fuel type and fire behavior.
WTKKT’s audio crunching may have caused Maclean to back off a little on the sawyer theory, which to me was not flaky but may have been used to assert that GM did have a legit escape route, as opposed to what they did have.
I’ve only seen on here and on wildfiretoday explicit discussion of how dumb it is, even after an initial decision to bushwhack downhill, to stay with it when the early going is .5/m/hr in pace. Since, reversal was in this case back up hill, and likely therefore even slower. There’s a general situational awareness issue there, too.
Dehydration, hypoglycemia and other impaired judgment issues might bear more discussion and probing, but I haven’t seen them explicitly discussed but for here.
Sorry for rambling a bit. But, I think a lot has been done on here. Whether any of it is used constructively to effect changed practices? I think some will.
Great summary, SR. I’m especially glad you thought of the “debunking” benefit of discussion here.
none of those are revelations that change the overall synopsis of the reports.
i wasn’t talking about what has been discussed on here… those are talking points, sure. but talking points on an internet site full of anonymous posters leaves little to be desired. it sounds to me like you’re just looking for someone to hang GM out to dry. i think it’s easy enough to see that their decision making that day was poor.
I just thought of something important discussed specifically here: the quality of the investigation.
Unrecorded interviews, contradictions not followed up on, unaccounted for GPS units, cameras, and phones. Apparently no attempt to look for phone records. The SAIR summary that blaringly ignores LCES and the 10 & 18. I know this wasn’t a “criminal” investigation. But if the time spent and frustration seen in this discussion forum suggest anything, it’s that a thorough, transparent investigation in the beginning would do a lot to quash rumors, conspiracy theories, and perhaps even lawsuits later on. And that more than the hundreds reading this forum would learn the applicable lessons and share them, so that more people don’t die.
I can only hope this forum could change the way investigations are run, if just by a little.
Sitta,
You’re assuming that “THEY” want to know the truth. It’s been my experience that particualrly involving fatalities, that is NOT the case. And that’s why they FIRST establish the conclusion and then find the ‘facts’ to support their ‘conclusion.’
the 10 & 18… really? you need a report to spell those out for you?
from us we there is the homeowners/others photos n videos. people need to be focused to seeing those- much different then reports. people need to show their photos/videos publicly. this would help in this process XXXfullsbilXXX (my letter before b does not work)
**
** DARRELL WILLIS ADOSH INTERVIEW – PART 2
**
** GRANITE MOUNTAIN WAS ‘SENT HOME’ FROM A FIRE
Immediately after Willis ‘announced’ to the ADOSH investigators that
the MacKenzie photos and videos existed… the very next topic of
conversation in his interview was whether Willis recalled any prior
‘incidents’ with Granite Mountain on other fires.
Willis then recalls at least 2 incidents within the previous 3 fire seasons.
Wills reports that GM was actually ‘demobbed’ from the Wesley Fire ( Payan ).
The were actually ‘sent home’ and ‘terrible’ evaluation report followed.
Willis also talks about some ‘knock-down-drag-out’ fight GM got into with OPS
on the Horseshoe 2 Fire ( Coronado ). There were not ‘demobbed’ from that
one but it was messy.
NOTE: The CONTEXT of Willis reporting these ‘incidents’ with Granite Mountain
was all about SAFETY and whether Granite Mountain had ever actually
REFUSED any assignments out of ‘safety’ concerns. So these accounts from
Willis are in response to that question and not whether there were any
‘incidents’ where they were caught ‘freelancing’ or performing ‘bad decisons
with good outcomes’.
What is ODD, however, is that when the ADOSH investigators interviewed
Brendan McDonough… they asked him the same question(s) about GM’s
‘prior behavior’ and ‘past performance’ on other fires… and whether there
had been ANY times they got a ‘bad writeup’ or were ‘demobbed’ for
ANY reason…
…and Brendan McDonough said ( unequivocally )…. NO, NEVER…
…even though the two incidents that Willis is reporting in his interview
were within the previous 3 fires seasons and McDonough WAS with
the crew for both of them.
START OF SECTION FROM ADOSH INTERVIEW WITH DARELL WILLIS
Date/Time: 8-19-13 / 1:05 am – Case # Willis – Page 31
A = Interviewee, Darrell Willis
Q1 = Barry Hicks – Wildland Fire Associates contractor for ADOSH
Q2 = Dave Larsen – Wildland Fire Associates contractor for ADOSH ( Rest in Peace ).
NOTE: Prescott City Attorney Jon Paladini was present for this interview.
Q1: Mm-hm. Um, so your – your best guess is they see the structures down there
and they figure they need to go….
A: And they had the time and the distance.
Q1: Figured.
A: They figured. I – I don’t know that. Only Eric can tell you that. And Jesse. But
I also understand that they’re, ah, they wouldn’t want to sit around and watch
the town burn down.
Q1: Yeah.
A: In the black. If they could help.
Q1: Yeah.
A: That’s my feeling. I don’t think there’s any crew in the nation that would want
to do that. Just sit on a – on a black spot. If – but – but here’s the thing. They’re
good decision-makers. Last year they got kicked off a fire in Idaho for
refusing to do, ah, a go direct on a fire and they worked with the division that
wouldn’t – wouldn’t budge on it and so he demobed them. So that proves to
me they’re safe. I mean, they’re not gonna do something that they think is
gonna, ah, be dangerous to the crew.
Q1: Did you hear what fire that was?
A: Uh, (W)- (W)- Wesley?
Q1: I hadn’t heard about that one.
A: It was on, uh, Payan, I think.
Q1: Oh, it was? Um, so they actually got demobed for refusing an assignment?
A: Got a terrible evaluation.
Q1: Um…
A: They ended up coaxing another crew into doing the work that they wanted to
do – that they wouldn’t do.
Q1: Now…
Q2: Talking about going direct, I don’t understand this getting kicked off for…
A: They, uh – they kept getting beat up going direct. And they said, “This is – this
is killing us. Why don’t we just take it out – ” They were in mixed comm. And
you know the controversy between fire and out and mixed comm and all that.
Q1: Yeah.
A: And they said there’s a good road down here, let’s try this. We’re just keep –
we’re just beating ourselves up trying to go direct. And the division said, “No.
We’re not – ” He – they provided them another plan, which is that turn-down
policy is if you – if you’re not gonna do it, give us another plan.
Q1: Mm-hm.
A: We gave them another 1389 plan and they said, “You guys are done, we don’t need
you.”
Q1: Right. Um, so – uh, and I – I just need to make sure Bruce heard that right.
That these guys turned down an assignment and got disciplined for doing that.
Uh, and…
A: And that was fine.
Q: Is that in writing?
Q1: Well, I would – I would…
A: It would be in writing.
Q1: …bet that it was – be in writing.
A: It was in writing. They got an evaluation.
Q1: Yeah.
A: I don’t know if I can pull up, find it. I’ll try…
Q1: I think that would…
A: Because we were…
Q1: That would be important information for us to have from – from your
standpoint. Uh, doesn’t – doesn’t necessarily apply to this situation, but that’s
one of the things these guys do and, uh, so – uh, and – and I just personally
don’t like hearing those kinds of stories about firefighters getting disciplined
for, um, raising a safety issue, uh, and getting sent home. Uh, not a – not a way
we ought to be doing business, I don’t believe.
Q2: Is this the only time that you – that’s ever occurred, to your knowledge?
A: I heard, uh, that on another opportunity – or another fire that they were on, the
Horseshoe 2, they got into a big disagreement with the Ops Chief about, uh, a
firing operation and they shut the firing operation down for, I think, two days
and the crew actually was right on it and they had other crews that said they
wouldn’t do it, either. They singled out Granite Mountain because they refused
to do it. This was, like, two years ago down in the – in the, uh – on the
Coronado, on Horseshoe 2.
Q1: Yeah, I remember that one.
A: Same kind of – not similar. They just got into a fight. The Ops Chief said do it
and they said, “No, we’re not – we don’t have the – we don’t have the spacing,
we don’t have the horsepower to accomplish what you wanna accomplish.”
Q2: Mmm.
A: And that – and, you know, if you have some fire experience, you know that
you pretty much gotta go with the guts of those hotshots because they’re the
ones that have been doing it a lot, and – you know, they’re not always right,
and you can push back, but…
Q1: But they’re…
A: …a lot of times their gut feelings are right.
Q1: Yeah.
Q2: Did they have a history, or have they ever stories, uh, of – of sitting one out in
the black? Had they had that experience?
A: I don’t know. I’ve never heard that. Nothing that I can bring to mind.
END OF SECTION FROM DARRELL WILLIS ADOSH INTERVIEW
WTKTT,
Some corrections and clarification are in order on this on if that’s okay.
It was the Wesley Fire on the PAYETTE (not Payan) NF in Idaho in September 2012.
You posted this: “They were in mixed comm. And you know the controversy between fire and out and mixed comm and all that.”
Listening and interpretation errors on this one. More likely, what was said was they were in mixed CON (as in conifer). … controversy between FIRE AND OUT (should be FIRING OUT) and mixed CON [conifer] and all that.”
So, the sentence (answer) SHOULD read – ‘They were in mixed con [conifer]. And you know the controversy between [firing out] and mixed [con] and all that.’
Hopefully, that should flow better and make more sense.
Now Willis responds almost identical to what he said at the fatality site news conference regarding “no wildland firefighter is satisfied sitting in the black doing nothing when the fire is progressing below them.’
WILLIS – “A: That’s my feeling. I don’t think there’s any crew in the nation that would want to do that. Just sit on a – on a black spot. If – but – but here’s the thing. They’re good decision-makers. …. So that proves to me they’re safe. I mean, they’re not gonna do something that they think is gonna, ah, be dangerous to the crew.”
REALLY? And what about June 30th when they left they’re perfectly good SZ?
And one of the Investigators comments on the Turn Down Protocol as follows: “I just personally don’t like hearing those kinds of stories about firefighters getting disciplined for, um, raising a safety issue, uh, and getting sent home. Uh, not a – not a way we ought to be doing business …”
He’s absolutely correct here UNFORTUNATELY that is more like what happens in the real world. I heard an experienced WFF refer to that as “Being shipped to Division Siberia, somewhere that’s been cold out for a week, for refusing an assignment based on safety concerns.” It happens much more than I like.
Payette Fire
Indirect line on the Payette dose not happen very often.
Refusing to go direct?? That was the plan of the fire to keep fire fighters safe. You would have To do a lot of explaining about that not being safe. The Overhead for some reason did not want to go indirect and felt it was safer to go direct. You cant refuse direct as a safety concern as that is the safest fire line to build. If the plans did not want to do any indirect line then you beat the fire line until you get a line on it. THIS WAS NOT A SAFETY CONCERN.
That is the first thing that I thought just as soon as I read the post. “And they said there’s a good road down here, let’s try this. We’re just keep –
we’re just beating ourselves up trying to go direct.”
Is NOT a safety concern. I can’t imagine a hotshot crew ever turning down or even arguing over an assignment that makes them work to hard! That goes against the entire work ethic of the hotshot culture.
Mr. Powers… see my response to RTS on
this subject thread below. Not only did Brendan
McDonough totally DENY they were ever
‘sent home’ from ANYWHERE…. Brendan also
totally refutes what Willis’ account of what
went down in Idaho. Willis said they had been
‘going direct and were just getting beat up
and wanted to go indirect’… but McDonough
says it was the exact opposite. The assignment
they refused from the smoke jumper who was
their DIV was when he WANTED them to
start going ‘indirect’ and GM thought it wasn’t
safe to do so… specifically because of possible
falling tree concerns.
I agree with RTS, as I have said before, there weren’t turn down protocols in my day, and I am sure there are penalties, at least some of the time, for exercising them today. It is not a perfect world.
And if you think I am full of myself and hubris, for even what I used to be, just wait until you meet some fire overhead. We called them fire gods for a reason. Doctors are not the only ones who have a God Complex.
Reply to RTS post on March 24, 2014 at 4:38 pm
>> RTS said…
>>
>> Some corrections and clarification are in order on
>> this on if that’s okay.
>> It was the Wesley Fire on the PAYETTE (not Payan)
>> NF in Idaho in September 2012.
Copy that. Darrell Willis himself ( in the audio recording )
seems to say something more like ‘Payenne’ than
‘PayAN’, as the ADOSH transcriber wrote, but he
was still not quite right ).
BTW: That transcript above is, in fact, ADOSH’s own
published transcript of their own audio recording.
>> RTS also wrote…
>> You posted this: “They were in mixed comm. And you
>> know the controversy between fire and out and mixed
>> comm and all that.”
>>
>> The sentence (answer) SHOULD read – ‘They were in
>> mixed con [conifer]. And you know the controversy
>> between [firing out] and mixed [con] and all that.’
>>
>> Hopefully, that should flow better and make more sense.
Yep. Sure does. Thanks.
In the actual audio recording… Willis DOES say
‘con’ ( with an ‘N’, not an ‘M’ ). Again, the ADOSH
transcriber just seems to have heard that wrong.
By the way… as far as the incident where GM got
‘sent home’ ( according to Willis ) from Idaho in
2012… not only does Brendan McDonough say
that NEVER happened ( in HIS interview )… his story
about what happened is the complete opposite of
what Willis told ADOSH.
Willis told ADOSH they were ‘sent home’ for refusing
to continue to ‘go direct’… but Brendan says it was
the opposite. They had been going ‘indirect’ and
refused to go ‘direct’ because of possible safety
issues with falling trees.
See below for Brendan’s actual testimony to ADOSH,
the day AFTER Willis’ interview.
>> RTS also said…
>> Now Willis responds almost identical to what he said
>> at the fatality site news conference regarding “no
>> wildland firefighter is satisfied sitting in the black doing
>> nothing when the fire is progressing below them.’
There is even more stuff like this towards the end
of Willis’ interview. The WFA and ADOSH investigators
press him about his attitudes on this and Willis just
launches (again) into this bizarre ‘speech’ about what
HE believes ‘any good/aggressive firefighter would do’.
Dave Larsen ( Rest in Peace ) disagrees strongly
with him and says something like “I think I’ve spent half
of my entire career in the black… and I’m proud of that.”
Willis also launches into one of his weird ‘Urban
Interface’ speeches as well, towards the end.
I STILL think the weirdest thing about this new information
from the Willis interview about ‘prior incidents’ ( on
other fires ) with Granite Mountain is that the very
next day… when the ADOSH investigators specifically
asked Brendan McDonough about what Willis said…
Brendan says that the Idaho ‘demob’ NEVER HAPPENED.
** BRENDAN DENIES THEY WERE EVER SENT HOME
The day after ADOSH first interview Darrell Willis was the
day they interviewed Brendan McDonough.
