The Arizona Industrial Commission today released the following reports in connection with the deaths of 19 Granite Mountain Hotshots on June 30 during the Yarnell Hill Fire:
AZ Dept. of Occupational Safety and Health Agenda 12/4/13
Worksheets for Proposed Citations
Wildland Fire Associates Report
InvestigativeMedia has also attached an important essay by Ted Putnam on the impossibility of firefighters following the 10 Standards Fire Orders. Putnam’s paper written in 2000 concludes:
“Currently the fire organization is not very proactive in making safety a major
influence in strategies and tactics. Getting the job done, money and image
concerns push firefighters into taking excessive risk. What is needed
organizationally is truthful fire investigations, an honest reporting system that
tracks physical, mental, cultural and social aspects of firefighting and a
willingness to become a learning organization. If safety is ever to become No.
1 in the fire community then the fire community must be willing to spend more
time, money and effort to make it No. 1. The fire community must get beyond
its superficial practices like saying over and over again that safety is No. 1
without any true, longer-term, institutionalized commitment.”
InvestigativeMedia will have a complete report shortly.
© Copyright 2013 John Dougherty, All rights Reserved. Written For: Investigative MEDIA
It seems that TTWARE was right a few comments above.
We seem to be running into the same ‘nesting level’ limitation
on this particular comment thread was seen in ‘chapter 1’ over
on the original thread.
The two short comments just above, with me asking Mr. Dougherty
to delete something and then FullSail responding are now what
are called ‘orphaned comments’. They should have disappeared
along with the ‘parent’ comment that was deleted… but they
did not… and are showing up above as new ‘top level’ comments.
The software that everyone is actually ‘posting’ to here is something
called ‘WordPress’… and there are some known ‘limitations’.
It has more to do with ‘nesting levels’ on threads than the actual
volume of posts… but very strange things can start to happen
if/when the number of ‘nested comments’ exceeds the limitations.
My only suggestion would be the same as before.
Just make sure, when you reply to someone on this particular thread from
now on, that you ‘mark it’ with something that ties it to the original comment
in case it becomes another ‘orphaned comment’ and just shows up
at the bottom of the thread all by itself.
I believe Mr. Dougherty is about to release some news about his own
SIT FOIA/FOIL package(s)… so maybe that will be the next logical
place to ‘continue’ this discussion.
There’s going to be a lot more to talk about soon.
He already CREATED a new thread he wants us to use for posting. I am the only person who commented on it. Go to the top of this page, click on the link in the bar that says “Yarnell Fire.” That is where his new comment thread is. Start commenting there! (My impression is that that is what he wants us to do, anyway….)
Reply to Elizabeth post on Dec 23, 2013 at 8:58 pm
>> Elizabeth said…
>> He ( John Dougherty ) already CREATED a new
>> thread he wants us to use for posting. I am the only
>> person who commented on it. Go to the top of this
>> page, click on the link in the bar that says “Yarnell
>> Fire.” That is where his new comment thread is.
>> Start commenting there! (My impression is that that
>> is what he wants us to do, anyway….)
Spot on, Elizabeth. You are right. Thank you.
That ends “Chapter 2” of this discussion and begins
“Chapter 3” on the new “Yarnell Hill Fire” page.
Perfect logical break. Before / After Christmas.
From Mr. Dougherty himself at the top of the
new ‘Yarnell Hill Fire’ page just created…
Please begin a new comment section below as Chapter II is filling up. Please keep the dialogue positive and informative. I’m working on upgrading the site to handle the heavy comment load.
And, I’m in the process of uploading the entire Arizona Forestry Division SAIR supplemental data. It’s 58GB of data and is taking considerable time. Thank you for your patience.
John Dougherty
I totally agree with Bob on the fact about the SUPER HEATED GASES and that going BACK up the hill was NOT an option once they committed to go down into the unburned chute and bowl. Too steep, flash over ignition, and the hot gases. So, this goes to the comments about all the bushes not completely burned, Nalgene bottles not completed melted, etc. The HOT GASES are what kills you, NOT the flames.
Here’s an editorial from Prescott News titled ‘The Fallout From The Yarnell Fire Will Be Bigger Than The Lawsuits’ that you all may find interesting..
http://www.prescottenews.com/index.php/features/opinion/editorials/item/22794-editorial-the-fallout-from-the-yarnell-fire-will-be-bigger-than-lawsuits
Back up the hill was not the only option. Into the boulders was another option, as was running forwards to their right and trying to possibly beat the fire flank. I am not saying those were options that would have saved everyone, or even anyone. But, assume there was a 1/3 chance that 1 person would have survived in that case. That makes telling people to drop gear and run a far better decision than telling everyone to deploy in the worst possible place, which is what they did. Remember there were animals that did make it through by sheltering in the rocks.
In terms of training scars, initially you do see both with Willis that day and with GM a willingness to cut things very close. McDonough obviously did as lookout, as well. Then, when things go bad, McDonough looked for a place to deploy — and it sounds to me as if the site chosen was not survivable. The tennis court id’d by Willis as a deployment site does not sound, given flame height, as if it would have been survivable. So, third training scar, go to deployment without assessing other options fully and without assessing whether you have a viable deployment site.
When Willis spoke and said the crew stuck with their training and picked the best possible site to deploy, I believe he was sincere. That they in fact deployed in an area likely to experience the most severe heat again shows to me again a possible issue in how all these decisions were being made.
In terms of looking at bad decisions and their costs, remember that McDonough also came very close to getting caught. Replay that chain of events a few times, and he would have been caught. Decisions made were going to catch up with people sooner or later.
Reply to NV post on December 24, 2013 at 9:26 am
Now there is a bit of ‘summary’ that probably should have
been in the SAIR report… with even a little more detail.
NOTE: If you look at the second video of Darrell Willis’
first press conference hosted at the deployment site,
there is a moment near the end ( after a reporter
has asked Willis exactly where McDonough was in
relation to where they were standing ) when the
camera does a long, slow pan to the RIGHT and
we get to see the entire side of the northern ridge
of the box canyon in pretty good close-up.
Notice the large expanse of ‘unburned boulders’
not more than 1 or 2 hundred FEET ( not yards )
directly north of the deployment site.
Also… look to the center of that pile of boulders.
There appears to be a pretty good amount of
unburned vegetation right there amongst the rocks.
These same ‘unburned boulders’ and the same
(apparently) ‘unburned vegetation’ also appears to be
visible in the recently released photo of the SAIT
investigators combing through the deployment site.
Tex ( Sonny ) Gilligan has ( I believe ) also pointed
this out a few times to people during his hikes
following the incident. I believe Tex described the
area as “about as large as a football field”.
I will try to find his exact quote on that.
NV
on December 24, 2013 at 9:26 am said:
okay- you could not run to the boulders but by the time they ran the chain saws and cleared out what they hoped was a safety deployment area they could of gotten to the boulders. We have heard the heat/gases are what most likely killed the men first than the fire. However, some of these boulders over there are cave-like and you can get under them. Also some of the wildlife survived by being in the boulders. Ted Putnam says they may have perished there anyways simply because they needed a flat spot for nineteen men to deploy their shelters.
“Could the GM crew have turned around and RAN when they realized the fire was around the corner?” I have a picture from the investigation files showing that there is no way they would have made it back up the hill to the ridgeline if they had tried to turn and run.. The picture shows how TINY the investigators look in the bottom of that valley. Even WITHOUT vegetation, it looks too steep to get out quickly. (Of course, I am not an expert, so … what do I know. But that is my view.)
If you become a “Facebook friend” of mine, you can see the photo posted on Facebook. I will try to find a better way to share that picture here.
They may have not made it all the way back up the hill, but would have had other options in terms of terrain. It is important to note that not everything in the general vicinity of the deployment site even burned. Unfortunately the decision made was to deploy in a physical circumstance that virtually guaranteed sustained direct flame contact and therefore no survivability. Other options may not have looked good, admittedly, but the range of possible outcomes would have been better. I do not suggest that anyone should be expected to sort that out when faced with an imminent burnover. That is where training comes in, informal as well as formal. In this case maybe using the phrase training scars is appropriate.
I would say that the probability of surviving by running back up the hill was 0 they would have been hit by superheated air that would have singed/fried there lungs before they got over the top. I still believe the canyon had flash over ignition with the heat wind and flame they were to far committed. They were where they should never have been.
Sonny/Joy sent me an e-mail after I posted this comment and they advised that it took the OSHA fellow (who was a serious runner) twenty minutes to cover the ground on the hill (without the vegetation being there) when he hiked that area with Joy/Sonny after the fire which suggests that the GM crew had no chance of turning around and running.
Reply to Elizabeth post on Dec 23, 2013 at 9:59 pm
>> Elizabeth said…
>> Sonny/Joy sent me an e-mail after I posted this
>> comment and they advised that it took the OSHA
>> fellow (who was a serious runner) twenty minutes
>> to cover the ground on the hill (without the vegetation
>> being there) when he hiked that area with Joy/Sonny
>> after the fire
Sonny (Tex) Gilligan reported the same OSHA
timed ‘test walk’ event in public back on September 29,
2013, the day after the SAIR report was released… but
in that original description of the event he put a time
of 22 minutes on the OSHA fella’s walk… not 20.
The OSHA ‘runner’ was Brett Steuter.
Here is Tex’s original description of this ‘test walk’…
WildFire Today
Article Title: Yarnell Hill Fire report released
http://wildfiretoday.com/2013/09/28/yarnell-hill-fire-report-released/
>> Tex Gilligan on September 29, 2013 at 6:52 pm said:
>>
>> By the way, OSHA actually timed the walk in the black
>> with us from the saddle where they dropped down to
>> the spot of demise.
>>
>> It took a Marathon Runner Brett Steuter 22 minutes
>> just to get to the spot they perished. That was with no
>> manzanita to fight.
>>
>> Joy took 33 minutes, and I was just ahead of Brett by
>> a couple minutes. Joy was with Bruce Hanna the other
>> OSHA official. Bruce fell and that was easy to do
>> since that grade was above 60%.
So if Brett took 22 minutes, and Tex was (quote)
“just ahead of Brett by a couple minutes”… that would
mean Tex himself is the one that made the trip in 20
minutes that day, not Brett.
If the SAIR times are correct for when GM left the
two-track road ( 4:20 PM ) and when the first
“We are in front of the flaming front” message went
out at 4:39 PM… that would mean the single-file line
of 19 men ( with equipment and packs ) made the
same ‘walk down’ in just 19 minutes… WITH
vegetation to fight.
That’s 1 minute FASTER than Tex… and 3 minutes
faster than Brett Steuter who had no equipment, no
packs, and no vegetation to contend with at all.
Hmm… something isn’t quite right there somewhere.
Either the times being given in the SAIR for the
descent are ‘complete fiction’… or there was
something wonky with the OSHA ‘test walk’.
The OSHA people just did a ‘test walk’ down from
the two-track and were (apparently) not trying to
be ‘on the double’ or anything.
What would have been REALLY interesting is if
Brett ( the runner ) had then turned around at the
deployment site and then timed himself absolutely
HAULING ASS back up to his starting point as
if his very life depended on it. FULL adrenaline.
I wonder what the timing would have been on that?
Sans vegetation, yes… but still would be interesting
to know.
WTKTT,
WFF is NOT a democracy. You DON’T get to VOTE on what YOU want to do. You follow ‘The Rules’ unless they’re …. (you know these by now).
“Did 2 men simply ORDER 17 others into a situation that violated almost every rule in the book and got them ALL killed…” Yes, it sure looks that way. They knew or should have known that they could say NO with an option based on the Turn Down protocols.
“or was this truly a ‘group’ decision amongst a tight-knit bunch of fellas with EVERYONE fully aware of the risks AND the training violations they were about to commit?” Yes, it appears that this also took place, i.e. Groupthink. IF this is what took place AND the overhead allowed it, then that speaks to poor leadership.
Reply to RTS on December 23, 2013 at 1:10 pm
I hear ya. The lawyers on both sides are going to have a
field day with this. Plaintiff’s lawyers will argue that the fuse
was lit on ‘wrongful death’ the moment the ORDER
was given. Defendant’s lawyers will counter with
‘this isn’t REALLY the military… it only looks that way’
and actually start quoting all the ‘Turn Down’ stuff
to counter the Plaintiff argument that anyone was
ACTUALLY being ‘forced’ to do anything.
It’s gonna be a mess.
Mike,
“I have got to believe that if they could have run, they would have. Every instinct in your body has to be to run.” First off, they should have never been there. But once in that predicament, YES, they could have run AND SHOULD HAVE RUN. In a very preverse way, the fact that they did NOT run, speaks volumes about SOME of the positive aspects of GMHS leadership in spite of what happened in the long run.
“Nobody would ever want to crawl into one of those shelters if there was a plausible alternative.” Unfortunately, the basic S-130 WFF training spends 3-4 hours training on fire shelters and only 1-2 hours on ‘The Rules.’ I think shelters were stressed more on GMHS than ‘The Rules’ and Entrapment Avoidance based on the words, actions, thoughts, etc. of Wildland Chief Willis and GMHS Lookout McDonaugh.
“But run like hell I am sure is always the first thought.” YES, I’m sure it is. Lessons Learned? Unfortunately, this has occured on several other fires with similar circumstances, e.g. lunch spots, good black, left the black to “re-engage” , etc. The Dude Fire (AZ-1990), South Canyon Fire (CO-1994), Thirty Mile Fire (WA-2005),and Cramer Fire (ID-2003), just to name the most recent.
“The lessons learned in this fire are going to be about not getting in that situation to begin with. That is the area where they had good options and bad options, not only bad ones.” YES, do NOT get yourself into those situations. That’s why KNOWING and FOLLOWING ‘The Rules” keeps you out of those situations.
I challenge you to search the Lessons Learned Center Incident Reviews of fires to find ONE case where WFF followed ‘The Rules’ and ended up in fire shelters or dead. You WON’T find even one!
Calvin,
Yes, especially since they knew or should have known their Fire Orders, LCES, and Watch Out Situations.
AND that’s where the Groupthink keeps coming up for me. SOMEONE should have said SOMETHING, don’t you think? Like WHY are we doing this? WHY don’t we have a Lookout once we left our perfectly good SZ and we’re travelling into the unburned?
Reply to RTS post on December 23, 2013 at 11:36 am
>> RTS said…
>> SOMEONE should have said SOMETHING, don’t you think?
Maybe they did.
Maybe there WAS a moment when the ‘comfort level’ for
whatever it was that was being planned went ‘around the
room’. Yea… I know… that’s not how the whole WFF ‘command
structure’ thing is supposed to work… but there’s no doubt this
was a tight group and they all respected each other… so maybe
they DID do that.
McDonough would probably know.
That might be one of the other things he heard happening
on the radio that he still doesn’t want to talk about.
Maybe some of the fellas DID raise some pretty serious
questions about this move… but still ended up going along
with it, anyway… and McDonough just doesn’t wasn’t to talk
about that ‘aspect’ of this.
That being said…
I’m still not seeing anyone in the MacKenzie video
who was all that thrilled about doing ANYTHING but exactly
what we see them doing… Steed included… and especially
the fellow ( Misner? ) who makes the sarcastic comment
following Marsh’s “I could just feel it, ya know” remark and
then spits on the ground while Ashcraft laughs and nods
in agreement. Joking around? Sure. Normal banter in a
tight-knit group? Sure… but those guys simply look hot,
tired, dirty, and not ready to do much of anything else that day.
Bottom line: Did the ‘comfort level’ Marsh was so concerned
about ONLY apply to Steed… and once Steed said “Okay…what
the heck… we’ll give it a shot”… the next command was
“Gaggle up”… or was there more to it than that?
Did 2 men simply ORDER 17 others into a situation that
violated almost every rule in the book and got them ALL killed…
or was this truly a ‘group’ decision amongst a tight-knit
bunch of fellas with EVERYONE fully aware of the risks
AND the training violations they were about to commit?
I think the lawyers for BOTH the plaintiffs AND the defendants
in all the currently filed lawsuits are going to do everything
THEY can to answer that question.
Legally speaking… it’s quite important for BOTH sides to
know the truth there… if at all possible.
Let’s not forget, the fatal decision did not occur at the time of the roughly 4pm ‘comfort level’ and gaggle-up moment, it occured when they stepped off the 2-track into the green.
Full Sail,
“…decisions made IN THE HEAT OF THE MOMENT …” The problem here is that this was NOT such a moment. It wasn’t like they were forced into their decision with a fatal outcome. They had all day to watch the fire behavior increase and they had all day in their perfectly good SZ to just hang out and watch the Big Dog eat. The ‘heat of the moment’ though might have been when they made their illogical, brash decision to leave said perfectly good SZ.
RTS, Do you think all 19 GM hotshots knew they didn’t have a lookout?
i am talking “heat of the moment” as in an incident rapidly escalating and growing with crews scrambling to respond or get out of the way and how SOMEONE WHO HAS ABSOLUTELY NO EXPERIENCE WITH SUCH THINGS sits at a desk and stares at google maps and thinks he knows something that he does not.
i think i’ve consistently acknowledged that GM’s SA was readily available for the taking.
Copy.Thanks for the clarification.
I think conjecture about exact conditions at some exact time during the minutes around deployment can hide the central decision-making lesson, which is that if deployment is not going to be survivable, actions other than deployment should be taken. Training, or bad training, and past bad decisions again.
Remember, McDonough was casually evaluating deployment sites that likely would not have been survivable. This process unfolded when others with GM were relatively calm. Willis seemed from the available notes to view his tennis court as a deployment site, not a safety zone, and to leave things at that. Common threads there.
No survivable deployment options leads to don’t deploy leads to seek other options. Bad decisions leading up to that point doesn’t mean that good decisions can’t help at that point.
Yes, but if “wants to know the TRUTH” didn’t have conjecture, he would only have facts, and what fun is that?
A very good point. If any plan says you can deploy here through it away. Wrong plan.
hmm, interesting… so the micro-analyzing of time and events by lay-person’s seeking to understand something they have never directly experienced might lead to conjecture about all sorts of details that would detract from the actual lessons learned that were probably already spelled out in multiple investigations… crazy!
i might add, that it also leads to said layperson getting the false impression that any conclusions that result from previously mentioned conjecture are not only insignificant and irrelevant, but that also do a disservice to the men who died by continually subjecting them to scrutiny over decisions made in the heat of the moment by someone sitting at a desk chair pretending to understand a situation that they continually prove they have no understanding of.
very interesting NV… thanks!
omit the word “false” in false impression above.
(i changed context mid stream)
This whole area seems a bit unproductive to me. I have got to believe that if they could have run, they would have. Every instinct in your body has to be to run. Nobody would ever want to crawl into one of those shelters if there was a plausible alternative. Especially with what that fire was like. People have survived in shelters, but not with that kind of fire apparently. But run like hell I am sure is always the first thought.
The lessons learned in this fire are going to be about not getting in that situation to begin with. That is the area where they had good options and bad options, not only bad ones.
well said.
NV said…. Bad decisions leading up to that point doesn’t mean that good decisions can’t help at that point.
Agree! The fireline packs, fuel bottles (fuel too?) and hand tools, chainsaws all within the deployment site tell us that bad decisions were being made up until the end! Why didn’t all this get thrown out of the deployment site?
Correction, Mike said not NV
no, you had it right the first time.
Thanks fullsail, I was confused. You are right NV said
Reply to post from NV on December 23, 2013 at 8:29 am
Thanks, NV. I see that you ‘get it’.
Nothing is going to bring those men back… but I think
the aftermath is still all about ‘lessons’ to try and prevent
such a tragedy in the future.Yes?
I have heard there are probably going to be ( required? )
‘training walks’ through the area conducted by qualified
WFF people in the future.
What do you think those ‘training instructors’ are going
to actually say to the trainees when they all arrive at
deployment site?
Do EXACTLY what they did… but just try to cut yourself
a little more manzanita, or something?
Man… I sure hope not.
I’m not the only one studying the aftermath of this fire
who can see ( and has pointed out ) that they DID
have ‘other options’… but there was something about
a lack of understanding of the limits of their equipment
combined with the ‘groupthink’ thing that prevented them
from realizing it, or something.
I would think the WFF community would be all over
that and looking for ways to change the training
and/or decision making process at a moment like that.
It was a bad, bad situation.
They shouldn’t have been there… but they were.
The ‘unthinkable’ actually happened.
The ‘decision making’ in moments like that is still
something that should be ‘looked at’ carefully
because it reflects on ‘training’ and ‘ability to
evaluate situations quickly’.
It’s the year 2013.
Has the WFF community ever considered using some
kind of ‘virtual reality’ testing for field supervisory
candidates like most police forces now use… and
airlines are now REQUIRED to use for pilot
re-certification testing?
It’s the chance to put candidates into REALLY bad
situations ( like June 30 ) and see what they will do…
without anyone getting hurt.
It presents situations and requires the candidates to
make ultra-fast decisions ( like what happened in that
box canyon on June 30 ) and then there’s an evaluation
of that kind of decision-making capability and an
assessment if the candidate really has absorbed all
the course material or ( in the case of airline pilot
re-certification ) still REMEMBERS the relevant
course material.
“Nobody did anything wrong” doesn’t even give the
industry the chance to try and add those kind of
new training procedures.
“Thanks, NV. I see that you ‘get it’.”
funny! cause you DON’T seem to “get it.”
“conjecture about exact conditions at some exact time during the minutes around deployment can hide the central decision-making lesson”
see, the above is YOU… conjecturing your way to irrelevant conclusions and “what if” scenarios.
none of us who are currently doing this work are going to learn any lessons from you WTKTT. and you will have absolutely no influence on any changes that will be made regarding how wildland fire is fought. i have yet to see anything out of your self-proclaimed revelations that wasn’t already accounted for in one of three investigations.
**
** EXACT LOCATION OF SECOND VIDEO THAT
** CAPTURES FINAL RADIO TRANSMISSIONS.
>> Calvin wrote…
>> I saw a brief clip on CNN last weekend (Saturday or Sunday
>> early morning) that was different than the video by Wildfire Today.
>> It was taken from a different location. Has anyone else saw that?
This is the video that features the ( so far unidentified ) bearded
firefighter standing in the road with a portable radio… and we also
hear some of the final GM radio transmissions in the background.
This WAS taken at a different location ( but actually not all that far
away ) from the video that was released by AZREPUBLIC.
These men were also on the Shrine road… but a little further east
towards Yarnell than the crew in the other AZREPUBLIC video.
The video was shot looking north-northeast with
the camera operator standing exactly here…
Latitude: 34.225839
Longitude: -112.750738
34.225839, -112.750738
Just cut-and-paste the line above with the comma between the latitude
and longitude values into the search bar of Google Maps, hit RETURN,
and a GREEN ARROW will be pointing at the exact location.
The MSM ( MainStream Media ) was pretty much just using THIS
video clip from the SAIT FOIA/FOIL package as a ‘background’ clip
in their reports with the other video being featured as the ‘real capture’
of the radio transmissions… but this video seems to have almost
the same full capture sequence and even includes all the attempts
by Bravo 33 ( ASM2 ) to contact GM after Marsh’s final “Affirm”
transmission.
I can’t find any MSM site that actually runs the whole video but the
following ‘LA Times’ article at least includes all the audio along
with the short sections of it that they did air…
Article title: Arizona firefighters’ last radio report recorded in video
Credit: LA Times article by Cindy Carcamo – December 16, 2013, 3:00 p.m
http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-ff-yarnell-wildfire-video-hotshots-20131216,0,129720.story#axzz2oHEwli1o
NOTE: In the ‘LA Times’ article above… their video player counts
DOWN the seconds ( not UP ), and their brief play of this second
video from this second location starts when their ‘countdown’
timer hits 32 seconds.
“…it might have been one heck of a ride and one
VERY scary story to tell later… but they might
have ALL made it.”
are you seriously still listening to this guy? it’s got to be at least the 4th or 5th time he has saved the lives of GM by playing the “what if…” game by using “fly over’s” in google maps and old satellite photos.
he talks like he knows exactly what it would have been like, hiking through the brush with packs and tools in a line with 18 others, he can tell you exactly what the fire behavior was doing, what GM must have been thinking, what they must have seen, he even seems to know how they felt about the situation.
“and they had 19 extra minutes because that’s when a generator at the ranch lost power but they were too dumb to use their smartphones but chief willis is out there waiting by the road tapping his toe…”
really? i am done with this ego maniac “WTKTT.” oh, i’ll still call him out when he starts making big leaps from his desk chair, but he’s impossible to take seriously.
Mr. Dougherty, I think we are getting close to maxing-out this comment area as well, as there are comments stuck at the bottom of the page, similar to what happened in the last string, when it became over-loaded, prompting the on-going comments to be moved here.
There has been an on-going discussion as to whether or not Hall/Joki were Type 3, Type 2 (short), or Type 2 (long) Team qualified.
In response to that commentary, on 12/21 I posted:
“The way SWCC had them listed this year, it looked like they could respond either as a Type III Team, a Type II Short Team, and if I remember correctly, for a while earlier in the year, a Type II Long Team. It stands to reason, if they were all Type II qualified (short or long), any, or all of them, could have filled-out a Type III Team if called upon.”
In response to those comments, on 12/21, Calvin ask me to provide a link or source for them. In response to Calvin’s query, I provided the following link, which I have repeated down here for anyone that may have missed it up the chain aways:
http://gacc.nifc.gov/swcc/dispatch_logistics/crews/sit300/sit300.htm
TTWARE… Thanks, the other link provided by RTS only shows Hall/Joki as type 3. Again thanks for the follow up
I have been laughing quite a bit.
At this point I wonder if your real name xxfullsailxx is Musser or Willis. If not, what pub can I find you three in?
I mean, it is okay to try and fry
Eric Marsh and Jesse Steed
but don’t you think the smoke got a lot of people dirty that day?
We need more evidence before we accept that these 2 men are the solely culpable for the mistakes that were made that day that took their lives. We did hear Marsh’s statement refusing to leave the black to help Yarnell at one point. What went on after that to change his mind is what we want to know. Someone knows and it may come out in the records and testimonies from people that talked with their 19 loved ones shortly before they went down into that death trap.
Calvin, WTKTT, and Full Sail,
The SIGG fuel MAY have been used in their frantic, last-ditch effort to burn out around themselves because I didn’t see any burned out drip torches in the two investigator, fatality site investigation photo.
Full Sail, did you notice any drip torches in the photos?
It’s mixed gas so it burns without the WHOOMPH that raw gas does. So, if that had no torches and that’s what it’s looking like, then MAYBE they used their saw gas from the SIGGS.
Regarding the Unit Logs: most likely they would have carried them in a cargo pants pocket rather than their packs. They’re more accessible there. And as I posted earlier, a lot of WFF wait until the end of shift or even the end of the assignment to BRIEFLY fill them out. They are NOT required.
Would they have been caring fuszee’s?
Bob,
For sure,they would have been carrying fusees, but they’re virtually worthless and very time-consuming in the brush.
The whole creating a deployment site and attempting to fire it all out in 2-3 minutes is just ludicrous in my opinion. Like the VLAT fiasco about dropping on them to save them, is just movie stuff. Totally unrealistic.
Their time would have been better utlized RUNNING toward The Ranch and safety and/or lighter fuels.
I think people keep picturing the ‘we are in front of
the flaming front’ moment as if the fire was some
kind of ‘wave’ filling the entire mouth of the canyon
at that point and coming right at them.
That is absolutely NOT the case.
What was really happening at 1639 ( 4:39 PM )
is that part of the firefront was ‘sweeping’
around that northern mound at the mouth
of the box canyon.
Sure… they must have run right into that
and got caught by surprise… but Mr. Powers
is right to suggest that one of their POSSIBLE
options would have been to not waste one
single second on an option that was NEVER
to going to work… and just ‘drop packs and
haul ass’ on a diagonal towards the edge
of the mound(s) on the southern side of
the box canyon.
They were already ‘on the flat’ of the canyon.
They were already ‘in or near that clearing’.
Look at the ‘flyovers’ of the rest of the terrain
between them and the Ranch at that point, and
compare that to the actual ADOSH fire
progression charts.
There was a CHANCE ( and we are only talking
CHANCES here ) that 19 incredibly fit men
absolutely HAULING ASS could have reached
the tip of that mound at the southern side of
the box canyon BEFORE the fire reached that
point… and then forget the stupid ranch… they
would have had a clear ‘run away on flat ground’
scenario right through the valley that separates
the ranch and the Candy Cane Lane area.
Satellite photos dated April 9, 2013 show that
they had already reached the part of the flat
of the canyon that kind of ‘thins out’ and the
closer you get to the ranch the more ‘clearings’
you would be finding.
It would have been like hauling ass through a
‘fun house’… twisting left and right around
manzanita and doing a lot of ‘ducking’ or just
blasting ahead with forearms in front of you…
but adrenaline is an amazing thing.
Page 64 of the SAIR reports says the
Boulder Springs Ranch didn’t lose their
generator on the very northern perimeter of
the property until exactly 1658 ( 4:58 PM ).
Do you realize that is almost TWENTY
MINUTES after Jesse Steed first reported
seeing the flames at 1639 ( 4:39 PM )?
It’s actually 19 minutes.
One minute for each Hotshot that died.
That’s a LOONG time under those circumstances
so if they hadn’t wasted even ONE second on
all this ‘site preparation’ crap and just ‘ran for
their lives’ FORWARD and to the southeast and
tried to keep as parallel as possible to the
advancing firefront…
…it might have been one heck of a ride and one
VERY scary story to tell later… but they might
have ALL made it.
Looking at maps or satellite images is a lot different than trying to make decisions in real time on the ground with fire and smoke all around. They obviously had quite limited time to make decisions and probably only appeared to have very bad options. Trying to draw lessons from choosing one bad option over another is probably not going to be that helpful in the future. The real lessons will come from how not to be in that awful position to begin with.
Agreed… but again.. for probably about
the fifth time now… I just timed myself
on my Android and in no more than
20 seconds… I can fire up Google
Maps, got to Yarnell, zoom down,
and see EXACTLY everything I
was describing above.
There were SIX smartphones out
there with that men. They were
‘tweeting’ and ‘twitpicing’ most
of the day. If they had only taken
20 seconds to look at where they
were planning to go they MIGHT
have realized they had more
options than they thought.
There is a huge poster on the wall
of the Granite Mountain ready
room that says…
HOW IS YOUR SITUATIONAL
AWARENESS TODAY?
I wish they had all stood in front
of that poster before they left
that morning and ‘saluted’ it.
If their situational awareness was what it needed to be, they would not have been in that box canyon and would have had no need to run anywhere.
Exactly… but even
if they HAD still decided to play ‘ranger danger’
and thought they would
cut some time… a
quick look at a map
beforehand might have
helped them survive
as well when the
‘unthinkable’ ended
up staring them in
the face.
Am I suggesting
access to Google Maps
be REQUIRED for
people in the field from
now on? I dunno…
maybe I am.
It’s the year 2013.
If you can ‘twitpic’
from where you are,
then you can do
SITWARE checks
as well. Might save
your life.
If their situational awareness was where it needed to be they would have left the ridge in time to save their own buggies.
Correction above: Mr. Powers asked the
question about the fuszees… and it was
RTS who made the followup comment
that GM’s time MIGHT have been better
used running TOWARD the ranch, or
safety, or lighter fuels. I was attributing
that to Mr. Powers instead of RTS. Sorry.
WTKTT said…There was a CHANCE ( and we are only talking
CHANCES here ) that 19 incredibly fit men
absolutely HAULING ASS could have reached the tip of that mound at the southern side of the box canyon BEFORE the fire reached that point…..
The Mound that you are talking about was actually Between GM and Boulder Springs Ranch, Right? I am not sure, but it appears that the mound would have been an obstacle between GM and BS Ranch? If the route they chose through the canyon had been more a little more southerly, they would have seen the fire earlier and they would have had a straighter shot to the ranch. Is that a road (jeep trail) out beyond the deployment zone, over the head of the standing investigator (Dougherty DZ pic) that seems to track to the right?
Reply to Calvin post
on December 22, 2013 at 10:00 pm
Yes… ‘as the bird flies’ there was
the base of a ‘mound’ between
them and Boulder Springs Ranch
jutting from the southern side of
the box canyon. There would then
have been ‘another’ mound after
that representing the termination
of that north-side ridge.
As I said… it would have been a
hell of a ride for them…
but the fireline at 1639 ( 4:39 ) had
not fully ‘assembled’ into any kind
of ‘due west’ advancing front.
Actually… it never did that until
it was blown halfway through the
canyon and past the deployment
site. The fire really did come into
the canyon on sort of an ‘oblique
angle’.
Could they have really SEEN that?
I doubt it. The wind-driven SMOKE
at 1639 must have already been
incredible.
Speaking of which… it’s still just
incredible to me that even if the
actual ‘orange flames’ were hidden
from their view during descent…
the SMOKE must have been
incredible and I can’t believe they
didn’t take their clues from that
alone… stop… and turn around.
Reply to Calvin post
on Dec 22, 2013 at 10:00 pm
>> Calvin asked…
>>
>> Is that a road (jeep trail) out
>> beyond the deployment zone,
>> over the head of the standing
>> investigator (Dougherty DZ pic)
>> that seems to track to the right?
Yes. It is. It’s even more than a
jeep trail. It’s a full blown road…
but it is much farther away than
the Dougherty article photo makes
it appear because of that Canon
55m lens and the 5.6m to infinity
field depth used for that photo.
That road is actually clearly visible
on Google maps running north
on the western perimeter of the
Boulder Springs Ranch.
By the way… that ‘mound’ you
were referring to out ahead of
the deployment site on the south
side of the canyon was exactly
this far away from the center of
the deployment site…
649 feet
216 yards
The MOMENT they reached that
point… they had a clear shot
to turn almost DUE SOUTH and
from that moment on they would
have been running AWAY from
the fire through clearer ground.
This is all hard to describe but if
you just look at a current Google
map of the canyon you will see
exactly what I mean. The closer
they got to the ranch… the more
CLEARINGS there were and the
moment they got to the end of
the south ridge line… it was
TOTALLY clear with trails and
paths leading directly DUE SOUTH
and out to the Candy Cane lane
area. They might have made it.
There was a CHANCE ( and we are only talking
CHANCES here ) that 19 incredibly fit men
absolutely HAULING ASS could have reached
the tip of that mound at the southern side of
the box canyon BEFORE the fire reached that
point… and then forget the stupid ranch… they
would have had a clear ‘run away on flat ground’
scenario right through the valley that separates
the ranch and the Candy Cane Lane area.====REPLY:
this has been proven by fire experts to be another drift trap and that was the way Joy wanted to go and all experts state it was worse than the box canyon and no, it would not be easier even though Joy was stubborn to think that due to the high fuel terrain. That was not a workable option. The only workable one was the one we took- the Congress side.
I was thinking combined with saw gas. If they weren’t caring drip torches. Many of us always packed fuszee’s. They had to light the fire out with something. They were also burning out earlier in the day.
Reply to RTS post on December 22, 2013 at 7:12 pm
>> RTS said…
>> Regarding the Unit Logs: most likely they would have carried
>> them in a cargo pants pocket rather than their packs.
>> They’re more accessible there.
This is what I assume. We covered this ground before.
The SAIR ‘damage reports’ for each of the men indicates
that if they were carrying these ‘unit logs’ in either their
shirt front pocket or front pants pocket… then they should
have survived the burnover. If either one had a notebook
in any BACK pocket, however, then it’s questionable.
Both of them had quite a bit of damage to the BACKS
of their clothing.
>> RTS also wrote…
>> And as I posted earlier, a lot of WFF wait until the end of
>> shift or even the end of the assignment to BRIEFLY
>> fill them out. They are NOT required.
What you actually said was…
>> On December 12, 2013 at 9:28 am RTS said…
>> Unit Logs are NOT required, only suggested, but then
>> it depends on what your supervisor wants too.
There is now substantial evidence from the ADOSH report
and the Yarnell Investigation Notes ( YIN ) that Willis started
keeping a real-time unit log from the moment he arrived at
the YHF at 11:30 PM, Saturday, June 29.
There’s really too much detail being reported in his ‘unit logs’
for him to have NOT been making notations in ‘real time’.
So it is, in fact, reasonable to assume now that since Darrell
Willis believed in ‘real-time’ unit logs ( and not lazy-later mode ),
that Granite Mountain would have been ‘taught’ and/or ‘required’
to have the same habit(s).
We shall see.
All we need is just one photograph from any one of the SIX
recovered smartphones that shows Jesse Steed making
an ‘entry’ in a unit log that day… and Katie Bar The Door.
Followup: It would also be handy if someone who knew
this group would just SAY whether or not Marsh/Steed
ever kept ‘unit logs’ at all… and if so… whether they
were required to do ‘real-time’ or allowed to do ‘lazy-later’.
Someone like Willis or McDonough ( I doubt that’ll happen )
or anyone who has ever actually WORKED with them.
GM did the Doce fire just two weeks earlier.
There must be plenty of people still alive in Prescott
who may have seen them making entries to ‘unit logs’.
**
** BACKPACKS WERE NEVER ENTERED INTO EVIDENCE BY YCSO
Reply to Calvin post on Dec 22, 2013 at 12:43 pm
>> Calvin said…
>> The PFD did the final comb through ( of the deployment site ).
Yes. That is what appears to be documented. What is interesting to note
is that all through the ‘comb-overs’ of the deployment site… no one was
removing any BACKPACKS.
It was only when both YCSO and SAIT said they were ‘done’ that PFD was
allowed to do the ‘final pass’ at the site and remove what was left such as
all the backpacks, melted tools, whatever was still there.
What happened then is that as they tried to remove Whitted’s backpack…
only then did they find his ‘Colorized iPhone’ that was stuck to his backpack.
This means that NONE of the backpacks were actually ‘searched’ on-site by
either YCSO or the SAIT investigators… and NONE of the backpacks ( and
their contents ) were ever entered in evidence by YCSO.
Only the iPhone… which the detectives picked up directly from PFD in Prescott.
I am assuming that the contents of the backpacks were returned to family members…
…but what about ‘unit logs’?
If Marsh/Steed were keeping unit logs that day ( we are still not sure about that
but it would appear they were supposed to since Willis did ) and those unit
logs were not found in their shirt or pants pockets… could they have been
‘stowed for the hike’ in their backpacks?
So this is still a crucial two-step process here…
1) Were either Marsh OR Steed ( or both ) actually keeping ‘unit logs’ that day?
2) IAOI ( If And Only If ) they were… then where are those ‘unit logs’ now?
First they have to exist… then they have to be FOUND before we discover
if they were in the habit of doing real-time updates like their boss Willis is
proven to have been doing that day, or whether they just practiced the ‘lazy
later’ mode of updating their unit logs.
Hint: Either Darrell Wills or Brendan McDonough ( or BOTH ) probably
know the answers to ALL of these important questions about GM ‘unit logs’.
Picture from SAIR p84. There are two chainsaws in this picture. According to deployment site body position illustration, Dustin Deford had a chainsaw right beside him. Could the saw closest to the camera be the saw found by Defords body? The other saw (farther away) appears that it could be the saw in the latest picture released by Dougherty. If that is true, The second saw would be in the approximate location of Marsh and Warneke (but not mentioned in Marsh or Warneke’s Individual PPE Analysis.
Then the blue Nalgene that is seen in both pictures, (possibly) belongs to Ashcraft. The yellow handled tool that is not charred would have been under the upper body of Scott Norris (per description on p 93 SAIR) Just trying to orient everything. Thoughts?
Reply to Calvin post on December 22, 2013 at 7:15 pm
Calvin… I have been doing exactly what you are
doing ( matching reported items with visual evidence
of deployment site ) and here is what I think…
I think it’s not really possible to make definitive
conclusions from just this one picture alone of the
SAIT team at the site BEFORE things were removed.
The photo is Mr. Dougherty’s article is simply not
showing the entirety of the ‘scene’.
Example: There is what appears to be a YCSO
deputy in a short-sleeved tan shirt off the right of
the frame with his elbow showing. He seems to
be ‘standing’ on or near an object and I can’t even
tell what it is… but he is obviously standing ‘amidst
more debris’ that we just can’t see.
I wonder how many of these site photos were in the
SAIT FOIA/FOIL package? Documentation says they
may have taken HUNDREDS of photos of that site…
and documentation ALSO says the the YCSO people
handed the SAIT investigators a CD of every photo
THEY took of the site as well… including the
amazing FARO 3-Dimensional images they took.
I wonder if the FARO images themselves were part of
the SAIT FOIA/FOIL… or if they ‘held those back’?
Calvin,
The fuel containers are SIGG bottles from Sigg Switerland AG. They’re made of either aluminum or stainless steel, and they’re very light and pretty durable. We carry chainsaw mix and bar oil in them and thus are able to spread the weight and bulk pretty evenly amongst the Crew by distributing them to everyone and not just the sawyers and swampers.
Thanks, that is what I thought. What is your opinion on the empty bottles laying around the deployment site. Note the caps are all missing. If used for lighting brush, why would they keep them in the DZ? It makes no sense! but then again, nothing does.
RTS… my thanks as well. That is really pertinent information.
So we are only now seeing some definitive proof of EXACTLY
what went on in/around that deployment site before those
men got into their shelters.
That’s important… because it all adds up to TIME.
It’s perfectly obvious from the photo that some things
happened that we weren’t really sure about until now.
1) All of the men DID have time to get their backpacks off.
No one went into a shelter with one. That adds TIME to
to the clock for how long it took to ‘get ready’.
2) Looks like ALL of the men who were carrying extra fuel
also had the time to get it out… and either ‘dump-as-directed’
on the burn-around-ourselves attempt or just ‘dump-it-anywhere’
away from themselves so there wouldn’t be any explosions
during burnover.
Again… this all takes TIME… and it adds to the final calculation
of how much time these men really had to ‘prepare the site’,
and still get into their shelters.
This is crucial stuff and the ‘real picture’ of their final moments
( and the real total time calculation ) hasn’t been done yet.
We still don’t have an actual TOD ( Time Of Death ) for any
of these 19 men, either. I have found even more photographic
evidence of ‘wrist watches’ amongst that group to the point
where it’s safe to say that MORE of them actually WERE
wearing wrist watches than were not.
Whatever happened to ANY of those wrist watches?
Would ANY of them ( digital or analog ) have shown
the acutal burnover time? Stay tuned.
I’m reposting a comment I made on the Shortest Day of the Year that most of you missed. I want to see what you think about the moral dilemma that PFD Division Chief Willis was in.
WTKTT posted – “Maybe Willis really does believe the words that come out of his mouth. Maybe he has to.”
RTS replied – Yes, I agree on both of those statements. In the media, public forum he was in, he kind of HAD TO defend the actions of his men. At least that”s what I’ve been told by others. That’s a tough one. I don’t necessarily agree with that. That really would be tough having to defend the fatal, foolhardy, illogical, against-all-training-and-conventional-wisdom actions of your men.
I think you have to somewhat admit that Willis was between the proverbial ‘rock and a hard spot.’ Ask yourself, what would you have said, in a public forum, to the world, about a couple of your leaders that are responsible for leading their Crew to their ultimate deaths? Think about it.”
RTS. From what I have read it is highly unusual for anyone to come forward like Willis (and others) did . At least until some reports have been released. Feel free to correct me. So I guess my thoughts are that no one made him come forward. And I agree with Gary, he should have been in a quiet room staring at the walls.
RTS… what kind of fuel bottles are in the deployment site picture?
Joy thought Willis came forward professionally and with respect yet I think he came forward because no one else would come forward and someone had to do the PR time. Our concerns are the evidence being shown is edited and not the raw footage as Joy has provided all. We both gave our accounts of that day. We saw the event from near or at the fire edge on 6-30-13 and Marsh asked them constantly there comfort level as you can hear here
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=omfw_Unt_VQ
and someone stated in background “you state that all day” meaning not just that talk but he was constantly vigil in his concern for their safety as well as ours for he constantly on all conversations asked us how we were headed. Now, what bothers us is that he is taken the sole blame here versus other options being evident that he was asking Steed his comfort level. Consider that Marsh was always a 1/4 mile or so away from them that day as we eye-witness that. Consider also that Marsh had denied hooking up with the Blue Ridge boys and helping out because he was safe in the black and crew. If they did not tamper and edit that video and photos we could look at this in another light but remember we have been 100% transparent on all levels and we were there and we are alive. We left the area just in time because when we got to the vehicle we saw the fire beyond the windmill- After hearing all the peoples’ stories that day we now know how close we were to being dead if we did not go my way. One thing to notice about Marsh was that he was not gungho but it appears somebody outside the crew was as well as someone inside the crew. Still, I think there is more to come and more evidence and it would be nice to see the raw footage of the already put out evidence as well. More evidence will reveal who really is responsible. Now, as far as God having the plans for these men in Heaven—I don’t want anything to do with a God who leaves 3 beautiful pregnant women behind and countless others suffering the grief of the loss of those heroes. If that is YOUR God keep Him to yourself. Mine is loving one. Remember 911 and other tragedies—it was not God but a human factor that led to those deaths and we believe the answers did not die with those 19. No more than 911 did- Why edit that video you see on the above link unless you want to mislead or redirect your narrative just as some have here tried to do.
I think Willis laid out his ‘agenda’ right there in his ‘speech’
from the deployment site when they let him ( and not Roy Hall )
host the first public press conference from the site.
In one breath he says he “doesn’t know what the lessons are”…
…and then less than 30 seconds later he’s saying the exact
opposite and launches into his own little ‘speech’ about
“defensive management” and “urban interface” and
“what a great job I’ve ( We’ve ) been doing along these
lines back in Prescott” and how he thinks if fire hits
Prescott now it will just “go around the houses” and
yada… yada… yada.
Forget his closing remark of “God had a different plan for
these men that day”.
I was most taken aback by this self-serving ‘commercial’ he
was inserting into the press conference that was nothing
but justification for him ‘keeping his job’.
This had to be just an ‘act of God’ for him.
Anything else means he might lose his job back in Prescott.
>> Calvin wrote…
>> I hope someone releases more of the video.
There is also complete ‘security camera’ video footage that was taken
from the perimeter of the Boulder Springs Ranch looking right out to
the north… towards those features I have named “Big Round Top”
and “Little Round Top”. I don’t know how MUCH there is… but if it’s
a good hour’s worth… we might be able to see ACTUAL video
proof of the ACTUAL ROS in that critical timeframe… in the exact
direction that matters.
That Boulder Springs Security camera footage has already been
‘glimpsed’ in reports by CNN and other people… but only for a few
seconds because the Mainstream Media ( MSM ) just thought that
was too ‘boring’ to show more than a few seconds of it.
So that video is, in fact, part of the SAIT FOIA/FOIL package.
I hope we get to see/examine the WHOLE thing.
>> Calvin also wrote…
>> I saw a brief clip on CNN last weekend (Saturday or Sunday
>> early morning) that was different than the video by Wildfire Today.
>> It was taken from a different location. Has anyone else saw that?
I searched and searched for this… even went to 3 different Internet
‘wayback’ machines… but I can’t seem to find this video you are
referring to. Do you recall anything else about it, or exactly where
you saw it? What looked ‘different’ about it?
The clip from CNN showed two FF standing in a dirt road with radios in hand, discussing whether deployment had occurred. The background was a boulder covered hill, not the wooded area from the other video. It was pretty short, but definitely different than other video.
Ah… OK… I know the one you are referring to.
Yes… it was appearing on MSM footage as just
sort of ‘background’… but another site ran it with
audio and the bearded firefighter with the handheld
is caught talking to both radio and others near him.
I have been working that one here trying to identify
exact location… but it’s a tricky one. Not much to
go on but the large yellow road sign and the
boulders. Stay tuned.
Reply to Calvin post on Dec 22, 2013 at 1:18 pm
Found it ( The exact location the video was shot ).
This is the video that features the ( so far unidentified )
bearded firefighter standing in the road with a portable
radio… and we also hear some of the final GM radio
transmissions in the background.
This WAS taken at a different location ( but actually
not all that far away ) from the video that was released
by AZREPUBLIC.
These men were also on the Shrine road… but a little
further east towards Yarnell than the crew in the other
AZREPUBLIC video.
The video was shot looking north-northeast with
the camera operator standing exactly here…
Latitude: 34.225839
Longitude: -112.750738
34.225839, -112.750738
The MSM ( MainStream Media ) was pretty much just
using THIS video clip from the SAIT FOIA/FOIL package
as a ‘background’ clip in their reports with the other
video being featured as the ‘real capture’ of the radio
transmissions… but this video seems to have almost
the same full capture sequence and even includes all
the attempts by Bravo 33 ( ASM2 ) to contact GM after
Marsh’s final “Affirm” transmission.
I wonder when we will get to see a copy of this
entire video from the SAIT FOIA/FOIL package?
I have lost track of this thread, but, FYI, I now have the entire FOIL/FOIA materials save a few things. I was going to try to figure out how to share the materials, but limit access to those of you on the informal investigation team here, but it looks like John Dougherty is going to do it….. If he doesn’t or can’t, I can give it a try.
FYI, the rest of the video from the helmet cam basically shows that the air folks tried like hell to find and help Granite Mountain (not that they could have), and GM tried a few times to communicate back, but no clear communications came through from GM. Rather, there was immediate and incoherent static RIGHT after the pilot would call out to GM on the radio. No clear communications from GM came through.
As I listen to the rest of the video, my heart goes out to the pilot. I am sure he had a pit in his stomach for quite some time after June 30. Hearing him repeatedly paging Granite Mountain calmly, saying something rational and calm like “you’re going have to tell us when you see the aircraft, because it is going to be a little tough for us to see ya….” It is heartbreaking. And then, after such a transmission, the pilot immediately gets a “response” of horrible static, showing that Marsh/GM are TRYING to communicate back to the pilot. But they can’t.
And then the pilot replies to the incoherent static by saying “… Ok… uh…” The way he says “…ok… uh…,” and everything that you might read into that is very very sad. It is not for the weak of heart, friends. God rest the souls of the 19.
Solely for purposes of saying something that I have been thinking, I say the following. Feel free to ignore it (and all of this, of course) – just want to make a comment: As I listen to the video, and I hear the pilot trying to keep calm while clearly realizing his efforts are likely futile, I find myself choking up, the same way I do when I read and re-read the interview notes regarding the BR crew member racing – on foot – to the deployment site. The way it is described, you can basically FEEL the desperation, and you can be sure that the BR guy was running faster than he had ever run in his life. It chokes me up every time I read it…. It makes me recall a personal situation several months ago in which a close friend (who is an emergency professional as her day job and a marathon runner as a hobby) heard an awful squeal of tires and realized that her child might have been in an accident at the end of her long, long driveway. In terror, my friend did not take the time to get into her car to drive to the end of the driveway to see if her child was killed, but, rather, she took off running. On foot, she *beat* her mother who got into the car and *DROVE* down the long driveway. To this day, my friend will not even talk about that sprint of terror and the fact that she outran the car. It is too much for her to even remember, that run of sheer terror, which is saying something, given that her day job involves facing dire situations and trying to rescue people. (The child was fine, thank God.) That is all I can think about when I picture the BR crew member running to the deployment site. My heart goes to him and to the pilot I hear trying to calmly, calmly page GM and Marsh.
**
** WHEN DID ERIC MARSH REALLY BECOME DIVS A?
The SAIR still wants us to believe it happened DURING the 7:00 AM briefing.
ADOSH won’t even confirm Marsh was actually present at the 7:00 AM
briefing and only says he became DIVS A sometime ‘after the meeting’.
The accidentally captured radio transmission from Marsh in the Globe
Type 2 Crew ‘staging’ video shot at the Yarnell Fire Station sometime
around 10:00 AM catches Eric still NOT using call sign ‘DIVS A’ yet.
Todd Abel’s interview with the SAIT team says NOTHING about when he
actually made Marsh DIVS A. Very strange.
In his SAIT interview… Brendan McDonough actually puts a time window
of between 10:45 and 11:36 AM on when Marsh became DIVS A. According
to Brendan… it happened exactly around the time that Rory Collins was
purposely dropping retardant on their indirect attack and forcing them
to change tactics. It looks like this is what prompted (perhaps) the FIRST
in a series of ‘cell phone calls’ from Marsh to Todd Abel… and it was during
that cell call that Abel decided to make Marsh ‘DIVS A’.
Page 7 of YIN ( SAIT Yarnell Investiation Notes )
Interview with Brendan McDonough 7/5/2013
Chronological events… according to McDonough…
– Crew reported to Yarnell Fire station morning of 6/30
– Briefed-Bad Road Access
– Briefed on fire where parked
– 45 min hike in to Fire activity low
– Going to go direct fire hung up mid-slope
– Eric-Supt to be Div A
– Supt needs a squad to go back securing edge to cold black
– Brendan volunteers his squad for assignment
– Eric out scouting ahead in front of Brendan’s squad
SIDENOTE: Two times… the SAIT investigator notes seem to suggest
that Brendan was the LEADER of the ‘squad’ that volunteered to
do the ‘tie to cold black’ assignment. Brendan says HE was the
one that volunteered HIS squad for the assignment and the very
next line refers to the squad as “Brendan’s squad”, as if he really
was the ‘squad leader’. Very strange.
There is now another confirmation that it wasn’t until this ‘late’ time in
the morning, and after the incidents with Rory Collins, that Todd Abel
actually made Marsh DIVS A.
It comes from the SAIT notes and their interview with Blue Ridge Hotshots.
Brian Frisby and his Capt. Trueheart. They told the SAIT team Eric ‘became
alpha’ at 10:45 AM ish, as they were heading up the saddle for their
‘face to face’ with Marsh…
Page 7 of YIN ( SAIT Yarnell Investiation Notes )
Interview with Blue Ridge IHC
Supt: Brian Frisby Foreman: True Brown
Squad Boss: Travis Fueller and Cory Ball
Interviewed by Godot, Jay, Jimmie, Tim, Jim, and Mike 07/10/2013
Brian & Trueheart went on the razor (UTV) to meet up with Eric and Jesse
in the saddle @ 1045. They mentioned they too had a bad briefing, bad radios.
Driving up to the saddle is when Eric became Alpha.
So what is unbelievable here is that even though the SAIT investigators
had at least TWO independent confirmations that Todd Abel didn’t
make Marsh DIVS A until around 10:45 AM that day… the SAIR still
came out saying that Marsh became DIVS A at the 7:00 AM briefing.
As if anyone needed any MORE proof… the SAIR is complete fiction.
I would hypothesize that Marsh became Div A after one of two events occurred (or maybe both) I haven’t seen any information released (yet) that indicates the time Arroyo called and reported they were unable to make it. I have to believe that the absence of 33% of your available hotshot crews had an effect on the “plan” (or lack of) for the day.
Rance Marquez interview notes p36 says…..I left Phoenix and arrived at ICP about 10:30 a.m. on the 3oth. I could see the fire from Congress.
I was committed to the Doce Fire so I asked if I could go, was told no. But I told him that It wouldn’t be very long because I heard that they had ordered Bea Day’s team so he said OK.
So Marquez comes to the fire and then leaves (shortly?) after 1030.
I will also assert that it was becoming clearer that the ICT was an inadequate (appears Roy Hall was actually a Type 3 commander)team and there was increasing pressure to order a Type 1 team. P2 YIN from Arizona Dispatch Center ……..Sun 8-1000 ordered T2 short team, no T3 team ordered transitioned from T4 to T2 incident. When the team took the incident it changed to an aircraft and logistics for dispatch. Pushed against T2 long for T1 based on potential.
• Pete had a meeting between 1200-1300 w/ agency administrators. Pete stressed his strong feelings for them to go with a T1 team order. Order was placed around 14-1430. There was a problem with T1 order, redid it around 15-1600ys….
It could be that Hall’s team were simply filling in empty positions in an attempt to cover their asses before another team took over.
Roy Hall interview p29 YIN…..11:00 Placed a call to David Geyer to go forward with the Central West Type 2 team full blown order. Received a report that the fire was traveling at 10-15 chains and flame lengths were 10-15 ft.
11:07 Placed a call to Bea Day and asked her to send, outside of the system, 2-3 of her best logs people and any ops people.
11:10 Called Jim Downey and strongly urged him to order the type 2 team. His comment back “how do you know it’s not a type one incident?” and requested that I do a complexity analysis. I responded that I was too busy to do that computer stuff and if he wanted to send it over, I would go over it with him.
I am not Surprised Roy Hall is named in the notice of claim. I wonder what he was busy doing, that he didn’t have time to do his JOB.
By all accounts, GM had 4 Chainsaws with them 6/30. P83 SAIR says….There were three saws found 20 to 40 feet off the southeast and east side of the deployment site.
p84 SAIR picture shows 2 chainsaws in the deployment area. FICTION
umm, what are you talking about?
there are clearly four saws being carried into the fire by GM in the photo taken by Joy Collura.
the SAIT says three saws were found outside the deployment site (20-40 feet) and one saw was found within the deployment site.
your post is fiction. are you hunting witches too?
FULLSAIL. Please re read my comment. I agree with you. Collura picture and her own account both say GM had 4 saws. You said….the SAIT says three saws were found outside the deployment site (20-40 feet) and one saw was found within the deployment site. Again I agree WITH you. However if you will take the time to look at the picture on p84 of SAIR page, you will note that there are 2 saws in the deployment area. That is all I am saying
the picture caption reads, “Figure 5. The area northeast of the deployment site contained sawed and burnt brush stobs, and the burned remnants of a hand tool, chainsaws and packs.”
so i don’t think that picture is comprehensive of the deployment site… so, i guess i’m not sure what you’re calling “fiction” since the SAIT accounts for four saws (even if the picture only shows two of them).
so if there’s only one tool head showing in the picture, that’s all the tools they had with them that day?
You again are correct. Figure five “Figure 5. The area northeast of the deployment site contained sawed and burnt brush stobs, and the burned remnants of a hand tool, chainsaws and packs.” BUT ! page 83 states…There were three saws found 20 to 40 feet off the southeast and east side of the deployment site.
Together these two different notations add up to a total of five saws. BUT then you have to add P 94 The burned remnants of a chain saw were next to the right side of the firefighter. (Dustin Deford)
Now the SAIR has told us there were actually SIX saws. Yep, fiction
hmm, i am not sure how math works in your part of the world, but here we don’t count the word “chainsaw” each time it appears in the text or pictures. here we try to account for ACTUAL numbers of items present at the scene.
example: if the text says there were eight sawed brush stobs and then there is a picture that shows one brush stob… THAT DOESN’T EQUAL NINE TOTAL BRUSH STOBS!
Fullsail said..the SAIT says three saws were found outside the deployment site (20-40 feet) and one saw was found within the deployment site. WRONG The SAIR actually says……There were three saws found 20 to 40 feet off the southeast and east side of the deployment site. p83
P84… figure 5 caption says…Figure 5. The area northeast of the deployment site contained sawed and burnt brush stobs, and the burned remnants of a hand tool, CHAINSAWS (2in pic) and packs.
Dustin Deford had one CHAINSAW right beside him
3chainsawS Southeast and east P83 Text
2 chainsawS Northeast P84 Text and picture
1 chainsaw Inside DZ P94 Text
As far as your example above, I understand your point But if the 8 sawed stobs (mentioned in the text) are noted North and the one sawed stob in the picture is noted South (in the attached caption) Then, indeed there are 9 total sawed stobs! At least that’s the way we do math AROUND HERE
ah, okay, you must be right then… those four saws we see them hiking in with must have mated when no one was looking.
i am done with you.
I am not saying there were 6 saws. I am saying that the SAIR says that. Sorry to frustrate you!
xxfullsailxx—
we just began to read the site—we heard you made it here. Welcome. We needed you here. Someone inquired to us if you attacked me that you should be removed- I have not read that part of you attacking me but I am 100% for the freedom of speech so we look forward to reading the comment wall this week- short on time tonight but so far from the bottom up to this point we just see you give a new flair to the page- Sonny enjoys your insight. He laughs and that we need-
Humor is an important part of life. Thank you.
I am not hunting witches. I am hunting facts
yep, more confirmation that you don’t really understand how things work and you don’t really listen to the people with the knowledge, trying to tell you…
to infer that there was no discussion of Marsh being Division Alpha at the 0700 briefing is ignorance on your part. since he was the most qualified individual on that piece of line, by default he would become Div A and that would most definitely be a part of any morning briefing.
the official transition to the Type 2 team happened sometime around 1030. at that time Marsh “officially” became Div A. prior to that, Marsh was Div. A for all intensive purposes.
just because the timelines and dialogue don’t meet your static expectations of how they SHOULD be, doesn’t mean the SAIR is “complete fiction.”
(Not that any of that is relevant to your witch hunt anyways.)
Thanks, very helpful!
Fullsail–You have not been paying to much attention to the information. All records indicate he was not assigned as DIVA until 1030. There is no witch hunt going on here we are trying to sift thru information and find facts that the SAIT did not do and pretty much did not report information that they had. You also believe that you do not have to notify or discuss moving from your line assignment with any one as that would be asking them to hold your hand and lead you off the mountain. Where were you when the training for line positions was being offered. Your one of those calculated risk guys that will be lucky to survive the next one, or you do not believe every thing that you have been saying here. You have already decided I’m to old to learn any thing from, I feel sorry for you.
what is it that you think i’m missing Bob? i more or less agreed that Eric Marsh OFFICIALLY became Div Alpha at 1030 when the team officially announced their transition.
prior to that, if they were the only ones out on that piece of ground and Marsh was the highest qualified individual, then he was inferred Div Alpha then too. i am pretty sure that all the reports are consistent in the summation that Marsh was going to be Div A from the time GM showed up at ICP.
I also agree with you, that a major infraction (again on Marsh’s shoulders) was not notifying ops that he was abandoning his Div with GM. totally agree.
and FYI, i didn’t say anything about not learning anything from old-timers (who i generally have a lot of respect for). I said i didn’t have anything to learn from someone who can say they “never deviated from the 10 & 18” or they “never dug line without a safe anchor point” …etc. to say that you did not make mistakes over the course of a 30 year career is to say that you’re the Jesus of wildfire, which i find hard to believe.
I must have totally misinterpreted your pore little lambs lost on a hill statement. Yes I never deviated from the 10 and 13, and I am not alone in that. Yes we followed the 10 standard orders and fought fire. I said I did not have any serious accidents with the crews that worked for me lucky or good people who knows, I always put safety first. That’s why I was selected for R5’s 1973 fire safety sensing program. We came up with recommendations that the regional forester put into operational procedures. I was trained by some great supervisors (Fire Gods) never thought I was one of those much less Jesus Christ. You have to make safety your #1 priority and everything else will fall into place. And I was probably still lucky because I still had 20, 40, or 60 other individuals working for me on the fire line.
I was always told by my first old time FMO “always set an example and others will follow”. I could name people you probably would not know that had the same record as me, many who became District and Forest FMO’s.
bob, i think i see where you are coming from. i realize there are plenty of management types out there who got there without having a major accident to speak of, including yourself, and i definitely respect that.
the “poor little lambs” comment is in reference to WTKTT’s assertion that someone needed to guide GM down off the hill. that was not anyone’s job that day but Marsh and/or Steed.
I agree with you that it was Marsh or Steeds responsibility misread your statement. When you stay focused you give good info. Stick with your positive approach it works better.
Reply to xxfullsailxx post on Dec 22, 2013 at 9:17 am
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>> to infer that there was no discussion of Marsh being
>> Division Alpha at the 0700 briefing is ignorance on
>> your part.
( Heavy sigh )
I never said there might not have been any ‘discussion’
about ‘who is going to be DIVS A today’ at the 7:00 AM
briefing. I said that the SAIR wants us to believe that
is the moment when Marsh was ACTUALLY appointed
to that job and the moment he ACTUALLY accepted it.
There is a lot of evidence now that THAT moment
being described in the SAIR is ‘total fiction’.
On the very FIRST page of the SAIR report…
>> Early on June 30, members of the Type 2 IMT began
>> arriving. In a briefing at 0700, the incoming Granite
>> Mountain IHC Superintendent accepted the role
>> of Division Alpha Supervisor.
They aren’t done yet… there’s even more…
Page 15 of the SAIR…
>> At the 0700 briefing on June 30, ICT4 and others from
>> the previous shift meet at the Yarnell Fire Station with
>> incoming personnel including ICT2, two Operations
>> Section Chiefs (OPS1 and OPS2), SPGS1, a fire
>> behavior analyst (FBAN), YCSO deputies, and the
>> Granite Mountain IHC Superintendent.
>> They agree the Granite Mountain Superintendent will
>> become Division Supervisor Alpha (DIVS A) and his
>> Assistant Superintendent (Granite Mountain Captain
>> or GM Capt) will run the crew.
oh, perfect! so you acknowledge that there was a briefing at 0700 at which E. Marsh accepted the fact that he “will become” Div A for the Type 2 team. AND you recognize that the Type 2 team officially transferred command sometime around 1030.
so NOW you understand (with regard to this one tiny insignificant detail) how fires transition from initial attack to extended attack!
so the only revelation here is that before you didn’t really understand the terminology used in the SAIR (which admittedly could have been written better for folks like you and calvin) and how things transpire on an evolving incident.
yay, we agree!
I am not sold on Willis or anyone else intervening at 4 PM to motivate GM to move (beyond Musser), but am not convinced it did not happen either. Musser was very vague (at least according to the notes) about the exact reason for his request to GM. Any chance he was acting just as a relay – i.e. someone told him to call GM?
I’m glad to see some discussion about Roy Hall. Some of his statements have been as tone deaf as can be – “Do you know who I am?”, “Glad there was no smoking gun”, “I had one sleepless night”. If he had as good a career as Gary said, I believe that he now has one thing in mind. That is to not let his legacy be the fact that he was the IC on the Yarnell Hill fire! I assure you, he does not want his role in this talked about at all.
Reply to mike post on December 21, 2013 at 11:25 pm
mike… Have you see this gem?
Roy Halll video interview with USA Today – October 5, 2013
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/10/04/commander-reflects-on-yarnell-fire-tragedy/2926419/
In this interview… Roy hall reads from a prepared statement
and says…
>> We will never know what Eric Marsh saw on
>> Sunday afternoon June 30th.
Nope. We already do.
>> Nor we will completely know all the conversations preceding
>> his decision… and Jesse Steed’s decision to move.
Wanna make a bet?
** Complete transcript of Roy Hall’s USA Today interview
** in case that video disappears…
We’ve talked about Yarnell Hill since the 70’s.
Yarnell Hill has always been a… in the back of our
minds… one of those troublesome fire areas.
The last week a June is… is historically, the most condemning
week of fire activity in Arizona…
and the way the monsoons move in from east to west…
the last of the firefights, depending on how… how early the monsoons
arrive or how late they are… ahm…
but the last week of June really sets the clock… ticking…
until.. ah… sufficient moisture arrives and… and… uh… sets things back.
This is common knowledge to firefighters, and… and its something
that’s briefed ah… in… pre-season fire refreshers.
It’s briefed on incidents.
There is nothing on the landscape… or a structure… a home…
that is worth the life of a firefighter.
So your… your priorities change from
How do we… how do we keep fire outta Yarnell
to the acknowledgment that fire is gonna get inta Yarnell…
and we’ve gotta get people… and I’m talkin’ about firefighters and
residents… out of harms way.
I got a call from… from… Paul Musser the OPS chief…. with
an update in Yarnell proper… that their… the fire had… had gotten into Yarnell…
that there were structures being lost.. and.. at that… at or about
that same time… and I can’t remember exactly when it was…
but I’m thinkin’… 4:30 ish…
that there was… that there… that.. that…
Granite Mountain had deployed shelters.
Your first and foremost concern is..
How do we help?
What… Whadda we need to do?
And.. do we… and… and…
My main concern was… do we have contact with ’em?
Do we have any contact with ’em?
I made sure that the Arizona Division of Forestry knew….
that there’d been a deployment…
and… that it was Granite Mountain…
and… that we would… (pause) we would keep them apprised.
I initiated a call to the Arizona Divsion a Forestry.
and basically told ’em…
the.. this outcome is not gonna be good.
We need ta prepare for the worst
But the confirmation of the fatalities had not…
er… I had not received that at that point.
There’s a propensity to say there’s got…
that somebody CAUSED this.
Somebody is at FAULT.
And… uh… this has… has… reaffirmed to me
that… that accidents can happen.
( Reading from his own press release now… )
A firefighter, utilzing the best available science, equipment, training,
and working within the scope of agency doctrine and policy,
can still suffer serious injury… or death.
( Looking up from his statement… )
When I started….
Nobody ever talked to me about dyin’ doin’ this.
It was exciting… it was challenging…
Yes, I knew it was dangerous…
But I… it wasn’t like war. It wasn’t like goin’ to war.
Uh… my main concern is for those families.
I’ve got kids. I’ve got grandkids.
And… in the faces of those… those… children of those firefighters
that expired on Yarnell Hill… I see in their face what might have
been in the faces of my children when I left for long
periods a time to go on a fire… and what I see is…
Dad’s gone on a fire… he’ll be back soon.
That’s hard. That’s really hard.
( Reading to the camera from his own prepared statement again )…
We will never know what Eric Marsh saw on Sunday afternoon June 30th.
Nor we will completely know all the conversations preceding his
decision… and Jesse Steed’s decision to move.
Whatever they saw, whatever the situation at that time, confirmed
their confidence that they had time and a safety margin necessary to move.
The situation changed very quickly… and that decision was compromised
I would not wish this tragedy on my worst enemy, however,
I would not trade places with anybody.
END OF ROY HALL INTERVIEW WITH USA TODAY
Actually there is more to this interview at Wildfire Today. P2 of Reflections of Incident Commander Roy Hall following the Yarnell Hill Fire report’s release….
Mountain Hotshots had become historical statistics we call
‘fatalities’.
We train wildland fire line supervisors to assess and take charge.
Battlefield -fire line decisions are made using ALL of the best
information available based on decades of experience and training.
We will never know what Granite Mountain supervisors saw on Sunday
afternoon, June 30th. Nor will we completely know all the
conversations preceding their decision to move the crew out of the
‘hard black’. Whatever they saw, whatever the situation at that
time; confirmed their confidence that they had the time and safety
margin necessary to move. I stand resolute and IMMOVABLE behind
this announcement and decision to move. The situation changed very
quickly and the decision was compromised, leaving nowhere to evade
the fire’s intense assault.
I would NOT wish this tragedy upon my worst enemy! However, I
would NOT trade places with anyone! There is no time like now to
LIVE for the legacy of safety for our wildland fire fighters! The
‘gorilla’ is still in the room! He ALWAYS has been! AND he ALWAYS
will be! We must never forget—we must NEVER rest—we must
ALWAYS remember!
We ALL keep asking, ‘WHAT could we have done differently?’ It IS
human nature to want to know WHAT happened! This effort attempts
to humanize an explanation that could make us all feel
better…HOWEVER, we just don’t know ALL the facts! Furthermore, IF
we are truly sincere of the statement we have uttered AND heard
literally hundreds of times in the past weeks–‘OUR heartfelt thoughts
and prayers go out to the families of these fallen heroes!’ THEN we
must realize and personally ACT NOW to STOP the speculation,
questions, and cynicism of Monday morning quarterbacking! It will
NOT bring back 19 of our best and finest comrades!
I AM committed to learning the most I possibly can from this tragedy!
The risk and exposure of the wildland fire ground is well documented,
however, there will ALWAYS be necessary decision space at the
>> Roy Hall
>> HOWEVER, we just don’t know ALL the facts!
You can say THAT again, Roy.
We’re workin’ on it.
also- the document that roy hall has in his hands is not his statement (though i agree the video tries to insinuate that…)
the document he is holding is a page out of the NWCG Operations Guide (the bible of all things wildland fire) regarding “Fire Doctrine” from which he is quoting:
“A firefighter, utilzing the best available science, equipment, training, and working within the scope of agency doctrine and policy, can still suffer serious injury… or death.”
which actually leads me to correct my previous statement regarding Fire Doctrine:
since GMIHC worked under the guidelines set forth by the NWCG as outlined in the Operations Guide… they were further empowered to make decisions in the field based on their own assessment of what was happening and had a responsibility to prioritize their own safety over any other actions (para-phrased from the Ops. Guide).
I agree Mike, and I never said the guy wasn’t a ****, I just said I THINK he has a big rep., but you are right, I do think there are more than a few who do not want their careers to be remembered this way and his hubris and ego is common among fire commanders.
**
** THE DEPLOYMENT SITE PHOTO SHOWING
** SAIT INVESTIGATORS, CREW EQUIPMENT,
** AND AT LEAST SIX GM RADIOS
NOTE: This is a repeat of a previous post I made that turned out to be
absurdly long. I tried to include the actual JPEG EXIF data from the
photo itself and did not realize how ridiculously long that made the post.
That original comment went to moderation ( thankfully! ) and I have
asked Mr. Dougherty to delete the whole thing.
THIS post only answers the questions Calvin asks and gives others an
indication where to find all the radios ( and other things ) in the photo.
On December 21, 2013 at 3:44 pm Calvin asked
>> Question….. Does anyone have any thoughts on the latest deployment
>> site picture that was released here at IM (InvestigativeMedia) with
>> the last article?
Funny you should ask. I was just about to release some ‘analysis’ of
that photograph which is really quite extraordinary and kind of got
‘lost in the noise’ this week.
The photo was taken by SAIT investigator(s) July 3, 2013 late in the
evening ( 6:56 PM ).
It is obviously from the SAIT FOIA/FOIL package, and there are probably
many similar pictures.
It is an ultra-high-res photo taken with a high-end Canon Digital Camera
and there are tons of significant details revealed in just the one that
was published. See below.
>> Calvin also asked…
>> Does anyone know for certain which direction the picture is facing?
The Canon EOS REBEL T3i camera that was used to take this
photo had an EF-S 18-55mm f/3.5-5.6 IS II lems attached but
the photo itself was actually taken at the 55 mm setting.
The focus was set to DEEP field of view with Min: 5.6 m and Max: Infinity.
That creates sort of a ‘distortion’ effect for objects in the distance which
makes it a little hard to identify them.
That being said… it’s safe to say this photo was taken looking across the
deployment site from west to east… looking OUT of the canyon and
pretty much in the direction where they must have seen the fire coming
around the northern mound of that box canyon.
The camera lens and settings are ‘distorting’ the near-ground out beyond
the mouth of the canyon and making those ‘mid-range’ distance objects
appear closer than they really are… but the key is the ‘hazy’ mountain
range profile in the distance. That’s the configuration of the mountains
on the OTHER (east) side of Yarnell and Highway 89, as seen from
the box canyon.
>> Calvin also asked…
>> Does anyone know if the deployment site area was partially covered
>> in grass or was it all sand before the burn?
Satellite imagery from April 9, 2013 ( just 82 days before the tragedy )
show it as MOSTLY sand… with perhaps a light dusting of dead
bear grass… but nothing heavy.
What follows now is just some ‘interesting things’ that this
photograph shows…
** AT LEAST SEVEN PORTABLE RADIOS IN THE PHOTO
There are at least SEVEN portable radios visible in this photo, counting the
one that is attached to the rear belt of the SAIT investigator who is hunched
over and examining one of the loose shelters along with the other
(standing) investigator.
I’m only including that one because it’s the same kind of Bendix/King
with 16″ antenna extension that Steed was carrying, and this
radio is needed to help identify another on in the photo.
FIRST RADIO
Look straight down from the red clamshell battery extension on
the BK that the SAIT investigator has on his belt.
You will see another ‘slightly burned’ Bendix/King with the same
red clamshell attached.
This BK is a little discolored… but perfectly intact… and if you zoom WAY
down you can almost still read some writing on the back of it… so even though
this was obviously a GM radio that went through the burnover, it really wasn’t
damaged much at all.
What’s curious is that THIS BK doesn’t have a 16″ antenna extension… so that
couldn’t be Steeds. I believe Steed’s is on the ground over in the right-hand
side of the photo.
SECOND RADIO
So on to that right-hand side of the photo…
I believe Steeds Bendix/King that DOES have the 16″ antenna extension
he put on it himself is clearly visible there on the ground in the
right-hand-side-center of the photo. Again… look for the bright red
BK clamshell battery extension that Steed was also known to have
on his BK.
THIRD RADIO
There appears to be ANOTHER radio just to the left of Steed’s…
but is does NOT appear to be Bendix/King.
Looks more like a Motorola ‘hand-clutch’ type with that distinct
curvature in the grip.
FOURTH RADIO
Just about in the center of that ‘Motorla hand-clutch’ radio lying
on the ground… and almost touching it… is another Bendix/King.
You are looking at the TOP of it and the antenna is bent.
It appears to have a red clamshell extension but it also seems
to have been blackened by the fire.
FIFTH RADIO
This radio is a little harder to see… but it’s there.
Go back to the SAIT investigators on the left.
If you zoom down next to the FOOT of the one that is standing,
you will see that they are examining a ‘loose shelter’ in front
of them that also has a partially melted helmet clearly visible.
Just next to the visible back of one of the investigator’s hands
that is near the ground is the top half of another partially scorched
portable radio. It also looks like a Bendix/King, like the others,
but the investigator’s foot would be obscuring the red clamshell,
if it even had one. This one also does NOT have a 16″ antenna
extension like Steed’s did. It only has the standard BK antenna.
It might actually be that radio itself that is the focus of the SAIT
investigators attention as this moment captured in the photo.
They both appear to be ‘looking’ at it and one of them may
actually be ‘reaching’ for it at that moment.
SIXTH RADIO
The SIXTH radio is almost impossible to see but it’s also there.
Best way I can describe this with just words is as follows…
Zoom down again to the right foot of the SAIT investigator that is
standing next to the one that’s hunched over ( where you can
see the SIXTH radio location described above ).
Now let your eye move directly to the right away from his foot
and to the other end of the ‘loose’ shetler they are examining.
At the right side of that white shelter debris is a burned
pick-axe. Move your eyes a little more right to the end of the
handle of the burned pick-axe.
Now look straight up from the end of burned handle.
There is a burned Bendix/King with the top buttons facing you
lying in the light-colored ‘sandy’ area. The antenna is a little
bent and sticking out to the right from the top of radio.
No Bendix/King standard red clamshell is visible on that one but
it’s definitely the top-button style panel of a BK.
** SO GM HAD AT LEAST SEVEN PORTABLE
** RADIOS THAT DAY
Counting the SIX handhelds that can be seen lying on the ground
in the deployment site photo… plus the one that we know Brendan
McDonough had all day and left his lookout position with…
…that makes at least SEVEN portables radios used by GM that day,
and at least SEVEN sets of ears that would have heard ALL of
the ‘discussing their options’ conversation over the GM intra-crew
frequency.
** THIS IS A HIGH-RES PHOTO
This is a VERY high-res photo that John Dougherty posted ( even
though it looks small in the article ) and if you want the entire original
photo at its original (HUGE) size… just use your mouse, right click the
photo in his article, and then pick ‘Save image as’. You will get a HUGE
copy of the original photo and can easily see the things described above.
** MEMORANDUM BOOK
The SAIT investigator that is hunched over has a notebook tucked
under his right arm. If you zoom down it says this on the cover…
MEMORANDUM BOOK
Spiral Bound
50 Sheets
I wonder where that ‘notebook’ is now… and what information
it has in it? Were copies of pages from that notebook anywhere
to be found in the SAIT FOIA/FOIL release packages?
** THE MISSING iPHONE
6 DAYS after this photo was taken is when the ‘Colored Case iPhone’
was finally found at the deployment site.
That was the one with the case that was ‘partially melted’ to the side of a
backpack and later identified as belonging to Clayton Whitted… since he
was the only one that had an iPhone with that kind of ‘colored case’.
If the ‘coloration’ they are talking about happens to be ‘pink’… then I believe the
published photo actually shows this ‘iPhone’ stuck to the side of a pack.
Look just to the right of where the foot of the SAIT investigator who is standing
meets the ground… right past what looks like another Bendix/King radio… and
just past some of the white material… a distinct PINK OBJECT is sticking out
of the material and it looks like it’s on the side of a backpack.
This looks very much like an iPhone with a pink casing.
CORRECTION: The YCSO police report only says it was 6
days ( July 9 ) after they first escorted the SAIT team to the
deployment site ( July 3 ) when THEY were finally told that
the ‘Colored iPhone’ was found at the deployment site
during a ‘final comb of the deployment site’.
There is no actual indication WHEN the SAIT team did this
‘final comb through’ or what day that iPhone was actually
found, or how long they waited before telling YCSO police
about it.
The PFD did the final comb through
P8 YCSO 7/9…I was advised that another phone
was located at the scene during a final comb through by the fire department and
that phone had been melted to a backpack. There was apparently some coloration
left on the phone and the information I received was the only firefighter that
had a phone of that color was Clayton Whitted. I picked up the phone from PFD
Reply to Calvin post on Dec 22, 2013 at 12:43 pm
>> Calvin said…
>> The PFD did the final comb through.
Yes. That is what appears to be documented.
What is interesting to note is that all through
the ‘comb-overs’ of the site… no one was
removing any BACKPACKS.
It was only when both YCSO and SAIT said
they were ‘done’ that PFD was allowed to
do the ‘final pass’ at the site and remove
what was left such as all the backpacks,
melted tools, whatever was still there.
What happened then is that as they tried to
remove Whitted’s backpack… only then did
they find the ‘Colorized iPhone’ that was
stuck to the backpack.
This means that NONE of the backpacks were
actually ‘searched’ on-site by either YCSO or
the SAIT investigators… and NONE of the
backpacks ( and their contents ) were ever
entered in evidence by YCSO. Only the iPhone.
I am assuming that the contents of the backpacks
were returned to family members…
…but what about ‘unit logs’?
If Marsh/Steed were keeping unit logs that day
( we are still not sure about that but it would
appear they were supposed to since Willis did )
and those unit logs were not found in their
shirt or pants pockets… could they have been
‘stowed for the hike’ in their backpacks?
Still a two-step process here…
1) Were either Marsh OR Steed ( or both )
actually keeping ‘unit logs’ that day?
2) IAOI ( If And Only If ) they were… then where
are those ‘unit logs’ now?
First they have to exist… then they have to be
FOUND before we discover if they were in the
habit of doing real-time updates like their
boss Willis is proven to have been doing that day,
or whether they just practiced the ‘lazy later’
mode of updating their unit logs.
You don’t know me from a hole in the wall, but I’ve been following these threads closely for various reasons (including I went to Prescott College and I photograph climate change stuff in Albuquerque). I’m a semi-professional photographer who uses a Canon T3i, and, before I moved into Rebel DSLRs, used higher-end Canon Powershots.. If you start w/the radio they’re looking at and follow straight right to the end of the shelter, I would bet big money you will see the Canon Powershot.
**
** TIME/DATE CONTEXT for the Deployment Site
** photo showing SAIT investigators, all the radios,
** and ( possibly ) the iPhone that was missed.
YCSO Detectives McDormett and Waldock met SAIT investigative team,
headed by Brad Mayhew on July 3, 2013, at the YHF IC command post
in Peeples Valley at 1615 ( 4:15 PM ) .
They escorted the SAIT team to the deployment site, which was being
guarded by YCSO officers.
The SAIT team took photographs ( including the one posted by Mr. Dougherty )
at this time and then started their examination of the scene.
The photo published has an internal JPEG EXIF creation timestamp of…
Create Date: 2013:07:03 18:56:15.26
That would be 6:56 PM on July 3, 2013, probably about two hours after the
SAIT team arrived at the deployment site.
So this photo represents the FIRST time the SAIT investigators were actually
‘on site’… and shortly after this photo was taken is when Brad asked the YCSO
detectives if they would ‘collect the remaining shelters and radios’… which
they did… and all of these things were entered into evidence back at YCSO
with evidence numbers 301-319 along with (quote) “other personal items
collected that day, July 3, numbered 401-407.”
I wonder if ‘other personal items’ included the MacKenzie camera… and this is
when it really did enter into evidence… or whether they still didn’t see that
camera that day?
6 DAYS after this is when the ‘Colored iPhone’ was finally found.
That was the one with the case that was ‘partially melted’ to the side of a
backpack and later identified as belonging to Clayton Whitted… since he
was the only one that had an iPhone with that kind of ‘colored case’.
If the ‘coloration’ they are talking about happens to be ‘pink’… then I believe the
published photo actually shows this ‘iPhone’ stuck to the side of a pack.
Look just to the right of where the foot of the SAIT investigator who is standing
meets the ground… right past what looks like another Bendix/King radio… and
just past some of the white material… a distinct PINK OBJECT is sticking out
of the material and it looks like it’s on the side of a backpack.
This looks very much like an iPhone with a pink casing.
Here is the exact text from McDormett’s YCSO Police report that covers
the same exact time this photo was taken…
On 7/3/13 I spoke to Jerry Payne (602-771-1416) who is a deputy state forester
with the Arizona State Forestry Division. Jerry advised that the state
investigation would be conducted by members of the state forestry divisions from
other states. He said the lead investigator would be a Brad Mayhew
(831-247-2811) and that Brad would contact me. I received a call from Brad and
he requested we meet at the Incident Command Center, which is located in Peeples
Valley. Brad wanted me to escort him to the scene. ET Waldock and I met the team
at 1615 hours. We went to the incident location, which was guarded by YCSO. The
investigative team took photographs and started their examination of the scene.
They were given a disk of the photos that YCSO had taken as well as a copy of
the FARO that was conducted on 7/1/13. Waldock also showed them the FARO results
on a laptop.
We were waiting for the state investigative team to give us the OK to collect
any remaining personal items when Brad asked me if we could collect the
remaining shelters and radios so they could inspect these items in a controlled
environment. I agreed as they did not have packaging materials, a feasible way
to transport or store the items, or a means to properly inventory the items. It
should be noted that the winds were very fierce at this time and created a
sandstorm affect that made it difficult to operate. Dep. Brian Kite, Waldock,
and I collected the remaining shelters and portable radios that we located at
the scene. These items are numbered #301-#319. Photos were taken from a
perspective that would hopefully show where these items were in conjunction with
where the individual remains had been. We then went back and collected the
remaining personal items that we could locate (#401-407). It was my
understanding that the fire department or designee would be collecting the
remaining items, including indistinguishable back packs, water bottles, axes,
remnants of chainsaws, etc. Photos were taken throughout the process. Refer to
photos and evidence submittal forms for further details. I contacted Lt. Boelts
and requested that YCSO guard the entrance to the incident location until all
items are removed from the scene. I was advised that this was going to be the
case.
( 6 DAYS later the other iPhone is found )…
On 07/09/13 I received the cellebrite information for item 326 (MacKenzie
phone). I made a copy of the information for YCSO as a backup and gave Randy
Okron with the state investigators team a copy. I was advised that another phone
was located at the scene during a final comb through by the fire department and
that phone had been melted to a backpack. There was apparently some coloration
left on the phone and the information I received was the only firefighter that
had a phone of that color was Clayton Whitted. I picked up the phone from PFD
the next day (7/10/13) and I assigned it number #324. The phone was an I Phone.
It should be noted that in the packaging for this phone were a number of nails
and eyelets that appeared to come from a boot or boots. I separated these from
the phone, placed them in their own package, and assigned these items number
325. I articulated in the evidence sheet that items 324 and 325 had been
packaged together.
YCSO Detective J. McDormett
WTKTT,
“Maybe Willis really does believe the words that come out of his mouth. Maybe he has to.”
Yes, I agree on both of those statements. In the media, public forum he was in, he kind of HAD TO defend the actions of his men. At least that”s what I’ve been told by others. That’s a tough one. I don’t necessarily agree with that. That really would be tough having to defend the fatal, foolhardy, illogical, against-all-training-and-conventional-wisdom actions of your men.
I think you have to somewhat admit that Willis was between the proverbial ‘rock and a hard spot.’ Ask yourself, what would you have said, in a public forum, to the world, about a couple of your leaders that are responsible for leading their Crew to their ultimate deaths? Think about it.
Agreed. If there actually WAS a conversation via either cell
or intra-crew frequency between Marsh and Willis just before
or during this infamous ‘discussing their options’ conversation…
…I’m pretty convinced it was just Willis making one of his
famous ‘suggestions’… and there was absolutely no discussion
of HOW they might get back to town.
Willis would, in fact, have simply just considered that minor
detail to be ‘their job’.
On that day… and at that TIME of day… with the fire blowing up
like a bomb… there most CERTAINLY should have been
detailed conversations between fire command and resources
in the field about EXACT routes that anyone was going to take
to do anything they might be being asked to do… but there’s
the rub. That’s just one more thing that SHOULD have happened
that day that simply didn’t.
If Willis ‘intervened’ at all… it was just ‘Can you get here?’.
HOW they were going to do that was up to them.
So THAT is what lets Willis sleep at night.
The choices they actually made that led to their death are
totally on THEM, in his mind, since even if he was ‘Mr.
motivator’ circa 4:00 PM… he still didn’t bother to discuss
their exact route with them. That was THEIR job.
Very sad.
yes, you’re right, someone, either ops able or ops musser or willis, should have gone up and took them by the hand and walked them off the hill… all those poor little lambs, lost on a hill in Yarnell. so so very sad.
you’re just on a witch hunt.
Calvin,
Yes I did. It was amazing how certain items faired well and others were toast.
RTS ( and Calvin )…
Did you see the ‘Notebook’ that the SAIT investigator has?
The SAIT investigator that is hunched over has a notebook tucked
under his right arm. If you zoom down it says this on the cover…
MEMORANDUM BOOK
Spiral Bound
50 Sheets
I wonder where that ‘notebook’ is now… and what information
it has in it? Were copies of pages from that notebook anywhere
to be found in the SAIT FOIA/FOIL release packages?
**
** THE DEPLOYMENT SITE PHOTO SHOWING
** SAIT INVESTIGATORS, CREW EQUIPMENT,
** AND AT LEAST SIX GM RADIOS
On December 21, 2013 at 3:44 pm Calvin asked
>> Question….. Does anyone have any thoughts on the latest deployment
>> site picture that was released here at IM (InvestigativeMedia) with
>> the last article?
Funny you should ask. I was just about to release some ‘analysis’ of
that photograph which is really quite extraordinary and kind of got
‘lost in the noise’ this week.
The photo was taken by SAIT investigator(s) July 3, 2013 late in the
evening ( 6:56 PM ).
It is obviously from the SAIT FOIA/FOIL package, and there are probably
many similar pictures.
It is an ultra-high-res photo taken with a high-end Canon Digital Camera
and there are tons of significant details revealed in just the one that
was published. See below.
>> Calvin also asked…
>> Does anyone know for certain which direction the picture is facing?
The Canon EOS REBEL T3i camera that was used to take this
photo had an EF-S 18-55mm f/3.5-5.6 IS II lems attached but
the photo itself was actually taken at the 55 mm setting.
The focus was set to DEEP field of view with Min: 5.6 m and Max: Infinity.
That creates sort of a ‘distortion’ effect for objects in the distance which
makes it a little hard to identify them.
That being said… it’s safe to say this photo was taken looking across the
deployment site from west to east… looking OUT of the canyon and
pretty much in the direction where they must have seen the fire coming
around the northern mound of that box canyon.
The camera lens and settings are ‘distorting’ the near-ground out beyond
the mouth of the canyon and making those ‘mid-range’ distance objects
appear closer than they really are… but the key is the ‘hazy’ mountain
range profile in the distance. That’s the configuration of the mountains
on the OTHER (east) side of Yarnell and Highway 89, as seen from
the box canyon.
>> Calvin also asked…
>> Does anyone know if the deployment site area was partially covered
>> in grass or was it all sand before the burn?
Satellite imagery from April 9, 2013 ( just 82 days before the tragedy )
show it as MOSTLY sand… with perhaps a light dusting of dead
bear grass… but nothing heavy.
What follows now is just some ‘interesting things’ that this
photograph shows…
** AT LEAST SEVEN PORTABLE RADIOS IN THE PHOTO
There are at least SEVEN portable radios visible in this photo, counting the
one that is attached to the rear belt of the SAIT investigator who is hunched
over and examining one of the loose shelters along with the other
(standing) investigator.
I’m only including that one because it’s the same kind of Bendix/King
with 16″ antenna extension that Steed was carrying, and this
radio is needed to help identify another on in the photo.
FIRST RADIO
Look straight down from the red clamshell battery extension on
the BK that the SAIT investigator has on his belt.
You will see another ‘slightly burned’ Bendix/King with the same
red clamshell attached.
This BK is a little discolored… but perfectly intact… and if you zoom WAY
down you can almost still read some writing on the back of it… so even though
this was obviously a GM radio that went through the burnover, it really wasn’t
damaged much at all.
What’s curious is that THIS BK doesn’t have a 16″ antenna extension… so that
couldn’t be Steeds. I believe Steed’s is on the ground over in the right-hand
side of the photo.
SECOND RADIO
So on to that right-hand side of the photo…
I believe Steeds Bendix/King that DOES have the 16″ antenna extension
he put on it himself is clearly visible there on the ground in the
right-hand-side-center of the photo. Again… look for the bright red
BK clamshell battery extension that Steed was also known to have
on his BK.
THIRD RADIO
There appears to be ANOTHER radio just to the left of Steed’s…
but is does NOT appear to be Bendix/King.
Looks more like a Motorola ‘hand-clutch’ type with that distinct
curvature in the grip.
FOURTH RADIO
Just about in the center of that ‘Motorla hand-clutch’ radio lying
on the ground… and almost touching it… is another Bendix/King.
You are looking at the TOP of it and the antenna is bent.
It appears to have a red clamshell extension but it also seems
to have been blackened by the fire.
FIFTH RADIO
This radio is a little harder to see… but it’s there.
Go back to the SAIT investigators on the left.
If you zoom down next to the FOOT of the one that is standing,
you will see that they are examining a ‘loose shelter’ in front
of them that also has a partially melted helmet clearly visible.
Just next to the visible back of one of the investigator’s hands
that is near the ground is the top half of another partially scorched
portable radio. It also looks like a Bendix/King, like the others,
but the investigator’s foot would be obscuring the red clamshell,
if it even had one. This one also does NOT have a 16″ antenna
extension like Steed’s did. It only has the standard BK antenna.
It might actually be that radio itself that is the focus of the SAIT
investigators attention as this moment captured in the photo.
They both appear to be ‘looking’ at it and one of them may
actually be ‘reaching’ for it at that moment.
SIXTH RADIO
The SIXTH radio is almost impossible to see but it’s also there.
Best way I can describe this with just words is as follows…
Zoom down again to the right foot of the SAIT investigator that is
standing next to the one that’s hunched over ( where you can
see the SIXTH radio location described above ).
Now let your eye move directly to the right away from his foot
and to the other end of the ‘loose’ shetler they are examining.
At the right side of that white shelter debris is a burned
pick-axe. Move your eyes a little more right to the end of the
handle of the burned pick-axe.
Now look straight up from the end of burned handle.
There is a burned Bendix/King with the top buttons facing you
lying in the light-colored ‘sandy’ area. The antenna is a little
bent and sticking out to the right from the top of radio.
No Bendix/King standard red clamshell is visible on that one but
it’s definitely the top-button style panel of a BK.
** SO GM HAD AT LEAST SEVEN PORTABLE
** RADIOS THAT DAY
Counting the SIX handhelds that can be seen lying on the ground
in the deployment site photo… plus the one that we know Brendan
McDonough had all day and left his lookout position with…
…that makes at least SEVEN portables radios used by GM that day,
and at least SEVEN sets of ears that would have heard ALL of
the ‘discussing their options’ conversation over the GM intra-crew
frequency.
** THIS IS A HIGH-RES PHOTO
This is a VERY high-res photo that John Dougherty posted ( even
though it looks small in the article ) and if you want the entire original
photo at its original (HUGE) size… just use your mouse, right click the
photo in his article, and then pick ‘Save image as’. You will get a HUGE
copy of the original photo and can easily see the things described above.
** MEMORANDUM BOOK
The SAIT investigator that is hunched over has a notebook tucked
under his right arm. If you zoom down it says this on the cover…
MEMORANDUM BOOK
Spiral Bound
50 Sheets
I wonder where that ‘notebook’ is now… and what information
it has in it? Were copies of pages from that notebook anywhere
to be found in the SAIT FOIA/FOIL release packages?
** OTHER THINGS?
I think I see a few other ‘significant’ things in this photo but I’m going to
need to ‘enhance’ even this high-res photo to be sure about that so
stay tuned on those.
** MORE THAN YOU (PROBABLY) WANTED TO KNOW
Just for the sake of completeness… Mr. Dougherty was smart enough to
not ‘edit’ this photo so the copy on his article still has all the original
JPEG metadata embedded in it.
So here is that ‘more than you probably wanted to know’ metadata
for future reference, and in case that photo ‘goes away’ online.
NOTE: This was a high-end Canon… but it did NOT have GPS location
embedded in the photograph. The high-end Canons all have that
capability but it has to be turned ON to get lat/long metadata.
From InvestigativeMedia Article…
http://www.investigativemedia.com/twelve-granite-mountain-hotshot-families-file-wrongful-death-claims-seeking-237-5-million/
Photo location…
http://www.investigativemedia.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Yarnell-03-July-042-copy.jpg
The photo was taken July 3, 2013 late in the evening ( 6:56 PM ).
The focus setting was SUPER depth of field from 5.27 to Infinity
so that’s creating a certain amount of ‘distortion’ with regards
to how close things in the distance actually appear.
The ‘short story’… from the JPEG metadata…
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NOTE to Mr. Dougherty…
Please delete the entire comment above.
It is ridiculously verbose and not necessary.
I will re-edit it and re-submit it with just the information
on where the radios are in the photo.
Thanks…. WTKTT
you? ridiculously verbose? no…..
Willis said this about Marsh with my EMPHASIS:
““He was WELL TRAINED, with 23 years of experience, and he had EVERY CLASS, BEYOND WHAT WAS REQUIRED, TO LEAD this group of individuals. He never faltered. I HAVE COMPLETE CONFIDENCE THAT HE KNEW EXACTLY WHAT WAS GOING ON SUNDAY EVENING [June 30th] AND THE BEST COURSE OF ACTION. That should NEVER be questioned,” Willis said. “He led (the crew) and they all agreed, THE LEADERSHIP WAS UNBELIEVABLE.”
It appears that we have a Boss with complete confidence in a well-trained leader who knew exactly what was going on June 30th AND the best course of action. And this should NEVER be questionned because their leadership was UNBELIEVABLE.
So, if I read this right, why are we delving into all this when the answer is clearly articulated right here? Aren’t we just wasting our time? But wait a minute. Lessons Learned? We don’t need to learn any more lessons, do we? That’s right, they did everything right but 19 firefighters died? Isn’t that what they call a non-sequitor, meaning it doesn’t follow?
Bendix King Radios
If anyone is interested. In the July 3rd photo of the 2 investigators, in the latest Lawsuit article above, I clearly identified at least six (6) and possibly a seventh B/K radio in the photo. And almost all of them appeared to be in pretty good shape considering the intense heat they withstood.
RTS… Do you see the blue Nalgene on the far right about 1/2 way up? It is hard to believe that the loop that holds the lid on the bottle hasn’t melted. AMAZING
This photo contains nothing but pure visual proof that
pretty much ALL smart/cell phones that might have
also been with this men must have all ‘survived’
enough for good data extraction.
Maybe some battery leads melted… but that is no big deal.
ACTIC extraction results.
Where are they?
This picture really doesn’t support the Moonscape appearance described by many after the fire. The pink flagging/tape/ribbon is actually being held up by existing tree/shrub trunks. WOW. The Blue Nalgene on the right side of screen (possibly Ashcraft”s) is very much intact, even the ring and loop that hold the lid in place. Actually, there are several Nalgene bottles visible.
There also appears to be numerous fuel containers without the lids. Thoughts on that?
If you also look closely at the tops of some
of the rock piles… you will clearly see
‘unburned vegetation’. This would match
Tex Gilligan’s statement that some of the
deer right in that area survived the same
fire storm there by climbing the rocks.
As for the fuel containers… I can only
imagine that when it was ‘do or die’
burnout-around-us time… that a lot
of the extra fuel was used and those
were empty containers that the men
dropped next to them. I certainly hope
they didn’t lay down with still-full
containers and when the liquid boiled
it blew the tops off.
The two fuel cans stacked on top of each other in the front left corner appear that they were still partially inside pack? I see the unburned area. I also see the old Jeep trail that connected Sesame and Boulder Springs, Right?
RTS… two minds of a single purpose.
I just posted a LONG post below about all the radios in
the photo and looks like you found all the ones that I did,
including the one by itself off in the sand.
See post below, however. I think I am seeing one non-BK
over next to Steed’s BK with the red clamshell and the
16″ antenna extension. Looks like one of the Motorola
‘hand-clutch’ things.
So counting the portable we KNOW Brendan had with him…
and the known fact that Willis was ‘monitoring’ that inra-crew
channel… that leaves at least EIGHT sets of ears that must
have heard all of the infamous ‘discussing their options’
conversation.
The crew knew what was up.
They knew why they were ‘moving’…
…but only TWO of those EIGHT sets of ears are alive to tell us
what everyone heard/knew before they left the safe black.
Willis and McDonough.
Reply to RTS post on December 21, 2013 at 8:39 pm
>> RTS said…
>> We don’t need to learn any more lessons, do we?
Maybe Willis really does believe the words that come out
of his mouth. Maybe he has to.
Maybe if he finally gets on a witness stand we will hear…
“Yes… I told them to get to Yarnell ASAP.”
“I figured they knew how to do that safely. That was their job.”
So he sleeps at night knowing that he never told anyone to
walk head-long into a wall of flames in broad daylight…
and that it wasn’t a ‘mistake’… it was an ‘accident’.
Mental gymnastics on his part.
**
** DARRELL WILLIS WAS ‘GROOMING’ ERIC MARSH
** TO BE HIS REPLACEMENT
Just another piece of ‘evidence’ in the mystery of how ‘close’ Eric Marsh
and Darrell Willis really were… even with the supposed ‘faking’ of a
certification and Marsh’s battle to get permanent employee benefits
for Andrew Ashcraft ( which was causing Marsh to lose sleep, according
to his wife, Amanda ).
There was another public interview just days after the fire when
Willis was describing what HE thought their ‘relationship’ was.
Willis said he was…
“…grooming Marsh to take over his position in the near future.”
So does anyone think that regardless of who had letters in front of their
names on June 30, 2013 in Yarnell… that when Willis (perhaps) called
Eric and made ‘suggestions’ of the ‘jump’ nature… that Marsh would
have found it VERY difficult to not ask ‘how high’?
Also… FWIW… note in Willis’ comments below his tendency to CLOSE
his public remarks with almost ‘preacher like’ blurbs.
At his public press conference at the deployment site his closing remark was…
“I just think God had a different plan for these men that day”.
In this public interview his closing remark is of the
“Peace that passeth all understanding” variety.
That’s really kind of odd.
Did Willis ever aspire to be a ‘preacher’, or something?
Full text of Willis’ comments about Marsh just days after the tragedy…
http://cvrnews.com/main.asp?SectionID=1&SubsectionID=1&ArticleID=57322
Willis said he lost 19 sons when the Hotshots died Sunday, and Eric Marsh, at 43, was the oldest one. He said he was grooming Marsh to take over his position in the near future.
“Our relationship went way beyond worker and and co-worker. It was friend,” he said.
Willis described Marsh as a tough leader but a considerate, kind and loyal man, in whom he had every confidence as the hotshot superintendent.
“He was well trained, with 23 years of experience, and he had every class, beyond what was required, to lead this group of individuals. He never faltered. I have complete confidence that he knew exactly what was going on Sunday evening and the best course of action. That should never be questioned,” Willis said. “He led (the crew) and they all agreed, the leadership there was unbelievable.”
Willis added, “My hope is that Amanda and the family, and Eric’s family, gets the peace that passes all understanding in this situation. I am so thankful for Eric.”
why does any of this surprise you?
marsh and willis worked together for quite a number of years… they built that crew together, they work (ed) for a small-ish FD in a tight knit community and were both very proud of their baby, GMIHC. AND they obviously seem to share some sort of religious beliefs.
technically speaking, marsh was working for either OSC Able or OSC Musser on the fire. if marsh had said to either one of them “we’re not comfortable crossing the green, we can’t help you” they both would have understood because they’ve both been around long enough to understand that situation. AND they would have defended marsh’s decision, NO MATTER HOW MANY HOMES BURNED DOWN. marsh and steed both knew that it was within their power, to refuse the assignment.
i do believe that GMIHC had some sort of mandate, SOP, or “order” that they were the structure protection gurus and as soon as someone said homes were imminently threatened, they tried to run in between… i bet that mindset, however ingrained, was further solidified after Doce Fire.
maybe chief willis “ordered” (in whatever capacity) the crew off the hill via cell phone. Maybe marsh and willis had some sort of telepathic connection… whatever. their SOP’s at Prescott FD are just that, THEIR SOP’s. and just like no federal IHC crew could get away with bible studies at work, no federal crews have SOP’s to defend structures at all costs or do whatever your Division Chief asks of you.
hopefully any other municipal Type 2IA crews striving for IHC status will take note…
have you looked in to the FS Foundational Doctrine? it has some good guidance, but only if manager’s and overhead buy into it and it certainly doesn’t cover any other agencies.
“21. Employees are expected and empowered to make reasonable and prudent decisions to accomplish the agency mission while minimizing exposure to hazards.”
Reply to xxfullsailxx post on Dec 21, 2013 at 9:52 pm
All good points and theories.
Nice to see you getting the hang of ‘leaping’ in this
discussion… instead of just criticizing the method.
Some of the ‘leaps’ made here since this discussion
began have now turned out to be absolutely true, and
I think that’s going to continue.
oh no, please don’t mis-understand, i am criticizing. it’s just that you only hear what is convenient to your current tail chasing.
I wanted to go back to what I said yesterday. Marsh and Able had several discussions on the cell phone. And yet Marsh did not call his OPS to discuss or notify him of the decision to move and where. Sounds strange to me, if radio traffic was to busy why would he not have used the phone. Who else was talking to him on the phone, why wasn’t this question asked or followed up on? There are some very loose threads here as an investigator I would have checked on, did any of the 60 investigators make note’s of this at all?
?? I just re-reviewed some of the interview notes for something else, and noticed where Able stated his last phone call with Marsh was the one in the morning, when Marsh was relaying about the heated discussion with Zulu regarding the break. Able said he thought all comms after that were by radio.
Sometimes, I have trouble remembering all of the info from the various sources seen , so is there something I’m forgetting about other sources that have related multiple phone calls between those two?
There is no direct evidence ( so far ) of the ‘other’ phone
calls from Marsh that Abel is obviously referring to.
I believe one of them was at either 11:36 or 11:45 AM
right after Rory Collins purposely dumped retardant
on GM’s indirect attack and forced Marsh to change
tactics. I believe that phone call is when Abel actually
made Marsh DIVS A and also gave him Blue Ridge.
A minute after that… Marsh is radioing Brian Frisby
and ‘suggesting’ he schlep all the way up to the
ridge ( with Trueheart ) for a ‘planning meeting’.
Were there even MORE cell calls from Marsh to
Abel? We don’t know.
All we really know is that Abel is admitting there were
multiple cell calls from Marsh… and that the LAST one
was the one that settled the DIVS Z argument and
assigned the division line to the old-grader location.
Finding/location/examining whatever cell phone Marsh
was using that day would obviously answer a lot of
these questions.
Reply to Bob Powers post on December 21, 2013 at 3:47 pm
The SAIR consolidated this mystery into one simple conclusion…
“Marsh believed he had already communicated his intent to move”.
The ADOSH investigators didn’t offer an ‘explanation’ at all…
but this crucial item was actually one of the ‘faults’ they found
with GM and part of the fine structure.
I think the lawyers for the defendants in the suits that have
been filed are going to go far beyond anything the SAIT
or ADOSH people did in solving this mystery.
The only reasonable explanation is that Marsh/Steed did not
WANT fire command to know exactly what they were doing,
or why. The reason for that ‘skulk mode’ decision is somewhere
in the same reason things changed from ‘we are committed
to the black’ to ‘we are moving south’ in less than 5 minutes.
Much more to come on this.
P89 SAIR says…..The estimated fire rate of spread near the deployment site was about 11 miles-per-hour. At this rate, the fire front would have travelled 100 yards in about 19 seconds. It takes a well-trained firefighter approximately 15 to 25 seconds to deploy a fire shelter from pulling the shelter PVC bag tear strip to fully deployed.
We know the video with the final radio transmissions has been manipulated (part missing after “we are in front of flaming front” approximately 25sec mark).
However, the “in front of the flaming font ” comment was made at ~16 seconds. Marsh reports preparing deployment site and getting ready to get in shelters at
~2:16 . That is full 120seconds. That would mean they actually saw the fire when it was 600 yards away, based on the SAIR and the reported 11mph travel rate.
I hope someone releases more of the video. I saw a brief clip on CNN last weekend (Saturday or Sunday early morning) that was different than the video by Wildfire Today. It was taken from a different location. Has anyone else saw that?
Question….. Does anyone have any thoughts on the latest deployment site picture that was released here at IM with the last article? Does anyone know for certain which direction the picture is facing? Does anyone know if the deployment site area was partially covered in grass or was it all sand before the burn?
Reply to Calvin post on December 21, 2013 at 3:44 pm
The distance from the center of the deployment site to
the very outer perimeter of the Boulder Springs Ranch was…
1900.58 feet
633.52 yards
Not only are you correct about how far away the fire had to
have been when they first saw it ( according to SAIR ROS
numbers )… they would have simply been watching the
Boulder Springs Ranch itself burn to the ground at that
moment.
BTW: At that same moment… the distance BEHIND them…
straight through the series of clearings that ‘lined up’ due
west of the deployment site and back up to the two-track
road was exactly…
1315.56 feet
438.52 yards
More about your other questions coming…
Clarification….. the Boulder Springs Ranch survived intact, entirely due to their previous defensible space efforts.
Roger that… but what I really meant above was
that from 600 yards away… it simply would have
APPEARED to be ‘burning down’ from the
perspective of the GM crew. They would not have
been able to distinguish a ‘burn around’ from a
‘burn over’ in progress at that distance and at
that time.
This is all moot. It didn’t happen.
Calvin was just pointing out how absurd the
original SAIR ROS numbers were at that
exact moment in time. Not possible.
Reply to Calvin post on December 21, 2013 at 3:44 pm
Calvin… see a longer post below that answers your questions
about the photo John Dougherty published with his article.
The SHORT story is…
The Canon EOS REBEL T3i camera that was used to take this
photo had an EF-S 18-55mm f/3.5-5.6 IS II lems attached but
the photo itself was actually taken at the 55 mm setting.
The focus was DEEP coverage and creates some distortion
for mid-range landscape features but this was definitely
just shot looking across the site back towards Yarnell and
about in the direction where they must have seen the fire
coming around the northern side of the canyon that day.
Also… there are SEVEN PORTABLE RADIOS in this picture,
and clear picture of an evidence notebook that one of the
SAIT investigators is carrying.
For the LONG STORY… See new post down below.
I’d like to add a bit of context, certainly NOT in defense of anyone, regarding the previously mentioned deference and respect that would be accorded Willis and Sciacca. It is well known that Sciacca has held every operational position from beginner hotshot, all the up to Type I Team IC, and Willis has been an Operations Section Chief on a Type II Team for several years, as well.
I bring this up, just to illuminate the fact that, when Willis showed up at the fire just before midnight and was assigned as a Structure Protection Specialist (equal to div sup), as an OSC on the CWZ Type 2 team, he either theoretically, or factually, was the most experienced operations person on the Yarnell fire until Able showed up at around 0600. I think that would cause any type IV or III IC to show deference to that level of experience, and under those circumstances, I would not think it unusual for Darrell to being advice that would be followed.
Of course. That’s just another part of the conundrum that is the
entire YHF. I’ve read the notes and the reports over and over now.
I’ve gone back and looked at the published incident logs and
the resource ordering, and compared them to the described
activities ( in the reports and notes ) of Shumate and Willis.
When Willis showed up at 11:30 PM June 29, 2013… he became
‘Co-Incident Commander’ with Shumate. I don’t care what the
‘official status’ ( Type 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6… ) was at that moment
in time… or who as an SPG or an OPS or a DIV or a FBAN
or any other alphabet soup… these 2 guys stayed up all night
ordering resources the for the next daytime work cycle.
It also appears ( and is documented ) that Darrell Willis did
a prety damn good job of assessing the structures in the
Model Creek and Peeples Valleys area. He was driving all
over that area in the fricking pitch-dark, making unit log
notes, consulting with Shumate, and a lot of other things.
So it’s not like he ( Willis ) just showed up, went on the
clock, and then just put his feet up somewhere drinking
coffee. His activities overnight are pretty well documented
and the guy was obviously doing a lot of ‘prep’ work for
the coming day.
That doesn’t mean there aren’t ‘mysteries’… however.
Example: His unit log notes show that his professional
evaluation of the Double Bar A Ranch was ‘negative’.
Not worth saving or spending time on. Too much tall
brush, too close to the structures. Yet… around
10 AM next morning… enormous resources ( 30+ men )
are being assigned to ‘save the ranch’. That’s a mystery.
The Double Bar A Ranch exchanged hands in a documented
real estate transaction in 2009 for about 1.5 million… but
it was a ‘brokered’ deal and I have been unable to find out
who the ‘buyer’ was.
When Granite Mountain was ‘ordered up’ and they were
originally listed as ‘not available’… and that resource
request was ‘kicked back’ to the State people… it is still
unclear who called who on the telephone.
Brendan McDonough was sitting in a bar in Prescott with
two other GM Hotshots at around 9:00 PM on Saturday
night and they were already discussing the ’emails’ they
had already received and what the job was down in Yarnell.
That means Willis was still in Prescott when this ‘back
channel resource order’ for GM came through.
So how did that really go down?
Did Shumate just call Willis and at the same time he told
him he was hired for Yarnell ask Willis to call Eric Marsh
and get GM down there as well… and did Willis then
call Marsh circa 8:30 PM and ‘suggest’ he get that
dog-tired crew down to Yarnell?