They asked Brendan directly about being ‘sent home’ from
any fires ( like the one in 2012 that Willis described )…
but Brendan says it NEVER HAPPENED.
BEGIN SECTION FROM ADOSH INTERVIEW
WITH BRENDAN MCDONOUGH
8-20-13/1:00 pm – Case # McDonough – Page 49
A = Interviewee – Brendan McDonough
Q = Bruce Hanna – ADOSH investigator
Q1 = Barry Hicks – ADOSH contractor
Q2 = Dave Larsen – ADOSH contractor ( Rest in Peace )
Q1: Bruce, you got anything ( for Brendan )?
Q: Yeah. I got a couple questions. The – Chief Willis we talked to yesterday.
A: Mm-hm.
Q: He talked about you guys going out on some
assignments where you declined them because of
safety issues.
A: Oh yeah
Q: Is that true?
A: Multiple assignments, um, Eric and Steed – from top
to bottom, they asked every single person what your
comfortability level was. And even a first-year guy, if they
said something it’s always taken into consideration. Um,
if you were thinking it, you knew they were.
Q: Right.
A: They had kids and there’s — yeah, there was quite a
few assignments that we declined and a lot of people on
the team were upset about that, and they didn’t care.
Q1: Do you remember one in – Idaho?
A: Yeah. Idaho, we declined the assignment, our
superintendent was a smoke jumper was, um, Shaff by
chance was his name?
Q1: Which one?
A: Ah, the division was Shaff. The guy’s name Shaff.
Probably about 5’6”, Asian gentleman. We declined an
assignment because of tree hazards…
Q1: Right.
A: …going downhill, um, really unstable, we hear trees
come down all the time.
Q1: Right.
A: And they wanted us to go indirect. It was really ratty,
didn’t burn solid, just a lot of potential and terrain and stuff.
There’s other viable options that we could have used.
Q1: What was the outcome of that one? When you
declined the assignment?
A: We just did an indirect piece.
Q1: But was the – did you all, ah, get sent home
because of…
A: No.
Q1: You did NOT get sent home?
A: We’ve never…
Q1: …so they changed the…
A: Yeah. I personally since I’ve worked on the crew we
have NEVER been sent home for declining an assignment.
Q1: Oh okay. Okay, ah, and, um, so you declined the
assignment. They gave you ah… you gave them an
alternative?
A: Yes, sir. Multiple alternatives.
Q1: And so…
A: Just like…
Q1: …they chose one of your alternatives?
A: Just like in the IRPG, verbatim.
Q1: Okay.
A: Verbatim or…
Q1: It – it worked just the way it was laid out to go? Okay.
Gotcha. Ah, well that’s good news. That – glad to hear that.
A: Yeah.
Q2: Very much.
Q1: Yeah. And, ah, so you’ve never had a – an assignment
where you’ve had a safety issue and got sent home
because you raised the safety issue?
A: No. They’ve always acknowledged it.
Q1: Okay.
A: Within the crew and on the team. Since I have been
there we have NEVER been sent home because of a
safety issue.
Q1: Okay.
END SECTION FROM ADOSH INTERVIEW
WITH BRENDAN MCDONOUGH
Ok then. If the GMHS (Marsh and Steed) were SO safety conscious and SO safety oriented according to Rookie McDonaugh in his ADOSH interview, WTF happened on June 30th? WTF happened to convince 18 men to walk DOWNHILL into a CHUTE and ultimately into a BOWL of very thick UNBURNED chaparral under very ADVERSE WEATHER AND ADVERSE AND INCREASING FIRE BEHAVIOR on June 30th without the benefit of a REQUIRED LOOKOUT to at least warn them they weren’t going to make it and to turn about? WTF?
Exactly… what are we supposed to take
from what EITHER Willis OR McDonough
were trying to say in their ADOSH
interviews.
Willis is saying what ‘excellent decision
makers they were’.
McDonough is even trying to establish
that Marsh/Steed ALWAYS checked the
‘comfort level’ about decisions with
EVERY crew member… even rookies.
Horseshit.
They were deathly afraid of ‘trees’… but
not of actual ‘fire’, or something?
I really don’t believe either of them.
It would be interesting to know what the
real truth is about Idaho, however, since
one person is saying they were definitely
‘booted’ off the fire and a ‘terrible’ evaluation
followed… and the other person is saying
that it never happened at all.
About the only thing that proves at this
point is that if McDonough and Willis did
‘get together’ to ‘get their stories straight’
prior to these interviews… they didn’t
do a very good job.
Speaking of ‘getting together’… Willis does
admit in his ADOSH interview that one of
the first things he did after the deployment
was ‘find McDonough’…
…but Willis ( unprompted ) immediately
adds that he ‘never asked him any
questions’… he just wanted to see how
he was doing.
Willis says he never even bothered to ask
Brendan why he happened to be standing
there in the parking lot even though a
helicopter was out looking for the rest his
crew… OR even asked Brendan if he
had any idea where they might be.
IMHO… That is hardly credible
**
** FULL AUDIO OF DARRELL WILLIS’ FIRST ADOSH INTERVIEW
The full AUDIO recording of Darrell Willis’ first ( of two ) interviews
with ADOSH investigators is now publicly available at…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/20inrene9tcx74a/QfiiHnaPeh/ADOSH%20Yarnell%20Hill%20Investigation/City%20of%20Prescott%20Fire%20–%20GMHS/Employee%20Interviews%20by%20ADOSH
This first ADOSH interview with Darrell took place on August 19, 2013,
at 1:05 AM in the morning, in Prescott. Jon Paladini, the Prescott City
Attorney, accompanied Willis at this interview.
There are any number of very ‘odd’ things being said by Willis in this interview
that haven’t been heard before… including his accounts of the times Granite
Mountain had actually been ‘kicked off’ a number of fires ( actually sent home
with scathing write-ups )… but more on THAT part of the interview later.
This ( first post of many regarding this interview, probably ) is just about
ONE of these ‘odd’ moments in his interview and concerns the ‘story’ he tells
the ADOSH investigators about the MacKenzie camera, and also ( perhaps
even more important )… what he does NOT tell them about it.
Since it was only August 19, the ADOSH investigators had no idea, at this point,
that Christopher MacKenzie’s camera had actually been found, returned to his
father, who is only then (supposedly) the one who discovered there was anything
on it, made a CD of the contents, and then (supposedly) handed that CD back
to Darrell Willis at Christopher’s funeral.
Only then did Willis (supposedly) pass that CD on to the SAIT investigators,
and it was all happening OUTSIDE the normal ‘YCSO police chain of
evidence’.
So the SAIT had ALL of the MacKenzie photos, video and audio at this time…
( on August 19 ) but since the SAIT was not cooperating with ADOSH… the
ADOSH investigators had no idea about MacKenzie’s camera until Willis
casually ‘announces’ the camera’s existence in this interview.
Here is the transcript of that moment in the interview when Willis ‘announces’
to the ADOSH investigators that HE has, in fact, already seen the photos and
videos from MacKenzie’s camera…
Barry Hicks = Wildland Fire Associates contractor for ADOSH
START OF SECTION FROM AUDIO INTERVIEW
+50:05 ( 50 minutes and 5 seconds into the interview )….
Barry Hicks: And you never heard any conversation with… between Granite
or Eric and Air Attack sayin’… we’re movin… um… and…
now… there was a… there’s a text message from one of the Granite
Mountain Hotshots, too, I believe it was to a Mother, wadn’t it?… uh… that says…
Darrell Willis: Yea… Wade Parker
Barry Hicks: …we see structures that need to be protected…
and Do you remember what time that was… that…
Darrell Willis: I’m thinkin’ it was after 4 o’clock.
Ah… I think it was 4:04 or somewhere in there.
I’ve… I’ve heard about that.
I’ve seen some… ah… pictures… that were about the same time.
We got some pictures from a camera… that was… MacKenzie.
The Sheriff picked it up… and they thought it was a burned up phone.
The sent it home with the parents.
Dad took it down to Walgreens.
They pulled a SIM card out of it and they pulled a whole bunch a pictures out of it.
Barry Hicks: Oh, really… huh.
Darrell Willis: And it was some of these pictures, in fact,
There’s some video there of where the fire was sittin’ at this time.
Almost exact same as that Parker
Barry Hicks: About the same time?
Darrell Willis: Uh-huh
Barry Hicks: Um… Did the video show anything different from…
Darrell Willis: Not really… you could just see that line of fire comin’ back to the south.
END OF SECTION FROM AUDIO INTERVIEW
Points…
1) MacKenzie’s camera was NOT ‘burned up’, or at least not in any kind of
condition that would cause any investigator to believe it was ‘garbage’ or ‘not
worth examining’. Christopher’s father himself described to the media how
he was amazed at what GOOD condition it was in when he received it and
that the ‘cloth cover’ wasn’t even burned. Christopher’s father also expressed
his amazement to the media that he would even be ‘receiving’ this camera
( with photos and videos ) back when he already knew the police were still
holding Christopher’s smartphone ‘as evidence’. What Christopher’s father did
NOT know at that time is that the only reason he received the camera is because
of the effort that was made to keep it OUTSIDE the ‘normal chain of evidence’.
2) Even if the camera had visible damage or appeared to be ‘burned up’… any
Sheriff or YCSO police investigator would have still submitted it into evidence
to be fully examined… ESPECIALLY if ( as Willis says )… they actually even
remotely thought it might be a ‘phone’. Those were stated as ‘high priority’
evidence items in the YCSO police reports themselves.
3) The Sheriff did NOT ‘send it home with the parents’. As far as we know… it
somehow left the deployment site, then somehow was ‘transported’ ( outside
the normal investigation channels ) over to the Medical Examiner’s office and
‘added’ to a bag of personal effects of Christopher MacKenzie. That ‘bag’ of
effects was then given to Christopher MacKenzie’s father by the Fire officials
( Chino Valley? ) in charge of doing that. The ‘Sheriff’ and/or the YCSO
investigators were not the ones delivering ANY of the personal effects back
to the families.
4) Darrell Willis is announcing to the ADOSH investigators, as early as August
19, that the MacKenzie camera WAS found, and it DID contain photos and
video, and that HE himself has seen/heard all of that… but he carefully does
NOT tell them about the most important thing of all about the videos… the fact
that they captured part of the ‘discussing their options’ radio conversations
and were the first proof that Marsh was not physically WITH Steed and the
crew circa 4:04 PM.
For someone who appeared to be ‘fully cooperating’ with the ADOSH
investigation… his mis-representation of the ‘chain of possession’ on the
MacKenzie camera and his failure to disclose the most important aspect
of what was ON it is VERY strange.
ALSO NOTE: In this very part of the interview… Mr. Barry Hicks DID ask
Darrell Willis the crucial question…
“And you never heard any conversation with… between Granite
or Eric and Air Attack sayin’… we’re movin?”
…but then doesn’t even give Willis a chance to answer and suddenly
‘changes the subject’ to being about the Wade Parker text photo.
Willis then talks freely about the ‘photos’… but ignores that first question about
whether he actually ‘heard’ any of GM’s conversations about ‘moving’.
Willis would go on to admit just a month or so later in his interview with
military.com that he was, in fact, ‘listening’ to the GM private intra-crew
radio channel that afternoon… and around the time they ‘decided to move’.
Thanks for retelling this, WTK. Being the one who researched it all, I was thinking it would end up in the foggy bins of past history. And it’s very important.
Especially since I just read in Brendan’s October interview that GM had four GPS units with them on June 30.
And PS, reading his interviews, it’s becoming more and more apparent to me that he KNEW that the “escape route” was the two-track road all the way to Boulder Springs Ranch. I have been befuddled, all along, that Brendan, after listening to all the convos on the crew channel, never said where GM had gone when they were searching for them. I couldn’t believe he didn’t know.
Now I realize, and believe, he didn’t know because he was very clear the escape route was the two-track ALL THE WAY to Boulder Springs Ranch. So he must have never heard any conversation regarding cutting down into the bowl. That leaves its own possibilities…..
Regarding Ball and the UTV, he didn’t borrow it from BR, he borrowed it when he was driven to the Yarnell Fire Department, after walking to Yarnell from the dozer line. The whole thing with Ball, the dozer, his two trips into Glen Illah, etc., are both less and more confusing to me after reading the unit logs and the current interviews, and I still have no clue how the BR Utility truck and trailer were brought out and when.
And also, I never believed GM had two trucks–sup and chase–despite what you wrote, because I have every vehicle in every related photograph keyworded and have seen absolutely nothing showing a GM chase truck. But you were right. And it was Steed’s, according to Brendan. Reading these interviews is quite enlightening, indeed.
Thx for keeping up the good work. I don’t have time to do much commenting and problem-solving, but I definitely keep up with reading.
Marti, I agree that Ball borrowed the quad from the YFD, not BR. But I think he actually rode with Mcdonough in the Supt truck or he was riding with Trew Brown in the chase truck when he went to retrieve the quad.
I do want to add one additional clarification to my earlier comment to Joy. It is to easy for me just to say the Granite Mountain Hotshots were my hero’s BEFORE they died, not because they died. They were my hero’s because they earned their living and supported their families, by moving towards a fire, moving towards the danger, for all of us.
**
** FULL TRANSCRIPT OF BACKGROUND RADIO CONVERSATIONS
** CAPTURED IN AIR STUDY VIDEO 20130630_154232_fire_behavior_EP
This is the AIR STUDY video that has always been reported to have the
‘callout’ from OPS2 Paul Musser to DIVSA Eric Marsh in it, but a public
copy of that video has not been available until today.
We also now discover ( as the ADOSH investigation notes suggested )
that the video BEGINS with what appears to be Eric Marsh ‘finishing’
a conversation with some other (unknown) person.
AIR STUDY VIDEO…
20130630_154232_fire_behavior_EP.MOV
Public Dropbox location…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/f8c8k68ctnpl4x8/MMsNwr4O2Y/Panebaker/Video#lh:null-20130630_154232_fire_behavior_EP.MOV
Video was shot on June 30, 2013 beginning at 1542 ( 3:42 PM ) plus 32 seconds.
Length: This video is only 24 seconds long.
FULL TRANSCRIPT OF BACKGROUND RADIO CONVERSATIONS…
NOTE: No ‘audio forensics’ required here. All the background radio
conversation captured in this AIR STUDY video can be clearly heard by
anyone with normal hearing.
ALSO NOTE: This video BEGINS at 1542.38 ( 3:42 PM plus 38 seconds ).
That is 2 minutes and 38 seconds AFTER Gary Cordes had officially
requested the full evacuation of Yarnell and Glen Ilah.