Still a BIG mystery that neither SAIT or ADOSH thought
it was relevant to look into.
I think the lawyers for the defendants in the recently filed suits
are going to have a different opinion about the ‘relevance’
of those events on Saturday night.
Mr Powers, RTS said….Even a Type 2 ‘Short Team’ is still a Type 2 IMT, so pretty sure they’re NOT interchangeable. I know Joki used to be a Type 2 IC.
He posted this last night in a response to a question from me. So I believe he is saying, Hall and Joki are not qualified Type 2 fire commanders, Right?
The way SWCC had them listed this year, it looked like they could respond either as a Type III Team, a Type II Short Team, or a Type II Long Team. It stands to reason, if they were all Type II qualified, any or all of them could have filled-out a Type III Team if called upon.
See the slight correction on ‘long team’ below.
Agree
TTWARE… RTS said….….Even a Type 2 ‘Short Team’ is still a Type 2 IMT, so pretty sure they’re NOT interchangeable. I know Joki used to be a Type 2 IC
I also only see where Hall/Joki are listed as Type3.
For most of the year, they were listed in SWCC as a Type II Team in one form or another, as well as Type III.
RTS Said on 12/20….Hall and Joki status
According to the SWCC website, both Hall and Joki are/were Type 3 IMT IC’s
This information is all I have found at link provided by RTS. Please provide a link or a reference
Read for yourself:
http://gacc.nifc.gov/swcc/dispatch_logistics/crews/sit300/sit300.htm
The way SWCC had them listed this year, it looked like they could respond either as a Type III Team, a Type II Short Team, and if I remember correctly, for a while earlier in the year, a Type II Long Team. It stands to reason, if they were all Type II qualified (short or long), any, or all of them, could have filled-out a Type III Team if called upon.
The State Dispatch assigned them to the Fire. They are the ones who have a list of qualifications and certifications. Were they qualified? I do not remember if the 2 Investigations listed qualifications of the over head. They should have as that is a part of the story of what happened. I would assume those qualifications are available from the State on request.
Calvin — I was going with the investigation report that a type 2 team took over the fire around noon the 30th. The North canyon fire the IC immediately closed the fatality area off and called in a fatality fire investigation team. This should be SOP on all wild land fatality fires. This would secure all the info including radio and cell phone info. (cell phones seem to be used quite a bite any more) They should be part of the fire investigation, in this case they weren’t. The local Sheriff was not prepared for this type of incident, nor any background knowledge. This should be part of IC team training.
Is this an accurate statement…. Roy Hall and Glen Joki’s Type 3 IMT IC took control of the Yarnell Hill Fire June 30 around 1022.
That would be my understanding. Were they type 2 short team qualified? I do not know, The State seemed to appoint whom ever they had on there qualifications list. The would have had red carded info in there dispatch office to assign a team based on decisions made at the State level. Did the investigation’s identify the qualifications of the overhead? They should have science every body acted within there authority (being snarky).
what can I say, you are probably right
BUT…FYI, To make things even more confusing (for me at least), if I was assigned to look for a smoking gun, Roy Hall’s hands would be the last place I would think to check.
IF my memory serves me correctly…Roy Hall is a highly respected and nationally recognized, and qualified Type I Incident Commander with decades of experience at every level, on every kind of fire, who can rightfully take credit for controlling some of this nation’s worst wildfires and who is retired from the U.S. Forest Service and is only doing short term “contract” work (by the fire) for Arizona State Forestry.
I would not expect to find a POWER VACUM within five miles of where Roy Hall is standing.
Unless you don’t have the private frequencies for a unit in
the field and you also don’t have their cell phone numbers.
BIG DOGS don’t like other BIG DOGS… and that’s why
iPhones were invented.
You guys are getting closerr to the WHO in this tragedy, I believe.
FYI, I should have said that Darrell Willis and Tony Sciacca would assume or take authority in a POWER VACUM (they are good soldiers), like there was on that aberration of a Class A Cluster **** the Yarnell Hill Fire!
To all of you John Q. Publics out there…almost all wildfires are fought by highly professional, highly trained, highly competent, very experienced and extremely dedicated wildland firefighters, who can do, and have done, amazing things for decades now to protect you, your family, your Wildland Urban Interface interests and your forests etc..
You only hear about the really bad ones…the Loop Fire, the South Canyon Fire, the Battlement Creek Fire, the Thirty Mile Fire, the Mann Gulch Fire, etc. Check out all of the bad ones here… http://www.fireleadership.gov/toolbox/staffride/library_staff_ride10.html
Q: What does a BIG DOG eat?
A: Anything he wants
Q: Mr. Willis, did you have any communications with Marsh?
A: I wasn’t REALLY involved with what they were doing.
what can I say, you are (probably) right
SOMETHING got us from ‘we are committed to
the black’ to ‘we are moving south’ in the course
of only 5 minutes.
Did the BIG DOG bark all the way from up
at the Model Creek School ICP?
Stay tuned.
well…you probably remember that has been my favorite tune to play ever since I talked to John Dougherty for the very first time. All of my experience tells me that is what it would have taken to get those boys out of the black and down that chute ASAP, in spite of my disagreements with xxfullsailxx on the subject, who by the way, really does seem to know what he is talking about, even if he is abrasive.
AND…I consider what I have been posting as FYI’s and not true comments, which I have stated numerous times I am not qualified to make, it makes my head hurt too much.
BUT…it really surprised me at how close WTKTT came to “the truth” in some of his most recent comments. There are always two pay grades at work fighting fire. There is the “job description” and pay grade a wildland firefighter will have in his/her day job…say that is a “Landscape Architect” and yes…the USFS really has people who do that (they make sure Mr. and Mrs. John Q. Public see beautiful trees while they drive their car on a road through the national forests and NOT tree stumps, logging slash, controlled burns, and large destructive machinery that provides America with CHEAP lumber at Home Depot). And that person would probably be a GS-11 or what would be considered a mid-level employee/manager at their day jobs.
But…when that same person goes on a fire assignment (there are really very few full-time “firefighters” who work for the federal government, a large percentage come from other disciples, who are also firefighters when called upon to do so…or they want to get out of their regular boring jobs and make a bucketful of extra money in overtime, hazard pay, night time differential, holiday pay, etc., while on a fire assignment) they will be suddenly transformed into a lowly grunt (crewman) on a Type 3 or 4 hand crew…or suddenly transformed into a General Command Staff Officer (or one of many, many kinds of other jobs not even on the fire line, finance, logistics, supply, transportation, public affairs etc.,) depending on who they are, what their experience level is, and the type of training they have had, or what they used to do before they buckled down and got a “real” job instead of chasing smoke while working their way through college.
So…the bottom line is this…Darrell Willis and Tony Sciacca are mid-level managers at their day jobs, BUT…whenever Darrell Willis or Tony Sciacca go on a wildfire assignment, certainly anywhere in Yavapai County, (and in Tony’s case maybe even the nation and certainly in Region 3) regardless of what job assignment they actually have, both of them are given the deference and respect and may even be given or assume (take)…the authority of Four Star Generals. Or let me say this another way…anywhere in the Prescott area and beyond, Darrell and Tony ARE THE BIG DOGS! WOOF!
WTKTT said “Example: Don’t you think it’s strange that, at the public press conference at the deployment site, Willis used the phrase “I wasn’t REALLY involved with what they (GM) were doing.”
Really?
Why even use that word?
It’s suspicious.
What that means is that he WAS
‘involved’… but only sorta-kinda.
If he wasn’t involved at all he would
have just said…
“I wasn’t involved with what they were doing.”
There would be on REALLY in there.
Anyway… the list goes on and on.”
Those who work in the field of law enforcement would call the use of that kind of word in that context a “qualifier” and is usually an indicator that the subject is being deceptive or what is commonly called LYING HIS ASS OFF!
WTKTT said “Anyway… the list goes on and on.
I actually shudder to think how
MUCH Darrell Willis might have had
to do with this entire Yarnell Hill
Fire… from soup to nuts.
He had that kind of personality to be throwing his weight around all over the place. You can hear it in his radio transmissions captured in the Globe Type II Crew videos.
So yea… I am not surprised at all that Darrell Willis is named in the suits. He is a KEY player in everything that happened with the Yarnell Hill Fire.”
I don’t think you have any idea how right you are. Let’s just say I will not go back to Prescott any time soon without an armed body guard.
See BIG DOG discussions above, Gary.
I am glad you reconsidered ‘avoiding this whole
circular conversation’.
I hate to tell you this.. ( and something tells me you already
know this )… but we are basically just getting started.
There’s a lot more to come.
I’m back on my meds now and I feel better, thank you.
Here’s a link for the July 1, 2013 Incident Action Plan (IAP) that lists all the Division assignements for that day.
http://www.azsf.az.gov/system/files/documents/files/Yarnell%20Hill%20IAP%207_1_2013.pdf
You’ll notice it was completed and approved at 2400 (midnight) June 30th.
Interestingly, Beery was assigned as STGS AND ALSO as DIV F. Not uncommon, but definitely not common either, even though when you parse out the double negative it basically says the same thing. As the STPS he was assigned six (6) Type 6 Engines and two Water Tenders. Their assignments were to “Identify structures needing protection, mop up around structures, and maintain sprinkler systems. Special instructions were to Identify destroyed or damaged structures.” As DIVS F, Berry was assigned the Lewis Type 2 Inmate Crew and their assignments were to “Identify structures needing protection, mop up around structures, and maintain sprinkler systems. Special instructions were to Identify destroyed or damaged structures.
Calvin,
Here’s the SWCC website for the IMT’s so you can research some yourself.
http://gacc.nifc.gov/swcc/dispatch_logistics/overhead/overhead.htm
Even a Type 2 ‘Short Team’ is still a Type 2 IMT, so pretty sure they’re NOT interchangeable. I know Joki used to be a Type 2 IC.
“If Mr Berry reports directly to OPS as he is DIV F, would Willis the SPGS report to DIV F, or OPS?” SPGS reports to OPS (or Branch Director) and works with and then advises DIVS.
WTKTT,
Not really a big deal on Beery’s lack of investigation notes. Some of it could be Beery just laying low, under the radar so-to-speak. Some of it most definitely the SAIT and their ‘selective interviews’ to build on their foregone ‘Established Conclusions.’
Roger that. It just honestly sounds like he sat in a room at the
Model Creek School all day by himself and just went outside
every now and then to look at the sky and run his ‘Rainy Day’
APP on his iPhone.
For a ‘Division Supervisor’ on a VERY active ( and dangerous )
fire… that sounds a little thin on the actual ‘interaction’ scale.
It does kinda look that way. I could only find documented evidence of what resources he had and their instructions for July 1 in the IAP below.
Although, I will say that Beery is NO slacker, and he has quite a bit of WFF experience as a DIVS. So, he would have and should have been ‘interacting’ with whatever resources he was assigned on June 30th.
I am NOT questioning either his ‘expertise’ or his
possible contribution to the effort up at the Model
Creek School ICP that day.
The Yarnell Investigation Notes ( YIN ) do, in fact,
report him saying lots of ‘smart things’ during
his interview. That’s fine. I’m glad he’s ‘smart’.
I want to know WHO he was talking to that day,
and WHO was talking to HIM… and WHAT
was being said. That information is totally lacking
from two highly-paid taxpayer-funded investigations
into this incident.
Regarding Jim Cook’s Times News statement misquoted:
The Times News ‘correction’ will read as follows:
“A statement in the Dec. 15 report “What Happened in Yarnell, Arizona?” misstated information from Jim Cook, a 37-year wildfires veteran who now is retired. Eric Marsh, crew superintendent of the Granite Mountain Hotshots, was trained to be a division supervisor. Cook’s remarks were intended to point to the lack of advanced-level training for firefighters from many agencies. The Times-News regrets the error.”
Yes… but I think the following question has been asked by any
number of people but never answered…
Was this the actual FIRST TIME that Eric Marsh was
functioning as a ‘Division Supervisor’ for ANY fire?
Does ANYONE know?
I have searched and searched online and I can find no public
evidence of his name ever appearing on any fire roster
as a ‘Division Supervisor’.
WTKTT,
Don’t know if it was his first DIVS assignment. If he had worked as a DIVS on Type 3 assignments, it most likely wouldn’t be ‘publicly’ documented unless the IMT posted their IAP’s online. Otherwise, those records would most likely show up in their personnel files and/or training/experience records.
I’ve become quite the expert at looking up public
IAPs and resource assignment lists that are
required to be made public… and that’s where
I don’t see Eric Marsh showing up anywhere,
anytime as a ‘Division Supervisor’.
That’s all I can do. If it ever REALLY happened
before… then AFAICT it would have been a
real ‘off the reservation’ sort of thing.
You WFF guys seem to forget.
You are ‘public servants’.
Everything you do is being ‘recorded’ and
is supposed to be ‘public information’.
That’s the deal when you take the ‘job’.
Robb Berry said interview….He remembered that Eric Marsh (supervisor for Granite) was the division supervisor for Zulu. (p4 YIN) The immediate sentence before is referencing to the Doce Fire. I think he is saying Marsh was Div Z at Doce. Was Doce a Type1 fire?
Reply to Calvin post on Dec 21, 2013 at 12:02 pm
>> calvin asked…
>>. Was Doce a Type1 fire?
Yes ( eventually ).
Tony Sciacca himself became the Type 1 IC for it
and the command level was ‘populated’ with
Prescott area people.
I can’t find any actual published IAPs or resource
lists for the Doce fire… but there is some
evidence that Marsh had SOME kind of
command position at Doce other than
GMIHCS.
It looks like Sciacca was IC, and he had
TWO DIVS under his command…
Jerry Anderson ( DIVS A ? )
Eric Marsh ( DIVS Z ? )
Can anyone CONFIRM this?
If it’s true… was THAT the first time Marsh was
ever a functional DIVS? That was only a week
or two before Yarnell.
From…
http://www.dcourier.com/m/Articles.aspx?ArticleID=120619
The IC on the Doce fire was Tony Sciacca.
Sciacca, a retired Prescott National Forest fire manager who also runs the Arizona Wildfire Academy here, ran the operations section with the help of Eric Marsh and Jerry Anderson.
Sciacca’s Type I team just happened to be next on the rotation, so it was assigned to arrive on the Doce fire the second day of June 19. He and many of his team members happened to be from the Prescott area.
The local Type III team members including Bentley already had built an incident action plan, and that really sped up the transition to the Type I team, Sciacca said. Instead of taking 1-2 days for the transition, it took just 12 hours.
“That was way huge” in getting more resources mobilized quickly to save homes, he said.
Reply to RTS post on December 20, 2013 at 7:05 pm
RTS… Thank you!
All great information.
Re: Rob Berry – DIVS F at YHF
The Yarnell Investigation Notes ( YIN ) for Berry span two pages ( 4 and 5 ).
At NO time in those notes is Darrell Willis ever mentioned, or that Berry
ever had ANY contact with him at ANY time.
The notes never say when Berry actually ‘arrived’ that day, but they do say…
he “observed south winds most of the morning” so he was definitely
there for most/all of the day and on into the night. ( There are nighttime
activity notes from him on June 30 ).
So it is surprising to learn he was there ‘early on’… but his name is
featured so little in any report or published document… and the notes
do not document who he was ever communicating with that day.
Actually… to tell you the truth… there isn’t much evidence in the notes
that this guy was doing much of anything all day other than the fact that
he was there clocking hours. There are a lot of ‘observations of weather’
noted but never any descriptions of interaction with anyone else there,
and certainly no indication he was ever ‘advising’ anyone, or being
‘advised’ himself in any way.
The only NAME mentioned in the Berry notes ( other than his ) is
Eric Marsh… and Berry says he was DIVS Z ( Zulu ) and NOT DIVS A…
Direct quote from the Rob Berry interview…
14. He remembered that Eric Marsh (supervisor for Granite) was the division supervisor for Zulu.
RTS thanks, Question. Can you elaborate on the Hall/Joki type 3 command? Is It appropriate for them to run a Type 2 Short IMT? Also. If Mr Berry reports directly to OPS as he is DIV F, would Willis the SPGS report to DIV F, or OPS?
Several things here:
Sciacca’s comment about chaparral burning downhill. When chaparral or any fuel type burns downhill, it is ALWAYS an indication of INTENSE FIRE BEHAVIOR! In the case of the YHF, there was significant wind influence fron the outflow winds, and that was what was driving the fire behavior that day once they had manifested themselves. Full Sail’s experienced comment that ” in light fuels WIND ALWAYS OVERRIDES SLOPE” is spot on except for the fact that I would not consider the chaparral that day to be ‘light fuels.’ What with the VOLATILE fuel type, HEAVY fuel loading, and LOW fuel moisture that day, this fire rocked with very rapid Rate(s) of Spread (ROS). In an earlier discussion, some of you were questionning the 12 mph ROS as not being accurate. Fires PULSE and usually only in foehn-type winds do these consistenly maintain their ROS.
Jim Cook comment regarding Martsh not be qualified as a DIVS. I went to the source and asked him. He said the Editor(s) misunderstood the statement he made regarding some Agencies, Departments not following certain policy and/or protocol regarding training and qualifications. He said the publication was going to publish a CORRECTION regarding the article.
DIVS F Robb Beery would work directly for OPS. I would hope that Beery was giving advice and counsel to SPGS Willis throughout the fire. And that SPGS Willis would seek advice and counsel from Beery.
Hall and Joki status
According to the SWCC website, both Hall and Joki are/were Type 3 IMT IC’s.
RJjumper’s comment on HS not being structure.
We teach in the NWCG S-215 Wildland Urban Interface course to utilize HS Crews for that very purpose. Fulll Sail gives the details quite accurately. We have been on many WUI fires doing structure protection, AND if it wasn’t for that being the case on MOST WUI fires, whole towns would have burned if it wasn’t for their actions.
Chaparral in extreme fire conditions is an interesting thing. For purposes of wind, it’s not solely a fine fuel (though much of the branches by themselves are, as is the grass component), and burns much hotter, but fire can spread as if through fine or light fuels.
In terms of any given local area, in terms of Sciacca’s initial comments, because chaparral generally is cleared out by infrequent hot fires, it’s true that many local areas may not have seen that kind of fire for a few decades. In terms of living in a chaparral ecosystem, one area where people can do better is understanding that those occasional hot fires are inevitable and therefore homeowners need to be responsible for having sufficient defensible space around their residence. Southern California has probably been more proactive in this regard than elsewhere in the Southwest with chaparral.
WTKTT said….…and before anyone jumps on what appears to be Sciacca
being told Willis was a ‘Division Chief’ on the fire itself ( which is
what I did for a second )… I am sure what that really means
there is that Sciacca works for Prescott Fire… and Darell Willis
is officially ‘Wildland Division Chief’ back in Prescott… so I’m
sure that’s all Sciacca meant when he referred to Willis as
a ‘Division Chief’. He just meant ‘Wildland Division Chief in Prescott’.
Kinda funny you brought up CONFUSION about what role Chief Willis was playing June 30 after (yet another misstep) by the PFD last week when they (mistakenly) reported that Willis was OPS after 1020. Thanks to Pete Wertheim for the correction!
But I am now wanting to know more about Mr. Robb Berry….. (p4) YIN(lol) says….. Robb was the division supervisor for Foxtrot on June 30th.
Well the Type 2 short roster says Rob Berry was actually SPGS.
So it brings up the point of who Willis was reporting to and when? Was Chief Willis reporting to Berry or Able or Hall? Or someone else?
See my comment from above, Darrell Willis would have reported (or not reported) to anyone he felt like.
Exactly. BIG DOG does what he wants.
If we are to ever discover Darell Willis’ complete involvement
with what happened that day… then someone has to put
the whistle on the BIG DOG and tell him to ‘speak’.
He’s just that kind of guy… and it was just that kind
of circumstances that weekend.
Since I don’t remember seeing any thing on cell phone information in either of the 2 investigations. I am concerned that no follow-up investigation on the cell phone calls to and from key players in this drama have been done. I would seriously doubt that YCSO did much at all. This is where it is critical to assign a fire fatality investigation team immediately. Another failure of the type 2 team on this fire.
Mr Powers… You say another failure by this type 2 team. Question: From the information I have found, Hall/Joki were
type 3 Incident commanders. Can anyone confirm or deny this?
Well.. as it turns out… unless the YCSO had some PCRTB
( Probable Cause / Reason To Believe ) criteria related to
a possible ‘criminal’ charge… current privacy laws would
have actually made it difficult for them to even ‘request’
any network cell records.
As we all know now ( thanks to Mr. Edward Snowden ), the
NSA and other federal agencies ( believe me.. it ain’t just
the NSA ) can get any damn thing they want any time they
want…
…but it is still ‘not true’ for the ‘middle men’ like local law
enforcement or even SBIs ( State Bureau of Investigations ).
The FEDS can get anything they want, anytime they want…
but they still make the local yocals jump through hoops
like PCRTB and search warrants and all that antiquated crap.
So unless YCSO found some evidence of the generic
‘foul play’ scenario ( which is actually just a check-box
on the cell network information request forms )… they
would have had a hard time even ‘asking’ for cell records.
Trust me on this.
Reply to Calvin post on December 20, 2013 at 12:13 pm
>> Calvin wrote…
>>
>> Tony Sciacca said…..I was only on scene 2 hours. I got a
>> call from Peyson dispatch at 13:55 for a Safety Officer.
>> Arrived at the middle school 50-55 minutes later and tied in
>> with RH and Paul Musser there. Divison Chief, Daryl Willis
>> painted the picture about what was going on. P51 Yarnell
>> Interview Notes (YIN)
>>
>> WTKTT….. It seems like Chief Willis is still playing Co-IC later in the day.
Yep… sure does.
I think Willis and Shumate treated is as ‘their fire’ all night long before
the morning of June 30 when they worked out ‘together’ what resources
would be needed for June 30 daytime and even did the ‘ordering’ together.
This is documented to be true.
Then Shumate totally burned out by morning and messed up ALL of
the briefings… and then Roy Hall shows up clueless.
I think Willis was jumping in there all over the place thinking he had
to ‘pick up the slack’ even though he’d been up all night and was
dog-tired himself. Shumate was useless by then and Hall was
clueless. What else was there to do?
…and before anyone jumps on what appears to be Sciacca
being told Willis was a ‘Division Chief’ on the fire itself ( which is
what I did for a second )… I am sure what that really means
there is that Sciacca works for Prescott Fire… and Darell Willis
is officially ‘Wildland Division Chief’ back in Prescott… so I’m
sure that’s all Sciacca meant when he referred to Willis as
a ‘Division Chief’. He just meant ‘Wildland Division Chief in Prescott’.
We’ve got evidence showing that Willis might have been bouncing
back and forth between OPS and SPG titles all day… but we don’t
need the additional weirdness of him suddenly being identified
as a ‘Division SUP’ or anything. I don’t think that ever happened.
If it actually ever DOES… I just wonder what ‘Division’ Willis
would have been assigned?…
Perhaps the “Everyone here is either dog toasted or clueless so
I’m in charge of everything now” division.
My FYI from above also applies here, fyi, he (Tony Sciacca) is a retired USFS Fire Management (Thumb Butte District ?) Officer for the Prescott National Forest and was the Prescott Hotshot Crew Boss back in my day. And he is highly respected at the national level as an IC and for his wildland fire experience all across the country. Darrell Willis and Tony Sciacca go way back as Willis is the retired Prescott Fire Department Chief who retired and was rehired in his current position.
I guess what I am also saying is you should not be at all surprised that Darrell Willis would have been making decisions far above his fire title and taking charge of whatever he wanted to given his background and status in the fire community anywhere in Yavapai County. He was/is the BIG DOG as is Tony Sciacca! And it is a pretty tight and exclusive club that are both founding members of.
Thank you, Gary. I know you said you were sick and
tired of what you perceive to be a ‘circular discussion’,
but as you just showed above you can still ‘nail it to
the wall from your living room’ so please consider
not giving up on this discussion.
I have almost used the phrase ‘BIG DOG’ a few times
myself when trying to just put Darrell Willis’ involvement
in this thing into some kind of perspective.
Again.. I am NOT a ‘firefighter’… but I can assure there
are times when I have been ‘up all night’ prepping a
situation with whatever other poor slobs were staying
up all night with me… only to have ‘more people’
arriving the next morning to ‘jump into the pool’.
At a certain point… you can take all the ‘structure’ and
the ‘job titles’ and throw them out the window.
There are time ( like this one? ) when no matter what
your title is… you MUST listen to the people who have
been ‘up all night’ and have been there before you
getting a ‘handle on this thing’.
There have been times I’ve been in the ‘late train’
myself and shown up facing the other fellas who
have been ‘up all night’ handling a situation.
You have to enter that scenario sometimes and just
say… “I don’t give a damn who anyone thinks they
are… who the hell knows what’s going on here?”
That’s the BIG DOG scenario.
I think that came into play in Yarnell on June 30, and
Willis simply was a ‘GO TO’ guy for a lot of people
just because he ‘knew what was going on’.
All that being said… I still think we need to learn more
details about his ACTUAL involvement and his
ACTUAL communications with everyone that day.
There is still the mystery he created himself during
that first press conference from the deployment site
when he ( slipped? ) said “WE heard they were
headed in a southerly direction.”
That contradicts everything the SAIR tried to establish
about what the ‘command’ level heard that afternoon.
We also know more know about where Willis actually
WAS when he might have heard this ‘heading south’
information over the GM private channel.
It really looks like he had already left the Double Bar
A Ranch area ( it was already a goner by then ) and
he was simply back at the ‘command post’ at the
Model Creek School.
Well… if that’s the case… then if Willis heard the
‘discussing their options’ traffic and the ‘heading
south’ information he alluded to at the press
conference…
…then everyone else at the command center must
have heard it too.
So it still all comes down to what Willis meant by…
“WE heard they were heading south.”
Who is WE?
Everyone around him that day during the infamous
‘discussing their options’ conversation?…
…or was it a slip with him recalling private conversations
with McDonough after the incident when they both
admitted to each other they heard the whole
‘discussing their options’ thing… and WE just means
“Me and McDonough”.
Like I said below, I am back on my meds now and I feel better thank you. Actually, I sometimes have an anger management problem and if I spend too long thinking about the Yarnell Hill Fire, it comes out, such as it did with my rant against xxfullsailxx above.
I mean, how could anyone who has seen the video and the stills from that Goddamn fire, and I really mean God should damn that fire, think a father (Eric Marsh) could take his beloved children (the Granite Mountain Hotshots) into the path of that thing is beyond me, unless someone who they could not say “no” to asked them to do.
And no xxfullsailxx, I am not talking about, “I order you under penalty of the loss of your job and benefits if you don’t obey my order.” I am talking about 2 men who had a father and son relationship and the father asked the son to do something the son really did not want to do (I could feel this coming, what is your comfort level etc.) but he was conditioned to do the best job he possibly could and wanted to please his father figure and his mentor.
Unfortunately, his gut reaction, “Hell No!” was overridden by his desire to please the boss, we all have it, or at least anyone who is successful at whatever work they do, has it.
AND I default back to Dr. Ted Putnam in the “Collapse of Decision Making On storm King Mountain”, neither Eric Marsh nor Jesse Steed was able to accurately judge just how dangerous their maneuver was under the circumstances.
And I want to further reiterate one other point, there is nothing wrong with Willis asking Marsh to take his crew to Yarnell. It was ultimately Marsh’s and Steed’s responsibility to ensure the safety of their crew (as others have said). The problem comes in when that act was lied about (in my opinion). And that problem is not even a legal one, he wasn’t under oath.
The alarm bells did not start going on inside my head until I listened to every word Willis said out at the deployment site several times. Nothing he said made any sense to me.
Like I said in an earlier comment, Willis should have been home staring at the wall in a semi-catatonic state mumbling to himself, that is where I would have been, not out at the deployment site or down on the football field before a game rolling in it.
Gary… it is impossible to ignore your
common-sense arguments on this
point. I believe you are ‘nailing’ it.
SOMETHING had to have happened
in the course of 5 minutes for a man
who was 43 years old and childless
himself and who thought enough
of those boys to say “Hell NO!” to
one man asking him to put them
in danger… to only minutes later
sounding VERY concerned about
something (perhaps) another
man ( Willis ) asked him to do…
…and we go from “Hell NO” to
“Gaggle UP!” in just 5 minutes.
Another point: I have listened to
the MacKenzie video/audio over
and over. Regarding Steed… it
really sounds like he could not
have cared less. He just sounds
hot, tired, frustrated… wants the
day to officially end. I get no
feeling from the tone in his voice
that saw or felt the need to go
anywhere or DO anything else
that day.
So it may just come down to
this ‘father/son’ thing between
Marsh and Willis.
So the discussion and statement by OPS1 Able that he talked with Marsh on the Cell Phone then blows the theory that the radio traffic was to busy for Marsh to notify OPS1 Able of his decision to move the crew and where they would head. He could have called OPS on a CELL PHONE and had that option the whole time as well as talking to any one else. There has to be phone records out there as to who called Marsh and when. Even if the phone was destroyed. The investigation should have got those records, if not the Law suit needs to get them.
There is still no evidence that ANY of the phones were even
near ‘destroyed’. In fact… all the (known) evidence is exactly
the opposite.
Sure… the battery leads melted on a few of them… but that
in no way means they were ‘destroyed’… they just wouldn’t
‘turn on’ so the YCSO detective couldn’t just ‘scrape’ the
phone in-house with the standard Cellebrite software.
TWO of the phones were documented in YCSO report as
defintely being ‘fully functional’ and able to ‘power up’… but
they were simply password-protected iPhones and the
YCSO fellas didn’t have the expetise to bypass the
sign-on screen… so they were sent to ACTIC ( Arizona
Counter Terrorism Information Center ).
If Marsh didn’t have his own cell phone… then he MUST have
had to borrow someone else’s… and MULTIPLE times…
because the Yarnell Interview Notes ( YIN ) say that Todd
Abel recalls having MULTIPLE cell phone calls from Marsh
that day.
So phones themselves ( call history ) or actual network
cell phone records… either will do.
I do o not put a lot of weight behind the Outside magazine article.
I feel it was mote sensationalized than the other documented publications.
Jist my opinion
I agree
Agree as well.
Mr. Dickman was obviously writing for his audience and it
wasn’t straight journalism… but I still think there are important
things being ( how shall I say? ) ‘expressed’ about these men
and that day that haven’t appeared anywhere else.
Example: The Dickman article says…
“Eric had been sober for about 13 years. Coffee was his
only drug now… and he took it black.”
That’s a pretty big revelation to ‘put out there’ unless Mr.
Dickman has some facts to back it up… so I am going
to give him the benefit of the doubt and call that a
‘true’ statement, unless someone says otherwise.
Ditto for some other things such as descriptions from
McDonough about what the ‘crew culture’ was really
like. Tight Military discipline ( Drop and give me 100 )
combined with a heavy ‘we build real men’ kind of
nuturing thing going on… and also combine all that
with a HEAVY religious component.
I have no reason to doubt that is the way Brendan was
describing ‘the culture of GM’ to Mr. Dickman and that
that is a true description of it.
Journalism? Nope.
Facts?… yep… a few.
WTKTT… According to Mcdonough’s interview notes from 7/5 p41…. 1445 starts to take weather for top of the hour first reading wrong does it a second time good but to make sure does it a third time turns back towards fire and notices that fire has made it to his trigger point to leave.
Daily Courier interview August 7….About 2:45 or 2:50 p.m., he heard over his radio that updated weather information was coming. Since it was almost time for Brendan to conduct his weather measurement at the top of the hour, Jesse said he’d listen to the radio information while Brendan checked the weather.
The Daily courier interview actually has video footage and Mr Mcdonough says with his own mouth what is stated above. BUT, there is a problem with his description of these events. According to Mcdonough (DC interview), Steed is GOING TO listen to the weather while Mcdonough conducts weather measurement. As far as we know, there were only two weather updates that afternoon, 1402 and 1526. It is hard for me to comprehend that an all important weather update was delayed. By all important I mean, According to DC interview Mcdonough states…Jesse then related that the crew could expect a 180-degree wind shift and wind gusts of 50-60 mph. The 1402 weather update calls for a 180- degree shift, NOT THE 1526 update. The interview notes from BR hotshots seem to back up Mcdonoughs account……(p9 BR interview notes) They only heard 1 wx update prior to picking Brendan up.
I am beginning to believe (more than ever) that Mcdonough actually left the post before 1500 (3pm), a full hour before any report acknowledges.
I really tend to AGREE with you, Calvin.
The more I read these reports… there is almost TOO MUCH
activity being ‘crammed’ into a very small timeframe for it
all to have really happened with that kind of ‘speed’… especially
since we now even read in the SAIT notes that when Frisby
picked up Brendan at the old grader… neither one of them
was (quote) “in any kind of hurry”.
The whole description of all the things that Frisby himself is
supposed to have accomplished between 1555 and 1615
almost makes him some kind of ‘superman’ or that he had
his own ‘transporter’ that day.
Taken all in all… it almost makes more sense that Frisby
himself had at least an hour to accomplish all these things
he is documented as doing at that part of the afternoon.
More on this later… including an update on WHEN Marsh
was actually made DIVS A.
Did you notice that this is also ‘nailed down’ in Brendan’s
SAIT interview notes?
Brendan says it didn’t happen until right after Rory Collins
( purposely? ) dumped retardant on their ‘indirect’ burnouts
and GM was forced to change tactics.
That was at 11:45 AM.
That was when McDonough ( who we now learn was a
squad leader ) volunteered to take his ‘squad’ over to
do the ‘tie into cold black’ thing that is documented in
all of the reports.
It’s also curious that Marsh waited until 11:50 AM that
morning to have this ‘face-to-face’ with Marsh. Marsh
didn’t ‘request’ that meeting until 5 minutes AFTER
Collins forced him to ‘change tactics’.
Here is what I think Brendan’s SAIT notes tell us…
11:36 and 11:45 – Air Attack ( Rory Collins ) purposely drops
retardant on their indirect work and forces tactic change.
11:46 – Marsh calls OPS1 (Abel) on a CELL PHONE to
report this. We know that Todd Abel has reported MORE
than just one cell call from Marsh so this could have been
the first one that day.
11:47 – Abel decides to make Marsh DIVS A, and tells him so.
11:48 – Marsh is now DIVS A. He calls Brian Frisby and
requests ( demands? ) he schlep all the way out to the
ridge with Trueheart for a ‘face-to-face’ planning meeting.
It’s possible this is how that part of the day went down.
I think you may be mistaken about Brendon being a ‘squad leader’. Without digging around for quite awhile, trying to find the actual statement, I think it went something like; ‘Brendon’s squad volunteered to……’. That can be read two different ways. One, Brendon was the leader (Brendon’s squad), or two, it was the squad Brendon was in (Brendon’s squad). I think it is the second version, and there is absolutely no evidence that he was qualified or acted as a squad leader, ever. Somewhere in all of this voluminous documentation, the squad leaders are specifed, and he’s not one of them.
TTWARE… P41 Yarnell Interview notes (YIN) Brendan Mcdonough Interview states….Brendan volunteers his squad for assignment
But I do not think he was a squad boss.
TTWARE…
As Calvin noted… the YIN quote only says ‘his’ squad,
and you are right… there is no documentation that
says McDonough was an ACTUAL ‘squad leader’…
…but that brings up another question for WFF folks.
How ‘off the reservation’ would it be for a second year
greenhorn to willy-nilly ‘volunteer his squad’ for
ANYTHING?
What would the REAL ‘squad boss’ have to say about
that… no matter now ‘no-brainer’ the task might seem
to be?
The “real squad boss” would tear Donut’s head off and **** down his neck.
Well… then we have just one more deep
mystery to solve, then. Brendan said
in his OWN interview that HE ‘volunteered
his squad’ for the ‘tie to cold black’ job
over on the west side of the ridge after
they decided to switch from indirect
to direct. It’s there in ‘black and white’.
Did that really happen… or is this more
evidence that Brendan was ‘making
things up’ even in front of the SAIT
investigators?
In regards to the topic of weather overall, in reading through the various ADOSH interview narratives, it’s amazing how many different personnel on the fire stated they did not get either one, or both, of the crucial weather updates. This includes some of the air resources.
As has been commented upon here many times, the number of firefighters “almost lost’ is stunning. From McDonough and the engine crews that were rescued by the BR Sup, to the structure protection guys on the north end who didn’t see one flank of the fire hooking around to block their escape route, who were advised of that fact by air attack. Also, a little discussed event that came close to having DIRE consequences, is the instance of the engine crews who were pulled-off their rigs to hike-in, and dig and cut on a much needed section of line somewhere toward the west end of Z. As the fire was bearing down on them and they were evacuating, they returned to where they had parked their vehicles. THEIR VEHICLES WERE GONE! Someone, moved them to points unknown, without telling anybody. It is simply refered to in the reports as ‘some crews got pinched’. I guess that’s a nice way of saying they almost got burned-over as well. Those folks need to be interviewed, to see how close they actually were to becoming another statistic.
Without a doubt there was chaos on every side of the fire. Primarily, in my opinion, due to the extreme fire behavior and the fact that the IC team still trying to assemble itself during the most active part of the day. Had they taken this fire more seriously 12hrs earlier, perhaps we wouldn’t be talking about it now. But, these are just contributory factors, ultimately GMIHC overhead had the final responsibility for the crews safety.
Tony Sciacca said….Historically chaparral only burns for one operating period. I had not seen fire fun downhill during the daytime in the this country. p51 Yarnell Interview Notes for Tony Sciacca
Can anyone else speak about the daytime downhill fire run? Is it that uncommon?
A downhill run given the conditions that day, low RH, low fuel moisture, high temps, along the weather forecast of possible downdrafts, would certainly not be an unforeseen event.
As for the comment about burning for one operational period. That may generally be true, but only if the operations during the period had been effective.
Calvin, the transcript does say “country,” but he could have meant county?
It’s a wind issue. CA, for instance, has Santa Ana winds that can push fires downhill, or lift and allow them to suddenly progress back uphill. I’m not sure what Sciacca means when he say that there’s no fire predictability. Not just the fire itself, but the weather acted pretty predictably. He may be referring to the fact that without the thunderstorm and the change in winds that the fire would have evolved differently.
i think what he is saying is that brush fires and especially in chaparral type fuel models often burn through one burn period (one day) and then RH (humidity) values rise enough in the evening to at least greatly reduce the amount of residual heat left.
the drought conditions and live fuel moisture levels experienced in that area made those fuels available to remain actively burning through the first night and subsequently into the fatal shift.
also- in light fuels WIND ALWAYS OVERRIDES SLOPE. meaning with enough wind a fire in lighter fuels can move down slope very quickly, and it looks sort of counter-intuitive when you see that.
Thanks NV and fullsail. It appears Sciacca is a type 1 IC. Odd if he actually meant county,( I guess I was also thinking about about Sciacca’s delay for an interview because he was “out of the country”) but I guess anything is possible. Fullsail, I can see what you are saying about wind being a bigger factor than slope in light fuels.
Does anyone know if Sciacca helps WFF abroad?
‘This country’ also is sort of slang for ‘out west’, or ‘the mountains’, or ‘the desert,’ if you get my drift.
actually, seeing as how tony works for Prescott F.D., i think he is referring to that specific geographic area around Yavapai County.
fyi, he is a retired USFS Fire Management (Thumb Butte District ?) Officer for the Prescott National Forest and was the Prescott Hotshot Crew Boss back in my day. And he is highly respected at the national level.
Much of central California has the sundowner winds influenced by costal temperatures. They blow down drainages at night.
Also southern Calif. Santa Anna’s blow off the top of mountains to the valleys at high speeds day and night they are hot winds as well.
jeff i,
I think everyone posting comments here agrees with you that the ultimate responsiblity for crew safety, lies with the leaders and the crew, themselves.
The majority of the peripheral discusion here, is trying to chip away at what might have been some of the factors that caused, what up until that day, was a seeminigly well-led crew, to step off the road and head down into that bowl.
That examination has to include human factors, both internally within the crew, and externally, those forces, pressures, or actions, occuring throughout the day, which may have consciously, or subconsciously affected the decision process.
Any answers found in that process, are ones that would be in addtion to what we are left with so far, reaffirming the 10 & 18 and LCES. If any external influences can be found that, in ‘the fog of war’, can cause things like the the safety measures mentioned above to become ‘cloudy’ as well, it would be a good thing for firefighters to learn and know.
Elusive,
I don’t know about everyone…
I agree that there is value in looking at outside factors and forces, and I am not trying to discourage that. But, I believe the most important lessons to be learning must take place at the crew level. Maybe I just felt the need to state the obvious out of fear of loosing site of it.
WTKTT… thanks for the follow up. You did not include the Daily Courier interview by Mcdonough from August 7 by Joanna Doddler Nellans….. About 2:45 or 2:50 p.m., he heard over his radio that updated weather information was coming. Since it was almost time for Brendan to conduct his weather measurement at the top of the hour, Jesse said he’d listen to the radio information while Brendan checked the weather.
Kyle Dickman interview above says…DONUT WAS LESS than a minute into slinging his 4 P.M. weather
when Steed came back over the radio. I am not following you here. According to this, Dickman reports Mcdonough doing his 4pm weather, 1545.
**
** WHEN DID BRENDAN MCDONOUGH ACTUALLY
** LEAVE HIS LOOKOUT POSITION?
Was it circa 1445 ( 2:45 PM ) or
was it circa 1550 ( 3:50 PM )?
Brendan McDonough himself has ‘changed his story’ on this one a few
times since June 30, 2013.
I know that calvin has been working this one, but I decided to put all the ‘known
sources’ together into one place and take a look at the ‘chronological order’ of
the changing times mentioned for WHEN Brendan left his lookout position.
In other words… what was he saying to WHO… and WHEN?
Things to notice in the full text of all the sources below…
The recently released SAIT notes say that Brendan McDonough
was interviewed by the SAIT investigators on July 5, 2013, just 5
days after the tragedy. In that SAIT interview… Brendan said he
left his lookout position at 1445 ( 2:45 PM ).
A month after that… Brendan is interviewed independently
by the ADOSH investigators… but suddenly he has changed the
time when he left his lookout position to more than an HOUR
later than what he told the SAIT investigators.
On August 20, 2013, ADOSH conducted their own independent
interview with Brendan McDonough. Brendan had his personal
attorney Emily Dolan present for this ADOSH interview.
The final ADOSH report says that Brendan told them ( with his
attorney present ) that he left his lookout position at 1550 ( 3:50 PM ).
That is more than an HOUR after the time he’d already reported to the
SAIT investigators a month or so earlier.
Then… a month AFTER this ADOSH interview… Brendan is back to
saying (publicly) that he left his lookout position at 1445 ( 2:45 PM ), as
he originally told the SAIT investigators on July 5, 2013.
On September 17, 2013… just 11 days before the SAIR document was
to be published, Author Kyle Dickman published his article based on
his exclusive independent interview with Brendan McDonough.
In his interview with Kyle Dickman, Brendan was STILL sure
that he had left his lookout position at 1445 ( 2:45 PM ), despite
what he had told ADOSH ( with his attorney present ) a month
before this article was published.
11 days after the Kyle Dickman interview was published, when
the SAIR report finally came out on September 28, 2013, that
time of 1445 ( 2:45 PM ) has now magically CHANGED back
to 1550 ( 3:50 PM ), which is what Brendan told the ADOSH
investigators… but is NOT what he actually told the SAIT
investigators on July 5, 2013, OR the author Kyle Dickman
circa September 17, 2013.
The SAIR put the time at MORE than an HOUR later than when
Brendan said it happened in his own SAIT interview AND in
his other independent interview with author Kyle Dickman.
So here is the chronological order of when Brendan was
saying 1445 ( 2:45 PM ) and when he was saying 1550 ( 3:50 PM )…
* July 5, 2013 – SAIT interview – Brendan says 1445 ( 2:45 PM )
* August 20, 2013 – ADOSH interview – Brendan says 1550 ( 4:50 PM )
* September 17, 2013 – Dickman article – Brendan is back to 1445 ( 2:45 PM )
* September 28, 2013 – SAIR report – Back to 1550 ( 4:50 PM )
* December 5, 2013 – WFAR report – Back to 1550 ( 4:50 PM )
* December 5, 2013 – ADOSH report – Back to 1550 ( 4:50 PM )
For the sake of completeness ( and so all the references are in
the same post somewhere ) here are the DATES again in chronological
order accompanied by the exact text and testimony of Brendan
McDonough as reported by these various sources…
** THE REPORTS AND INTERVIEWS ( CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER )
* DATE: July 5, 2013 – Brendan says 1445 ( 2:45 PM )
Page 41 of SAIT notes…
Yarnell Hill Fire Investigation
Interview with Brendan McDonough – 7/5/2013
1445 starts to take weather for top of the hour first reading
wrong does it a second time good but to make sure does
it a third time turns back towards fire and notices that fire
has made it to his trigger point to leave. On his way down to
old grader looks at a spot that he might use as a deployment
site to his right decides it’s to small continues to area of
old grader.
* DATE: August 20, 2013 – Brendan says 1550 ( 4:50 PM )
Page 8 of ADOSH report…
August 20, 2013 – ADOSH conducts interviews with City
of Prescott employees Tony Sciacca and Brendan McDonough.
Brendan McDonough has his personal attorney Emily Dolan
present for his interview. With his attorney present… Brendan
McDonough says he left his lookout position at 1550 ( 3:50 PM ).
* DATE: September 17, 2013 – Brendan is back to 1445 ( 2:45 PM )
Outside Magazine
Tuesday, September 17, 2013
19: The True Story of the Yarnell Fire
By Kyle Dickman – Based on exclusive
interviews with Brendan McDonough.
http://www.outsideonline.com/outdoor-adventure/YarnellFire.html
DONUT WAS LESS than a minute into slinging his 4 P.M. weather
when Steed came back over the radio.
“Donut, you up?”
“Go, Steed.”
“They’re calling for a 180-degree wind shift and gusts of up to 60
miles per hour out of the northeast.”
“Copy that.”
He looked up at the approaching wall of flames and blinked. For the first
time that afternoon, the wind was blowing at his face instead of his back.
The flank that had been slowly backing down the valley had suddenly
jumped to life. Two-foot flames had grown to twelve, and within moments
the fire was running up a ridge on the east side of the valley and then
south, directly at Donut.
“Steed, Donut. It hit my trigger point.” The fire had crossed the drainage
on the valley floor only a quarter of a mile away. “I’m bumping back to
the dozer push.”
“Alright, let me know when you get there. We’ve got eyes on you.”
Donut tossed on his pack and grabbed his gear as he started wading
down through the brush field and boulders toward the safety of the clearing
the bulldozer had created that morning.
* DATE: September 28, 2013 – SAIR report – Back to 1550 ( 3:50 PM )
Page 23 of SAIR document published September 28, 2013…
At about 1550, GM Lookout is taking weather observations when
GM Capt calls him to relay the weather update. DIVS A hears the
transmission and copies. GM Lookout copies and continues taking
weather observations. He looks at the fire to the north and notes it is
moving slowly toward his location. He scans back up to where the
crew is working, to the thermometer, back to the crew, and then back
to the fire. In that short time, the fire has started building and the wind
is already beginning to shift. GM Lookout is not worried, but he
recognizes it is time for him to move. He calls GM Capt and says
the fire has hit his trigger point and he is moving towards the open
area at the old grader. GM Capt calmly replies, “Okay, cool.”
GM Lookout hikes toward the grader. As he hikes, he identifies
options including an alternative lookout spot further up the road, a
possible shelter deployment site near the grader, and a little clearing
just down from his original lookout spot where he could deploy his
fire shelter if the fire caught him.
* DATE: December 5, 2013 – WFAR report – Says 1550 ( 3:50 PM )
Page 14 of WFAR ( Wildland Fire Associates Report )
At about 1550, the GM Lookout was taking weather observations
when the GMIHC Captain called to relay the weather update.
GM Lookout acknowledged the message and continued to take
weather observations. By the time the GM Lookout completed the
weather observations and scanned the surroundings as well as the
crew location, the fire had started building and the wind was beginning
to shift. GM Lookout recognized the fire had hit the first trigger
point established for his safety. After informing the GMIHC Captain,
GM Lookout moved towards the open area at the old grader. The
GMIHC Captain received the information relatively calmly.
As the GM Lookout hiked toward the grader, he noted the options
open to himself including an alternate lookout spot further up the
road, a possible shelter deployment site near the grader, and a
little clearing just down from his original lookout spot where he could
deploy his fire shelter if needed. The BRIHC Superintendent was
driving back to meet DIVS A for a face-to-face meeting. He met with
the GM Lookout as he reached the grader. (4)
Footnote (4) ADOSH Interview with GM Lookout.
* DATE: December 5, 2013 – ADOSH report – Says 1550 ( 3:50 PM )
Page 18 of ADOSH report…
At approximately 1550 hours, McDonough noticed that the fire
head, which had been steadily progressing northwards, had
switched directions, was approximately two miles wide, and
burning southward towards his position. The fire had reached
his trigger point just to the north of his lookout position.
McDonough radioed his supervisor GMIHC Captain Steed and
explained that the fire had reached his trigger point and
he was leaving. Steed confirmed the message and could
see the fire and McDonough in the valley below his position.
McDonough hiked south while looking for a reasonable location
to deploy his shelter should he become entrapped. He made
his way to the old abandoned grader at the dozer line where
brush had been cleared earlier that day. During his interview
( with ADOSH investigators and with his lawyer present ), he
stated the he believed this area to be his best option as a
safety zone. His other option was to hike up the steep
mountain slope to previously burned wildland
Re-read your post, you have 3 different times mentioned, from the comfort of your own home… And your surprised that McDonough is confused in an interview situation??
Yea… I goofed on some of the 24 hour time format
translations in parentheses and such. Typing too fast.
If I could edit the post I would.
Calvin is also right… I even left out some OTHER
reports from McDonough about when this happened.
Read the actual ‘report’ text… however.
That’s the information we are being asked to believe.
When do YOU believe he left his lookout post?
Who ( or what report ) do YOU believe?
Reply to calvin post on December 18, 2013 at 9:07 am
>> calvin wrote…
>>
>> WTKTT, Thanks for taking the time to review the parker
>> photo. I appreciate the great description in your comment.
>> As I look at this picture again I see the tan spot (clearing).
>> There appears to be something white on the west end, it is
>> not very clear but distinctive against the bright tan spot. I am
>> asking because, according to BR interview notes, (p8)….Get
>> to the trucks Brian gets GM with only minutes before the fire
>> would have been on them. The picture by Parker does not
>> show fire in proximity to the GM buggy parking area and BR
>> indicate moving them just before burnover. You would think
>> the GM buggies would still be in the parking area when parker
>> picture is taken based on the ONLY interviews given by BR.
>> Also, are the names Big and Little roundtop on the map or
>> have they been identified elsewhere as such? Thanks
calvin… have you seen the photos in the ADOSH media supplement that were
taken by Brendan McDonough himself ( and time stamped by ADOSH )?
He took a few of them at the exact moment you are describing… right after
Brian Frisby ( BR Supt ) had dropped him off back at the GM vehicles.
We can be SURE that is where he is because one of the photos in the
sequence was taken as Brendan was standing on the gunwale of the GM
Supervisor Truck and was shot to the north looking over the roof of the
truck itself.
What is REALLY confusing here ( and you are correct to notice it ) is that
these pictures do NOT match what is shown in the Parker photo and the
timestamp that the SAIT put on that Parker photo.
This could have a lot to do with the other lingering issue I know you have been
working on and that is the 1445 versus 1545 time discrepancy as to when
Brendan actually left his lookout spot.
You are right. Brendan has now said it was 1445 in two separate interviews.
That is a full HOUR earlier than any official report says it happened.
Could Brendan really have been that confused that day?
I suppose his own weather reports that he was ‘spinning’ during his
lookout duties would tell us that.
I wonder if the SAIT ever bothered to obtain those (documents) from him
or the Prescott Fire Department?
If they did… then I imagine copies of those actual weather reports he was
‘spinning’, ( and the actual times he was writing down ) could/should be part
of the SAIT FOIA/FOIL package.
We shall see.
Followup: Forgot to answer your last question.
The names ‘Little Round Top’ and ‘Big Round Top’ are simply the
names I have been giving to those landscape features here in
my own notes about the photographic evidence from that day.
I do not know if those mounds out there have official ‘names’
or even informal ones used by any local hikers.
**
** ARTICLES FROM TODAY
Just as a quick reference… here are the articles covering the important
things that have happened just today alone…
** BREAKING NEWS: 12 Hotshot families file claims against public entities
The Prescott Daily Courier – 12/19/2013 2:30:00 PM
http://www.dcourier.com/main.asp?SectionID=1&SubSectionID=1&ArticleID=126569&utm_source=&utm_medium=&utm_campaign=
** City of Prescott and Arizona State Forestry reject Yarnell Fire claims and fines
December 19, 2013 by Bill Gabbert of Wildfire Today
http://wildfiretoday.com/2013/12/19/city-of-prescott-and-arizona-state-forestry-reject-yarnell-fire-claims-and-fines/
** State Forestry contests hotshot safety citations and fines
Prescott Daily Courier – 12/19/2013 12:10:00 PM
http://www.dcourier.com/main.asp?FromHome=1&TypeID=1&ArticleID=126566&SectionID=1&SubSectionID=1&utm_source=&utm_medium=&utm_campaign=
Mr. Dougherty himself also published an article about the
events of today…
** Twelve Granite Mountain Hotshot Families File
** Wrongful Death Claims Seeking $237.5 Million
http://www.investigativemedia.com/twelve-granite-mountain-hotshot-families-file-wrongful-death-claims-seeking-237-5-million/
I know that the City of Prescott is only ONE of the defendants
named in all the suits… but just to put the $237.5 million
dollar number into perspective…
The entire estimated financial resources available to the city of
Prescott, Arizona for the year 2014 is $230,161,910.
That’s $7.4 million dollars LESS than the amounts named
in the suits filed today.
In addition to the entities named in the claim, there were 4 individuals named – IC Roy Hall, OPS1 Abel, Russ Shumate (first IC) and Darrell Willis. Shumate named due to the ineffective IA obviously. Hall named because he was in charge. Anything to be read into this list? Anyone not on the list that might have been there? Willis is named because….?
Willis was the Wildland Division Chief for the
Prescott Fire Department, and was instrumental
in creating, organizing, and maintaining the only
Type 1 Hotshot team in the country wholly owned
and operated by a Municipal Fire Department.
Regardless of his actions on June 30, 2013
( which are mostly still a mystery and also
complicated by contradictory statements
of his own )…
…Willis was ultimately responsible for things
like training programs and certification for
that crew.
We also now learn from the SAIT notes that
it was Brendan McDonough himself who
was supposedly the ‘squad leader’ that took
his ‘squad’ off to ‘tie into the cold black’ after
Air Attack ( Rory Collins ) dropped retardant
on their own backfires ( on purpose? ) and
they had to ‘change tactics’ and ‘go direct’.
Since when is someone who is only in their
SECOND fire season qualified to be a
‘squad leader’?
Did Willis accept the ‘assignment’ even though
these men were dog-tired and really shouldn’t
have even been in Yarnell that day?
Do things like this all come back to Willis and
his own ‘competency’?
I guess we will find out now.
I guess I was asking if you think that Willis was being named for his actions before 6/30 or on 6/30? What we know FOR SURE of his actions on 6/30 probably does not justify a claim, at least by the families of the GMHS (maybe by others?).
I think it all ties together. The entire handling of the fire from the lightning strike to the deployment is the center of the lawsuits and not just 6/30.
Willis was there the night before 6/30
at 11:30 PM. He was basically ‘Co-IC’
with Shumate throughout the night and
so is responsible for a lot of the planning and the results the next day.
Then there is the day itself, of course.
Then there are all the questions about not just the WFF culture in general, but the peculiar culture of Granite Mountain itself.
Then there are the ( documented ) things like (perhaps) faking a certification document and refusing to cooperate with Marsh when all he was trying to do was maintain full-time benefits for one of the 7 required full-time positions ( Ashcraft ).
Then there is the (supposed) ‘suggestions’ to Marsh… at least once but maybe multiple times that day and perhaps at ultra-critical moments.
Example: Don’t you think it’s strange that, at the public press conference at the deployment site, Willis used the phrase “I wasn’t REALLY involved with what they (GM) were doing.”
Really?
Why even use that word?
It’s suspicious.
What that means is that he WAS
‘involved’… but only sorta-kinda.
If he wasn’t involved at all he would
have just said…
“I wasn’t involved with what they were doing.”
There would be on REALLY in there.
Anyway… the list goes on and on.
I actually shudder to think how
MUCH Darrell Willis might have had
to do with this entire Yarnell Hill
Fire… from soup to nuts.
He had that kind of personality to be throwing his weight around all over the place. You can hear it in his radio transmissions captured in the Globe Type II Crew videos.
So yea… I am not surprised at all that Darrell Willis is named in the suits. He is a KEY player in everything that happened with the Yarnell Hill Fire.
Tony Sciacca said…..I was only on scene 2 hours. I got a call from Peyson dispatch at 13:55 for a Safety Officer. Arrived at the middle school 50-55 minutes later and tied in with RH and Paul Musser there. Divison Chief, Daryl Willis painted the picture about what was going on. P51 Yarnell Interview Notes (YIN)
WTKTT….. It seems like Chief Willis is still playing Co-IC later in the day.