ALSO NOTE: When the video starts… someone is already answering
someone else’s previous radio call in the background and the voice that
is heard responding is a more than 90 percent probable match for Eric
Marsh. Even the ADOSH investigation notes confirm that is is most
likely him speaking at the start of this video.
VIDEO STARTS
+0:00
Eric Marsh: …towards the structures… uh… (pause) southern… uh…
(pause) into Yarnell.
NOTE: As soon as Marsh finished answering whoever he
was talking to… OPS2 Paul Musser calls him directly…
+0:06
Paul Musser: Division Alpha, Operations Musser.
NOTE: Silence for a moment, then someone comes on and
simply says “Thank you” to Marsh for his response.
My opinion only: The voice saying “Thank you” SOUNDS like it COULD
have been Darell Willis. It is a good match for other radio captures of
Darell Willis’ voice.
+0:13
(Unknown): Thank you.
NOTE: There is no other background traffic in the remaining
11 seconds. Marsh does not respond to Musser by the time
the video ends at 1542.56
+0:24
VIDEO ENDS
So the exact ‘clock’ time for this clear attempt on OPS2 Musser’s part to
engage in conversation directly with DIVSA Eric Marsh is now known to be…
1542.38 ( 3:42 PM plus 38 seconds ).
That is TWO minutes after the moment when SPGS1 Gary Cordes officially
called for full the full evacuation of Yarnell and Glen Ilah, and Musser was
known to be physically with Cordes at this time somewhere in Yarnell ( probably
the Ranch House Restaurant staging area ).
Some typos above. The video itself begins at 1542.32
( 3:42 PM plus 32 seconds ) and not 1542.38 as accidentally
typed up above in some places.
The radio call from OPS2 Musser to DIVSA Marsh happens
+6 seconds into the video, making the time of THAT radio
call 1542.38 ( 3:42 PM plus 38 seconds ).
well, as usual, you get the most obvious of the dialogue correct, but are circumspect at best about the rest of it… good to know nothing really changes.
the first part of the video (that you attribute to Marsh) could be anyone and is more likely air attack, since they are actually talking about the fire burning over the retardant lines and towards Yarnell… (which you fail to pick up on apparently?)
lucky for you i am back! …to hold your feet on the ground, before you go leaping again.
“90% probable match” is pretty optimistic i’d say.
Welcome back…….
XXFULLSAILXX! Our old friend and loyal opposition, welcome back!
Reply to xxfullsailxx post on March 24, 2014 at 7:24 am
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>> well, as usual, you get the most obvious of the
>> dialogue correct, but are circumspect at best about
>> the rest of it…
What are you referring to?
Obviously the ‘foreground’ dialogue is not included
in the transcription above. Is that what you are
talking about?
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>> good to know nothing really changes.
Apparently not. Here to just make trouble again?
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>> the first part of the video (that you attribute to Marsh)
>> could be anyone and is more likely air attack, since
>> they are actually talking about the fire burning over
>> the retardant lines and towards Yarnell…
>> (which you fail to pick up on apparently?)
See below. I am the one who found the ADOSH
AIR STUDY video notes from the recently released
ADOSH investigation supporting documentation, and
it is the ADOSH investigators themselves who
first heard this dialogue and their own notes say
they believe it is Eric Marsh.
I agree with the ADOSH investigators.
It sounds just like Eric Marsh.
I am also the one ( again, see below ) that pointed out
that it is, in fact, NOT totally clear what Marsh ( or
whoever that is ) might be talking about.
He MIGHT be talking about the FIRE
OR
He MIGHT be talking about their plans to leave the black.
That’s what we do now.
We talk about it.
>> xxfullsailxx also said…
>> lucky for you i am back! …to hold your feet on the
>> ground, before you go leaping again.
And I am still here to let YOU know when I think you
are full of it as well. Type away.
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>> “90% probable match” is pretty optimistic i’d say.
See ADOSH investigation notes.
They are 100 percent sure ( no qualifying notes on
their decision that it is Marsh ).
At least I added the ’10 percent doubt’.
Reply to xxfullsailxx post on March 24, 2014 at 7:24 am
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>> well, as usual, you get the most obvious of the
>> dialogue correct, but are circumspect at best about
>> the rest of it…
WTKTT asks, “What are you referring to? Obviously the ‘foreground’ dialogue is not included
in the transcription above. Is that what you are
talking about?”
i was referring to the one thing you got right, the most obvious thing, that Musser’s voice is very clear in the video. the rest of it is just blind speculation, as usual.
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>> good to know nothing really changes.
Apparently not. Here to just make trouble again?
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>> the first part of the video (that you attribute to Marsh)
>> could be anyone and is more likely air attack, since
>> they are actually talking about the fire burning over
>> the retardant lines and towards Yarnell…
>> (which you fail to pick up on apparently?)
WTKTT also says, “See below. I am the one who found the ADOSH AIR STUDY video notes from the recently released ADOSH investigation supporting documentation, and it is the ADOSH investigators themselves who first heard this dialogue and their own notes say they believe it is Eric Marsh. I agree with the ADOSH investigators. It sounds just like Eric Marsh. I am also the one ( again, see below ) that pointed out that it is, in fact, NOT totally clear what Marsh ( or whoever that is ) might be talking about. He MIGHT be talking about the FIRE OR He MIGHT be talking about their plans to leave the black. That’s what we do now. We talk about it.”
i really love how you tout “I FOUND THIS” or “I FOUND THAT” like you’re a petulant child looking for attention. “IT’S MINE, IT’S MINE!”
>> xxfullsailxx also said…
>> lucky for you i am back! …to hold your feet on the
>> ground, before you go leaping again.
WTKTT also said, “And I am still here to let YOU know when I think you
are full of it as well. Type away.”
thanks! will do!
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>> “90% probable match” is pretty optimistic i’d say.
WTKTT says, “See ADOSH investigation notes.
They are 100 percent sure ( no qualifying notes on
their decision that it is Marsh ).”
you get a lot of mileage out of some hand scribbled notes on a yellow pad with no qualifiers. i don’t think you’re hearing what you think you’re hearing…
WTKTT says, “At least I added the ’10 percent doubt’”.
i think you should qualify all your statements with a 50% doubt… meaning there’s a 50/50 chance you might know (or understand) what you’re talking about.
Reply to xxfullsailxx post
on March 24, 2014 at 8:03 pm
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>> i really love how you tout
>> “I FOUND THIS” or “I FOUND THAT”
No ‘touting’ involved. YOU are the one who
seemed to be unaware in YOUR post
that the ADOSH investigators had
already found the same audio capture
before I even mentioned it… so if you
have a problem with what you think
is being reported… take it up with ADOSH.
You’ve only been back for a few posts
and once again I have to remind you…
This is NOT about ME… and it’s NOT
about YOU. It’s about what really
happened in Yarnell on June 30, 2013.
>> xxfullsailxx
>> i think you should qualify all your
>> statements with a 50% doubt…
>> meaning there’s a 50/50 chance you
>> might know (or understand) what
>> you’re talking about.
I take it back. Maybe some things CAN
change. You are willing to at least give
me 50 percent now, it seems.
Send me your address.
I’ll send you an autographed baseball.
( I think only Gary is going to fully pick
up on that one ).
Batting 50% is a super star?
…”into Yarnell” sounds a bit like Marsh. “Thank you”, sounds a bit like Willis.
But, apparently, THE KEY CONVERSATION ON THIS VIDEO for all of us, comes right AFTER all of that, when someone says, “Where do we document that, at?”. Whoever was participating in THAT discussion, heard the entire conversation, and knew who all of the various participants were, along with, the complete conversational verbiage!
It’s a shame it didn’t last for more than 24 seconds.
I’m absolutely sure that just after the video ends…
Eric Marsh probably ‘answers’ the direct callout to
him from OPS2 Paul Musser.
If he didn’t… I’ll bet Paul Musser called him again.
OPS people don’t take kindly to being ignored
by DIVS people when they are calling them directly.
I do NOT believe this video was actually ‘edited’ or
‘cropped’ and here is why…
If you look in the background… all they were really
trying to do is capture that quick SEAT drop that
is taking place… and there is just enough video
to do that successfully.
It’s a little odd that this particular video is an Apple
Quicktime MOV format and the others are MP4,
but I also don’t think that’s proof of any ‘editing’
after-the-fact.
It seems to just be what it is. A short little video
someone took ( with their iPhone? ) to be sure and
capture that quick SEAT drop in the background,
which they do.
i think that you are making the very bad assumption that they were making any reference at all to what was being said over the radio. they could have been talking about anything… they could have been joking… they could have been talking about the air show, they could have been talking about the traffic, they could have been talking about passing gas…
maybe you were joking in your above comment? at least i hope so.
Reply to xxfullsailxx post
on March 24, 2014 at 8:08 pm
I will give you the benefit of the doubt that you
were trying to make a valid point up above… but
you honestly ‘lost me’.
What are you talking about?
Who is the ‘they’ in your comment above?
Which (prior) comment or statement were you
even referring to?
Please try again.
Okay… maybe I ‘deciphered’ what you
were trying to say.
Were you trying to say that the comments
by the guys in the FOREGROUND ( the
‘they’ you may have been referring to ) may
have had nothing to do with the radio
conversation taking place in the
BACKGROUND?
That wasn’t my comment…. but if that’s
what you were trying to establish above
then I would tend to agree.
I don’t think any of the foreground chatter
in this video has anything to do with the
background chatter. I don’t think they were
paying attention.
They were focused on the SEAT drop
that was happening and you can even hear
the 5 or 6 shutter clicks as they focused on
getting their own photographs during
the drop.
Additional photos and video have been uploaded to the aerial firefighting study folder. More videos will be loaded shortly. Thank you. John
Thank you, John! ( ongoing thanks, of course ).
There is now a (public) copy of this infamous AIR STUDY video
available that does, in fact, capture OPS2 Paul Musser making
a radio call directly to DIVSA Eric Marsh.
The exact time of that ‘callout’ is now known.
It took place at exactly…
1542.38 ( 3:42 PM plus 38 seconds ).
See above for a full transcript of ALL the background radio
transmissions captured in this particular AIR STUDY video.
I had the opportunity to talk with the YHF Type 3 IC (ICT3) Russ Shumate recently, and he shared some details on the initial and extended attack of the YHF (June 29, 2013) that are pretty informative.
The SAIT states that 7 firefighters were helicoptered onto the Weaver Mountains ridge on June 29th. The fire was “holding on al four sides …” The SAIT further stated “that night 13 firefighters remain[ed] on the hill …”
Based on several year’s worth of past wildland fire experiences on the Weaver Mountians (site of the YHF), ICT3 Shumate said for SAFETY REASONS DUE TO LIGHTNING POTENTIAL, he had a fairly strict standard operating procedure. He learned to ALWAYS LIMIT the number of WFF on top of the Weaver Mountains to ONE OR TWO HELICOPTER LOADS, approximately an HOUR’S WORTH OF FLIGHT TIME, to ensure he could get all the WFF off the Weaver Mountains and out of harm’s way in short order, once a lightning storm was imminent and before the lightning was upon them. He said years’ worth ofoccurences of this limited him to the one hour and 1-2 helicopter loads, so that’s what he based his strategy and tactics on that weekend.
ICT3 Shumate stated on June 29th, the YHF had BACKED DOWNHILL on the very STEEP slopes through the THICK CHAPARRAL amongst the HUGE BOULDERS. This made it very difficult and unsafe to fight fire on the STEEP slope(s) in the THICK BRUSH amongst the HUGE BOULDERS at that time of day under the HOT, DRY, AND WINDY conditions.
The SAIT further stated that the “fire eventually jumps the two-track road on the east flank and grows to about six acres by late afternoon.” So, it makes more sense to me now that the fire was backing INTERIOR down the steep slope(s) underneath the VERY DENSE, VERY DRY, VERY DECADENT chaparral overstory scrub oak brush, amongst the large boulders. Once it flared up as the relative humidity dropped with increasing wind, it wouldn’t have taken much effort for it to run to the road and jump it. They had NO Engine there for water, only bladder bags.So, it may have even crossed the road as a slopover rather than as spot fires, which would have made it more difficult to catch without an Engine right there.
Moreover, by now you know that SEVERAL of the Watch Outs would have applied:
8) CONSTRUCTING LINE WITHOUT A SAFE ANCHOR POINT.
9) BUILDING FIRELINE DOWNHILL WITH FIRE BELOW.
11) UNBURNED FUEL BETWEEN YOU AND THE FIRE.
14) WEATHER GETTING HOTTER AND DRIER.
15) WIND BEGINS TO INCREASE AND/OR CHANGE DIRECTION.
17) TERRAIN AND FUELS MAKE ESCAPE TO SAFETY ZONES DIFFICULT.
So, this explained to me a bit more ICT3 Shumate’s reasoning in limiting the number of WFF to engage the YHF that day. Moreover, he stated the Inmate Crew did all they could under the circumstances AND that the Crew Boss feels really bad about them ‘losing their line,’ even to this day.
yeah, after reading shumate’s account in the unit logs i had much more sympathy for what they were doing in the first 24 hours of the incident. the fire looked down right docile from the air attack photos when it was first flown and it didn’t look like good country to be stumbling around in the dark trying to find an assed-out fire… i think their initial response was pretty reasonable, even more so given the number of potential starts that they thought they might be dealing with after the lightning bust. besides the fact that it’s not just shumate making the calls… you also have duty officer’s from both BLM and ASFD working on the sidelines with line officer’s in the mix too, presumably.
i don’t quite understand why they didn’t launch the type 2 ship with bucket to help squash the slop over though. the ship and crew were still on scene and they couldn’t get any other air resources in so why not use it? … the other thing that bugs me about the response was, it wasn’t more than a 1-2 hour hike in… so crew-shuttle by helicopter wasn’t the only option to get people on OR off the hill. i know lightning is a big factor, but it’s something we deal with all the time…
of course, that’s all hind-sight… i think people have been pretty harsh on shumate and the initial attack strategy, excessively so.
xxfullsailxx,
Welcome back.
Shumate was pretty adamant about the lightning from past experiences in the Weaver Mountains. Watch Out #19, Death from Above you know.
I don’t know about why they didn’t use bucket work, didn’t ask him that. I told him, I thought he did the best job he could under the circumstances.
When you make the time, listen to the Willis interview tape(s). He reveals a lot about the fire behavior on the Doce Fire as well as the YHF that was interesting, particularly the very active NIGHTTIME FIRE BEHAVIOR.