There was a lot of evidence including tracks, had the right investigation team been called, and the area secured. That’s what happened on North Canyon, a fire fatality investigation teem should have been on site. Not the sheriff’s department to much evidence and information was lost because they did not know what they were looking for and what was valuable information.
Well, it’s apparent now, that any truth that’s out there, WILL indeed come out. It might take a while, BUT IT”S GOING TO HAPPEN. 12 Hotshot families have now filed suit against the ‘powers that be’, and I think it’s VERY apparent that as well as some changes in policy, they want the truth!! See the new Dougherty IM article above.
We knew it was coming after the Last investigation. Not knowing who I would say its all the seasonal crewmen families. Unless the survivors of the permanent employee’s did not sign off on there benefits.
My mistake found the article. Outside Mag. Kyle Dickman.
The statement was—The crew stated over the radio they were moving to Yarnell. That is the first time some one said that they heard radio traffic stating that. It sounded like it was made by McDonough.
Reply to Bob Powers post on Dec 19, 2013 at 2:43 pm
I believe I have figured this one out.
Please correct me if I am wrong.
The quote you have been referring to is not from a NEW article
at all, as you first described it a few days ago.
It is probably from either the original Kyle Dickman article
based on his interviews with Brendan McDonough dated
Tuesday, Sepetember 17, 2013…
Outside Magazine
Tuesday, September 17, 2013
19: The True Story of the Yarnell Fire
By Kyle Dickman based on interviews with Brendan McDonough
http://www.outsideonline.com/outdoor-adventure/YarnellFire.html
OR…
It came from Mr. Bill Gabbert’s ‘article about another article’ that
he does a lot which covered the same Kyle Dickman article
and appeared on his Wildfire today site on the same exact day…
Outside Magazine covers the Yarnell Hill Fire
September 17, 2013 by Bill Gabbert, Wildfire Today
http://wildfiretoday.com/2013/09/17/outside-magazine-covers-the-yarnell-hill-fire/
The following is Mr. Gabbert describing exactly what is also
in the Kyle Dickman ( Outside Magazine ) article…
>> With conditions changing so dramatically, Eric and the
>> crew’s leadership—[acting crew superintendent Captain
>> Jesse] Steed, Clayton [Whitted], Travis [Carter], Robert
>> [Caldwell]—would have gathered for a moment on the ridge
>> to discuss their options while the other hotshots sat perched
>> on white granite boulders watching the drama unfold.
>>
>> Do we hunker down in the black and do nothing but watch
>> Yarnell burn? Or do we head down there, do some point
>> protection, and try to save a couple of homes?
>>
>> Eric would have made the decision.
>>
>> He couldn’t have imagined that, by heading for town, he
>> was leading his crew toward a series of increasingly
>> compromised circumstances, each more desperate than
>> the last.
>>
>> He (Eric) radioed out that Granite Mountain was moving
>> back toward Yarnell.”
So right there is ( I believe ) the ‘quote’ in question.
That is actually ( word for word ) what was in the original
Kyle Dickman article.
The lingering question is… is that what Brendan McDonough
REALLY told Mr. Dickman he heard Eric Marsh say during their
interviews… or is this quote ( republished word for word by Mr.
Gabbert ) just a victim of Mr. Dickman’s obvious ‘interpretive
narrative’ style in his original article?
We don’t know. ( but it would be nice to know, fer sure ).
I have no idea how this quote turned into Brendan McDonough
himself saying that Eric announced they were ‘headed for the
Helms’ ranch’.
I really don’t think Eric Marsh could have possibly said that
( since it is almost certain Marsh had no idea that afternoon
who owned that ranch ) nor, in turn, could Brendan have ever
HEARD him say that.
I think the ‘Helms’ ranch’ thing becoming part of that reported
quote from Brendan is/was just another ‘lost in the interpretation’
moment.
All that being said… it would still be nice to know EXACTLY
what Brendan told Mr. Kyle Dickman he heard over the radio.
If Mr. Dickman actually heard Brendan say he heard Marsh
say “We are moving back toward Yarnell” over the radio…
then 2 official investigations and 60+ investigators didn’t get
the same information from Brendan.
WTKTT That’s what I was trying to explain. I was not sure either if it is just righter flair or something that was really heard. As we have been searching for a radio statement that GM was moving to Yarnell. We will need some real conformation on this one.
Another Question if the GM crew lived and worked in that area (Yarnell ), Would some of them not known the name of the ranch?. It would seem possible. Could that be ruled out?
Yes. It’s possible. A few people have suggested over the last few weeks that ‘personal ties’ might have even had something to do with the decision to leave the black… but no one has ever followed up on that. Best I could do was discover that while Chief Dan Andersen ( who lives in Glen Ilah ) knows Darrell Willis… I don’t think there were near friendly enough for Willis to instruct ‘his’ crew to try and go save Anderson’s house.
There is also just the chance of ‘familiarity’ such as the fact that Jesse Steed was a ‘runner’ and he even ran in some marathon event right there in the Yarnell area not long before the burnover.
So yea… it’s POSSIBLE that someone on that crew knew that the ‘bomb-proof ranch’,
AKA Boulder Springs Ranch…
was also known as ‘The Helms’ place’…
…but my money is on black for this spin
of the roulette wheel. I do NOT believe
anyone in the fire command and on the
radio channels that day knew it was
referred to by the locals as ‘The Helms’
place’.
This is just a ‘wrap-up’ of what I think is
a ‘moot’ discussion since I think we’ve
proved Brendan himself did NOT ever
say he heard Marsh say ‘Helms’ ranch’…
…but as with a lot of things regarding this
incident and the evidence floating around…
this issue MIGHT come up AGAIN.
I t was a reference to an article in a magazine that an ex Hot Shot writer did that interviewed several families and Brendan McDonough. It could have been referenced by Tex and Joy.
What magazine?
The significant thing about the quote ( and I posted about this
last night but it evaporated ) is that Brendan is ( apparently )
quoted as saying he heard them say they were “going to
the Helms’ ranch.”
The curious thing there is that the Helms’ ranch was ONLY
being referred to that day as either “that bomb-proof ranch”
or its topo map name of “Boulder Springs Ranch”.
The fact that the ranch actually belonged to Lee and DJ Helm
only emerged sometime AFTER the incident.
The local hikers Tex Gilligan and Joy Collura certainly knew
Lee and DJ Helm and they would have referred to it as
the ‘Helms’ place’… but both have testified numerous times
now that even though they talked to Marsh THREE times
that morning/afternoon… there was NEVER any mention
of any ‘ranch’ ( by ANY name ). Marsh never asked… and
they never talked about it.
The SAIR would have us believe they did… and even tried
to get us to swallow some story about the hikers actually
discussing the ‘alternate escape route’. We all know now
why the SAIT had to ‘make that up’. They knew they
were lying about all that being discussed in the ‘brieifings’,
yet they had to find some plausible way to make us all
think that Marsh/Steed were aware that the ridge-road
went all the way to the ranch. If they didn’t… then that
would have been an obvious fatal oversight on any
number of persons’ part. So they used the hikers as
the excuse for making us believe their story.
Regardless… my point here is that for Brendan McDonough
to say he heard ‘Helms Ranch’ coming out of the mouths
of Marsh/Steed is not in the ‘believable’ range.
No one in the command structure that day ( Marsh and Steed
included ) knew that was what the locals called the place.
Something is very ‘wrong’ there, and needs to be looked at.
WTKTT: The SAIR FOIA package includes an e-mail from Joy confirming that she told Marsh about their alternative escape route DOWN the backside of the mountain to Congress. The “escape route” she discussed with Marsh was not to Helms, but, again, toward Congress.
FYI, I have not been refusing to share the FOIA/FOIL materials – they just have not all arrived yet. Plus, I have been busy on an unrelated project (which is why I have not been posting or reading much), but I will post when I have the materials in hand!
Elizabeth… thank you.
Re: ‘Escape Route’
Yes… Joy Collura posted heavily to ‘chapter 1’
of this ongoing discussion to make it clear
what she did or didn’t say to Marsh.
When Joy first appeared posting on this
discussion over a month ago… it was the first
question I asked her and she kindly replied right
away.
Here is a ‘cut-and-paste’ from ‘chapter 1’ of
this discussion thread…
>> On November 18, 2013 at 7:00 pm
>> Joy A Collura said…
>>
>> WTKTT asked…
>> At any time during any of your encounters
>> with Eric Marsh that day… did you ever get
>> the impression that he KNEW the high ridge
>> road that headed south would eventually take
>> him right to a point near the Boulder Springs
>> Ranch?
>>
>> Joy responded…
>> NO.
>>
>> HE ASKED US THE BEST WAY TO THE
>> FIRE AND HE SEEM TO NOT KNOW
>> THE AREA TOO WELL.
>>
>> WTKTT also asked…
>> Did ‘the ranch’ ever come up at all?
>>
>> Joy responded…
>> NO.
She also said they ONLY told them which way
THEY were going to go, which was to leave
the two-track road and bounce down on
the Congress side back over towards
where their ( Tex and Joy ) vehicles were
parked over near Candy Cane Lane.
In retrospect… even though the Boulder Springs
Ranch was NEVER discussed… if Marsh had
simply recalled what Joy had told her… and
he and Steed had just decided to go that ‘third
alternate’ way… those 19 men would still be
alive today like Joy and Tex are.
Re: FOIA
I never suggested you were ‘refusing’ to do
anything… I only said we ‘hadn’t heard from you’.
LOL. We all have lives.
I just hope most/all of that information becomes
public somehow… someday.
Besides… this thing isn’t going away.
As the events of today alone have proved… this
incident is going to be examined in detail for
a long, long, time.
>> calvin asked…
>> WTKTT… regarding Globe Type 2 Crew Video #4…
>> Is that VLAT number 910 or 911?
My best guess is 910, but cannot verify that 100 percent.
The rear engine cowling with the number on it only comes into view
starting at +22 seconds.
The best view of that cowling comes at +25 seconds.
Enhancement of the frame(s) in the +25 to +27 second range SEEM
to indicate a ZERO and not a ONE on the end of the number there.
The video is too grainy to be 100 percent sure. Must have been an iPhone.
The other piece of evidence to back up the 910 assumption is that
VLATs 910 and 911 have slightly different rear engine exhaust flange
configurations.
The video seems to show that the exhaust flange configuration is
closer to VLAT 910 than VLAT 911.
When I got cut off awhile back John got me back on and said my posts were going into the spam mail. May have happened to you last night non of mine were reposted.
Everything I posted last night was fully ‘accepted’ and
visible before I signed off. No ‘spam’ filter involved.
Re: Your “Let’s get back on track” message yesterday.
I agree… and I almost posted an evaluation I have done
here of the TIME stamps in the recent video of the
‘final moments of GM’… but I hesitate to do that until
I can see the ENTIRE video.
Both Mr. Dougherty and Elizabeth have indicated they
received their SAIT FOIA/FOIL packages last Monday.
We’ve heard nothing from either of them since.
I’d rather wait until the REAL (unedited) video(s) are
somehow publicly available before I say anything
about the TIME stamps.
That AZREPUBLIC video release last Friday was
butchered.
So I hear you about ‘moving forward’… but a whole bunch
of other ‘evidence’ is (supposedly) about to be made
public… so I think we are just ‘back-drafting’ at the
moment.
By the way… a lot of the posts that disappeared last
night were requests to YOU to please provide a link
to that ‘recent interview with Brendan McDonough’
you mention where you say he says he heard the
crew say they were ‘going to the Helms’ ranch’.
I have searched everywhere online and can find no
such article. Where did you read/see this?
I believe it was on here that I viewed it. The article was a x FF now writer that interviewed Brendon with excerpts from wife’s and families. Some of the statements seemed really off in what happened and time frames. I’ll look back and let you know where and reread it.
My post requesting a reference to the apparently recent release of comments from Brendon, specifically referencing the Helm’s ranch has disappeared. I would still like to obtain that, if someone could supply it.
A large number of posts from yesterday have disappeared
including some new photographic evidence and more
analysis of existing ones. I’ll try to re-post my replies to
calvin’s ( good ) questions about some of the photographs
and the fact that Brendan is still claiming he left his lookout
post at 1445 instead of 1545.
About 40 posts were gone this AM at home, but then were there at work. Now they are gone from both computers. I think we are stressing this site’s capacity.
I was wondering why there was not any thing on this morning. I usually catch up with you late night discussions.
Mr. Powers… see above for a ‘reply’ to your
post about the tape/flagging. There is a
photograph to back up your theory. I posted
a link to it last night but that’s one of the
comments that evaporated so I have
posted it again on your original comment.
Reply to TTWARE regarding disappearing posts:
Am astonished to see just how many posts have been removed. (And no explanation for this event, either.) If this kind of thing has happened before, I’ve apparently not been cognizant of it. I’m a little taken aback by this — especially when considering the type of post you had submitted.
Hopefully that will be addressed by several people on this thread.
One point that had resurfaced prior to some thread pruning was the possibility of past bad decisions with good outcomes. Conceptually, these are difficult training issues because the people making them often aren’t aware they are bad decisions. There is also no tree nearly hitting anyone or another more visible type of near miss. Past bushwhacks would be simply past trips through the brush, unless someone sprains a knee or there is a more serious problem. This may not be the place to talk specifics, but I believe giving info on any bad decisions with good outcomes in the past to Dougherty could be a way of collecting this in a way that allows for vetting.
I hope crew Supt. will sit down and discuss that very thing. I know RTS has brought that up and I am sure he will add to the discussion when Superintendents sit down to work out a training agenda. As well I hope the others who are still WFF.
BOB POWERS…
thank you for sharing the twin falls newspaper coverage of fire fatalities… it was very well done!
http://magicvalley.com/app/projects/never-again/Fire/index1.html
Thanks those of us that are fire fighters and those that are not learned a lot from the article’s. One of there staff has been assigned to fire coverage for 10 years and she does a great job of reporting in southern Idaho. There 30 min. video documentary covered North canyon and Yarnell hill they were well put together I’ll let every body know if you can order it. I lost two old friends on North Canyon.
We seem to be chasing rabbits the past couple of days we need to get back on track.
1. The new time frames from the helmet cam. That was just produced and what that dose to the fire progression charts and time frame for the crew.
2. The new article with interview with Brendon that stated he said the crew said they were headed to the Helms ranch.
3. The statement by Willis that he felt a little guilt about GM entrapment as he had asked them to help him tie in line, Some have said that happened in the morning. Could it have happened again when the fire started making its run’s
4. Radio traffic was occurring with GM the time of silence has been reduced by 6 Min. not including Brendon’s Discussion of where the trucks were parked.
As we research maybe more. We need to start working on things we can get answers on that clear up some of the confusion or investigative information that is turning out to be wrong.
Thanks sorry if that upsets anyone. I am open for new input.
Regarding the Willis conversation about getting “an anchor on this thing” around Yarnell, is there a possibility “0600” which has been suggested as roughly the time this conversation occurred was really roughly 1600? I apologize if I am raising something that has already been nailed down. It just seems out of context for Willis to have been pressing or asking Marsh before Marsh was there, in a way he felt guilt over later, at that time in the morning. But, over the course of the day, at 1600 the conversation would seem to reflect the course of the day’s events. It is easy for people to make a completely innocuous error in noting times. And of course, it could also have been a general statement made in the morning, even if a bit out of context.
I think there is something hear that was my summation as well. Why would you say any thing about quilt for something said in the morning? Seems to be a very loose comment.
Quick one on flagging- possibly Steed was bringing up the rear and Marsh was back further. Steed wrapped a bush with flagging and the roll was almost out so he left it attached to the flagging, to indicate where they dropped off. several explanations any could be correct. One of those little details we will never know.
Reply to Bob Powers post on December 18, 2013 at 9:56 am
Mr Powers… as it turns out… there WERE some small bushes
right there by the side of the road where Tex Gilligan found
the depleted roll of pink tape/flagging..
At least that is what satellite imagery from April 9, 2013 seems
to indicate.
So your proposal is a valid theory… along with the other recent
one about a standard ‘arrow’ being used at that location.
Joy Collura took ‘before’ an ‘after’ pictures from up on that
saddle. I will check them to see what they might show.
I certainly don’t expect to find any evidence of ‘melted tape’
remaining on any bushes that might have been there…but
Joy Collura uses a very high-res camera so you never know.
As with most things in this incident… it never hurts to
recheck evidence a second ( or a third, fourth, fifth… ) time.
FOUND it! ( Well, sort of ).
One of Joy Collura’s ‘after’ photos was taken at almost
the exact location the pink tape/flagging was found.
Problem is… she was standing about 6 feet to the left
of that exact location and whatever small ‘bush’ might
have been there is out-of-frame to the right.
However… look at the very bottom of this photograph.
It DOES show the remnants of a small bush right
in front of the camera and right by the side of the
two-track. It appears to be about waist-high and
would match any other small bush at that location
off to the left or right.
So it apparently might have been an ideal ‘small bush’
for leaving some kind of obvious ‘signal’ for someone
coming up from behind.
That photograph is HERE on Collura’s ZAZZLE page…
http://www.zazzle.com/rlv/isapi/designall.dll?action=getimage&id=397980bc-c7a5-48ce-80b5-061e660b584b&bg=0xffffff
** POSSIBLE ALTERNATE DEPLOYMENT SITES
Something I hadn’t notice before in this photograph.
The deployment area and the dozer road leading to it
are clearly visible as the ‘tan dirt’ areas in the distance.
However… look just a short ways closer to the camera,
about a hundred feet WEST of the deployment site.
The photo shows TWO other relatively UNBURNED
areas. Those are NOT places where the investigators
cleared ground. Those are the actual remnants of
two of the clearings that existed prior to the burnover
and lined up due west of the deployment site.
So… did GM actually choose the WRONG place to
deploy down there?
If they had just ‘backed up’ a hundred feet or so to
either one of these other ‘clearings’ that look
relatively ‘unburned’… would they have survived?
This photographic evidence actually matches the
statements in the article you just posted from
your own local paper where the ‘expert’ ( who has
visited the site ) was wondering the same thing
himself.
Hindsight is 20/20.
When you are trying to find a deployment site and the fire is bearing down on you, in a panic, you don’t have the luxury of assessing tge pros and cons of each site.
There is also still no evidence of exactly
what path they took to wind up where
they were found. If they had come through
the series of ‘clearings’ that line up west
of the deployment site on the way DOWN,
then they would have already had a good
mental image of the ‘clearings’ that
were available to them.
If they really did bushwack their way
through the drainage gully… then they
probably wouldn’t have even been
aware these other ‘clearings’ were
available to them.
The SAIT did a piss-poor job of actually
even trying to identify the exact route
that was taken. They just ‘guessed’ and
then drew a line on a topo chart.
i’m not sure you can say “there is no evidence” of the path. twenty people with packs and tools walking in a line kick up quite a bit of dirt. i’ll bet their tracks were very evident once the fire slicked off the hillside and i would imagine someone GPS’ed the track. although the SAIR says that they don’t know the exact path of travel, someone walked a very squiggly line through the box canyon for the maps. i have a hard time believing there weren’t a heavy set of tracks through there.
I AGREE with everything you are saying above as far as what ‘evidence’ anyone could imagine SHOULD have been left there. Even Tex Gilligan ( the hiker ) says there was some obvious evidence of the path they took including evidence of chainsaw work OUTSIDE of the deployment area… but he also says no one he ever took on a hike-through was ever all that interested.
Problem is… we have never gotten ANY details on that ( what evidence there was or wasn’t… or if any ‘official’ attempt at all was ever made to observe, photograph, or collect it ).
I can ‘imagine’ all kinds of things. I still want to know what ‘official’ effort was really made to discover the truth, and the details of those findings.
The ‘squiggly line’ is the same
one that would be drawn by anyone working off either a topo map or Google Maps if they just ‘assumed’ they followed the gully itself, with no evidence to actually back that up.
To say that the line of men just descended in the actual gully does not account for the roll of pink tape/flagging that was found by Tex Gilligan. It was found quite some distance south of where the SAIR diagrams indicate they ‘think’ the men left the road. Tex Gilligan tried to contact the SAIT about this when he found it but didn’t get any response from them. Didn’t “fit their story” so they weren’t interested.
I believe ADOSH responded to Tex about ‘finding the tape/flagging’… but there is no real ‘evidence’ of the path taken by the men presented in their report, either.
i think you need to get a job with dougherty, putnam, or maclean… at least then you might have access to some real evidence instead of conjecturing your way through this.
i’ve seen your various discussions about the spent roll of pink flagging, i personally think all it means is someone dropped a spent roll of flagging. there’s no reason to think it was marking anything.
you can make up whatever conspiracies you want i guess, but i have a hard time imagining that after they found the bodies, someone didn’t start doing some GPS’ing… to me, that’s what that squiggly line is on the maps. that’s also often how firelines get put on maps, by somebody walking the line with a GPS.
Well.. again… I certainly would expect any investigators worth their salt to have done that… and perhaps that documented evidence is actually in the SAIT FOIA/FOIL package(s).
As for the tape/flagging thing… I don’t think you have read what you say you have read. This is NOT what I ( personally ) think happened.
You DO know that this discussion is simply a ‘continuation’ of a previous discussion that was going on for weeks before you showed up, right?
We maxed out the comment thread on the previous ‘chapter’ and Mr. Dougherty requested we continue it here. See the top of this thread for a link to the ‘first part’ of this ongoing research/commenting.
oh yes, i’ve read through most of your tail chasing back there too. really love the accusatory stance you took with Blue Ridge and the posting of their phone numbers… and the B.McDonahue having a cheeseburger while his crew was dying was cute too.
@Mike who’d asked “If this very fine crew super messed up and crew supers absolutely control their crew’s safety, how do we prevent a repeat of this? Do we just stop at “mistakes were made” or is there a step beyond that?” In terms of lessons learned, one should be that crew supers don’t live in vacuums. That Marsh didn’t cert to the crew’s status earlier in the year, when pressed to do so in that email exchange between him and Willis, speaks to his character but also to pressures he was under.
We obviously don’t know, yet, conclusively, whether someone spoke with Marsh following Musser’s request. But, I do think a crew with some of these issues was more likely to be involved in an incident like the Yarnell entrapment than one without them.
Likewise, Willis was using what sounds like a likely inadequate possible deployment site and no safety zone that day, separate from the GM crew. GM’s lookout cut things close and could have had to deploy, had BR not run into him, in what again would likely not have been a survivable incident. I think there’s a real training issue there, and again think that seeing these things tied together with personnel out of Prescott makes an entrapment more likely to occur. Enough close calls and inevitably someone gets bit.
We also still don’t know, and may never, if there was a past history of bushwhacks that happened without incident. Unburned has obviously been a big topic of discussion online, but in this case the chaparral particularly limited mobility and choices and was costly in terms of time.
Very well said NV—Even without the state or investigations saying any thing there are a lot of lessons to be learned.
1. back to the basic 10 and 18 full discussion.
2. Fire shelter deployment sites your not always able to preplan those sites as they are a last minuet selection.
3. Fire shelter survivability HEAT and OXIGON
4. Always scout Safety zones and escape routes The closer the better.
5. Unburned fuel when is it ok and when is it bad— LCES in place???
6. Meetings to discuss and establish a training outline for all fire fighters next summer.
There are thins that stand out on this fire for lessons learned.
Wednesday test for im
Oh, and one more thing. Go back and read the original article John Dougherty wrote where he quoted me more than everyone else combined, and then compare that to what ADOSH said, I ******* NAILED IT from my living room almost before they finished moping up that ******* Circus of Fire ran by a bunch of Circus Clowns that was defended by a bunch of agency political appointees and hacks for Christ’s sake. I wish I had you on my hotshot crew back in the day!
Oh, and one more thing, I am done with this circular discussion. I know more than I need to know. I am just going to wait until the families of the Granite Mountain Hotshots get to rename this ******* cheap ass fight-wildfires-on-a-shoestring-with-the-culls-from-professional wildfire teams state because they own it!
Yes, I am still following this discussion, but I swear to the Fire Gods I will not post anymore comments.
xxfullsailxx said “the fact is, you ARE looking for a smoking gun. whether it be air attack flying off the fire, a div sup leaving the line, confusion from too many ops. section chief’s or a dictator/hypnotist Division Chief “ordering” Granite Mountain off the hill.”
Actually, I was looking for a way to explain the inexplicable. So…maybe I should just go along with your thoughts on this subject. In spite of the fact that Eric Marsh and Jesse Steed had extensive experiences as wildland firefighters at many levels and were really squared away crew bosses, they misread a predicted weather event, broke almost every rule in the book that has been developed over the last 100 years of wildland firefighting to keep firefighters safe, while taking their crew through unburned fuel in front of a raging out-of-control wildfire burning in extreme conditions, through dry explosive fuel that hadn’t burned in 40 years while ignoring all of the obvious facts of the explosive situation that John Q. Public (Tex) recognized as a extremely dangerous situation and he and Joy went the other way while they disobeyed a direct order from one supervisor while giving out disingenuous information on their radios to everyone regarding their true direction of travel and intentions etc., etc., etc., which resulted in the worst blunder and subsequent single loss of life in the history of wildland firefighting (not counting the Idaho Fires of 1910, which I have explained, don’t really count) FOR NO GOOD ******* REASON other than the fact they had been working their asses off all day and wanted to get back to their buggies and reengage a fire Tex and Joy could see was just about to obliterate the collection of indefensible structures in that ****hole they call Yarnell? Does this explanation satisfy you? I can hardly wait to study the Lessons Learned for the Yarnell Hill Fire Staff Ride that is going to be developed by the NWCG! I hope they use you as a Subject Matter Expert since you know so ******* much and I am just a stupid used-to-be wildland firefighter who doesn’t understand the complexities of working with other agencies and the public in this current world since I retired as a Supervisory Senior Special Agent working for the Washington Office of the federal land management agency that just happens to manage more federal land than all other federal land management agencies combined. How the **** to you think I got there from being a GS-464-Forestry Technician for Christ’s sake with my head up my ass, don’t answer that, I’m not sure myself anymore.
Damm Gary that was classic. Not much more to add.
hard for me to believe too… but even after the exhaustive effort presented on this website… that does seem to be the case. noone besides marsh and/or steed decided to leave the black and walk the crew out.
thanks for all your input!
Gary, hi. I have a small piece of info (actual info as opposed to conjecture) that I wanted to share with the group, but I’m only gonna do it if YOU promise to jump in and give the smackdown if xxfullsailxx tries to snark on me regarding my piece of info shared….
Eagerly awaiting your reply….
Dont hold out, please lay it on the table.
yes, by all means, don’t let me hold you back Elizabeth.
there’s plenty of people here who will defend you against my snarkyness!
Right on, if I can give an appropriate smack-down, I will be happy to do it. Oh, and by the say xxfullsaixx, thank you for downloading A FREE copy of chapter one of my book, “Betrayed By Our Fire Gods” from ourfiregods.com. I hope you learn something from the old school way of doing things.
yes, of course! was wondering about checking out your jeep website too… when you have the chance you mind emailing a link?
Certainly, I need all of the hits I can get, I will also send you a link to my road trip web site. Thank you for asking.
I am confused. Are you agreeing with FUllsail aka Darin-the-expert or not?
just re-iterating my reply from yesterday…
gary was NOT agreeing with me… i’d say he was being sarcastic in recommending me as a SME for a Lesson’s Learned…
your confusion is pretty funny though!
**
** IS ROBERT CALDWELL’S VOICE ACTUALLY
** RECORDED IN THE ‘LAST MOMENTS’ VIDEO/AUDIO?
A possibly very significant piece of new information appeared
just last night and it spurred some interesting discussion
today… so for the sake of recording more detail… here is
the exact ‘piece of evidence’ that ( might have ) emerged.
A standard Facebook ‘group’ comment from Amanda Marsh
about how painful it was to hear Eric’s voice on the video
was posted last evening.
That original post from Amanda Marsh is here…
https://www.facebook.com/groups/595705917126991/permalink/677629595601289/
The beginning of Amanda Marsh’s post reads…
>> In Memory of Our Good Friend, Eric Marsh
>> Its very disturbing to me and hurtful to know that people can
>> hear Eric’s stressed, scared voice on the radio. How sad that
>> people, other than family and fire officials feel the need to listen
>> to the last transmissions. The more energy we put towards
>> this, it just fuels… (More)…
That ‘letter’ was then ‘replicated’ on another Facebook page which is here…
19 Prescott Firefighter’s Last Alarm
13,391 likes · 1,142 talking about this
https://www.facebook.com/PrescottFallenFirefighters
People started to comment back to Amanda on THAT page
and this is the exact text of just ONE of the 45 or so
comments that appeared…
Laurie McKee Sutton
Amanda I totally relate – Robert’s voice is on there too – It is not how we
want to remember him – It is so painful – Thank you for saying how I
feel – love ya soul sister xoxox
Laurie McKee Sutton is Grant Quinn McKee’s sister.
Grant Quinn McKee is one of the GM Hotshots that died
and the son of Marcia McKee… who has the multi-million
dollar wrongful death suit already filed.
Laure McKee Sutton’s own Facebook page is…
https://www.facebook.com/laurie.sutton.94
Her husband’s name is Jim Sutton.
His Facebook page is…
https://www.facebook.com/jim.sutton.779
The ‘Robert’ being referred to in her comment must be GM
Hotshot Robert E. Caldwell. He was the only ‘Robert’ on the GM crew.
Claire and Robert Caldwell were in Laurie McKee Sutton’s ‘Friend’ list on Facebook.
Prescott Daily Courier article with photo of Linda Caldwell,
Grant Quinn McKee, and Laurie Sutton all running a store
together in Prescott back in 2009…
http://www.dcourier.com/Main.asp?SectionID=1&SubSectionID=1&ArticleID=71243
So not only is Laurie McKee Sutton related to the Hotshot Grant McKee,
she appears to ALSO be related to GM Hotshot Robert Caldwell.
So… it would stand to reason that she knew Robert’s voice VERY well.
That being said…
I have listened to the audio over and over… and I cannot find any
reason to believe that there are more than TWO voices recorded
from out in the box canyon.
Voice 1: Initial MAYDAY and all ‘Do you read me?’ calls after that.
Voice 2: Eric Marsh suddenly appearing on the radio, announcing
that he is “DIVS A here with Granite Mountain”, and then announcing
that they are ‘deploying’.
So I believe there are NOT THREE voices from the canyon… only TWO.
That means either Laurie McKee Sutton is correct… and squad leader
Robert Caldwell is the one making all the transmissions other than
Marsh’s…
OR… She is simply mistaken… and all the other transmissions
really are Captain Jesse Steed.
Personally?… I have compared that voice from the first MAYDAY
call that says “We are in front of the flaming front” with Steed’s
voice from the MacKenzie video saying “I Copy… and it’s almost
made it to that two track road we walked in on”… and I think
those voices belong to one and the same individual. Jesse Steed.
So my best guess about this supposed new piece of evidence
that emerged last night is that Laurie McKee Sutton is simply
incorrect about that being Robert Caldwell’s voice.
Your mileage may vary… and everyone PLEASE chime in
with an opinion.
I did not know ANY of these men… but somebody out there
did and it’s time they helped us all discover WHO is really
speaking on that recently released video. It’s important.
It is still astonishing to me that the SAIT, with all their
resources ( 50+ investigators ), access to witnesses,
and multi-million dollar budget… REFUSED to identify
who is speaking at these critical times…
…but ‘astonishment’ just continues to be the only way
to describe this entire incident and the (supposed)
professional follow-up / analysis.
**
** FINALIZED GPS COORDINATES FOR ALL FOUR
** GLOBE TYPE II CREW VIDEOS FROM THE YARNELL FIRE
This is just some ongoing ‘followup’ work.
In ‘chapter 1’ of this research/commenting… I discovered FOUR
new videos of the Yarnell Hill Fire that had never been seen before
sitting on YouTube under the YouTube user account name 4490red.
This ‘Globe Type II Crew’ was resourced the night before out of
the Globe Fire Department. Apparently, Globe FD has a subcontract
with Arizona State Forestry Commission to supply personnel ‘as needed’
when calls go out. The vehicles they were all driving were AZ State
vehicles and the caps they were wearing were AZ Forestry… but
when they finally got around to uploading the videos they took
that day ( June 30, 2013 ) this ‘4490red’ fellow just defaulted
to his own employment designation as ‘Globe Type II Crew’.
I was able to find out who YouTube user 4490red actually is since
he left all the clues needed to do that in his own YouTube videos
and he does, in fact, work for the Globe, AZ Fire District… but I’m
still not going to publish his name here since that’s not really
important at this time.
What HAS always been important is exactly WHERE these videos
were taken throughout the fateful day of June 30, 2013, and what
the ‘accidentally captured’ radio transmissions tell us.
These are the videos that accidentally capture a number of radio
conversations that day featuring both Eric Marsh and Darrell Willis.
Anyway… just for the sake of completeness… here are the
actual EXACT locations for all FOUR ‘Globe Type II Crew’
videos shot in Yarnell on June 30, 2013.
They are listed in chronological order as to when they were
taken during the day… starting with the crew just sitting in
the parking lot of the Yarnell Fire Station waiting for their
assignment, to the ones taken while they were assigned
to Structure Protection Group 2 ( Darrell Willis ) and working
in the Model Creek area ( Peeples Valley )… to the final video
taken just around the time of the burnover event from the
U-Store-It Storage facility on Highway 89.
Just cut-and-paste any of the “Latitude, -Longitude” lines
with the ‘comma’ separating the values into the search
bar of Google Maps, hit ENTER, and a large GREEN ARROW
will be pointing at the exact location.
NOTE: That final video has new relevance since it is the
exact same ‘mini-storage’ facility mentioned in the recently
released MAYDAY video/audio transcipt(s), and the place
where the crew in that video was actually headed as
we see them tear out of the Shrine area.
** VIDEO 1
YouTube Video Title…
Yarnell Hill Fire 6_30_2013. Globe Type II Crew – Staging
YouTube address…
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rgh_O9vcCyQ
YouTube ABOUT information…
Yarnell Hill Fire 6/30/2013. Globe Type II Crew.
Uploaded by YouTube user: 4490red
Published on Oct 9, 2013
Staged at Yarnell Fire Dept. morning of 6/30/2013. 4th crew on
scene. Granite Mountain can be heard on the radio calling
Operations on Tac 1. Waiting to see if we were going to be
choppered up on the mountain. Everyone was in good spirits
that morning.
The first video these fellas shot that day ( June 30, 2013 ).
They are just sitting in parking lot of Yarnell Hill
Fire Station and waiting for an assignment.
They would NOT be ‘choppered up on the mountain’.
Shortly after this video was taken they were assigned
to Structure Protection Group 2 ( SPGS2 – Darrell Willis )
and Willis had them clearing brush around houses up
in the Model Creek ( Peeples Valley ) area.
This is the one with Eric Marsh’s voice on the radio
at +43 seconds when he says…
+43: Operations, Abel, Granite Mountain, on TAC 1
( There was never any response ).
NOTE: It is now pretty much been proven that this was
not a ‘call sign’ slip on Eric Marsh’s part. The reason
he does NOT identify himself as ‘DIVS A’ at this time
( as he would the remainder of the day ) is because he
wasn’t even informed he’d been given that assignment yet.
Eric Marsh was already ‘on the hike’ out to the ridge
when this radio transmission was accidentally captured
in this video… and he still believed he was just GMIHC.
Location where video was taken…
Dirt parking lot just due east of the Yarnell Hill Fire
Station Helipad.
Camera operator was sitting in the driver seat of
one of the AZ State Crew Carriers exactly here when
he shot this video…
Latitude: 34.222295
Longitude: -112.745052
34.222295, -112.745052
** VIDEO 2
YouTube Video Title…
Yarnell Hill Fire 6_30_2013. Globe Type II Crew – Fire Whirl
YouTube address…
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E6FUZnoX0Gw
YouTube ABOUT information…
Yarnell Hill Fire 6/30/2013. Globe Type II Crew.
Uploaded by YouTube user: 4490red
Published on Oct 9, 2013
Yarnell Hill Fire 6/30/2013. North East structure protection group.
Prepping houses as the fire burned towards us.
They have been assigned to SPGS 2 ( Darrell Willis ) and they
are up in the Model Creek ( Peeples Valley ) area clearing
brush from around homes in that neighborhood.
They are on the NORTH side of the fire at this point.
Winds are still blowing from the SouthWest.
This is the video with the ‘fire tornado’ in it seen on the fireline.
Camera operator was standing exactly here when he shot this video…
Latitude: 34.282010
Longitude: -112.766376
34.282010, -112.766376
** VIDEO 3
YouTube Video Title…
Yarnell Hill Fire 6_30_2013. Globe Type II Crew – 2 VLAT drops
YouTube address…
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qwc3IexjJTk
YouTube ABOUT information…
Yarnell Hill Fire 6/30/2013. Globe Type II Crew.
Uploaded by YouTube user: 4490red
Published on Oct 9, 2013
Yarnell Hill Fire. 6/30/2013. Globe Type II Crew. DC-10 Tanker
drop on Northeast flank. Late afternoon 6/30/2013. Helped prevent
spread to the Northeast before the wind shift.
Crew had been assigned to SPGS 2 ( Darrell Willis ) and
they are still just clearing brush around houses in Model Creek,
up in Peeples Valley, as they had been doing most of the day.
This is much later in the day than the previous video shot from
the same general area in Model Creek.
Approaching thunderstorm is clearly seen arriving into
the Yarnell area and is alread overhead.
Shows TWO sequential VLAT drops on the north side of
the fire, just before ( or right at the time ) the winds shifted.
Willis is heard talking to ‘Corey Moser’ on the radio in this video…
+1:50
Willis: Task Force Moser, Structure 2, on TAC 2.
Moser: Structure 2, Moser, go ahead.
Willis: Hey Corey, have you checked those… ah… the ranch?
Moser: That’s negative. I’ve got… ah… three engines I’ve been workin’ this flop.
Looks like we just about got it caught… so I’m gonna head over
and check the ranch out as soon as I’m… ah… comfortable here.
Willis: Copy.
NOTE: What is significant about this ‘accidentally’ captured radio
communication from Willis is that ( according to all other published
records ) Willis SHOULD have been at the ‘Double Bar A Ranch’
himself at this time making sure everyone got out of there safely
since by this time of day it could not be saved. Instead… here we
clearly hear Willis asking Corey Moser to go ‘check on the ranch’.
Very curious. Where WAS Willis at this moment in time? Still unkown.
Camera operator was standing exactly here when he shot this video…
Latitude: 34.282593
Longitude: -112.765360
34.282593, -112.765360
** VIDEO 4
YouTube Video Title…
Yarnell Hill Fire 6_30_2013. Globe Type II Crew – At the U-Store-It
YouTube address…
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=riLzhfH6g_M
YouTube ABOUT information…
Yarnell Hill Fire 6/30/2013. Globe Type II Crew.
Uploaded by YouTube user: 4490red
Published on Oct 6, 2013
Yarnell Hill Fire. 6/30/2013. DC-10 Tanker drop just
east of Glen Ilah. After the wind shift. Right around
the time of the entrapment.
This is the one where they are in the U-Store-It mini-storage parking
lot later in the day… about the time of the burnover ( according
to their own About comments ) watching a VLAT drop with their
white Globe Type II ‘Crew Trucks’ in the foreground and the
‘Ranger 58′ radio traffic heard in the background right after the drop.
Their own description of where they took this video is NOT CORRECT.
They were not really ‘just east of Glen Ilah’. The mini-storage facility
seen in the video is actually north of Yarnell itself, just as you leave
town, on the west side of Highway 89.
The EXACT time of this video has still not been determined.
If it was right BEFORE the burnover… then this could be the VLAT
line-up and drop that Marsh was trying to help with when he called
out “That’s where we want retardant” just 2 minutes before the
first MAYDAY call from the canyon. That’s a stretch… but it’s possible.
The flight path and location matches the description in both the
SAIR and the ADOSH as a ‘retardant drop to the north of Yarnell’.
If it was right AFTER the burnover… then this could be Air Command
telling this VLAT to “Get in touch with Ranger 58 ( The DPS Helicopter )
right now and GO BACK”. Ranger 58 would have been already scrambling
at this moment following the ‘We are deploying’ message.
Camera operator was standing exactly here when he shot this video…
Latitude: 34.231000
Longitude: -112.739872
34.231000, -112.739872
You could also just drop this address into the Google Maps search bar
and the red marker will be right on the exact location…
21972 Arizona 89, Yarnell, AZ
WTKTT,
“Brings up a good question for WFF people, however. When you ARE in a ‘mountaintrail’ area… and trying to mark a spot where you left the road for someone
who is coming up later… what’s the standard practice? Just drop a roll of
tape on the ground and HOPE the guy sees it… or something more obvious
like an ‘arrow’ weighted with rocks, or something?”
YES, that’s ALMOST exactly what I do. It needs to be REALLY OBVIOUS. I tie it to the brush/branch up high, then tie it to a rock on the ground point the direction to go.
AND it’s called FLAGGING, not tape. Tape is for tool heads or injuries. More basic FF 101 for all you non-WFF out there.
Reply to RTS post on December 17, 2013 at 9:06 pm
>> RTS wrote…
>> YES, that’s ALMOST exactly what I do. It needs to be
>> REALLY OBVIOUS. I tie it to the brush/branch up high,
>> then tie it to a rock on the ground point the direction to go.
There wasn’t really any ‘branch’ near the side of the road
at that point to do that… but I think it’s safe to say now that
just willy-nilly ‘dropping a roll of tape’ ( I’m sorry, ‘flagging’ )
off to the side of the road and expecting that to be some kind
of real ‘marker’ for someone coming up from behind is
totally absurd.
>> RTS also wrote…
>> AND it’s called FLAGGING, not tape.
>> Tape is for tool heads or injuries.
>> More basic FF 101 for all you non-WFF out there.
Thanks. What WOULD we do without you fireboys?
By the way… if anyone is OUT… they’re running a special
right now up on the Forestry Suppliers website.
Hint: Just use their product search bar and ask for either
‘tape’ or ‘flagging’. You will get the exact same pages.
https://www.forestry-suppliers.com/search.asp?stext=tape&page=2
Full Sail,
Disregard the above, you already did. Bad SA on me. Posts not scouted and sized up on my part.
no worries!
I have to agree with Bob in that the GMHS Crew travelled together. It’s very likely though that Marsh took a serarate route ending up in the same place AFTER the rest of them.
i concur as well. the crew would have departed together, with either steed or an experienced squad boss leading the way. overhead are usually the first in and the last out. marsh probably came up behind the crew, realized what was going on and made the calm call to air attack that we hear in the video.
an interesting question would be whether or not the spent pink roll of flagging was from marsh scouting a more direct escape route back to the ranch. but again, we’ll never know. i imagine IF he flagged a game trail down through the green any remnants would have been burnt up given the fire behavior.
Full Sail,
I responded to your reply to me on the SOP issue above from a few days ago.. Let me know what you think.
WTKTT –You are right about the info that it was the squad boss Robert being important to the families and those who are seeking all the information. I apologize for my statement it does matter. I was referring to the reason they got there in the first place, and what information is gained if it was Robert on the radio. He was part of the crew, he was a squad boss and he also had responsibility for his crew and to his supervisor. They were trapped and he was doing his part.
Yes… but does this possible new development mean a lot
more than that?
We have been assuming all along that these men were in
single file on descent… and that Steed was leading them.
What if that’s not the case?
What if they ‘broke into squads’ and were descending along
different paths?
What if the ‘missing 9 men’ from the MacKenzie video and
the mysterious ‘third voice’ represent a ‘squad’ that had
been sent ahead to ‘check out the escape route’ and they
were WELL ahead of the other men?
It introduces the possibility that one of the squads encountered
the flaming front FIRST.
It also introduces the possibility that some of these other
men may have ended up running TOWARDS their death…
instead of using every possible second to RETREAT.
We still don’t know exactly how this went down.
That’s why we are still here.
Every detail counts.
That’s MY perspective, anyway. Always has been.
That’s why I am here participating.
Why some of these other commenters are here?
I’m no longer sure.
Based on my knowledge the crew bunched up and left in one unit, That’s SOP for a hot Shot crew. Line up– every body has there place in the crew line it is not haphazard. Move out when the leader is ready to depart– Leader in front Captain, Supt, lead squad boss which could have been assigned as the asst. for the day. usually one of the leaders would take up the rear to make sure every body kept pace. That is the way it has always been I would expect no difference with GM.
“It also introduces the possibility that some of these other
men may have ended up running TOWARDS their death…
instead of using every possible second to RETREAT.”
no, i think you’re leaping again…
the fact that there were 19 shelters deployed in a very tight formation, indicates that they remained a cohesive unit to the bitter end… for better or worse. it amazes me in fact, that no one did their own thing. that alone speaks volumes to the type of crew that steed and marsh ran.
Reply to xxfullsailxx post
on December 17, 2013 at 8:01 pm
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>> it amazes me in fact, that no one did
>> their own thing.
That’s TWICE in one day that we AGREE!
I, too, have always been TRULY amazed that
no one ran for it. The top of the ridge was only
470 yards away and there were four distinct
CLEARINGS that lined up due west of the
deployment site. Some ‘open field running’
was definitely possible. Some of them would
have PROBABLY made it.
By the way… not sure if you knew this… but there
has ALWAYS been a ‘theory’ put forth by a
former WFF Hotshot-turned-author that these
men did, in fact, run TOWARDS their death.
Kyle Dickman was the first author to obtain
exclusive interviews with Brendan McDonough,
even prior to the SAIR being released.
Brendan ‘warmed up’ to Kyle since he was a
‘fire brother’… and told him things that have
never even appeared in any official report.
In his article… Kyle Dickman says that GM was
still ‘descending’ when they first saw the fire
and hadn’t even reached the canyon floor yet.
He then ‘theorizes’ that they decided deployment
was the only option… and then ran FORWARD
some distance TOWARDS the fire and the flat
part of the canyon just to find a good place
to deploy.
You owe it to yourself to read the article.
I do NOT agree with his ‘theory’… but since he
is ‘one of your own’ I thought you might find it
interesting to read his theory.
It has still NOT been determined exactly where
they were when they actually first realized they
were in deep trouble.
Was it ( coincidentally ) at the spot where they
deployed?… or did they really have to spend
some time ‘searching’ for that spot?
How much time?
Did they ‘retreat’ to that spot… or did they, in fact,
have to move ‘forward’ to find it? Still unknown.
Here is Kyle Dickman’s original article…
Outside Magazine
Tuesday, September 17, 2013
19: The True Story of the Yarnell Fire
Author: Former WFF Hotshot Kyle Dickman
Based on exclusive interviews with
Brendan McDonough.
http://www.outsideonline.com/outdoor-adventure/YarnellFire.html
Kyle Dickman is an associate editor for Outside magazine. He was a hotshot for years before
becoming a magazine editor. He belonged to the
Tahoe Hotshot Crew. Dickman started fighting
forest fires when he was 18 years old.
yes, that was a very good article.
i don’t think that it is hard to believe that GM, once realizing the situation, probably backtracked to a flat spot they thought was large enough for all to deploy. looking at the topo map (but not having actually been to the site) it seems to me they didn’t have to get too far around the knob to see the fire advancing on their position.
WTKTT, I have been following your work closely and you have done an incredible job. I, for one, believe that every small piece of evidence is crucial. It appears that the reports that have been issued (SAIR and WFAR) are inaccurate. The strongest piece of evidence that I can provide is the actual words of the only living survivor of the GMIHC. In the interview notes released last week Mr. Mcdonough stated for the second time ( 8/7 Prescott Daily Courier) that he left his lookout post shortly after 1445. The interview notes on p 41 dated 7/5 (first time but only released last week) says ..1445 starts to take weather for top of the hour first reading wrong does it a second time good but to make sure does it a third time turns back towards fire and notices that fire has made it to his trigger point to leave. P42…Advises Steed he is there (old grader) Steed says he can see him decides at this time if he needs to deploy this is the spot. Looks at a possible new lookout spot up hill at about this time Blue Ridge Supt shows up and says he will give him a ride out. Not in any rush to load up asks the Blue Ridge Supt if wants to talk to Crew on his radio. Next paragraph…. Blue Ridge Supt advised to Steed fire conditions and asks if they have good black. Steed says yes they have good black and can see the fire. Blue Ridge says they will move there trucks and have Brendan with them.
I am eager to see if Mcdonough indicates leaving his lookout post at 1445 in the other TWO interviews done by ADOSH.
There is a lot of confliction in the few statements above. Mcdonough does not contact BR to pick him up. He considers a different lookout spot. And once BR arrives at grader they are in no rush to load up. But in the same few short sentences, Mcdonough and Steed discuss deployment. I understand that you should always be thinking worst case scenario, but to actually discuss deploying when (per Mcdonough’s interview) He doesn’t call for BR to evacuate him, considers finding another spot to serve as lookout, and do not rush away once picked up; doesn’t add up to me.
BR interview notes (P9) …They only heard 1 wx update prior to picking Brendan up. This seems to be a confirmation that Mcdonough was picked up prior to the second weather update first announced at 1526.
>> On December 14, 2013 at 12:44 pm TTWARE said…
>>
>> It would seem perhaps a more logical progression of events for
>> DIV A and GM to be feeling good about being safe in the black,
>> and then citing THAT to Musser at the time of the turn-down of
>> his request, AND THEN, immediately after that receiving a request
>> from Willis to protect Yarnell, causing an abrupt change in their
>> prior decision, whereby they immediately departed for Yarnell.
>>
>> IN FACT, if Willis actually heard the Musser turn-down over the radio,
>> AND THEN prodded them to go anyway, perhaps a little more
>> than ‘minor guilt’ ( on Willis’s part ) would be in order.
There’s been a lot of ‘new’ discussion above about this new piece of
evidence from the SAIT notes that Willis definitely TOLD Marsh
“we’ve got to get this thing anchored”… and WHEN he gave that
directive to Marsh.
The SAIT notes actually say that this ‘directive’ from Willis to Marsh came
early in the morning. Willis had been UP ALL NIGHT along scouting
the Model Creek / Peeples Valley are and sizing up structure protection
needs and consulting with Shumate all night.
We learn now it was actually Willis’ input to Shumate throughout the night
that was causing a lot of the overnight ‘requests for more resources’ to
go out. So Willis was almost ‘Co-IC’ overnight that night… telling Shumate
what to order and probably WHO to order.
There is also still the lingering issue of whether Willis ‘intervened’ after
Marsh/Steed issued their turn-down to Musser later in the afternoon,
and whether Willis had a ‘second opinion’ about that and might have
contacted Marsh to ‘suggest’ he change his mind.
What is still key to all of that, I think, is whether Eric Marsh really would
have given a crap what Darrell Willis ‘thought’ about anything.
There is evidence that he did NOT.
There had been a LOT of ‘conflict’ between Marsh and the people running
his organization back in Prescott. Willis stood directly between Marsh
and the City of Prescott when it came to administrative issues and
Amanda Marsh herself has come out in public describing some of
those issues/conflicts.
It wasn’t just the mysterious ‘certification’ thing… where Willis got Steed
to sign a certification document that Marsh was apparently refusing
to sign. We know now ( as per Amanda Marsh ) that there was a huge
confilict between Marsh ( Willis? ) and the City of Prescott over Marsh
trying to obtain full-time benefits for Andrew Ashcraft.
The following is a transcript of what Amanda Marsh has had to say
in public about this… in case you haven’t seen it.
She gave a video interview to reporters on the steps of the Courthouse
just after being ‘dissed’ at a meeting of the Prescott City Council.
She was NOT happy… and proceeded to tell us all how NOT happy
her husband ( Eric Marsh ) had also been recently.
The ‘Q:’ prefixes in the transcript below are reporter’s question.
The ‘G:’ prefixes in the transcript below are from a gentleman that was
with Amanda that day at the Council Meeting and also ‘pushing her cause’.
The rest of the transcript is pure Amanda Marsh speaking out, and the
EMPHASIS shown below is not mine. It is when Amanda herself was
raising her voice in anger.
AMANDA MARSH PRESS CONFERENCE – August 7, 2013
YouTube VIDEO…
Granite Mountain Hotshots-Amanda Marsh-Press Conference-Aug. 7 2013
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tjiRjERhgbU
About
Published on Aug 7, 2013
Amanda Marsh (widow of Granite Mountain Hotshot, Eric Marsh)
speaks to the media after the press conference held by Juliann Ashcraft
(widow of Granite Mountain Hotshot, Andrew Ashcraft) on
Wednesday, August 7, 2013 on the steps of the Yavapai County
Courthouse in Prescott, AZ.
Amanda Marsh speaks…
We’re talking about the need for raising taxes in Prescott when our Hotshot
um… program is already in place. The money is already there. The program is
already in place… it’s just a shaky program… it’s just a shaky foundation.
Um… and… so… the City…
I wanted to ask that question… and… they wouldn’t let me speak.
And then that made me mad.
So I did want to thank them for wanting to… um… for wanting to bring the
crew back… but… I don’t know.
I thought that the way they handled the situation.. and handled me…
was pretty poor seeing how I’m one of the widows and I just asked for
TWO minutes.
Um… so that’s what happened.
Q: Amanda… I know you’re not a very public person… and this is a rare
occasion for you to be speaking out.
Absolutely.
This won’t happen again.
Q: What is it about this? I mean… You obviously you feel very strongly that
these… these widows should be getting the benefits that they deserve?
I’m only here for Juliann at the moment… and… um…
My husband, Eric Marsh, he used… he used to not be able to
SLEEP at night trying to deal with the issue of Andrew Ashcraft’s benefits.
Um…
He was VERY upset with the City.
He was VERY upset with the entire City Council.
Because they made it SO hard for him to get benefits for that position.
And MY husband… This fair and just amazing human being…
could not deliver that to Andrew and his family.
And it made him SO upset.
And you can SEE it.
I mean… he talked about it in his employee evaluation.
He was VERY upset about it… and I am upset about it, too.
And I can remember exactly the conversations that he would have when
he got home.
He was SO upset.
Um… he didn’t feel like it was right.
He tried SO hard to get benefits for that FULL TIME position.
Q: He understood the family was getting ACCESS?
Excuse me?
Q: He knew the family was getting ACCESS… had to go on State Aid?
I don’t know that he knew that.
I don’t remember him ever saying anything about that.
Q: What’s… do you remember anything specific he said to you in your conversations?
Ya know… I just remember that he was really upset.
I remember that he just couldn’t sleep at night.
I do remember that very clearly.
Q: What do you think of the difference between full-time benefits and temporary.
Something that amounts to a million dollars over a lifetime?
You know… I don’t want to speak about any of that because that’s not why
I’m here. I’m just here to speak about Juliann and HER benefits.
Q: What made it so hard for her to get the benefit?
Eric Marsh to get him the benefits? What obstacles were in his way?
The City did NOT want to benefit those… that full-time position even though
it had been benefited before.
So admittedly by the city… that was a full-time position… because that
position was benefited prior to this.
Q: So where they just dragging their feet… or trying to cut costs?
I think they were trying to cut costs.
G: Understand… the Hotshot crew doesn’t cost the City any money.
G: The Hotshot crew’s activities are reimbursed by the Federal Government.
G: The net cost of the hotshot crew is minimal.
G: So this is not really much of an issue.
You got about another two… yeah… OK.
Q: Wanna say something about that?
Yea… I do… I do.
Q: Go ahead
G: I almost got you outta here. You were doin’ so good.
Okay… I’m gonna talk about that guy… and I can’t remember
his name. I think his last name is Steele.
He told ME…
He addressed me by MY name, Amanda, and Mrs. Marsh…
and then he told me to get out of his face. So how’s that?
Pretty bad, isn’t it?
Q: You obviously feel so strongly about this that you wanted to get
right up in there?
Well… I feel strongly for Juliann.
We’ve have been through E-NOUGH.
We’ve been through enough.
Juliann has been through enough.
She is grieving for the loss of Andrew.
She is greiving for that MASSIVE gaping hole in her life…
And now she’s trying to figure out how to raise four children… by herself.
And… you know… she’s talking about having to go back to work.
Well… I think what she left out is the fact that there’s ONE parent
left for that family. If she goes back to work… that means those kids are
without her for that time period that she’s at work and the time that she
comes home and she’s tired.
And that’s not fair.
It’s not fair.
That’s it.
END OF AMANDA MARSH PUBLIC INTERVIEW
Why do you feel the need to post the entire written dialogue? Do you think people don’t know how to use their mouse to click on the link? Do you not realize that whatever point you were trying to make gets lost in the mile long scroll through redundant dialogue?
Because WTKTT is good at putting the info togather for all of us. And it makes it easer for all to follow. we kind of agreed to this format so every one was on the same page.
Fullsail….. If you have nothing to contribute to the discussion, in a positive manner, please feel free to leave. Your negativity is not appreciated by those trying to find answers from this event…
Add me to the list of people who agree with Rocksteady on this.
What is wrong with you, xxfullsailxx?
Do you totally fail to appreciate how ridiculous it is that you are making post after post on this blog in order to criticize other people for… wait for it … making post after post? If it weren’t so obnoxious, it would actually be sorta funny.
Bill on Wildfiretoday.com had to chastise you, then John on investigativemedia.com chastised you, as did J.Stout, Rock Steady, Bob P., et cetera. But it seems like you are still failing to get the message. Hopefully you are more perceptive when you are out on the line.
Allow me to give a shot at spelling it out for you: People on this blog and on Bill’s blog are not fond of your tenor, your snark. It is not productive, it is not respectful, and it is not welcome. Knock it off.
umm, i don’t think i was talking to any of you, but since you’ve chosen to insert yourself into the conversation…
i feel that posting the dialogue as well as a link to the video of the dialogue is not only redundant, it does a disservice to the point that WTKTT was trying to make. furthermore, the effects of carpal tunnel syndrome are well documented. and scrolling with your mouse, only contributes. so i am trying to do you a favor.
lastly, this conversation isn’t about me, so if you don’t like what i am saying, then ignore me. the website administrators will hit my mute button when they feel it is appropriate.
Eric Marsh was a professional doing the job he was well qualified for, his dealings with his employer had no bearing on the decisions he was making that day.
If you really want to know the truth, why bring all the hearsay into the discussion?
From all I have heard and read , Eric Marsh was extremely qualified and highly regarded. Yet he made a very bad mistake as you say (over and over). Fine, we can all accept that. Now what? If this very fine crew super messed up and crew supers absolutely control their crew’s safety, how do we prevent a repeat of this? Do we just stop at “mistakes were made” or is there a step beyond that?
I agree with mike, the way things are coming out and new info some of our hearsay is getting closer to fact. We are in discussion at this time and have reached no conclusions with out fact. His dealings with his employer are a important part of this conversation, until absolute fact is known. As in any investigation dot the I’s and cross the T’s all of them. There may be nothing but there is information out there that still leaves us with the question. As a professional he did not follow LCES nor did he notify his OPS of his plan, we are searching for why. It wasn’t just an act of God.
Marsh and Steed were qualified professionals, they made a judgement call, unfortunately they were wrong and it had horrendous consequences. Yes, they ignored LCES but this same type of decision is made, on some scale, every day of every fire season, fortunately with a different ending. The lesson to be learned is to admit a mistake was made and to ask why was it made. Why did they think it was a good idea to head down into that bowl?
2 investigations have been done, probably most of the basic facts of this case are out there (allowing for some additional info that may or may not come). We have seen the pictures of them watching the fire, they apparently had the weather info that was available. So, as wildland firefighters, do you have any thoughts on what caused him to underestimate the fire? I surmised that he allowed what he saw to trump what he knew (the fuels, the dryness, the fact that the weather was in flux), but that is just a guess. I would be interested in the thoughts of those with experience. According to most here, this was not a close call.
I would have sat it out with just what I’ve seen and the other factors that day. That why I keep asking the question why. I may never get that answer.
in my opinion, they thought the storm front had come, and was pushing the fire to the east-south-east. when they hike off lookout spot they thought they would outflank the fire and shortcut to the ranch. whether that shortcut was a pre-determined and flagged escape route or some overheads spur of the moment idea, we will never know.
they lost sight of the fire when they were south of the knob and when they popped out, they realized the fire was quickly advancing due south and cutting off their path to the ranch.
they didn’t fully communicate their movement because the radio was a cluster !@#$ with the fire advancing on yarnell and resources trying to get out of the way. and noone in their right mind thought GM would do anything but sit and wait it out in the black.
i agree that a safety officer worth his or her salt could have prevented disaster.
So he was relying on the direction not changing (i.e. easterly was parallel to their route). Sounds as if he was relying on a best-case scenario, and not accounting for the worst. Not anticipating the possibility of a wind shift in a thunderstorm – is that not a pretty bad error?
I agree with fullsail, I simply think they thought they could outflank it and get to someplace where they could do some good. Yes, that is a pretty bad error but crews make those kind of moves all the time although probably not in as volatile of a situation as that day.
?
I have been having problems posting, so…I am going to try and do some catch up here, although I don’t have anything to add to solving this puzzle, just more general comments because I can.
xxfullsailxx said “the idea that eric marsh or jesse steed were “ordered” down is not something that sits well with me, though i do think it’s worthwhile to look into all the influencing factors that lead to GM leaving their safety zone in the middle of the burn period and walk through the green. in my experience over the last 12 seasons, no one “orders” (in terms of demanding an action) a crew anywhere.”
Like so much in the wildland firefighting culture, this topic is very nuanced that requires a lot of explanation to those who are not familiar with that culture. So…my short response to your comment is that I agree with you most of the time, in fact On December 5, I said, “We have discussed the wildland fire culture quite a bit, but there is at least one difference with the military. I think It is very, very, rare for someone to say, “I order you to do such and such.” I think “orders” are given more like ordinary people would do in a conversation, a lot like WTKTT say’s above, so Marsh and Steed would hear a request, “Hey can you guy’s get down here ASAP to help us here?” That would be more like how an order is given, more like a request to do what the requester thinks is right. And of course I think they would not have a problem telling just anybody “no” but would have a problem telling somebody special “no”.”
However, I think there are sometimes that orders are orders and orders are in fact given. For example, I consider, “That was when he (OPS1) told his DIVS A and the GMHS under his command to “Just hunker down (there) and be safe”.” that was in fact an “order” and should have been followed. And if that order had been followed…all of the Granite Mountain Hotshots would be alive today.
In addition, in an earlier comment I also stated, “I think they were moving to the backside of Yarnell to work ASAP per their orders from a higher authority they could not say “no” to.”
So…if the higher authority (Darrell Willis, for example) they could not say “no” to would have said,
I would like you to go
I wish you would go
Can you go
Will you go
It would be best if you go
Can you possibly go
Please go
I think you should go
If I were you, I would go
etc. well…even though none of those are technically an order in the strict sense of a military order, but if Eric Marsh would have heard any of those from the right person, I believe he would have interpreted it as an “order” to go.
Furthermore, the reason I always tried to say “they had been asked (ordered) to do” is to try and make the distinction between the two ways of telling somebody you want them to do something. This attempt at making the distinction was for the sake of both the people who are reading this thread and contributing to it who do not have a background in wildland firefighting, and there is a lot of this discussion that is very depended on the interpretation of semantics.
So the short answer it…I agree with you AND I disagree with you, which means yes…just like so many things since June 30, 2013, I am conflicted and confused about a lot of things.
Yes, WTKTT, this quasi military culture where no one gives orders but only suggestions that can be turned down is very confusing.
Elizabeth said, “What are you referencing that I wrote, xxfullsailxx? Clearly you are condemning it, but clue me in to what you think I said that was so wrong….”
Please ignore xxfullsailxx, as you probably have already suspected, the widland firefighting force is full of testosterone driven, ego-maniacs, type A personalities, who have huge ego’s and have been pumped full of hubris. Most of the nice ones were killed off and eaten at a young age, although apparently, a large number of them found their way onto the Granite Mountain Hotshots, but they were the exception, not the rule.
Luckily for me, I developed a leak when I retired and the hubris I was pumped full of is almost all gone. Hubris can not only be a killer for old men, it can kill young ones as well.
Elizabeth N. said “No criticism. No hostility toward you. Just trying to think this through….”
I did not think you were being critical or hostile, although you and I are probably just going to have to agree to disagree on whether wildland firefighting crews should be run as democracies. And yes, I got lucky many times, in fact…one of my favorite sayings used to be, “It is better to be lucky than good.”
xxfullsailxx said, i also appreciate the fact that you don’t try to say that you did everything right throughout your career. everyone makes mistakes at some point throughout their career. hopefully none as tragic as this.
Yes, my life is full of mistakes and regrets. I actually have a very long list, and if it will help here, I can offer many more for discussion. And if I had it to do all over again, I would, only I would try harder to get it RIGHT next time.
xxfullsailxx said, “and i am so tired of wading through “Elizabeth’s” and “want to know the truth’s” B.S.
you all don’t have a clue what you’re talking about and you make huge leaps from very shaky foundations.
“WTKTT”: you don’t know half of what you claim to “know.”
“Elizabeth”: for someone who is “trained as a lawyer” you don’t seem to recognize the inadequacy of assumption.”
So…let me see if I got this right xxfullsailxx, if you think WTKTT is 50 percent wrong, then even you think WTKTT is 50 percent right. I think in baseball, that would make him a superstar, right? And even here, batting .500 when the SAIT batted 0 with their SAIR makes him a superstar, right? Oh…and one other thing, please show me even 10 percent of the half he claims to know but you think he doesn’t. And one more thing…neither WTKTT or Elizabeth N. have said they are subject matter experts (SME), just people who want help if they can.
You on the other hand, are representing yourself as a SME, so like I said in a previous comment, I think you should be willing to put your real name on your comments and stand behind them.
And yes, apparently everyone involved in this discussion has some discretionary time on their hands, even you. I for one, am glad so many people are devoting that discretionary time to solving this conundrum…”What the hell happened on the Yarnell Hill Fire? Or don’t you think the 19 out of 20 of the Granite Mountain Hotshots are worth it?
Gary’s answer is right in the heat of the moment. a squad boss could have taken over the radio as Steed was busy directing the Deployment site. What difference does it make?
Gary’s response: Expected
Mr. Power’s response: Helpful… but also surprising.
We now have a statement/evidence that it was NOT
Captain Jesse Steed making the actual MAYDAY calls.
What difference does it make?
If you care at all about what REALLY happened that day…
Including the final moments of these men…
It matters a LOT.
More to come on this point.
One of the Facebook pages is saying that the other voice on the audio besides Marsh is “Robert” – would be Robert Caldwell I assume, who was a squad boss. Certainly that would seem to be possible. Not sure it is really all that critical.
Reply to mike post on December 16, 2013 at 10:40 pm
Just to be clear… are you referring to the ‘third voice’ heard
saying “You bet!” in the second 9 second MacKenzie video clip?
Also… which Facebook page are you referring to?
Could you post a link?
No, the reference is to the last radio transmission video, I believe. The page is Prescott Firefighters Last Alarm. Mrs. Marsh has put a post up near the top. In one of the comments, a family member says that Robert’s voice is also on that video – there are only 2 of the GMHS heard on that video. Understandably, there is a lot of upset on their part about the release of the video.
I imagine so. It’s hard for anyone to listen to.
This brings up a question for the WFF people,
though, I suppose.
Under what conditions would a simple squad
boss even be ‘allowed’ to be trying to make
his own transmissions on either Channel 10
or 16… when his supervisor and his own DIV
are right there near him?
Would that be a serious violation of this
all-important ‘pecking order’, even in an
emergency situation?…
…or could it be that Steed just got busy
directing the improvement of the deployment
site and actually told him ( that squad boss )
to ‘take over’ with the radio?
Not unusual at all for a squad boss to be on the radio like this.
Also simple squad bosses are actually crew boss rated on Shot crews so a squad boss would be next in line for a captain (asst. supt.)
oops= Strike team leaders.
We all know when we sign up for this kind of work that there is a tragedy risk and that public attention is going to follow when or if a tragedy occurs. It happened with 9-11, and it has always happened.
That that is the way it goes and it has to be that way as part of the learning process and investigation process. At the risk of being blunt and saying the truth, if you do not want to open yourself or your family to the attention or the painful examination, maybe a desk job in the private sector is the better option.
My sympathies to all of the families. Even for someone without family involved, it is hard to hear some of the audio or see some video.
Elizabeth,
“Going direct” is right on the fireline, ‘one foot in the black.’ What DIVS A Marsh wanted, and AA was NOT getting was for AA to “pre-treat’ along the line, wet it down, so as to give the GMHS time to put in their parallel line (a few feet next to the fire periment allowing for radiant heat reduction – the inverse square law) so they could burn it out. However, the AA was being a jerk and insisting DIVS A go ‘direct,’ and again, that’s NOT what DIVS A wanted to do. AA was trying to basically FORCE him to go ‘direct’ by dropping on the burnout operation of their parallel line.
Afterall, they were in Watch Out #11 with lots of unburned fuel that needed to be mitigated.
As I said in an earlier post, these ODF guys always insist on going direct and NOT burning out. There’s a time and a place for that, but then wasn’t the time. AND the AA is supposed to work WITH the DIVS and support his operation, NOT work against him as he was doing in this case.
When you have a lot of line some times it is much faster to back off usually not a lot and build line and fire it out as you go it is much faster than meandering around on the burned edge and you still have the black with you. At that time the fire was above them not active and they had the weather with them. They also had direct access back to the burn as they moved. This is done all the time and dose not violate #11. When you back off a 1/4 or more miles from the main fire then you are going indirect and you need to be aware and put a lot of things into place. Also you need to continually burn out as you go, so you are bringing the black with you. That’s probably clear as mud if you are not a fire fighter. Marsh was trying to get as much line built as he could and that was the best way to do it and LCES was in place.
Reply to Bob Powers post on Dec 17, 2013 at 9:05 am
>> Mr. Powers wrote…
>> That’s probably clear as mud if you are not a fire fighter.
Nope. I am no firefighter ( well… other than putting them
out when they get started on my own back 40 )… but
it makes perfect sense.
With no disrespect… it’s not rocket surgery.
Dangerous, yes…. but there’s only a certain number of
ways to ‘get the cows in the barn’, so to speak.
Remember when I asked all of you what going “direct” meant? Below are some first-hand quotes from the Blue Ridge guys who were trying to explain in interviews what Marsh was trying to get done, and this is part of what prompted me to ask you all to explain what YOU thought “direct” meant:
“They watched Granite Mtn bring fire down the hill in the saddle…….
But the AA had the SEAT drop right on the heat….
Eric got on the radio and said I want to pretreat the area….
AA came back with I want you guys to go direct….
The next drop the SEAT dropped again right on the heat they were putting down so Eric gave up.”
Elizabeth,
“… I got the impression that [Marquez[ was saying that Marsh wasn’t satisfied with where he (Marsh/GM) was in the geography and where he was going to therefore end up cutting an unconnected line; …” That’s not how I interpreted it.
“The way Marquez tells it, he didn’t just leave – just flounce off in a huff. He actually went off – seemingly with Marsh’s concurrence – to look for another access point, to get to a place where he could tie-in more effectively with Marsh.” Not quite following you here. The access point should have been decided/scouted by Marsh and the GMHS, not by DIVS Z. And for Marquez to tie in effectively with Marsh didn’t need sany scouting. Just say where you want to meet, and meet. The issue between Marsh and Marquez was over Division boundaries, not access.
“Remember that there is a group of folks here who believe that Steed was trying to take the ridge-line route to the Helms Ranch (and then Yarnell), but Steed came OFF the ridge b/c he failed to understand the sharp dip in the ridge path and the fact that it would quickly “un-dip” back toward the Helms ranch.”
Maybe so, it doesn’t/didn’t matter. It sounds/looks like it wasn’t properly scouted before hand – one of the Fire Orders and one of the Watch Outs.
“Some folks believe that Marsh came down *after* Steed into the green, basically catching up to them *after* they had already gotten off the ridge-line (presumably accidentally), which might explain why Steed was calm at 4:39 and then a bit more panicked two minutes later when he caught up with the group.” I agree with you on this one. Marsh was just doing his job as DIVS A separate from the Crew, as any DIVS would/should do.
I posted this on another thread, but meant to do it here instead. I picked up on this with my first read of the interview notes:
p46 of the interview notes states that BR was assigned to Division A. I don’t think I have ever read or heard that before, but come to think of it, I don’t think I’ve previously seen any notes or documents officially assigning them to DIV Z. I just made that assumption because that is where DIV Z (Marquez) was instructed to go to. Apparently, there is no record assigning him ANY resources. With DIV Z showing up in the middle of the work day, wanting to take a certain piece of ground and resources from DIV A, it is easy to see how friction could develop between A and Z.
Reply to TTWARE post on December 16, 2013 at 1:21 pm
** Re: Page 46 of SAIT notes.
Discovering now ( and only after months and two highly
expensive official reports ) that Blue Ridge was actually
part of Marsh’s DIVS A does not surprise me. I can’t
believe we had to just discover that in “interviewer’s notes”
that had to be obtained with FOIA/FOIL… but such is this
entire fiasco.
It actually explains a lot of what happened that day to know
that Brian Frisby considered Marsh his ‘boss’ that afternoon.
It explains Marsh ‘dissing’ both Rance Marquez ( DIVS Z )
and Rory Collins ( Air Attack ) and insisting that the plan
he and Brian Frisby had already agreed on be the one
that they continue working on.
It also explains the mysterious ‘request for a second
face-to-face’ meeting from Marsh to Frisby… just before
Brendan had to abandon his lookout position. I have always
thought that was curious. It was a TERRIBLE inconvenience
for Frisby to have to drop what he was doing at that busy
time and schlep all the way out to that ridge ( 2 miles )
on a UTV just because Marsh didn’t feel comfortable
talking about something over the radio…
…but inconvenient or not… Frisby agreed to do it.
That’s when he ‘accidentally’ found Brendan and motored
him back east and out of there.
It makes sense now that if Marsh ‘requested’ the meeting…
Brian felt the need to comply becase Marsh was ‘DIVS A’
and his BOSS at that moment.
again, you really don’t understand what you are talking about, and i really am trying to say that without being insulting.
i would consider marsh and frisby peers in this scenario (yes, even if someone interviewed said that BR was assigned to Div. A). there is a developing incident without a lot of overhead and people are just trying to come up with a plan of attack. since Div Zulu was late to the scene, BR and GM were formulating a plan.
stop making more of the face to face between marsh and frisby than there is. it is much easier to discuss tactics and strategy face to face than it is over busy radio frequencies, especially when radios have a programming bug. two miles is virtually no distance on a UTV. so it was no big deal for frisby to run up there and have a discussion about the overall cluster that the incident was becoming. i am sure they were both recognizing that things were about to get dicey, and wanted to reassess the overall strategy.
you continually make huge leaps from very shaky foundations.
fullsail is right on with his comments, you people without HotShot experience just don’t get it and you try to read way too much into insignificant details.
Some times we chase rabbits here. You are right Frisby and marsh were working together. Marsh was DIVA and Frisby inherited DIVZ. or since there was no real division line DIVZ may have just faded away. Meeting face to face would have been good except time just ran out and they had to much open line between them. But I am sure the were working together as Peers. With no conflicts.
My original comment referenced an apparently ‘new’ revelation that BR was actually assigned to DIV A. In the two released reports, along with other information, that fact was never mentioned. Most people (including me) apparently assumed that since DIV Z (Marquez) was sent to the area BR was working in, that BR must have been working in Division Z.
Also, my original comment had no hint of any friction between Frisby or Marsh, it simply provided a possible reason that Marsh and Marquez (A & Z) could have had friction, due to the fact that Marsh & Frisby’s crews had already been at work, carrying out their previously developed plan. Then, Marquez shows up, wants some a DIV A’ ground and personnel, without having his own plan.
I think a critical point here, is that Marquez was sent out (assigned?) to be DIV Z, with no resources assigned to him. After he disappeared, was BR supposed to assume that they were now working in DIV Z?? It sounds like, after Marquez left, no one (OPS or anyone else) ever tried to contact DIV Z on the radio, so BR must have remained ‘officially’ assigned to A, even after the so called division break was created, and they were apparently working on the ‘Z’ side of it.
I remember more than one report of the division break finally being decided upon between A & Z, but I don’t recall anyone ever officially stating there had been a transfer of resources (BR) from A to Z.
Utimately, what I am trying to say here, is that DIV A, GM, and BR, actually knew the score here, and what I ‘believe’ was happening, is that BR was trying to hold together a leaderless division, along with trying to carry-out their own plan.
it is not black and white! there were no official division breaks! division zulu was almost non-existent! yes, BR and GM were working together on that entire chunk of line. GM at the anchor point and BR out scouting a tie in point… i.e. coming up with a strategy for a piece of ground with no real division breaks and an approaching fire front and foretasted weather that is not conducive to containing the fire that day.
and yes, Marquez showed up in the middle of it and depending on how he approached the two hotshot sups (i.e. whether he came in demanding his own strategy or was trying to listen to what they came up with) would determine the working relationship between the three of them. i don’t know much about Marquez’s background, but it would be pretty unwise to come in to a situation with two sups and not be somewhat open to what they had come up with. it would have led to friction… but none of that really has anything to do with why GM did what they did.
fullsail, Since we don’t actually yet know what caused GM’s 4 o’clock decision to move, I think it’s safe to assume that the possiblity exists that there were other factors, occuring throughout the day, which influenced that decision. The whole ‘Z’ thing, seen as an indicator of how the fire was being run, ‘could’ have been one of them.
i disagree. some of us do know why GM left their safety zone (at least as well as we ever will without hearing from steed or marsh). they left to get back to their buggies so they could assist in Yarnell. odds are, marsh and steed probably made that decision together.
yep, the fire was a sh!t show, there is plenty of evidence for that.
Yarnell is not wildland – it is STRUCTURES. Are Hotshots structure teams? No.
“Jumper:”
hotshot crews perform all sorts of structure protection work, from hose lay/sprinkler set ups, burn out ops., triage and structure prep. etc. if you’ve been on a crew in the past 10 years, odds are you’ve worked directly around structures.
If that’s what they did why in such a rush. Sit in the black for 45 min. let the fire make its run then hike out in the black. If you add up all the things that had happened, moved there lookout and crossed the road they came up on past the old cat it was evident it was going to burn across the flat below them. Again why the hurry?
Reply to TTWARE post
on December 17, 2013 at 10:02 am
Totally agree.
There is no doubt that after that first
face-to-face between Marsh/Steed and
Frisby/Trueheart all the way up at the
anchor point… and the full half-hour
planning session… and Frisby is
documented as having told Marsh the
command briefings that morning
were ‘worthless’… that Marsh/Frisby
felt it was ‘up to them’ in that area all
the way from the anchor point to the
Shrine area.
As Frisby/Trueheart left the ridge with
Brendan to drop him at his lookout
spot… It wouldn’t surprise me if the
send-off conversation was this…
Marsh: It’s you and me bro!
Frisby: You bet!
They had NO IDEA, at that point, if this
Marquez guy was even EVER going
to show his face that day, or not.
All of sudden… he does.
The rest is then confusion, arguments,
Rory Collins ( Air Attack ) trying to insert
himself into the situation to ‘help resolve
the arguments’ he was hearing on the
radio down there… yada, yada, yada.
The real circus began when the fire
reversed and there was no DIVS Z in
place. The structure protection guys
in the Shrine area were the ones that
actually almost died themselves because
they had no active DIVS in place. If not
for BR’s extra efforts ‘playing’ DIVS to
get them all dis-engaged and out of
there… there may have been more
bodies brought off that fire that day.
Yet still the SAIR said…
All protocols were followed.
No mistakes were made that day.
you know what else? it’s a hard thing to say, but i am going to go ahead and say it…
it was extremely fortuitous that BR came back to get Brendan. i am sure that Frisby realized what was going on and that it wasn’t just a coincidence. they dropped him off so i am sure they felt responsible to move him out of there as the fire started heating up.
another disclaimer: GM had a good vantage down on Brendan’s position as well as good eyes on the fire. they were looking out for him as well, but that doesn’t mean they didn’t underestimate rates of spread and the oncoming downdrafts from the t-cell, and it certainly seems as though Brendan was missing his “E” and “S” from LCES…
so here it is: if BR hadn’t made it back there, it seems that Brendan would have been faced with his own shelter deployment. whether or not he would have survived is questionable, but i can’t help but think that the rest of GM would have been witness to that scenario and maybe the change in their focus would have prevented them from taking their fatal walk.
maybe it’s already been said, and it is totally hindsight bias and irrelevant at this point. i’m sure if Brendan is an introspective type of person, he has run through that scenario in his own head many times.
About a month ago… on ‘chapter 1’ of this ongoing
research/comment thread… there was a
discussion about whether the choice Brendan
says he had ALREADY made for a deploy
( the old-grader location ) would have been
survivable.
Joy Collura took an amazing photograph of
that area just days after the fire.
Judge for yourself if you think he would
have survived.
NOTE: There is still GREEN on the leeward
side of the deployment site… even with
everything around it ‘moonscaped’.
That photo is here…
http://www.zazzle.com/rlv/isapi/designall.dll?action=getimage&id=fbbeed4c-832f-4743-914c-7fb2db455ab9
There are only two people left alive who can
still ‘fill in the details’ of everything that
happened in that part of the fire all day
that day… from soup to nuts.
Brian Frisby and Brendan McDonough.
One is being prevented from talking by his employer.
The other is (still) simply reluctant to talk.
Maybe one or both of those conditions
will (soon) change.
whether or not brendan could have survived, was not my point.
Weren’t you just saying that if
Brendan had to deploy… that
might have ‘changed their focus’?
I actually AGREE with you.
If they knew Brendan was deploying
down there… I think ‘whether or
not Brendan had survived’ would
have been all they would have
been concerned about themselves,
and at least those 19 would still
be with us today.
the point is the hypothetical change in focus, not the deployment site survivability.
We remain in
AGREEMENT, then.
If ‘one of their own’
was in trouble… right
there down in front
of them… they would
have stayed right
where they were and
we MIGHT only be
here now trying to
determine how
Brendan McDonough
could have possibly
lost his life that day.
So I am still sitting here looking at the pictures taken by the crew with high fire activity.
Marsh states that the winds are getting squarely and sees high fire activity within 1 to 2 miles of his location.
The crew is in the black and has been there for some time. All have their gear either off or comfortable. This is a crew at this point that dose not expect to move.
The discussion between Marsh and Steed and an unknown person. Then all of a sudden they are up and moving (to reengage)
Something happened that put them on the move just after that discussion?
We are finding bits of information that we are putting together. I think its all there we are going to have to drag it out one peace at a time.
When they stepped down into unburned fuel from the black they lost all control of the situation awareness. A calculated risk not a good choice. I think they made that decision based on somebody telling them to get to Yarnell that they could not refuse.
Bob or anyone, before I forget, what are the chances Steed/Marsh moved b/c of the THUNDER that they and others heard? Meaning, they did not want to wait in the black and get toasted by lightening….
PAGING JOY and SONNY/TEX: Where Steed was resting with the crew (in the black) at roughly 4 p.m., does that area strike you as a lightening rod – is it the highest point in the area, such that lightening was a credible motivator to get Steed/Marsh to move.
Also, WHERE – exactly,, as best you can – did Sonny/Tex recently find the pink tape?
THIRD, have you hiked to the area where you think Steed/Marsh started going down, and is there anything there that would suggest WHY they went down at that exact place? Meaning, was there an old dirt trail there? Was there a natural reduction in the brush there? Was that the only place where there were NOT boulders? Did you see ANYTHING that would explain *that* descent point rather than one twenty or 50 or whatever yards before or after?
It looked like the mountain was full of bolder areas from the Google. I do not believe that lighting was a factor and they had not seen any ground strikes in the area. They were off the top of the mountain from there pictures. so not on the ridge line anyway . If there was lighting they would have been more exposed when they went down the ridge. (don’t expose your self on the ridge line and stay away from your metal tools) part of safety training. I did not see or hear any concern about the lighting, I believe air attack would have been talking about that as well.
Thank you, Bob. FYI – my disk came from Az Forestry today. If nobody else uploads the materials (e.g. the media), I will do it tonight!
It sounded like john was going to do that. Or it may have been Wildfire today. I start getting mixed up here. Also my news paper is running a 4 day news on fatality fires. there good article’s ( magicvalley.com Times news) started Sunday.
Reply to Elizabeth N. post on Dec 16, 2013 at 12:42 pm
Elizabeth…
Re: Lightning/Thunder that afternoon
I don’t trust the SAIR narrative as far as I can throw it…
but I believe a lot of the ‘doppler radar’ and other
meteorological charts and data are up to snuff. It’s
just data from outside sources. It doesn’t lie and
doesn’t appear to have been ‘manipulated’ like
the ‘narrative’ part of the SAIR obviously has been.
Page 72 of the SAIR is the only place it mentions any
evidence of lightning and/or thunder that afternoon
and it was just two quick in-cloud strikes at 4:20 PM.
That would have been 20 minutes AFTER Granite
Mountain had decided to ‘leave the black’. It is
curious, however, that these two recorded thunder
claps would have been heard by Steed at just about
the moment he was deciding to drop off the two-track
road and descend into the canyon.
I personally don’t believe this influenced Steed’s
decision to leave the two-track in any way. I still believe
that wasn’t even a ‘moment of choice’ for Steed while
he was leading the line of 17 other men… with Marsh
still catching up from behind. A ‘decision moment’
or a ‘need to consult’ only takes place when you
actually think you have options to talk about with
someone. Steed had NO IDEA there was any
other option that afternoon or anything to ‘discuss’
with anyone… so his ‘left-blinker’ just went on the
moment the Boulder Springs Ranch came into view.
That being said… the actual timing for the recorded
thunder being heard at 4:20 PM is, in fact, curious.
>> Page 72 of the SAIR…
>>
>> Around 1620 MST, field personnel near Highway 89 in
>> the Yarnell area began to hear thunder, and shortly
>> afterward noted spritzes of rain or mist mixed with
>> ash. The Earth Networks Total Lightning Network
>> verified the thunder, showing two in-cloud lightning
>> flashes at 1620 (Figure 11)
NOTE that these were ‘in-cloud’ lightning strikes… so
no ghastly bolts were seen hitting any ground… but
GM would certainly have heard the thunder at exactly
4:20 PM.
Re: PAGING JOY and SONNY/TEX
Obviously I can’t answer for them… but most of the
questions you are asking of them have already been
discussed in the previous ‘chapter’ of this ongoing
research/commenting on Mr. Dougherty’s previous
article at this URL…
http://www.investigativemedia.com/yarnell-hill-fire-investigation-ignored-major-mistakes-by-the-state
I will post some of those (pevious) answers here just
to save the lookup time…
>> Elizabeth asked…
>> WHERE, exactly, did Sonny/Tex recently
>> find the pink tape?
Tex already posted the exact longitude/latitude point
on the previous discussion thread. It is exactly here…
Latitude: 34.2215
Longitude: -112.78218
34.2215, -112.78218
Just cut-and-paste the line above with the comma
between the decimal latitude/longitude values into
the search bar of Google Maps, hit RETURN, and
the exact location will appear. A GREEN ARROW
will be pointing to this exact point on the ridge road.
>> Elizabeth asked…
>> You have you hiked to the area where you think
>> Steed/Marsh started going down, and is there
>> anything there that would suggest WHY they went
>> down at that exact place? Meaning, was there an
>> old dirt trail there?
Yes, there was. 2 of them, in fact. One that heads
right for the ‘gully’ and another that heads for the
series of ‘clearings’ that connect together all the
way down to the deployment site.
See link to VIDEO below.
>> Was there a natural reduction in the brush there?
Yes. Multiple places. See link to VIDEO below.
>> Was that the only place where there
>> were NOT boulders?
No. Multiple ‘clear’ spots there to begin a descent.
Again… see the link to the VIDEO posted below.
>> Did you see ANYTHING that would explain *that*
>> descent point rather than one twenty or 50 or
>> whatever yards before or after?
You can see for yourself, and decide.
A video was posted on the previous ‘chapter’ thread
that provides a complete ‘visual’ on this.
It is a close-up ‘fly-down’ and ‘fly-back’ of the exact
area you are asking about.
Notice the series of ‘clearings’ that all line up towards
the deployment site. There still has been no definitive
proof that GM utilized these ‘clearings’ to assist
their descent… but they were definitely ‘there’.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tUiv3TC-RrY
The actual DATE on the satellite imagery used for
this closeup ‘fly-down’ and ‘fly-back’ in the box
canyon is April 9, 2013… just 82 days before the
tragedy.
The EXACT spot where Tex Gilligan found the pink
tape is also marked in this video and you will see
that it is some distance beyond the point where
the drainage gully met the saddle… which is
where the SAIR diagram thinks they descended.
So that means only a finite set of things…
1) The entire line of men reached the point where
the pink tape was found… ONE of them dropped
the roll of tape… and then the entire line of men
‘backed up’ on the road to then descend where
the SAIR diagram thinks they did. ( Not likely ).
2) The entire line of men began their descent in
that ‘clear’ area right there where the tape was dropped
or just shortly beyond that.
3) Steed and his line of 17 men did, in fact, descend
where the drainage meets the gully… but when Marsh
finally caught up from behind… he went beyond that point,
dropped the roll of pink tape where Tex found it, and then
descended himself at a different point still trying to
‘catch up’ with the rest of them who were down in
the canyon already.
OR, 4) Marsh had not caught up with the crew yet, and the tape was intensionally left by the crew to mark the point of desent for Marsh. With things starting to look a bit dicey, the roll with not much tape left on it, might not have been a priority for him to pick up.
Yes… perfectly possible.
My own opinion on that would be…
1) The roll was so depleted that it just
simply stands to reason it belonged
to Marsh. There isn’t much evidence
of Steed or any squad boss using their
tapes much that day. You can actually
SEE all these ‘other’ rolls of pink tape
on the backs of these men in the
MacKenzie video(s) and still pictures,
right before they headed south. I don’t
see any rolls of pink that look ‘depleted’
enough to match the one Tex found.
2) If you ARE going to ‘mark a spot’ for
someone… wouldn’t you try to do a
better job? It was not found ON the
road. It was in an unlikely place just
off the side of the road… and that’s why
many, many SAIT investigators walked
right by it and never even saw it. It was
only Tex Gilligan’s sharp eyes that
found it some time after the investigators
were ‘up there’.
Brings up a good question for WFF people,
however. When you ARE in a ‘mountain
trail’ area… and trying to mark a spot
where you left the road for someone
who is coming up later… what’s the
standard practice? Just drop a roll of
tape on the ground and HOPE the guy
sees it… or something more obvious
like an ‘arrow’ weighted with rocks,
or something?
I’ll go with that. They would have done a better job marking the spot than just leaving a depleted roll on the ground.!
Bob – you are right, a calculated risk is a very poor choice. Looking at this situation, you all see risk. The thing is, I don’t think Marsh did, at least as far as affecting their planned route. Maybe it was the speed or the direction he saw, whatever it was he did not think it was going to affect them.
Having said that, I do not think they leave the black without the Musser request. Not because Musser “ordered” them, in fact Musser almost certainly said OK when Marsh turned him down. But now they knew they were needed, had something to do. When he decided they could move safely (after talking with Steed), Marsh decided to move. Musser did not request the whole crew, but since they were not doing anything, the whole crew moved as a unit.
I really do not think that Willis was involved in any kind of order. If Marsh thought it was dangerous and Willis told him to go, Marsh would have told him what he thought (this is a man who would not sign paperwork he did not think was correct). No way if that happens does Willis pull rank, that would be insane.
Reply to mike post on December 16, 2013 at 10:26 pm
So… do you think after the TDWAO ( Turn Down With
Alternate Option ) to Musser… the ‘comfort level’ heard
in the MacKenzie video was referring to the following?
1) We have our OPS1 ( Abel ) telling us to just
‘hunker and be safe’.
2) We have our OPS2 ( Musser ) asking us to send
people to town to help.
If we try to please (2)… do we piss off (1)… or even
be accused later of ‘disobeying an order’ ( Sic: ‘hunker
and be safe’ ).
Maybe that’s what the real ‘comfort level’ was that
Marsh was asking Steed about.
COULD their choice to please OPS2 be considered
‘disobeying a directive’ from another OPS ( OPS1 ),
and would there be consequences for that later?
Could that explain WHY such an experienced crew
would appear to have gone out of their way to NOT
tell the command channels exactly where they
were or what their real intentions were?
Were they aiming for a ‘Forgiveness will be easier
than permission’ scenario?
Seems plausible… now that we KNOW the two different
directives/request they received from different OPS
level command people within minutes of each other.
In the MacKenzie video, I think they are discussing moving, obviously that is the question of the moment at the time. I don’t know how they viewed what Abel said, does not seem like they viewed it as a drop-dead order. Remember, Abel says he did not recall saying that – kinda odd if it was some kind of formal order. Are we even sure that Marsh heard it?
Reply to mike post on Dec 17, 2013 at 12:07
It seems like the more information that
comes out… we get less and less SURE
of anything.
You just hit on one of the things that is
VERY confusing in this WFF ‘culture’.
One moment… all you hear is how
important all this more-than-quasi military
approach to the work is… and how
important all this ‘discipline’ and
‘structure’ and these ‘command level’
positions are… and then in the next breath
you hear that the actual REALITY is that
no one ever really tells anyone to do
anything… you just sort of make suggestions
and/or ‘ask nice’.
Then you throw in this very strict ‘Turn
Down With Alternate Option’ protocol and
the confusion deepens even more.
So WHEN is a simple ‘suggestion’ or
‘advice’ coming from up above ever
actually considered a ‘directive’ or even
an outright ‘command’?
Apparently… it’s really, really hard to say.
I think the real problem here is everybody assumed GM would stay in the black. IC, OPS all 3 and Blue Ridge. No body thought they would go down thru the unburned, because they would not have done it. So a passing in a conversation Hunker and be safe. Probably not an order but a closing remark.
Again we keep coming back to this. Marsh made the decision, ask to or not he is responsible for the safety of the crew. Marsh moved with out a plan or notifying anyone on the decision.
Fullsail,, if you are so annoyed by others opinions, stop reading and posting.
Elizabeth, keep asking the question to the puzzle.
For your info, I am an active WFF, with 31 years of experience. I am presently certified as an I/C 2, Ignition Specialist 1, FBAN 1, plus many other certifications. The only dog in the fight I have, is I feel that this incident was a cluster, the investigations were a cover up, and if WE do not do the legwork investigation on our own, the answers may not be found, for the famikies of those that perished.
Mike
Elisabeth–While there is a strict chain of command I do believe Gary and I would also say that a good relationship between the squad bosses and asst. supt. and supt. allows the complete discussion and flow of information’ if there is a concern or problem. In our crew we always relied on each other to bring up concerns. The Supt. still made the decisions but always listened to the input. You heard Marsh ask Steed if he was comfortable with that? Part of the discussion. Again sometimes group think takes over If you do not review the 10 and 18 at that point you miss the opportunity to make good decisions. Review dose not take long but will immediately bring up red flags if the plan is not complete.
On the fire I referred to earlier I and the crew were lucky because a preplanned SZ was in place and close to everyone.
I do have a big dog in this hunt as you know. What happened on Rattle Snake, Mann Gulch, Loop, North canyon, Cramer Yarnell and others Has the same problem
1. Unburned Fuel between you and the fire.
2. Communications
3. Lookout
4. Escape rout and SZ close and accessible.
Those are and have been the main 4 for over 60 years, situation awareness a full evaluation and continued awareness and update continually. Unburned Fuel has been overlooked to many times. Maybe because we spend to much time doing indirect attack, or just underestimate the fire. In this higher large fires and fuels with drought this needs to be a priority in fire fighters safety and situation awareness. Over 60 years its not new its just being overlooked and Fire Fighters are dying.
This continues to be an outstanding example of community-driven journalism. @Fullsail, if you’re frustrated by the length of some of the replies, view them as the equivalent of notes, not final reports. Elizabeth’s point about the brittleness of hierarchical command structures is a valid risk management issue present in any high-stakes environment. The military talks about it. Mountaineering and skiing guides (who are naturally deferred to) talk about it. For purposes of understanding GM’s actions, I think numerous commentators have actually suggested (as Elizabeth has not) that GM was in fact following a non-hierarchical model, with everyone individually assessing and agreeing to the actions and route chosen. For purposes of understanding decision-making here, understanding that this is a hierarchy is helpful. Likewise, Marsh being subject to pressure from his boss, particularly in light of disagreements over signing off on GM’s status earlier in the year, I believe is quite possible.
As to the 10 and 18 in high-stress situations, I believe it actually makes them more valuable in that situation. Since normal, case by case analysis is going to suffer from everything from lack of sleep to being out of breath to fragmented command, having rules that have been drilled almost like motor skills to help is very valuable.
Part of what the group here has helped piece together (with Elizabeth and WTKTT as integral parts of doing so) is that the SAIR left out some key pieces to the puzzle in terms of what record exists of what was said and done.
thanks, but i don’t care to read someone’s stream of consciousness.
GM had something like 7 second year ff’s and a bunch of rookies and 2 of 3 new squad bosses. It was described as a rebuilding year and they were barely (questionably so…) qualified as an IHC. So it’s hard to believe that there was much democracy when it came to tactical decision making (as 90% of crews are not a democracy).
There is good reason for the hierarchy on hotshot crews. The main one being, that the Sup. and Captain have earned there positions through years of experience and demonstrated ability to make decisions under stressful conditions. There is a chain of command for the very reason that E’s premise is trying to negate.
so you are another “Willis made Marsh go down in the hole” theorist… for why? you think that Marsh was worried he would get fired if he didn’t march on command? maybe he was worried that he would get a bad year-end performance evaluation if he didn’t hike his folks down to Yarnell as quickly as possible? Maybe he knowingly put his own safety and the safety of 18 others in jeopardy because he was worried that Chief Willis might de-fund his crew next year? That theory is very contradictory to all reports of Eric Marsh’s character and abilities as a wildland firefighter.
community driven journalism, eh? i thought it was a lot of people with too much time on their hands micro-analyzing and commenting on a news article. i’d be curious to know if john dougherty has his team scouring this “notepad” everyday for ideas?
**
** SAIT NOTES CONTAIN PROOF THAT THERE IS
** MORE MACKENZIE ( AND/OR OTHER ) VIDEO.
The SAIT NOTES released on Friday state CLEARLY that there is more
Christopher MacKenzie video/audio ( and/or other video/audio ) available
that has never been seen ( or heard ) publicly.
Jim Karels himself says ( in his notes ) that this ‘unreleased’ video/audio
covers the Steed/Marsh ‘discussing their options’ timeframe and contains
Todd Abel’s (OPS1’s) participation ( and voice ) in this discussion.
I think it’s ironic ( and, somehow, appropriate ) that Jim Karels himself is the
one who has ‘slipped up’ in his notes and revealed that the SAIT was ( with
HIS ultimate permission and guidance ) letting the SAIT members edit and
withhold evidence, dial back times on a poor dead boy’s last photographs,
and omit key testimony and facts from the SAIR document and the carefully
coordinated September 28, 2013 ‘media dump’.
When Jim Karels ( the head of the entire SAIT team ) was interviewing OPS1
( Todd Abel )… he specifically asked him if he recalled him telling Marsh
‘hunker and be safe’… because they have him captured on VIDEO / AUDIO
as ‘having said that to Marsh’.
Abel says he doesn’t recall that conversation… even though it was captured
on video/audio.
Guess what?
There is no “hunker and be safe” moment in the publicly released
( and obviously edited ) 9 second video clips from Christopher MacKenzie.
So what ‘video evidence of the conversation’ is Jim Karels referring to?
Parts that have been EDITED OUT of the public MacKenzie clips…
…or is there even another VIDEO ( or more than one ) that we still don’t
know about that was capturing the ‘discussing their options’ conversation?
What follows is the ‘proof’ itself from page 1 of the SAIT NOTES, and then
then what ALL the other ‘reports’ say about this ‘hunker and be safe’
moment.
It’s a fascinating look at how the exact SAME EVENT is described differently
in ( count ’em ) FOUR different documents now all paid for with Arizona
taxpayer dollars.
Pay close attention to the ‘~1555’ entry from Jim Karel’s notes directly below.
Going into the interview with Todd Abel… Jim Karels already KNOWS that
Abel told Marsh to ‘hunker and be safe’ because Karel’s own notes say
‘we have that radio conversation captured on video’.
Abel himself then says he doesn’t recall that conversation.
So how could the SAIR then end up saying Abel DID tell Marsh to ‘hunker
and be safe’ ( which it does ) unless Karels is telling the truth here in his
notes about them ‘having that radio conversation captured on video’?
SAIT NOTES – Page 1
These notes are compiled from recollections of, and discussions between,
the accident team members who interviewed people involved with the
Yarnell Hill Fire.
Interview with Todd Abel by J Karels on 8/14/2013
Just after the later weather forecast (around 1530) was when Marsh mentioned
the winds squirrely. The broadcast came out, He’s (Abel) listening on the radio
if everyone got it. He (Abel) thinks he might have walked over marsh. so he
(Abel) calls (Marsh) to confirm with marsh that he got it and he did.
Re: The ~1555 radio conversation that we HAVE ON THE VIDEO,
(which includes the phrase okay, you hunker down in the black).
Abel did not recall having this conversation with Marsh.
NOTE: There it is. Jim Karels admits they have more video/audio
covering this crucial Steed/Marsh ‘discussing their options’ timeframe
which also includes Todd Abel’s participation in that discussion.
What follows now is what actually ended up appearing in ALL the released
reports regarding this timeframe covered in Karel’s notes…
SAIR – Page 22…
OPS1 is listening on the radio to make sure everyone received the most
recent weather announcement. At about 1550, he radios DIVS A directly
to ask if he got the weather update and if he is “in a good spot.” DIVS A
affirms that he received the update, and he tells OPS1 the winds are
starting to get “squirrely” up on the ridge. He says he is working his way
off the top and OPS1 closes by advising DIVS A to hunker and be safe.
NOTE: NO mention that this ‘hunker and be safe’ advice was actually
captured on video as the SAIT NOTES say it was, or any mention
that Abel himself told the SAIT he ‘did not even recall’ that part
of the conversation even though they ‘have it on the video’.
WFAR – Page 14…
At 1550, several communications occurred at or near the same
time. Field OSC called DIVS A by radio to make sure that DIVS A
was aware of the latest weather update. DIVS A confirmed the
update and noted that the winds were getting “squirrely” on the
ridge. DIVS A informed Field OSC that GMIHC moving off the top.
NOTE: NO mention of the ‘hunker and be safe’ directive from OPS1 ( Abel ).
ADOSH – Page 18
At approximately 1545 hours, Division A Supervisor Marsh had a
radio conversation with Operations Section Chief 1 Abel
regarding the weather and the position of Granite Mountain IHC.
Marsh was located near the top of the Weaver Mountains and
had a clear view of the thunderstorm, the fire, and the valley below.
Marsh and Abel had been watching the storm for some time
and discussed their concerns regarding the storm’s effects.
Marsh reportedly stated that Granite Mountain was safe and
in the black ( i.e, previously burned wildland ). Marsh mentioned
that the winds were “squirrely” at his position and that the
retardant and dozer lines north of Yarnell were being comprised.
Shortly thereafter ( 1545 ) Operations Section Chief II Musser
radioed GMIHC and asked if they could spare resources
to assist in Yarnell. Either Marsh or GMIHC Captain Steed
responded that they were committed to the black and
that Musser should contact BRIHC working in the valley
( during his interview Musser stated that he wasn’t sure
who he was talking with ).
NOTE: The ADOSH version of these ‘moments’ contains much
more detail about what Abel and Marsh ‘talked about’ and
includes the same ‘winds are getting squrrely’ quote from
Marsh… but the ADOSH narrative says NOTHING about
Abel advising Marsh to ‘hunker and be safe’… even though
the SAIT NOTES say they have Abel recorded ‘on video’
as having said this around that time.
END OF (OFFICIAL) REPORTS
So somebody throw me a bone here.
FOUR documents paid for with Arizona taxpayer dollars and we still don’t
have the ‘straight story’.
How many MORE reports ( and more taxpayer dollars ) is
it going to take to get the frickin’ TRUTH, here?
WHERE is this VIDEO that Jim Karels himself admits they HAVE?
RTS: When I read the Marquez interview, I got the impression that he was saying that Marsh wasn’t satisfied with where he (Marsh/GM) was in the geography and where he was going to therefore end up cutting an unconnected line. The way Marquez tells it, he didn’t just leave – just flounce off in a huff. He actually went off – seemingly with Marsh’s concurrence – to look for another access point, to get to a place where he could tie-in more effectively with Marsh.
Remember that there is a group of folks here who believe that Steed was trying to take the ridge-line route to the Helms Ranch (and then Yarnell), but Steed came OFF the ridge b/c he failed to understand the sharp dip in the ridge path and the fact that it would quickly “un-dip” back toward the Helms ranch. Some folks believe that Marsh came down *after* Steed into the green, basically catching up to them *after* they had already gotten off the ridge-line (presumably accidentally), which might explain why Steed was calm at 4:39 and then a bit more panicked two minutes later when he caught up with the group.
Two disparate thoughts, but I wanted to put them out there…..
Reply to Elizabeth N. post on December 15, 2013 at 10:10 pm
Odd timing, Elizabeth. I was just about to post something
along those lines myself but you summarized it pretty well.
The THEORY has been that we KNOW Marsh was NOT with
Steed/Crew circa 4:02 PM ( The MacKenzie video and the
partial capture of the ‘discussing their options’ conversation ).
We also KNOW they were ‘on the move south’ just 3-4
minutes later ( The Wade Parker photo showing them
LEAVING the location of the MacKenzie video ).
So it’s safe to say Marsh was NOT with them when they
left that area.
So what would the final ‘roll and go’ command have been
from Marsh to Steed?
Marsh: Just head for that ranch that’s supposed to be
to the southeast there and I’ll catch up with you as
soon as I can.
Steed: Copy that. We’re gone.
I still believe all the evidence is there that Marsh did NOT
‘catch up’ with them until AFTER either most or all of
the line of 18 men had already descended into the canyon.
I believe that Steed has his ‘marching orders’… and when
he reached that saddle and the Ranch came into view…
Steed just put his left blinker on… left the road… and the
‘gaggle’ of 17 men behind him just put their left-blinkers
on as well and followed him.
Others with WFF experience have said ‘no way’ that Steed
could have made a decision like that without first stopping
and calling Eric… but I still believe despite what might
have been ‘normal procedure’… that that is exactly what
happened that day.
Steed had NO IDEA where that two-track road went.
If he believed there was only ONE way to get to the ranch
then, to him, it wasn’t a ‘moment of decision’ at all.
It was the ONLY way to get there, he had his marching
orders… so on comes his ‘left blinker’.
When Marsh finally DID catch them… I believe the roll of
pink tape that hiker Tex Gilligan found proves that he
only did so when they had already left the road. That
roll of pink tape was well-depleted… and Eric was the
one doing most of the ‘trail marking’ that day. I believe
the only reason it was there for Tex to find is because
Eric Marsh became the LAST MAN in the line and there
was no one there to see him drop it, pick it up, and hand
it back to him.
So for Eric Marsh… dropping into the canyon simply became
a moment of… “There they go… and I must follow them…
for I am their leader.”
There is also now a piece of NEW evidence to support
this theory and it is in the video/audio just released Friday.
Eric Marsh was known to be in GREAT shape. Even the
hikers Tex Gilligan and Joy Collura… when they first met
him up near the ridge at exactly 8:07 AM that morning…
both commented on what great shape he was in and
the ‘agility’ he was displaying. They said he ‘moved like
a deer and was never out of breath’.
Well… listen to the audio track just released.
When Eric Marsh finally comes onto the radio… he is
completely OUT OF BREATH. Calm… yes… but he
is obviously breathing heavily.
I suppose I would be too if I’d just seen a wall of flames in
front of me but stick with me for a moment.
This was not PANIC ‘out of breath’… it sounds like simply
‘at the end of runninig’ type ‘out of breath’.
So I believe the new video/audio proves that not only was it
Jesse Steed ( at the head of the line of 19 men ) who is
the one ‘breaking in on Arizona 16’ for that first MAYDAY…
I believe the time that passes then before we hear Marsh
come on the radio ‘out of breath’ is because he was
WAAY back at the end of the line and only realized the
trouble Steed was in up ahead when he heard the
same MAYDAY from Steed.
Marsh then RAN through the tangled brush as fast as he
could to get to Steed… and then ‘took over’ as ‘DIVS A’
when he saw the real situation… and that’s why he is
so ‘out of breath’ on that ‘we are deploying’ transmission.
(Almost) all the evidence is there now to support this theory
on how they got down there ( Steed made the actual decision )
and what happened in those last moments ( Eric had to run
up to Steed from way in the back to even see what was
really happening ).
WTKTT: Quick question for you – you think that the panicked transmission was Steed, with Marsh following-up shortly thereafter. Can you please go back and re-listen to that? I opened the video in two different browsers, and played both communications in immediate succession. It sort of sounded like Marsh both times. I think one of the guys in the background of the fellow with the helmet video-cam actually says (with respect to that first panicked yelling) “is that Eric [Marsh]?”
It makes more SENSE if the first transmission is Steed, and the second is Marsh, but I am not actually sure if that is honestly the truth. Re-listen to them if you get a second – one right after the other – and tell me what you think….
Reply to Elizabeth N. post
on Dec 16, 2013 at 8:20 am said:
Elizabeth. I have done as you asked.
I am still convinced that whenever the caller in
that video simply identifies himself as
“Granite Mountain”… that is Jesse Steed, and
only when the caller finally identifies himself
as “DIVS A here with Granite Mountain” do
we hear Eric Marsh ( out of breath ) for the
first time in that MAYDAY sequence.
You missed a LOOONG discussion about this
in ‘chapter 1’ of this research/commenting
that was done without benefit of any audio.
A number of experienced WFF people chimed
in and agreed that once Eric Marsh knew
that he was ‘DIVS A’… he was too experienced
and conscientious a firefighter to NOT then
be ‘identifying’ himself with the call sign
‘DIVS A’ at all times for the remainder of the day.
Even in his final moments… and on his final
radio communications… he does that.
When the caller just begins a transmission
with ‘Granite Mountain’ ( and no DIVS A prefix ),
you can also be sure that is Captain Jesse
Steed… also following proper radio protocol.
Understood. Thank you for your time. I apologize for imposing, but I am grateful that you responded.
xxfullsailxx – thanks for adding your experienced insight to the thread.
Just to let you know, I have quite a few years of ONGOING and CURRENT wildland fire experience, and even though I am actively involved in this thread, I am NOT a slacker.
I took the time to read several of the interviews from the AZCentral.com site that Mike suggested. It’s worth the time. A lot (60 pages) of good information there even though they are interviews and NOT statements from the individuals.
http://www.azcentral.com/ic/pdf/1213-yarnell-interview-notes.pdf
These are excerpts taken from the interview in somewhat progressive interview-order if that makes sense. All EMPHASIS is added by me.
OPS Abel interview
“Marsh’s phone call, they talked about resources and division break between z and alpha (Marsh said somewhat heated discussion, but they worked out the break …”
BRHS Supt. interview
The Air Attack (Rory Collins) was putting retardent drops on GMHS firing operation TWICE even though AA was aware they were burning out their indirect line. AA was DIRECTING Marsh toward going DIRECT ATTACK instead of indirect and burning out.
This squares with what I posted earlier about this guy’s Douglas Forest Protection Agency, contracting with Oregon Division of Forestry, INFLUENCE regarding DIRECT ATTACK – because these guys DON’T burn out.
IC Roy Hall interview
The arrogant IC Hall’s first sentence was “YOU UNDERSTAND WHO I AM:” Oh, I’m impressed.
“My first priority was to get aircraft over the fire. Second priority, told Russ that we stand together at the briefing.” And WHERE does firefighter and public safety fit in?
Rance Marquez interview
“My conversation with Eric LED ME TO BELIEVE THAT HE FELT THAT HE WASN’T GOING TO BE EFFECTIVE WHERE THEY WERE.”
I think this is fairly revealing as it rings true with a statement Willis said at the news conference at the fatality site. Willis said “NO wildland firefighter is satisfied sitting IN THE BLACK as the fire progresses …”
Really? This wildland firefighter is PERFECTLY SATISFIED with sitting in the black as the fire progresses. When the big dog’s eating, you let the big dog eat. You can go engage AFTER the fire makes its runs.
Was this PFD policy or SOP or just something Willis made up for the media circus that day? If it was some type of an accepted PFD practice, then this MAY have had some influence on WHY Marsh and GMHS left their perfectly good SZ.
Marquez makes this statement about the BRHS – “BLUE RIDGE WAS DOING NOTHING.” So, in spite of all they had done and were doing that day, he clearly was NOT aware of it because HE LEFT THE DIVISION!
If not for the BRHS, there were A LOT of firefighters, vehicles, AND citizens that MAY have been burned over that day. Just read the interviews of these Engine Bosses and crewmembers with very little situational awareness!
Musser and Abel interview
“MARSH CALLED ABLE ON THE CELL PHONE and mentioned there was some intense communication between himself and Marquez on the Division break between Alpha and Zula.”
So, Marsh either had a phone or borrowed one and INITIATED the call to OPS.
“Musser hears radio traffic from Eric Marsh, Granite Mountain, that said “THEY WERE GOING TO PRE-DETERMINED ROUTE TO THE STRUCTURES.” EMPHASIS in original here. “Musser was not sure who that radio traffic was sent to?”
This is almost exactly what I comment on earlier from Musser.
All good ‘catches’ in the NOTES…
…but the BIG one is that only now… months later… after all
the speculation… we learn that Eric Marsh most certainly
had his own cell/smartphone that day ( unlikely he would
have been borrowing someone else’s for these off-road
conversations )…
…and that Marsh wasn’t hesitating to use it when he had
something he wanted to talk about but also wanted to
keep it off the radio. ( E.g. Talking with OPS about Marquez ).