Reply to xxfullsailxx post on March 24, 2014 at 7:48 pm
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>> i don’t quite understand why they didn’t launch the
>> type 2 ship with bucket to help squash the slop over
>> though. the ship and crew were still on scene and
>> they couldn’t get any other air resources in so why
>> not use it?
The only evidence that Shumate even tried to get
some bucket drops going that day ( even though some
say that should have been happening ALL day ) is
contained in his own unit log(s).
It wasn’t until 1600 ( 4:00 PM ), after the fire had
‘escaped’ and was now ‘established’ on the east
side of the two-track that Shumate made his first
move to even ‘prepare’ for bucket drops that day.
From Shumate’s unit log(s)…
_______________________________________________
1600 – Spot across the road was established and crews
were having a difficult time hooking it. Slop was (now)
approximately 1-2 acres. Ordered AA and SEATS to
launch. Ordered Yarnell Fire Department ( YFD ) Water
Tender to utilize for creation of a dip site for potential
bucket work.
_______________________________________________
This ‘appears’ to be the first time the YFD then made
any move to set up that ‘pumpkin’ over at the Boulder
Springs Ranch ( which remained set up there even
throughout the night and the next day ). They also
apparently got that done fairly quickly…
…but then (apparently) nothing else happened.
>> xxfullsailxx also said…
>> the other thing that bugs me about the response was,
>> it wasn’t more than a 1-2 hour hike in… so crew-shuttle
>> by helicopter wasn’t the only option to get people on
>> OR off the hill.
The next morning… it only took Granite Mountain 45
minutes to make the same hike west from the
Sesame clearing staging area all the way up to
where the fire had been burning Saturday and the
same spot where the Lewis DOC crew had been
working all day Saturday.
The only attempt Shumate actually made on Saturday
to see if they even really needed to use a chopper that
day as the ONLY way to get people to/from to the fire
was early that morning ( on the 29th ).
At 0900… Shumate specifically asked the Lewis CRWB
( Crew Work Boss ) to ‘scout that out’ and see if there
was any way to drive or hike up to the fire.
He said there wasn’t ( even when any local YFD person
could have easily told him there were, in fact, clear
two-tracks leading all the way up there ).
From Shumate’s unit log
( Page 36 of full SAIT ‘unit log’ document )…
________________________________________________
Saturday, June 29, 2013 – 0900
Assignments: Lewis crew; CRWB ( Crew Work Boss ) to
determine if there is a route to drive or hike to fire, being
mindful of if the fire behavior changes, would the crew be
safe hiking through the fuels. Lewis CRWB reports that
none of the roads are drivable and that a hike in would not
be achievable with the (DOC) crew.
________________________________________________
So it wasn’t that there weren’t ways to hike any number of
firefighters to/from the fire on Saturday… it was that
the DOC Crew Boss either didn’t do a good job ‘scouting
this out’ and/or didn’t think his crew would be able to
(physically) ‘accomplish’ the hike.
Relply to RTS post on March 23, 2014 at 8:28 pm
>> RTS said…
>> Shumate said for SAFETY REASONS DUE TO LIGHTNING
>> POTENTIAL, he had a fairly strict standard operating
>> procedure. He learned to ALWAYS LIMIT the number of
>> WFF on top of the Weaver Mountains to ONE OR TWO
>> HELICOPTER LOADS, approximately an HOUR’S WORTH
>> OF FLIGHT TIME, to ensure that he could to ensure he could
>> get all the WFF off the Weaver Mountains and out of harm’s
>> way in short order, once a lightning storm was imminent and
>> before the lightning was upon them.
Yes. In the recently released SAIT unit logs… Shumate’s own
unit log confirms that that WAS his ‘thinking’ that day.
The real reason he went with the ‘chopper lifts’, however, is
because he had asked the Lewis DOC crew boss at 0900
to see if there was any way to hike his crew up there… and
the DOC crew boss told Shumate ‘No’ ( Even though any
local YFD person could have told either him or Shumate all
about the known/clear two-tracks leading all the way to the fire
and, indeed, were the very same two-tracks that Granite
Mountain used the next morning to make it all the way to
that same spot with just a 45 minute hike. )
>> RTS also wrote
>> So, this ( and all the other reasons above ) explained to me
>> a bit more ICT3 Shumate’s reasoning in limiting the number
>> of WFF to engage the YHF that day.
Yes… everything he told you and you then relayed/described up
above definitely explains HIS reasoning for HIS IA plan that day…
…but whether or not that overall IA plan was, ultimately, adequate
for the situation ( or not ) will ( and should ) remain a subject of
debate.
It still all falls squarely into the ‘Are there ANY lessons to be
learned from the (whole) Yarnell Hill Fire?’ category.
>> Moreover, he stated the Inmate Crew did all they could
>> under the circumstances
Probably so. In reality… if the terrain, conditions and fire behavior
as described above really were not suitable for the Lewis DOC
crew to successfully fight fire there that day ( which is the
impression your information above is giving), then given ALL
these conditions and their level of training and competence…
…maybe they shouldn’t have even been up there in the first place.
Maybe the IA that day needed a different approach with a better
chance of success.
>> AND that the Crew Boss feels really bad about them
>> ‘losing their line,’ even to this day.
I’ll bet he does.
Did Shumate (himself) mention the ‘chainsaw gas’ situation and
( if or how ) that factored into them being unable to ‘catch’ the
slopover when it happened?
There is no mention whatsoever of this ‘running out of chainsaw
gas’ situation that afternoon in Shumate’s own unit logs even
though it is well documented in the official reports.
Did he mention how he was able to get 7 more crew members
up there in the late afternoon along with enough supplies for them
to spend the night up there… but was somehow unable to get
them chainsaw gas when they really needed it?
Did he mention how he only began to consider or prepare for
bucket-drops that day AFTER the fire ‘escaped’… but then that
never really got organized or even took place until long after the
fire was out of control and darkness was coming?
WTKTT,
ICT3 Shumate did NOT mention any of those things you asked about in your last few paragraphs, e.g. saw gas, etc., and I never asked him. The saw gas responsibility would fall on the Lewis Crew Boss and NOT the IC. Likewise, the helicopter bucket work would have been the Lewis Crew Boss’ responsibility, i.e. Fire Order #3 – Base all actions on current and EXPECTED behavior of the fire.
RTS… thanks.
Personally ( after FINALLY getting to see Shumate’s
own unit logs ) I don’t think just having working
chainsaws ( or not ) would have made a whole
lot of difference after they let that thing jump
that road… but it’s still curious how it was mentioned
in all the reports and that it rendered the ground
team (quote) “ineffective”… but Shumate says
nothing about it himself.
The only real cure was prevention that day.
Shumate had 5 hours to just ‘put the nails in the
coffin’ on that 2-4 acre thing with little to no fire
activity and little to no wind.
It didn’t happen.
**
** FULL TRANSCRIPT OF BACKGROUND RADIO CONVERSATION
** IN AIR STUDY VIDEO 20130630_153014_SEAT_EP.MOV
**
** CONTAINS BYRON KIMBALL’S 1531 WEATHER REPORT
** GOING OUT ( LOUD AND CLEAR ) ON TAC 1
Reply to Bob Powers post on March 23, 2014 at 7:01 am
>> Bob Powers said…
>> 38 min start of the above noted 40-50 MPH out flow winds with in a 1/2 hour
>> by weather person. Then 22 min. after that GM and Marsh are on the move
>> in the brush field.
>>
>> This is critical.
>>
>> Why would any crew go into unburned fuel with those kind of wind predictions?
VERY good question.
Still deserves a VERY good answer but I’m afraid we still don’t have that (yet).
>> The above are tape times can you or do you have exact times to
>> coordinate to?
As with ALL of these AIR STUDY videos… the exact DATE and TIME when
the video begins is supposedly right there in the recorded FILENAME of the
video itself.
In this case… AIR STUDY video title / filename of…
20130630_153014_SEAT_EP.MOV
…means it was shot on June 30, 2013, starting at exactly
1530 ( 3:30 PM ) plus 14 seconds.
>> Bob Powers also wrote…
>> If the crew moved which I believe they did after this critical weather report
>> then they truly ignored what was a real and verifiable warning. This caught
>> my attention I know we have discussed this earlier but this also helps set
>> time frames.
If the DATE / TIME stamps in the AIR STUDY videos can be trusted as totally
accurate ( no one has said they can’t be, at this point )… then the ACTUAL time
when Byron Kimball’s detailed and ominous weather report went out ‘loud and
clear’ over the TAC 1 radio channel would be…
VIDEO starts at exactly 1530 plus 14 seconds.
Byron Weather report is at exactly +0:47.9 seconds into the video… so that
makes the EXACT time the weather report actually began over the radio…
1531 plus 1.9 seconds ( 1530.14 + 47.9 seconds )
That’s 3:31 PM ( plus 1.9 seconds ).
Here is the actual FULL transcript of the background radio conversation in this
AIR STUDY video that captured Byron Kimball’s detailed weather report
going out ( loud and clear ) over TAC 1 at 3:31 PM.
NOTE: There is no need for any ‘audio forensics’ here. The background
conversation in this AIR STUDY video is CLEARLY heard by anyone with even
normal hearing… and Byron Kimball himself is speaking especially LOUDLY
and CLEARLY as he gives his weather report over the TAC 1 radio channel.
Notice in the transcript below that when Byron was giving his weather report and
was CLEARLY warning everyone of the wind change and HIGH wind speeds
to be expected… he was ALSO giving detailed information about the expected
outpoint to outflow location(s), but the video cuts off before we hear the rest of
his detailed weather report…
AIR STUDY VIDEO…
20130630_153014_SEAT_EP.MOV
NOTE: This is one of the AIR STUDY videos that *has* been made public and
is still available at the following YouTube link…
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IP8vglS_PPM
BACKGROUND RADIO TRAFFIC…
+0.02.6
(Unknown): (?) is gonna be with me (?) has to do and get (torches?) out.
+0:14.1
(Unknown): Copy
+0:30.3
(Unknown): Task Force (common?) to Task Force Six.
+0:37.8
Byron Kimball: Operations Abel, Fire Behavior, on TAC 1
NOTE: The responder to this callout sounds more like OPS2 Paul Musser
than OPS1 Todd Abel.
+0:43.5
( Todd Abel or Paul Musser ): Go ahead, Byron
+0:47.9
Byron Kimball: Within the half-hour, (pause) EAST winds. (pause)
Possibility of as high as 50 miles an hour or likely 25 (pause) definitely
25, 35 gusting 40 (pause) east / northeast within the half hour. Um… the
outpoint to outflow line also ( will be ) located…
( At this point… both a Helicopter and a fixed-wing make a loud flyover and the
background conversation in the last few seconds of the video cannot be heard. )
+1:10.5
VIDEO ENDS – REST OF WEATHER REPORT CUT OFF
I would like to interrupt this deadly serious conversation for a minute to share with you a hilarious short video that explains the smokejumper versus hotshot rivalry better than I ever could. It also gives some insight into both jobs, and wildland firefighting in general.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RGOvM2u8l64
Working is over rated——-
Hilarious.
I especially like the ‘tanning room this way’ poster on the back wall.
1, 2, 3, 4, 4, 4….
…What comes after FOUR?
ROFLMFAO
I didn’t even notice the tanning room this way poster, now I am going to have to watch it again.
Good one and pretty accurate too. I lked it when the HS asked the SJ “with all the tanning, gardening, and nail filing. I was wondering if you and your bros actually like women?’ The HS also asks him “. …. do you even remember how to work?”
Are there’re any smokejumpers out there even following this thread? Speak up!
I have a questions for the experienced WFF folks here. I know that Marsh and Marquez had a disagreement about the line of demarcation for Div A and Div Z responsibilities. Interestingly, Marquez notes don’t make it a big deal, but others say it was a heated discussion. My questions are-Is this type of disagreement common? Isn’t there a superior that would step in and make that decison?
No not common. Yes and that should have been in the Plan.
Divisions should be clearly marked on the Fire map. Just another part of this total cluster on the fire. I do believe they settled what ever the questions were. Marquez never really took over the Division for any length of time.
Reply to Observer post on March 23, 2014 at 11:43 am
>> Observer wrote…
>>
>> I know that Marsh and Marquez had a disagreement about the
>> line of demarcation for Div A and Div Z responsibilities.
>>
>> Interestingly, Marquez notes don’t make it a big deal, but
>> others say it was a heated discussion.
>>
>> Isn’t there a superior that would step in and make that decison?
Supposedly… OPS1 Todd Abel resolved that with Eric Marsh,
and they did it in a PRIVATE ‘cell phone call’ between Marsh
and Abel, shortly after ‘the argument’ with Marquez.
Page 27 of the SAIR report…
_____________________________________________________
Division Supervisor Zulu (DIVS Z), a single resource ordered for the Type 3 team, arrives at the Blue Ridge crew carriers around 1210 and calls DIVS A to discuss a division break and resource assignments. DIVS Z is having radio problems, so he uses a Blue Ridge crew radio to talk with DIVS A over the Blue Ridge intra-crew frequency. DIVS A and DIVS Z cannot agree on the break location or associated supervisory responsibilities, resulting in uncertainty among some personnel about the physical break between Divisions Alpha and Zulu. ( See Footnote 6 ).
_____________________________________________________
The ‘Footnote 6’ being referenced at this point in the SAIR
then says this…
(6) DIVS A ( Eric Marsh ) and OPS1 ( Todd Abel ) communicate
later about the division break being at the grader.
In his SAIT Investigation Interview… OPS1 Todd Abel said
that this ‘communication’ with Marsh about the division
breaks was actually a CELL PHONE CALL with Marsh.
Page 1 of the SAIT Yarnell Investigation Notes ( YIN )…
Interview with Todd Abel by J Karels on 8/14/2013
_____________________________________________________
Blue Ridge was assigned to Division A. He thought he told either Frisby or True over radio. While working their way in, Cordis already had line going in so they were tying in with him. In his mind the whole corner where the dozer line tied into the ridge was Alpha.
Sent Rance in, to contact Div a and decide div break. Marsh’s phone call, they talked about resources and division break between z and alpha (Marsh said somewhat heated discussion, but they worked out the break, which abel understood to be: down off hill near the grader spot was where the break was going to be. rest of line to the east is zulu. (Believes this was last cell call, other convos were over radio).
_____________________________________________________
NOTE that Todd Abel says this ‘cell call’ with Marsh about
the division break argument with Marquez was the (quote) “last
cell call ( with Marsh ), other convos were over the radio”.
That proves the following…
1) Eric Marsh had has own cell phone ( or smartphone ) that
day and
2) Eric Marsh was freely using his cell phone ( more than once )
that day to communicate privately with fire command and
OPS1 Todd Abel himself.