Where is that cell phone now?
Screw phone company records ( though those would
still help )… that phone will have its own onboard ‘call history’
complete with calls sent/received, times, phone numbers,
call duration lengths, etc.
We still have no idea what the results of any of the ACTIC
( Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center ) examinations
of the phones were.
At least two of the phones sent to ACTIC were iPhones that
were still fully functional after the burnover. The YCSO
police investigators just said they were ‘password protected’
( which means they were fully operational and still powering
on ) but they were just going to need ACTIC to make the
standard request(s) to Apple to get the code needed to
bypass the password protection.
Well… DID they?
We still need to know how, in just the space of
a FEW MINUTES… we got from this…
** GOOD CHOICE
TDWAO ( Turn Down With Alternate Option ) and
Marsh/Steed telling Musser “We can’t spare resources.
We are committed to the black (now). Try Blue Ridge”…
to ( minutes later ) this…
** BAD CHOICE
Let’s break every rule we were ever taught… try to beat the fire
into Glen Ilah… and also make sure no one on the standard
command radio channels REALLY knows where we are or
what we’re doing.
That’s an astonishing ‘turnaround’…
in just the space of a few minutes.
Sole decision of Marsh/Steed? ( Brendan would know ).
Cell phone call in there? ( Multiple ways to find out ).
Third-party directive via radio? ( Brendan would also know ).
Heat stroke?
Which?
FYI – I asked (via FOIL/FOIA) for either the phone records that the investigators looked at or at least a LIST of the records that they reviewed. Whatever they are giving me in response will come this week.
Be prepared to discover that the actual documented
results from ACTIC ( Arizona Counter Terrorism
Information Center ) might still be sitting in a
filing cabinet over at the YCSO police station.
The specific request for data extraction(s) came
FROM the YCSO police to the ACTIC group, so
that’s where the results would be returned.
If the SAIT people did not, themselves, REQUEST
a copy of those results… then they won’t be
in any FOIA/FOIL package from them.
Something tells me the SAIT didn’t give a hoot
in heck about any of that. They already had
their story cooked up by the time those ACTIC
results were available and didn’t need any
‘facts’ messing up their day.
So without any ‘interest’ in the documents… and
no criminal activity to pursue… those result
documents are just buried in a filing cabinet
over at the YCSO police station.
ADOSH published it’s entire ‘event list’ at the
start of their investigation as to who they made
requests for information to. They also did NOT
make any requests to YCSO for the results
of the ACTIC phone examinations.
WTKTT: ADOSH reviewed the materials reviewed for the preparation of the SAIR. If the SAIR “team” reviewed the phone records, then ADOSH also did. The way I worded my FOIL/FOIA request, I should get the records regardless of who prepared them, as long as they were submitted to Forestry. Your point is duly noted, though. If I do not get them in the package coming this week, I will follow-up with YCSO.
ADOSH did, in fact, have the right permissions to examine evidence in the possession of YCSO. See the actual proof of this ( below ) from the YCSO police report…
…but there is nothing in the ADOSH that says they ever actually inquired about the phones OR the ACTIC results.
The ‘letter’ they refer to below was eventually supplied and ADOSH was able to see pretty much anything they wanted to ( or ASKED to see ) over at the YCSO evidence storage… but the phones were no longer there… and there is no known information about what happened to them after they were sent to ACTIC.
Page 9 of the YCSO police report…
On 07/10/13 Bruce Hanna and Brett Steurer of OSHA came to the office and asked for me. They had been given my contact information. They said they were conducting their own separate investigation into the incident. They asked to eventually go to the scene once they had an “expert” in place. They asked to view the shelters, photos and reports. I contacted Lt. Boelts who said it would be OK to give them (what we have) providing they provide us with the request on a letterhead. I had them direct the letter to Lt. Boelts as I would be away for a couple weeks. I gave them Lt. Boelts contact information. I gave them my card. They gave me their cards and a pamphlet showing the laws that gave them the authorization to ask for these things. I gave copies of these items to Lt. Boelts. We are awaiting the letter before taking any further action.
Date, Time, Reporting Officer:
Tue Jul 16 10:43:08 MST 2013
Det J McDormett #5472
robert- i respect what you’ve had to say throughout these articles and appreciate the obvious experience that you bring to this discussion…i hear what you’re saying… by all accounts that shift sounds like a complete debacle.
i had started reading the interview notes a couple days ago and need to pick back up on it… i agree, that they offer more insight and evidence than what the general public has been offered prior. but they also show how futile it is for so many in this comment arena to be trying to piece together bits and pieces of details down to the last minute when odds are, no one was taking notes of exact times, or exact radio transmissions. unit logs are handy tools, but when sh!t is hitting the fan, it’s impossible to keep track of all the movements and conversations.
Re: Blue Ridge… i think they were doing exactly what they should have been, letting the crew sit while the overhead was out scouting
and coming up with a plan. when they felt like they had safe, manageable work, they put the crew to work.
Re: Air Attack… i can only imagine how frustrating that was having air attack dictate the tactics in Marsh’s division. and i hear you about ODF… a lot of them don’t like to cold-trail either.
Re: Prescott SOP’s… to me it doesn’t matter if that’s their SOP’s. they weren’t in Prescott FD’s jurisdiction. Willis was not their supervisor on that fire. you don’t think Marsh was a strong enough leader to say “no” if he felt a given assignment was unsafe? i know Musser (a Hotshot Sup himself for well over a decade) would have understood that they were committed to the black and unavailable to assist. and i would hope that Marsh had a strong enough relationship with Able (being from the same county) that they would understand each other’s position.
i do believe that Marsh felt ineffective in the black at that point, and wanted to reengage his crew.
and i am so tired of wading through “Elizabeth’s” and “want to know the truth’s” B.S.
you all don’t have a clue what you’re talking about and you make huge leaps from very shaky foundations.
“WTKTT”: you don’t know half of what you claim to “know.”
“Elizabeth”: for someone who is “trained as a lawyer” you don’t seem to recognize the inadequacy of assumption.
Dear xxfullsailxx:
Thanks for the feedback, but which comments of mine are, in your words, “bullshit,” “ignoran[t],” and “huge leaps”? If you do not clarify, I cannot go back and rectify the situation, get a better understanding, or clarify what I am trying to communicate.
Also, what is the “assumption” that you claim that I am failing to recognize as “inadequa[te]”?
Thanks in advance.
Elizabeth, i already gave a couple examples above. IN MY VIEW, you seem to be well intention-ed, but you don’t really have a clue what you’re talking about. you make all sorts of assumptions, to the point of trying to speak for people who are either deceased or whom you’ve never met.
Bill almost cut you off his Wildfire today Because of your attack on people. You apologized but evidently haven’t learned your lesson. Please refrain from attacking people and be opened and involved in the process.
bob, with all due respect, i have little to learn from someone who is continually claiming to have done everything right throughout their career, and who always followed the rules, and never had any employee get injured.
(and who can’t recognize the many differences between fighting fire today vs. 20-30 years ago.)
i am not “attacking people,” i am expressing an opinion… the fact that Bill Gabbert censors comments is certainly his prerogative, and i respect that he is the owner/creator of Wildfire Today. but his cherry picking of comments makes his website more of a blog than news media.
Fullsale– I feel sorry for you if you cant learn any thing from me, Gary, Rod Wrench and others on this site and Wildfire today. Because I have been out of Fire for 20 years does not mean I do not understand fire today. Or I am not giving good advice from lessons learned in the past. I was on a lot of major fires in my time in many capacities. I did not have major accidents because I paid attention to safety, not because the hazards weren’t there. RTS can tell you what a hard head I was about safety.
John Dougherty (who runs this website – investigativemedia.com) *just* posted the following comment:
John Dougherty on December 16, 2013 at 10:53 am said:
Please refrain from ANY personal attacks or nasty comments concerning anyone posting on this site. Please maintain a professional approach to discussing the issues. Disagreement is natural. But name calling will not be tolerated and anyone who continues to post in this manner will be permanently blocked from the site. Thank you, John
Thank you John And Elizabeth I would like to get back on track with our research. I think fullsail has good things he could input in a positive manner. weather he wants to learn any thing from us is again up to him.
xxfullsailxx,
RE: The PFD SOP question
I was always told that you had to follow YOUR rules and SOP from your home unit no matter where you were fighting fire. And I’m thinking maybe ATTITUDE or UNWRITTEN rule may be better terms for what I was trying to get across. Kind of like a peer pressure thing.
I still believe that the decision to leave their perfectly good SZ was of his own volition, his own conclusion, along with the agreement by Steed. Although now it’s looking like Steed led the Crew out and Marsh caught up with them in the bowl.
it is interesting to wonder what mindset GM had being from a municipal department; and if they felt like structure protection was their forte, since they were so closely attached to PFD. it would be interesting to hear from other IHC crew overhead about how they worked on other assignments and whether or not there was a common theme in the assignments they took or were given. knowing that they just came off the Doce Fire, i wonder how that influenced their mindset. they were basically heralded as heroes in their own front yard. then, not even hardly a week later they’re in their backyard with similar scenario and possibly expectations.
regardless, both steed and marsh came from pretty solid wildland backgrounds. they both trained and taught wildland concepts and tactics. they knew weather and fire behavior and they sure as hell knew LCES. no matter what anyone else was telling them or asking of them (or any module leader for that matter) they assessed the risk themselves, and probably made the decision together to disengage and walk out.
i think we’re saying the same thing. thanks.
B.Powers and a few others-
the fact is, you ARE looking for a smoking gun. whether it be air attack flying off the fire, a div sup leaving the line, confusion from too many ops. section chief’s or a dictator/hypnotist Division Chief “ordering” Granite Mountain off the hill.
you think that Willis had enough power/leverage/hypnotism/whatever to convince Marsh AND Steed that it was a good idea to short cut the green back to the ranch? like Willis said, “Marsh, you get down to Yarnell with your crew right now or else…”? and Marsh went tromping through the green with 18 of his crewmembers knowing that he could end up out flanked by the fire but saying to himself, “I better get my crew down there to Yarnell cause Chief Willis told me to and I might get fired if I don’t…”?
or maybe you think that was the first time that Marsh/Steed were asked to do something hazardous with their crew during a going incident?… and when faced with such a complex situation that they just started running down the hill through the green and no one else knew what to do either so they just left their safety zone and blindly followed Marsh/Steed to their death as “Elizabeth” has suggested?
or is it more likely that they had been working their asses off all morning, and were frustrated that air attack dropped on their burn and wanted them to go direct and then Div Zulu shows up and wants to change the plan that Blue Ridge and GM have talked about and they can’t get on the same page so Div Zulu leaves, and the whole management team is a cluster and the radio is overloaded with traffic and then the weather turns and the fire kicks up and starts rolling away from them and all their work that day has gone to pot and now there sitting in the black, miles away from their buggies and out of the fight and fire is about to be threatening a community and yes, they feel pressured to act, so they decide they should get the crew off the hill and in a better position to help, which means getting back to their buggies but the they came in on would take them way out of the way when the ranch is right there and so they decide to short cut, because the fire is flanking them and they think that the NWS weather front has hit and the thundercell is pushing the fire, so they descend down the saddle and lose sight of the fire for a few minutes and then pop out the bottom only to realize that the wind has shifted again and now the fire is coming right at them and there is no way they are getting back up the hill in time.
I think it is well established that the initial attack was lacking and more could have been done. And the mobilization of the Type 2 team during the second operational period was a mess, and resources were tight and conditions were prime for some gnarly fire behavior. No matter what all else is going on though, Hotshot crews are a team, and they have very competent leadership who make decisions, but we are all human, and we all make mistakes. Most mistakes don’t have such dire consequences
FYI: I don’t take this personally, I don’t “have a dog in this fight.” And I too have been following this story since the day it happened. It is not easy to sit here and read some of these comments for the simple fact that many of them show a complete ignorance as to what a chaotic, dynamic and frustrating work environment it is during the second operational period of an escalating incident threatening urban interface.
What are you referencing that I wrote, xxfullsailxx? Clearly you are condemning it, but clue me in to what you think I said that was so wrong….
(Note that I am USING my real name, by the way. You could do the same.)
not going to wade through all the ramblings here to find the exact quote, but i think gary olsen captured the basic idea…
“Elizabeth N said, ‘As I understand it, the culture of the Hotshots tends to be one of “hierarchy” (“trust your captain/superintendent implicitly and do what he says without second-guessing”), which is exactly the opposite of what is the SAFEST thing to do when things are melting down and leaders (given that they are human) are not likely to be making their best decisions based on all available evidence.'”
elizabeth, i don’t mean to sound hostile. you seem genuine in your interest, and you obviously have a lot of time to devote to this, but you don’t have a clue what you’re talking about.
a “HUGE, HUGE rape problem” analogy… really? that’s so off the mark, on so many levels.
Reply to fullsail:
Your comments here — and over at Wildfire Today — make it abundantly clear to me that you ‘do’ take it personally and you ‘do’ have a dog in this fight, particularly when it comes to the topic of “the second operational period of an escalating incident threatening urban interface.”
As to the fact that you find some of the comments in this forum as being ignorant, my reply is this: I am sorry you feel that way.
And if it causes you some level of discomfort to find that not everyone shares your point of view that the tragedy at Yarnell Hill can be attributed entirely to a case of ‘mistakes happen’ . . . then I am sorry you feel that way, too.
I’ve noticed how you tried over at Wildfire Today to discourage comments from people you don’t feel should be submitting comments, and you didn’t have much success with that there. Am just guessing here, but I tend to think that you are not going to have an appreciable amount of success with that here, either.
j. stout- if you’re trying to imply that i am some how directly related to this incident, i am not. i did not directly know any of the involved personnel with the exception of one, paul musser, who i worked for in 2002 and 2003.
and, no need for you to be sorry for anything. obviously the main folks involved in this discussion have a lot of time on their hands, so i don’t really expect to successfully discourage them.
Regarding the issues of Willis’ mentioning to Marsh about “it is not anchored”.
In the interview notes, that mention comes under the 0600 heading. It says Marsh and Willis talked then. The interview notes were chronological, suspect that conversation about anchoring was early in the day. Willis says they did not talk again.
There has been a lot of speculation about what changed Marsh’s mind re: the Musser request, about some intervening event or call. I still think the most likely thing is that Marsh did so on his own, after talking to Steed. From a couple of comments, it sounds like Musser was a good OPS, with a good reputation. I suspect he and Marsh had worked together often before. If Musser called Marsh to ask for help from a unit 1.5 miles away, I suspect he was darn panicked and sounded so. While the initial response was no, I think Marsh wanted to help someone he respected out who had a very big problem. They reassessed, thought they could safely and the rest is history.
I’ve been looking a bit to try and find the ‘interview notes’ that describe Marsh and Willis talking at 0600, so far without success. It has been my understanding, that GM and Marsh were not yet at Yarnell at 0600. Perhaps I am mistaken about that?
The anchoring conversation, certainly sounds like the type of thing that could have occured earlier in the day, based on the conditions, BUT, I am a bit confused as to why Willis would feel ANY guilt over it at all. Anchoring a fire, is Wildfire 101, and a discussion of such, should never be a source for guilt (alternately, perhaps a LACK of that discussion could be). It sounds like GM DID in fact, anchor the fire into a boulder field adjoining cold black. So with that being done, why the guilt?? The fact that they were unable to complete the subsequent line contruction in time, doesn’t refute the fact that they HAD an anchor point.
Therefore, the whole expression of guilt thing puzzles me, and I think cell phone records might reveal more than some people are willing to.
They took the PDF file off the front page. But go to azcentral, type in yarnell notes in the search. A bunch of results will come up. There are some that have pdf in the address. Click on those and you should be in the notes (one of the results is for an interview between Karels and Abel).
I just learned something from our local paper (Times news Twin Falls ID.) They are running a 4 day report on fatality fires lessons learned. To read the article go to magicvalley.com go to times news. They said in the article that Marsh was not a qualified Davison boss. They did a lot of research on there article. This statement surprised me. Dose any body know what his red card was? Statement—-Eric Marsh wasn’t trained (as a division superintendent) Jim cook noted ( he is from NIFC) recently retired.
I guess I should add the mistake I made on the Valdez Fire was parking the crew carrier on a road above the fire where it was threatened an hour later and leading the crew to cut hand line ABOVE the fire. Does any of that sound familiar?
Lessons learned we have all been there. Los Padres 1968 I was a crew boss with a State inmate crew there were 2 crews and several engine crews assigned to a road to stop spot fires from the fire burning at us from below. I was uncomfortable and we had safety zones The fire made a run at us and we got to the SZ in the nick of time as did the others and we all survived. So the rest of my carrier became LCES which wasn’t even invented then.
It kept me really aware of the 10 and 13.
Forgive me, Gary, but you and Bob are making the exact points as to why questioning a boss’s decision should be *ENCOURAGED* in high-stake workplaces (such as the front line of a massive fire). Meaning, in the two bad situations that you and Bob both candidly describe, you both got LUCKY. Particularly in Bob’s situation, things could have been a lot, lot, lot worse. I say that not by way of criticizing Bob, but, rather, by way of countering your prior point, Gary, in which you correctly point out that, relatively speaking, *MASS* crew fatalities have been far and few between. That is true. But, apparently, part of the reason is because folks got LUCKY repeatedly when bad decisions (using hindsight judgment, of course) were made.
No criticism. No hostility toward you. Just trying to think this through….
Based on what you have explained to me about the Hotshot world and the way that many men move on (e.g. off the fire lines), it seems then that just because you are at the top of the totem pole out in the field does not mean that your eyes or judgment work better than everyone else’s. It just means that you have been around longer. Don’t get me wrong: You (“you” meaning the crew boss/super./capt.) certainly have more experience and probably far more training, but surely things can get past you or surely you can miss things. That is what the empirical research done by the behavioralists say, anyway.
Elizabeth N said, “As I understand it, the culture of the Hotshots tends to be one of “hierarchy” (“trust your captain/superintendent implicitly and do what he says without second-guessing”), which is exactly the opposite of what is the SAFEST thing to do when things are melting down and leaders (given that they are human) are not likely to be making their best decisions based on all available evidence.”
So…I am having a philosophical difference of opinion with at least one person on the ASAIT in spite of my previous extensive and meandering comments. So…here is another one. And since I have not been on the line as a hotshot since 1984, I realize this may have changed, so I would like to hear from some of the wildland firefighters with more current experience, and if I am wrong, I will stand down.
But…I think this is issue is important, and I don’t mean to pick on Elizabeth N. alone, because there has been many other similar comments that have run throughout this thread on this same topic.
And here comes another anecdote. Old firefighters never run out of anecdotes, they just run out of people who are interested in hearing them. When I was with the Santa Fe Hotshots, an aspiring comedian in the Forest Supervisor’s Office made up a gag organizational chart for the Santa Fe Hotshots that was routed through all of the departments on the forest to be signed off on and was ultimately approved by the Forest Supervisor. The chart had two blocks, the upper one said, “Gary Olson”, and the lower one said, “Everybody Else.” Which was not only funny at the time, but makes the point I am trying to make here with fewer words. This was…and is…the only way for a hotshot crew to operate. And it has worked successfully…almost all of the time.
I think it is very important to implicitly trust your supervisor on a hotshot crew (or any type of crew) and do exactly what they say without questioning them when things are melting down. Theoretically, the supervisor, whether it is a senior crewperson, a squad boss, the assistant crew boss (captain) or the crew boss (superintendent), is the person with the most experience and training, and is therefore more likely than not, to make the correct decision when the fire is going to hell in a hand basket.
Now of course, this theory is based on the concept that the very best person with the most experience and training is in fact, the one who is leading at the time of the melt down.
And…I feel another history lesson coming on. Back in my day (pre-ICS for the most part, although I did work for 2 years on the line and 4 years in the office under that system) things were simpler, for example, I was never called on to engage in structure protection, thank God, or all may have been lost. The crew organizational chart was also much, much simpler. There was just a crew boss and two (some crews in other regions had 3) squad bosses.
This simpler organization also meant lower GS grades, which led to retention problems with a high turnover rate. High turnover rates can lead to problems with professionalizing the wildland firefighting force, although a great number of really good people return each year hoping things will get better and…they like the job for a variety of reasons.
Things started to change with what personnel officers and higher level managers call “grade-creep”, and with what the work force and first-line supervisors and managers call, “enabling employees to provide for their families and actually make a career out of what may have started out to be just a job.”
This led to all of the titles you are reading now, which kind of sounds like everybody was in charge of something on the Granite Mountain Hotshot crew as well as all other crews. Specialized titles and skills justify higher GS (pay) grades and permanent positions which leads to a more experienced and highly trained work force.
And there is a point to this story…if the American public wants a professional widland firefighting force wherein the cluster **** that you read about in the ADOSH report is LESS LIKELY to happen…well then, you should encourage your political representative to enable agency managers to quit screwing the wildland firefighting employees over. Yes, I know that is NOT going to happen, but I thought I would throw it out just for the hell of it. Sometimes you get exactly what you pay for…Good Citizens Of Yarnell Who Have Now Filed Their Own Lawsuit.
But…back to my main point of having a crew follow the leader, so to speak. I think history proves this is the preferred standard operating procedure. As I have stated before, here are the statistics for hotshot crew deaths.
1. The Loop Fire of 1966, 12 El Cariso Hotshots dead – the crew boss agreed to cut hand line in a chute above an fire, even after another crew refused to do so. Bad call.
2. The Battlement Creek Fire of 1976, 3 Mormon Lake Hotshots dead, including the crew boss, who agreed to cut and burn out hand line above a backfire and then he kept a skeleton team (4 men) to finish the job even though he watched the backfire advance towards them for at least 2 hours. Bad call.
3. The South Canyon Fire of 1994, 9 Prineville Hotshots dead (an entire squad) after the crew boss agreed to have them cut line above the fire in a chaotic environment where nobody was in clearly in charge and the agency managing the fire (BLM) repeatedly screwed up from day one. Neither the crew boss or assistant crew boss was with the squad who was killed. Bad call.
4. The Yarnell Hill Fire of 2013, 19 out of 20 Granite Mountain Hotshots dead. Obviously, I can’t summarize what went wrong here in a sentence as that is still being debated, but there is no question the crew boss made a bad call, we just don’t know the “why” yet, or at least we don’t conclusively know the why.
So…here is my main point. In spite of these terrible and tragic losses, hotshot supervisors have a pretty good record overall in making the right call when things are at their very worst when you consider the hundreds of thousands (?) of shifts hotshot crews have put in on deadly wildfires over the past 75 years.
I don’t think there should be any question in any one’s mind that in the few minutes, less than 5 (?), the Granite Mountain Hotshots had to make a decision when faced with the flaming front of the Yarnell Hill Fire, there was no time to take an opinion poll or have a crew meeting to democratically discuss their options.
And although this was an extreme example of the kind of decision making that goes on within various units (crews) assigned to the fire line, it was not unique in any way, those kinds of decisions are made by supervisors all the time without asking for anyone’s input.
On a side note, the decision for the Granite Mountain Hotshot crew to leave the black and to try and reach the backside of Glen Ilha or Yarnell (in my opinion) was made in a relatively calm moment that was without stress, unless you count being asked (or ordered, by their supervisor, in my opinion) to leave their safety zone descend into the valley.
It is also apparent to me at least, that not only did Eric Marsh take the time to think about this request (order) he took the time to ask his assistant crew boss for his opinion regarding his comfort level for attempting to do what they had been asked (ordered) to do, which of course is a good thing and goes on all of the time.
In summary, it is not uncommon for a hotshot crew boss to ask the opinions of those he trusts on the crew to factor into his decision making process. BUT…it is still critical that the crew boss (or other person in charge of the situation at that moment) have the authority and complete trust of the crew to call “Today Is Easter” and expect everyone to start immediately looking for Easter eggs without questioning the why, or for how long.
On a side note: WTKTT said, “According to Brendan McDonough… it went even far beyond that. It was also a religious experience. He was ‘baptized’ by other members of the Granite Mountain team ( which included Mormons and ( I believe ) an active preacher ) just a week or two before the burn over in Yarnell.”
FYI…I don’t think there has been any evidence presented in this format or anywhere else that I am aware of that “fighting wildfire while being a Mormon or active preacher” is an inherently bad thing. That comment was king of left hanging, in my opinion, and definitely inferred that this particular characteristic of the Granite Mountain Hotshots (which was probably unique to the Granite Mountain Hotshots) was a weakness and an accident just waiting to happen.
On another side note: I think we should all remember that although Eric Marsh made a very, very big mistake at work, we all should remember what the Bible says, “Let he who has not ****** up at work, cast the first stone.” Everybody who was with me on the Valdez Fire with the Santa Fe Hotshots knows I made at least one mistake during my time a hotshot crew boss, but the Valdez Fire was far more forgiving than the Yarnell Hill Fire.
gary olsen- i very much so appreciate your comment with one caveat…
the idea that eric marsh or jesse steed were “ordered” down is not something that sits well with me, though i do think it’s worthwhile to look into all the influencing factors that lead to GM leaving their safety zone in the middle of the burn period and walk through the green. in my experience over the last 12 seasons, noone “orders” (in terms of demanding an action) a crew anywhere.
something that has been harped on us over the past 10 years, is “assignment turn down protocols.” to the point where 90% of wildland firefighters can spout off the page number in the IRPG and give you a run down of the steps/protocols involved. additionally, i am sure that eric marsh had worked with musser and abel multiple times over the years and had strong enough relationships with them (whether good or bad) to feel comfortable in expressing his viewpoint and turning down assignments.
i definitely appreciate the fact that you recognize the additional complexities involved in wildland fire today vs. yesterday. although the basic principles and tactics of wildland fire have not changed, urban interface, the number of cooperators responding (directly associated with those communities) all throughout the country has added a new level of pressure to respond to incidents with a “hurry-up offense.”
i also appreciate the fact that you don’t try to say that you did everything right throughout your career. everyone makes mistakes at some point throughout their career. hopefully none as tragic as this.
Fullssail…
What if, when Willis “ordered” the crew to relocate to Yarnell, they tried the turn down protocol, but then they were told “You heard Air Attack, You got between 1 and 2 hours to get there. Should be no problem. Okay?”
“Guess so Chief, we will call you when we get to the Boulder Springs Ranch”
Turn down protocol may not have been used if they were not well aware of fire behaviour, rates of spread, etc.
you think a 20+ year veteran wildland firefighter who has worked in the southwest for 10+ years, who is fighting fire in his own backyard, who is a hotshot superintendent, who has been on the division all morning, who is responsible for 19 others isn’t assessing fire behavior before he asks his crew to move?
you think jesse stead wasn’t assessing fire behavior while he was sitting at lunch spot watching the fire behavior?
obviously, they made a poor calculation. but as i’ve said before, noone “orders” a crew (as in “demands”) a hotshot crew anywhere without the captain or superintendent assessing whether or not THEY FEEL it is a safe operation.
Fullsail you ask the question we have all been asking. Why did he move with what he was seeing. The latest statement that Willis ask him to assist is now under review. Did Willis have more authority over Marsh than we know? He was Marsh’s direct supervisor. This is not a normal fire command. Way back there was some discussion that Marsh had refused to sign the crew off as certified. Willis did it while marsh was on leave. There may be some internal conflict here we are not aware of. Again we are searching not blaming. Don’t take personal what we say as we are looking for the answers. Every body knows who I am but I do not know the real names of many imputing on this discussion including you and what dog you have in this fight. We have been here searching for answers for 2 months, you just jumped in unless you changed your handle, so I’ll work with you. I know your a wild land fire fighter and I respect that.
And you know that this same applies within the structural worls, as well?
Remember Willis was PFD, so was Marsh and the whole GMH crew.
both jesse stead and eric marsh had extensive wildland backgrounds prior to being employed by PFD. they were not working directly for willis, neither through the IMT nor in Prescott FD’s jurisdiction.
Gary–I will say I have worked with and for a lot of Mormons and other religious people including myself. I have never known there religious views to get in the way of fighting fire. When things get tight or go to hell we have all said silent prayers.
**
** RESIDENTS OF YARNELL FILE SUITS FOR DAMAGES
This sort of got ‘lost in the noise’ yesterday ( Friday ) but it is
a very significant development.
It was another article that appeared last night in the Arizona Republic.
Residents of Yarnell are now filing class-action suits against the same
list of defendants as Marcia McKee… the mother of GM Hotshot Grant
McKee who was killed in Yarnell on June 30, 2013.
RESIDENTS FILE LEGAL CLAIMS OVER
ACTIONS DURING ( YARNELL ) BLAZE
http://www.azcentral.com/news/arizona/articles/20131213residents-file-legal-claims-over-actions-during-blaze.html
By Kristina Goetz The Republic | azcentral.com Fri Dec 13, 2013 10:56 PM
More than a dozen Yarnell-area residents filed a raft of legal claims on Friday with the Arizona Attorney General’s Office seeking damages for loss of property and lost earning potential from the Yarnell Hill Fire and for emotional distress arising from a “cover-up.”
In the notices of claim, the residents say that the fire destroyed their homes and other property and much of their community because of the “negligence, carelessness and intentional misconduct” of Yavapai County, Prescott, the state and the Yarnell Fire District.
They argue that with reasonable coordination and planning, firefighting managers could have prevented the area’s “obliteration” without endangering the Granite Mountain Hotshots — 19 of whom died in the June 30 blaze — or other firefighters battling the blaze.
The notices of claim further charge that fire commanders had a duty to arrange an orderly withdrawal that would have allowed fleeing residents to save heirlooms, mementos and other personal property. That, the notices argue, would have “changed the last-minute, terror-filled, desperate flight for their lives into a calm, orderly and efficient retreat.”
The claims seek damages from the state, Yavapai County, Prescott and the Yarnell Fire District. The Fire District handles firefighting in the area. The Arizona State Forestry Division was coordinating the fight against the Yarnell Hill Fire on June 30.
The notices cited the 4-0 vote earlier this month by the Industrial Commission of Arizona to impose $559,000 in penalties against the Arizona Forestry Division for its handling and oversight of the fire.
Craig Knapp, attorney for those who filed the notices, declined to comment. “We’re not done, so I can’t comment until we’re done filing all the claims,” he said. He declined to specify how many more will be filed other than that it is “a significant number.”
The firefighting managers failed to develop a coherent strategy to fight the fire and protect the surrounding communities and residents, and then they ordered a disjointed evacuation, the residents claim.
“But for blind luck, the pluck of Yarnell’s residents and a few fortunate flukes of wind, the firefighting managers would have caused massive deaths,” the notices read. Chiefs bungled the effort from start to finish and then “lamely tried to cover up and whitewash their own negligence and intentional wrongdoing,” the notices say.
Bob,
As I’ve said several times, when fatalities are involved, the “Factual Reports” are anything BUT factual. And as in this case, a cover-up and a whitewash ensued. Plus, there is the FACT that they establish a conclusion first, the find the ‘facts’ to sustain their conclusion. Which leads to, among other things, selective interviews. And they can go anywhere their pre-established conclusion leads them.
And another strong influence here confounding it all, is the FACILITATED LEARNING ANALYSIS (FLA) where they only care about everyone ‘TELLING THEIR STORY’ instead of dealing with facts (or at least permissable inferences), which result in ‘factual reports.’
You REALLY should check this stuff out. http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=16353
Here are some glowing tidbits:
1) Focus of Process – This process dissects an event and demonstrates to employees – through their own words – both what they should learn from the event and how they should similarly learn from subsequent events.
2) Report Format – IF documented, the eport GENERALLY a brief description of the event and a description of what those PEOPLE INVOLVED LEARNED FROM THE ACCIDENT.
3) Witness Statements – Statements …. are given in a GROUP DEBRIEFING ATMOSPHERE. Employees talk based on their willingness to share their PERSPECTIVES and lessons learned. …. and they should NOT be recorded.
This should help explain why the SAIT is worth so little.
One of those things as hard headed as I am I would not be happy with I am afraid.
So… when a report such as the SAIR isn’t…
FACILITATING anything.. or allowing anyone to
LEARN anything… or can’t even be considered valid
ANALYSIS…
…do the taxpayers of Arizona get their coupla MILLION
dollars back that this worthless effort probably COST?
Link for today’s (Dec 14th) azcentral.com article titled,something like ‘Yarnell Hill Fire – ‘Total Non-Stop Chaos.’ using the words of the BR HS. Some new information in there.
http://www.azcentral.com/news/arizona/articles/20131213yarnell-hill-fire-documents-breakdown-disaster.html?nclick_check=1
Robert the things we are finding out now makes the SAIT look like a bunch of BS. A waist of time and money. They sure didn’t Post or review the info that was out there a poor job all the way around. Also what are fire shelters going for now?
A new fire shelter commercially sells for around $360.00.
GSA or large state contracts may be able to get them cheaper due to large quantity purchases.
**
** LOCATION OF NEW VIDEO WITH FINAL RADIO TRANSMISSIONS
In case anyone was wondering… the exact LOCATION for where this newly
released video was shot was right near the St. Joseph Shrine area.
The camera operator was standing just at the point where the pavement
ends on Shrine road and the dirt track part begins.
The yellow sign by the right side of the road about a hundred feet to the
west at the start of the video actually says “No Outlet”… and the small
square brown sign seen on the left side of the road when the camera
pans to the east for a moment says ‘Shrine’.
The camera operator was standing exactly here…
Latitude: 34.227234
Longitude: -112.752814
34.227234, -112.752814
Just cut-and-paste the line above with the comma between the two values
into the search bar of Google Maps and then hit ENTER. A large GREEN
ARROW will appear on the map pointing to exactly where the camera
was filming this video. Just zoom down a few times and you will see
the spot where the Shrine Road pavement ends and the dirt part begins
as seen in the video.
The video was also shot at the exact moment when both the SAIR and
the ADOSH fire progression charts show the fireline ‘surrounding’ the
St. Joseph Shrine area and that is why the video itself shows fire
all around them. A trick of geography made a ‘loop’ in the fireline that
ended up ‘surrounding’ this spot before the loop closed to the east and
this location was then totally engulfed in flames.
These guys seen in the video are actually only moments away from
death themselves. If the ‘loop’ had closed around the area to the east
just a few minutes earlier than it actually did… they would have been
trapped right where we see them in the video.
Also… the ‘mini-storage’ facility referenced in the transcript and which is
where these men were headed as they evacuated the Shrine road area
is exactly here…
Latitude: 34.231000
Longitude: -112.739872
34.231000, -112.739872
Again… just cut-and-paste the line above with the comma in the Google
Maps search bar, hit ENTER, and the GREEN ARROW shows the spot.
You could also just drop this address into the Google Maps search bar
and the red marker will be right on the exact location…
21972 Arizona 89, Yarnell, AZ
This is the same crew and the same mini-storage facility seen in the
public YouTube video entitled…
Yarnell Hill Fire 6/30/2013. Globe Type II Crew.
It is at this exact link…
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=riLzhfH6g_M
This just one of four public YouTube videos uploaded back in October
by this ‘Globe Type II’ crew and a YouTube user with the account name
of ’4490red’… and it shows a VLAT drop just near that ‘U-Store-It’ facility
with the white Globe Type II ‘Crew Trucks’ in the foreground and the
‘Ranger 58′ radio traffic heard right after the drop.
That video was shot probably just moments after this crew evacuated
from the Shrine road and arrived at this U-Store-It facility.
Just go to YouTube and search for user name 4490red and you will
find all FOUR of these videos from the Yarnell fire that day.
The ABOUT information uploaded by them with the video shot at
the U-Store-It facility says…
Yarnell Hill Fire 6/30/2013. Globe Type II Crew.
Uploaded by YouTube user: 4490red
Published on Oct 6, 2013
Yarnell Hill Fire. 6/30/2013. DC-10 Tanker drop just
east of Glen Ilah. After the wind shift. Right around
the time of the entrapment.
By the way… there is actually active Google Street View data
for the point above… where the camera operator was
actually standing… but the Google Street View data ENDS
just about 10 feet west of that point.
So you can simply drag the little ‘Street View’ icon to the point
above and see exactly what is in the video when you look from
left to right… but just make sure you are either on the point
itself or just east of it… otherwise… Google Street View will
say ‘no data’.
The Google Street View car did NOT proceed west onto
the dirt part of Shrine Road. It stopped right there where
these fireman did when they shot their video.
It’s important for us to get things back on track if need be, and along those lines City of Prescott PIO Pete Wertheim has issued a CORRECTION for something that was stated in the Darrell Willis response to the IM article, “Granite Mountain Hotshots Were Asked if They Could Protect Yarnell”. The correction is now included with the article, in the response to question #1. The correction states that “at 10:20 am, Darrell Wiillis began working under OPS”, and did not become an OSC, as had previously been stated. Apparently, prior to 10:20, Willis had been reporting directly to the IC.
Also, in comments I posted previously, I took the new reporting by the Arizona Republic to infer that the ‘last contact’ between Willis and DIV A/GM occurred close to the time of GMs decision to move out. In re-reading the article a couple of times, it became apparent to me that the ‘last contact’ could have occured much earlier in the day. As I mentioned in those previous comments, only clarification from Willis, or cell phone records, or both, will clear this up.
In this morning’s Arizona Republic article on the ADOF release of documents referencing the chaos in the planning and management of the Yarnell Hill fire, comes the following information:
*******************************************
“Darrell Willis of the Prescott Fire Department, who helped found the Granite Mountain Hotshots, told investigators he had pressed Marsh to complete a protective fire break around Yarnell before the accident, saying, “This thing is not anchored — we got to get an anchor on this thing.” The notes say Willis “seemed to have some ‘minor guilt’” in retrospect.
“This was the last conversation he had with Eric,” investigators wrote.
***************************************
IF THIS CONVERSATION WHERE WILLIS “PRESSED MARSH TO COMPLETE A PROTECTIVE BREAK AROUND YARNELL” OCCURED AFTER THE GM TURNDOWN OF MUSSER’S REQUEST TO ASSIST IN YARNELL, THEN THAT WOULD *CONFIRM* WHAT SOME HAVE BEEN SPECULATING ALL ALONG, THAT WILLIS PLAYED AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN THEIR DECISION TO LEAVE THE BLACK AND SAFETY! Why else would he be expressing ‘minor guilt’?
The proof in this pudding will either be a clarification by Willis, or the release of cell phone records, or both.
WTNTT Can we get that article on here. Could be our missing link. If it is what it is.
Bob Powers,
Here’s the link:
http://www.azcentral.com/news/arizona/articles/20131213yarnell-hill-fire-documents-breakdown-disaster.html
Reply to TTWARE regarding the conversation between Willis and Marsh: Even if this conversation took place ‘before’ the Musser request to assist in Yarnell, isn’t is still tremendously significant — as it may have played a part with the Musser request being turned down? The Musser request wasn’t for an entire HS crew plus a Division Superintendent (and the Willis request would have been). Seems to me this is huge. Really huge. Whether it took place before or after.
Correction, the above should have been “isn’t it still tremendously significant” . . .
J Stout,
Either way it would be significant, BUT it would seem perhaps a more logical progression of events for DIV A and GM to be feeling good about being safe in the black, and then citing THAT to Musser at the time of the turn-down of his request, AND THEN, immediately after that receiving a request from Willis to protect Yarnell, causing an abrupt change in their prior decision, whereby they immediately departed for Yarnell.
IN FACT, if Willis actually heard the Musser turn-down over the radio, AND THEN prodded them to go anyway, perhaps a little more than ‘minor guilt’ would be in order.
Reply to TTWARE: True. I see your point.
The TIME on this is obviously critical. Don’t forget there is also
the moment we know about now when Marsh basically told
Air Attack ( Rory Collins ) to take a flying hike when Collins
tried to assert ‘command authority’ during Marsh’s argument
with the newly arrived DIVS Z ( Marquez ).
SAIR says this ‘argument’ took place around 1210 but the
ADOSH put Marquez’s arrival on the fire much later at 1300.
If Marsh had just been told to “get ‘er dun” by Willis… then that
would explain him ‘dissing’ BOTH Marquez AND Collins and
just wanting to stick with the plan he and Frisby cooked up
when Frisby came up to the ridge earlier for the ‘face to face’.
Regardless of the time, however… this new piece of evidence
shows that indeed… Willis was not hesitating to play BIG BOSS
that day and call out to Marsh and try to tell him what to do…
…even though Willis wasn’t Marsh’s ‘fireline’ supervisor.
Actually… maybe he WAS for a while.
Aren’t we also learning just now that Willis was ‘promoted’
to an OPS position for a while that day?
Maybe that was when he was calling Marsh ( DIVS A ) and
felt he had the authority to tell a DIVS what to do.
More to come… I’m sure.
So, would Marsh have had a cell phone that was his personal property, or would it have been one that was property of the Prescott FD?
There were SIX cell phones recovered from the
deployment site. It has still never been fully
determined who they all belonged to.
The YCSO police investigators sent them to
ACTIC ( Arizona Counter Terrorism Information
Center ) so they could attempt data extraction
way back in July. We have never learned the
results of the ACTIC examinations.
I would imagine the documented ‘results’ from
the ACTIC request would have been delivered
to the SAIT… so that document detailing the
results must also be part of a full FOIA to
the ADF for documents related to their
investigation.
Regardless… Willis had the GM intra-crew
frequency… and has admitted he was
‘monitoring their private channel’ pretty
much all day while he was running the
structure protection effort up north at the
Double Bar A ranch.
He could have called Marsh at ANY time on
this ‘private channel’ and been telling him
to ‘Jump’ with Eric responding “How high?”.
The new video/audio released today is going viral.
It’s only 1:00 AM and I am already seeing all the MSM ( MainStream Media )
feed sites picking it up.
Going to be a busy MSM cycle tomorrow.
Newtown 1 year anniversary
Updates on today’s Colorado School shooting.
Video/Audio of last moments of Granite Mountain.
Check out Wildfire Today. The actual audio of the last radio transmissions of the GMHS has been posted. Chilling to actually hear.
If I am not mistaken, it sounds like the events might have occurred 7-10 minutes earlier than prior timelines suggested. Which are correct???
Reply to mike post on December 13, 2013 at 8:41 pm
You are right, mike.
These timeframes are WAAY earlier than anything published
in any report so far.
If Steed ( we can be sure it was him now ) first reported
they were ‘in front of the flaming front’ at 1633, as this
timeframe seems to report, versus 1639 as the SAIR
and ADOSH report… then that blows a LOT of assumptions
and analysis out of the water.
A 6 minute difference in this timeframe is CRUCIAL.
It makes a LOT of other things wrong… including most of
the ‘official’ fire progression charts published so far.
Time to straighten all this out and see what the ‘new’
( actual? ) timeline shows/tell us.
We also now see SECONDS values on the timestamps
for the first time. If the ‘clock’ being used here on this
video is absolutely correct… a lot of things change now.
Well… we seem to have another ‘MacKenzie EDIT’
situation going on with this new video release.
There is ( yet again ) another obvious EDIT in this newly
released video at the +25 second mark.
This time… instead of it being an obvious ‘fade’ separating
the edits… its just a ‘straight cut’. It happens AFTER we
hear Jesse Steed break in on Arizona 16 with his first
MAYDAY and just BEFORE we hear the local firefighter
near the truck say “Got fire right over here now”.
The PROBLEM is that the ‘official transcript’ that was
also obtained from the Arizona Forestry Commission
that accompanied this ‘video’ does NOT account for
this ‘edit’ in the video.
The transcript is attempting to show ‘video times’
on the left in the MM:SS format then followed by
( HH:MM:SS ) ‘actual’ (atomic?) times.
Both of these times in the transcript only show a 12
second separation between Steed’s first MAYDAY
and the local firefighter saying “Got fire right over here
now”… and do NOT account for the obvious EDIT
in the video itself at the +25 second mark.
So that means however much TIME is actually ‘missing’
there because of the EDIT throws off ALL of the rest
of the ‘timestamps’ for the rest of the transcript.
This really boggles my mind.
Is it possible, then… that the SAIT investigators didn’t
even have access to the original video… and then
didn’t notice the ‘edit’… and they just assumed that
all the events in the video were ‘contiguous’ and
that affected their entire transcript ‘actual time’ stamps?
This would create a ‘mystery’ that is just like the
MacKenzie video, then.
Who would have had the opportunity to EDIT raw video
even before the SAIT team got to see it?
ALSO… notice how the released video actually STARTS.
It shows even more evidence of ‘editing’ or ‘tampering’.
For a brief moment at the very START of this new video
we actually see someone clicking on the PLAY button of
a standard video player. Looks like it was being played
on a Macintosh PC.
The ‘toolbar’ they clicked on is actually IN THE VIDEO
and then just ‘slips away’ from view after a second or two.
That means this released video was actually ‘captured’
with some screen-capture product like EZVIDEO or
something… and is NOT any kind of ‘raw’ video file.
Someone just ‘captured’ the movie being played on
their screen using some other screen-capture software
product… then uploaded the capture itself to YouTube
and NOT the original video.
Very strange.
I have been watching the Lessons Learned case studies and have found a common these. “ANCHOR POINTS” or lack thereof.
In Canda, we use LACES, versus LCES.
The A is for Anchor. If you are not anchoring your line to something that will not change (ie. road, lake, safe black) then you are not in compliance with LACES.
Just a thought, it is easy enough to change LCES to LACES, and it may get firefighters thinking and acting a bit more safe..
Looking at Yarnell, the Boys had no A…. They did not have some other stuff too, but definitely no Anchor..
the “A” in anchor point refers to line construction, correct? as in “constructing line without a safe anchor point.” we (in the U.S.) account for anchor point both in our primary tactic of “anchor, flank and pinch” as well as in the “18 watchout situations.” GMIHC’s initial assignment was to construct line from the black/road junction. they did indeed have a safe anchor point.
with regard to their movement from their assignment back towards the ranch, i think there are a number of other more appropriate infractions, such as, “cannot see main fire, not in contact with someone who can” or “base all action on current and expected behavior of the fire.”
for you to suggest that there is an absence of the idea of “anchor point” is incorrect. GM had an anchor point.
Granit Mountain walked clear across the edge of the fire to start at an anchor point. The real problem a lot of open line was between DIV A and DIV Z.. One crew just did not have enough time to construct all of the open line. Some place in DIV Z they lost the fire. I am not sure if it was along the open line or crossed the cat line?
I do not believe that ANCHOR is stressed hhigh enough.
Your right I never built line without one, direct or indirect.
There may be a few out there that think, ‘three Operations Sections Chiefs, no problemo, our Team has done that and it worked out fine’.
Let’s see how well it worked in this situation, at the time at which all firefighters were being evacuated off of the line. Regarding Division A and GM, OPS Willis has stated that he “had heard they were ‘moving south'”, OPS Musser knew that they were heading down ‘their predetermined route’, and OPS Able thought they were safe in ‘good black’. None of the three OSC knew their actual location or apparently, even what the other OPS knew, and the two OPS that knew that they were on the move, also did not know their routing and destination, as well.
So, at the time when the fire was blowing-up, and firefighter evacuations were underway, there were two OSC that knew that there was a crew out there somewhere, on the move, and they had no idea where they were, and where they were headed.
When ASM intervened with the ‘time-out’ querey after 1600 hrs, the OPS (Able) that he spoke with was the ONLY one of the three that DIDN’T know that DIV A and GM were on the move. Then, when ASM finally made contact with DIV A at around 1630 hrs to ask if they were ‘ok’, Marsh responded that they were ok, ‘just moving’. Granted ASM has acknowledged that they had received a poor briefing from the departing air attack at approximately 1600, but that seems to be all the more reason during the chaos, to follow-up Marsh’es statement with a “where exactly are you?” for future reference, especially since EVERYBODY else had been, or was currently being, evacuated off of the fire.
DIV A’s minimalist radio responses to various people didn’t necessarily help the situation, but receiving direction and requests from more than one supervisor must have muddied the waters a bit, as well.
As a supervisor, you’re always supposed to know where you people are, so you can get them out safely, if need be. If you have three supervisors, and they aren’t all on the same page, something might get lost between the cracks, as it did here.
Willis story keeps changing. He was SPGS at the North end, then he was OPS, then he was designating a tennis court as a deployment site, then he was saying that he would blindly follow the crew, with the decision they made that day, then he doesn’t know if we will ever know the truth, followed by “God having a different plan for the crew that day”…..
I think his house of cards will fall over very soon.
Reply to Rocksteady post on December 12, 2013 at 5:28 pm
Don’t you think it’s also a little ‘odd’ that first Willis refuses
to pre-answer questions for Mr. Dougherty’s latest article
asking him about what went on up there at the
Double Bar A ranch… and the whole ‘tennis court as a
safety zone for 30 men’ thing…
…and then he suddenly ‘responds’ less than an hour after
the article is published with some lame deal about how
the tennis court was NOT a ‘safety zone’… it was only
a possible ‘deployment zone’.
Since when do a bunch of fellas from the prison and just
regular Type 2 structure guys have $500 fire shelters
in their pockets?
‘Deployment’ is a Type 1 Hotshot thing.
The only ‘Hotshots’ on the fire were far away from where
he was pointing at some tennis court and saying it was
any kind of ‘safety’ or ‘deployment’ zone.
Willis goofed. He picked the wrong words to try and
explain his own (bad) decision making that day.
Here is exactly what ‘Willis’ himself said ( via the Prescott
Public Relations officer ) within an hour of Mr. Dougherty’s
article being published…
>> Response to Question/Comment #3
>>
>> The tennis court was, at most, a Deployment Zone to
>> be used as a last ditch life saving site.
How do you DEPLOY without a DEPLOYMENT SHELTER, Darrell?
Inquiring minds want to know.
All wild land fire fighters are required to carrie them. I don’t believe they are $500 They did not use to be but I would have to refer to some of the current guy’s. If you are on a wild land fire it is mandatory.
WTKTT, Everyone on the fire line would have a shelter, kncluding the DOC guys. And per Federal guidelines, if they wanted to work on a federal fire (most of the fires out there these days), they would have had to have the latest versions of the shelter with them.
I would assume Arizona State would be compliant wit that as well. They also have a use life of 2 to 3 years depending on how many fires they are packed on. Or life expectancy We had to replace every 3 years, and 1 to 2 years on hot shot crews. The aluminum when bent or sat on starts to flake off in the binds after awhile.
TTWARE… thanks! See below for the quote of
$500 per shelter from Darrell Willis himself.
Question, though… Willis has ALSO said in his
‘reply’ to the article about the DOC crew suddenly
‘leaving the fire’ that the reason was because
they were totally unfamiliar with ‘lighting backfires’
so he ‘sent them away’ at that time.
How in the heck does that make them even
qualified to ‘work on a federal fireline’ in the
first place?
This was a pure STRUCTURE protection
operation at the Double Bar A ranch. Does
anyone just hired to clear brush around
houses have to have a $500 shelter too?
Ah… OK… thanks fellas.
The $500 bucks per shelter is coming from Willis himself
so I just didn’t think anyone would have $10,000
( ten thousand ) dollars worth of ‘extra’ fire shelters
to just be passing out to 20 prison crew guys.
This was a pure STRUCTURE protection assignment
up at the Double Bar A Ranch. Does that make a
difference? Are you saying that anyone who just
shows up to do structure protection has to have
a ‘deployment shelter’ too?
Here is what Willis had to say about fire shelters from
his press conference at the deployment site
July 23, 2013. He was answering a reporter’s question.
This is where he put the $500 price tag on them but
also said he had no idea what the max temperature
rating is before ‘breakdown’…
>> Q: Chief… how hot would it had to have been for
>> those shelters to breakdown?
>> At what temperature does that start to happen?
>>
>> Willis: I don’t know the facts on that.
>>
>> ( Pause )
>>
>> I know that after 19 years and 5 days after Storm
>> King… this… this is when this occurred… Storm
>> King situation… I know that… uh… after that event
>> in Colorado…there was a new design for fire
>> shelters… and it was based on that event.
>>
>> And so.. ya know… they had the best of equipment.
>>
>> We didn’t… we didn’t… ah… skimp on anything.
>>
>> One a those… ya know… they’re referred to as
>> tents or whatever… fire shelters…
>> they’re $500 ( five hundred dollars)… and we have
>> one on each person… and… uh… ya know they’re
>> the best of the best in equipment that… that money
>> can buy.
If they were wildland firefighters, even if assigned to structure protection, they would be carrying fire shelters. Doesn’t matter if its a hotshot crew, type 2 crew, prison crew–all crews carry shelters.
Thanks, OG!
Additional question, then.
Willis also said the reason that the DOC
crew suddenly ‘disappeared’ from the
fire in the middle of the work day is because
he ‘sent them away’ since they had
‘no experience in setting backfires’.
Does that automatically mean this DOC
crew could not possibly have been
considered a ‘wildland’ crew… and as
such… would NOT have not fire shelters
of their own with them?
No–they were a wildland firefighters, just not with the experience he felt was needed. Often type 2 crews don’t do back burns unless they are working in conjunction with a more highly trained crew.
Let me go back for a min. To what RTS has been saying about good out comes from bad decisions. If training on deployment sites follows Willis site and where GM deployed Then the following decision process leaving the black.
Looking off from the Lunch spot and from the drop into the canyon there were several open areas. A very poor decision process, If the fire blows up before we get to the ranch we have several deployment spots we could use in route to the ranch. Lack of training prompted them to believe they could survive by deploying if they needed to. This is a bad plan with bad outcomes, If they reached the ranch good outcome if not they could deploy not planning on the high heat and flame lengths. It seems they felt safe doing what they did and there decision to do it.
it is not (and should never be) protocol to base any action on a deployment zone. although we may note a particular area as a “good place to deploy” during a hike in or during reconnaissance, we certainly should not be engaging a fire based on anything but an adequate, available safety zone (defined as an minimum area four times expected flame lengths).
GMIHC didn’t drop off the ridge line into the hole thinking that they could deploy if they had to. by the time they realized where the fire was, they had no other option. from what i’ve read and heard about GMIHC, it was not a lack of training that lead to their fate.
I agree that it is disturbing that Brendan McDonough was also considering a deployment option prior to BRIHC’s arrival on the UTV.
More disturbing yet is a qualified Div Sup basing actions on an available tennis court as a deployment zone. but this is not terribly uncommon, i have heard many an overhead claim a very dirty burn as “good black” or that a dozer pushed safety zone was over an acre in size when it was actually an inadequate 1/4 acre.
Reply to Bob Powers post on Dec 12, 2013 at 10:39 am
The ‘tennis court’ thing isn’t the only time we see Darrell Willis
displaying what seems to be a complete lack of understanding
of the limits of a deployment shelter… or what does or does
not constitute a good ‘safety zone’ or survivable ‘deployment site’.
He also ‘demonstrated his expertise’ ( or lack thereof ) on these
things back on July 23, 2013, during that first media event at the
deployment site… which he hosted and narrated.
Even while standing exactly where these men died… he
enthusiastically defended the ‘site’ that Eric Marsh and
Jesse Steed chose to ‘deploy’. He called it “the best place
in the bowl” for a deployment….
…but then, a moment later, when asked by a reporter at
what temperature a standard issue fire shelter might
‘break down’ due to heat and not be able to sustain life
he said…
“I don’t know the answer to that”.
Similar discussion about ‘the tennis court’ and Willis’
(supposed) ‘expertise’ is/was going on over in the comment
section of Mr. Dougherty’s most recent article and I have
just posted the entire transcript of Willis’ July 23 media
event at the deployment site.
That other (recent) article is here…
http://www.investigativemedia.com/granite-mountain-hotshots-were-asked-if-they-could-protect-yarnell
Another astonishing fact that has just dribbled out as part of the Willis response through COP PIO Wertheim to the most recent John Dougherty article, is that as of 10:20 am, Willis switched from being the Group Supervisor for Structure Protection Group 2, into being an Operations Section Chief.
THIS MEANS that as of 10:20 am that morning, there were THREE Operation Section Chiefs on the fire, up until, and including, the time of burnover. This ‘little’ detail was NEVER mentioned in either the SAIR or ADOSH reports.
I’m sure many people more versed than me in normal ICS structure, would like to know exactly how, the THREE Operation Section Chiefs divided their responsiblilities, and EXACTLY what their subordinates knew about all of that.
usually there is 1 OPS Per fire of this size 2 in the same location is strange 3 in the same area is very confusing. Not sure what was going on here. The 30th seemed to be a Chinese fire drill no plan no coordination no ICS organization structure no safety officer and no real plan. Acceptable to burn 100 structures, no line no burn out dig dirt and hope it goes out.
The next obvious questions are, who ‘asked’ for the third Operations Section Chief and for what reason, how was the division of their duties determined, and MOST IMPORTANTLY, how was this information relayed to their subordinates?
Somewhere in all of these reports and articles, I read where Willis stated that at that time, he passed along his SPGS duties to a subordinate. According to other reports, that subordinate was a Task Force Leader trainee (TFLDt), without the qualification to assume a Group level (same as division level) position.
Unit Logs are NOT required, only suggested, but then it depends on what your supervisor wants too.
I agree with Bob’s statement on the Unit Logs. Some folks, mostly supervisors, have the time to fill them out as they go through their shift, while others either take mental or written notes, then fill them out at the end of shift, or the end of their tour.