Eric Marsh’s cell phone has never been found.
It was never reported as being recovered from the deployment
site, and it was never entered into evidence along with the
other cell phones / smartphones recovered from the
deployment site.
Eric Marsh’s cell phone simply VANISHED.
Only Darrell Willis and others with the Prescott Fire Department
know what really happened to Eric Marsh’s cell phone.
Regarding the ‘let’s all get along and sing Kumbaya’ discussion above; it seems to me that instead of debating the merits of an idea, some of the people here prefer to express outrage over how they FEEL about ideas, facts, allelgations, or whatever they disagree with, i.e. EMOTIONALISM. So then, it appears that these emotional protests against these perceived outrages has replaced rational dialogue. And so, subjective feelings have transcended objective discussions about ‘the truth.’
Just as there are Rules for WFF, there are also Rules for debatting, logic, and the like. Here’s some basic Rules of Logic – http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logic .You can also search out the rules of debate.
I for one will continue to express disagreement when it is needed using the other person’s words (hence cut and paste). I am NOT going to be a Team Player and merely ‘go along to get along’ – a form of Groupthink. It’s OKAY to disagree because that’s all it is, disagreement. It is NOT intolererance or any other Liberal ‘crime.’
**
** NEW ADOSH MATERIAL – PART 1 – AIR STUDY VIDEO NOTES
In the latest public release of ADOSH investigation supporting documentation,
there are some notes made on a piece of yellow legal paper by one of the
ADOSH investigators while he was listening to various AIR STUDY videos…
A photo of that piece of yellow legal paper is here…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/20inrene9tcx74a/hcScQv7aPb/ADOSH%20Notes%20and%20Emails/N9589%20Audio%20Notes.pdf
Here is the (full) transcription of those handwritten notes…
_________________________________________________________________
1/8/14
M. Krotenberg ( ? )
20130630_153014_SEAT_EP – 00:38
Bryon Kimball with WX update on TAC 1
– Outflow winds due within 1/2 hr.
– 40-50 mph
20130630_154232_fire_behavior_EP
– Towards the structures – Southern – towards Yarnell ( Marsh )
– Division Alpha – Operations Musser
20130630_161620_VLAT_split_1_EP – 1:00
Granite is making their way to the structures. Able?
20130630_161858_VLAT_split_2_EP
1:35 – Blue Ridge lost dozer line
________________________________________________________________
With regards to TWO of those videos that the ADOSH investigator
( M. Krotenberg? ) was making notes on…
>> ADOSH NOTES for…
>> 20130630_161620_VLAT_split_1_EP – 1:00
>> Granite is making their way to the structures. Able?
Apparently… the ADOSH investigator is confirming that he hears what has also
been heard by others in this AIR STUDY video at the +1:00 mark.
In the +1:00 timeframe, the only comment he could be referring to is when
(apparently) Jesse Steed adds to what Eric Marsh just said and says…
“We’ll be pushing our way down into the structures”.
That entire conversation is the “Granite Mountain, what’s your status?” sequence
starting at +0:40.52 and the actual transcript ( not completely confirmed )
appears to be as follows…
_______________________________________________________________
+0:40.52
(Unknown): Granite Mountain ( Five? )…
What’s your status right now?
NOTE: A pretty heavy accent on this speaker. Sounds like
Louisiana Cajun? What he says almost sounds like…
“Granite Montun… wuz yo status rat now?
ALSO NOTE: Even though the caller asked for ‘Granite
Mountain’ specifically, and not ‘DIVS A’… Eric Marsh responds
immediately on behalf of Granite Mountain before Jesse Steed
even has a chance to say anything. Jesse only ‘chimes’ in with
his own ‘status’ report about “we’re pushin’ our way down into
the structures” when Marsh is done speaking.
+0:54.09 to +1:03.81
Eric Marsh: Well the guys… uh… Granite… is makin’ their
way out the exact escape route from this mornin’… an’ it
heads… ah… (pause) SOUTH. ( slight pause )
mid-slope, cuttin’ over.
+1:07.18
( Another voice immediately adds to what Marsh said but it is )
( NOT Marsh this time. It sounds like Jesse Steed )
Jesse Steed: We’ll be pushin’ our way down into the structures.
_______________________________________________________________
There are really no revelations here… but it is SIGNIFICANT to see the
actual written PROOF that the ADOSH investigator himself is hearing this
“direct communication with Granite Mountain” and an indication of their exact
intentions right smack in the middle of the ‘blackout’ timeframe when the
SAIR said there were no such ‘verifiable’ communications.
>> ADOSH NOTES for…
>> 20130630_154232_fire_behavior_EP
>> – Towards the structures – Southern – towards Yarnell ( Marsh )
>> – Division Alpha – Operations Musser
THIS is that same ‘mysterious’ AIR STUDY video that no one has released
publicly yet and the one that apparently has the radio callout from OPS2
Musser to DIVSA Marsh in it.
The ADOSH investigator now seems to CONFIRM that it does, in fact, contain
this ‘callout’ from OPS2 Musser to DIVSA Marsh… but now we ALSO learn
there is something else very interesting captured in this video.
Something to do with Eric Marsh talking about ‘the structures’ and using
the word ‘SOUTH’ and the words ‘towards Yarnell’.
Is this captured audio just Marsh talking to someone about the FIRE activity
( and Marsh says just SOUTH and not SOUTHEAST, which itself would be
very interesting )…
…or is this captured audio something about GM’s intended MOVEMENTS
away from the ‘safe black’?
We know that both Elizabeth and Mr. Dougherty have this AIR STUDY video in
their possession… but it still has not been ‘released’ publicly even now.
The same AIR STUDY video was listed as also being part of the SAIT
investigation and was apparently distributed in the SAIT FOIA/FOIL package
with the following SAIT evidence item record number and inside the
following SAIT CD folder…
SAIT Investigation Record: AO5-20130630:
AerialFirefightingStudyPhotosVideos F:
PhotosAndVideos: Panebaker: Video:
20130630_154232_fire_behavior_EP.MOV
The fact that this particular AIR STUDY video has NOT been made public
yet was discussed once again ( two weeks ago ) back in Chapter V.
Mr. Dougherty then said the following with regards to this video back during
Chapter V of this ongoing discussion… on February 28…
>> John Dougherty on February 28, 2014 at 12:24 pm said:
>>
>> I’m uploading it now and it will be available in
>> AerialFirefightingStudy>Panebaker>Video folder shortly.
It’s been more than two weeks and it is still not there yet.
The folder still just says ‘Partial, uploads underway’…
A05-Aerial Firefighting Study Photos and Videos: (Partial, uploads underway.)
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/bearbyko2mizyd4/mIMtwKd89b
John ( and/or Elizabeth )… any update on when this particular AIR STUDY
video might actually become publicly available?
I’m honestly *NOT* trying to be a naghead about this… but it seems to be even
more important now than ever before to hear what is really being said in this
particular AIR STUDY video and see if a real ‘transcript’ can be produced,
or if there is, indeed, even anything ELSE in this video that hasn’t been
reported or documented yet.
A note on times WTKTT–
38 min start of the above noted 40-50 MPH out flow winds with in a 1/2 hour by weather person. Then 22 min. after that GM and Marsh are on the move in the brush field. This is critical why would any crew go into unburned fuel with those kind of wind predictions? The above are tape times can you or do you have exact times to coordinate to? If the crew moved which I believe they did after this critical weather report then they truly ignored what was a real and verifiable warning. This caught my attention I know we have discussed this earlier but this also helps set time frames.
Reply to Bob Powers post on March 23, 2014 at 7:01 am
>> Bob Powers said…
>> A note on times WTKTT–
>> 38 min start of the above noted 40-50 MPH out flow
>> winds with in a 1/2 hour by weather person. Then 22
>> min. after that GM and Marsh are on the move in the
>> brush field. This is critical why would any crew go
>> into unburned fuel with those kind of wind predictions?
VERY good question.
Still deserves a VERY good answer but I’m afraid we still
don’t have that (yet).
>> The above are tape times can you or do you have
>> exact times to coordinate to?
As with ALL of these AIR STUDY videos… the exact
DATE and TIME when the video begins is supposedly
right there in the recorded FILENAME of the video itself.
In this case… AIR STUDY video title / filename of…
20130630_153014_SEAT_EP.MOV
…means it was shot on June 30, 2013, starting at
exactly 1530 ( 3:30 PM ) plus 14 seconds.
>> Bob Powers also wrote…
>> If the crew moved which I believe they did after this
>> critical weather report then they truly ignored what
>> was a real and verifiable warning. This caught my
>> attention I know we have discussed this earlier but
>> this also helps set time frames.
If the DATE / TIME stamps in the AIR STUDY videos
can be trusted as totally accurate ( no one has said
they can’t be, at this point )… then the ACTUAL time
when Byron Kimball’s detailed and ominous
weather report went out ‘loud and clear’ over the
TAC 1 radio channel would be…
VIDEO starts at exactly 1530 plus 14 seconds.
Byron Weather report is at exactly +0:47.9 seconds
into the video… so that makes the EXACT time
the weather report actually began over the radio…
1531 plus 1.9 seconds ( 1530.14 + 47.9 seconds )
That’s 3:31 PM ( plus 1.9 seconds ).
Here is the actual FULL transcript of the background
radio conversation in this AIR STUDY video that
captured Byron Kimball’s detailed weather report
going out ( loud and clear ) over TAC 1 at 3:31 PM.
NOTE: There is no need for any ‘audio forensics’ here.
The background conversation in this AIR STUDY video
is CLEARLY heard by anyone with even normal hearing
and Byron Kimball himself is speaking especially
LOUDLY and CLEARLY as he gives his weather
report over the TAC 1 radio channel.
Notice in the transcript below that when Byron was
giving his weather report and was CLEARLY warning
everyone of the wind change and HIGH wind speeds
to be expected… he was ALSO giving detailed information
about the expected outpoint to outflow location(s), but
the video cuts off before we hear the rest of his
detailed weather report…
AIR STUDY VIDEO…
20130630_153014_SEAT_EP.MOV
NOTE: This is one of the AIR STUDY videos that *has*
been made public and is still available at the following
YouTube link…
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IP8vglS_PPM
BACKGROUND RADIO TRAFFIC…
+0.02.6
(Unknown): (?) is gonna be with me
(?) has to do and get (torches?) out.
+0:14.1
(Unknown): Copy
+0:30.3
(Unknown): Task Force (common?) to Task Force Six.
+0:37.8
Byron Kimball: Operations Abel, Fire Behavior, on TAC 1
NOTE: The responder to this callout sounds more like
OPS2 Paul Musser than OPS1 Todd Abel.
+0:43.5
( Todd Abel or Paul Musser ): Go ahead, Byron
+0:47.9
Byron Kimball: Within the half-hour, (pause) EAST winds.
(pause) Possibility of as high as 50 miles an hour or
likely 25 (pause) definitely 25, 35 gusting 40 (pause)
east / northeast within the half hour. Um… the outpoint
to outflow line also ( will be ) located…
( At this point… both a Helicopter and a fixed-wing make
a loud flyover and the background conversation in the
last few seconds of the video cannot be heard. )
+1:10.5
VIDEO ENDS – REST OF WEATHER REPORT CUT OFF
Joy – I did not call Elizabeth a “fool.” In fact, I did not call anyone a fool. I said I did not argue with fools. That statement implied that I thought Elizabeth’s stable of closet fire experts who are attempting to make a case that the Granite Mountain Hotshots had to leave the black and march in front of a wall of flames were fools, and I was not going to argue with them. Now, if Elizabeth wants to try on that shoe, and if it fits her, that is up to her.
The bottom line is this. Tex instinctively knew to leave the area in the right direction (there were several to choose from) at the right time (other times would have worked as well) but the Granite Mountain Hotshots under the leadership of Eric Marsh as the Division A Supervisor and Jesse Steed as the Acting Crew Boss made a calculated and conscious decision to march their crew in the direction the fire was burning, south by southeast, as it was being driven by very strong outflow winds from a thunder cell that had been predicted to appear by the National Weather Service well in advance. AFTER being strongly advised to remain where they were, SAFE and in the BLACK.
And both Eric Marsh and Jesse Steed acknowledged that they received that warning and in fact observed the weather event in progress, and they clearly observed the fire had in fact reversed direction, and was now putting up a pyro cumulous cloud of ash and smoke that rose several thousand feet in the air, which every firefighter and every other person with any common sense knows means the situation has deteriorated to the point that there is nothing any person, or any equipment invented or built by people, can do to try and control said fire.
I have long been asking the question, “Why did the Granite Mountain Hotshots die?” in an attempt to reconcile what I had heard from others about Eric Marsh with what Eric Marsh did. RTS has now answered that question based on the consensus of the most highly recognized and respected leaders in the field of hotshot crews today…and that was a group of hotshot superintendents who walked the remains of the Yarnell Hill Fire. Eric Marsh made a catastrophic mistake, and he killed himself and his crew.
Although RTS is technically correct, Jesse Steed could have overruled Eric Marsh who was acting as Division Group Supervisor, since Jesse Steed was Acting as the Granite Mountain Hotshot Crew Boss, and refused to follow him…so Jesse Steed does have some responsibility for that decision as well. BUT, I think that we all can acknowledge (or at least I can) that in the real world, Jesse Steed was obligated to follow Eric Marsh once his decision was made.
The crew also had some obligation (according to others, not me) to voice their objections to follow their leaders down such a reckless path, which was a death chute, and that path was obviously a death chute, since similar death chutes have been killing hotshots since 1966, and they have been pointed out in countless training exercises to be death chutes. But I happen to know in the real world of hotshots, that choice was not an option for the crew…so they died as hotshots. Doing exactly what their leaders ordered them to do, which by the way, works almost all of the time, in fact, that method for survival has only failed hotshots 4 times in the history of wildland firefighting, the Loop Fire of 1966 (12 El Cariso Hotshots dead, including the crew boss), the Battlement Creek Fire of 1976 (3 Mormon Lake Hotshots dead, including the crew boss, with a fourth hotshot severely burned), and the South Canyon Fire of 1994 (9 Prineville Hotshots dead)…and the Yarnell Hill Fire of 2013 (19 Granite Mountain Hotshots dead, including the crew boss).
I have reconciled what I heard about the Granite Mountain Hotshots with what Eric Marsh did, because I had heard how good Eric Marsh was from Darrell Willis and his circle of fire buddies. That assessment turned out to be exaggerated or misplaced or something else altogether, other that correct. Eric Marsh decided to break almost all of the rules that have been developed over more than 100 years of widland firefighting in American, specifically to protect wildland firefighters…all at once, and apparently without a backup plan.