And there’s a lot of substance to the suggestion to NOT turn them in because of the legal ramifications.
Well… at least we DO know for sure now that THIS particular group’s supervisor (Willis) was in the habit of keeping ‘Unit logs’, so it stands to reason the people under him would be required to do so as well.
As for whether any of these logs were ‘real time’ or ‘after the fact’… that remains to be seen.
Reply to Elizabeth N. post on December 11, 2013 at 6:09 pm
>> Elizabeth said…
>> I made a FOIA/FOIL/etc. request for the transcripts ( of Brendan
>> McDonough’s interviews with both the SAIT and ADOSH ).
>> I still haven’t gotten anything from the AZ Dept. of Forestry, and
>> AZDOSH says next week would be the soonest to get some of the
>> materials that they have. In both cases, I am told that the materials
>> are hung up in “legal.” If John Dougherty or someone else has gotten
>> the materials already (pursuant to the freedom of information laws),
>> I’d be curious to know.
Be prepared for the standard excuse… “can’t release material that is relevant
to a pending legal action ( the Marcia McKee legal claim )”…
…but then again… maybe that will NOT happen.
Example: Apparently, even though Darrell Willis is named in this legal claim,
Mr. Dougherty was already able to obtain copies of Darrell Willis’ ‘Unit logs’
from the Yarnell Hill fire for both June 29 and June 30.
They are referenced in his most recent article entitled “Granite Mountain
Hotshots Were Asked if they Could Protect Yarnell”.
>> From the article…
>>
>> Despite the fire’s increasing threat, there still was no order for the
>> firefighters to retreat. About 1 p.m., most of the firemen under Willis’
>> command at the Double Bar-A Ranch made a stunning decision.
>>
>> A 20-member hand crew of inmates from the Yuma state prison
>> “packed-up and left” the fire ground, the ADOSH report says.
>> Willis did not disclose in his “Unit Log” operational report for
>> June 29 and 30, filed with Prescott Fire Department, that the
>> prison crew left the fire.
I don’t know if the City of Prescott (COP) and/or the Prescott Fire Department
(PFD) supplied Willis’ ‘Unit logs’ willingly to Mr. Dougherty ( with redactions? )
or if he had to file some kind of Arizona State/Municipal FOIA request to get
them, but he seems to definitely have copies.
SIDENOTE: Hmm… We KNOW now that BOTH the SAIT and ADOSH
conducted their own separate ‘interviews’ with Brendan… but I wonder if the
Prescott Fire Department did the same thing as part of their own ‘on the job’
post-accident employee interview procedures? Wouldn’t hurt to ask, I suppose.
So if the COP and/or PFD were willing to provide Willis’ ‘Unit logs’
from the Yarnell Fire… why wouldn’t they also supply the same ‘Unit logs’
for both Eric Marsh and Jesse Steed, if requested?
According to the SAIR… if they existed… they should have survived
the burnover. ( See below ).
The ADOSH report references the Blue Ridge Hotshots ‘Unit logs’
from that day… and TTWARE has verified above that BOTH Marsh as
DIVS A and Steed as GM Superintendent SHOULD have been keeping their
own separate ‘Unit logs’ on June 30, just like Darrell Willis was doing.
>> TTWARE on December 10, 2013 at 7:55 am said:
>>
>> WTKTT, In response to your query regarding who should have had
>> Unit Logs, all personnel supervising other resources should (are
>> required to?) be maintaining a Unit Log.
So if Steed and Marsh were NOT keeping ‘Unit logs’ that day…
that would (apparently) be just one more ‘off the reservation’ piece of
behavior on the part of Marsh/Steed that day and even that would
be important to know as far as the ‘whole story’ of that day goes.
The SAIR damage descriptions for each firefighter also tells us that if
these ‘Unit Logs’ happened to be in either their front shirt pocket or pants
pocket… ( or just stowed in their packs ) then they SHOULD have survived
the burnover and should have been returned to their employer… the Prescott
Fire Department.
So a request for the ‘Unit logs’ of June 30 for both Steed and Marsh
could only realistically be met with the following responses…
1. The logs never existed. Steed and Marsh weren’t even doing that.
2. The logs were being kept… but apparently didn’t survive the burnover.
3. The logs were kept… they survived the burnover… but you can’t see them.
Forgot the FOURTH (hopefully) ‘realistic’ response…
4. The logs were kept… they survived the burnover… and YES,
you can see them if you file the right paperwork since these
are public documents funded with taxpayer dollars.
Or they didn’t fill out the logs till they got back to base, attend of shift. Some people are lazy enough to do that. So some logs might not be a blow by blow account. An after the fact ledger. Also I thought you guys yesterday fell into the spam drawer as I did, there wasn’t much going on.
Well… if that turns out to be the case… then perhaps
ANOTHER ‘lesson learned’ here ( and a possible
NEW directive for all WFF supervisory personnel )
can/should be…
“Thou SHALT update your Unit logs in REAL TIME
and not wait until later.”
Just saying its possible. Have known people like that. Some years back the forest service told people to quit doing unit logs as they had ramifications for law suits.
Check out the new article today from John Dougherty Quite a bit of information. Including Willis thinking a tennis court was large enough for a safety Zone for 41 fire fighters……Interesting.
From a PR viewpoint, the new article (and its title) is a disaster for the Forestry Service and I think will represent a sea change in how the public views this story. No longer is it just a “change in the wind” or an “act of God” like most of the public believes. Now it looks like the fire command caused the GMHS to do what they did – and then tried to cover it up. The nuances of the turn down option are going to be lost on the general public, just as they have been a little difficult for some of us lay people here to completely embrace. If this story breaks into the Arizona Republic and thus into USA Today, the public fury is going to escalate.
As well it should Mike.
Darrell Willis provided ‘responses’ to Mr. Dougherty less than
one hour after the article was published. Classic “I won’t
answer questions beforehand… but when I see what you
have written I’ll do the ‘rebuttal’ thing lickety-split.”
The responses were not direct from Willis. They ( of course )
came ‘through’ the City of Prescott’s Public Information Officer.
Willis simply says the ‘tennis court’ was not a ‘safety zone’.
It was only a possible ‘deployment site’.
Bzzzzzt… sorry Darell… wrong answer.
Choosing that particular tennis court as EITHER a ‘safety zone’
OR a ‘deployment site’ for 30+ people represents the same
level of ignorance and incompetence either way.
That ‘tennis court’ was literally SURROUNDED with
green vegetation and very TALL trees on the windward
side which, if ignited, would have put flames onto the
court surface for its entire length. It would have taken at
least a half-hour to even ‘prepare’ that area so it would
be possibly ‘survivable’ for about (max) a baker’s dozen men.
By the way… the ‘tennis court’ in question is exactly here…
Latitude: 34.269811
Longitude: -112.776014
34.269811, -112.776014
Just cut-and-paste the line above with the comma in it
into the Google Maps search bar, hit ENTER, and a large
GREEN ARROW will be pointing right at the court.
The satellite imagery shown is dated April 9, 2013.
Just 82 days before that fateful day in Yarnell.
One thing this shows is a total lack of knowledge of what constitutes a safety zone, LACK OF TRAINING. If this is the attitude they used in training for the hot shot crew it caught up with them. We lost the crew a long time ago in training. What is a survivable area for deployment?
One of the things that really astonished me early on
was when they had that first public ‘media event’
out at the deployment site.
My first astonishment was that they would let
Darrell Willis be the one to ‘host’ it. I certainly
wouldn’t want to be doing that if I’d just lost all
but one of my men… and 20 percent of the
entire department I work for.
My SECOND astonishment was the way
Willis suddenly went on and on about how
‘well’ he thought his men performed that
day at the deployment site.
He suddenly went on and on about what an
excellent choice that ‘deployment site’ was
and took great pains to point out little swales
in the ground and then also took the time
to explain ( far all you ignorant non-fire people )
how they must have known that gave them
a better chance of the fire ‘lifting over them’
and whatnot.
It really was astonishing.
This was the site of TOTAL FAILURE on the
part of these men… and he was still defending
their choices and letting us know how ‘smart’
they were and how proud he was of them.
It took me a while to get my jaw up off the floor.
To Identify the tennis court as a deployment site with no escape rout or SZ is ignorant. You should be planning escape routes not deployment sites. WTF is all I can say.
Since when do a bunch of guys on
a prison crew and other simple Type 2
Structure Protection guys have
$500 deployment shelters in their
pockets?
Willis didn’t think about his answer.
How do you tell 30 guys without
deployment shelters to ‘go over
to the tennis court and deploy’.
What does that involve?…
Just bend over into a ball and
kiss your butt goodbye?
Mike,
I have to agree with you on the air support issue and I touched on it in an earlier post. I think we will all find out in the long run, that this was just another bad decsion based on similar prior good outcomes.
This post concerns what WTKTT and Calvin has been discussing for a few days.
There has been talk about what role air support might have played in Marsh’s decision. First – did being told that the fire would not reach Yarnell for 1-2 hours reassure Marsh? Second – were the GMHS promised a retardant drop?
I do not think either of these played a major role in Marsh’s decision. When making a major tactical decision, Marsh would not have relied on someone else’s assessment of the situation, he would make his own judgment. He could see the fire, knew the weather etc. He decided the move was safe based on what he saw, not on what someone else thought. He was wrong, and I think that had to do with relying on his eyes, not his brain as I explained above. Now if air support told him the fire was going to be in Yarnell in 5 minutes, he likely would have been dissuaded from going. But I think he would have made the same decision he did if he had never heard from the air. Likewise, I do not think he changed his mind on going because of some promised retardant drop. Such a thing is too iffy and potentially ineffective to rely on it as a safety measure I would think (correct me if I am wrong). A retardant drop would not have made him think it was alright to go if he thought otherwise without it.
In short, looking at the situation, Marsh thought it was safe to go, that the fire was not going to reach their route with them still on the move. Unfortunately he was very wrong.
Reply to mike post on December 10, 2013 at 10:22 pm
Have to agree, mike.
I like your description and you pointing out that the only
definite influence on Marsh what ‘Air’ might have said would be
on the ‘edge’ cases.
If Air had said “5 minutes”… would have made a difference.
If Air had said “Definitely 2 hours”… would have made a diff.
But “Air” said (vaguely) “1-2 HOURS”.
In all truth… you can’t say Rory Collins was actually all
that wrong. The SAIR says he said that around 1550 while
ADOSH puts it closer to just prior to 1558, when he
is documented as having ‘abruptly left the fire’. Hindsight
now tells us that his low-side number was actually not
that far off. ( Minus 5 or 10 minutes ).
What Collins said also has everything to do with what he
actually meant by “Yarnell” and “town” in his statement… and
even depends on what Marsh might have ‘thought’ he meant.
There was a lot of ‘town’ out there to the east… when looking at
it from the Weaver Mountains due west where Marsh was
standing. Yarnell looks pretty ‘spread out’ along the eastern
horizon from where Marsh was standing.
What part of ‘town’ was Collins really meaning when he said
‘1-2 hours’? Maybe he meant the ‘Glen Ilah’ part of ‘town’ he
could see from the air. Maybe he didn’t… but maybe Marsh
even THOUGHT he did.
Regardless.. if Marsh’s ‘eyes’ were telling him that the fire
was heading ‘towards town’ and was going to stay that
way… then those timeframes from “Air” would have meant
nothing to him at all. He would have still thought he was
coming in ‘the back way’ with the fire movement always
AWAY from the travel route or, at worst, parallel.
So ( as you say above )… Marsh simply didn’t hear anything
from ‘Air’ that was DISAGREEING with what he thought he
was seeing with his own eyes… so he went with his
own ‘estimates’.
The real killer here was that Marsh had NO idea how their rate
of travel was going to drop to a crawl once they dropped
into that canyon. As both the ADOSH and the WFAR reports
admit now… there was NO SCOUTING of this ‘planned
escape route’ at all on the part of DIVS A or GMIHS and
absolutely no attempt to ( as WFAR says ) ‘improve the
route’ as a good LCES evaluation requires.
The ADOSH fire progression video I uploaded at this link…
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=boj4zCdOX5I
…shows that even the ADOSH investigators don’t think the
fire would have crossed into the alternate escape route
area even as late as 1650. If they had known about that
route ( they did NOT… but stick with me ) and had stayed
on that two-track and maintained the same rate of travel
as they made from the Lunch Spot to the Descent Point…
they would have been inside the Ranch with minutes to spare.
If they had been able to maintain the same rate of travel
as they crossed down into and across the box canyon…
same story… ADOSH fire progression charts say they
would have made it. ( just barely… but probably in the
nick of time ).
It was losing the ‘rate of travel’ they had imagined in their
minds they could maintain for ‘the whole trip’ that actually
killed them.
When they knew they were getting bogged down… losing
their own ‘imagined’ rate of travel… should they have
reevaluated and/or called their own timeout on the descent
before it was going to be too late to do a ‘full reverse’?
Yea… probably so… but they didn’t.
I still liken this to a ‘blown approach’ when you are still
3 miles out from the runway and you let ‘proximity
relaxation’ kick in. If you just THINK there are no crosswinds
down there and you don’t even bother to look at the windsocks
coming in… and you wait until the runway is right in front of you
before you discover there’s actually a 40 mph cross-wind
staring you in the face… you are probably going to crash it up.
You have ‘blown it’. The only cure was prevention.
Reply to calvin post on December 8, 2013 at 10:54 am
>> calvin said
>> P 15 AOSHA Worksheets for Proposed Citation……
>> At approximately 1630, Marsh spoke with ASM B33 (also identified as ASM2)
>> and reported that they were going down their escape route to the safety zone.
>> B33 asks if everything is ok. marsh responds that everything is ok they are
>> just heading to the Safety Zone.
>> If these accounts are all accurate, ASM2 was advised about GM position
>> location and starting at 1545 had three other discussions with OPS1 and
>> DIVA concerning their movements. ASM2 had one hour AFTER being
>> asked to check on GM before the entrapment. ASM2 was aware GM was
>> moving. ASM2 did not know the location of GM even after DIV A actually
>> says “That is where we want the retardant.”
>>
>> There is a lot of new information ( in the ADOSH and WAFR ) to be
>> dissected and analyzed.
>>
>> It should also be noted that ( in addition to Blue Ridge Hotshots)
>> ASM2 (Thomas French and John Burfiend) were not allowed to
>> be interviewed ( by ADOSH ) either.
Not true… if the WFAR is to be believed.
On page 15 of the Wildland Fire Associates Report ( WAFR ) it has a
brief discussion of when ASM2 was requesting the ‘timeout’ to verify
where Granite Mountain really was and OPS1 ( Abel ) blew him off
and just said “they’re in good black.”
There is a ‘footnote (6)’ on the ASM2 references in the WAFR and
footnote (6) on page 15 says…
(6) ADOSH Interview with ASM2.
So if you are right about ADOSH being denied access to ASM2 as
well as the Blue Ridge Hotshots… then that footnote in the WAFR is a total lie.
**
** Wildland Fire Associates Report ( WAFR )
** confirms that Brendan McDonough heard
** ALL of the ‘discussing their options’ conversation.
There hasn’t been much talk about the WAFR report that the ADOSH
contracted ‘Wildland Fire Associates’ to produce for them, and which
was released right along withe the ADOSH documents…
…but this WAFR has some gems of its own in it.
I’m compiling a list… but this is the one that really jumped out.
Page 15 of the WAFR…
:: Circa 1555-1558
:: On the GMIHC intracrew frequency, GM Lookout heard the DIVS A and
:: GMIHC Captain discussing the options of whether to stay in the black or
:: to move (5).
There is a ‘footnote 5’ at the end of this quote on that page… and
footnote 5 says…
(5) ADOSH Interview with GM Lookout.
Since we all know now that the Arizona State SAIT team originally
promised ADOSH they could ‘participate’ in the SAIT investigation,
but then booted ADOSH out of the process only 48 hours later…
…then this footnote verifies that ADOSH must have conducted its OWN
separate interview with Brendan McDonough.
So that means TWICE… in TWO separate interviews ( both SAIT
and ADOSH ), Brendan McDonough has told them both the same thing.
He heard every word of the infamous “discussing their options”
conversation which is what contains the real answer for them
leaving the ‘safe black’ and marching to their deaths.
But even though BOTH the SAIR and the WAFR now report this same
fact in their narrative(s)… NEITHER the SAIR nor the WAFR reports say
one single additional word about what Brendan may or may not have heard.
They only acknowldege that he DID, in fact, hear what was said.
Matter of fact… what’s get really wonky here is that the WAFR is specifically
attributing their own claim that Brendan ‘heard it all’ to an ADOSH interview…
…but the actual ADOSH narrative doesn’t even include the same statement
found in both the SAIR and the WAFR that Brendan “heard Marsh and
Steed discussing their options”.
The ADOSH narrative just skips over that circa the 1555-1558 timeframe
and never mentions Brendan ‘hearing’ anything.
Very odd, that.
Bottom line: We can stop GUESSING whether Brendan McDonough
did or didn’t hear ALL of the infamous ‘discussing their options’
conversation and whether he does or doesn’t know exactly why
Marsh and Steed decided to leave the ‘good black’.
McDonough DID hear all that. ( Verified in TWO different interviews now ).
McDonough DOES know all that.
Reply to WTKTT regarding the WAFR:
Have been hoping to see some discussion here as to what the WAFR has to say about Marsh in both the 0700 and 0800 meetings. The 0800 meeting in particular.
Reply to J. Stout post on December 10, 2013 at 9:59 pm
The ADOSH investigators say they couldn’t even verify,
for sure, if Marsh was even THERE at this lightly
attended 7:00 AM briefing. Best ADOSH could come
up with is that he was ‘reported’ to have been there.
I have no idea what that really means.
Reported by who? They couldn’t then get a ‘yea… he
was really there’ from ANY of those other people
documented as having been there? Truly strange.
The SAIR, however, not only puts Marsh definitely
at the 7:00 AM… they have him practically doing
a tap-number and entertaining the whole crowd.
The SAIR says Marsh was ‘looking at Google Maps
on iPads’ and ‘discussing the action plan with
everyone’ and the SAIR even says he knelt down
on one knee during the meeting and was anointed
‘Sir DIVS A’ right there in front of everyone.
All total fiction… according to ADOSH.
ADOSH says Marsh wasn’t ‘told’ he was DIVS A until
well AFTER the meeting… maybe not even until he
was out at the end of Sesame ‘suiting up’ for his hike.
This (supposed) 8:00 AM ‘briefing’ description is also
a joke in pretty much ALL THREE reports now.
( SAIR, ADOSH and WFAR ).
They all are trying to say Marsh had some ‘second
briefing’ out at the end of Sesame when someone just
pointed in the general direction south and said “there’s
some bomb-proof ranch over that way somewhere”.
Marsh was NOT THERE.
Joy Collura and Tex Gilligan first met Eric Marsh all
the way out at almost the anchor point on the top
of the western ridge at exactly 8:03 AM.
That means Eric had been ‘hiking’ his way out there
(alone) since at least 7:30 AM.
I read that report and totally missed it. You hit gold, good work. Now we need a release of the entire interview. John should be all over this.
Reply to Bob Powers post on Dec 10, 2013 at 10:18 pm
I would like to see the actual transcripts for BOTH
interviews with Brendan McDonough.
Unless we can’t trust what is ANY of these reports…
then the proof is now there that there MUST be
two separate and distinct ‘interviews’ with Brendan.
One done by the SAIT.
One done by the ADOSH investigators.
Something tells me, however, that we might discover
the reason that there is only a mention of Brendan
‘hearing them discussing their options’ in BOTH
the SAIR and the ADOSH… but then no actual
‘content reported’… is that Brendan might have
actually REFUSED to say anything about ‘the
content of those radio communications’ to
either the SAIT or the ADOSH investigators.
That would be right in line with Brendan agreeing to
public video interviews with the Courier after the
reports came out… and he slung some jive about
“I will always defend my brothers and let everyone
know what happened… because I was there.”…
…and then, in his next breath, he told the Courier
reporter, “…but there are things I won’t talk about.”
Maybe Brendan, himself, was ‘lawyered up’ for BOTH
of these interviews and the only thing we will see in
both the SAIT and ADOSH transcripts is…
“Interviewee acknowledges hearing Steed and Marsh
discussing their options about whether to move or
stay in the black… but he refuses to comment further
or reveal any of the content of those discussions.”
Either way… if that’s what the transcripts of BOTH of
his interviews actually says… I still want to SEE IT.
Why they did not include more information on what was said bothers me. To keep the dead from being charged? Brendon did not Remember what was all said? It is a strange statement with out any further info.
I made a FOIA/FOIL/etc. request for the transcripts. I still haven’t gotten anything from the AZ Dept. of Forestry, and AZDOSH says next week would be the soonest to get some of the materials that they have. In both cases, I am told that the materials are hung up in “legal.” If John Dougherty or someone else has gotten the materials already (pursuant to the freedom of information laws), I’d be curious to know.
Reply to Elizabeth N. post
on December 11, 2013 at 6:09 pm
Mr. Dougherty apparently has
already obtained some documents
from the City of Prescott and/or
Prescott Fire Department.
In his most recent article… he
is referencing copies of Darrell
Willis’ own ‘Unit logs’ from
June 29 and June 30.
See a longer post about this
just below.
Here’s a link to the Wildfire Today Dec. 9th article explaining the Forest Service’s twisted logic in denying their employees the ability to be interviewed, give statements, and the like.
http://wildfiretoday.com/2013/12/09/forest-services-explanation-for-their-refusal-to-fully-cooperate-with-yarnell-hill-fire-investigations/#comments
So saith the Forest Service:
“The Interagency Serious Accident Investigation of the Yarnell Hill Fire was, in contrast, a SAFETY and Accident investigation. While the safety investigators also looked into rule compliance the focus was concentrated on understanding why the accident happened; which may or may not be related to rule compliance.”
Wildfire Today commented: “Refusing to allow the federal government employees to be interviewed by the ADOSH teams is a very disturbing development.”
“The SAIT report did not include any names nor did it list the people they interviewed, so it is difficult to determine how much if any cooperation they received from the Forest Service. That report basically said no mistakes were made, while the ADOSH reports provided much, much more detail about what happened on the fire.”
“If this is going to be the policy of the USFS going forward, it can severely disrupt future lessons learned inquiries, and in some cases could make them “useless”. Interfering with the process of learning of how to prevent similar fatalities does a disservice to the dead firefighters.”
>> Wildfire Today said…
>> Interfering with the process of learning how to prevent
>> similar fatalities does a disservice to the dead firefighters.
It doesn’t do a whole lot for the ones you’ve got left ALIVE, either.
Robert seems to be the new way of doing things. Its to bad there are not still some people with B***s to change the way they want to do things. There use to be a few Regional Foresters that would not have let that happen.
QUESTION For Those With Experience, Please:
I am looking at a dispatch report titled “WildCAD Incident Card – Arizona Dispatch Center, ‘YARNELL HILL SUPPORT’ Medical Aid.” It seems to be a dispatch log regarding the Yarnelll Hill Fire burn-over, showing what air resources were used or dispatched immediately after the burn-over.
My QUESTION is this: Who prepares this document or is it automatically prepared by a computer with voice-recognition software that logs calls as they are made or transmissions as they are made?
Thank you very much in advanced.
Elizabeth N.
WildCAD is basically a GIS-based Computer-Aided Dispatch System where the data is input by a dispatcher. Here’s a link below for the WildCAD User’s Guide if you really want to know the details. Otherwise call one of the Dispatch Offices.
http://gacc.nifc.gov/swcc/dc/nmadc/management_admin/software/user_guides/WildCAD_User_Guide_5.0.pdf
RTS – Thanks. You answered my question w/ your first line.
Reply to calvin post on December 8, 2013 at 9:22 am
>> calvin wrote…
>> Any comments about the photo on page 13 Of Wildlands Fire
>> Associates Report (WFAR?) How does this picture fit in with
>> the rest of Mackenzie photos?
>> Is this from Mackenzie phone or camera?
No. It is NOT! This is NEW… and from a previously UNKNOWN source.
Look closely. That is Christopher MacKenzie himself on the RIGHT hand side
of this photo taking his picture IMG_0888 which would eventually become the
photo on page 23 of the SAIR, and the one where the SAIT willy-nilly dialed
back the actual TIME the photo was taken by 11-12 minutes just to suit
their made-up narrative.
THIS photo, on page 13 of the WFA report, was taken by whoever was standing
just to the LEFT of Christopher MacKenzie just as he took his own IMG_0888.
THIS photo ( in the WFA ) was actually taken only 3-5 seconds AFTER
Christopher ( on the right ) took his own IMG_0888. There are only just a few
seconds of separation between the two… but the WFA photo is definitely
just (immediately) AFTER Chrstopher’s IMG_0888.
How can you tell?… easy. Look at the SMOKE in both photos. At the far right
of the smoke cloud… there is a large swirl that, at that moment, looks just
like the letter ‘C’.
It is present in BOTH photographs… and has only advanced just slightly in
relation to the ground as seen in Christopher’s IMG_0888.
Now look at the smoke plume just above the edge of where the orange fireline
on the ground stops as it tracks east.
In the WFA photo… it has ‘puffed out’ only slightly from the way it is seen in
Christopher’s IMG_0888.
So who the hell took this WFA page 13 photo?
WFA photo caption only says…
“Figure 4. Photo taken by a GMIHC Crew member on two-track
road on June 30, 2013.”
Great. Thanks for nuthin’, fellas.
These are NEW photos ( Previously unknown to even exist ).
WHAT ‘device’ is this?
WHOSE ‘device’ is this?
Is this actually from one of the ACTIC ( Arizona Counter Terrorism Information
Center ) data recovery dumps from one of the iPhones or Androids
recovered at the deployment site and properly entered into evidence…
…or is it from another ‘digital camera’ that ( like Christopher’s
Canon Powershot ) was recovered from the bodies but never actually
entered into evidence by the YCSO police investigators?
How many MORE photos are there from ‘this device’?
Taken at WHAT times??
Where are the originals and/or copies? WHO has them now?
Inquiring minds WANT TO KNOW.
** MORE WRIST WATCHES DISCOVERED IN THIS WFA PHOTO
We now discover at least TWO more wrist watches. Christopher MacKenzie
himself ( that’s his left arm in the WFA photo ) has a big one. Looks DIGITAL
to me but the resolution is so good I think I may be able to actually identify the
exact make/model of watch. Stay tuned.
It also has the kind of ‘plastic band’ that would have melted during the burnover
so this may be the ‘loose watch’ that was discovered in a shelter that ultimately
didn’t even have a firefighter in it ( as per the YCSO police report ).
Now look at Steed’s RIGHT arm. He is also now confirmed to be wearing a wrist
watch that day… and his looks to be ANALOG. That means there’s a good
chance Steed’s own watch could (finally) confirm the exact time of burnover,
unless the analog parts kept running when the flames hit.
**
** 35 DAYS AND COUNTING
Just FYI…
As of tomorrow morning… ALL of the defendants listed in the first public
claim filed on November 15, 2013 by Marcia McKee ( the mother of GM
Hotshot Grant McKee, who was one of the 19 victims on June 30, 2013 )
have just 35 days left to accept the ‘sum-certain’ option of that claim.
The ‘sum-certain settlement offer’ for $12 million expires at 11:15 AM
on the morning of January 14, 2014.
I heard the Prescott Fire Department let Brendan go? If that is true, maybe that will change some of the equation?
Reply to Gary Olson post on Dec 9, 2013 at 6:47 pm
I can’t find any news online about that this evening…
…but the ‘Windsock Cocktail Lounge’ in Prescott, AZ, where
Brendan has been known to hang just had a ‘fundraiser’
for him yesterday.
The facebook page for the bar says…
“Please help us make sure that Brendan and his baby daughter have a Very Merry Christmas. We still have a lot of items for sale at The Windsock. All proceeds will go to the Brendan Mcdonough Charity Fund. Cash donations are being accepted at any Wells Fargo account number 7361874469. We Love You Brendan!”
https://www.facebook.com/pages/The-Windsock-Cocktail-Lounge/107056652668730?directed_target_id=0
I heard the same thing from other sources. To be clear, Brendon was initially hired as a temp, so normally letting him go after the season would not be unusual, but considering the circumstances. I would think the COP would want to keep him on, if only to help with any PTSD, or other issues that might develop. Of course, the COP has not necessarily been the pillar of righteousness during this whole affair.
**
** SAIR AND ADOSH DISCREPANCIES – PART 1
One of the most important moments in the day is when Eric Marsh and Jesse
Steed had (apparently) just finished their mysterious ‘discussing their options’
and ‘comfort level’ discussion(s) up on the ridge circa 4:00 PM… and Marsh
was now ‘announcing’ their decision on one of the ‘shared’ radio frequencies.
Both the SAIR and the ADOSH have almost wildly different accounts of ‘this
moment’… so I thought a good breakdown on the differences was in order.
So here is the ‘side by side’ for this critical moment in the day…
First the full text from both… then there is a line-by-line breakdown.
Page 24 of SAIR says…
:: As BR Supt is en route to pick up drivers to
:: move the Granite Mountain crew carriers, SPGS1
:: contacts him to ask if they still have the option to
:: burn out from the dozer line. BR Supt tells him no.
:: DIVS A, hearing the transmission, agrees and says
:: he believes the fire is almost as far as the Granite
:: Mountain vehicles. A moment later, DIVS A says,
:: “I want to pass on that we’re going to make our way
:: to our escape route.” BR Supt attempts to clarify,
:: “You guys are in the black, correct?” DIVS A responds,
:: “Yeah, we’re picking our way through the black.” DIVS A
:: then mentions a road in the bottom and “going out toward
:: the ranch.” BR Supt thinks DIVS A is talking about
:: heading northeast, through the black, to one of the
:: ranches in that direction. BR Supt says, “DIVS A, to
:: confirm, you’re talking about the road you saw me on
:: with the UTV earlier, in the bottom.” DIVS A replies,
:: “Yes, the road I saw you on with the Ranger [the UTV].”
Here is the same ‘moment in time’ as descibed now by ADOSH…
Page 19 of ADOSH says…
:: Following this conversation ( the ‘comfort level’ conversation partially
:: captured by MacKenzie video at 16:02 – 4:02 PM ) GMIHC and Marsh
:: decided to move from their position.
:: According to BRIHC unit logs, Eric (Marsh) says,
:: “I copy fire is progressed to the buggies, Also going to make our way
:: through out escape route.”
:: Brian (Frisby) asks, “Are you in good black?”
:: Eric says, “picking our way through the black to the rd in the bottom out
:: towards the ranch.”
:: Brian (Frisby) thinks he meant towards the two-track. To confirm Brian
:: says, “the rd we came on w/ the ranger… affirm”.
:: ( NOTE: ADOSH does not report any response from Marsh ).
:: Musser heard the radio transmission but didn’t recall the exact words.
:: Abel (OPS1) and Musser (OPS2) reportedly were not aware of the
:: location of Marsh’s reported predetermined route.
** IMPORTANT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO
** ACCOUNTS OF THIS SAME MOMENT IN TIME
** FIRE REACHING THE BUGGIES
:: SAIR
:: As BR Supt is en route to pick up drivers to move the Granite Mountain crew
:: carriers, SPGS1 contacts him to ask if they still have the option to burn out
:: from the dozer line. BR Supt tells him no.
:: DIVS A, hearing the transmission, agrees and says he believes the fire is
:: almost as far as the Granite Mountain vehicles.
:: ADOSH
:: According to BRIHC unit logs, Eric (Marsh) says,
:: “I copy fire is progressed to the buggies”
SAIR version of this ‘has the fire reached the buggies’ moment says that Marsh
offered the opinion himself.
ADOSH says the opposite… that Marsh was simply saying ‘I copy’ after
someone ( Brian Frisby? ) has just TOLD him that the fire HAS reached
the buggies.
** MAKING OUR WAY
:: SAIR
:: A moment later, DIVS A says,
:: “I want to pass on that we’re going to make our way to our escape route.”
:: ADOSH
:: According to BRIHC unit logs, Eric (Marsh) says,
:: “Also going to make our way through escape route.”
Both QUOTES contain the words ‘escape route’…
…but there is no “I want to pass on that…” phrase in ADOSH version as
reported by the SAIR.
SAIR says “…make our way TO escape route”.
ADOSH says “…make our way THROUGH out escape route”.
Small difference, maybe… but keep in mind… these are (supposedly) direct
QUOTES in these ‘official’ narratives… so either testimony changed between
interviews… or we are simply still only hearing what the authors of the
narrative(s) are ‘making up’ to characterize what was really said.
** IN THE BLACK?
:: SAIR
:: BR Supt attempts to clarify, “You guys are in the black, correct?”
:: ADOSH
:: Brian (Frisby) asks, “Are you in good black?”
Totally different.
Same question… of course… but totally different quotes.
So which is correct? Only Brain Frisby really knows.
** PICKING OUR WAY… AND THE ‘RANCH’ MOMENT…
:: SAIR
:: DIVS A responds,
:: “Yeah, we’re picking our way through the black.” then mentions a road in the
:: bottom and “going out toward the ranch.”
:: ADOSH
:: Eric says, “picking our way through the black to the rd in the bottom out
:: towards the ranch.”
Close… but ADOSH feels confident enough to put exact ‘words’ in Marsh’s
mouth whereas SAIR author did not and just ‘summarizes’ the second part
of what Marsh said.
However… note that BOTH versions include the following…
“road in the bottom” and “going out toward the ranch.”
RANCH is specifically mentioned in BOTH versions of this moment.
** WHICH WAY IS THAT?
:: SAIR
:: BR Supt thinks DIVS A is talking about heading northeast, through the black,
:: to one of the ranches in that direction.
:: ADOSH
:: Brian (Frisby) thinks he meant towards the two-track.
TOTALLY different… yet both ‘thoughts’ are being directly attributed
to Brian Frisby.
So which is it, Brian?
Was the SAIR must making up your ‘thoughts’ for you there like ‘northeast’ and
‘through the black’ and ‘to one of the ranches in that direction’ because those
thoughts fit THEIR narrative better… and you let them just put those ‘thoughts
in your head’ and report them publicly…
…or did you really just think “towards the two-track and never once thought of
a ‘ranch to the northeast’?
Gotta be one or the other. Please tell us.
** THE ATTEMPT TO CONFIRM
:: SAIR
:: BR Supt says, “DIVS A, to confirm, you’re talking about the road you saw
:: me on with the UTV earlier, in the bottom.”
:: ADOSH
:: To confirm Brian says, “the rd we came on w/ the ranger… affirm”.
Again… Both the SAIR and the ADOSH are tryinig to make us believe these
are the exact words coming out of Brian Frisby’s mouth at this same exact
moment… but the quotes are TOTALLY DIFFERENT.
Once again, Brian… only you know.
Please chime in and tell us which one is the real one ( or whether they are
BOTH inaccurate ).
** THE AFFIRMATION
:: SAIR says…
:: DIVS A replies, “Yes, the road I saw you on with the Ranger [the UTV].”
:: ADOSH does NOT report ANY reply from Marsh.
That’s weird.
The SAIR is, somehow, SURE that Marsh replied to Frisby and puts exact
words in Marsh’s mouth ( as per Brian Frisby? ).
The ADOSH says NOTHING. According to their report, there was no response
or ‘affirmation’ from Marsh at all.
Again… Brian… which is it?
Did Marsh answer you, or not?
If so… what did he actually SAY?
** DID OPS1 (Abel) AND/OR OPS2 (Musser) HEAR THIS EXCHANGE?
:: SAIR says NOTHING about this
:: ADOSH says YES… OPS2 (Musser) definitely did.
::
:: Musser heard the radio transmission but didn’t recall the exact words.
:: Abel (OPS1) and Musser (OPS2) reportedly were not aware of the location
:: of Marsh’s reported predetermined route.
Really?
The SAIR says they WERE ( aware ).
The SAIR says they were BOTH right there at the 7:00 AM briefing when there
was this (supposed) ‘Google Maps on an iPad’ moment and the ‘Boulder
Springs Ranch’ was ‘pointed out’ to everyone as an ‘excellent safety zone’.
Here again is the list of people that (supposedly) attended the 7:00 AM
( according to SAIR ) briefing at the Yarnell Hill Fire Station when
(supposedly) Marsh was first informed he was going to be ‘DIVS A’ that day…
Page 15 of the SAIR…
:: Sunday, 30 June 2013
:: At the 0700 briefing on June 30, ICT4 and others from the
:: previous shift meet at the Yarnell Fire Station with incoming
:: personnel including ICT2, two Operations Section Chiefs
:: OPS1 ( Abel ) and OPS2 ( Musser ), SPGS1, a fire behavior
:: analyst (FBAN), YCSO deputies, and the Granite Mountain
:: IHC Superintendent ( Eric Marsh ).
:: The briefing covers strategy and tactics, the previous night’s
:: spot weather forecast, and radio frequencies.
:: They review the area using Google Maps on an iPad
:: and they note Boulder Springs Ranch as an
:: excellent safety zone.
Ironically, same page 15 of ADOSH describes the same ‘meeting’,
but in a MUCH different way…
Page 15 of ADOSH…
:: At 0700 hours, Incident Commander Russ Shumate met with
:: Operations Section Chief 1 Todd Abel, Operations Section
:: Chief 2 Paul Musser, and Structure Protection Group 1 Supervisor
:: Gary Cordes. During that meeting, Abel and Cordes decided
:: that Division A would create an anchor point at the south heel
:: of the fire and tie into a dozer line ( Division Z ) that would
:: extend across the valley floor north of Yarnell and Glen Ilah.
:: Shumate, Abel, Musser and Cordes believed if there were
:: favorable winds they could burn-out from the dozer line to
:: protect Yarnell and Glen Ilah from fire advancing from the
:: north.
:: At 0700, a briefing occurred between Shumate and incoming
:: Incident Commander Type 2 ( ICT2 – Roy Hall ), Musser and
:: Abel, Cordes, fire behavior analyst ( FBAN – Byron Kimball ),
:: and deputies from the Yarnell County Sheriff’s Office. The
:: GMIHC Superintendent ( Eric Marsh ) was reportedly present
:: and listened in on much of the discussion. Hall informed
:: everyone that his first priority was to have an air operations
:: plan developed so that air resources could operate safely
:: over the fire. Hall’s second priority was to hold a briefing with
:: all assigned resource representatives prior to transfer of
:: incident command.
:: Following the meeting Abel (OPS1) assigned Marsh as the
:: Division Alpha Supervisor (DIVS A) transferring leadership
:: of the GMIHC crew to the Granite Mountain IHC Captain
:: ( Jesse Steed ). The GMIHC were assigned to Marsh with
:: the task of establishing the anchor point at the heel of the
:: fire, using direct and indirect attack.
That’s it for the ADOSH concerning this crucial 7:00 AM breifing.
There is NO MENTION WHATSOVER of any ‘Google Maps on an iPad’ or
ANY indication that the ‘Boulder Springs Ranch’ was an ‘excellent safety zone’.
No mention of ANY ‘escape routes’ or ‘safety zone’ discussions at all.
Zero. Zip. Nada.
According to an ‘Occupational Safety And Hazard’ investigative team…
NO evidence was found of ANYONE ‘pointing to any maps’ or any
‘Google Maps on an iPad’ as the SAIR wants us to believe.
According to ADOSH… Eric Marsh left that briefing with no frickin’ idea where
the Boulder Springs Ranch REALLY was, or any idea about the ‘roads leading
to it’, as SAIR expected us to swallow.
So is this TWO ‘different’ briefings the ADOSH is describing that took place
at the exact same moment… or just one that followed right after the other?
Was Marsh there for BOTH described briefings, or only the ‘second half’ as
ADOSH seems to indicate?
Also… ADOSH does not seem to be as SURE that Eric Marsh was
ACTUALLY there as the SAIR is.
Maybe he wasn’t… but the State of Arizona and the SAIT people could not
afford for him to have NOT been there… from a liability viewpoint… so they
just went ahead and definitely said he WAS there.
If the ADOSH version of the 7:00 AM briefing is complete and correct…
then ( and only then ) could it be possible for BOTH OPS1 ( Abel ) and
OPS2 ( Musser ) to be claiming they were ‘not aware’ of Marsh’s intended
safety zone and/or ‘predetermined’ escape route to it.
More to come…
WTKTT,
The differences between Frisby’s SAIR accounting and his ADOSH accounting probably stem from where and how they were obtained. None of us know exactly how the SAIT obtained their info, but based on what we know now, it might not have been from Frisby himself. The ADOSH account, however, is very specific, in that, it states the info is from the Unit Log, and that means it’s probably verbatim from the log The verbage in the log itself would not necessarily be verbatim, but simply descriptions (sometimes brief) of notable things occuring during their shift.
“the rd we came on w/ the ranger….. affirm” I believe is the way a unit log conversation might be written, with Frisby asking the question, AND THEN, Marsh answering, “affirm”. I believe that is the correct way to interpret that.
TTWARE,
I think you are spot on here.
Also, there was most definitely some Facilitated Learning Analysis (FLA) influence with the SAIT, and that process uses ‘narratives and stories’ instead of statements and such from investigators. Long, convoluted link below for detail from their Guide.
https://higherlogicdownload.s3.amazonaws.com/WILDFIRELESSONS/FLA_Guide.pdf?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAJH5D4I4FWRALBOUA&Expires=1386652760&Signature=%2Ba4A9D5zsT398W%2F8dqUvw3T%2BcoE%3D
Reply to TTWARE post on December 9, 2013 at 7:28 pm
>> TTWARE said…
>> “the rd we came on w/ the ranger….. affirm” I believe
>> is the way a unit log conversation might be written,
>> with Frisby asking the question, AND THEN,
>> Marsh answering, “affirm”. I believe that is the
>> correct way to interpret that.
Fair enough…
…but here comes the 64 million dollar ( which could
be the actual amount at stake here for even just one
of 19 wrongful death suits ) question…
Where is Jesse Steed’s GMIHS ‘unit log’ from that day?
The SAIR provides detail to prove there really wasn’t
much burnoff of clothing, especially for men that
ended up prone… and personal effects from pockets
were found at the medical examiner’s office ‘unburned’
and ‘unscathed’…
…so if Steed’s logbook was in his top pocket of his
shirt then the SAIR is saying it should have survived
the burnover.
The SAIR also says that the ‘front part’ of his
pants ( including pants pockets ) remained ‘intact’.
Here is what the SAIR actually published as a
‘damage report’ for Steed…
He was prone ( face down ), fully deployed in
his shelter, and while the back of his clothing
sustained damage the front pretty much did NOT…
:: Jesse Steed, Granite Mountain #2
:: 1. Shelter Condition:
:: a. Outer Shell: 80% of foil burned away;
:: silica cloth brittle in some areas.
:: b. Inner Shell: 75% of foil burned away;
:: 50% fiberglass burned away.
:: c. Floor: 70% of foil burned away,
:: silica cloth brittle in some areas
:: d. Seams: Intact.
:: 2. PPE:
:: a. Clothing: The shirt back charred and burned away;
:: the front area tucked into pants and parts of the
:: sleeves remained yellow and intact. Pants, back of
:: legs and seat charred. Much of the front of pants
:: remained intact and green in color.
:: b. Helmet: Right side of red helmet melted.
:: 3. Body position: The firefighter was found lying prone,
:: feet toward the northwest.
:: 4. Shelter Use: The firefighter was fully deployed
:: inside the shelter.
So where is that ‘unit log’ book?
If it wasn’t entered as ‘evidence’ over at the
YCSO police station… would someone have simply
just given it to Darrell Willis?
Also… is a ‘DIVS X’ required to keep a ‘unit log’ as well?
Would Eric Marsh been keeping one, too?
If so… where is THAT one?
Followup: Don’t forget that Darrell Willis and 2 others
from PFD ( still unnamed? ) ‘spent the night’ right
there at the deployment site and covered each of
the bodies with ‘tarps’ before the YCSO police
investigators arrived about 5:00 AM.
So they had ‘access’ to the bodies for hours and
hours before the investigators even showed up.
WTKTT, In response to your query regarding who should have had Unit Logs, all personnel supervising other resources should (are required to?) be maintaining a Unit Log.
Fine. Thank You.
So where do you think Steed’s
and Marsh’s ‘unit logs’ from that day
are now?
WTKTT: I’m not sure if I completely agree with a couple of small aspects of your analysis, but I DO know that you are *incredible.* Excellent attention to detail. Thanks for doing work that is tedious and time-consuming.
Reply to Elizabeth N. post on Dec 9, 2013 at 9:11
When people are trying to bulls**t you…
…details count.
I cannot post anything here.
Reply to Elizabeth N. post on December 9, 2013 at 4:40 pm
Elizabeth… something we discovered on the other LOOOONG
thread where this conversation started is that if you are coming
here fairly often… it’s a good thing to ‘clear your browser cache’
from time to time or you MIGHT end up having trouble posting.
This software is using ‘cookies’ when you visit here to try
and remember which ‘post’ you were reading last… and
if you come here a lot you can develop what is called
‘cookie confusion’. It’s a bug in the software. It can just
get ‘confused’ and send your posts into never-never land.
I notice that you also post a lot to the Wildfire today site on Mr.
Bill Gabbert’s articles. Though I don’t believe ‘InvestigativeMedia’
and ‘Wildfire today’ are actually affiliated in any way, they are,
in fact, both essentially using the same generic software for
presenting articles and recording comments and whatnot.
I believe that increases your chance of developing ‘cookie
confusion’ both HERE and THERE ( since you are basically
talking to two different implementations of the same software )
so just be sure to clear your Browser cache on a regular basis.
Thanks for the tip. (And the earlier reference to donkey kong, which makes a depressing topic a bit happier….)
In case anyone cares: The posts that are coming up from me today are largely actually posts from yesterday or whenever, and I am mortified that they are all coming up, making me look a bit, uhm, insane. I posted multiple times b/c they would not go through. I did not realize *all* of them would eventually go through. I’m glad you all are aware of the software glitch so that that you do not assume I am some sort of hyper-posting internet weirdo.
Cookies cleared from now on.
TTWARE,
Regarding what Musser knew; when I talked with him after the incident first happened, he told me that Marsh said “We’re travelling our predetermined route.” I specifically asked him if Marsh said Escape Route and he said no. The Escape Route quote was later from Marsh replying to BR HS Supt. when he stated to Marsh, “You’re in the black, right?”
Concerning the two OPS giving direction, making requests, and such – I have seen it happen, not much though, but it does occur at times when there is a lot going on like at the YHF.
One of the communications issues we have seen a lot with the advent of cell phones, is that information must be shared over the radio and/or face-to-face for all to benefit from it, otherwise it’s only between the two parties. That may have been the case with the two OPS somewhat, just trying to cover all the angles and bases, and there would be duplication and maybe even conflicting direction then. Don’t really know …
Talking with Ted Putnam, he says that under very stressful situations (like the YHF), almost everyone breaks down even the most experienced, a little bit on habits, thought processing, communications, and the like. And he even says to the point that our minds will reject new, incoming information that may benefit us in the particular situation. He says that might very well have been the case with the GM HS heading down into the death bowl. They knew better, but …
RTS, Thanks for your insight with your response. Since you had that direct conversation with Musser shortly after the event, I’ll go with that, including the fact that the words ‘escape route’ were not mentioned. It doesn’t change the fact, though, that he knew they were heading down their ‘predetermined route’, without him (Musser) knowing location, route, or destination, within minutes of the time that all firefighters on the fire would be evacuated. Had Able know this as well, the subsequent conversation with ASM probably would have been much different.
Your points regarding your conversation with Ted Putnam are well taken. Although we’d all like to believe that we would have not made many of the errors occuring that day, we all would be effected to some degree by the assertions made by Putnam.
Ted Putnam and I have a disagreement with his conception of the 10 and 18. Be that as it may I’ll leave that to the current FF’s to decide.
DING DING DING! Putnam makes the key behavioral point. Under stress, communication breaks down, thinking breaks down, and habits kick in. Under stress, I have a much better chance of getting you to go along with a stupid idea of mine than I do of getting you to go along with my stupid idea when we are under NO stress, particularly if your “habit” is to normally defer to me (e.g. I am your boss, for example). This is unfortunately the opposite of what is the safest thing to do – e.g. to question every red flag.
As I understand it, the culture of the Hotshots tends to be one of “hierarchy” (“trust your captain/superintendent implicitly and do what he says without second-guessing”), which is exactly the opposite of what is the SAFEST thing to do when things are melting down and leaders (given that they are human) are not likely to be making their best decisions based on all available evidence.
The very reason the “rules” of wildland firefighting would seem to be so important is situations where all is going to crap. You fall back on what is ingrained. They will keep you safe, when your “seat of the pants” decision-making might be impaired.
I still think that what convinced Marsh that it was OK to descend into that bowl was that his EYES told him it was OK, that the fire would not reach their path during their move. Whereas his training, the “rules” and all the nonvisual information about that situation screamed STOP.
I also think Rory Collins ( Air Attack ) telling him
(Marsh) he had 1-2 HOURS before the fire would
‘reach Yarnell’ right at the exact time they were
‘discussing their options’ didn’t help.
This did nothing but reinforce what you are talking
about. He somehow convinced himself he had the
time to take those boys where he wanted to.
I mean… how could the guy in the airplane who
can SEE the WHOLE fire possibly be SO wrong
that we might actually die, or something?
Nah. Not possible. “Gaggle up, boys! Move out!”
A former smokejumper collegue sent this YouTube clip of the YHF. Not sure if it’s the one the SAIT put together or another one. Good Google Earth flythrough and animated fire behavior that helps put things into perspective once the GMHS dropped down into the unburned bowl.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vro9lhe5E6M
RTS, I’m not sure lately if people are checking prior comments a ways back for any recent replys attached to their previous comments, or most everybody is mostly now posting replies at the bottom of the page as new comments, and then just referencing the comment futher-up that it goes with.
If you haven’t seen it, or even if you have, I am curious if you have any thoughts regarding my 12-9, 9:16am reply to your 12-8, 726pm comment. There is some conflicting info out there on what Musser ‘knew’.
Also, with your knowledge and experience, do you have any thoughts regarding my comment at 9:56 today concerning two OPS seemingly giving direction and making requests of field personnel during the same time period?
Reply to RTS post on December 9, 2013 at 1:57
Re: The case study video on YouTube.
Very well done.
He was obviously using the SAIR ‘fire progression’
charts which actually differ a lot from the ADOSH ones.
I’m trying to compare them both myself to see what
the major differences are. Best I can tell… ADOSH has
the fireline reaching the mouth of the box canyon some
few minutes earlier than the SAIR… and the burn fronts
into Yarnell and Glen Ilah differ a lot.
One minor point…
In the ‘case study’ video… the Google Earth ‘eye-level
trail walk’ from 3:45 to 4:20′ is very accurate. It matches
any ‘eye-level’ trail walk from the anchor point to where
the roll of pink tape was found that I can do here myself.
However… it appears the ‘narrator’ wasn’t even looking at
the screen during that ‘trail walk’ as he did the audio overlay.
Narrator says… “Then they dropped down in a chaparral
choked drainage, completely losing any view of the rapidly
growing fire.”
His own ‘eye level’ view on the screen proves that is
NOT the case. Even before that moment… at the critical
time when they arrived at the ‘saddle’ and had to
decide to leave the road… his own video shows they
could still see the fire in the distance, over the saddle.
There is no ‘smoke’ in any of these Google Earth eye-level
‘walks’, however… but if the smoke was so bad out there
that it was obscuring the fireline itself… you would think
that would have been ‘warning’ enough for them to at
least get on the horn with ASM2 ( or somebody ) and
verify firefront location before stepping off that two-track.
Bob,
From what the ADOSH found, Marquez just walked away. And the IMT/OPS never ‘officially’ replaced him. I still say that the BR Supt. and Foreman were doing their best to coordiante things in DIV Z.
This is where Watch Out #19 comes into play – Death From Above – and it starts with overhead.
Thanks and no doubt that The BR Supt. took over you cant operate with all those resources with out some one coordinating the effort.
The guys that worked for Marquez earlier on the Doce Fire said he was out of his element and not that competent then, so he was WAY out of his league on the YHF.
So he quit because he wasn’t capable of handling his assignment. Did he wait for someone to be assigned or did he just walk? Maybe its nothing or maybe more. Not something that normally happens. incompetence seems to be showing up as a cause factor with several overhead. The switch from one team to another didn’t seem smooth either. Except for the guys building line was any body coordinating any thing?
Bob,
Although not ‘official’, I think that the BR Supt. kinda took over the DIVS Z duties in a way when Marquez abandoned his post. BR Supt.was at least perfroming TFLD duties, again not officially.
As far as the replacement Air Attack, I’m pretty sure he is Forest Service, so he also would be under the ‘gag order.’
WTKTT,
Thanks for the ADOSH Google Earth video. It definitely helps to put things into perspective a little better, especially for the non-wildland fire folks.
Regarding the weather and subsequent fire behavior, almost all the meteorologists stated that this was ‘a common Southwest thunderstorm.’ The only thing that was kinda odd was that it finally approached from the North they said. As far as fire spread and fire behavior, nothing new for me. Willis said it was the most extreme fire behavior he’s ever seen. And others made similar comments. That’s Willis and others. We’ve been seeing this more and more though over the pastseveral years. The other big factors, I think, were the scrub oak fuel component, mixed with Bear grass and Catclaw, which is highly volatile AND the tremendous fuel loading AND the fact that the area had not burned in 40-50 years AND that many of theYarnell residents did absolutely nothing to Firewise or mitigate their properties, thus having volatile fuels within flame length distance from the structures. That obviously made for some pretty destructive, extreme fire behavior.
I am still wondering if there is more to the DIVZ person quitting. It seems strange unless there was a lot more controversy than we have.
Also Calvin said he thought he was FS just clarifying if it says in the OSHA report that he could not speak either.
Mr. Powers… the ADOSH report has specific footnote
references on pages where ASM2 is either talked about
and/or quoted and the the footnotes all say…
“From ADOSH interview with ASM2”
They do not say “Taken from SAIT interview with ASM2”.
They all specifically say that ADOSH had a full
interview with ASM2… regardless of whether he
was an FS employee or not.
So was it ONLY the Blue Ridge Hotshots that ADOSH
was ‘verboten’ to talk to? Not sure yet.
Followup: Apologies. You were specifically asking
about DIVS Z ( Rance Marquez ) but my reply
talked about ASM2 ( FS employees ).
Sorry about that.
Marquez’s actual job is a ‘Fuel Expert’ with the
Arizona Bureau of Land Management (BLM).
I also meant to say the ‘Wildland Fire Associates
Report’ ( WFAR ) is the one with the direct
footnotes reporting ADOSH having their own
access/interview with ASM2 ( FS employees ).
The WAFR actually has direct quotes from
Marquez about the problems that day such as
“There was simply no way to connect the dots
out there and build good line” and things like
that… so I am assuming the WAFR had their
own interview with him. The ADOSH is based
on the WAFR and was using the same quotes
from the WAFR.
Confusing? Yep… but things are starting to fall
in place.
Two things I picked up from your discussions.
1. Div. Z There is nothing said about BR having any discussion with Div. Z he was there supervisor, did they head knock as well before he abandoned his job? Did BR Supt. take over that Div. Z and that is why GM Marsh wanted to talk with him at that critical point? That would make science.
2. The ASM2 that took over was I believe was USFS was he gag ordered as well? I did not notice in the OSHA report.
Also let me clarify a point in our conversation. BR has not lawyered up. The attorney generals office has ordered them to no talk to investigators about the fire, violating that order will cause them to lose there jobs. They are Government employees that must act within government rules and procedures. There is a reason we will have to wait and see. If they are called to testify they will have to speak then.
Reply to Bob Powers post on December 9, 2013 at 9:18 am
>> Mr. Powers wrote…
>> Also let me clarify a point in our conversation.
>> BR has not lawyered up.
>> The attorney generals office has ordered them to not
>> talk to investigators about the fire, violating that order
>> will cause them to lose there jobs.
Just wondering… if being “ORDERED by a bunch of lawyers
to not talk about something or you will lose your job” does
not meet your personal definition of ‘lawyering up’…
…I’m just curious what WOULD?
I assure you… I am not trying to be antagonistic here in any way.
I really, truly, would simply like to know what your own
personal definition of ‘lawyering up’ would be?
What additional criteria would need to be involved to meet
YOUR definition?
Manley hiring your own lawyers and not talking with out them. There being told not to talk by Fed. Lawyers, who really aren’t there hired or assigned representatives but are the USFS attorneys. My definition I’ll own it.
I believe the classic definition of lawyering up is hiring a lawyer because you do not want to talk, whereas, in the case of the USDA employees, they did not hire the lawyers or even ask for them or have any choice in the matter, we do not have any idea whether the Blue Ridge Hotshots want to talk or not, and saying they don’t want to talk just because they haven’t yet or to suggest somehow that proves they do not want to talk…is a real stretch of the imagination and jumping to conclusions.
Fair enough. Thank you.
**
** NEW VIDEO
**
** ADOSH FIRE PROGRESSIONS TRANSLATED TO 3D GOOGLE EARTH
I have fully ‘translated’ the 2 dimensional ADOSH Fire Progression Charts
to 3 dimensions in Google Earth and this is the first video in what might
be several to come showing where the fire was on June 30, at what time,
from a 3 dimensional perspective.