So…the big question has been answered for me. There remains however, several unanswered questions which are…exactly what role did everyone else play in contributing or casual factors in the deaths of the Granite Mountain Hotshots? I’m afraid that discussion is going to outlive you, me, and everyone else who is participating in the thread. BUT…I am convinced that there are many others who are also responsible for the deaths of those 19 heroes, and most of them work for the State of Arizona, Division of Forestry, and the City of Prescott, Prescott Fire Department.
HOWEVER, I think the leadership of the both the City of Prescott of and State of Arizona should take a look in the mirror and ask themselves, “What could I have done to prevent this tragedy?”
Now…may God bless both you and Tex in all of your future hikes and endeavors together, and I want to thank both you and Tex for all of your tireless efforts to bring some clarity to what is now the worst disaster (baring the Idaho fires of 1910, which don’t really count) in the history of wildland firefighting in the United States. May you find what we are all searching for…a way to fix our broken hearts, or at least make them feel just a little bit better.
I need to add a few remarks to clarify my comment above.
1. There isn’t universal agreement on this thread that the sequence of events occurred as I outlined them. That MAY not be what actually happened. We may never know for sure, and we probably won’t know for sure until WHEN, and IF those individuals who have first hand knowledge of the day’s events come forward, and tell us what they know. For example, the decision to go down the death chute may not have been made by Eric Marsh, it may have been made by Jesse Steed, and Eric Marsh was simply attempting to catch up with the crew.
2. My conclusions are drawn from my education and training, and most importantly, my conclusions are based on my experiences in 10 years as a hotshot, 7 years as a hotshot crew boss.
3. The Yarnell Hill Fire disaster was not cause by a single event or decision, e.g., the decision to hike down the death chute. This tragedy was cause by a cascading sequence of decisions and events, many of which were outside of the control of the Granite Mountain Hotshots leadership. And many of the decisions were made by people who should have known better, and were in fact, fighting the Yarnell Hill Fire by the theory of organized chaos.
4. Even though I believe Eric Marsh made the fatal decision, I can still mourn the loss of his life. As a hotshot crew boss who was trained and conditioned to fight fire AGRESSIVELY…but provide for safety first…I made many similar decisions and mistakes. But in the end, I was luckier than Eric Marsh. The bottom line is this…wildland firefighting is not even as safe as most people think it is. Chaos is often running the wildfire, AND calling the shots.
5. The Granite Mountain Hotshots were my hero’s BEFORE they died, not because they died.
Oh…and one more thing, Eric said, Sitta, I do not want to see good people leave this discussion because of the b.s. back and forth stuff. We are all guily of it at one time or another but we need to bring focus back.”
Elizabeth, Eric and Sitta are right. I don’t want to see anyone leave this discussion either, especially you. You have gone to a great deal of time and expense to obtain all of the FOIA materials you have, and to analyze that material and make it available on this thread.
I sincerely apologize for offending you in anyway, and for the negative comments I made. Please accept this apology, and continue to support this thread, as an old friend told me once, “we owe it to the kids on the fire line today.”
Elizabeth,
This is in response to and clarification of your GMHS Station Fire Performance Evaluation post.
“Elizabeth on March 20, 2014 at 2:40 pm said:…. evidence that *I* have gathered does not suggest that Jesse Steed or Eric Marsh had a pattern of behaving in a needlessly and excessively risky manner. Marsh was actually commended by an outside fire official for GM’s and his work on the Station Fire.”
Okay then. That means several things to me (and probably other WFF). Marsh and Steed and the GMHS may have very well done a ‘commendable’ job on the Station Fire. It also means to me that the ‘outside official,’ could have merely been politically correct and given them a commendable rating or merely a boilerplate version like all the other Crews that worked for him. It may have also come from a municipal/wildland fire supervisor that had little or no wildland experience. The ‘commendable’ rating MAY have resulted from Marsh and/or Steed schmoozing or kissing ass to the ‘outside official’ and he just thought they were all ‘nice guys.’ And some overhead from some agencies won’t even go up on the firelines, but supervise from their command vehicles in California. I would have to see the rating to see where the ‘outside offical’ was from, what Agency, what position, and what region of the country.
Commendable ratings’ in-and-of themselves mean very little to experienced WFF supervisors.
Folks, let’s quit the back and forth bullshit of arguing and insinuating amongst ourselves. I have been in the fire service too long to have any patients for this! No one is getting paid to post in here or do the hours of research they have done. ANYONE!.. Let’s knock off all the copy and pasting and ” this one said this and that one said that!”
Agree to disagree and move on!…..Everyone here, is here because they give a crap about knowing the truth of June 30, 2013. So let’s get off this path to nowhere and back onto the road to what matters and open sharing of information. If you are unable to share sources, that is understandable, however those conversations are best not discussed on this thread. There are no sides here, we are all for the same cause….
Well said. It’s easy to get frustrated because the stakes are high (the truth, the reputation of those living and those gone, the feelings of the loved ones, and the safety of current and future WFFs).
Eric is right. We are ultimately on the same side, and we are all invested in this. We’ve learned we should keep the private conversations separate from this public thread; we can move on from here. It looks like JD’s posted plenty of new ADOSH info that can use some eyes:
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/20inrene9tcx74a/ZbnvFe9JW5
Sitta, I do not want to see good people leave this discussion because of the b.s. back and forth stuff. We are all guily of it at one time or another but we need to bring focus back..
Agree with Eric and Sitta.
Elizabeth,
“Elizabeth on March 21, 2014 at 8:23 am said:
Gary, Bob, and RTS: Some of your most recent comments toward me have been needlessly and personally attacking, not to mention completely hurtful and upsetting (e.g. Gary calling me a “fool,” RTS mocking me, …. not needlessly insulting or attacking) …. but you have ignored my pleas.”
Needlessly and personally attcking you? I think NOT. You make statements and I and others respond if/when we disagree or whatever, so therefore they are NOT needless. As far as ‘personally’ goes, I think NOT again. “Mocking [you].” I think NOT again. To the best of my knowledge, there have been no ad hominem attacks on you personally. I can’t help it if you got offended by my ‘Queen’ of the Hill or whatever comment awhile back. I have been attacking your ACTIONS, your WORDS, your LOGIC, and the like. Those are NOT personal attacks. And as far as these being “completely hurtful and upsetting” I’m afraid you’re engaging in drama and histrionics here. COMPLETELY? Really? You’re on your own on the hurtful and upsetting prongs because those are entirely YOUR reactions. Nobody caused those but you.
….
Regarding RTS’ claim of Being Christian, you posted “…. , I expect RTS to be honest and kind in his response. Unless he was lying about being a Christian. (Love thy neighbor, RTS, I believe is on the Christian “to-do” list….).”
Nice hypocrtical slam here. You do have a talent for that and logical fallacies as well. Honest? I have been completely HONEST in my posts and my replies to you. But that seems to be what offends you, my HONESTY. So, I am NOT lying about being a Christian. Why would I do that? Yes, I am a Christian and I’m very thankful for that. ‘Love thy neighbor’? Got it. None of this or any other blog has anything to do with that. So then, what’s that comment all about? It’s the words, the actions, the how, why, what, when, where that counts.
“Elizabeth posted on March 21, 2014 at 9:47 am: …. I am trying to figure out what they were THINKING, whether there could have POSSIBLY been a reason why the black did not sit well with them. There is no way to figure that OUT without examining all possible reasons why the black might have been bad, right? …. it seems useful to try to think about why they might have rejected the idea of sitting in the black. ….”
And “Elizabeth on March 21, 2014 at 10:21 am said: Where did I make a misleading suggestion that GM got scared down?”
Come on now, I think you pretty much insinuated that above.
What were they thinking? I allege they were thinking about other times they had similar experiences and gotten away with it, and this situation is similar, so …. I’ll tell you what they were NOT thinking – they were NOT thinking about the WFF rules. And “whether there could have POSSIBLY been a reason why the black did not sit well with them?” Among other things, how about the influence of PFD Wildland Chief Willis’ comments at the fatality site news conference that “no wildland firefighter is satisfied sitting in the black, in a SZ watching the fire progress below them” [while they sit there and do nothing]. Thetre was ABSOLUTELY NO GOOD REASON, NONE, to leave their perfectly good SZ when they did. NONE! Get over it, the black was NOT bad. I allege they rejected the idea of sitting in the black because they BLATANTLY violated most of the Fire Orders and LCES. Moreover, they BLATANTLY failed to recognize,heed, or mitigate many of the Watch Outs. And also for the other above stated and quoted comments.
“Elizabeth on March 21, 2014 at 10:21 am said: ….(Do you remember the time that I was falsely accused of calling Rory Collins a coward? I never said it – it wasn’t me.). That’s right it WASN’T you nor was it me that used the word ‘coward.’. What I said was that he was acting in a COWARDLY manner speaking of his actions (not an ad hominem attack) when he unexpectadely abandoned the YHF.
This is one of my favorites when you posted “Whereas RTS might be the guy that Eric Marsh fired a few years ago, ….” And just where may I ask did you come up with this gem? When did I allegedly work on the GMHS? And was I fired because I stressed the WFF Rules (10 and 18 and LCES). Was that why I was fired? Or was it because I spoke up (against the GMHS Groupthink) about their alleged recurrent pattern of ‘bad decsions with prior good outcomes’? Which one was it? Or was it both of them or maybe some other reasons I was fired from a Crew I never worked for?
I am very thankful for all that you have done on this forum with all the documents and downloads and such that you have posted. Ongoing thanks for all that effort.
Update on Dave Larsen— He moved out of the Superintendent job in 1988 (from RTS) and up the ladder to Fire Management Officer before he retired. He would have been an over head in 2009 not in charge of the hotshots, when he gave the rating to Granit Mountain. I knew him from work and training a class individual. If he was in charge of the burn out then he was there and on top of the crews no one would have done any thing on there own.
Reply to Bob Powers post on March 22, 2014 at 3:17 pm
Mr. Powers… you are correct.
I was wrong to say that Dave Larsen was *actually* still the active
Superintendent of the Helena Hotshots in September/August 2009
during the ‘Station Fire’.
There is still evidence that Dave Larsen was THERE ( working
the Station Fire ) and supervising the Helena Hotshots from the
‘operations’ level… but you are right… Mr. Larsen had long since
moved up to higher management from his days when he WAS
the actual ground Superintendent of the Helena Hotshots.
During their assignments at the ‘Station Fire’ in 2009, the acting
Superintendent for the Helena Hotshots appears to have actually
been a Mr. Fred Thompson.
I found a PHOTOGRAPH that appears to prove this.
The following is a link to an article in ‘Sky and Telescope’
magazine that was written a year after the ‘Station Fire’ and
is entitled…
Mount Wilson Observatory: One Year After the Fire
http://www.skyandtelescope.com/community/skyblog/newsblog/101589553.html
This article has a PHOTOGRAPH of the Helena Hotshots posing
with Hal McAlister, the Mount Wilson Observatory director.
The photo was taken DURING the actual ‘Station Fire’, 2009.
It’s about halfway down in the middle of the article.
The caption on this photo of the Helena Hotshots at the
‘Station Fire’ reads…
_____________________________________________________
Members of the Helena Hotshots pause for a group shot in front
of the CHARA building atop Mount Wilson. Click on the image
to see the full team, along with observatory director Hal McAlister
at far left and team leader Fred Thompson at far right.
_____________________________________________________
For anyone who might be wondering just from reading this
one particular message who Mr. Dave Larsen is…
Dave Larsen was one of the authors of the Wildland Fire
Associates Report that was contracted by Arizona
ADOSH as their ‘official’ investigation into the deaths
of the 19 Granite Mountain Hotshots.
Mr. Larsen was the one tasked with investigating the
‘organizational’ and ‘operational’ aspects of the Yarnell Hill Fire
for the ADOSH / WFAR report.
Dave Larsen was adamant that the cultures, philosophies,
and protocols of ‘Wildland Firefighting’ and ‘Structural
Firefighting’ were ( and should remain ) separate and not
be ‘mixed’. He has been often quoted saying he could NEVER
understand the mindset of risking lives to save structures.
Sadly… Dave Larsen passed away suddenly a few weeks ago.
Here is a link to his obituary ( which has a great picture of him )…
http://helenair.com/news/local/obituaries/dave-larsen/article_1ab8f7ee-96e3-11e3-89f9-001a4bcf887a.html?comment_form=true
From Dave Larsen’s Obituary…
___________________________________________________
Dave Larsen — the man, the myth, the legend — left us without
warning on Feb. 12, 2014. Dave was born April 6, 1952, in
Omaha, Neb., to Delbert and Frances (Hamon) Larsen. He
joined his older brother, Dan, and they spent their early years in
Nebraska, Missouri and Kansas on various Air Force bases.
In 1961, his father got a job in Kalispell, where Dave lived until
moving to Helena in 1968 and graduating from Helena High
School in 1970. Dave went on to earn both a bachelor’s degree
in history and an electrical engineering degree from MSU
(Go, Bobcats!).
Dave spent the majority of his career working for the U.S. Forest
Service in fire management, beginning with a job manning
Hogback Lookout and, after more 30 years, retiring as the fire
management officer on the Helena Ranger District.
To say Dave’s career was amazing is an understatement.
He became nationally recognized as an expert in all aspects of
fire management. He held numerous positions over the years on
incident command teams, achieving status as one of the few and
elite National Type 1 Incident commanders. He became one of
only five IC’s who were certified in all three genres of firefighting…
fire suppression, prescribed fire and the use of fire in wilderness.
In addition to the numerous fire assignments around the country,
Dave also played a support role in historical events such as
Hurricane Katrina and Columbia Shuttle Recovery efforts.
Utmost in Dave’s philosophy, however, was firefighter safety.
He could never understand risking lives to save structures.
As such, a recent accomplishment he was very proud of was his
work with Wildland Fire Associates on an investigation of the
Yarnell Hill fire in Arizona last summer where 19 firefighters
perished. Dave felt like his contributions would make a difference
in keeping lives safe in the future.
___________________________________________________
Well done, Dave Larsen.
Rest in peace.
We all share your hope that one day, a FULL, complete
investigation of what really happened in Yarnell on June
30, 2013, will help save lives in the future.
Side note—-
Angeles National forest. 1969 thru 1971 I was Clear Creek Fire Prev. Tech. and Mount Wilson was part of my patrol area. It is all under special use by the Forest Service and Had all the local TV station transmitters as well as several Observatories. A very high value area to the Las Angeles basin. I had yearly responsibility for Fire safety inspections to insure hazardous fuels were removed.
One of the oldest, most famous, and most
VALUABLE observatories in the country.
It was a HIGH PRIORITY defense target
throughout the 2009 ‘Station Fire’.
Fire came within 500 yards of one of the VERY
expensive telescopes used in their CHARA array.
Mr. Dougherty requested that, at this start of this new Chapter IV, we all
express a preference for whether the latest comments should be appearing
first ( a with Chapter V ) or last ( as with earlier Chapters ).
My own opinion is that the newer ‘latest comments first’ format seems to
be the way to go. It *seems* to be easier to have (different) ‘contiguous threads’
within the format with a parent comment and then people ‘adding’ to that
parent comment with child comments.
There is still a tendency for people to not ‘scroll down’ and read things and
a lot of things have to get drawn back up as new ‘parent comments’ so
they don’t get ‘lost in the noise’… but that was true with the previous
format as well. Important points were being ‘drawn down’ instead so
the could continue to be talked about.
WordPress is really not the ideal format for this kind of ongoing discussion,
but once you get the ‘hang’ of it… it works fine.
There’s going to be a fair amount of ‘scrolling’ involved no matter which
way you try to use it… so I would say ‘stick with latest comments at
the top’.
What it *might* help some people to know ( if they don’t already ) is that there
is always a FIND option on your Browser Toolbar that can FIND words and
phrases within a page such as this. If you are looking to ‘draw up’ an important
point and make a new parent comment out of it… you can always just FIND
the original comment quickly using the Browser toolbar option(s).
My 2 cents.
Sorry… typo in very first sentence.
This is Chapter VI ( SIX ) of this ongoing discussion, not IV
as I typed above.
Robert the Second on March 22, 2014 at 9:55 am said:
I wrote this phrase down yesterday to touch on it today. It’s been bandied about a few times recently. “Speaking ill of the dead.”
We’re NOT ‘speaking ill of the dead’ but we are speaking to and addressing what they DID or DID NOT do that resulted in their deaths. THEY were the ones that made the bad decisions with the bad outcomes. No one else made those fatal decisions for them, no one held a virtual gun to their heads, there was NO Sword of Damocles hanging over their heads threatening them.
So, it’s only fair that I back off Marsh being the one totally responsible for the GMHS fatalities. Marsh was the Division Supervisor of DIV A that day and Jesee Steed was the Acting GMHS Superintendent. Therefore, Steed was fully responsible that day for the GMHS safety and welfare. Even though Marsh may have been tangentially responsible for the fatal outcomes that day, Steed was the one ultimately responsible for what happened June 30th.
Steed and Matrsh knew or should have known better to strictly follow the well established WFF Rules on June 30th.
Never seen anybody make anything other than technical observations as to the deceased here. People may have criticized Marsh’s communication style, but poor communication, particularly for someone also a strong leader, is a legitimate safety issue along with a social issue. (It is in part a safety issue because of the social dynamics involved with small groups, as well as between the group and the “outside,” in this case.)
I don’t know that some of the more fanciful assertions made on GM’s behalf necessarily put them in a better light, either. E.g., Elizabeth’s assertion that GM may have suddenly deemed the black too risky, whether because of islands of unburned, or “superheated gases” and “catastrophic smoke” that it appears Elizabeth may or may not have heard from unnamed sources would have been too much for GM had they stayed put. Does anyone really think that it would put Marsh or Steed’s professional judgment in a better light to say that they, after initially assessing the black as a safe place to be, in a manner consistent with other’s assessment at the time, other’s assessment now, and consistent with actual facts, then made a sudden about-face because of completely unfounded fears, decided they had no choice but to try to make it back to Yarnell by basically the worst possible way,….and told no one about the supposed “danger in the black” that they had suddenly identified?
Likewise, Elizabeth has also so far refused to name any sources for her conclusion that it looked reasonable to GM at the time they started down, for them to take the route they did. Is she saying they had no experience with local vegetation, particularly on uneven steep slopes, so had no idea the brush would be painfully slow to walk through? Does that really make them look better? Is she suggesting that crews in the future shouldn’t give any consideration to speed of travel, ability to retreat, and other practical boot-on-ground issues, and just go with their feelings instead?
Part of the job, unfortunately, is that if a serious cluster happens, other people get to learn from it. But for the fact that some people are trying to make even the route chosen by GM look “reasonable” on here, I don’t fwiw think there’s that much to learn from the actual route. People knew that type of thing was a bad mistake a long time ago. There are however important training and reporting issues that are part of the “swiss cheese” that allowed some of this happen. It starts by acknowledging there was a mistake and some underlying problems.
I totally agree well said.
Reply to RTS post on March 22, 2014 at 10:54 am
>> RTS said…
>> So, it’s only fair that I back off Marsh being the one totally
>> responsible for the GMHS fatalities. Marsh was the Division
>> Supervisor of DIV A that day and Jesee Steed was the Acting
>> GMHS Superintendent.
Absolutely… and I don’t think this ‘fact’ has actually been
talked about perhaps as much as it should be.
I still believe the fact that Marsh suddenly became DIVSA
that day ( AFTER his attendance at meetings that Jesse
Steed ‘missed’ because he did NOT know he would end
being GMHS Sup himself that day ) had a LOT to do with
what happened later that day.
Steed was eating breakfast with the rest of the crew up
at the ICP in Model Creek when Marsh ( only ) was down
at the Yarnell Fire Station attending the ( brief but important )
meeting that took place there circa 0600 – 0700.
NOTE: The ‘formal briefing’ at the YHF station took place at
0700 but all the public evidence now indicates that there was a
lot of important ‘off the cuff’ planning conversation taking place
BEFORE that meeting even started… like even in the
parking lot of the Yarnell Fire Station.
Steed ‘missed’ ALL of that.
Even if there WAS a moment when someone was firing up
some iPad with Google Maps on it at that meeting ( which
the SAIR originally said happened but I believe is total fiction
since no other report either mentions or can verify it )…
Steed missed ALL of that too ( Google maps on an iPad at YHF ).
There is also the fact that we KNOW, now, that following Marsh’s
employee evaluation on May 3 ( just 57 days before YHF ),
Darrell Willis made it CLEAR to Marsh that he wanted him to
“start mentoring Steed as his replacement” and wanted Marsh
to “start letting Steed take more responsibility for the crew”.
Well… that is EXACTLY what Marsh was doing that day.
He was doing EXACTLY what Willis told him to do on May 3.
He was LETTING Jesse Steed be the sole ‘Supervisor’ for
Granite Mountain that day and was hardly ever with them
at all ( physically ) for almost the entire day.
But here are the ‘exceptions’ to that ( other than Marsh
being with Steed for the NOON face-to-face with Frisby/Brown )…
A NUMBER of times that day… People were calling out to
“Granite Mountain” ( specifically ) on the TAC channels…
but Marsh ‘jumped in’ to respond before Steed even had
a chance to answer the call.
We have actual AUDIO CAPTURE proof of that.
That really means only one of two things…
1) It was just habit. Marsh was just knee-jerking when he
heard radio calls for ‘Granite Mountain’ that day and just
wasn’t stopping to give Jesse the benefit of the doubt to
answer those ( specific ) callouts.
2) Marsh did not totally trust Steed to answer some of the
radio calls specifically aimed at ‘Granite Mountain’.
It depended on WHO was calling, perhaps.
So how much ‘decision making’ was Marsh REALLY letting
Steed do that day? How much did Marsh really TRUST him?
It’s hard to say.
Brendan McDonough probably knows more about this
aspect of what was going on that day.
Steed MAY have even said something about it only in the
crew’s hearing like… “If he wants me to run the crew today
I wish he would just let me do it”… or something like that.
There is also, in fact, still that ‘sarcastic’ comment being made
by ( Misner? ) as captured in the MacKenzie video right
after Marsh told Steed… “I could just fee it, ya know”.
The fact that Marsh had NOT been with them all day and
they were witness to Steed trying to run the crew all day
but still being ‘interrupted’ on the radio by Marsh at
various times might have been a situation that was not
lost on the men…. and hence… the sarcastic comment
out of Marsh’s hearing.
I also believe ( WARNING: Not a verified fact. Just a
possibility that only McDonough could probably verify )
that the following ‘summary’ is the way it *might* have gone
down with the late-day radio calls and the ‘request for resources’
from OPS2 Paul Musser.
NOTE: No TIMES here… since this is just an overview
of a possible (unverified) theory…
– Marsh made it clear to any number of people ( or at least
gave the impression ) that HE *and* GM were ‘in the black’
and everyone later testifies this WAS their ‘understanding’.
– OPS1 Todd Abel tells Marsh to “Keep ME updated, hunker
and be safe ( in the black )”.
– We don’t know what Marsh said in response, but it might
have just been “Copy that” ( As in… yes… we’ll do that ).
– Steed HEARS this exchange between Abel and Marsh,
but doesn’t really say anything. He just assumes that is,
in fact, now their plan *at this point*.
– Musser comes on the radio AFTER this and makes his
infamous ‘request for resources’… but he prefixes his
call with “Granite Mountain, OPS2 Musser, on TAC X”
and Musser SPECIFICALLY asks to speak with GM
( and not DIVSA ).
– THIS time ( that day )… Steed keys his mic button BEFORE
Marsh can ‘jump in’… and Steed is the one who ‘responds’
to this request from Musser.
– Steed is now just reflecting what he absolutely believes
the ‘plan’ to be ( as per moment before when Marsh was
talking to OPS1 Abel )… and Steed is the one who simply
replies with the standard TDWA ( Turn Down With Alternative )
and tells Musser they are ‘committed to the black’ ( as he
heard Abel tell them to do )… and Steed suggests Musser
ask Blue Ridge since they are already down there and
already ( at that time ) are a ‘free resource’ with no
official assignment. ( This is now verified by BR unit logs ).
– Musser just says ‘copy that’, even though he then testified
later he wasn’t sure who had been speaking ( Marsh or Steed ).
*** Now something WEIRD happens…
– Marsh heard that exchange ( between Steed and Musser )
and maybe might have even been pissed that Steed got to
his mic button before Marsh did ( that time ).
– Marsh now wants to ‘talk about this’ and have a ‘comfort
level’ discussion with Steed about what he just told Musser.
– Marsh is not convinced that Steed should have turned
down Musser’s request so quickly… and now wants to
see if he can, perhaps, change Steed’s mind.
The rest is now the infamous ‘discussing their options’
conversation… and Brendan McDonough ( and others
who might have been listening on the GM private frequency
like Darrell Willis ) still know exactly how that conversation went.
If they ever talk about it… we might discover that the
‘feel this coming’ and ‘comfort level’ part of that ‘discussing
their options’ was nothing more than Marsh trying to not
assert total authority over Steed and just TELL him to
change his mind…. Marsh was still trying to let Steed
‘run the crew’ and was just doing his best to ‘persuade’
Steed to ‘change his mind’.
Fast forward 20 minutes and we still don’t know WHO
actually made the decision the leave the two track…
but I still believe there is more than a good chance that
even though Marsh was able to ‘persuade’ Steed to
change his mind about the TDWA he gave Musser…
…that Marsh then ‘backed off’ his ‘interference mode’ and
let Jesse (alone) make all the decisions about the exact
route to take that afternoon.
I still believe Marsh himself might have been fully shocked
to see the decision Steed had made about cutting through
the canyon when Marsh finally caught up from behind.
At that point, however, Marsh simply just followed them
down because for him, it was simply a matter of…
“There they go… and I must follow them… for I am their leader.”
>> RTS also said…
>> Therefore, Steed was fully responsible that day for the GMHS
>> safety and welfare. Even though Marsh may have been
>> tangentially responsible for the fatal outcomes that day,
>> Steed was the one ultimately responsible for what happened
>> June 30th.
Agreed.
Obviously what I wrote above is all total conjecture on my
part ( but it’s possible ).
All I was trying to do here is echo your comments and say
that the fact that Jesse Steed was SUPPOSED to have
been totally in charge of Granite Mountain that day… and
how that played into what happened… really hasn’t been
fully explored yet.
WTKTT,
Copy that. Very plausible though. I do know that the GMHS was MUCH more comfortable working for Captain Steed. The GMHS had gotten used to working with Steed and preferred his supervisory style.
Regarding “…. Marsh himself might have been fully shocked
to see the decision Steed had made about cutting through
the canyon when Marsh finally caught up from behind.”
That’s a tough one. Shocked maybe, but Marsh did acquiese (unless he said something otherwise on Crew Net) which means he approved of the decision and the subsequent action.
Remember the TIMING here.
We still have no ‘definite’ time for the
YARNELL-GAMBLE video, where someone ( yet
to be identified ) is definitely urging Marsh and
GM to ‘hurry up’…
…but it is looking very much like that ‘urging’ could
have been right around 1618 or 1620… the exact
moment the SAIR itself says they were making
the decision whether to leave the two track or not.
That ‘hurry up’ captured in the YARNELL-GAMBLE
video MAY have come right at the exact moment
when it was time to ‘decide’ which way to go…
and MAY have been a major determining factor
in the decision.
“Hurry up”, right at that moment, may have
made all the difference.
Without having scouted it… and without knowing
what lie ahead… that canyon looked like a
‘shortcut’ to Steed at 1618-1620.
If you also read most/all of the ‘Who were the
Granite Mountain Hotshots’ pages with bios
and memorials… you see a recurring theme.
Most of the ‘rookies’ specifically mention ‘looking
up to Steed’ and ‘wanting to be like him’ and more
than one described his amazing physical
abilities and their admiration for the shape he was in.
There isn’t a whole lot of mention of Marsh in
those same ‘bios’ and ‘memorials’.
WTKTT,
You are closer than you think here. There were at least two former GMHS that did NOT return to the Crew after both the 2011 and 2012 fire seasons. And the alleged reasons mentioned by these men to their parents and friends related specifically to ‘bad decisions with prior good outcomes.’
Now that all the material from the
publicly-funded ADOSH investigation
is available… I am looking for those
’emails’ where ADOSH requested
interviews with FIVE former GMH.
I can’t even find the email requests
that their own report said they
sent out… much less the replies
or any interview transcripts…
but I’m still looking. Stay tuned.
Scratch that. I found the
emails. Report coming.
Hi WWTKTT. That you stated is very close to the scenario I saw from the start. Somehow it appeared that Jesse Steed had the upper hand in decisions regarding the race to the Helm’s Ranch. Consider that Willis and Sneed are both Semper Fi and Marsh was more what I would consider a “cookie cutter cowboy”. That is not to disparage Marsh, but he was also always some distance from the crew, at least during the time we watched the action. If you have read Josh Eells report in the MENS JOURNAL article you would read that the men compared Steed to a “Greek God”. Hell, he even held off three bears with his chain saw in a night fire jump. Where Eells got his info was from interviews he had with family and friends. Eventually the truth will surface, and whew what a long process.