This is simply an ‘aerial overview’ as seen from the WEST looking
back towards Yarnell, over the deployment site and the Boulder
Springs Ranch.
It only shows the 5 ADOSH fire progression charts starting at
1600 ( 4:00 PM ) through 1650 ( 4:50 PM ).
Next will be an ‘eye-level’ view along the southerly walk that the
Granite Mountain Hotshots were taking before they dropped down
into the box canyon.
I’m afraid Mr. Powers seems to have been right.
There ARE points along that southerly walk, before they dropped into the
box canyon, when they SHOULD have been aware of ( and able to see ) the
‘fast push’ that fire was making in the very direction they planned to travel.
So either the smoke was obscuring everything ( which should have been
sufficient warning unto itself )… or these men were absolutely insane.
Here is the link to the most recent video…
ADOSH Fire Progression 1
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=boj4zCdOX5I
Here is the ‘About’ information that was uploaded with the video…
About…
These are the ADOSH Fire Progression charts fully
translated to 3D in Google Earth. This short video only
includes the ADOSH fire progression starting at
1600 ( 4:00 PM ) to 1650 ( 4:50 PM ). The view is an
aerial view from the WEST looking back at Yarnell. The
deployment site and the Boulder Springs Ranch are shown
in the lower right.
WTKTT,
I will concede your point, to a point. The fact that the ATGS realized things were going to hell below was ‘a big deal’ and at least he attempted to call a time out or tactical pause. We do those often enough when the situation warrants it. DIVS Z could have, should have done it BUT HE ABANDONED HIS POSITION AT 1330!
“I still think those fellas would be alive today if ASM2 had been allowed to go find out exactly where they were at that point in time.”
Knowing “exactly where they were at that point in time” would not have mattered because it’s merely fanatasy-land, movie stuff to believe that an airtanker would’ve been able to find them, line up, and drop on them in order to save their lives. A drop was certainly not going to slow or stop the intense fire spread. It’s possible in the movies, but certainly not possible and not very practical or realistic in the real world.
Reply to RTS post on December 8, 2013 at 11:37
I have no idea what might have happened that afternoon AFTER
ASM2 had obtained a ‘visual’ on GM’s location… but I can’t help
thinking it MAY have saved their lives.
I’m not talking about whether the VLAT drop would have been
possible or not. I happen to think they would have been too
covered in wind-driven smoke at THAT point for anything but
the luckiest ‘blind’ drop in the world to have done them any
good there…
…I am talking about the TIME when ASM2 actually WANTED
to go ‘find out where they were’.
According to the SAIR timeline… they would have been
about halfway south from the MacKenzie video spot to
the point where Tex Gilligan found that roll of pink tape,
which had to be on/near the actual ‘Descent Point’.
If ASM2 had seen them THERE… actually WALKING south…
I can’t believe he wouldn’t have called down and said…
“ASM2: Ah… DIVS A / Granite Mountain… this is ASM2.
I see you. Where in the hell are you GOING?”
“Marsh: ASM2, DIVS A. We’re going to that bomb-proof
ranch off to the southeast there.”
I have also just finished transposing the ADOSH fire
progression charts into Google Earth… and there are
some new videos coming on that… but if the timing
is right here then ASM2 would have ALSO seen what
they could NOT at that moment… that the fire had
made a big ‘push’ towards the mouth of that very
canyon they were going to drop into.
I also want to believe ( with all my toes and fingers crossed )
that ASM2 would have then said…
“ASM2: DIVS A. That’s a NEGATIVE. Fire is pushing fast
that way. You don’t have the time for that.”
Yes, I’m thinking that Bravo 33 and ASM2 are one and the same, but I was NOT there and therefore not verified by those that were. But that’s what I get reading all the documents.
Just to be clear – AGAIN – going to a SZ is fighting fire, it’s LCES, it’s NO BIG DEAL. Just because a Resource goes into or is in a SZ is NOT cause for alarm. I still think OPS didn’t ‘blow him off’ in that sense, but was CONVINCED that GM HS was in ‘good black’ in a SZ [which they were], was told to ‘hunker and stay safe’ [which they were] and that no experienced fire supervisor(s) would be doing anything otherwise, and certainly not violating all logic and training and WTF doing what they did.
He had plenty of more important matters on his mind. Once again, for the tenth time – It is the firefighter and fireline supervisor on-the-ground at the time, wherever they are, whatever they’re doing, that is responsible for their own safety. NOT OPS, NOT a Safety Officer, NOT Air Attack, ….
Reply to RTS post December 8, 2013 at 11:01 pm
…and once again, for about the 8th time ( I still feel like I’m 2
behind you but don’t worry… I’ll catch up )…
…I don’t care what is NORMALLY done.
There was something about THAT DAY, and THAT SITUATION
that made this conscientious man in an airplane get a ‘bad
enough feeling’ about what was happening down there on
the ground to call for a ‘timeout’.
Not THAT is a ‘big deal’, from what I can tell.
NO ONE likes to take a full ‘timeout’ on a fire, I don’t think.
So for ASM2 to even suggest it means he must have have
been pretty damn sure what he did NOT know ( where these
men really were ) at a time when HE was now SUPPOSED
to know.
I will always believe that OPS1 screwed up by not recognizing
how seriously this ‘trusted officer on the fire’ felt it was to
go VERIFY something… and not be ASSUMING anything.
Typo above:
“Not THAT is a big deal”
…should have been…
“Now THAT is a big deal”
RTS, Yes OPS (Able) was on the radio stating that he believed that GM was safe in good black. At the same time, OPS (Musser) knew that GM had been on the move, without his being aware of their location, routing, or destination. The left hand not knowing what the right is doing.
Yes, I have been harping on this point a bit, but having two OPS, both on the radio giving direction and making requests during the same time period, is not like any ICS structure I’ve ever heard of.
Your right. And every body acted within protocol, no body did any thing wrong. The first investigation was, is, and will always will be a complete farce. How could 54 people sign off on such a complete misrepresentation of the facts.
I think we also know now that there was another reason
why ASM might have been calling for ‘timeout’ so soon
after he arrived. HE had not been BRIEFED yet… and
now had all this double-duty dumped on him because
Air Attack ( Rory Collins ) just bolted for Deer Valley.
What ASM2 probably SHOULD have said is…
“I NEED a quick timeout here. I have NOT been
briefed. I know YOU think you know where people
are… but I do NOT. Air Attack had eyes on these
guys all day during his turnarouands… but I do
NOT know where they REALLY are… so cool your
jets for a minute while I go see where they REALLY
are at this moment in time. Over and out.”
Reply to RTS post on December 8, 2013 at 10:35 pm
Just to be clear… “Bravo 33” and ASM2 ( as per the SAIR ) would
be one and the same person/aircraft, Yes?
Briefed or not… I think the guy showed great presence of mind to call for
the ‘timeout’ when he did so soon after arriving and after ‘hearing about a
crew in ( or going to? ) a safety zone’.
It’s still a shame that OPS1 ( Abel? ) blew him off.
I still think those fellas would be alive today if ASM2 had been allowed
to go find out exactly where they were at that point in time.
Couple of comments about the Musser “request”.
Note that it was mentioned in the ADOSH report, but not the WFA timeline (nor in the SAIR). The intro to the WFA report says they participated in the ADOSH interviews, so they should have known about it. Did they leave it out because it was not important to the issues they were being consulted on? I feel the SAIT had to know about this, surely they interviewed Musser and asked him about any communication with GM that day. This is not something Musser would have forgotten to mention, after what happened I am sure it was remembered every single day during this time. So we have to conclude that the SAIT left this out of their report, and then blathered on about how all the men were dead and we would never understand their motivation. What a crock!
In addition, what we know about this request is a lot thinner than it should be. What specifically was the reason given to Marsh? Hard to believe he asked for an unspecified # of men to walk nearly 2 miles just “to help out”. Surely some urgency and specifics were conveyed. After all, within a very few minutes Marsh does change his mind. Was the reason the nature of the request itself, or some other intervening event or communication?
Finally, I agree that we are likely reading too much into the BRHS’ refusal to talk openly with ADOSH. If the lawyers tell these guys to not talk, at least for the time being that is what they are going to do. However, does anybody know what the face-to-face between Marsh and Frisby was supposed to be about? Seems odd, with everyone so busy, that something needed to be discussed in person and not by another means. Anyways, the meeting never occurred, but odd that it was planned.
Reply to mike’s post December 8, 2013 at 10:40 pm
Even odder still is the fact that Brian Frisby was schlepping his
way ALL the way back out to that ridge ( 2 miles ) on an ATV
a SECOND time ( at a time just before everything was going to
hit the fan ) just because Marsh ‘wanted him to’.
Brian Frisby did NOT come across Brendan abandoning his
lookout post when he did because he had a ‘sixth sense’ or
because he’d already been called by Brendan.
Brian Frisby ACCIDENTALLY came across Brendan when
he did ( and a good thing, too! ) because he we already
on his way out for this SECOND face-to-face that Marsh
had just requested.
This is fully documented in both SAIR and ADOSH now.
So yea… I hear ya… what could have been so all-fired
important, in Marsh’s mind, that he would ask this poor
guy ( Frisby ) to make that second dusty, hot, bumpy 2
mile trip all the way up to the ridge just so they wouldn’t
have to use a radio? It’s very odd.
It was ALL starting to hit the fan around the time.
Marsh really had no right to ask Frisby to drop everything
he was doing and ride the UTV donkey all the way out
to the ridge AGAIN ( at such a time ). What’s weird is that
Frisby actually AGREED to do it… and ended up just
stumbling across Brendan who was only 5 minutes away
from probably having to deploy himself by the old grader.
You see… THESE are the ‘kinds of questions’ that only
Brian Frisby and/or other BR Hotshots can answer at
this point… along with the still mysterious issue of whether
or not Brendan McDonough is/was lying in public about
having ‘gone over to the Shrine area’ with Blue Ridge,
or not. There is now a witness who says he did NOT.
Only the Blue Ridge Hotshots can ‘clear up’ some of these
things… and I can’t believe anyone in their chain of command
can’t see the value in letting them TALK about these things.
‘Lawyering up’ and being ‘uncooperative’, regardless of whose
decision that is… just puts them back into the category of
‘having something to hide’.
It defies common sense.
This is a complete and utter guess, but, based on what I read and re-read in *all* of the documentation (which includes the dispatch logs, which I re-read again tonight), I honestly wonder if Marsh summoned Frisby for a face-to-face meeting because Marsh wanted to say something akin to “Listen, this is an entire cluster-fu&!, there is no strategy, I had a plane dump on my burn-out fire, DivS Zulu bailed, and you told me earlier today that the briefing you got sucked. This isn’t safe for any of us. [and, if RTS is to be believed, whats-his-name proved last week at the Dolce fire that he sucked in managing this type of fire.] I say we pull our guys out, get back to the Middle School, and regroup. We have to figure out who is in charge, what resources are available to us, who is feeding us information, and how we need to attack. What do you think? Are you with me? Or do you see a way to stay out here and stay safe?”
Am I delusional or is there a chance that THAT is what was so important that Marsh wanted an actual face-to-face, just like he did when his work with Blue Ridge STARTED six hours prior?
Reply to Elizabeth N. post
on December 9, 2013 at 8:53 pm
Elizabeth. It’s possible. That might have been what
Marsh WANTED that SECOND ‘face-to-face’
with Brian Frisby to be about… but the truth is that
time was against everyone by that point.
Brian agreed to ‘head on up’… but he never
made it. It was too late for that. He stumbled
across Brendan near the old grader just after
he had to abandon his lookout post… and
realized he MIGHT have time to get he and
Brendan up the ridge together on the UTV…
…but they would not be able to get BACK.
They ( Frisby and McDonough ) would then
have been just as ‘stuck’ up there as GM was.
Somehow… I wish Frisby HAD continued on
up to the ridge. There is a chance that, with
Frisby with them and his extra ‘input’ into the
‘discussing their options’ conversation…
Frisby might have had the smarts to realize
all they had to do was whistle-dixie or play
donkey-kong on the iPhones for about 30
minutes… and they could have all just walked
back down that same two-track road amidst
‘new black’ all the way to Yarnell… and home.
Elizabeth N. and WTKTT,
I did some research on the cowardly ATGS Rory Collins that unexpectedly “at 1558 abruptly leaves the fire” during a very critical time in the fire, and was not replaced. “He [Rory Collins] turned air tactical operations over to Bravo 33 who was very busy dealing with lead plane [one that leads the airtankers in on their drops] duties at the time.” Rory Collins gave the incoming Bravo 33 “a very brief update” which equates to a really lousy briefing, leaving him “unaware of either Division breaks and on the ground firefighter locations.” ADOSH noted that “Bravo 33 had been ordered as a lead plane thinking that the Air Attack function was covered [by Rory Collins]. So, this left Bravo 33 swamped dealing with tankers, resources on the ground, Yarnell afire, and then the GMHS debacle.
RORY COLLINS works for the Douglas Forest Protective Agency (DFPA) in Oregon and dispatches with the Oregon Division of Forestry (ODF). ODF and DFPA are generally not well-versed in chaparral fires and certainly not well versed in burnout operations, as they generally ‘go direct’ on all their fires. And so that kind of explains why Rory Collins kept ordering retardent on GM HS burnout operations.
Elizabeth N…
Calling Rory Collins “cowardly” is uncalled for and accusatory.
If oyu have ever been in a small fixed wing aircraft, on a 100 degree day over a very active forest fire, doing continious orbits, it is POSSIBLE that Collins was air sick. It does happen frequently. When you get this sort of airsick, you are out of the game. PERIOD. You land, the pilot helps you to teh lounge area and you lay there feeling like warmed over death.
Don’t label people prior to discovering the reason he departed.
WAIT!! I did not call Mr. Collins “cowardly.”
Elizabeth N. did NOT call Mr. Collins cowardly!
FYI – I am curious about why Mr. Collins left, since the OSHA report makes what I consider to be a pointed note about it, but I would NEVER call him cowardly! We have no idea why Mr. Collins left so “abruptly” (in the words of OSHA), because Mr. Collins refused to return the calls of OSHA to speak with them. For all we know, Mr. Collins could have been ORDERED to leave by whomever is above him or whomever was trying to direct the entire debacle.
Please, please do not attribute to me any sort of attacks on anyone, including Mr. Collins.
Rocksteady, I don’t think that was Elizabeth N. Re-read the post.
Thank you. It was not me!
I stand corrected… and humbly apologize to Elizabeth N…. Lesson learned, dont try to respond on small screen of the smart phone… Sorry Eliz.
WAIT!! I did not call Mr. Collins “cowardly.”
Elizabeth N. did NOT call Mr. Collins cowardly!
Reply to Elizabeth N. post on December 8, 2013 at 9:56 pm
>> Elizabeth said…
>> I see up above that a comment was made about a new witness being
>> found or making comments. Any link to that new witnesses’s
>> story/comments?
This ‘witness’ to Brendan McDonough leaving the area where the GM vehicles
were parked by himself ( and NOT helping to move the Crew Carriers, as he
has stated publicy ) first came to light on the ‘other’ ( first chapter ) of this
ongoing discussion over on Mr. Dougherty’s other article…
http://www.investigativemedia.com/yarnell-hill-fire-investigation-ignored-major-mistakes-by-the-state/
Just use the ‘Find’ option in your Browser and search for the witnesses’ last
name ‘Buford’ to find the comment where he was first mentioned by the
hikers Tex Gilligan and Joy Collura.
Sonny (Tex) Gilligan actually give contact information for this witness down at
the very bottom of this posting.
As best as ‘cut and paste’ will allow me to do, here is a ‘reproduction’ of that
original conversation which led to Mr. Buford’s name and story coming to light…
>> On November 30, 2013 at 10:24 pm
>> calvin asked…
>> Another minor detail…. Once Mcdonough was dropped off at Eric’s truck
>> Frisby went to get other drivers to move GM buggies.
>> Did Mcdonough head on over to the Ranch House then?
WTKTT responded…
I doubt it. The Tom Story photograph shows both McDonough ( in the GM
Supervisor truck ) and BOTH GM Crew Carriers 7A and 7B paused in the
‘staging area’ where the Shrine road meets Highway 89. Every vehicle in
that photo would then momentarily leave there and head south on Highway
89 for the Ranch House Restaurant.
That would mean that Brendan must have EXITED the area via the Shrine
Road… which means he did, in fact, wait where the GM vehicles were
parked out on Sesame for the GM crew members to return, and then they
ALL drove over to the Shrine area together.
Don’t forget… Brendan was clueless about the roads around there. That
wasn’t his job in the morning and he had no idea it would BECOME his job
to be moving all the vehicles by himself later in the day.
The GM Crew Carriers got to their parking spot that morning by coming out
Lakewood Drive in Glen Ilah and passing by Chief Andersen’s home at 8:03 AM.
Brendan never saw the ‘cutover’ road that he would need to take later that day to
get over to the Shrine area from where the GM vehicles were parked.
So he MUST have waited for the BR guys to get back before moving the
vehicles… and he followed them over to the Shrine area on that cutover road
because otherwise, he would have had no idea how to get over there ( to
the Shrine area ).
>> Joy A Collura and Tex (Sonny) Harold Eldon Gilligan
>> on December 1, 2013 at 12:26 pm said:
>>
>> Buford of Yarnell states the man Jim next to Helm’s
>> saw Brendan drive out and that is not off the Shrine area
>> but over near Sesame area—he stated the look Brendan
>> had is worth you all reaching Jim to go over his testimony
>> of that moment.
WTKTT responded…
Whoa. Full stop.
If that is true… that someone saw Brendan EXIT the Sesame area that day
(alone in the GM Supervisor truck) back through Glen Ilah… and that he had
some kind of horrific or worried look on his face… and did NOT go over to
the Shrine area at all…
…then that makes mincemeat of BOTH the SAIR report AND Brendan’s
own public statements about this timeframe and about his participation
in ‘moving the GM vehicles’.
First let’s revisit what the SAIR says about this… and then we will revisit
what Brendan himself has said about this in his public video interview.
** What the SAIR has to say about Brendan’s involvement
** ( or lack thereof? ) in moving the GM vehicles…
Page 24 of the SAIR says…
:: BR Supt drops GM Lookout off at the Granite Mountain IHC Supt truck
:: at about 1555 and then heads around the corner to get some of his
:: crew to help move the Granite Mountain crew carriers. On the Granite
:: Mountain intra-crew frequency, GM Lookout hears DIVS A and GM
:: Capt talking about their options, whether to stay in the black or to
:: come up with a plan to move.
NOTE: There it is again. The SAIR states, unequivocally, that Brendan
McDonough heard every word of the mysterious (and crucial) ‘discussing
their options’ and ‘comfort level’ discussions between Marsh and Steed…
but does not supply one iota of additional text that would then explain
everything that was going to happen the rest of the day and that we are
all still simply ‘guessing’ about.
ALSO NOTE: The SAIR says Brendan was dropped off SPECIFICALLY
at the ‘GM Supervisor Truck’ and then, at that point, BR Supt was only
fetching crew to move the Carriers themselves. This MAY suggest that
Brendan was, in fact, ‘on his own’ at that point with the GM Supervisor
truck and never participated in helping BR move the Carriers at all.
ALSO NOTE: After this little blurb in the SAIR about Brendan being ‘dropped
off at the GM Supervisor truck’… ‘GM Lookout’ ( Brendan McDonough ) is
NEVER MENTIONED AGAIN in the entire SAIR report. As far as the
SAIR is concerned… Brendan just ‘disappears from history’ at that moment.
That is… unless you count the ‘timeline’ at the end of the SAIR document.
There ( on page 63 ), the SAIR suddenly seems to assert that Brendan DID
go over to the Shrine Area with the BR fellas…
Page 63 of the SAIR ( Event Timeline )…
1555 ( 4:55 PM ): Granite Mountain Lookout and Blue Ridge IHC start
moving Granite Mountain IHC trucks to Shrine area
The SAIR continues at this point with more detail about the moving
of the GM Crew Carriers… but with NO MENTION of McDonough now…
Page 25 of the SAIR says…
:: Fire reaches SPGS1’s first trigger point, and he requests YCSO to order
:: an immediate resident evacuation for Yarnell. ( 1600 / 4:00 PM according
:: to SAIR event timeline, page 63 ). Around this time, drivers arrive at the
:: Shrine area with the Granite Mountain crew carriers, and soon they are
:: loading the Blue Ridge crewmembers and leaving the area.
NOTE: This section does NOT say that McDonough was actually WITH
the ‘drivers that arrive at the Shrine area’. McDonough was driving Eric
Marsh’s Superintendent truck. The SAIR only says that the ‘Crew
Carriers’ arrived over at the Shrine circa 1600 ( 4:00 PM ). This is now
a full page AFTER Brendan had been mentioned being specifically
dropped off by the ‘GM Superintendent truck’ and would then ‘disappear
from history’ and never be mentioned again the report.
** That’s it for the SAIR’s description of Brendan’s involvement ( or lack
** thereof ? ) in moving the GM vehicles.
**
** Now let’s revist what Brendan himself had to say ( in public ) about that…
Brendan in his own words about this ‘moving the vehicles’ activity
from his public video interview with the Daily Courier…
:: So at that point ( when BR Supt picked me up by the old grader ) I loaded
:: my stuff up… and… as I’m loading my stuff up… I hand my radio to the…
:: the sup off of the other hotshot crew and… he’s relaying information to
:: my superintendent and captain about where our vehicles are parked, that
:: they’re gonna move ‘em for us, that they have me with them… and it’s
:: safer for me to go out with him, back to the vehicles, back to the main
:: road in Yarnell than to try and meet up with them ( my own crew )…
:: and he relayed information on what the fire’s doing and kinda what
:: their goal was.. and… just giving them as much information as he
:: could… on what was goin’ on… and… at that point.. um… I was already
:: in the ATV and we’re on our way and I’m just… on the radio… I tell…
:: uh… my superintendent and captain that if they need anything, give
:: me a call, and that I’ll see ‘em soon.
::
:: We ( BR Supt and I ) had arrived at the vehicles… and Blue Ridge
:: hotshot crew… they helped us ( Me and BR Supt? ) bump those
:: vehicles around to a different side of the fire, in a safer area… um…
:: for them to be in… and at that point… I was pretty much with them…
:: and… I mean… in this job you’re supposed to always remain flexible…
:: and… uh… when I had left… my position was compromised… and my
:: safety… and my crew understood… and they were comfortable with
:: me leaving knowing that they could see the fire… and… um…
::
:: I mean… as any… any crew member they always wish they could
:: be with their crew… those are the guys ya love and ya wanna work
:: with… and… when I was with Blue Ridge I felt very comfortable,
:: ya know. It was.. It was almost like being… ya know… with a…
:: it was at home. Good feeling… um… but our goal was to prep a
:: dozer line which means to get ready to burn it… possibly… so we
:: were gonna clear out a lot of the fuels that’s on this line that a
:: dozer has pushed… heavy equipment has pushed… and within
:: minutes of getting there… uh… the fire activity was just picking up
:: and keep picking up from when I had left… and… around that time…
:: this had to been around 4… 4:15, 4:30 ish… I’m guessing…
:: my times on that day are really hazy… um… we ended up going…
:: they kinda pulled the resources off and the divisions and… jus cus
:: of what was goin’ on and people on their own were doing it jus…
:: wasn’t… uh… safe area… cus at that point when we had moved we
:: were even closer to the fire… and… we pulled off, we parked at
:: a cafe’, and during the time, ya know, told my superintendent and
:: captain that we had the vehicles in a safe area… and… once
:: again… if they needed anything just give me a call and I’ll see
:: ‘em soon… and that’s the last time that I talked to ‘em.
WTF?
Forget the fact that Brendan’s story doesn’t even hold water within
the same two paragraphs… because the SAIR says BR Supt told
SPGS1 ( Willis? ) they were NOT going to ‘burn that dozer’ line
( there was no longer time ) while he was simply on his way to get
some BR fellas to go back and help Brendan.
Page 24 of SAIR says…
:: As BR Supt is en route to pick up drivers to move the Granite Mountain
:: crew carriers, SPGS1 contacts him to ask if they still have the option
:: to burn out from the dozer line. BR Supt tells him no.
That means Brendan’s story about “our goal (he and BR now) was to
prep a dozer line” is nonsense. That ‘plan’ was abandoned before
Brian Frisby ( BR Supt ) ever even got back to the Shrine area to
even begin to tell some other BR guys to go back to where the GM
Crew Carriers ( and Brendan, supposedly? ) was.
So yea… forget the inconsistencies in Brendan’s own story
even from sentence to sentence…
If, as a WITNESS now claims, Brendan really did just EXIT Sesame street
by himself ( driving the GM Supervisor truck ) the way GM came in that
morning… out Lakewood drive through Glen Ilah and directly to the Ranch
House Restaurant…
…and ONLY the GM Crew Carriers got ‘humped’ over to the Shrine area
by some of the BR fellas…
…then BOTH the SAIR report AND Brendan’s public statements
are complete fiction.
I suppose this could all be EASILY verified by ANY of the Blue Ridge
Mountain Hotshots and not just Brian Frisby ( BR Supt. )
Was Brendan McDonough ( in the GM Supervisor Truck ) EVER really
‘over with them now’ in the Shrine area after he left his lookout
position… or did he simply ‘disappear’ that afternoon after getting dropped
off at the truck by Brian Frisby?
Did he just head right over the Ranch House Restaurant and order
a burger, or something?
NOTE: The SAIR event timeline also says this about the firefighters
leaving the Shrine area, going out to the ‘staging’ area where
Shrine road meets Hwy 89, and then everyone proceeding directly
down to the Ranch House Restaurant ( the cafe’ )…
1640 ( 4:40 PM )
Last firefighters leave the northern subdivision of Yarnell and reach Hwy 89
( staging area where Shrine road meets Hwy 89 – The Tom Story photograph? )
1643 ( 4:43 PM )
Fire resources regroup at the Ranch House Restaurant in southern Yarnell.
Not possible, if Brendan’s story is to be believed.
He said that when he arrived at the cafe’ with everyone else… he then called
his ‘cap and sup’ a SECOND time to tell them the vehicles were now safe
at the cafe’ and if they needed anything… ‘just give him a call’.
If the SAIR is right about the TIME when everyone actually arrived at the
cafe’… then Brendan was talking to men that were already in their shelters
and just about to die ( or already gone ).
SAIR says Marsh’s final “Affirm!” radio message came at 1642 ( 4:42 PM ).
That’s 1 minute BEFORE Brendan ( according to him ) would have called
his ‘cap and sup’ just to chit-chat about the vehicles and tell them
they were now “safe at the cafe’ “.
No wonder even Brendan doesn’t give any hint what Steed or Marsh’s
response to that second ‘see ya soon’ call from him that day might
have been.
There WAS no response…because ( according to the SAIR timeline )
they were both already dead.
>> Sonny on December 3, 2013 at 11:09 am said:
>>
>> http://bufordsworkshop.com/ is the contact page for Buford
>> just so you know and I am short on online time so that is all
>> I can do so you can find out the man next to Helm’s place who
>> saw that face he described to us- a look of worry is what Buford
>> was told- WORTH looking into especially OSHA and investigators
>> but it seems you all are more invested in this and I hope to have
>> some down time soon to sit and really READ the comment wall
>> but we just have a lot going on to spend the time but we are
>> giving you all pure information and sources—
Followup: If you click the link that Sonny (Tex) Gilligan provided
for Mr. Buford… there is small print at the bottom of the
website with this information…
BufordsWorkshop
22772 Hwy 89 Box 95
Yarnell, AZ 85362
928 671-1895
I see up above that a comment was made about a new witness being found or making comments. Any link to that new witnesses’s story/comments?
Robert the Second and WTKTT:
I am *not* giving legal advice here, but I think an employer that would fire a “whistleblower” (e.g. an employee who when to OSHA to report what he/she saw) would be doing so at his or her own peril.
I hear your point, Robert the Second, about the fact that an employee could be fired for speaking with the OSHA investigators after the employee’s boss told him/her NOT to speak with the OSHA investigator, but I am willing to bet that some would call that type of employee termination to be “unlawful retaliation.” Essentially, the employee is being fired for reporting about an unsafe situation to OSHA. I am not admitted to practice in Arizona, but I *have* to believe that it would be legally dicey to fire an employee under those circumstances. While the employee might be breaking the employer’s orders, the employee is also engaging in some pretty important, perhaps statutorily-protected, speech, such that I am willing to bet that it would be unlawful to fire the employee under those circumstances. That said, do NOT take my thoughts as any sort of legal guidance, b/c I am not admitted to practice in AZ, I know little (or nothing) about this area of law in AZ, and I am obviously not giving legal advice here.
P.S. I realize that your point is only to highlight why some of the Blue Ridge folks are being silent. I just wanted to offer a comment about whether an employer really would be likely to have the chutzpah to fire a Blue Ridge employee or one of the pilots who had the courage to speak out to OSHA about what they saw.
You are 100 percent correct in theory, but 100 percent wrong in reality. There are thousands of ways to screw with an employee and never link it to retaliation as a “whistleblower.”
For starters, almost all of the Blue Ridge Hotshots are “temporary” or seasonal employees, their “season” is already over and they have NO guarantees to be rehired next year, in fact, the USFS could just to decide to eliminate the entire crew due to budgetary constraints and move the crew slot to the White Mountains of New Hampshire and start all over again with new people.
The ways to punish people are endless and lawyers who specialize in employment practices are like all other lawyers, beyond the means of most people.
I don’t know if you read some of my earlier posts, but what I was trying to say is that it was part of my job to dig the holes to hide the bodies, Uncle Sugar may be sweet, but some of the people who work for him are downright mean.
WTKTT,
Remember, the BR HS are not being “uncooperative” – they have been directed by their Agency, the USDA Forest Serice to NOT speak to any attorneys or anyone for that matter about the YHF.
And I also believe the AZDOSH Report addresses this very issue of their Agency diecting them to be quiet.
This is a very recent comment from Gary Olson on the subject on our messed up thread.
“One thing I should have added that is any employee ignores that kind of order of their agency, there is no doubt they would be fired immediately. You might be asking some young men to pay a very, very, heavy price price for everyone’s else’s, screw up, lies, and deceit. Good luck getting another job in any similar field after being FIRED by the USFS. See my previous comment, They ARE THE 800 POUND GORRILLA IN THE NATION!”
Reply to RTS post December 8, 2013 at 9:06
I hear ya. I really do. There’s that “job, job, job, job” mantra
I keep hearing. I know a young person can think that’s about
all that matters… but time will show him/her the real truth.
Personally… I just don’t know how any of these people would
really give a crap about CONTINUING to work for these
‘agencies’ after the way they are behaving over this.
First the Arizona State Forestry Commission, now the
USDA Forestry Service ( and don’t forget the hefty share
of ‘under the bus’ throwing the City of Prescott has been
doing with some of the families ).
I mean… who would WANT to work for people that appear
to be doing all they can to cover up problems in the very
workplace they want you to wade into every year?
Doesn’t give one a whole lot of confidence or respect in
their ’employers’… does it?
I’m not asking anyone to ‘lose their job’, if that’s all that
matters to them.
Surely there must be a way for a lot of the pertinent questions
to be submitted/answered (truthfully) without anyone having to
“lose their frickin’ job”.
WTKTT:
Remember what Mr. Powers recommended the last time there was one of those WTKTT rants . . . “You just take a deep breath, step back . . . “
Reply to J. Stout post on Dec 8, 2013 at 11:04 pm
(( inhale )) — (( exhale ))
(( inhale )) — (( exhale ))
Ah. That’s better.
Nope. I still don’t think I would want to work for
the Arizona State Forestry Commission or
the USDA Forestry Service. Sorry.
Sorry? No need for anything like that on your part, as my post was not intended as an attempt to change your viewpoint.
Reply to RtS:
What you and Gary Olson are saying here is important. Thanks for reiterating the comments on this thread. Because young men who want to be firefighters and who wish to be able to practice the profession that matters most to them are faced with the reality that they are going to have to be an ’employee’ for an agency somewhere — whether it’s the city, county, state or federal government. And, have to deal with the downside that comes along with it. Bottom line, there is no such thing as a freelance firefighter.
It is not a job, it is a way of life. Some may find Eric Marsh’s methods that were used to build spirit de corps confusing or unnecessary but…crew identity and cohesion is what makes it work, unfortunately, there can be a downside to that identify, but this is getting away from my point, none of those who fight wildfire for just a job do it for very long, or very well…it may sound corny to call it a “calling”, but it is certainly is a lifestyle and much, much, much more than just a job.
According to Brendan McDonough… it went even
far beyond that. It was also a religious experience.
He was ‘baptized’ by other members of the
Granite Mountain team ( which included Mormons
and ( I believe ) an active preacher ) just a week
or two before the burnonver in Yarnell.
Willis, Marsh, Steed and others were HEAVY
into this sort of thing… and they brought it to
work with them, too.
So combine “Drop and give me 100” with
them sitting around during breaks out in the
boondocks and reading from the Bible ( as
has been reported elsewhere )…
…and you are 100 percent correct.
This just ain’t no hourly-rate JOB.
These guys were letting it all be much, much,
much MORE than that.
Maybe sometimes that helps you live.
Maybe sometimes that gets you killed.
Before you even ask…
Here’s the public information being
referenced above.
It’s from the Kyle Dickman article based
on his interview with Brendan McDonough.
It’s a familiar story in hotshotting: the discipline and rigor of crew life puts wayward young men on track. But Granite Mountain had a more nurturing atmosphere than most crews. Clayton Whitted, a squad boss like Robert, was a former youth pastor at the Heights Church in Prescott. During some shifts on the fire line, the crew would openly discuss Jesus or ask Clayton to tell stories from the Bible. It was through him that Donut accepted Jesus as his savior, on a fire in New Mexico two weeks before Yarnell Hill. “Clayton, Steed, Eric—those guys had it figured out. They made people better,” Donut says. “I wanted a piece of that.”
It is a way of life I grew up in from 5 years old till I was 50 and which I still stay in contact with. The USFS and Wild land fire fighting The people I met The people I still know The places I lived and the places I raised my kids. People envied me I fought fire to protect the Forests and mountains I loved and still go to too hunt, fish, camp, and horse back ride. It is a life that is hard to explain but was very fulfilling.
I’m trained as a lawyer, but I primarily do expert witness work and consulting. I have reviewed more investigations in my life than I can remember – I review corporate investigations (of the sort we saw in Enron or regarding Sandusky and Penn State). I mention this by way of background, as Gary Olsen (I think) had suggested.
It seems clear to me that the OSHA report deliberately pointed at two things that we have not yet discussed:
(1) Rory (?) Collins, the air attack pilot who “abruptly” (seemingly without explanation) left the scene while things were escalating with the Granite Mountain crew. We are left with the impression that Marsh and Collins locked horns earlier in the day b/c
* Marsh (and Frisby or whatever his name was) did not want to change their strategy to whatever Collins was suggesting or trying to direct, and
* Collins dropped retardant in a way that directly interfered with Marsh’s (Granite Mountain’s) *already* burning burn-out or backfire, such that Marsh had to change the GM strategy to a “direct” strategy.
Note: The OSHA report made clear that Collins – not his attorney, not his employer – refused to return OSHA’s calls. OSHA mentioned this separate and apart from all of the other folks who were not *allowed* to speak with OSHA.
What does all of this mean? Specifically, how does this fit together to help us see more clearly the bigger picture.
(2) Divs Z essentially walked away. The OSHA report authors wanted us to know that. But did he walk away b/c he saw that it was a dangerous cluster-fu*$ (excuse my French) that he refused to participate in, or did he walk away in an abdication of duty that OSHA wants to specifically highlight for our attention?
What was going on with Divs Z and Marsh? It would be INCREDIBLY helpful if people who *knew* about some of the involved personalities or the underlying dynamics or what they believe to have been the dynamics chimed in.
FYI: From my standpoint, as a gal who reads a *lot* of investigation reports, the authors of this OSHA report are giving us a lot of information on pages 17-20 of the narrative. Those of you who have been closely tracking every single detail – like Calvin – will hopefully be able to figure out how those pages fill in some of the gaps. It is clear to me that pages 19 and 20 are really the “money” pages… I am just not sure WHAT exactly those pages are telling me.
Reply to Elizabeth N. post on December 8, 2013 at 8:13 pm
Elizabeth… yes.. those pages in the ADOSH are ‘telling a story’
that the SAIR was obviously trying to ‘stay away from’.
Mr. Dougherty caught the most OBVIOUS ‘new evidence’ right
away and that was the ‘call out’ to Marsh/Steed circa 1545-1550
asking if they could ‘spare resources’ back in town.
ADOSH doesn’t tell us exactly what Musser said/asked, such
as whether it was a specific request like “Can you make it
Glen Ilah?” or just a generic “We really could use some
help down here.”
But now we have a conundrum.
How do we get from Marsh/Steed responding with…
“No… we are committed to the black. Why don’t you
ask the Blue Ridge Hotshots to help”.
…to, minutes later, a group of tired, hot, frustrated men
skulking around in the back country like some Black-Ops
team, breaking every rule in the WFF book, and walking
head-long into a wall of flames in broad daylight.
Marsh/Steed’s ( now documented ) response to Musser
was standard WFF ‘asked/answered’ TDWAO. ( Turn Down
With Alternate Option ).
That SHOULD have been the ‘end of the day’ for them, and
in just 30 minutes they could have been picking their way
through ‘new’ black all the way to Yarnell and home again.
Someone knows “what’s missing” here.
Someone knows how it changed from an affirmed commitment
to the black ( documented now ) to a ‘death march’.
Someone who is still alive.
WantsToKnow…
I am making a different point than you are. I am focusing on something DIFFERENT. What was going on with Collins and with Divs Z that the OSHA report is trying to highlight? *THAT* is what I am thinking about. Not Musser.
Reply to Elizabeth N. post
December 8, 2013 at 8:41 pm
Elizabeth… sorry. You sound peeved there?
I was responding you YOUR last paragraph
in your previous message where you seem to
be inviting comment on pages 19-20 ADOSH.
Your points about ‘what a mess the afternoon was’
are well taken… and ALL of that needs to come
out. All of that could very well explain why no one
even cared about properly ‘communication’
( The ‘C’ in LCES ) by late in the afternoon.
I was simply pointing out one of the THE most
important things to take away from the ADOSH
narrative. Regardless of how pissed these guys
all were with each other circa 4:00 PM…
something very specific happened between
‘we are committed to the black’ and ( just minutes
later ) 2 men taking 17 others on a walk to
their death(s).
Maybe that’s exactly what has been ‘edited out’
of the MacKenzie video.
Sorry – not peeved! Sorry for sounding peeved. Your point is a great one. I was just highlighting that mine was different. Apologies!
First off, Musser called GM HS on either the Tactical (TAC) channel or Command (repeater). He did NOT use one of the Crew frequencies. Musser said that Marsh told him they were taking “their PREDETERMINED route.” Musser was very clear that he did NOT say Escape Route. Only when Marsh talked with the BR HS Supt. did he use the words ESCAPE ROUTE when Frisby was clarifying WTF he just heard Marsh say.
Second, a Safety Officer worth his salt should/would have seen that things were definitely escalating and going to pot quickly what with the Watch Out Situations just ticking right off and building exponentially, the DIVS Z was NOT in place, as in he’s WTF GONE!, and firefighters were on-the-edge. So, a Safety Officer recognizing all this would/should have gotten with OPS and called a TACTICAL PAUSE, basically a Time Out. The AZDOSH speaks to this issue quite clearly. HOWEVER, it’s up to the FF and/or Supervisor on-the-ground and at-that-time to ensure their safety, NOT the Safety Officer.
Regarding the radio, Crew Net, and frequency issues:
1) Each Crew has its own frequecy and tone guard, so they are able to talk to anyone on their Crew with that frequency while on and/or scanning that channel,
2) Their B/K radios are 16 Groups of 16 Channels each,
3) They (virtually everyone on the fire with a similar radio) MORE THAN LIKELY had a Group just for the Yarnell Hill Fire, and IN that Group, they MOST LIKELY ALL had the follwing channels and frequencies: Command, Local Unit Command Repeater for State Forestry and/or State Lands, maybe BLM, maybe Forest Service, TAC 1, 2, 3, 4 etc (Each DIV and/or GROUP has a separate frequency)., Mutual Aid, Air to Ground, Emergency Air to Ground, AND ONLY the Hot Shots (and maybe Willis) had THEIR respective HOT SHOT CREW NET FREQUENCIES,
4) The reason that BR L/O handed the radio to BR Supt. was PROBABLY so that BR Supt. could talk DIRECTLY to GM on THEIR GM HS Crew Net, rather than on the very-busy-by-now Tactical Channel that ALL the other Resouces on that Division were on. Even though DIV A was pretty slim on Resources with only GM HS and DIVS Marsh. TAC channels get very busy, very quickly.
5) And this DIRECT communication between BR Supt/Crew and GM HS would also solve the issue of the relaying, decifering, etc. to the BR HS Supt what was said, what was meant, what you said, what he said, blah blah, blah. And that way nothing would be lost in the translation so-to-speak.
6) We do it all the time to ensure Fire Order Number #8 – “Give clear instructions and be sure they are understood.”
So much for radio 101.
Reply to RTS post on December 8, 2013 at 7:25 pm
Regarding (4).
Thanks… that’s what I figured.
So, realistically… the ONLY people left alive who probably
heard ALL of the infamous ‘discussing their options’ and
‘comfort level’ discussion would be…
Darrell Willis
Brendan McDonough
The mysterious third voice heard saying “You bet!” with
radio modulation in response to Marsh’s “…ya know”
statement at the start of the second MacKenzie video clip.
AND… anyone that might have been standing near any
of these 3 persons who had the GM intra-crew frequency
programmed in.
Even though Blue Ridge is documented as having been
totally ‘uncooperative’ with the ADOSH investigation… there
really is no reason to believe that Brian Frisby or any other
BR Hotshot could have realistically ‘overheard’ that
critical ‘discussing their options’ conversation. They simply
didn’t have the right GM intra-crew frequency number to
even be accidentally ‘listening in’.
I believe it’s been proven that Brendan McDonough MUST
have been ‘alone’ at the point these conversations took
place… either standing next to the GM Supervisor Truck
on Sesame and still using his Bendix/King portable… or
already inside the GM Supervisor Truck and now listening
to the onboard radio. He was either just sitting there waiting
for BR crew to return to help move the Carriers… or ( as a
new witness report claims ) was already driving south out
through Glen Ilah on Lakewood Drive by himself with ( as the
witness describes ) this ‘very worried look on his face’.
We still don’t know where Willis was at this moment, either,
whether he heard the conversation… or whether anyone was
near him to also hear it.
We also still don’t know who that mysterious ‘third voice’
is/was who MUST have also known the GM intra-crew
frequency in order to be a part of that ( video recorded )
conversation.
So close… yet (still) so far.
Reply to WTKTT regarding the mysterious “third voice” on the radio:
Does anyone happen to recall how many radios the GM crew had with them that day? Am asking that question as I think I recall Mr. Powers saying, in a long ago previous post of his, that HS crews often used their radios to talk to one another even when they were actually loosely together in one location — but far enough apart so that using the radio beat having to shout at the person you wanted to speak with.
Reply to J. Stout post on Dec 8, 2013 at 9:07 pm
There was at least one active ‘squad’ that day
that broke off to do some ‘tying into the clear
black’ work, as documented in the SAIR… so
that makes 3 radios up on the ridge for sure
and one other BK with Brendan.
The YCSO police investigation report records
that all radios recovered from the deployment
site were entered into evidence, each with
their own evidence number… but neglected to
say how MANY there were.
However… calvin has also pointed out that at
no time in any of the MacKenzie photos or
videos circa 4:02, when we overhear parts
of the ‘discussing their options’ conversation,
can we account for more then 9 or 10
GM Hotshots there at that exact location.
If they were ALL there at that time ( except for
Marsh who we know was ‘floating around’
farther north )… then they must have all been
standing BEHIND Christopher MacKenzie.
So… is it possible that even at that moment
captured in the MacKenzie photos/videos that
they were NOT ‘all there’ and there was still
some other segment of GM apart from that
site… and maybe that “You bet” we hear is
coming from whoever had that other radio
programmed with the GM intra-crew frequency?
You betcha. It’s still possible.
I just wish that there was someone who would
step forward and identify that ‘third voice’ we
can clearly hear on the MacKenzie video.
Whoever says “You bet” there… says it VERY
loud and clearly… even though it was ‘over the
radio’ with modulation.
RTS, I agree with your commentary except I still see a conflict in the way things are reported to have played out.
Let’s assume for a minute that certain probable occurances actually happened, ie;
(1) The conversation between GM and Marsh occured on the private GM crew channel, which as suggested by many, would have been overheard only by one, and MAYBE two, other radios.
(2) For the conversation between Frisby and Marsh to be over-heard by Musser, it would of have to have been made either on Div Tac or Command channels. I think you would agree that there was no way Marsh and Frisby would have been discussing this on the command channel at this point in time and under these circumstances. So that leaves Musser to have overheard them on Div Tac.
The conflict I’m seeing is that according to the ADOSH report, Frisby documented in his unit log that Marsh used the terminology ‘escape route’ during their conversation and then immediately following that, ADOSH reports that “Musser overheard the radio transmission, but didn’t recall the exact words”.
In your commentary above you relate that ‘Musser was very clear that he did NOT say Escape Route.’
I’m not sure where that particular statement came from. But, in relating that statement in regards to overhearing what Marsh and Frisby had said, it certainly conflicts with the ADOSH report of Musser overhearing their conversation, but not recalling the exact words, If he couldn’t recall the exact words, how could he be ABSOLUTELY sure that the terminology ‘escape route’ wasn’t used?
Regardless, he overheard that they were on the move, and he had absolutely no idea of their location, routing, or destination, at that moment, or at the time of deployment.
Reply to TTWARE post on December 9, 2013 at 9:16 am
Good point(s).
If I were an ‘investigator’… I would have turned the lamps
up a little at that point and said…
“Let me get this straight, Mr. Musser. You are telling us
that you can’t recall what was said… but you are
absolutely certain what was NOT said? I’m afraid
you’re going to be here a little longer. We need you
to help us understand this.”
There are also some SERIOUS discrepancies between
the SAIR and the ADOSH in the way they both describe
this exact same ‘moment in time’ and who said what
and/or who ‘believed’ what. See a longer post about
this down below that I plan to put up shortly.
Ya I’m back—-Intercrew freq. is the crews freq. only each crew has one. If there is more than 1 HS crew on a FS forest then they may have the same freq. and can talk to each other. Marsh had a DIV freq. that he talked on w/ ops.,other div., . since the crews were from other locations they did not have same freq.. either Marsh’s radio was programed for the fire freq. or he got a radio from the briefing. I am assuming air guard was part of the crew radio freq. One of the 16. Simple answer BR could not talk to GM on inter crew freq. Glad to be back.
Reply to Bob Powers
post on December 8, 2013 at 3:37 pm
Thank you, Mr. Powers.
So do you think it’s safe to say ( with the known evidence from
Brendan that he had to ‘hand his radio’ to BR Supt just so he
could tell them he’d just picked Brendan up ) that Blue Ridge
most probably would NOT have ‘overheard’ this infamous
‘discussion their option’ and ‘comfort level’ discussion
between Steed and Marsh circa 1600 ( 4:00 PM )?
Brian Frisby ( BR Supt ) had already spent a half-hour that
morning meeting face-to-face with Marsh/Steed up by the
anchor point where GM was working… but that doesn’t
automatically mean Marsh/Steed would have ‘given’
Brian Frisby their ‘intra-crew’ radio frequency number, right?
The freq. have to be changed by a radio teck. with special equipment. I believe Brendan gave the radio to Frisby while he was loading equip, from what I read earlier. With no radio traffic on that freq. it was easy to communicate. Unless Brendan was close to BR they would not have heard the exchange between Marsh and Steed.
These days on the BK radios, it’s relatively easy to punch-in new frequencies, or make corrections on the fly, and I’ve done many.
But my understanding of the intra-crew freq, is that each crew wants to have the ability to talk amongst themselves with absolute privacy, and this is a freq number they probably would not give out, even to another crew.
It’s probable that Marsh and Steed were talking intra-crew, so no one but their crew heard that conversation, BUT with Musser overhearing the conversation between Marsh and Frisby, they would have had to be talking on a Divison Tac, either A or Z.
It’s possible that Frisby and Marsh were talking on that channel with Brendon’s radio, but the ort
Please disregard that last sentence.
Like I’ve said before Willis had there freq. other locals might was Musser a local or possibly with Willis?
That’s the other thing that is now
important to know. WHERE was
Willis (physically) at various times
during the day.
In one of the Globe Type 2 team
videos on YouTube… Willis is
CLEARLY heard on the radio having
a discussion with a guy named
‘Moser’ ( NOT Musser ) about whether
he had ‘checked on the ranch’ yet.
Willis is referring to the multi-million
dollar Double Bar A Ranch at the
end of Hays Ranch Road… just
south of Peeples Valley.
That means Willis was NOT with
‘Moser’… and he was also NOT
at the Double Bar A Ranch itself.
So where was he?
I believe there is a good chance here
that Willis was pretty much
physically WITH Paul Musser most
of the day.
It might even have been Willis who
just turned to Musser and said…
“Why don’t you call out to GM and
see if they can spare some
resources”.
If Willis was physically with Musser
during that request ( now documented
in ADOSH ), then Willis would have
also heard the answer.
Marsh/Steed said “NO… we are
committed to the black… why
don’t you try Blue Ridge”.
If Willis heard Marsh say that…
I wonder if Willis might have
had a ‘second opinion’… and
then got someplace away from
Musser and took out his cell phone?
It’s still possible.
I think we are still being fed by two reports just what they want us to know and no more. Especially the first report, I think we have pretty much came to that conclusion.
WTKTT: In various comments made to the media immediately after the tragedy, Willis references his cell phone being used by him during the time period of the burn-over. I am *not* suggesting Willis gave a secret order or “suggestion” to anyone to go down through the green, but I believe the 54 SAIR investigators should have looked at everyone’s cell phone records, just to get an accurate understanding of who was communicating with whom , when, and how.
**
** THIS IS A CONTINUATION OF AN ONGOING DISCUSSION
Just a quick note to anyone reading these comments here.
This is actually just a ‘continuation’ of an ongoing discussion that began
in the ‘comments’ section of Mr. Dougherty’s previous article entitled…
Yarnell Hill Fire Investigation (SAIR) Ignored Major Mistakes by the State
…which is at this URL…
http://www.investigativemedia.com/yarnell-hill-fire-investigation-ignored-major-mistakes-by-the-state/
There are literally HUNDREDS of comments, discussions and discoveries
revealed on that previous thread which reached its limit around the first
week of December… and then continued HERE.
The previous discussion is, essentially, the Pre-ADOSH release chapter
which focused mainly on the Arizona State Forestry Commission’s
Special Accident Investigation Report ( The SAIR ) which was released
on September 28, 2013.
This ‘new’ chapter of the discussion picks up where the previous chapter
left off and now includes BOTH the SAIR and the newly released
ADOSH investigation report.
Yes I have been following but couldn’t comment it has been some good discussion. and we have some more to work with.
Checking to see if I am still in cyber space
Hello, Mr. Powers.
Yes… you seem to still be ‘on the air’.
I hope you and yours had a good Thanksgiving holiday.
Reply to TTWARE regarding Musser hearing the radio transmission but not recalling the exact words:
Saw where that was stated the narrative and have been meaning to ask: This means he had to be listening to GM’s crew frequency right?
J. Stout, It could have been on GM crew freq, BR crew freq, DIV A freq, or even DIV Z freq. All of those frequencies would have been available to them, but more than likely the frequency of the person initially being called, ie, if BR was calling DIV A, he would have hailed him on DIV A freq, and vice versa.
This is another one of those things that is known by several other people who were listening, but who have chosen not to say for whatever reasons.
That hits on two things I’ve been wondering about.
1) in Brendan McDonough’s public video interview he said
that when Brian Frisby ( BR Supt ) picked him up at the
old grader after he had to bail from his lookout position…
Brendan says he “handed his radio to BR Supt so he
could tell his cap and sup ( Steed and Marsh ) that
he was now with them, etc. etc.”
Does that mean BR was having ‘trouble’ with tone
guards that day and could NOT talk directly with
Marsh/Steed on the GM (private) intra-crew frequency,
and that’s why Brendan had to “hand him his radio”?
2) Related to question above. There’s been a lot of
confusion from day one about WHICH frequencies
all these reported radio conversations were
ACTUALLY taking place on. People seem to be
using the ‘inter-crew’ and ‘intra-crew’ frequency
descriptions as if they are one and the same?
Is that really the case?
I would think that ‘intra-crew’ ( intra meaning internal )
would refer to that frequency that is ONLY known
to the members of ONE crew… so they can all talk
privately with each other.
I would think that ‘inter-crew’ ( inter meaning between )
would refer to ANOTHER frequency that ALL the
Hotshot crews use to hear each OTHER.
Are there really these TWO different frequencies
available when on a fire job site… or just the ONE
which is alternately referred to as both the ‘inter’
and the ‘intra’ crew frequency?
The SAIR itself seems to ‘freely mix’ these two terms
and it’s very confusing.
Checking to see if I am on here haven’t been able to respond for 5 days
Mr. Powers… it seems the previous discussion actually exceeded
the software limits for ‘commenting’ on one particular article.
Mr. Dougherty has requested we ‘continue’ the discussion here
on this article’s thread. It’s a good logical break. That makes
the previous discussion the Pre-ADOSH chapter and this
thread can be the Post-ADOSH continuation which can
include both the SAIR and the ADOSH.
NOTE: The comment below was posted in the series of on-going Yarnell Hill commentary at the same time that Investigative Media was posting a request to move that comment forum here due to web issues, so I have re-posted it here.
There have been a few tid-bits revealed in the ADOSH report that had up until then, never seen the ‘public’ light of day. One thing you all may have noticed, but I don’t think I have seen mentioned here yet, is that OPS1 Musser actually stated in his interview that he knew that GM was on the move during the critical time leading up to entrapment.
ADOSH inspection narrative, page 19, 1601 hrs, just after the description of the Marsh and Steed conversation captured on video:
“Following this conversation, GMIHC and Marsh decided to move from their position. According to BRIHC unit logs, Eric (Marsh) says, “I copy fire is progressed to the buggies, also going to make our way through out escape route”. Brian (Frisby) asks, ‘Are you in good black?” Eric says “picking our way through the black to the rd in the bottom out towards the ranch.” Brian thinks he meant toward the two-track. To confirm Brian says, “the rd we came on w/ the ranger……affirm.”
AND NOW THIS:
“Musser heard the radio transmission, but didn’t recall the exact words. Abel and Musser reportedly were not aware of the location of Marsh’s reported predetermined route.
So at the moment ASM asked for a time-out and OPS1 said GM was safe in the black, OPS1 actually knew they had been on the move, and DIDN’T know their location, routing or their destination.
This bit of information has led me to something that has been starring me in the face for along time, but that I couldn’t see.
This fire had two Operation Section Chiefs operating at the same time. Granted, one was SUPPOSED to be a ‘Planning Ops’ and one was supposed to be a ‘Field Ops’, but during the day they were BOTH giving direction to, and making requests of the field troops. It is obvious from the various reports, that often the right hand didn’t know what the left hand was doing. This must have created additional confusion to field supervisors in trying to recognize who their real OPS Supervisor was.
I’m sure that OPS was structured this way because there was yet no Planning Section Chief on the fire and they wanted to try and address that need, but PSCs don’t get on the radio and direct or make requests of the troops in the field. As might be apparent by the lack of planning evident in the reports, the planning aspect seemed to get neglected as both OPS evolved into a ‘field’ capacity.
Perhaps if there had truly been only one OPS on the radio that day for ‘his’ subordinates to report to, the confusion level would have come down enough to have saved some lives. Just speculating………….;….
Reply to TTTWARE
post on December 8, 2013 at 10:33 am
TTWARE… Good points, all!
I also don’t think there’s any question that this is where the
‘missing’ Safety Officer ( who was SUPPOSED to be on
duty at this time ) would have come into play.
I would imagine that ANY traffic about people way out in
the boondock saying they are now ‘moving’… when the
fire is blowing up like a bomb… would have been something
he would be required to be ‘all over’.
If the Safety Officer had been on duty… I could imagine that
confusing exchange between Marsh and Frisby would/should
have immediately been followed with him breaking in
the radio saying…
“DIVS A / Granite Mountain… this is SFO1… please explain.
Last transmit confusing. EXACTLY where are you NOW,
EXACTLY where are you GOING… and EXACTLY HOW
do you plan on getting there? Come back. Over.”
I can imagine any OPSx saying “They’re big boys. They’re
supposed to know what they are doing.”…
…but what other job would a Safety Officer have that would
be more important than to make sure hot, tired men aren’t
making a ‘bad decision’ and a ‘bad move’ at a ‘bad time’?
Would love to know who exactlly owned some of those indefensible structures. Think I might know who one was.