We always carry a hollow spot in our hearts for the loss of all these men. They were heroic in their efforts; however, it goes to say that there is plenty missing in detail.
We wonder why Marsh’s phones never surfaced, burnt or not. But then mouths seem to be shut by too many.
We are still wondering why were copies of the restriction order for the area where the deaths occurred were dated June 16 (Joy and I both witnessed the document) and quickly deleted from public records of the Arizona Forest Service. Maybe they are only in cyberspace and really there in an office somewhere.
Good work and tidings, and thanks for people like John Dougherty, Bob Powers, xxxFullsailxxx, Gary Olson, RTS, Murray Taylor, Ted Putnam/Johnny/Charley M., John MacLean/Wayne and Holly Neill, just to mention a few that we either hiked with or had occasion to learn from. Those 19 men deserve the best investigation possible–information some firemen in the future will be able to learn and perhaps save their butts. Thanks to all for hanging in there and giving of yourself to resolve the mystery.
Tex (Sonny) Gilligan
on May 19, 2014 at 5:26 pm said:
Hi WWTKTT. That you stated is very close to the scenario I saw from the start. REMEMBER AS PEOPLE READ COMMENTS BY US—HIS PERCEPTION AND MINE ARE DIFFERENT. I DID NOT SEE IT HIS WAY FROM THE START.Somehow it appeared that Jesse Steed had the upper hand in decisions regarding the race to the Helm’s Ranch.HOW DOES TEX KNOW THIS—THIS IS AN ASSUMPTION BY WHAT HE READ BY JOSH EELLS—HE DOES NOT KNOW WILLIS OR STEED SO HE IS OK TO HIS THOUGHTS BUT I DO NOT AGREE TO JUST THROW STUFF OUT THERE UNLESS YOU CAN PROPERLY ASSESS IT WITH DOCUMENTS OR SOMETHING. TEX DOES NOT NOR NEVER MET WILLIS OR STEED SO IT IS HOW HE SAW THE WEEKEND. Consider that Willis and Sneed are both Semper Fi WHAT DOES THAT MATTER UNLESS YOU CAN DOCUMENT MORE ABOUT THAT THEN TO ME IT IS A PERCEPTION NOT BASED ON WHERE YOU GOING WITH IT??? and Marsh was more what I would consider a “cookie cutter cowboy”.SEE, I DID NOT FIND MARSH TO BE THAT WAY. I FOUND HIM TO BE CONFIDENT AND WENT LIKE A BUNNY RABBIT AND WAS FIT FOR THE OUTDOORS. TO ME, A COOKIE CUTTER COWBOY APPEARS TO BE A COWBOY BUT DRESSES THE PART TO LOOK LIKE ONE BUT IS NOT ONE AND MARSH DID NOT FIT THAT DESCRIPTION TO ME— That is not to disparage Marsh, but he was also always some distance from the crewTHAT IS THE FIRST FACT I READ FOR THIS IS FACTS THAT MARSH WHEN WE SAW HIM WAS AWAY FROM THE MEN BUT NOT AT ALL TIMES—THERE WAS TIMES I SAW HIM WITH ANOTHER EVEN HAVE A PHOTO OF IT., at least during the time we watched the action. If you have read Josh Eells report in the MENS JOURNAL article you would read that the men compared Steed to a “Greek God”. Hell, he even held off three bears with his chain saw in a night fire jump. Where Eells got his info was from interviews he had with family and friends. Eventually the truth will surface, and whew what a long process. THAT IS MY HOPE TOO.
We always carry a hollow spot in our hearts for the loss of all these men. AND FOR THE FAMILIES AND FRIENDS TOO.They were heroic in their efforts; however, it goes to say that there is plenty missing in detail. TRUE. TRUE. TRUE. AND I AM SHOCKED THE LACK OF DETAILS THAT HAVE SURFACED TO THIS DATE.
We wonder why Marsh’s phones never surfaced, TEX WONDERS THAT—I NEVER GAVE IT TOO MUCH THOUGHT EXCEPT THAT THERE IS MORE DETAILS NEEDED TO COME OUT TO PROPERLY ASSESS THIS FIRE AND THE FATALITIES. burnt or not. But then mouths seem to be shut by too many. THAT IS FACT. I DON’T KNOW WHY TOO.
WeTEX IS WONDERING. THE ONLY THING I WONDER IS HOW COME THAT LADY IN THE RED CROSS CAME ACROSS OUR PATHS AND SHOWED IT TO US AT ALL—VERY STRANGE—THE DOCTOR IN THE RED CROSS (bb) KNOWS WHAT I MEAN THERE—ODD. are still wondering why were copies of the restriction order for the area where the deaths occurred were dated June 16 (Joy and I both witnessed the document) YES I DID SEE A FEW DOCUMENTS BY A LADY IN THE RED CROSS SHELTER BUT I DO NOT UNDERSTAND WHY IT WAS SHOWN TO ME AND OTHERS-and quickly deleted from public records of the Arizona Forest Service. YES WHEN WE CAME BACK WE SAW IT AGAIN BUT THEN IT DID VANISH AFTER THAT—NEVER WAS FOUND AGAIN BUT A FIRE RESTRICTION PAPER FROM JUNE 16TH BUT NOT WHAT WE WERE SHOWN—TWO DIFFERENT PAPERS/DOCUMENTS.Maybe they are only in cyberspace and really there in an office somewhere.
Good work and tidings, and thanks for people like John Dougherty, Bob Powers, xxxFullsailxxx, Gary Olson, RTS, Murray Taylor, Ted Putnam/Johnny/Charley M., John MacLean/Wayne and Holly Neill, GLAD HE SAID JUST TO MENTION A FEW AND I AM SHORT ON TIME TO SIT AN NAME DROP YOU ALL BUT YOU KNOW WHO YOU ARE- AND DEEP THANK YOU TO YOU FOR ALL YOU HAVE DONE. just to mention a few that we either hiked with or had occasion to learn from. Those 19 men deserve the best investigation possibleAND SO DO THE LOVED ONES; THE DESERVE IT TOO.–information some firemen in the future will be able to learn and perhaps save their butts. Thanks to all for hanging in there and giving of yourself to resolve the mystery.YES, THANK YOU TO ALL HERE. I REALLY AM NOT DOING WELL SO WHO KNOWS BUT I DID LEAVE THE NAVAJO LAKE AREA AND HIT THE HOT SRPINGS SO HOPING FOR BETTER DAYS BUT I AM PRETTY LETHARGIC—
Dan Philbin, not Philbun.
Was the “dozer operator” from 6/30 (Justin Hernandez?) interviewed? Are there any comments available that were 1. Made by him, or 2. Made about him and his whereabouts after the entrapment and burnover of GMIHC?
We now know from Dan Philbun that the dozer was actually immobilized after power lines fell on the dozer IN YARNELL, and that he helped untangle it later in the evening. We also know that during the search and rescue effort, Ranger 58 was searching for 20-22 people (TOL… 22 would have been GMIHC, DIVS, and dozer operator)
Questions.
1. Where was dozer operator (Justin Hernandez?) when the power lines collapsed (presumably an effect from the fire)? Still with the dozer?
2. Why had he been unable to communicate his location and apparent safety to the search party?
3. Where, exactly was the dozer?
4. Had there been a change of command of the dozer? Meaning, was Ball no longer HEQB?
Calvin,
I don’t have exact answers to your questions, but I’ll throw these thoughts out there, anyway.
Regarding #2, it has been stated in various reports that the dozer operator did not have a radio.
Regarding #4, if the dozer had been pulled of the line and then parked (staged) along the highway, the dozer was no longer required to have a dozer boss with it. When this happened, Ball (ALONG WITH HIS RADIO), probably went to re-join with BR.
The electrical wires, quite possibly fell on the dozer as it was parked along the highway.
Another STRONG POSSIBILITY, is that, when someone from the in-coming Team found out that the dozer operator did not have a red card, he was removed from further duty, because working on the line without it is A HUGE NO NO!
Reply to calvin post on March 22, 2014 at 4:11 am
>> calvin said…
>>
>> Was the “dozer operator” from 6/30 (Justin Hernandez?)
>> interviewed?
Not that I know of. I just checked both SAIT interview notes
and the newer Blue Ridge Unit logs and he is never even
mentioned, much less actually interviewed.
>> Are there any comments available that were
>> 1. Made by him, or
>> 2. Made about him and his whereabouts after the
>> entrapment and burnover of GMIHC?
None that I can find in the public record.
>> We now know from Dan Philbin that the dozer was actually
>> immobilized after power lines fell on the dozer IN YARNELL,
>> and that he helped untangle it later in the evening.
See below. It’s possible this ‘entanglement’ with the power lines
took place more at the west end of Glen Ilah than in Yarnell
proper… at the point where Lakewood and Manzanita end/intersect
and where ( apparently ) the dozer was last ‘staged’ following the
evacuation notices.
>> We also know that during the search and rescue effort,
>> Ranger 58 was searching for 20-22 people (TOL… 22
>> would have been GMIHC, DIVS, and dozer operator)
Yes. To me… this just proves that following the news of
deployment, all the personell at the Ranch House Restaurant
did start asking each other who was or wasn’t accounted for…
and it seems that no one knew where Hernandez might be so
he was being reported as ‘possibly’ needing an emergency
locate along with GM.
Even Air Attack ( Bravo 33 ) said in their own SAIT interview that
they had NO IDEA that day that the DIVSA person they had been
speaking with was, in fact, the regular Superintendent of Granite
Mountain, so that’s why they though he was one of the ‘extra’
people they needed to locate along with what would be a normal
20 man Hotshot Crew contingent.
It was pretty confusing around that time.
>> calvin also wrote…
>>
>> Questions.
>> 1. Where was dozer operator (Justin Hernandez?)
>> when the power lines collapsed (presumably an effect from
>> the fire)? Still with the dozer?
Power lines will always ‘droop’ when they heat up and the tension
leaves the lines. This even happens on any really hot day in the
summer… and it was ALREADY a very hot day, even without
adding fire temps to it. This is documented as happening in
Yarnell and the Glen Ilah area that afternoon.
Take away enough of the normal ‘tension’ in the lines… and they
will ‘droop’ almost all the way to the ground.
See the last line of this paragraph from Blure Ridge YIN interview
which mentions ‘power lines drooping’…
Page 10 of SAIT Yarnell Investigation Notes ( YIN )…
____________________________________________________
People coming in/out all over. B & T met w/ Ball 2 T6 engines and a WT. they were told to go in and do something. The fire was pushing hard it was passed Ball called Travis and said let no one else in. Propane tanks going off, houses burning, power lines drooping.
____________________________________________________
As far as where Hernandez really was late that afternoon, I can
find no direct evidence in the public record.
See below. He *might* have been with the dozer where it
*might* have been staged at end of Lakewood/Manzanita.
>> 2. Why had he been unable to communicate his location
>> and apparent safety to the search party?
It is actually documented that the dozer operator did NOT
have his own radio that day.
He ONLY had a radio for as long as Ball was ‘with him’
and he had the loan of one from Blue Ridge.
Page 10 from Blue Ridge (redacted) notes and what
appears to be Ball’s own ‘unit log’…
“Blueridge One requested me plus one to travel to fires edge.
I was assigned (xxxxxxx) (xxxxxxxxxxxx) county employee
not IA qualified and did not have a radio. Gave radio from
BRIHC to operator (xxxxxx).”
>> 3. Where, exactly was the dozer?
In the recently released Blue Ridge Unit logs notes there
is suddenly this mysterious entry in one of the crew reports
about the Dozer being staged at the bottom of the Sesame
area, at the same place where the BR truck with the
UTV trailer was staged ( intersection of Lakewood and
Manzanita, where the pavement ends and Sesame
area begins… )
Page 28 of Blue Ridge (redacted) unit logs…
____________________________________________________
1430-1600 ?? – (xxxxxxxx) me walks (xxxx) back to
transport area. Crew moves (xxxx) instructed to gear
up + gets a briefing on weather + their assignment.
BR IHC will prep dozer line to N/NE back to drainage
leading to Boy Scout Camp. Buggies are moved around
to where Dozer was staged at Lakewood/Manzanita
subdivion.
___________________________________________________
This location for the dozer ( staged at intersection of
Lakewood and Manzanita in Glen Ilah ) is actually also
supported at the end of what appear to be Ball’s own
(redacted) unit log.
When it all started hitting the fan ( and AFTER the
evacuations had already been ordered by Cordes )…
apparently Cordes still wanted Ball to see if there was
any chance of the dozer cutting more line to the southwest,
around Glen Ilah… and Ball apparently borrowed the Blue
Ridge UTV Ranger to scout this out ( and, at this same
time, the dozer drives over towards Manzanita/Lakewood at
west end of Glen Ilah and ‘stages’ there? )
Page 11 of Blue Ridge (redacted) notes…
____________________________________________________
1600??: BRIHC disengaging to safety zone.
BRIHC one informs Structure Group One they are pushing
everyone out of subdivision.
(xxxxxxxxxxxxxx)
Structure group one assigns me and one other to locate
possibility of dozer line to southwest of Yarnell.
Acquire ATV: travel into subdivision back to Dozer line.
Multiple structures fully engulfed and multiple
spot fires in subdivision.
Notify structure group one about fire and structures on
corner of manzanita and lakewood (xxxxxxxxx)
Started evacuations of subdivision.
Helitanker drops water near manzanita junction.
Inquiry about helitanker availability. Told there are
other priorities (xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx)
Evacuations for next couple of hours.
Signed: (xxxxxxxxx) 7 / 1 / 2013
____________________________________________________
>> 4. Had there been a change of command of the dozer?
>> Meaning, was Ball no longer HEQB?
Probably so… but even in the newly released (redacted)
Blue Ridge unit logs there is NO mention of the exact
time when Ball actually left the dozer ( and the operator )
and rejoined all the other Blue Ridge crew at the Ranch
House Restaurant.
It sounds like ( from what appear to be Ball’s own
unit log notes ) that this happened just after Ball
borrowed the BR UTV and was ‘scouting’ Glen Ilah
for a possible new dozer push… but found nothing
but already burning structures and bailed out back
to the Ranch House Restaurant on the BR Ranger,
which is where we know it ended up before the
‘ground rescue mission’ began.
And ( see above ) if Ball HAD left him and taken the BR
radio back that he loaned him earlier… then that is why
no one was able to contact Hernandez anymore after
that point that day.